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Beyond *Trustpolitik*
on the Korean Peninsula

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**Executive Summary**

East Asia Institute (EAI) launched the North Korea Policy research team in order to offer policy ideas that include countermeasures for Pyongyang's recent strategic line, seeking “simultaneous development of the economy and nuclear weapons capability.” Based on their expertise in security, economics, and international relations, the research team, including EAI chairman Young-Sun Ha, suggests that Seoul should form a complex “deterrence-engagement-trust” strategy to prompt Pyongyang’s evolution from the current self-contradictory strategic line into a new line, line 2.0, toward the path of security without nuclear weapons in tandem with economic development.

**Research Question**

What measures are required in order to allow inter-Korean relations to evolve from its current vicious cycle of crisis-negotiations-agreement-infringement to irreversible and sustainable peace?

**Aim and Purpose**

This study suggests a new policy towards Pyongyang that prompts a shift from Deterrence Phase (quadrant III) to Trust Phase (quadrant I) of the graph below, and contributes to the establishment of a peaceful order on the Korean peninsula as well as in East Asia. In order to do so, the research team suggests that South Korea should pursue a complex strategy that simultaneously pursues all measures of deterrence, engagement, and trust-building.

![Graph] War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula
Four Principles

1. **[Enhancing Deterrence]** Proactively deter and defend against North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and local provocations. South Korea needs to conduct a Korean version of “Deterrence and Defense Posture Review” (DDPR) and secure comprehensive capabilities including Kill-Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, U.S. extended deterrence, and interoperability of wartime operational control (OPCON), alongside peace system arrangements on the Korean peninsula.

2. **[Changing North Korea]** Facilitate and promote North Korea’s evolution toward a more reform-oriented, two-track strategic line 2.0 which pursues economic development and security without nuclear weapons. Considering the rigid sanctions of the international non-proliferation regime toward nuclear weapons development, it is unrealistic to simultaneously carry out substantial economic development alongside nuclear weapons development. However, sending the message that the current two-track strategic line is doomed to fail is not conducive in encouraging Pyongyang’s evolution toward strategic line 2.0, as that will only be perceived by the North as a possible path toward regime collapse. Meticulous efforts are needed in order to persuade political elites in Pyongyang to consider an alternative two-track strategic line of seeking security without nuclear weapons and economic development by convincing them of the dilemmas caused by the current two-track strategic line, which is based on exaggerated security threats of hostile U.S. policy toward North Korea. A future vision of a Korean peninsula corroborated by concrete plans including an East Asian peace system is required in this regard.

3. **[Promoting International Cooperation]** International co-evolutionary efforts initiated by South Korea are essential to support Pyongyang’s evolution. North Korea’s new two-track approach of security without nuclear weapons and economic prosperity should co-evolve with the East Asia Peace and Prosperity Initiative. The current Park Geun-hye administration’s “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative” grounded on functionalism will struggle in East Asia where juvenescent, nationalism-triggered strife is fierce. It may end up only as wishful thinking to expect cooperation in softer and non-military issues to trickle down into security cooperation in East Asia. Furthermore, limiting the scope to Northeast Asia is also marginal. The peace and cooperation initiative should include multi-level, complex networks: harmonious developments of the existing Korea-U.S.-Japan network and the rising Korea-China network in Northeast Asia; as well as collaborative networks with relevant countries and international institutions in East Asia and beyond. Simultaneously, the initiative is required to include not only traditional security and economic issues but also emerging issues of the environment and culture, as well as that of information/knowledge and governance. Under this East Asia Peace and Prosperity Initiative in the long-run, South Korea should help North Korea co-evolve toward a two-track strategic line version 3.0: non-nuclear weapons security and economy-first politics.
4. [Building Trust] Initiate complex trust building processes which includes all phases of deterrence, engagement, and trust. The Park Geun-hye administration’s “Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula” proposes a step-by-step trust-building process to solve the North Korea problem. It addresses Pyongyang’s humanitarian issues first and attempts advanced economic aid/cooperation when North Korea responds to South Korea’s initial efforts. The current status on the peninsula, however, is not placed on quadrant I of main negotiation but is transitioning from quadrant III of crisis to quadrant IV of transformation, to quadrant I of peace. In this regard, a new North Korea policy is not feasible if its measures are confined to specific phases and certain issue areas. Trust-building on the peninsula should pursue a complex manner which encompasses a mitigation of mistrust on quadrant III of crisis; accumulate credit for trust-building on quadrant IV of transformation; and full-fledged trust-building on quadrant I of negotiation.

Complex Strategy of Deterrence, Engagement, and Trust

Deterrence Measures

*Goal*

1. Effectively deterring North Korea’s provocations and nuclear weapons threat.
2. Convincing North Korea of the futility of nuclear weapons development and confirming the infeasibility of granting North Korea nuclear power status.
3. Making Pyongyang understand the intention of South Korea and the international community, which does not pursue a regime collapse, rather, is seeking an establishment of non-nuclear weapons security and economy-first politics in North Korea.

*Tasks*

1. **Enhancing military deterrence**: South Korea should increase its military readiness posture against North Korean provocations and attack; consequently encourage North Korea to abandon tactics of localized provocations as well as to evolve to a security without nuclear weapons system. As Pyongyang poses myriad forms of military threats, Seoul needs to strengthen its readiness posture related to the most feasible threats and prioritize the most vulnerable areas as outlined below;
   1) **Local provocation**: i. pursue proactive deterrence; ii. enhance Korea-U.S. combined readiness posture toward North Korea’s local provocation
   2) **Long-range artillery and missile threats to the capital area of South Korea**: i. develop middle-range land-to-air ballistic missiles, ii. establish KAMD
   3) **Nuclear weapons**: i. enhance credibility of U.S. extended deterrence capability on the peninsula, ii. decide whether to be incorporated into U.S. missile defense system
2. **Maintaining economic sanctions**: Seoul needs to continue to participate in United Nations (UN)-centered international economic sanctions against North Korea; and make efforts to enhance the effectiveness of economic sanctions along with increasing military readiness and sending signals to Pyongyang, as imposing sanctions alone will not directly compel North Korea to decide on denuclearization.

3. **Signaling**: South Korea should deliver a dual message to Pyongyang – i) principled position of South Korea and the international community with regards to the North Korean problem; ii) South Korea's intention of coexistence with North Korea and Seoul's long-term vision for the peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula.
   1) *Highlight the futility of nuclear weapons development*: North Korea's nuclear weapons program expedites the advancement of ROK-U.S. and Korea-U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation, which not only has detrimental effects on North Korea's national security but also exacerbates Pyongyang's strategic position by aggravating China's concerns over increasing U.S. presence in the region.
   2) *Confirm the infeasibility of granting North Korea nuclear power status*: Under the situation that both the United States and China have agreed on the overall objective of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, North Korea's expectation to be granted nuclear power status is completely infeasible.
   3) *Explain that South Korea's deterrence capability is defensive in nature*: Seoul is required to persistently convey the message to Pyongyang, Beijing, and the international community that South Korean military reinforcement is based on a defensive strategy that aims at countering military threats from North Korea.
   4) *Increase the incentive of engagement*: Deterrence measures become more effective when they are combined with incentives for change. Provide a concrete roadmap for engagement and the trust process, and thus persuasively explain to Pyongyang that Seoul also pursues an irreversible path for change in a “tying hands” manner that contributes to mutual benefits in inter-Korean relations.

4. **Securing support from the domestic realm**: It is necessary to win public support from domestic politics through elucidating the function of deterrence measures as to prevent inter-Korean conflict; in order to encourage mutual engagement and trust building on the Korean peninsula.

**Engagement Measures**

**Goal**

1. Developing an irreversible denuclearization process in Pyongyang.
2. Establishing a new strategic line of carrying out economic construction and building a security
without nuclear weapons system.

3. Building a South Korea-led international regime for economic assistance to North Korea and revitalizing the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation program.

Task

1. Pursuing vigilant diplomacy towards Washington and Beijing for the resumption of negotiations for North Korea denuclearization: Admittedly, it is a substantial diplomatic asset for Seoul that Washington and Beijing agree on the final goal of denuclearizing North Korea. However, while South Korea sticks to the rigid principles of Trustpolitik, that the two Koreas should reciprocate authentic words and deeds, the United States and China could examine the utility of negotiations with North Korea based on their strategic calculation and pursue it through various channels. South Korea should pay close attention to diplomatic warfare centering on the Korean peninsula among the parties involved.

2. Synchronizing the sequence of development in inter-Korean relations with the level of progress in the North Korean denuclearization process: Pyongyang seeks to secure high ground for the future strategic environment that is favorable for North Korea by manipulating the issues of inter-Korean relations. As those projects relate to the amount of cash flows to Pyongyang, issues of resuming Mount Kumgang tourism and lifting the May 24th Measures cannot be dealt with without considering the degree of international sanctions imposed against North Korea. South Korea’s engagement measures should be conducted based on a policy roadmap that takes into account the linkage of inter-Korean issues and the denuclearization process of North Korea.

3. Supporting economic development in North Korea and designing a blueprint for inter-Korean economic cooperation

   1) Economic and humanitarian assistance: i) identifying items for humanitarian assistance that could directly reach vulnerable groups in North Korea; ii) pursuing direct aid via government to government channels as well as indirect aid through NGOs and international organizations, meanwhile demand North Korea improve its monitoring system; iii) establishing transparent criteria for granting approval to private organizations’ assistance programs in North Korea; iv) preparing an international regime for economic assistance to North Korea

   2) Economic Cooperation: South Korea needs to come up with more creative projects that goes beyond projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism → i) conducting an inter-Korean economic cooperation track that follows Pyongyang’s economic development policies; ii) focusing on “internalization” rather than “internationalization” of the Kaesong Complex; iii) pursuing a package project that links interrelated projects and creates a synergy effect; iv) inventing multilateral projects that could encourage the participation of China and Russia
**Trust-Building Measures**

**Goal**

1. Establishing a sustainable peace system on the Korean peninsula that the international community guarantees.
2. Building a mutual development system that does not pose a security threat to each other.
3. Promoting a virtuous cycle of development on the Korean peninsula as well as peace and cooperation in East Asia.
4. Shaping the peaceful unification of the two Koreas and preparing a joint plan for the unification process.

**Task**

1. Establishing and maintaining a complex peace system on the Korean peninsula: Seoul should work out an arrangement that assures mutual economic development of the two Koreas supported by international society, and promotes strategic trust between them during or after the process of peace system building on the Korean peninsula.

2. Designing a mid- and long-term plan for the post peace regime: The two Koreas need to overcome old confrontation and rivalry and construct a trust-based relationship that collaboratively designs the future of the Korean peninsula. The issue of unification will emerge as a crucial task during the process of designing the future. South Korea should propose its version of unification with a concrete plan for successful negotiations.

3. Pursuing effective diplomacy among parties directly involved: A trust-based relationship between Seoul and Pyongyang would satisfy basic interests of neighboring great powers that have sought peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Afterwards, however, those countries will compete over the strategic role of a unified Korea in East Asia. Dynamics between Washington and Beijing will become decisive during this phase. If the great powers were to fall into rivalry and confrontation, a newly unified Korea would have to make a tremendously difficult choice. Diplomatic efforts and the strategic direction of East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative would be of critical significance to Seoul.
Authors

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