CRISIS ROOMS

Towards a global network?

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Foreword

In EU jargon, 'crisis management' has come to be identified with two main types of operational intervention. First, with what is now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, previously ESDP), consisting of civilian missions and military operations undertaken by the EU outside its borders and considered as an integral part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since 1999, when it was first launched, this crisis management policy has gradually broadened in range and scope, now encompassing a wider set of actors and activities than originally intended or imagined.

Second, the term 'crisis management' now also includes the use of the Instrument for Stability (created in 2006) and the launch of crisis response schemes in the fields of peacebuilding, security sector reform, support to governance, trans-regional threats, emerging or acute crisis situations, CBRN risk mitigation, and pre/post-crisis capacity building. These types of intervention – however distinct at the source and separate in terms of procedures – have become increasingly intertwined in tackling concrete emergencies.

Furthermore, crises have become more complex in the way they originate, unfold and are handled: alongside more conventional sources of conflict and instability, such phenomena as terrorism (especially since 9/11 and the bomb attacks in Madrid and London in 2004-05) or natural and man-made disasters now need to be factored into the equation. Indeed, humanitarian aid and disaster response (HADR) has slowly but surely crept into the traditional portfolio of military and civilian 'crisis managers' – in the EU as well as elsewhere in the world. Moreover, the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the eurozone crisis of 2010-11 have added yet another dimension to the notion and practice of EU/global 'crisis management'.

In parallel, the meaning of 'security' itself has undergone major changes, from the 'cooperative security' that characterised the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order, to the concept of 'human security' set out in the UNDP's milestone 1994 Human Development Report, which focused on individuals above and beyond states and paved the way for the UN principle of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P). The concept of security has also evolved from the notion of 'functional' security (more centred on preserving our systems and their critical functions) to that of 'societal' se-

curity (more explicitly focused on individuals) – although both notions emphasise the usefulness of public-private cooperation.

The European Union, for its part, has gradually developed many elements of a comprehensive, across-the-board toolbox for 'crisis management' at large, linking its internal dimension and its external projection. A cross-border regulatory regime *par excellence*, the EU has also put in place specific means and mechanisms to act across geographical borders and functional boundaries. Be it in the sphere of animal health or consumer safety, environmental standards, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, civil protection or peacebuilding – the Union is now a security actor in its own right, both within Europe and beyond.

As is the case with many current conflicts, disasters, diseases and disruptions rarely respect natural, political or administrative boundaries. Oil or chemical spills, radioactive or volcanic clouds, river floods or forest fires, natural or virtual viruses – not to mention challenges associated with migration, piracy or cyber threats – are all highly mobile and impervious to territorial boundaries. The task of preventing and mitigating the effects of these phenomena cannot therefore be confined to a single nation or continent – let alone a single set of policies.

This is the rationale that underpinned the International Conference organised last December by the European External Action Service.[1] More than 300 experts and officials from across Europe and the world convened in the EU capital to discuss ways of communicating and cooperating more closely (and more efficiently) in managing and responding to 'crises'. In particular, discussions centred on crisis 'rooms': secluded high-tech locations where huge TV monitors and computer screens collect and process data, imagery and information from the outside world in real time, and convey their findings to decision-makers 24/7. By virtue of its institutional links, analytical expertise and pioneering interest in these areas,[2] the EUISS was actively involved in the conference from the outset.

With this initiative, coordinated by the EUISS and the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate of the EEAS, the EU continues the tradition of jointly organised conferences and publications devoted to contemporary issues in the field of European Crisis Management response. This book is the fruit of that collaboration and brings together key elements from the Conference. The first section sets out the political

1. *Towards a Global Network of Crisis Rooms – High Level Conference on Managing Complex International Crises*, 3-4 December 2013, Albert Hall, Brussels.

2. See Antonio Missiroli (ed.), 'Disasters, diseases, disruptions: A new D-drive for the EU,' *Chaillot Paper* no. 83, EUISS, September 2005.

and conceptual background; the second one – based on the speeches delivered during the Conference – comprises various perspectives from leading regional and international organisations; in the third section, the EUISS Senior Analysts offer their synthesis of and perspective on discussions that took place in four round tables; finally, the fourth section includes additional elements of analysis and reflection prepared by independent scholars and analysts. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the opinion or position of the European External Action Service.

We strongly hope that this publication – just like the Conference itself – will represent a major stepping stone as well as a springboard for the ongoing efforts of crisis responders worldwide to establish their own 'security community'.

Agostino Miozzo
Antonio Missiroli
April 2014

Setting the stage

The role of the European External Action Service in a global network of crisis rooms

Catherine Ashton

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The number of serious international crises is growing and their complexity is having a severe impact across the world, from Syria to the Philippines, the Central African Republic and the events in Thailand. Responding to crises has to be high on the agenda of all those who have responsibility for foreign and security policy at any given moment.

The earthquake in Haiti in 2010 probably provides one of the best demonstrations of the successful bringing together of all the different people who need to engage in response to any form of crisis: from NGOs providing education, water, food or tents through to the military who were rebuilding schools and moving earth and rubble. It was an extraordinary undertaking. In those circumstances I met one of the key actors in this effort, Agostino Miozzo, who was then working for the Italian Civil Protection Agency.

This and many other similar experiences have been translated into the architecture of the External Action Service (EEAS). It is a work in progress which, *inter alia*, has led to the creation of the Directorate of Crisis Response and Operational Coordination.

It is clear that in an interconnected world there is no major crisis anywhere that does not have repercussions everywhere, and certainly there is no crisis that does not affect the European Union and its worldwide network of political and economic partnerships. The EU has a stake in international trade and security and its citizens are active all over the world at any given moment; consequently its procedures and structures must be able to react and respond to crises in the fastest, most efficient and most joined-up way possible. It is also clear that the EU is only part of the answer to the challenges that are posed by any international crisis. Handling a complex situation will always require the efforts of the international community at large, and entail working in close partnership, pooling means and coordination.

It is therefore vital to consider exactly how to increase coordination and effectiveness in crisis response and how to network, partner and pool resources more efficiently. Most of the work already done by the EEAS on tackling its response to crises has been done in partnership with others. International cooperation has gone from strength to strength, from the inauguration of the League of Arab States' crisis room to discussions with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the possibility of establishing a regional centre of information sharing and early warning systems, supporting them in setting up their Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management and the creation of an EU Cooperation Office in the ASEAN Secretariat. The highly professional staff of the EU-Myanmar Task Force are also working effectively

together and making progress in creating a state-of-the-art Crisis Response Centre in Myanmar.

Given the challenges we face today – climate change, terrorism, extremism, the natural and created crises of the twenty-first century – there is no question that these must be tackled through cooperation with partners. The fundamental principle established in the European Union in crisis response is that this work must always be done in partnership with others.

Reaction time can be of vital importance when dealing with a crisis, and questions that need to be addressed are: how can existing early warning capabilities be improved? How can political and operational reactions be best coordinated? How can access to the best information be optimised? How can that information be shared more effectively across organisations throughout the world?

It is also worthwhile reflecting on how to develop a structure that will make it possible to learn from the best practices implemented by all stakeholders, thus making the best use of the experiences of each – experiences that are too often locked in an institution or sometimes even in a handful of individuals. It is necessary to find better and smarter ways of sharing best practice and knowledge so as to be able to respond more quickly and more effectively, and to be able to benefit from the complementary qualities of civilian staff and diplomats and military strategists, putting them together in such a way as to make the best possible use of and mutually reinforce their individual competencies.

The crisis in Haiti also provides a good illustration of the multiplicity of tasks undertaken, for example, by the military, such as providing hospital shifts, surgeons able to operate in difficult conditions, machinery to move earth and rubble, as well as the use of naval resources to move around the island when the roads were impassable for many days after the earthquake.

It is essential to look across the spectrum in the face of any crisis, not to underestimate the importance of humanitarian aid and to recognise the value of support precisely for what it is, irrespective of political and military circumstances, and for all stakeholders to work alongside each other in a coordinated way.

The idea of building a global network of crisis rooms is one that is certainly worth exploring, in order to find ways to link these different centres through state-of-the-art technologies, pool expertise and strengths, and mutually reinforce early warning and crisis management capabilities.

Efforts should be directed towards greater convergence of long-term strategies to ensure that the different ways in which we operate across the world each plays its part in contributing to long-term security and prosperity in any country or region. Crisis management and humanitarian aid, while undeniably of immense importance, cannot substitute for strategic vision on long-term action, as too often they can deal only with the symptoms of crises. However, it is necessary to think strategically about how to deal with the causes of crises. Therefore, defining that vision, focusing on crisis prevention, mobilising different strengths and capacities and working in partnership are the key principles underpinning policy in dealing with conflicts and crises.

This is sometimes referred to as the *comprehensive approach*. It simply means bringing together all of the different policies, or instruments, for a common purpose, which is to endeavour to tackle issues and problems before they evolve into a crisis that can so easily devour resources and create havoc and chaos for so many people across the world. Such an approach is built on the conviction that in order to be effective we need to join forces and pool assets – those of the External Action Service, the Commission and EU member states, complemented by strong partnerships across the world.

Towards a global network of crisis rooms

David Nyheim

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INTRODUCTION

One of the challenges for crisis rooms around the world is to define functional cooperation mechanisms that set the stage for more joined-up management of complex international crises. The argument for a network of crisis rooms rests on five critical assumptions:

- Major emergencies and complex crises have multiple dimensions (political, security, environmental, humanitarian, etc.) and require coordinated, integrated and multi-level responses
- A good grasp of the drivers behind a crisis, possible scenarios, and a feed of operational information is required to define response options at different levels
- Situation centres or crisis rooms within states and international organisations provide the evidence base of crisis decision-making, a key contribution to stabilisation at a global level
- Inter-connected and strengthened crisis rooms will enhance the global crisis response architecture and our joint capacity to deal effectively with major emergencies and complex crises
- Cooperation between situation centres and crisis rooms among states and international organisations is needed, possible and politically sanctioned.

This chapter provides a short context analysis that explores these critical assumptions in more depth and provides a framework for a tiered cooperation process.

BALANCE SHEET: CRISIS/OPPORTUNITY AND AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS

Complex crises are like 'wicked problems': they are difficult or almost impossible to deal with as they are often made of nested or interdependent issues, fast evolving variables, or require highly interdisciplinary competencies. They are either man-made or nature driven. Similarly, there are opportunities and windows for change related to existing foreign policy challenges, which emerge and are like complex crises in their characteristics and what is required to seize them.

There are several typologies of crises. A useful theoretical model is proposed by Stephan Gundel, who classifies crises according to how predictable and influenceable they are.

He lists four types of crises: those that are 'conventional', 'unexpected', 'intractable' and 'fundamental'. 'Conventional crises' are predictable and influenceable, while 'unexpected crises' are difficult to predict but can be influenced when they occur. 'Intractable crises' can be anticipated, but are difficult or impossible to do anything about or prepare for. 'Fundamental crises' are the most dangerous type of crises as they cannot be predicted or influenced. A typology of crises and opportunities illustrates the span of issues dealt with by many crisis rooms and is given in Figure 1 (see further explanation and examples in Box 1). It shows how the threat and opportunity picture covered by many crisis rooms involves man-made and natural emergencies, multiple dimensions (political, security, military, environmental, consular, humanitarian, civil protection, energy, transport or public health dimensions), and can be sudden, ongoing or slow-onset.

FIGURE 1. TYPOLOGY OF CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY



Newly emerged threats

There are several newly emerged threats that today form part of the crisis picture globally. These include transnational organised crime, criminalised conflict, extremism and terrorism, and climate change.

Transnational organised crime spans a range of activities, including trafficking in drugs, firearms and people. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC), 'the vast sums of money involved can compromise legitimate economies and directly impact public processes by "buying" elections through corruption. It yields high profits for its culprits and results in high risks for individuals who fall victim to it'.[1] Today transnational organised crime is a global threat with macro-economic proportions. Illicit goods are sourced from one continent, trafficked across another and marketed in a third. It permeates government institutions, fuels corruption and undermines economic and social development. It adapts as relationships between criminal networks become more flexible and sophisticated.

BOX 1. CRISIS EXAMPLES

Sudden or rapid crises/opportunities and slow-onset/developing crises/opportunities may become ongoing crises/opportunities.

Proximity and location-specific crises and opportunities have a limited geographic scope, although their impacts may be felt beyond where they happen.

Examples of these in a sudden or rapid crisis/opportunities context are the In Amenas attack in Algeria (2013) (crisis), the Nairobi mall attack in Kenya (2013) (crisis), or the democratic transition in Burma/Myanmar (2011-) (opportunity).

Cross-border and regional crises/opportunities spill across borders and have regional dynamics.

Examples of these in an ongoing crisis/opportunities context include the current conflict in Mali/Northern Nigeria (crisis) and agreement on Syrian chemical weapons and ongoing decommissioning (opportunity).

Global crises/opportunities are events that have world-wide or cross-regional ramifications.

Examples of these in a slow-onset/developing crisis/opportunities context relate to climate change, global terrorism (crisis), and post-2008 financial crisis reforms to the financial sector (opportunity).

A key milestone in research into greed-driven or criminalised conflicts was the publication by the World Bank of 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War' in 2001. In the report, Collier and Hoeffler argued that the traditional view that 'grievance begets conflict, which begets grievance, which begets further conflict' (a view out of which many early warning systems have been conceived), and that interventions need to reduce the level of grievance, has significant limitations. They proposed that opportunities for predation are the key causes of conflict and 'the grievances this generates induce diasporas to finance further conflict'. Later work (e.g. Murshed and Tadjoeddin[2]), has nuanced this picture and argues that greed and grievance

1. See UNODC, 'Digest of Organised Crime Cases', 2012, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/EnglishDigest_Final301012_30102012.pdf.

2. Mansoob Murshed and Mohammad Tadjoeddin , 'Reappraising the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict', Microcon Research Working Paper 2, September 2007.

drivers of violence often co-exist and reinforce each other, but where the political economy of violence perpetuates and entrenches conflict. Beyond such criminalised conflicts are situations of significant criminalised violence – termed by the OECD Development and Assistance Committee (DAC) as 'armed violence' situations; armed violence is defined as 'the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death, or psychosocial harm which undermines development'[3] and is characterised by the widespread availability of small arms (see Table 1 for an overview of countries affected by criminalised conflict and armed violence).

Much of the debate on extremism and terrorism is linked to what is currently seen in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and Palestine – as well as the 'war on terror'. If we use Large's (2005)[4] understanding of terrorism – a political, ideological or religious act that is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of acute fear and despair – and look at situations where terrorist acts (e.g. mass atrocities, symbolic killings, such as public beheadings, etc.) are part of the tactics, the list of countries (see Table 2) affected by extremism and terrorism expands significantly.

TABLE 1. SELECTED COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY CRIMINALISED CONFLICT AND ARMED VIOLENCE

Africa	Asia	Europe	Central/Latin America and Caribbean	North Africa/ Middle East
Sudan, Somalia, DR Congo, Mali, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Uganda, CAR, Chad	Afghanistan, India (Naxalite), Yemen, Uzbekistan, Thailand (South), Pakistan	Russia (North Caucasus), Georgia (Abkhazia)	Colombia, Ecuador (NBZ), Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Jamaica, Honduras, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago	Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine

3. See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/48913388.pdf.

4. Judith Large, 'Democracy and Terrorism: The Impact of the Anti', paper presented at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Club de Madrid, Madrid, 8-11 March 2005. Available at http://summit.clubmadrid.org/contribute/democracy-and-terrorism-the-impact-of-the-anti.html.

TABLE 2: SELECTED COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

Africa	Asia	Europe	Central/Latin America and Caribbean	North Africa/ Middle East
Sudan, Somalia, DR Congo, Mali, Nigeria (North), Mauritania	Afghanistan, India (Naxalite and Kashmir), Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Thailand (South), Pakistan, Indonesia	Russia (North Caucasus)	Colombia	Yemen, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria

Source: Adapted from David Nyheim, 'The Global Balance Sheet: Emerging Security Threats and Multilateral Response Capabilities', paper presented at The Stanley Foundation's Strategy for Peace Conference, Airlie House Conference Centre (15-17 October 2009).

There is now broad agreement that climate changes are happening and that these will be felt increasingly in a variety of ways. However, although the broad impacts can be forecast, our understanding of likely sub-regional impacts is limited – particularly in developing countries where data reliability is poor and data collection on climate change is not systematic. Rough projections indicate that many (developing and developed) countries are likely to experience drops in food production, increased temperatures, erosion and desertification, sea-level rises affecting crops and fishing, as well as extreme weather events.

A report by the High Representative and European Commission to the European Council[5] in March 2008 on climate change impacts on conflict identified seven areas of concern:

1. Conflict over resources such as water, food and fish stocks
2. Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure, including decreases of up to 20% of global GDP per year, damage to coastal areas that are home to about one fifth of the world's population, and damage to infrastructure supporting mega-cities, such as port facilities and oil refineries
3. Loss of territory and border disputes following receding coastlines and submergence of large areas

5. European Commission, 'Climate Change and International Security', paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S113/08, Brussels, March 2008. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EN_clim_change_low.pdf.

4. Environmentally induced migration, particularly of populations that already suffer from poor health conditions, unemployment or social exclusion
5. Situations of fragility and radicalisation in weak or failing states by overstretching already limited capacities of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face
6. Tension over energy supply from intensified competition over access to and control over energy resources
7. Pressure on international governance from the impacts of climate mitigation policies (or policy failures) that may drive political tension nationally and internationally.

The above threats have several implications for situation centres/crisis rooms:

- The distinct characteristics of newly emerged threats may require a broadening of information collection sources and methods of collection
- Analytical methods – whether for problem analysis or forecasting – require adjustments. Grievance-premised analytical methods, common in early warning systems, may be inadequate
- The client base may need to be expanded for some situation centres/crisis rooms – as different threats speak to a broader and perhaps different set of responders
- Addressing threat causes and dynamics may require the deployment of existing response instruments in new ways and the use of an expanded set of instruments
- The impact of climate change, in particular, means that the scope of coverage of many crisis rooms may have to extend to new countries and regions (e.g. OECD countries).

Early warning and early response instruments

The OECD study 'Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response' (2009)[6] draws several conclusions on existing global and regional warning and response instruments. Specifically, the report notes:

6. See: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264059818-en.

- Capacities to respond to situations of violent conflict and state fragility have evolved significantly since the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in the Balkans (1990s). Mandates of international organisations and their response mechanisms have been strengthened, along with available funding. There is today a broader range of operational crisis response tools and mechanisms.
- There is a better understanding of what is required for an effective response. Key elements are: (a) a robust understanding of ground and political dynamics; (b) time invested in planning and strategy; (c) an integrated and diverse package of response measures; and (d) speed, ownership and coordination.
- However, a greater number of early warning and response mechanisms/instruments have not translated into significantly better responses. The warning and response link is weak and weakened further by poor quality early warning, immature response mechanisms/instruments, along with a range of personal, institutional and political shortcomings that affect decision-making.

Borrowing from the typology of the OECD study, several generations of crisis rooms/early warning systems can be outlined. They differ in their mandates, organisational set-up, information sources and analysis methods, and links to decision-making and response. These differences, in turn, determine the need, interest, ability and scope of each to cooperate with other crisis rooms/early warning systems.

A 2011 review of conflict risk reduction, crisis prevention and conflict mitigation capabilities in international organisations[7] echoes the findings of the OECD study (2009). It calls for a push to enhance the global architecture for preventive action, where institutions, regimes, operating procedures and capacities in crisis information collection, analysis and response are linked and strengthened.

7. Paul Stares and Micah Zenko, 'Partners in Preventive Action: The United States and International Organisations' (2011), available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Intl_Preventive_Action_CSR62.pdf.

TABLE 3. GENERATIONS OF CRISIS ROOMS

	Mandate	Organisational set-up	Information sources/Analytical methods	Link to decision-making and response
First Generation *Often exclusive focus on providing internal client with crisis information/ analysis*	· Crisis prediction · Evidence for decision-making	· Centralised/HQ-based · Information management team Analysts · Information/ analysis infra-structure	· Mixed (open, grey, black) sources · Quantitative and qualitative methods	· Internal client base · Warning and analytical products
Second Generation *Broader set of internal and affiliated clients that require crisis information/ analysis + options for response that speak to specific response instruments*	· Crisis prediction · Evidence for decision-making · Priority-setting inputs	· Centralised/ HQ-based + field networks · Information management team Analysts · Information/ analysis infrastructure	· Mixed (open, grey, black) sources · Quantitative and qualitative methods · GIS applications	· Internal + external client base · Warning and analytical products · Watch-list products · Provision of response options · Operational link to response instruments
Third Generation *Internal and external clients that are drawn into crisis response strategy formulation + micro-level response role for information network*	· Crisis prediction · Evidence for decision-making · Priority-setting inputs · Active support of response	· HQ team + strong field units · Combined information and response teams · Analysts · Information/ analysis infrastructure	· Open sources · Quantitative and qualitative methods · GIS applications	· Internal and external client base · Warning and analytical products · Facilitation of response strategies · Field-level responses

ENHANCE, SHARE, COOPERATE: TOWARDS A GLOBAL NETWORK?

There are four topics that need to be addressed in the context of managing complex international crises: (a) enhancing early warning and preparedness; (b) information sharing and communication; (c) strengthening civil-military cooperation; and (d) how to build a global network.

Enhancing early warning and preparedness

Conflict early warning is today undergoing significant and appropriate scrutiny. Critics point to inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events and inadequate links of operational responses to early warning.[8] Indeed, the open-source nature of many early warning systems means that whereas they can provide valuable strategic and operational insight, at a tactical level they cannot capture information about the plans (the 'strategic surprise element') of conflicting parties that determine when and where violence breaks out. Some argue that good analysis of conflict boils down to simple personal judgement and that the 'bells and whistles' (graphs, indicator lists, local information networks, etc.) of some early warning systems add little value. Proponents of conflict early warning say that it helps decision-makers and other stakeholders to anticipate developments and understand the nature and dynamics of different situations.[9] In its contemporary form, conflict early warning contributes to the evidence base of conflict management and prevention decision-making. Beyond that, a good early warning system (along with its information sources and analytical tools) helps anticipate trends in violent conflict situations. Those systems that have strong links to response provide options for conflict management and prevention, forums for joint problem definition, joined-up response planning among different actors and local responses to escalating situations.

An early warning system involves regular and organised collection and analysis of information on violent conflict situations. It delivers a set of early warning products (based on qualitative and/or quantitative conflict analysis methods) that are linked to response instruments or mechanisms. Early warning systems exist now within governments, multilateral agencies and NGOs. They play different roles, ranging from giving alerts and catalysing response to bolstering the evidence base of decision-making and serving

8. Anna Matveeva, 'Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas', *GPAC* Issue Paper no. 1, September 2006.

9. Hélène Lavoix, 'Etude sur l'Alerte Précoce', Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, 2007.

as response mechanisms themselves. There is a consensus on what constitutes a 'good' early warning system and this good practice has been operationalised in initiatives such as FAST (now closed down), CEWARN, and the ECOWAS Early Warning System to mention just a few (see Box 2). There are also serious questions about the quality of analysis produced by many early warning systems: do they cover the real issues? Is the analytical depth sufficient for decision-making? The answer to these questions is probably 'partially'. The need to bolster analytical rigour remains – along with enabling situational awareness among decision-makers. Situational awareness is knowing what is going on (as the situation unfolds) so you can do something about it. Early warning reports support situational awareness among decision-makers by providing situation assessments (background reports, current situation analysis, scenarios and forecasting) and updating these on a regular basis.

BOX 2. GOOD PRACTICE IN OPERATIONAL CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

Early warning is a process that (a) alerts decision-makers to the potential outbreak, escalation, and resurgence of crisis; and (b) promotes an understanding among decision-makers of the nature and impacts of the crisis. Crisis or emergency preparedness is a state of readiness to respond to a disaster, crisis or any other type of emergency situation.

A 'good' early warning system is one that:

- Is based 'close to the ground' or has strong field-based networks of monitors
- Uses multiple sources of information and both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods
- Capitalises on appropriate communication and information technology
- Provides regular reports and updates on conflict dynamics to key national and international stakeholders
- Has a strong link to responders or response mechanisms.

In terms of quantitative and qualitative analytical methods, significant advances have been made. Quantitative methods have strong predictive capabilities, particularly in relation to political crisis and instability. State fragility indices provide easily graspable watch-lists and help agencies working on these issues to prioritise focus countries. Qualitative methods provide rich context analysis, as well as ways to plan programmatic responses and assess the impact of these responses on violent conflicts. More recent qualitative methods for state fragility analysis provide useful planning frameworks for programmatic responses. Numerous weaknesses persist, nonetheless. Analytical tools fundamentally over-simplify complex and fluid violent conflicts and situations of state fragility. They provide simple snap-shots that are quickly outdated and the quality of analysis often suffers from data deficits.

Three questions emerge from the above:

- On what topics (system design, information collection, analysis, links to response) can sharing experiences enhance the performance of individual early warning systems/crisis rooms?
- What are examples of good practice cooperation between early warning systems/crisis rooms? What has made such cooperation successful?
- Will closer cooperation between crisis rooms/early warning systems help bolster the global crisis management architecture?

Information sharing/communication

As the reach of communication technologies has increased, so has the quantity of data generated. As explained in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) ground-breaking report on 'Humanitarianism in the Network Age' (2013), it has become so large that the data exhaust (passively generated data from transactions or devices, such as GPS data from active mobile phones) has to be stored and analysed in large parallel systems. There is also a vast quantity of online sources (Twitter, YouTube, etc.) and mobile phone applications that can enable improved situational awareness. Making such 'big data' useful to – and tapping better into online and mobile sources in – complex crisis management are the great challenges and opportunities of the network age.

In addition, broad, quick and timely international cooperation to support national or international needs assessments, project identification and planning in post-disaster and post-conflict situations is key to effective crisis response. There are several preconditions for such cooperation, particularly between crisis rooms. Some of these preconditions are about information sharing, communication and infrastructure. Speed and a constant state of readiness depend on specific IT resources (notably videoconferencing, sharing mechanisms and access to open sources), human skills, and trust in and between crisis rooms.

Big data provides a critical source of data from often data-scarce crisis-affected areas. However, the challenge is to understand how to use the new range of available data sources and transform this data into useful information. Beyond such operational use of big data, there is an emerging tactical dimension, where the act of sharing information becomes a response. The logic is simple and cues for early warning systems/crisis

rooms can be taken from the humanitarian and peacebuilding fields. As explained in 'Humanitarianism in the Network Age' (2013, p. 3),

> 'People from all walks of life are using modern communications technologies to help each other. Just as private companies are interacting more effectively with their customers, humanitarian agencies have an opportunity to get closer to the people they assist. The spread of mobile phones, the growth of the Internet and the rise of digital social media are enabling people to reach out to each other across previously impenetrable divides. For example, in February 2012, citizens from across crisis-wrecked Somalia communicated via SMS with high-ranking Government officials who had gathered at a summit in London to determine their future'.

What is within reach, therefore, is both of operational and tactical value; it is a model where for some crises, people determine their own priorities and communicate them to those who can assist. In terms of online and mobile sources for crisis data, Ushaidi and similar organisations are using these effectively. An exchange between trailblazing non-governmental initiatives and the crisis rooms of governments and international organisations on using such technology for crisis analysis can be beneficial.

Much of the thinking around crisis information sharing is centred on challenges associated with different organisational information-sharing approaches. The mandates and legal bases of crisis rooms and early warning systems is a key determinant here, as is the policy decision of whether (and what kind of) information should be shared, how and under what terms. If a policy decision to share is made, then information sharing protocols become important. They define the reasons why information sharing is required, how it supports the functions of the partnership, spell out the principles that govern the sharing, and set the foundation for partners to agree to share the required information.

Three key questions are:

- What opportunities exist to make shared use of 'big data' and web/mobile applications across crisis rooms and in their information collection and analysis processes?
- What are the opportunities, challenges and prerequisites for information sharing between crisis rooms?
- Is there a political appetite among decision-makers to make information sharing between crisis rooms a more frequent practice?

Strengthening civil-military cooperation

The UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines civil-military cooperation as the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organisations, development organisations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives.

In his 2012 article on the role of civil-military cooperation in complex crises, Kasselman charts the origins of contemporary civil-military cooperation, 'as a military capability and as a theoretical idea', back to the 1990s and NATO in the Balkans. The main objective was 'the creation of a military tool for analysis and action that would integrate the "civil dimension" in an effort to meet the challenges posed by unclear confrontation patterns between opposing forces, changing geographical conditions, political and ethnic considerations, and domestic and international factors'.[10] Today, civil-military cooperation is a key element in peacekeeping and peace operations. There are differing interpretations as to what the term means. A common theme, however, is that it refers to concepts and mechanisms for interaction between military and civilian elements deployed in the field, particularly those from the humanitarian and development communities.[11]

Shared platforms for communication and information between military and civilian organisations in crisis settings are seen as key to reduce duplication and strengthen the basis for crisis decision-making. However, practice shows that military units do not like to share information with international and non-governmental organisations, and vice versa. Despite occasional information sharing, the practice has not been sufficiently institutionalised. NATO's recent Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (2013), however, places significant emphasis on information collection, analysis, dissemination and sharing as critical to anticipate and prevent or contain violent conflict. It also stresses the importance of information sharing in generating a shared problem understanding; and a shared problem understanding as the cornerstone of a comprehensive response to complex crises.

10. See: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=159127.
11. See: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO%20Civil-Military%20Coordination%20Policy.pdf.

Three key questions are:

- How can crisis rooms contribute to better civil-military information sharing in complex crises?
- What role should crisis rooms play in fostering a shared problem understanding and in the development of comprehensive responses to complex crises?
- How can 'operation rooms' (military) and 'crisis rooms' (civilian) cooperate effectively?

Building a global network?

The range of crises covered by crisis rooms in governments and international organisations affirms the assumption that they are complex, multifaceted and require comprehensive responses. Seizing windows of opportunity to stabilise or consolidate peace is similarly difficult. What is also clear is that the capability to understand, let alone address these types of crises and newly emerged threats is uneven across organisations and still weak in most crisis-prone regions.

Understanding the causes, drivers and dynamics of complex crises is recognised today as a prerequisite for effective response. Although significant strides have been made, there remain numerous challenges in information collection and sharing, as well as in available analytical methods. Advances in technology offer important operational (with big data and dedicated web/mobile platforms) and tactical opportunities. The role of crisis rooms within states and international organisations is set to become more important. However, with increased importance, demands are likely to become greater.

An important element of a strategy to strengthen the global crisis response architecture includes a network of strengthened and inter-connected crisis rooms. Efforts to make these connections are happening at a regional level (e.g. AU CEWS linkages to ECOWAS, CEWARN, etc.) and through direct cooperation (e.g. EEAS and LAS, AU, ASEAN) and capacity building. Cooperating on consular matters too is happening, but is still limited. Key challenges in this work include the different mandates and disparate capabilities of crisis rooms, and sometimes the absence of a policy decision to connect to others. The ability to join a network meaningfully and participate in network activities that add immediate value is not a given. And whereas cooperation between crisis rooms may be both needed and possible, it needs a policy decision to happen along with sustained political support.

Furthermore, creating a global network of crisis rooms needs to be part of a broader strategy to bolster the global crisis-response architecture. Another critical element of this architecture are the crisis-response instruments and mechanisms (such as the Instrument for Stability, etc.) managed by governments and inter-governmental organisations. The link between crisis rooms and response instruments remains, in many cases, weak. The onus is still on crisis rooms to provide the evidence base for response instruments, as opposed to being on response instruments to ensure that measures taken are evidence-based.

Four key questions thus emerge:

- What are the obvious areas (training, methodology, consular issues, information sharing, etc.) where collaboration between crisis rooms would add value to each?
- What are the drivers and obstacles to making such collaboration happen?
- What are the policy options for collaboration if a policy decision is made to link a crisis room to others?
- How do inter-connected and strengthened crisis rooms fit within a broader strategy to bolster the global crisis-response architecture?

AN EMERGING FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION?

There are several strategic arguments in support of developing a global network of crisis rooms. These arguments rest on a belief that the assumptions outlined in the introduction of this chapter are valid. At the same time, there are a range of obstacles to making such a network plausible and operational in a way that strengthens the global crisis-response architecture. Obstacles range from the different mandates, set-up, information sources used, capacities and willingness to cooperate with others, to mention a few.

Lessons from elsewhere show that networks that are founded on and support a community of practice are most effective. A further lesson from other networks is that the appetite and willingness to cooperate in different ways needs to be accommodated. A tiered cooperation approach for a network of willing crisis rooms should therefore be considered. A framework for a tier-based system with levels of cooperation and value-added spaces for participating crisis rooms is given in Figure 2. Critical for the development of such a network – and for its sustainability – is its governance and accountability

mechanisms, both of which should be subject to a feasibility study that considers the challenges and opportunities outlined here.

FIGURE 2. A TIERED COOPERATION APPROACH



Rooms with different views

The European External Action Service and complex crises

3

Pierre Vimont

Crisis management, especially management of complex political crises, is one of the core tasks of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Key to the work of the EEAS is the so-called 'comprehensive approach', whereby it strives to bring together the various strands of expertise available within the EU institutions and member states to achieve the best possible results. This concept is highly relevant in the area of crisis management, where we are faced with increasingly complex crises that have political, economic, military, diplomatic, security, consular and humanitarian dimensions.

Since the creation of the EEAS, a number of steps have been taken to ensure greater coherence in crisis prevention and crisis management. The creation of the Department for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination was the first such step. The co-location of civilian and military personnel (Duty Officers and Watchkeepers) in the EU Situation Room (SITROOM) was another important step and provides a good example of civilian-military cooperation. It also generated considerable savings, since this joining of forces enabled the Situation Room to be operational on a 24/7 basis, while using fewer resources.

When a major crisis breaks out beyond the EU's borders, all the competent services in the EEAS and other EU institutions are regularly convened, within the framework of the Crisis Platform or the Crisis Management Board, to exchange the latest information and draw operational conclusions which are promptly translated into action on the ground. Both the Crisis Platform and the Crisis Management Board are important innovations in the administrative organisation of the EEAS and represent considerable progress, especially given the increasing number of complex, multidimensional crises which require the pooling of expertise and resources.

The distribution of non-classified early warning information products has also gradually been extended to other EU institutions and member states, as well as to international and regional organisations with whom the EEAS closely cooperates. This is indeed a first step towards a common understanding of a crisis and its underlying factors, which should lead in the longer term to greater cooperation in designing solutions in the area of crisis prevention and crisis management.

Crisis centres around the world have a special role to play to help all players involved understand the realities of the crises they are confronted with in their regions. Thus the progress in cooperation in the area of crisis management with various regional organisations, such as the League of Arab States (LAS), the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), countries like Myanmar and, last but not least, the Organization of American States (OAS), is particularly welcome. Obviously

one of the first prerequisites for cooperation is familiarity. Good, personal communication coupled with state-of-the-art technology is critical for preparedness, to mitigate confusion and achieve a speedy response.

Communication and trust are the preconditions for sharing as much information as possible on *weak risk signals*, i.e. those events that do not necessarily occupy the front pages of major newspapers, but indicate emerging trends, and anticipate possible developments in a given country or region. The EEAS is a young institution and it has a lot to learn from the experiences, good or bad, of other older organisations or states.

The practice of global crisis management

4

Agostino Miozzo

The Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is the focal point for the EU's management of complex crises originating outside the European Union, such as conflicts, political violence and catastrophic events, and which require many parts of the EU system to intervene (political and diplomatic actors, humanitarian, security, military, etc.). It is also the main EEAS player in the field of situational awareness, alert management and anticipative early warning. The department is composed of three divisions: the EU Situation Room, the Consular Division, and the Planning and Operations Division. To facilitate the management of complex crises within the EU, a 'crisis platform' has been created within the department, under the authority of the High Representative (HR), which provides an infrastructure for cooperation in crisis management, oriented towards fostering unity of effort and generating the so-called comprehensive approach.

GLOBAL NETWORK OF CRISIS ROOMS

Having previously gathered all the EU crisis-related administrations to debate the specificities of the European operational context, it is now time to move forward, globally, and create an even greater regime of cooperation between crisis responders in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas and Asia. Indeed, one may wonder why such a formal network does not already exist. One reason for this might be that in many public administrations the 'culture' of crisis management has not yet developed or has not yet reached maturity. However, the absence of the *right culture* cannot on its own explain why such a global network does not yet exist. Furthermore, the security environment clearly suggests that a global network is clearly something worth striving for. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) reports that in 2012 there were *357 natural disasters* around the world. The Heidelberg Institute for Conflict Studies indicates that globally there are *208 political conflicts* characterised by intense violence.

In all likelihood, there is a basic or an operational reason for the lack of regular, structured working arrangements at a global level. In the quest for an effective global crisis response network, the following areas and questions need to be considered:

- Early warning: How is it done in Europe and elsewhere? Why does it not live up to expectations? What can be done pragmatically, in a truly multilateral dimension, to foster a common capacity to anticipate the crises ahead?
- Information sharing: What information can be collected? How and under which conditions can it be shared between international organisations and partners?

- The 'comprehensive approach': What is the interplay between the military and civilians in crisis response and what has changed in the past decade in this field?

CRISIS MANAGER: A SUPERHERO

Cooperating globally in the field of crisis response sounds like the job description of a superhero. In 1976, Susan George wrote a definition of the ideal profile of a crisis manager, which sounds like a description of someone with supernatural powers: 'First they must take graduate degrees in social anthropology, geography, economics, a dozen orc so difficult and unrelated languages, medicine and business administration. Second, they must demonstrate competence in agronomy, hydrology, practical nursing, accounting, psychology, automotive mechanics and civil engineering'.[1] It is hard to find people like that, and it is hard to become a performing crisis manager in a short space of time.

Every crisis is different from the previous one, and each one has something in common with a previous event:

- The Haiyan Super Typhoon of 2013 shocked the world with its exceptionally deadly violence (over 5,600 fatalities; a level 5 event); in 2008 category 4 Cyclone Nargis (which made landfall in Myanmar) caused some 138,000 fatalities; and in 1998 Hurricane Mitch, another level 5 event, left 2.7 million people homeless in Central America.
- The Tohoku Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011 caused 15,883 fatalities (less than the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami which killed 230,000 people), but in Fukushima it caused the second level 7 nuclear accident in history after Chernobyl.
- The world of conflicts offers even more similarities and disparities: according to the very accurate Conflict Barometer (published by the Heidelberg Institute for Conflict Studies), there are 208 violent conflicts in the world, including 18 wars (level 5, i.e. Syria), 25 level 4 conflicts (i.e. in the Central African Republic - CAR) and 165 level 3 conflicts (i.e. the situation with the Maras in El Salvador or the drug cartels in Guatemala).

1. Susan George, *Ill fares the land: essays on food, hunger and power* (London: Penguin, 1990).

It is difficult to become an expert in this profession. It takes time and every event provides another lesson to learn. It is a constant learning process, where lessons come in the shape of 'formative shocks'. All of those involved must dare to be creative, make proposals, create new bridges and imagine new, previously unthinkable solutions.

TOWARDS A GLOBAL DEFINITION OF CRISIS?

Adequate early warning is difficult if there is uncertainty over the object of the warning. It is therefore important to look closely at definitions. Both academics and the international community of crisis responders still have trouble defining the term 'crisis'. The words 'threat', 'urgency' and 'uncertainty' are useful when it comes to defining a crisis, but they are not enough to qualify it fully.

Firstly, what set of elements creates a 'complex crisis'? What is *the* most important factor when it comes to identifying a *major* crisis: the number of fatalities, the presence of a military dimension, a threat to the notion of democracy, proximity to Europe or maybe the impact on our citizens touring or living in the region concerned? What type of event obliges those standing watch in the EU Situation Room to wake up the crisis-response managers at 3 a.m.? Such theoretical uncertainties are an obstacle to a fully effective operational framework. When confronted with 208 simultaneous political conflicts (levels 3, 4 and 5 in the Heidelberg Scale), there is no instrument or *consensual model* by which to set priorities.

Secondly, when it comes to a response, the international community hesitates as to which tools to use, with the result that the *comprehensive approach* fails. In respect of *costs*, there is no guide as to how to invest taxpayers' money in crisis response in a sensible manner. What is the 'right' amount of financial costs for operations or projects: 100 million or 5 million? Is this too much or too little, with regard to what exactly? In terms of *impact*, when is it possible to say – exactly – that a crisis response has been successful? With refugees it is relatively straightforward, but in a situation such as that in CAR or Syria or Libya, when can the response be considered to be a 'mission accomplished'?

INFORMATION BOTTLENECKS

Detecting *evidence* of future crises is an obvious prerequisite for warning. But collected information must pass through various 'bottlenecks' before it can activate 'early action'. The first bottleneck is at the field level. Information must raise questions at theatre or

tactical level. This implies that there is motivation and attention among those who are 'standing watch': *does that motivation really exist?* Secondly, information can be detected in a fragmented way at various levels of an organisation; the quality of the internal organisation of bureaucracies is therefore key to the right information reaching the right decision-making levels. In addition, information must be selected in an effective way: organisations need to have adequate technological means to filter major data sets. *Do they have the tools to manage this type of filtering?* The information must then be analysed: adequate training must be made available to reduce the impact of analysts' cognitive bias. Finally, the information must be passed to the higher levels of bureaucracy to be compared with other data and other sources and to be turned into decisions**:** at this level there needs to be a genuine interest in action, informed political opinion, and a dose of audacity. There are many bottlenecks that hamper the process of moving from early warning to early action. Black swans and strategic surprises cannot be avoided, but it is precisely because we can predict that we will be taken by surprise, that it is important to invest in resilience.

COMPLEX CRISES

Complex crises cannot be dealt with in a simplistic manner and often go beyond the range of capability of any single nation. They require complex responses, or a comprehensive approach, and rely on interventions by an interconnected network of players. Complex crises, indeed all crises, require cooperation. No one can afford to refuse help. But help and cooperation can come in different forms: sometimes it can be lifesaving, but at other times it can create obstacles in the midst of a crisis.

Hence the need to create the first *global inventory* of 24-hour situation centres or crisis rooms operating in the EU member states, strategic partner states and international organisations (which are becoming increasingly relevant as stabilising forces on a global scale). It is also imperative for international players to sit down together in order to identify a scale of cooperation opportunities ranging from the minimum – what is easily achievable – to the maximum – the ideal scenario –, and to choose the most pragmatic set of ideas to reinforce cooperation. For instance, joint training and the establishment of basic communication routines (e.g. videoconferencing) among different actors would be a minimum but realistic level of cooperation. As in many other fields of human experience, time is of the essence in early warning. Speed is acquired through training and retraining players and by integrating the following key functions into an organisation's *circle of competencies*: active information sourcing, quick detection of information, active sharing, inclusive project and operation management, etc.

In conclusion, the notion of *speed* needs to be embedded in cooperation, as do ways of reducing uncertainties. This can be achieved through fostering multilateral cooperation, increasing the frequency of contacts or investing in advanced analytical training and the most up-to-date information technologies. At the same time, uncertainties can be reduced through working together on intervention models and impact analysis. Finally, extending the reach of action to other circles and different sets of actors implies less uncertainty and more speed.

The management of international crises: the Republic of Korea's contribution

Dong-ik Shin

5

Over the past decades the Republic of Korea (ROK) has made a substantial contribution to addressing international crises, including through cooperation with the European Union. Korea's relations with the EU are reaching new heights across the board. Indeed, 2013 marked the 50th anniversary of Korea-EU relations, and, since the signing of the Strategic Partnership in 2010, Korea and the EU have been strengthening cooperation, not only on bilateral issues but also in promoting international security and prosperity. In the future, Korea hopes to work more closely with the EU in the area of security, and crisis management in particular. The EU has played a leading role in managing crises around the world through conflict prevention, peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

EU RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Korea greatly values the contributions of the EU, and particularly the High Representative, in reaching an agreement on the initial measures to address Iran's nuclear programme, a situation which has the potential to become a serious crisis. Although the agreement is only a first step, it represents tangible and meaningful progress. It will bring a halt to Iran's nuclear activities by limiting uranium enrichment to a certain level and 'neutralising' the uranium that has already been enriched. It also lays the groundwork for a comprehensive solution dealing with the threat of Iran's nuclear programme. The agreement needs to be faithfully implemented and a comprehensive solution to the question of Iran's nuclear weapons programme needs to be found in due time. In that respect, the EU's continuing engagement with the E3+3 partners is very much welcomed.

With regard to security, Korea-EU cooperation in the area of crisis management is going from strength to strength, thanks largely to the EU-led maritime security capacity-building mission in the Horn of Africa – EUCAP Nestor – to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. The Korean navy has been actively participating in efforts to fight piracy in the region. Aside from providing financial assistance to EUCAP Nestor and the Djibouti Regional Training Centre, Korea is also reviewing the possibility of dispatching maritime police instructors to the mission.

Furthermore, Korea and the EU *Framework Participation Agreement on Crisis Management Operations* is to be signed in 2014. Korea will thus be the first Asian country to have concluded three major agreements with the EU covering politics (a Framework Agreement), economics (a Free Trade Agreement) and security (an agreement on crisis

management).This agreement should be the bedrock for the further development of Korea-EU relations into a genuine global partnership.

Korea and the EU are expanding the scope of cooperation to cybersecurity issues. Cyber threats increasingly pose a serious challenge to international security and should therefore be addressed through international cooperation. With the strong support of the EU, Korea successfully held the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace in October 2013, raising global awareness of the urgent need to promote international cooperation in this area. In 2014, Korea and the EU will hold the first consultations on cybersecurity.

KOREA AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

As the international community becomes more interconnected, cooperation with all relevant actors is critical to resolve such complex and transnational global challenges as nuclear security, terrorism, natural disasters and climate change.

For Korea, there are four priorities in addressing international crises. First, it is important to mobilise resources and capacities across the globe to prevent and address crises effectively. Second, preventive diplomacy should be strengthened to ensure that crises do not happen in the first place. In this regard, it is important to introduce and strengthen early-warning mechanisms across the board, from disaster management to conflicts. Third, in order to be fully prepared to respond to crises, it is important to undertake training programmes and strengthen rapid coordination and cooperation with all stakeholders, domestically and internationally. And finally, it is important to assist developing countries to enhance their capacity to respond to crises.

Under the Administration of President Park Geun-hye, Korea is more than ever committed to promoting global prosperity, and accordingly designated *global happiness* as a major policy objective. Thanks to the international community's assistance, Korea has been able to rise from the ashes of war to become a fully-fledged democracy and donor country in the span of a generation. After joining the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010 as a middle power, Korea is now committed to similarly assisting developing countries.

As part of such efforts, the Korean government is pursuing preventive diplomacy in northeast Asia, where tensions have been on the rise. More specifically, Korea is pursuing a policy called *Trustpolitik* to promote reconciliation and cooperation in the region.

Trustpolitik is implemented through the Korean Peninsula Trust-Building Process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative.

In recognition of the fact that building trust is indispensable for cooperation, the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative aims to promote a culture of regional cooperation grounded in trust. It focuses on establishing habits of dialogue and cooperation starting with softer issues, such as climate change, natural disasters and nuclear security.

To address international crises in other regions, Korea has been participating in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) and reconstruction efforts and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, as well as stepping up humanitarian assistance. More specifically, Korea currently has 629 personnel working in 8 UN PKO missions, including UNMISS (South Sudan) and UNIFIL (Lebanon). To date, Korea has participated in 18 UN PKO missions, since it first dispatched personnel to Somalia in 1993.

Korea has also been actively engaged in post-conflict reconstruction efforts to secure peace and security in countries such as Afghanistan, where it set up a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Parwan province in 2010 and pursued projects in education, agricultural development and training the Afghan police. Korea's PRT premises were transferred to the Afghan authorities in 2012. Today, Korea runs a hospital and a vocational training centre, disbursing the $500 million committed in 2011.

Korea has also increased its humanitarian assistance to countries affected by natural disasters and conflicts, such as the Philippines, Mali and Syria. Most recently, to help the Philippines recover from the devastating typhoon that hit in November 2013, Korea provided $5 million in humanitarian assistance and $20 million in untied aid, and dispatched disaster relief teams to carry out relief and recovery operations, as well as army medics and engineers.

Since Asia is prone to devastating, large-scale natural disasters, collective action and rapid coordination by the international community is critical. In this context, Korea co-hosted the 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx) with Thailand in May 2013. ARF DiREx represents a paradigm shift in humanitarian assistance from a reactive response to more proactive management of natural disasters in the region.

1,600 disaster relief experts from 8 international organisations and 28 ARF member countries participated in the exercise. In a simulated large-scale disaster involving an

earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the civilian and military sectors of participating countries had to cooperate and coordinate to carry out relief activities promptly and effectively. The Exercise comprised three main components: a Table Top Exercise (TTX), a Field Training Exercise (FTX), and an After Action Review (AAR). In the Table Top Exercise (TTX), participants shared ideas and experiences on the operationalisation of existing frameworks and coordination mechanisms for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The Field Training Exercise (FTX) focused on seven scenarios: the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), rock-slide, collapse of structure, maritime rescue, medical relief, chemical leakage, and an air rescue operation. The After Action Review (AAR) focused on an overall assessment of lessons learnt and made appropriate recommendations.

The DiREx exercise contributed, first of all, to strengthening international cooperation in disaster response; second, to building the necessary capacity of participating countries to respond to disasters; and, third, to laying the groundwork for a rapid and effective disaster-response mechanism.

Indeed, as a direct result of the DiREx training exercise, countries in the region were able to cooperate and coordinate very effectively in responding to the crisis in the Philippines, reaffirming the great importance of these exercises. It is thus clear that carrying out such training exercises more periodically with a larger number of stakeholders would be extremely useful.

Crisis rooms in the Arab world

Haifa Abu Ghazaleh

6

Experience shows that emergencies and seemingly intractable conflicts of interest and culture are often entangled in longer-term crises – of identity, economy, solidarity and communication. Such broad, deep-rooted crises are often among the drivers of emergencies that seem much narrower in scope. Emergencies and unexpected crises, therefore, are often the first seismic tremors of wider shifts. However, while crises are often multidimensional and holistic, the instruments to address them are all too often one-dimensional and fragmented. The 'crisis-makers' – whether climate change or transnational criminal or terrorist networks – are usually globalised, but the crisis managers are not.

There are, of course, good reasons for the current imbalance of power between crisis makers and crisis managers. While nature is impersonal and pays no attention to people's lives, their stability, plans, values and aspirations, crisis managers must do so, even when trying to reform those aspects of economic and social life that drive climate change. A terrorist group needs no mandate or consensus, but crisis managers cannot succeed in the long term without winning broadly based mandates, consensus and public trust.

Crisis management is a complex task because it must strike a delicate balance. To rise to the challenges, there needs to be a significant degree of international coordination, which, among other things, implies standardisation of hardware, data and training. Crisis rooms must be able to speak a common language. However, given that crisis management often involves wide-ranging, sensitive issues – not least of culture and society –, the particularity of each region also needs to be taken into account when deciding upon appropriate mechanisms and structures of governance.

There are five particular challenges when it comes to the anticipation and management of crises in the contemporary Arab world.

First, the level of cooperation and coordination is uneven across the region. While it is customary to speak of '*the* Arab world', as though it is one, this is a misleading turn of phrase, as there is a wide internal diversity of politics, economy, culture and religious identities. This diversity extends to levels of political cooperation: for example, the long tradition of cooperation and coordination among the Gulf states is not to be found in North Africa, or certainly not to the same degree. With such diverse levels of general cooperation, more consistent levels of cooperation and coordination need to be built up and earned in the area of crisis management. The first steps in coordinating scenario analysis and crisis response must respect the region's variable geometry.

The second challenge concerns the paradox of markets. Progress in addressing conventional economic crises might disguise a more intractable or fundamental crisis. Markets are often described in terms that could make crisis managers envious: they have widespread sources of information, process stakeholder signals at local level and transmit signals quickly to decision-making centres. However, they do not seem able to react to crises in a timely manner. In the face of environmental degradation, for example, they encourage procrastination and the enjoyment of short-term economic opportunities at the expense of a long-term sustainable future, confident that in the long run a technological solution will be found. When the Arab uprisings began in late 2010, three of the countries where change reached the very top – Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – all had economies that were thriving, at least according to conventional economic indicators. Indeed, each economy was routinely praised in the international press. It is thus clear that in evaluating the implications of economic decisions, one cannot rely on conventional economic indicators alone.

The third challenge concerns crises of identity, which can sometimes enlarge the sense of general crisis for the social actors concerned. A conventional crisis of identity is prevalent in the Arab world, as it is elsewhere. One finds, for example, a range of radical and religious groups and activists who believe that any deviation from their vision of the world will lead society over the brink into corruption and catastrophe. The point is not whether they are right. The point is that, in practice, their sense of crisis tends to exacerbate the crises that need to be addressed.

The fourth challenge concerns another paradox: states that are the most immediately affected by an unexpected or intractable crisis often feel too swamped or unstable to see the building up of a crisis room as a manageable goal or top priority. It would partly seem to be a matter of reluctance to develop new institutionalised ways of working while struggling to address the consequences of social upheaval. There may also be a sense that the crises are well-known, given their pervasiveness and seriousness. Whatever the reasons – and it should be emphasised that many are understandable – they account for the paradox that, in a region currently under the stress of many critical upheavals, the case for crisis rooms often needs a strong advocate.

The fifth challenge concerns how to address and involve the perspectives of social groups that are often the outliers and the first to feel the brunt of a crisis. Women, youth and minority groups are obvious examples – for the Arab world as elsewhere. Tribal groups also need to be mentioned. They are not to be found everywhere in the Arab world but in some places they are salient, whether we are attempting to address politics or the

environmental degradation of geographical areas over which they consider they have special rights.

None of these challenges to crisis management is unique to the Arab world, but they do have a particular character in the region. What is also apparent is how long-term, well-known conventional crises are linked to more unexpected, intractable or fundamental crises.

These challenges raise a number of questions:

First, the crisis room at the headquarters of the League of Arab States (LAS) in Cairo has been set up relatively recently, thanks to cooperation with the European Union. The level of cooperation has been vital but is still at the preliminary phase; likewise, the mandate of the crisis room. A pan-Arab network is one of our ambitions, but a great deal of work still needs to be done. Therefore the question is: how is it best to proceed in a context of variable geometry? While the tempo of each organisation and member state must be respected, should universal gradualism be the aim? Should we not proceed to a higher level of engagement unless the earlier stage has been reached in all areas of cooperation? Since some areas, such as health, are amenable to advanced levels of cooperation before others, perhaps it would be sensible to pursue variable geometry thematically as well as geographically. If successful, such cooperation would serve to facilitate cooperation on other issues.

Second, what broader frameworks are needed for cooperation to take place? The need for common standards while respecting particularity suggests that multi-level networks, making use of existing institutions and international conventions, would be the best form of organisation. But is any further consolidation needed for better coordination to take place? What role can regional organisations play in this coordination? Some countries may see the advantages of belonging to a network of crisis rooms, but may feel that the time is not yet ripe for their public administration to host one. In such circumstances, can regional organisations serve a useful role as an incubator of national crisis rooms? It would be interesting to see what experience elsewhere suggests.

Finally, the successful development of crisis rooms depends on the ability of the general administration to make effective and routine use of analysis, which, notoriously, can take several years. What, on the basis of past experience, can be done to expedite this process?

One suggestion would be a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, it is important that training for all public servants and diplomats should involve some familiarisation with the functions and processes of crisis rooms; in the same way that the implications of the World Wide Web for public administration and diplomacy are now routinely taught.

On the other hand, it is important to build up 'communities of practice' for desk-to-desk personnel, for inter-regional as well as regional communities. Such communities would go beyond the sharing of data and analysis. They would also help foster insight into different organisational cultures and sensitivities. Such interpersonal knowledge, built up before a crisis arises, would permit effective teamwork to begin more quickly when a real crisis emerges. However, such communities of practice require a coordinating mechanism to take routine care of logistics, meetings and follow-ups. Which would be the best way to designate a coordinator and are there any existing institutions that can be designated?



The experience of the Organization of American States in crisis response

7

Albert R. Ramdin

There has been long-term cooperation between the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union, which became the first and only nonstate to be granted Permanent Observer status in the OAS in 1989 on an exceptional basis because of its unique legal and representative capacity at the international level.

The collaboration between the two organisations began with programmes aimed at combating drug-trafficking in the early years, and has blossomed to its current state with regular political dialogues, exchanges of information and cooperation projects covering a broad range of issues of common interest, such as the promotion and protection of human rights, strengthening public security, fostering equitable and sustainable development, peace and conflict resolution, electoral observation, and upholding the rule of law and democratic governance. It is important to highlight these areas of cooperation as they show how organisations such as the EU and the OAS can forge a common vision on issues that are relevant to managing international crises.

From the global financial crisis of 2008, the catastrophic natural disasters of the last decade, to the most recent typhoon in the Philippines, the international community has faced a variety of crises to which it has always attempted to respond in the most effective and timely manner. From generating the political will, leveraging the necessary resources and facilitating the requisite cooperation among governments, NGOs and donors, to mitigating the impacts and consequences of the crises, what is certain is that the magnitude of today's crises demands cooperation.

When a crisis strikes unexpectedly, we find ourselves in a race against time and, in most cases, under-resourced and in need of an ever greater number of people to deal with the enormous task of managing the effects of the crisis and rebuilding – and, in cases of political crises, reconciling and seeking peace between those most affected. The ability of the OAS to cooperate was tested in 2010 when the worst earthquake in decades struck the poorest country in the western hemisphere: Haiti.

For the first time, the OAS was able to establish a 24-hour situation room, with the collaboration of the international community. During this period, the situation room was able to track and monitor all emergency relief efforts and resources, both human and financial, offered by the many different countries and organisations assisting Haiti. This included not just what member states were contributing bilaterally, but also assistance from the World Bank, the United Nations, the inter-American institutions, OAS Permanent Observers and other international donors. The situation room acted as a coordinating mechanism and clearing house for information for OAS members, providing an opportunity for the OAS to demonstrate leadership both within the inter-American

system and internationally, in a situation of deep crisis and terrible human tragedy that was crying out for an urgent and coherent response.

Even during the ensuing difficult period of recovery and reconstruction, the OAS continued to work tirelessly to strengthen collaboration on the ground with its inter-American and international partners. While coordination was often challenging, the results proved that there are better prospects for success with sufficient political will, enhanced cooperation between like-minded organisations, and effective and clear lines of communication.

While natural disasters test our ability to cooperate and coordinate our response capacity in unimaginable ways, the world also faces many sources of crisis which originate from our complex and ever-changing world order, impacted by social unrest, unmet needs and continuous political conflicts around the world. Climate change, natural disasters and disease, poverty, inequity and socio-economic instability, transnational organised crime and terrorism: these are not only the concern of the larger and more powerful countries of the world, but are also of central interest to smaller states. Indeed, it is recognised by all that these threats today have no boundaries.

For many working in the international arena, it has been challenging to work collectively and cooperatively in a globalised environment, with many layers of stakeholders, institutions and government interests. We can clearly learn from each other's experiences and draw on each other's strengths, best practices and lessons learned. There is a large degree of wisdom in the assertion that in every crisis there is an opportunity for change and an opportunity to learn something new. A new architecture for improving and enhancing our response capacity in complex situations is a critical step forward. The complexity and multifaceted nature of both man-made and natural disasters and crises underscore the need for more integrated and coordinated responses on the part of regional and international organisations.

It has long been clear that regional organisations can and should play a crucial role in mediation, conflict prevention and crisis management. They serve as an effective 'first approach' for addressing serious situations of actual and potential confrontation. A deep understanding of a region and of the key stakeholders facilitates active participation in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts.

OAS RESPONSE MECHANISMS

The founding Charter of the OAS, the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other regional instruments call for a large degree of preventive diplomacy and crisis management. The OAS has a long history of working in conflict mitigation both between and within states, and has done so through the promotion of democratic practices, respect for human rights and the promotion of the rule of law.

It is important to recall that in the late 1980s and 1990s, the political, economic and social challenges that put democratic stability at risk in the Americas prompted OAS member states to search for a way to go beyond the Charter's principles and develop operational solutions to the challenges to democratic stability and reinforcement. This process was given new impetus in 1991 with the adoption of OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080 'Representative Democracy', which outlined the steps to be taken in the event of a sudden or an irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by a democratically-elected government. It provided an opportunity for the OAS Secretary General to convene an immediate meeting of the Permanent Council to examine the situation and call for an *ad hoc* meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or a special session of the General Assembly, within ten days, to look into the events collectively and adopt any decisions they deemed appropriate, in accordance with the OAS Charter and international law.

Between 1991 and 2000, we saw nine presidencies interrupted in the Americas, where presidents were unable to complete their constitutionally-established terms, and there was one attempt to destabilise a democratically elected government. Resolution 1080 was invoked in six of these cases: Haiti (1991); Peru (1992); Venezuela (1992); Guatemala (1993); Paraguay (1996); and Ecuador (1997). In a further effort to consolidate democracy in the region, the 34 member states of the OAS unanimously adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter during a special session of the General Assembly held in Lima, Peru, on the historic day of 11 September 2001.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter constituted a great stride in consolidating representative democracy in the Americas, since it goes far beyond the minimal concept of democracy, namely the holding of elections, to establish an inextricable link between democracy, human rights, integral development and combating poverty. It represents a commitment by OAS member states to strive to achieve these goals and, more importantly, it expands the existing regional mechanisms available to the OAS to respond to threats to constitutional order, preserve democratic systems and confront national and regional crises.

It should be noted that Latin America has struggled more with intrastate than with interstate conflict, although in recent years the OAS has also faced some specific cases of tensions between states. It is important to understand that when talking about mediation, crisis prevention and management, and about instruments that would enable international organisations to take action, the distinction between conflicts between states and within states is essential because the norms governing them and the possibilities for action are different in each case.

Conflict dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean differ from other regions, as there has been no armed conflict between states since 1995, and in the only ongoing internal conflict, in Colombia, there is a real chance of a peaceful solution for the first time in five decades. The OAS General Secretariat currently maintains two special peace missions on the ground: one in Colombia and one on the border between Belize and Guatemala.

The development of instruments such as Resolution 1080 and the InterAmerican Democratic Charter have allowed the OAS Secretary General and Permanent Council to visit member states to analyse situations that put institutional processes or the legitimate exercise of power at risk, and report back to the Permanent Council in order to adopt collective decisions to use diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to restore democratic order.

In the event that such diplomatic initiatives should fail, the General Assembly may decide to suspend a member state from its right to participate in the OAS, until the situation is resolved, as was the case of Honduras in 2009, following the *coup d'état* against the government of Honduras and the arbitrary detention and expulsion from the country of the constitutional president, Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, to cite only one example.

Between 2001 and 2013, six presidencies were interrupted and there were various political crises that had destabilising effects on the democracies of the region. Since its adoption in 2001 and its subsequent application, the Inter-American Democratic Charter has proven effective in preventing and resolving conflicts and political crises in the Americas by making the OAS a key actor in facilitating and negotiating peaceful solutions to critical political situations, such as in Venezuela (2002), Nicaragua (2005), Ecuador (2005 and 2010), Bolivia (2008), Honduras (2009) and Paraguay (2012).

The Inter-American System has been a pioneer in incorporating the requirement of representative democracy as a form of government in its member states, and the OAS

has been at the forefront of these efforts. It remains a visionary organisation, inasmuch as it remains the only major regional body that has the necessary mechanisms in place to guide, support or sanction a member state when a rupture of the democratic order occurs. While democracy does not necessarily guarantee equality of conditions, we strongly believe that it guarantees equality of opportunities where there is rule of law.

INTERSTATE CONFLICTS AND THE OAS

The OAS has played a fundamental role in several territorial disputes. In 2000, the OAS created the Peace Fund to address territorial disputes. This mechanism provides member states with technical and financial support, if they so request, to solve any territorial controversies that may exist. As a result, the OAS has been able to provide technical and political support through facilitation and diplomacy in border disputes, such as the one between Belize and Guatemala which has been ongoing since the former's independence.

The OAS process has been considered highly successful, achieving in 12 years what was not possible in over more than a century. The OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone has resolved hundreds of incidents and averted many more which could have escalated into more serious confrontations. The Office plays a key role in strengthening coordination and exchanges between the armed forces of both countries, through the quarterly meetings of the Guatemalan Army and the Belize Defence Forces. Its presence is essential to maintaining peace until the dispute is settled. The Belize-Guatemalan process has provided the OAS with invaluable experience in the area of peaceful conflict resolution, which we are confident can serve as a model to be replicated in other regions.

The OAS has also been called upon to address political crises. In the past year, the OAS played an important role in the mediation of the political crisis that arose after the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo of the Republic of Paraguay in mid-June 2012. At the time, the OAS invoked the Democratic Charter and the Chair of the Permanent Council proposed that the Secretary General conduct a fact-finding visit to Paraguay. The SG was accompanied by representatives of the sub-regional groups of the member states to gather information *in situ* from authorities in all branches of government and a range of political and social actors, and requested to submit a report to the Permanent Council that would enable it to adopt appropriate measures.

In all of the above-mentioned initiatives – in Colombia, Paraguay, Belize and Guatemala – the OAS has played a crucial role in disputes after the fact. While the timing of its actions certainly does not detract from the relevance and effectiveness of its efforts, it does highlight what is really one of the key challenges faced by institutions in managing complex international crises: how can we be more proactive, and not merely reactive, to the onset of conflicts and threats in member states? In order to be able to offer these services to its member states, the OAS General Secretariat must continue to build its own capacity and develop practical tools and mechanisms to respond to calls for action from its governments.

In an effort to be more proactive, in May of this year the OAS, in coordination with the EU's Joint Research Centre and based on the successful experiment carried out in the African Union, began the development and implementation of a news aggregation and analysis system known as the Americas Media Monitor. This tool is designed to contribute to the institutional capacity of the OAS to monitor countries from a multiple and coordinated perspective (including democracy, conflict, human rights and security), and to improve the organisation's preventive, early-response and early-action capacity, as well as adopt a more systematic approach to monitoring political crises once they have surfaced. Essentially, the system, as part of the OAS Situation Room, will pull constantly updated information from previously selected multiple open news sources from five geographical clusters: (1) the region as a whole; (2) Mexico and Central America; (3) the Caribbean; (4) the Andean Region; and (5) the Southern Cone.

In addition to its high-level mediation and peacebuilding efforts, the OAS has been putting together a small team dedicated to institutional strengthening in mediation and the promotion of dialogue in the region. It is to be hoped that these efforts will strengthen OAS in-house capacity in the area of mediation and dialogue and assist OAS member states in building their own capacity in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

In terms of support to member states, the OAS has provided training to public officials to strengthen their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve social conflicts; it has organised forums to foster discussion on specific issues and promoted networking among member states; and it has provided technical assistance to specific countries to develop and implement targeted programmes to enhance their capacity to prevent and manage social conflicts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Cooperation is not an easy process but some recommendations from the perspective of the OAS' experience would be:

1. In times of crises, it is important to keep in mind that most governments view issues and their solutions in a domestic context. Sometimes this may hinder international cooperation, but it is critical to show that cooperating partners can have separate but complementary interests and sustainable solutions can be achieved through cooperative action.
2. It is important to recognise that cooperation must be pursued in multiple venues concurrently. Whatever the situation or crisis may be, effective cooperative action is a matter of drawing on a multi-layered international system, using the comparative advantages of bilateral, sub-regional and multilateral strengths in an effective manner.
3. Economic differences between larger countries or donors and smaller economies must be taken into consideration. Ensuring that all key stakeholders and countries are involved in the solution of a particular conflict or problem can be vital to any process of negotiation, solution or agreement.

The role of international, regional and sub-regional organisations in conflict mediation and resolution must not be underestimated. The OAS and the EU share a common vision of the situations that could potentially lead to complex international crises. In this sense, the EU-OAS relationship is far more than an inter-institutional relationship; it is a true partnership centred on improving the well-being of citizens, by addressing all of the factors that put democratic stability at risk. The OAS has been committed to promoting the need for greater cooperation between regional organisations and civil society for at least the last two decades.

It is to be hoped that the successful and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and the OAS will stand as an example to continue building on the synergies and collaborative spirit with other regional organisations to effectively determine where and how we can best use our comparative advantages as partners in pursuit of the prosperous and peaceful regions we all envision for our peoples.

The ICRC's humanitarian approach: opportunities and challenges for partnership and coordination

Christine Beerli

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The urgency of addressing the issue of crisis management and how the international community can better respond through improved cooperation and coordination, in particular to humanitarian crises in their various forms, has once again been brought into sharp focus by the devastating Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The sheer extent of the destruction, coming on top of recent flooding and long-term armed violence in some of the affected areas, resulted in a multitude of humanitarian needs on an overwhelming scale.

The national and international responses to the disaster were put seriously to the test, with the shadow of the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the floods in Pakistan later that same year still looming large. In both cases, the international humanitarian response came under sharp criticism from various quarters, not least for the blurring of lines between political, military and humanitarian agendas, poor leadership, and a slow, muddled and largely uncoordinated response by huge numbers of often competing humanitarian organisations. All these factors were said to contribute to the inadequate response, with large-scale needs remaining unmet many months after the disasters in the respective countries.

While the jury may still be out as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall international response to this latest catastrophe in the Philippines, the pressure to do better is clearly immense. Moreover, the frequency, complexity and intensity of many of today's humanitarian crises seem, if anything, to be increasing. Natural disaster is in many cases the final straw on top of various other ongoing and intertwined crises and underlying problems. Against this background, the notion of a 'global network of crisis rooms' working in a coordinated fashion to optimise crisis management and response certainly sounds like a desirable goal. But how realistic is it?

At the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), there is a clear recognition of the need for improved links with other response teams in order to address the wide range of protection and assistance needs of people affected by crisis, primarily by armed conflict and other situations of violence, as per the ICRC's mandate. While the ICRC aims to broaden its support base through engagement with more diverse stakeholders – and to make the most of the opportunities that such diversity brings –, such outreach also has certain limitations in view of the ICRC's particular humanitarian approach to both protracted crises and emergencies.

THE ICRC'S HUMANITARIAN APPROACH

The ICRC's overriding aim is to ensure a constant and *relevant* operational presence that remains faithful to its fundamental principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. In practice this requires an approach that is needs-based and centred on the beneficiaries, and entails engagement with all stakeholders. The ICRC thus gains the widest possible acceptance and respect, and subsequently the widest possible humanitarian access to people in need of protection and assistance. Indeed, for the ICRC, protection and assistance go hand-in-hand.

Protection essentially entails promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) at all levels. On the ground, this involves continuous engagement with *all* parties to the conflict, including non-state armed groups, and building pragmatic relationships with the relevant political forces at both local and national levels in a confidential manner, thus building trust. It includes supporting authorities to incorporate IHL into national legislation and into army training manuals, for example. The ICRC does this in countries that are at peace as well as in those affected by conflict.

In parallel with its protection activities, the ICRC works to address victims' needs: be they food, water, shelter, medical care or other essential items; tracing missing family members and re-establishing links between them; or ensuring that people in detention are well-treated. Protection can facilitate assistance, and vice versa. Indeed, the importance of combining the two in an intelligent way has become increasingly apparent. Furthermore, professional standards in protection work are of the utmost importance, and the ICRC has recently published an updated guide on this issue.

The ICRC is thus one of very few humanitarian organisations that have been able to operate inside Syria – despite the formidable access constraints – and work with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to deliver food, clean water, medical supplies and other essential relief to hundreds of thousands of people affected by the devastating conflict. Elsewhere, the ICRC has long maintained major operations in numerous armed conflicts where both chronic and acute humanitarian needs on a massive scale receive relatively little attention. Afghanistan is one example, where after three decades of intermittent conflict and insecurity the situation of civilians remains highly precarious, not least with the withdrawal of international military forces from the country. Somalia is another, where sporadic fighting, particularly in central and southern parts of the country, has further intensified the vulnerabilities and needs of the long-suffering population. Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan are also currently home to the ICRC's five largest operations. The importance and value of the organisation's

established practice of maintaining its presence and activities in the most sensitive areas of the world, combined with the flexibility to scale its activities up or down in response to changing needs, cannot be underestimated.

THE MECHANICS OF THE ICRC'S RESPONSE

With regard to the 'mechanics' of the ICRC's crisis response, there is a Crisis Room at its Geneva headquarters which is activated for any operational emergency or critical incident and which functions as a hub for information gathering, analysis and decision-making. Under the authority of the Director of Operations, the Crisis Room can trigger various mechanisms and special procedures, including the rapid deployment mechanism. This was activated last year for ten different emergencies, from Syria to Typhoon Bopha in the Philippines.

The Crisis Room was activated again just recently in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The rapid deployment mechanism was set in motion, with more than 40 ICRC surge capacity personnel being deployed as well as an additional 45 National Society experts to supplement the ICRC's existing structures. These include specialists in health, water and shelter, economic security and logistics, as well as in the re-establishment of family links. The ICRC's emergency response has been focused in Samar province, where it has already been operational for many years in the context of the protracted armed conflict affecting that area and where it works closely with the Philippine Red Cross and other partners in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

PARTNERSHIPS

In working with other organisations, the ICRC's primary objective is to further strengthen and develop partnerships within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which is the largest humanitarian network in the world, supported by millions of volunteers. This is particularly important at the local level in order to acquire a thorough understanding of the situation on the ground and the needs of the various communities concerned.

Beyond this, the ICRC has fruitful cooperation and collaboration with various organisations in different spheres and at different levels – including the United Nations and the European Union, and their various bodies and agencies – albeit outside the confines of any formal coordination mechanisms. The ICRC's Brussels delegation, for example,

has developed an *ad hoc* dialogue in recent years with a whole range of the EU's crisis-management entities and with the geographical departments of the European External Action Service. This is quite apart from its relationships with various components of the European Commission, in particular with the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO). The main aim has been to share operational, legal and thematic expertise and humanitarian analysis in contexts where the overall response can be improved. The President of the ICRC also has biannual meetings with the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC).

Moreover, the engagement is mutual and includes initiatives such as the EU's joint adoption with member states of seven pledges during the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2011; and the inclusion of IHL issues in the EU's Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy and in its Action Plan. Indeed, the EU's understanding of and support for the ICRC's position in general is much appreciated.

With regard to the ICRC's engagement with the United Nations, UN peacekeeping missions provide one example: these missions, which nearly all have a mandate to protect civilians, are operating in various contexts where the ICRC has had a longstanding presence, and more and more military and police forces are being deployed in post-conflict and conflict settings. While it is no secret that this raises certain concerns and challenges – essentially with regard to the blurring of military, political and humanitarian mandates and the ensuing risks for impartial humanitarian access – it is important to find ways for the different approaches to protection to co-exist and complement each other.

In recent years the ICRC has increased dialogue and interaction with UN peacekeeping missions in the field and with the Department of Peacekeeping in New York: pre-deployment briefings of UN peacekeepers by the ICRC is one example; joint workshops on topics related to training and the applicability of international humanitarian law to UN peacekeeping and the protection of civilians is another. The ICRC also regularly addresses the Security Council in its annual debate on the protection of civilians. In recent years this issue has been prioritised in the context of peacekeeping and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law.

The ICRC recognises that the use of military and civil defence assets can contribute effectively to emergency response in certain contexts, provided that such assets are managed and deployed in compliance with the Oslo Guidelines and that their use is specific to defined needs, notably in respect of the use of logistics assets.

On the ground, the ICRC's approach to partnership and coordination is pragmatic as well as principled. It strives to work closely with those who share its vision of field-based action and relevance, and who have close proximity to people affected by armed conflict or other situations of violence. With this in mind, one international NGO with whom the ICRC works closely in various challenging contexts is *Médecins Sans Frontières*.

The minimum common factor between the ICRC and other humanitarian actors, regardless of their particular mandate or approach, must be the principles of humanity and impartiality, with aid prioritised and allocated strictly on the basis of humanitarian needs only. There must be a genuine commitment to match the rhetoric of 'principled humanitarian action' with a meaningful response on the ground. This requires transparency and clarity on such fundamental issues as beneficiary numbers, access and capacities. Increasingly, flexible local coordination arrangements tailored to a specific context are becoming the norm.

In conclusion, the ICRC is of course acutely aware that its particular humanitarian approach – and its role in what might be broadly termed 'crisis management' – is only one of many among an increasing number of civilian and military actors with different mandates, objectives and ways of working. While no one approach can be considered the 'right one' and no single entity has the capacity to deliver on all, it is important at least to have clarity and transparency on the particular objectives of different actors – be they civilian or military – and a clear distinction between the two.

A concerted international effort aimed at tackling humanitarian crises will naturally have a better chance of achieving concrete improvements on the ground than fragmented, or even competing, initiatives. So while the ICRC's inherent independence precludes it from being part of a crisis coordination centre or other similar structure, it certainly stands ready to share operational information and analysis in contexts where the overall humanitarian response can be improved. Indeed, the common goal of making a real difference for people affected by war or disaster demands it.

The World Food Programme in the world of crisis rooms

Amir Mahmoud Abdulla

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The mission of the World Food Programme (WFP), as the world's largest and most effective humanitarian organisation, is to end hunger. The WFP's work on early warning and preparedness and the role of information during crises is fundamental to this mission. As a food assistance agency, it is reasonable to ask whether the WFP has a relevant role to play in a global network of crisis rooms. The answer is fairly simple.

It is clear that having enough food to eat is intimately linked to a nation's stability. People who lack adequate physical, social and economic access to food and nutrition are considered food insecure. It is also clear that food insecurity often occurs among people who experience violent conflict, who live in extreme poverty or in places with degraded natural resources. The negative impacts on nutrition, education, livelihoods and growth often result in the instability that characterises many complex crises.

Indeed, there are cases in which governments have been toppled as a result of food insecurity, and issues related to food security, agriculture and natural resources contribute to the prolonged and complex nature of most emergency situations. Although the answer to the question of the WFP's relevance may be fairly straightforward, the answers to the problems it faces are far less so, hence the need to form partnerships and, in particular, to share information.

Many European institutions, particularly the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Directorate (ECHO) in the Directorate General for Development Cooperation – EuropeAid, and the External Action Service, are major partners of the World Food Programme. Many of the EU member states are also very strong supporters of WFP.

The WFP operations centre – formally called the Situation Room – has long-standing partnerships and networks with crisis rooms in Europe, including, for example, with what is now the ECHO Emergency Response Coordination Centre. Indeed, in 2007 WFP hosted a meeting with the crisis rooms of major multilateral entities which contributed to the growth of such networks in recent years.

EVIDENCE

For some time WFP has effectively facilitated the international humanitarian community's early warning reporting system, devoting more resources to it than most and, together with UNICEF, co-chairing the Interagency Sub-working Group on Preparedness, which as of next year will be the SWG on Preparedness and Resilience.

WFP has continued to direct resources to this reporting system precisely because some threats to food security, such as drought or flood, usually present warning signs. Over the last few of years, WFP has also extended its expertise into analysis of what might be referred to as socio-political risks, which, in the context of information systems and reporting, is relatively new terrain. At the same time, WFP has helped guide the humanitarian early warning reporting system to cover suggested early action. Clearly, collection and analysis of information is itself not without cost. Yet, commitment of resources to action cannot be made without evidence, at least evidence that would on balance reasonably support a call for action in what are usually uncertain environments. This demands information from the field and elsewhere.

It is abundantly clear that even with an extensive presence such as that of the WFP, from capitals to sub-national locations on the front lines, partnering with others is not optional, it is fundamental. It is therefore to be welcomed that arrangements have already been developed between the WFP and European institutions and various member states in early warning, including with the Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC). These arrangements need to be expanded.

WFP has also helped ensure that interagency early warning information was made public and available to its partners. Basically, there is no point in warning about a pending crisis without also looking at possible action and, in turn, realising that action may not be possible without funding.

SPEED BUMPS

People often refer to problems related to sharing information as obstacles, yet they could also be termed 'speed bumps', as they are things that could be readily passed over with a little careful driving. One example of a speed bump is a culture of sensitivity, and in some cases, arguably, over-sensitivity.

This can result in snippets of information that are important to everyone involved in decision-making being over-classified in terms of security. The classic anecdote here is that of the humanitarian worker who gave the military a map of his locations and then realised that it was the only copy he had; by the time he asked for a copy back, he was unable to get one because the map had already been classified by the military recipient as secret.

WFP has found that classified information is actually accessible if we throw extra resources at the problem. Information, such as very high-resolution satellite imagery, is commercially available and there are many ex-military imagery interpreters available. Information can also be extracted through application of more human and computing power. Fundamentally, if information is not shared and communicated, opportunities to build on partnerships may be lost, thus duplicating efforts and wasting time and, ultimately, money.

TRUST

Finally, trust is strengthened through regular interaction and sharing; it is highly personal. Events such as conferences help develop and build an overall architecture of trust, together, throughout all systems. WFP has extensively adopted crisis-management simulation exercises as a way to build trust, and supports other partners in this way in the belief that simulations encourage interaction in a less contentious environment. It is a tool used by WFP with increasing effect to build trust, and focuses not only on natural disaster scenarios, but also on more complex situations within the humanitarian community from the sub-national to the highest strategic level. A simulation exercise was conducted to prepare for potential violence related to the elections in Kenya in early 2013, for example. WFP has also helped the multi-dimensional mission in Somalia hone its crisis-management procedures and its ability to work with partners. WFP also works with national disaster management authorities, thus helping to build trust with national institutions. These are some among many other examples in which both the WFP and its partners benefit.

In conclusion, there needs to be a strong and clear message that the automatic position is to share information. Sharing information during crises and developing early warning and preparedness is not a technical or procedural issue. It is, quite simply, an act of leadership.

Views from different rooms

Enhancing early warning and preparedness

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Florence Gaub

'Early' in itself is a relative rather than an absolute term. When it comes to crisis prevention, the purpose of early warning, as defined by the OECD, is to alert decision-makers of the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of a crisis, and to promote an understanding among decision-makers of the nature of the crisis and its possible impacts. Although relative, there is indeed a consensus that in the context of crisis and crisis prevention, earlier equates with better: in other words, the earlier a potential crisis is detected, the easier it is to diminish its scope or prevent it altogether. However, it would seem that agreement ends here and there remains much room for improvement in cooperation and coordination among crisis rooms. There are four main threads that run through discussions revolving around early warning and preparedness.

A 'TRAFFIC LIGHT' SYSTEM OF CRISES

The very word 'crisis' comes from the Greek word *krisis* which means 'decision'. Adapted from medical Latin, where the word was used to describe a physical state between life and death, it has since migrated into a wider social context to denote a difficult situation which requires hard decisions to be made. But where does a crisis begin and end? Not only has the use of the term proliferated (statistics show that its use has doubled since 1932), but it is also now often applied to situations that lack the original sense of urgency (e.g. 'migration crisis').

Just as the rooms in question are variously termed 'situation room' or 'crisis room', there is no clear definition of when a crisis is in its early stages and therefore considered part of an 'early warning' mechanism, a crisis, a potential conflict or, worst of all, an escalating conflict. The severity of these different stages can be ranked green, amber or red, according to a traffic light system, but precise criteria for an exact definition are still lacking. The term 'situation' – famously used in the phrase 'Mr President, we have a situation' – probably covers all four dimensions of a complex decision-making moment without qualifying it. However, for cooperation, coordination or collaboration, it is necessary to find common ground in order to define whether a crisis is early, mid-term or acute. At what point does a situation move from 'early warning' to 'crisis'? Of what does an early warning system warn? An example from the EEAS is the assessment of a country's risk potential by the EU delegations on the spot; the assessment is based on objective criteria but ultimately remains a subjective one.

Similarly, different traffic-light rankings will require different responses. Although it is universally agreed that the earlier a situation is addressed the better, there is methodological disagreement as to which tools should be used in any given situation. A conflict

or crisis might require immediate action, while early-warning mechanisms can still be qualified as prevention. Therefore, a distinction can be made between the different categories according to the rapidity with which either is addressed, rather than other criteria such as geography, military aspects, etc. The fact that the terms 'conflict' and 'crisis' are often used interchangeably not only contributes to further confusion, but ultimately might also lead to a biased response. In addition, the different responses to any given situation can affect each other adversely. For example, humanitarian efforts are sometimes at odds with the broader political framework and can contribute to a shift in the centre of gravity of a crisis rather than solve it.

Complexity is further highlighted by multiple crises occurring simultaneously. Criteria whereby different crises are prioritised are either lacking or not harmonised, and yet today there are 208 ongoing political conflicts. The prioritisation of crises will often reflect the broader strategic thinking in a security community; as such, they are defined, by default, by national or sectorial concerns rather than in absolute terms. The relativity of crises depends therefore on different interests that need to be aligned and fosters the theoretical uncertainty in which discussions take place.

THE CASSANDRA EFFECT

In an ideal world, early warning should translate into early action. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out in his 2002 report on the prevention of armed conflict, prevention is always less costly than the management or resolution of a conflict. A study found that the international community's efforts in seven conflicts during the 1990s amounted to $200 billion, while prevention would have cost only $70 billion[1]. Yet although the mathematical conclusions are clear, prevention is not something that comes easily to human beings. In fact, the cognitive gap between future but intangible developments and the present day is so pronounced that prevention is generally difficult for the human race to implement. In the history of mankind, the introduction of seat belts can be considered as the only successful implementation of a preventive measure. Efforts to encourage prevention in areas where it would be equally beneficial – such as the cessation of smoking or the use of sunscreen – have generally been less successful. This is unfortunately also true in the broader field of climate change. In other words: as long as a problem is not visible, humans will not feel the necessity to act. In spite of the clear advantages of early action, there is no culture of prevention linking early insights to early intervention.

1. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, Final Report (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), p.20.

In practice, this means that while crisis rooms often identify crises early on and warn of them, decision-makers do not act on the recommendations. Almost all crisis rooms bemoan political reluctance to act when crises are still in their early stages, which in itself flies in the face of the concept of early warning altogether.

In addition to a general difficulty in engaging in prevention, the criterion by which to measure successful crisis prevention is a negative one: the absence of a crisis. Simply put: early warners, like Cassandra of Greek mythology, are often proved right precisely because nobody took their warnings seriously. Then again, the need for prevention might depend on the subject: the more tangible it is to decision-makers, the more likely they are to act. The case of European fighters in Syria is a case in point: of the 200-1,000 suspected of engaging in the war, half are expected to return to Europe and develop into a domestic security threat, given their experience and radicalisation. This prospect has already translated into measures designed to contain or prevent such developments. However, this is a rare example. Where the future potential of a crisis is less tangible, geographically remote or only indirectly linked to Europe, the emotional appeal to act is less urgent.

The main questions therefore remain: how can success be measured in terms of a non-crisis, and how can a culture of prevention be established in an environment where people are prone to acting later in spite of the rational benefits of acting sooner?

PART OF THE PROBLEM, PART OF THE SOLUTION

In 2004, the media monitoring software of a crisis room sounded the alarm: the word 'genocide' had appeared with worrying frequency in Rwandan media, echoing developments which led to the massacre of at least half a million people in 1994. Only, in 2004, the media were not instigating anything, but were instead reporting the ten-year anniversary of the tragedy, a nuance the software itself could not detect. This example highlights the shortcomings of technology when it comes to the analysis of complex crises, their early detection, the recognition of interlinkages, and ultimately their resolution. In order to resolve a crisis, it is necessary to understand it, and while technology can gather information, only humans can develop mechanisms to change the dynamics of a crisis. Although nowadays we have more access to information and an abundance of tools to break it down, only the human brain is sophisticated enough to deal with the complexity of human developments in a given society.

In most crisis rooms, therefore, qualitative human analysis (i.e. a 'judgment call') takes precedence over a quantitative one, and virtually none relies on modern technology alone to assess situations. 'Pouring the data into a narrative' is the main task of risk analysis. But while computers have their shortcomings, so too do human beings. The brain, while arguably the most advanced computer of all, is notoriously biased: avoidance of cognitive dissonance involves the general circumvention of information that contradicts previously established ideas; human beings are simply not good at changing their minds. Bias also exists at the cultural, political, professional and psychological level. Lastly, humans cannot know what they do not know, and often lack the imagination to conceive of what unknown factors might exist.

How, then, can the main pillar of early warning, crisis prevention and crisis management be improved? The example of Mozambique, where violence erupted again in April 2013, shows how political analysis failed despite the existence of data indicating potential unrest, in part because the country was not considered fragile and there was therefore a bias in favour of stability. Although more and more information is now available, sheer quantity does not imply quality, and, more importantly, humans do not have the capacity to deal with such large amounts of data. Rather, the challenge now is to 'filter the signal through the noise'.

Some crisis rooms rely on a formative discussion among several individuals, while others rely on external experts. Field research based on interviews rather than written material is another approach to circumventing cognitive bias. Others again complement their data through local contacts to bolster knowledge. Educated individuals capable of questioning their own cultural context and their own held beliefs are key to the process. In the EU context, this means – among other things – linking two professional fields (in the EU Delegations, but not only) which rarely interact, namely development and security, in order to offset the professional bias in both areas. Similarly, different opinions on crisis elements will lead to different assessments. It is therefore important to consider from which quarter a particular assessment comes.

THE MORE THE MERRIER?

During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, President John F. Kennedy assembled a special committee of the United States National Security Council comprising individuals from seven different organisations concerned by the discovery of Soviet missiles on the island: the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA. These seven

organisations came up with six potential responses to the crisis, each very much influenced by their different institutional outlooks. In other words: the presence of multiple actors led to multiple proposals on how to deal with the crisis. In some ways this anecdote reflects the current landscape in crisis prevention and early warning. Since the conflicts in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s, global capabilities for early warning have improved dramatically; mechanisms and funding have evolved accordingly, and many more actors with different tasks, outlooks and remits are aiming for the same goal: preventing conflict. However, sometimes the multiplication of actors has also led to greater confusion.

Not only do these actors rarely share information with each other – be it classified or not – but at times their sub-goals work against each other. In some cases, cooperation is politically sensitive, in others it faces not institutional but content barriers and differences in priorities, interests, risk assessments and analyses can translate into very different results. Most importantly, these 'turf wars' exist not only at the international level, but also at the national level, and in many cases even at the institutional level. Within the European Union alone there are several different units which deal with functional crises related to health, security, transport and other areas, but which do not cooperate as much as some would consider it beneficial to do.

A starting point for more cooperation, therefore, needs to be the creation of common benchmarks and the establishment of a shared understanding of what a crisis is. Institutional reforms and cooperation can only follow once methodological clarity exists at the more strategic levels, not the other way around. If the comprehensive approach is to be implemented in a meaningful way, this is the way forward. Otherwise, institutional stove-piping will continue to get in the way of effective crisis prevention and resolution.

In conclusion, early warning and preparedness face a number of challenges which derive partly from the essence of being human (i.e. the avoidance of cognitive dissonance), are partly the result of our strategic environment (i.e. differing assessments of a crisis), and are partly the outcome of a broader institutional landscape. Recognising these challenges is most certainly the first step to addressing them.

Political and technical aspects of information sharing

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Patryk Pawlak

INTRODUCTION

Time and information are among the most valuable commodities during a crisis. A timely response depends to a large extent on the accuracy of information and determines the fate of those going through the crisis. On the other hand, the value of a piece of information depends on the speed with which it is delivered. Even the most important information loses its value if it is received after a decision has been taken. It is not surprising therefore that decisions regarding information-sharing mechanisms – what is shared, with whom and when – are taken with great care.

Access to information – facts about people, places or events – and the value we attach to it will ultimately determine whether our actions succeed or fail. Poor information limits our room for manoeuvre, maintains uncertainty and can result in poor decision-making. Conversely, information that is accurate and unique can remove question marks and provide a huge advantage in dealing with complex challenges. Information thus becomes an instrument of power – over people (in authoritarian regimes) or natural phenomena. For this reason governments have established vast intelligence services.

It is the value of information as a tool in dealing with uncertainty that pushes various actors to share what they know. The process of sharing itself implies a certain degree of trust between two sides and expectations of reciprocity. Without these two conditions, hardly any information-sharing scheme would last in the long run. At the same time, it should also be recognised that information overload might have an adverse effect, since it then becomes far more difficult to identify the pieces of information that are essential. This point is particularly relevant nowadays when access to information is much easier thanks to ubiquitous internet and mobile communication technologies.

WHAT DO CRISIS ROOMS SHARE?

Information is of little value without an understanding of what it can be used for. In a similar vein, information sharing needs to serve a specific objective and requires a clearly defined strategic aim (what is the purpose and desired end state) in order to allow for the definition of credible and actionable options. For instance, information about the direction and strength of storm winds acquires value only when it is transmitted to those directly affected and with a clear indication of possible courses of action. Otherwise, it is just a weather forecast. Therefore, the main task of a crisis room is to gain an understanding of a situation (what has happened, what is the impact) in order to

put forward different options for action – including their limitations and the resources required – in support of the decision-making process.

While information sharing can help deal with uncertainties related to natural or man-made disasters and crises arising from conflicts, the specific outcome is often the product of the interplay between technical and political aspects of that process.

Political determinants

With regard to the political dimension, it is possible to distinguish four main aspects that affect information sharing and cooperation between crisis rooms.

First, the political will to develop capabilities while recognising the importance of cooperation is an important precondition closely linked to the idea of leadership. While crisis rooms play a crucial role when things go wrong, making the case for their development is much more difficult when they are competing for resources in times of peace. It is almost impossible without the political leadership that views crisis rooms and cooperation between them as a long-term investment. Leadership also plays an important role when dealing with tensions and turf wars between ministries which each have their own expertise and approach to problems at hand. Given that in some countries crisis rooms are a relatively new phenomenon, it is sometimes difficult to integrate them into existing governmental structures and this can lead to tensions within the administration.

Second, information sharing is easier in the event of natural disasters than in political crises. This is because nature is apolitical. This can be seen clearly when comparing the responses in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, which devastated the Philippines in 2013, and those observed during the crisis in Syria, which has been on the political agenda since 2011. These two cases also illustrate perfectly an earlier point regarding the clarity of objectives and actionable options. Whereas in the case of Haiyan the aim was clear (i.e. to help the Philippines deal with the consequences of the typhoon and restore life to normal), in the case of Syria there is little clarity as to what action should be taken due to often conflicting information about the situation on the ground. There is even less agreement as to what steps might lead to the resolution of the conflict. Therefore, the difficulty lies not in actually taking action but rather in agreeing on what action should be taken.

The comparison between these two crises points to another challenge of information sharing, namely the nature of the data shared. The information exchanged between stakeholders in case of natural disaster comes mostly from open sources and therefore

poses no problems for bilateral or multilateral relationships. The operational nature of the information (i.e. what areas have been most affected, what is the level of destruction, what are the most urgent needs) makes cooperation much easier. This is not the case for strategic information that may have implications for national security or reputation, and most often comes from confidential sources.

Furthermore, there is sometimes a need for rapid political decisions to be taken in order to respond to a crisis, which in turn requires an established and properly functioning coordination process. Within the EU the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR), adopted in June 2013, serve this function and bring numerous actors around the same 'table': member states, the presidency of the Council, the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). It is also important to prescribe specific roles within such a dense network of actors in order to manage information flows efficiently.

Finally, a government's decision to request and/or accept help is also a political one since it may be interpreted as a sign of weakness. During the conference on a global network of crisis rooms held in December 2013, one of the speakers summed up this dilemma in the following way: information sharing is one thing but making use of the existing arrangements is a different issue. Indeed, one of the reasons for the very limited use of the former EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) might be that the implementation criteria were framed in such a way that might give the impression that a country was incapable of action.

Technical determinants

The technical dimension encompasses those aspects of information sharing that are not dependent on political involvement. It includes, for instance, linguistic problems which, in the absence of translations (and under the pressure of time), make sharing information an exercise in futility, even if there is a clear interest and willingness to do so. Related to that is a broader question of general training for officials working in crisis rooms and the development of their skills, including their analytical skills. This is particularly important given that crisis managers are expected to provide reliable and actionable options to decision-makers. Reputational issues leave little room for wrong assessments.

The scope of information sharing between different crisis rooms is also a function of their different maturity levels and the contexts in which they operate. It should be acknowledged that while some actors are quite advanced in developing their capabilities

and structures, others continue to struggle with basic problems, such as equipment and staffing. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO, for instance, was created back in 1998 and has received over 60 requests for international assistance (mostly for natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies). It is NATO's focal point for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Based at NATO headquarters in Brussels, EADRCC coordinates responses among the allied and partner nations and, since 2001, also acts as a clearinghouse for assistance after a CBRN incident.

The EU Situation Room, on the other hand, came to life after the creation of the European External Action Service. Formally created in 2011, in conjunction with the reorganisation of security-related assets within the EEAS, it is in fact the result of the merger of the staff, the know-how and, in part, the technology of two pre-existing structures (2001), the Council's SITCEN and the Commission's DG RELEX Crisis Room. The EU Situation Room provides worldwide monitoring and situation awareness for all relevant stakeholders from the European institutions. It also maintains regular contact with the crisis centres of other regional and international organisations, such as the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the African Union (AU).

Part of the problem common to all regional organisations is the persistent fragmentation of crisis centres and the need for coordination. For instance, Central America is a region with high vulnerability levels that requires extensive coordination. As the challenges identified in the Central America Security Strategy require increasing coordination, member states of the Central American Integration System have developed their own crisis-management mechanisms.

Probably one of the most important aspects of information sharing is timing. In a crisis, if information does not help to deal with the problem immediately there is little value in sharing later on. There needs to be a clear benefit to the process. This is particularly relevant as crises are often dynamic and complex phenomena: in 2011 the earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tohoku in Japan caused a tsunami which in turn caused a nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.

MAKING THINGS WORK

Even though the creation of a network of crisis rooms remains only a project for the time being and despite numerous obstacles to information sharing, it is possible to identify a number of existing processes that support cooperation between crisis rooms. For instance, NATO has specific arrangements with UN-OCHA, the European External Action Service and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). Nevertheless, sharing information acquired from open sources poses fewer problems than the analysis of confidential information.

When formal information sharing is not an option, informal cooperation is often the only solution. When NATO took over the mission in Libya, for example, it established informal channels for information exchanges with the ICRC, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and World Food Programme (WFP) to ensure that their concerns were taken into consideration but also to ensure that they received additional information that could support their activities. Related to this is a general question about who should provide the impetus for closer cooperation and information sharing. While there are certain positive aspects to such centralised leadership within the network of crisis rooms, there are also risks associated with too much codification that might only create additional obstacles to cooperation. In such cases common sense needs to be a guiding principle.

One of the key challenges for the crisis-management community is to build capacities in regions which are particularly prone to natural crises or which face political volatility. The European Union has committed substantial resources to capacity building in partner third countries and regional organisations, including in terms of funding, know-how, training and exercises, hardware and software, and exchange of methodologies. Internally, it also contributes to strengthening relations between crisis rooms and, even more importantly, helps to avoid duplications and creates complementarities by sharing specific products (situation reports or flash reports), including crisis-related information provided by, among others, EU Delegations, EU member states, EU CSDP Operations and Missions, EUSR teams, and International Organisations.

Finally, new technological developments offer valuable tools for gathering and analysing data. The value of crowdsourcing information and using volunteers in data analysis became clear in the aftermath of the natural disasters in Haiti, Japan or, more recently, the Philippines. A number of crowdsourcing platforms offer valuable support for responders by collecting, managing, analysing and, most importantly, sharing the data with governmental aid agencies or other organisations. For instance, Ushahidi

is a crisis-mapping platform where information is submitted via text message, email, or Twitter. The proliferation of similar crisis-mapping initiatives has resulted in the emergence of new actors such as the Standby Task Force or the Digital Humanitarian Network which act as intermediaries between conventional humanitarian organisations and these new informal networks.

TABLE 1. EXAMPLES OF EU CAPACITY-BUILDING PROJECTS

Myanmar	· The EU and Burma/Myanmar will work together towards enhancing the capacity of the latter to develop an effective emergency response and early warning capability in order to facilitate a timely and efficient response to emergencies, including adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. · The EU will contribute to enhancing Burma/Myanmar's crisis response system through capacity building and knowledge sharing, in particular through supporting the establishment of the Myanmar Crisis Response Centre.
ASEAN	· ASEAN and the EU will explore the possibility of cooperating in the field of crisis response through the sharing of experiences and capacity building. · The EU participated in Disaster Relief Exercise ARF DiREx 2013 which took place in Thailand in May 2013
Arab League	· The EU entirely funded the Crisis Room in the LAS headquarters in Cairo, opened in 2012. · The project, which is already operational, is creating a capacity within the LAS to perform an effective crisis-related early warning system. · It also establishes links with the EU's early warning system. · The EU also donated its know-how and tools to the project and will help train 200 Arab officials who will run the operation.

A number of EU projects funded under the 7th Framework Programme for Research focus on ways in which suitable information technology design can enhance informal interactions in networks while maintaining the flexibility to accommodate situational and locational variation so as to enhance information sharing. For instance, project COSMIC (The Contribution of Social Media in Crisis Management) aims to highlight the value of citizen-generated data in order to identify where specific emergency resources or search-and-rescue operations are necessary. In a similar vein, project iSAR+ (Online and Mobile Communications for Crisis Response and Search and Rescue) aims to harness the value of citizens as 'in-situ first sensors'. The objective of the project is not only to develop effective guidelines for new media users so that they can contribute to crisis-response efforts, but more importantly to use existing technologies in ways

that enhance the trust of citizens and public protection and disaster relief organisations (PPDRs) in channels of bi-directional social media communication.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Crisis rooms are learning organisations. Each crisis provides an opportunity for learning and further fine-tuning. For example, analysis of past experiences and current cooperation efforts suggests the need for better data analysis in real time as well as the need to spread the culture of information sharing by developing a reflex for coordination and communication. An important component of the whole process is establishing the mechanisms for harnessing acquired knowledge and experience and translating them into concrete steps and guidance for the future. Thus, just as important as sharing information is the decision to share experiences – what works, what does not work and why. Such actions are of little value if not accompanied by efforts to improve existing instruments and complement them with capacity building. All of which often occurs within a highly politicised context. Although no region is free of crisis, some organisations are under greater pressure than others, as the majority of crises occur in their region. It would seem that putting out fires also involves walking on very thin ice.

Strengthening civilian-military cooperation

Eva Gross

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Crisis and situation rooms are at the centre of response. As such, they are the first institutional instance for developing shared awareness and approaches to any given contingency, and thus play an important part in conceptualising and then implementing a joined-up and coherent approach. Such an approach can involve a multitude of actors, within but also beyond any given state or institution. Civilian-military cooperation is essential for operationalising the comprehensive approach but, more concretely, for operationalising crisis response in the long and the short term. Such cooperation, as well as efforts to enhance it, comes into play both at the stage of initial crisis response and as part of the concurrent efforts to set up longer-term measures. Throughout these processes, the sharing of timely and relevant information is crucial.

ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS

Enhancing cooperation, starting from information sharing in the initial stages of crisis response to eventual side-by-side cooperation in theatre, requires the establishment of trust and familiarity with the respective aims and approaches of various actors. Trust facilitates interpersonal cooperation and enables the sharing of information. However, it takes leadership to bridge organisational cultures and create cooperative structures to institutionalise such trust.

Synergy and complementarity are essential for coordination among different actors and for the sequencing of measures, starting from crisis response to longer-term policies. But there are significant differences in approach. Organisational cultures and outlooks vary among different actors, from the military to a variety of civilian actors including diplomats, development and humanitarian organisations, local civil society and government as well as the private sector – in other words, the different sectors that engage in crisis and post-crisis settings.

Increasing complementarity requires a careful definition (and awareness) of individual mandates. The experience of Afghanistan in particular – where, arguably, the notion of the comprehensive approach was born – has served as proof that information sharing and the alignment of processes is difficult but not impossible. It also provides important lessons learned in how to arrive at a *modus operandi* between different actors in the field, and at headquarters level.

At bottom, effective coordination requires respect for different mandates and a coordination mechanism. More importantly, trust requires patience and a *quid pro quo* mentality, and the larger the group the more difficult trust-building becomes. The experience

of others in trying to bridge cultural, professional and organisational differences can be instructive in taking future civilian-military cooperation further.

But perhaps the key takeaway is the importance of addressing these issues ahead of time: in other words, before a crisis hits. This is because the moment of initial crisis response is the time when trust and familiarity with counterparts, as well as institutional approaches, are vital for a successful response. It is the time to 'cash in the chips', so to speak, and capitalise on preventive work.

AN EXISTING NETWORK

When it comes to exploring strengthened connections between different crisis rooms, one could say that a *de facto* network of crisis rooms already exists. The responses to the November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines demonstrated a degree of readiness and coordination. This suggests that it might be useful to think in terms of a crisis response system which needs to be fine-tuned, but where the key ingredients already exist. In other words, it is worth utilising or drawing from existing networks.

While the UN is the mother of all networks, the case of the Philippines has shown that a diaspora network not only exists but can be useful in transmitting and receiving information on casualties as well as survivors. This demonstrates the need for thinking outside the box, not only in respect of relevant actors but also with regard to the means of transmitting information. Civilian-military coordination also worked in the Philippines: disaster management interventions could be decentralised thanks to local government autonomy whereby every town has a comprehensive disaster council. International aid helped to increase these capabilities.

EASY AND COMPLEX CRISES

Nevertheless, despite the relatively smooth process of emergency response in the case of Typhoon Haiyan, it is important to be aware that responses to natural disasters and humanitarian crises differ from responses to political crises. In the latter case, potentially different interests are at stake (although in many cases humanitarian crises and natural disasters can exacerbate or unveil underlying conflict and produce a ripple effect), including the ability or willingness of local authorities to provide access. There is also the question of personal risk for conflict responders in the field arising from armed

confrontations. Effective coordination is even more important in such cases where there are potentially different interests (and risks) involved.

While natural disasters – the 'easy' crises – account for a minority of all crises, the others are not so easy to coordinate and manage. Beyond logistics, questions of force protection, communication and/or cyber capabilities come into play and these should not be mixed up with purely humanitarian help, logistics and capacity challenges. Thus, most – if not all – crises should be considered as essentially complex, with multiple and overlapping causes. The Sahel region, where a large weapons network, a youth bulge, and weak governments and security institutions have contributed to rising insecurity, provides a good example.

Crisis rooms enable a coordinated initial response, but not all actors involved in addressing a crisis and its longer-term solution are part of a crisis room. For example, police intelligence and expertise can be useful in tracking threats that go beyond the immediate need for response, a case in point being the prison escapes in Libya and the Philippines which were a further consequence of the crisis and disaster. Police capabilities such as forensic support or victim identification can play an important role (i.e. in the Philippines in 2013 and Haiti in 2008). This again illustrates the point that effective response requires knowledge and awareness of the different actors, and at which stage of the response they should be brought into play.

ONE NAME, DIFFERENT MANDATES

When discussing crisis rooms, and the ways and means in which they can cooperate with one another and with other parts of their respective bureaucracies, it is important to bear in mind that mandates and scope differ among individual states and international institutions. An important commonality is a state of around-the-clock readiness. Crisis rooms are a hub for information and have some say over who else this information is shared with (and when).

Beyond that, there are significant differences: some crisis rooms have a coordination function or decision-making mandate, whereas others do not. The degree to which civilian-military coordination feeds into their work also differs. And some crisis rooms may already engage in regional cooperation and coordination at EU level (or with the EU), whereas others have less experience doing so, or in different areas.

These differences have implications for the degree of interoperability between crisis rooms. It also means that linking crisis rooms globally is challenging, as national systems are difficult, though not impossible, to link up. Once the decision to establish such a network is taken, it will be possible to build the technical architecture to facilitate the sharing of information. Of course, the human factor should also be borne in mind: trust and confidence need to be developed concurrently with technology.

IMPROVING CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION

As for the question of civilian-military cooperation – and their constituent long-term and short-term activities – it might be more useful to think in terms of civilian-military platforms rather than crisis rooms and the first order of response.

Cooperation is affected by different working cultures, rotation of staff and lack of institutional memory, all of which present challenges to information sharing. Furthermore, there are differences between strategic and tactical information sharing, as well as informal exchanges. It is necessary to develop a coordination reflex where, as far as possible, coordination and sharing of information become automatic and spontaneous. Boundaries between open and classified intelligence should be relaxed to enable information sharing, though once again this requires trust as a basis for interaction.

Furthermore, in terms of interoperability and sequencing, even if there is a discussion to be had about the changing role – or expectations – of the military in crisis response, it is important to note that the military is the smallest part of civilian-military cooperation, as well as being the most well-defined. In the case of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), which supports the EU Military Committee (EUMC), civilians and the military sit side by side. It is also a comparatively small office with 192 Seconded National Experts (SNEs) compared to 29,000 EU officials overall and roughly 1,100 employees in the EEAS headquarters only.

Civilian actors come from a range of backgrounds and are not interchangeable: they include police, NGOs with a variety of scopes and mandates, development agencies, diplomats, local civil society, the private sector and others. They all have different strategic and operational aims and modes of execution, and they do not always sing from the same hymn sheet.

Effective cooperation hinges on two issues: civilian-military cooperation in crises remains controversial and many non-governmental actors do not interact with the military

or only on a case-by-case basis. Beyond this, however, experience has shown that different actors use different language to describe the same thing, such as different acronyms. Efforts need to be made to learn each other's terminology and for the military to speak 'civilian' as well as vice versa.

The sooner communication improves, the easier cooperation will become in the field. Improved knowledge and personal relationships can be difficult because of rotation schedules (for the military they tend to be short, for diplomats a little longer and for NGOs they can be long term). Trust can be established through knowledge of each other's *modus operandi*. This means that trust has to be actively built and based on shared experiences, but must also facilitate knowledge of each other's respective approaches.

The figure below illustrates the EU's planning process for military crisis missions, and indicates the complexity and the number of actors involved in the planning process. It also highlights the need, as well as the opportunity, for sequencing additional actors and activities.

FIGURE 1. EU PLANNING PROCESS



Source: Bruce Williams' presentation at the Crisis Rooms conference.

A final important point to note in discussing cooperation is that integration should not be confused with amalgamation. Each set of actors has a specific skill set that needs to be preserved. The EU missions in the Horn of Africa, for instance, combine and link civilian and military instruments, diplomacy and capacity-building programmes. The

complexity of the challenges facing this particular region – as well as others – means that additional actors with a longer-range impact should also be brought in, such as police officers.

INFORMATION SHARING

Information sharing is vital but equally fraught with potential for conflict. Classification levels vary, and cooperation between military and civilian actors, while crucial, has proven difficult. Trust issues feed into information-sharing practices. Classification should be approached with greater flexibility, or ways to handle classification more flexibly should be explored.

While information sharing is crucial, it is also important that the right information should be passed on to the right people. Moreover, information does not equal intelligence, as there is also a human factor that comes into play. In the case of the UN, it is the Situation Centre (SitCen) that turns information into analysis, providing situational awareness of an evolving situation on the ground. UN reports are based on UN eyes and ears on the ground, and include daily reports to the Secretary-General, daily summaries and verbal briefings. This not only reinforces the point that the UN has an extremely vast in-house civilian-military information collection capacity, but also suggests the utility of exploring an EU-UN partnership between SitCens, with the aim of exchanging intelligence products.

TECHNOLOGY: AN ENABLER BUT NOT A PANACEA

Technology is an important enabler for cooperation in the field and at headquarters level. Communication networks can foster synergy between the civilian and the military side. Its added value depends on operational requirements. The mandate and role of each actor, as well as their purpose, must therefore be clear. Technology cannot replace the human factor – trust, political considerations – and leadership. These issues go beyond technical specifications and require the 'why' question to be asked and the human factor behind technical systems to be addressed.

Industry can provide smart technology, but to maximise the utility of whatever system is put in place presupposes a framework for cooperation and a definition of the mandate and role of different actors, otherwise it is nothing more than a room full of technology. Beyond sharing information with different actors, this is also about defining the

purpose of a crisis room (versus a situation room) and how civilian organisations can be included. Since it is difficult to establish information-sharing arrangements *ex post facto*, these should be set up with prevention in mind and the sooner the better.

EU CRISIS RESPONSE: POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS

In the broad debate on civilian-military coordination, the EU faces considerable challenges due to its institutional complexity and constituent parts. Recognising and responding to crises early requires a common tool for analysis. This would also strengthen civilian-military relationships for early interpretation and identifying weak signals and trends in violence. Collecting and sharing such data would improve the chances of managing crises in the making.

More work can be done on identifying triggers of fragility, so as to be able to intervene at different levels of conflict: peace-time/prevention; the outbreak of crisis where there is a crisis-response mode; and stabilisation. The EU is a diverse institution with various crisis platforms. There is thus a need for clarity as to who is in charge of anticipation and response in order to minimise the risk of parallel structures and duplication. Defining endgames and methods, and recognising that human resources are at the core of analysis, are two important elements of clarifying processes and operations.

It is therefore important to answer the 'why' question before aiming to set up cooperation structures. Finally, comprehensiveness by definition involves partners. Given the challenges of civilian-military cooperation, and the inherent needs of crisis response, it is primarily the EU member states that need to define capabilities and the common ground they wish to share. This should be the starting point for exploring not only the possibility of deepening existing networks but also of expanding cooperation.

Cooperating on a global scale: constraints and opportunities

Thierry Tardy

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Crisis rooms exist in most international organisations dealing with crises in one way or another – be they natural disasters or man-made crises – and most states have crisis rooms at ministerial (Foreign Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, Health, etc.) or inter-agency level. The question is therefore how these various units interact and in accordance with what rules, and how cooperation could be enhanced. While cooperation is usually seen as being necessary to further improve the work and effectiveness of crisis rooms, and ultimately the response to crises, the institutionalisation of cooperation is still at a very early stage and many obstacles remain.

THE NEED FOR COOPERATION

There exists a large consensus within the community of crisis rooms on the necessity to develop inter-institutional cooperation, for at least three main sets of reasons.

Firstly, cooperation is necessary because of the complexity of crises; contemporary crises are characterised by their multidimensionality and the diversity of the actors involved, both at local and international level. This complexity requires a multi-layered response which combines various components pertaining to the political, security, and humanitarian environment and which furthermore adapts to the different stages of the crisis. Yet no single actor can pretend to deliver what is needed for all layers and at all phases of the crisis response, hence the necessity to establish cooperation among different actors. In other words, multifaceted and complex crises require global and interconnected responses and it is therefore necessary to adapt to this new environment.

Secondly, and consequently, cooperation allows crisis rooms to increase their level of awareness and the amount of information at their disposal, to check that information and draw on the expertise of partners. Cooperation among crisis rooms is required at different levels: vertically between the field and headquarters to get a full picture of any given situation; and horizontally among various crisis rooms that have a different level of input, operational capacity or field presence.

Thirdly, cooperation is seen as a way to optimise resources and prevent duplication. Overall it aims at improving the reactivity of crisis rooms and therefore their general effectiveness and impact. The more crisis rooms are able to analyse and react in a coordinated manner and draw on their comparative advantages and respective capabilities, the more effective the response should be.

In this context, cooperation among crisis rooms has already started to a limited extent and on an *ad hoc* basis. The degree to which cooperation is institutionalised is relatively low, with as yet few channels of communication or established tools of cooperation among crisis centres. The various entities are at the stage of getting to know one another rather than at the stage of implementing previously adopted documents or cooperation through existing mechanisms. Furthermore, the process of socialisation among crisis rooms is developing in a non-strategic manner and is largely event-driven. Post-crisis lessons-learned exercises do take place, but they seldom lead to practical measures aimed at improving cooperation.

OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION

Two broad categories of constraints seem to hamper the development of cooperation. They relate to the nature of crisis rooms as well as to the nature of cooperation itself.

First, crisis rooms are characterised by their heterogeneity in terms of mandate, the scope of their activities, their structure and size. Some focus on early warning or conflict prevention, while others embrace a broader spectrum of activities. As a consequence, they also have different names from one country or institution to another (crisis room, situation room, situation centre, crisis management centre, conflict prevention centre, etc.). Furthermore, institutions with different names may cover the same activities while others with similar titles may have different conceptions of their particular role. Beyond the terminology issue, there are different mandates and possibly different institutional cultures (a culture of prevention versus a culture of management, for example). Similarly, crisis rooms are at different stages of their own development and existence, and therefore display various degrees of experience and ability to engage in the cooperation process.

This heterogeneity is not conducive to cooperation and can on the contrary lead to uneven relationships or non-reciprocal cooperation. The question is how a conflict prevention centre could interact effectively with a conflict management unit, given the differences in their mandate. This in turn raises the issue of the transition from early warning to early action by institutions that cover different aspects of the crisis response spectrum. Moreover, a centre that has recently been established is more likely to concentrate on its own internal development than on institutionalising cooperation with partners. Lastly, crisis centres may have different methodologies of risk analysis (quantitative versus qualitative, the nature of risk factors or risk areas, etc.), which in theory make cooperation even more necessary or create complementarity. However, in practice,

these differences undermine a shared understanding of the issues at stake and of the priorities of the policy response.

Another obstacle to cooperation is the time factor inherent in the very mandate of crisis rooms. Two points are worth mentioning in this context. First is the question of when to cooperate and, in particular, when to exchange information with others to ensure maximum effectiveness. Second is the fact that cooperation is a time-consuming activity, and it may be precisely when information sharing is needed that staff will lack the time to cooperate. Furthermore, information sharing carries the risk of 'information overload', especially for institutions with a limited capacity to process increased amounts of data. Once again, this leads to the issue of the prioritisation of tasks. When a crisis hits, one is more likely to be absorbed by the activities to be carried out urgently than to be thinking about sharing information with potential partners, hence the necessity to have well-functioning cooperation mechanisms that do not create an administrative burden in the throes of a crisis.

In respect of constraints relating to the nature of cooperation, the two central issues of trust and 'interest' come into play. First, trust appears as a key prerequisite for inter-institutional cooperation. Crisis rooms will cooperate all the more with each other when they have developed a sufficient level of trust, both at the institutional and human levels (desk-to-desk, personal contacts, etc.). As can be observed at the state level, the propensity to cooperate is greater when the number of players is limited: bilateral cooperation is technically and politically easier than multilateral cooperation.

This being said, overall, crisis rooms are unfamiliar with each other, which does not bode well for the development of trust and mutually beneficial cooperation. In point of fact, most examples of inter-institutional cooperation involve countries that are politically close; they tend to be regional rather than global, .and concern natural disasters rather than armed conflicts, which hints at a negative correlation between the level of cooperation and the political sensitivity of the crisis at stake. Presumably some areas such as health emergencies are easier to coordinate than conflict-related issues. In all cases, institutions must agree beforehand on what to share and at what level. Indeed, cooperation is conditioned upon a strong commitment at the political level, and therefore appears to be an act of leadership. Crisis room staff will be all the more keen to cooperate if instructions are clear as to when and how to cooperate.

Second, cooperation is interest-driven, in the sense that crisis rooms will cooperate provided that cooperation pays off and brings something that is not accessible outside the cooperative process. This leads back, in particular, to the issue of reciprocity in

information sharing, which is a precondition for long-term cooperation. Reciprocity is more likely to emerge among units of similar size or institutional culture, while the current constellation of crisis units is characterised by heterogeneity.

Conversely, this suggests that in some situations the perceived interest of one crisis unit may make it decide not to share information or cooperate for fear of jeopardising its own role or effectiveness. Related to this is the issue of coordination among crisis rooms: cooperation requires a certain level of coordination and therefore acceptance by crisis rooms to be coordinated, with all the political and technical difficulties that may ensue. There currently exists no institution with a mandate to coordinate crisis rooms.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that information sharing or cooperation are a reflection of power relations among institutions that position themselves on a market where information is of strategic importance. Be it within a given institution or among different ones, early warning units are also engaged in turf battles which do not facilitate cooperation. More broadly, all institutions that are engaged in conflict prevention or management are *de facto* involved in a process that affects the dynamics of power within a particular society, and they may have different strategies. In this context, information – and sharing it – is also about shaping a process, acquiring visibility, gaining or losing influence. This makes the issue of cooperation inherently political, especially when such cooperation involves entities located in a conflict zone or in countries that have a stake in the issue. Crisis rooms are also part of national or international administrations that may pursue different agendas in dealing with a given crisis. As a result, it is difficult to analyse their role and to distinguish it from that of broader political entities. This nuances the general consensus on the merits of inter-institutional cooperation. In particular, it calls into question the correlation between cooperation and effectiveness, as some situations may indeed require a non-cooperative approach, or make it difficult to activate communication channels between crisis rooms. In other cases cooperation may be absolutely indispensable but hampered by politics.

THE WAY FORWARD

Cooperation among crisis rooms on a global scale appears to be a very ambitious project and probably out of reach in the short term. A first step may be instead to develop cooperation on a regional scale and among like-minded institutions. First and foremost, building trust among the main stakeholders is a prerequisite for any type of cooperation.

Recommendations include:

- Promoting regular interaction at various levels outside crises (desk-to-desk, regular inter-institutional workshops, etc.)
- Establishing points of contact among institutions and liaison officers in times of crisis
- Conducting joint training and exercises
- Exchanging on best practices and joint lessons learned exercises
- Improving relationships with the private sector and NGOs (although sharing information with private entities whose mandate or data protection and confidentiality protocols might be very different from that of state institutions can be problematic)
- Developing a common terminology and common benchmarks.

To produce results, strong and sustained support at the political level as well as within the management teams of the respective crisis rooms is essential. Ultimately, cooperation largely depends on the mindset of the people and their own conception of the merits of cooperation. In most policy areas the 'cooperation reflex' does not appear to be given *a priori*. For it to emerge, what is required is a long-term and non-linear process of building a culture of cooperation that draws on practical cases and best practice.

Responses: Europe and beyond

Upgrading the Union's response to crises

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Agnieszka Nimark and Patryk Pawlak

Discussions about the so-called 'solidarity clause' of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 222 TFEU) have kept the crisis and disaster management community (not to be confused with that dealing with CSDP proper) quite busy over the last few years. Issues related to its possible activation – and the implications for individual member states – have been at the core of the debate. But the real news is the parallel acceleration of efforts to upgrade existing instruments and incremental progress towards a more comprehensive crisis response, management and coordination *system* at the EU level.

The previous EU architecture, largely in flux over the past few years, has been significantly strengthened with the adoption of the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements and the transformation of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) into the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). On top of that, the toolbox to address crises that may affect the Union's security and interests but occur *outside* the EU has been further reinforced with the creation of the EEAS Crisis Response System, comprising the Crisis Platform, EU Situation Room and Crisis Management Board. In September 2013 the EU-28 adopted an important decision concerning serious cross-border threats to health, which, *inter alia*, expands the scope of epidemiological surveillance under the control of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Finally, consultations about the implementation of the solidarity clause proper are underway, and, even with several details yet to be thrashed out, the current discussions on the joint proposal presented by the Commission and the High Representative in January 2013 indicate that the future process will be largely based on instruments already in place.

REVIEWING WAYS AND MEANS

The increase in the number and severity of natural and man-made disasters has accelerated efforts to update EU legislation in the field of civil protection. To that end, in December 2013 the European Parliament and the Council adopted a new decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (Decision No 1313/2013/EU of 17 December 2013). The new legal instrument is based for the first time on Article 196 TFEU relating to civil protection and aims to better integrate approaches to crisis and disaster management as required by the Lisbon Treaty. However, the Union Mechanism is also expected to contribute to the *de facto* implementation of the solidarity clause: established in 2001, the Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM) was primarily meant to facilitate cooperation between the EU member states in civil protection assistance interventions. It has gradually become a key instrument to enable rapid and efficient emergency responses in the event of major disasters occurring outside or inside the EU.

According to the decision, replacing both the previous Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM) and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (CPFI), the goal is not only to support and enhance coordination of operational responses, but also to complement and facilitate member states' actions to improve prevention and preparedness for natural and man-made disasters of all kinds, as well as to increase public awareness and preparedness for disasters. Although the CPM relies on resources managed at national and regional level by the authorities of 32 participating states (28 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and FYROM), the Financial Instrument is now incorporated into a single legal act providing, under its Financial Provisions (Chapter V), for Union financial assistance to enhance prevention of, preparedness for and effective response to disasters. The decision guarantees a financial envelope for the implementation of the Union Mechanism (368.428 million) for the next seven years.

From the operational point of view, one of the main innovations enshrined in the new legislation is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), already established in May 2013. Compared to its predecessor, this enhanced coordination platform – situated in DG ECHO – is characterised by reinforced services. Unlike the MIC, the ERCC has a 24/7 monitoring capacity that enables an immediate response to emergencies. With three separate operations rooms, the centre has the capacity to manage more than one emergency simultaneously. It also provides channels for real-time coordination and information sharing through videoconferencing, allowing the centre to connect relevant member state authorities (such as national crisis centres), Commission services and Council bodies.

Emergency response to major disasters outside the EU combines various elements, such as civil protection assistance and humanitarian aid, as well as financial assistance from individual member states. By maintaining direct links with the civil protection and humanitarian aid authorities in the EU-28, the ERCC enables a smooth and real-time exchange of information regarding the assistance offered to (and the needs of) the disaster-stricken country.

The ERCC not only performs monitoring and information-sharing tasks but also contributes to the development of emergency response capabilities by coordinating the availability and deployment of pools of voluntary pre-identified resources. Complementary EU-funded capabilities could also be developed to ensure cost efficiency. The proposal on the implementation of the solidarity clause suggests using the ERCC as a single 'entry point' – at operational level – for the possible activation of the solidarity clause, with a view to simplifying procedures.

TABLE 1. MAJOR DISASTERS AND THE EU'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE

CPM activation (upon request for assistance)	
2004/2005	Tsunami in South Asia
2005	Hurricanes *Katrina* and *Rita* (US)
2008	Terrorist attack in Mumbai
2009	Severe respiratory infection (H1N1): Bulgaria, Ukraine
2010	Gulf of Mexico oil spill (US)
	Floods in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania
	Haiti earthquake
2011	Civil unrest in Libya
	Tunisia (Libya conflict): repatriation of third-country nationals (TCNs)
	Explosion at a power plant in Cyprus
2012	Floods in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovak Republic
	Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan
2013	Cyclone Haruna in Madagascar
	Syrian refugees in Lebanon
	Syrian refugees in Bulgaria
	Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines
CCA webpage activation (information-sharing mode)	
2008	Terrorist attack in Mumbai
2010	Haiti earthquake
	Eruption of the volcano Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland and related ash cloud problems

In addition to the ERCC, the decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism foresees other improvements regarding the Union's preparedness. Indeed, half of the mechanism's financial envelope is allocated to actions related to preparedness. The focus is placed on developing a coherent planning framework for response operations, in particular enhancing the overall level of preparedness for large-scale disasters. Such a framework will require, *inter alia,* preparation of reference scenarios, asset mapping and the development of plans for the deployment of response capabilities. The European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC) should be established in order to provide a voluntary pool of pre-committed response capacities of the member states. These actions should be combined with the creation of a training network and diversification of the training programmes enacted so far.

Another important goal of the CPM review was to achieve a higher level of protection against disasters by preventing or reducing their effects. Building on the ongoing work on an integrated risk assessment and management policy initiated in 2010, the Commission, together with the member states, should develop guidelines on the content, methodology and structure of national risk assessments by the end of 2014. Based on these guidelines, the member states are required to develop a summary of their risk assessments at national or appropriate sub-national level and make them available to the Commission by the end of 2015, as well as develop their national risk management plans and communicate them on a regular basis. The contribution of member states to such integrated risk assessment would have a significant impact – in the long term – on the establishment of a coherent EU risk management policy, as outlined in the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy. As part of this effort, the Cohesion Fund for 2014-2020 includes (in connection with the objective of promoting climate change adaptation) support for investments related to risk prevention and management, thus providing incentives to address specific risks, ensure resilience and enhance response to disasters.

POLITICAL COORDINATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

The case of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster vividly illustrates the political dilemmas facing the EU when dealing with a crisis. While civil protection and humanitarian aid provided the framework for delivering technical, financial and in-kind assistance to Japan in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami, the mechanisms for *political* coordination between member states were rather underdeveloped. The former EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) in the Council were to be employed only in the event of an 'extremely severe crisis' affecting several member states, and dealing with the Fukushima disaster was considered outside the scope of the CCA. The solutions to counter its possible consequences for public health in the EU extended well beyond crisis response as an automatic and ultimately technocratic process. For instance, freezing the import of goods from Japan would have significant implications for bilateral trade relations; similarly, diverting supply routes to sea ports with appropriate screening capabilities could potentially distort competition in the EU.

The adoption of the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements in June 2013 has signalled an important change in the Union's approach to crisis and disaster management. For instance, in the event of a volcanic ash cloud crisis similar to that which occurred in 2010, the IPCR arrangements would now permit member states to quickly coordinate their decisions on closing national airspaces, which would *de facto* ground airplanes across the EU. The arrangements provide a platform for political

coordination in the EU, including member states and relevant European bodies and agencies, in a cross-sectoral manner (i.e. between member states, the Council Secretariat General, the Commission, the EEAS and relevant EU agencies) in order to allow a timely, coherent and effective political response. While the IPCR strengthens the political process, it does not replace sector-specific mechanisms and arrangements, as it is primarily a political coordination mechanism without any additional resources (financial or other) linked to it.

Two new aspects of the IPCR process demand particular attention. First, unlike the CCA, the new arrangements are designed to be flexible (no threshold for activation, no *ad hoc* groups involved), scalable (from information sharing to coordination or decision-making, e.g. on exceptional measures), and based on existing, well-known and tested procedures (i.e. leading role of the COREPER, involvement of Council working parties according to their mandate). The key role of the COREPER stems from its horizontal competencies and decision-making powers as well as the possibility to convene quickly in Brussels. The Presidency – which typically chairs the COREPER – is tasked with ensuring political and strategic direction throughout the whole IPCR process, assisted by an informal roundtable bringing together all relevant stakeholders with the objective of preparing, developing and updating proposals for action. The scalability of the IPCR process also implies that, depending on the extent of a crisis, decisions can be taken at various levels – from the COREPER to (in exceptional cases) the European Council itself.

Second, to support preparatory work in the roundtable and inform deliberations in the respective Council meetings, the Commission and the EEAS aim to develop Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA). ISAA is a key support capability under the IPCR arrangements, as it feeds into the political process by providing factual information. In addition, a Council-owned web platform will aggregate inputs previously validated by member states at national level and feed them into the ISAA process. The platform can also be used in 'normal' times to help develop relations between stakeholders and a sort of 'IPCR culture' based on information sharing – a crucial factor when a real crisis hits and the best laid plans are severely tested.

Due to historical reasons, the EU Situation Room has retained a specific role in the IPCR context. It stems from the Service Level Agreement concluded when the former SITCEN was transferred from the Council to the EEAS in 2011. In particular, the EU Situation Room contributes to the process with situational awareness reports prepared on the basis of inputs from crisis centres in member states, CFSP/CSDP missions, EU delegations and international organisations. The situational reports are shared on the

dedicated IPCR web platform. The importance of the EU Situation Room in the process can be partly explained by the fact that it is the only service at the EU level offering a manned 24/7 service.

NETWORKING AND ASSESSING

The arrangements for the implementation of the 'solidarity clause', as outlined in the joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative, add yet another layer to the process. Issues still outstanding include the geographical scope, the activation and response process, coordination with IPCR, financial and legal aspects, and the military dimension.

The solidarity clause imposes a legal obligation on the Union and the member states to act jointly if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. Its implementation – as currently proposed at the EU level – is largely based on bringing together existing tools, structures and capabilities to build and enforce synergies between them. To avoid duplications and improve efficiency, the joint proposal employs a network-based approach with one 'centre of gravity', whereby the most pertinent centre will serve as a hub and an interface with member states and will be supported by relevant expertise.

The focus on integrated threat and risk assessment at European level is also quite interesting. According to the joint proposal currently on the table, a report prepared by the Commission and the High Representative would deliver information about threats, risks and hazards provided by various sources in member states, EU institutions, services and agencies, as well as international organisations. The report would then be regularly assessed and reviewed by the European Council and potentially become an important element in discussions about the means – existing and needed – to meet major threats or give general guidelines at EU level.

FIGURE 1. THE USE OF EU MECHANISMS IN CRISIS RESPONSE



Source: Council of the European Union

CRISES AS OPPORTUNITIES

The EU has long recognised – and not only in this domain – that each crisis brings an opportunity for improvement. In just over a decade it has established mechanisms providing assistance during natural disasters (floods, forest fires and earthquakes), health emergencies (support to Bulgaria during the H1N1 scare), man-made disasters (the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico) and terrorism (the attack in Mumbai). Yet the process is far from being complete. The difficulty in overcoming political challenges related to crisis management is exemplified by the fact that neither the CCA nor the IPCR have ever been activated in full, even though 40 Instrument for Stability projects were launched and 16 CSDP missions were engaged in 2012/2013.

Several elements still require implementing measures. Exchange of information between stakeholders remains a challenge: the answer is unlikely to come only from robust technical infrastructure, but, perhaps more importantly, through building trust and a culture of cooperation among stakeholders. This can be achieved through joint training and exercises and/or exchanging good practice across crisis rooms. Finally, much as drawing up scenarios contributes to improving *functional* preparedness, it is also true that the key response in a crisis is, ultimately, sending the political message that the EU is willing and able to provide assistance and offer solidarity.

Sensemaking in crises: what role for the EU?

Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren and Mark Rhinard

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INTRODUCTION[1]

The EU's role in the joint response to crisis and disaster has evolved rapidly in recent years. It has developed promising if modest capabilities to assist member states overwhelmed by disaster (the Civil Protection Mechanism), deliver aid to disaster-stricken countries outside the EU (DG ECHO), and send assistance and teams to troubled areas around the world (the Common Security and Defence Policy, Instrument for Stability and Rapid Reaction Mechanism). Few can dispute that the EU is on its way to becoming a crisis manager both at home and abroad.[2]

The Lisbon Treaty gives expression to this role, providing a new legal basis for a range of activities from consular cooperation to civil protection, and prompting new policy initiatives on issues as diverse as health threats and energy crises. The Council's Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) are being revamped into the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) system, while the Solidarity Clause enshrined in article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty is being translated into guidelines for member states. The Civil Protection Mechanism has been 'recast', DG ECHO's European Response Coordination Centre activated and the European External Action Service (EEAS) is assuming an increasingly active role in the domain of external crisis coordination and consular protection. EU agencies such as Frontex, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Europol and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) operate a range of crisis-management tools.

One ambition underlying many of these initiatives is to enhance what we call 'sensemaking'.[3] Sensemaking pertains to the capacity to gather, analyse and disseminate critical information that helps crisis managers organise an effective response to urgent threats.

This is no easy task. The Icelandic ash crisis in 2010, for instance, revealed the difficulties of gaining crucial information on the causes, dynamics, effects and potential solutions to such a transboundary event.[4] Available information was distributed across multiple jurisdictions and policy sectors and fragmented across public and private organisations, raising concerns about accuracy. It consequently took a long time for the member states involved to arrive at a shared picture of the situation.

1. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding received by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). We would also like to express our gratitude to Ylva Pettersson, Lavinia Cadar and Monica Svantesson, who helped with the empirical components of this chapter.

2. Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren and Mark Rhinard, *The European Union as Crisis Manager* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

3. Arjen Boin, Paul 't Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, *The Politics of Crisis Management* (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Karl E. Weick, *Sensemaking in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).

4. See Chris Ansell, Arjen Boin and Ann Keller, 'Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System', *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, vol. 18, no. 4, 2010, pp. 197-207.

Agostino Miozzo, Managing Director of Crisis Response at the EEAS, has remarked that 'we must avoid the overflow of information. Overflow means paralysis; it means that we are unable to proceed, to work and to react. We need precise, clear and reliable information from different sources'.[5] Miozzo is not alone in expressing frustration with the information process during crises. It is a perennial problem, which has plagued the response to every recent large-scale crisis (ranging from 9/11 to Katrina, mad cow disease and Fukushima).

European policymakers in different institutions are experimenting with ways to enhance sensemaking. The EEAS, the Council Secretariat, many of the Commission's Directorates-General (DGs) and EU agencies have assembled systems for crisis information management or are in the process of building one. These systems may come in the form of a software tool, a method, a venue or some combination of the three, and are aimed at the collection, analysis and dissemination of data to create an integrated picture of unfolding threats.

A recent research project mapped and categorised the sensemaking tools that can be found across the EU's institutions and agencies.[6] The project identified a wide array of sensemaking systems, used for different purposes and using different means. This chapter briefly summarises the main findings of that project and reflects on the implications for the EU's role in transboundary crisis management.

SENSEMAKING: AN OVERVIEW

At the strategic level of government, it is possible to discern a set of critical tasks that senior policymakers and politicians are expected to fulfil during a crisis. They have to coordinate complex networks and make critical decisions; they must communicate with the public and other stakeholders; and they must account for their actions and preserve governmental legitimacy. However, to fulfil these tasks effectively requires another critical task: sensemaking.

Sensemaking is defined here in terms of collecting, analysing and sharing information on the causes, dynamics and effects of a crisis, and its potential solution (cf. Weick, 1995). It is an essential task: if done well, it provides decision-makers with a *shared perception of what is happening*. All too often, it appears that decision-makers have different

5. Comments made during the Conference for National Crisis Coordination Centres, 30-31 May 2012, Brussels.

6. Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, and Mark Rhinard, *Making Sense of Sense-Making: The EU's Role in Collecting, Analysing and Disseminating Information in Times of Crisis* (Stockholm: National Defence College, 2014).

mental pictures of the crisis situation, which can and do lead to confusion, misunderstandings, irritation and, ultimately, misguided decisions.

In order to study how public organisations prepare for and fulfil this sensemaking task, it helps to make a distinction between *detection* and *understanding*.

Detection pertains to the recognition that a crisis has begun. Sometimes that is self-evident: an earthquake or tsunami is usually immediately and widely noticed. However, as a general rule, the starting point of a crisis is much easier to pinpoint *afterwards*, with the benefit of hindsight, rather than *during* the actual crisis. *Understanding* a crisis pertains to the causes, dynamics and consequences of an unfolding crisis. Again, what happens during a crisis may appear painfully obvious in hindsight. In the midst of the crisis, however, it is usually anything but obvious. Policymakers typically find themselves confronted with an overload of seemingly useless information and a dearth of much-needed information. What may be clear at the operational level may be understood very differently at the strategic level.

To detect and understand unfolding crises, three interrelated processes are necessary:

1. Collecting information: defining what information is needed and gathering or requesting it.
2. Analysing information: piecing together information from various sources, validating it and creating a 'complete' picture of a situation.
3. Sharing information: communicating the emerging picture of the situation with internal and external partners, while specifying what is known for sure and what is merely suspected.

FIGURE 1: THE PROCESS OF SENSEMAKING



Source: Author's compilation.

WHAT THE EU HAS IN PLACE

Combing through the EU institutions (the Commission's DGs, EU agencies, the Council Secretariat-General, the EEAS and the European Parliament) for methods and tools used to collect, analyse, check and communicate information on emerging and unfolding crises, 84 systems were identified that fit both the definition of sensemaking and crisis (See Annex 1).

The following patterns were observed:

All systems can gather and share information. The gathering is partly done through reporting from national participants. It can be on a voluntary (consular protection) or mandatory (health threats) basis. Gathering is also done through the automatic retrieval of information, through computer programmes that scan the internet for open sources or collect weather forecasts and radiological measurements.

Two thirds of the systems can perform some sort of analysis. This means that the system allows EU officials to provide additional 'value added' to the information uploaded by member states. This added value takes various forms. It can include simply adding European-level information or providing a 'situation report' based on aggregating uploads. In some cases, software programmes provide automated analysis, making use of forecasting models and risk-assessment techniques. A more familiar and no less common method is human analysis, where a group of people mull over the available information. This is typically done in one of the 'situation rooms', the emergency centres located in several Commission DGs and agencies.[7] Some analysis is conducted not at the EU level, but at member state level or in other international organisations.

The systems cover a wide variety of policy fields ranging from civil protection, health, maritime surveillance and border management to nuclear security, external threats, intra-EU coordination, critical infrastructure and law enforcement. Some policy areas have more systems than others. Health, civil protection and border management/maritime surveillance have more than ten each, external security has seven, law enforcement four, geospatial information four, and critical infrastructure and nuclear security three, while other policy areas have one or two. Most systems are intended for actors within a defined policy field.

7. Situation rooms with a monitoring function are found in the EEAS, DG HOME, DG ECHO, DG SANCO, Europol, Frontex, ECDC, the European Global Satellite Navigation System Agency, the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre and in the European Maritime Safety Agency.

There have been noticeable efforts to enhance inter-sectoral communication, making information from one sector available to others. ARGUS is the Commission's intra-institutional communication tool, where information from one rapid alert system is fed to other systems. The Council Secretariat's Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (previously called the Crisis Coordination Arrangements) aim at facilitating an EU-wide response to major crises, especially in terms of political coordination. If a major emergency is declared, an Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) will be produced jointly by the Commission and the EEAS. New systems are being developed, while others are being merged. In the area of health threats, plans are underway to consolidate several tools into the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS). Similarly, in the area of maritime surveillance, national surveillance tools are to be integrated into one system.

Systems can be divided between those that focus on the acute crisis mode (e.g. EWRS or the Common Emergency Communication and Information System [CECIS] for civil protection assistance) and those that involve longer-term reflection and discussion (the Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN] and the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network [CIWIN]). In the latter group, discussions often focus on what measures are being taken to prevent future disturbances and events. Experience nevertheless shows that these systems can be used during an acute crisis.

Distribution of collected information and/or analysis is often done via automatic email alerts that are typically generated when new information is uploaded into the system. A few systems that rely on human communication, such as ARGUS, are closed networks for nominated experts only, whereas others are open to the public (systems monitoring weather and natural hazards, for example). A little more than half of the systems are completely or partially dependent on input from the member states. Independent analysis of information by officials at EU level is fairly rare.

It is not clear who might be put in charge of harnessing the full potential of these systems for information collection, analysis and dissemination. Very few actors in Brussels have cross-sectoral and cross-institutional responsibilities. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is one, and they are active in IPCR; the Commission's Secretariat-General has recently tried to coordinate across sectors in the Commission, but the unit responsible is being disbanded.

FUTURE TRAJECTORIES: QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The emergence of sensemaking tools and systems is one of the most prominent developments in EU crisis-management capacity building. Some of these systems have become more or less institutionalised. The EWRS system of the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) is routinely used to help detect impending epidemics. The CoOL website (run by the EEAS) helps member states coordinate consular assistance to EU citizens who find themselves in crisis-torn areas (such as Libya during the Arab Spring).

Most of these systems do not provide full-blown analysis. This may well be in accordance with member states' preferences: most systems were not designed to carry out analysis. In the few cases of value-added analysis, the EU has an explicit remit to carry out its 'own analysis'. In the words of one national official, 'we want the "raw data" and wish to do the analysis ourselves, because every member state has such different preconditions'. Another official from the national level concurred, stating that:

> 'Sometimes the information coming from the EU feels dated and "old". Therefore a website where information could be shared directly between member states would be more helpful, as that would provide more timely information. There is no need for the EU to collect the info and then process it themselves (which then risks being outdated when finally published), when real-time info from other member states could give a better overall picture for other member states'.

Some people recognise that transboundary crises will require a joined-up capacity to process relevant information. One national-level official went so far as to say: 'That is the aim, but that has not been the case so far. There is however some sector-specific exchange of information that other ministries are taking part of, e.g. taking place within the working groups, and some other information sharing'. But this particular official also lamented the lack of an overarching perspective.

Case studies and interviews suggest that member states participate in these systems with varying degrees of enthusiasm, despite the fact that participation can be legally obligatory. Some of the systems provide information that is considered useful. But there is also a degree of 'peer pressure' that characterises participation dynamics, meaning that member states want to avoid being seen as doing nothing if colleagues in other governments are actively engaging.

Scant evidence has been found regarding the 'effectiveness' of these sensemaking systems. Some formal, internal reviews have taken place, as in the examples of the CCA and the EWRS. On a similar note, it would appear that there is very little data verification or

quality control of uploaded information. What member states want to upload, they can upload; any control would have to be exercised at the national level.

In any event, the question of effectiveness may be moot. Member state governments are still more likely to undertake sensemaking at home, within national capitals, with information from various sources – including the EU – rather than at the EU level.

A number of questions thus arise:

1. *What should the role of the EU be in joint sensemaking?* In many of these systems, the EU's role is closer to that of secretary (including the task of validation) rather than analyst. These systems can produce an abundance of raw data, but it is not clear how this would enhance shared sensemaking during a crisis. While sharing information is a useful first step, enhanced analysis is needed to carve out a sensemaking role for the EU.
2. *How many systems/crisis rooms does the EU need?* It does of course make sense that some information sources are redundant (especially given the many different policy areas that fall within the EU's remit). But does the EU need 84 systems? Some consolidation is under way, but few systems provide true integrative capacity by bringing sources together.
3. *Many systems are in place, but who is using them?* That is a difficult question to answer. It may sound logical to state that member states would benefit from an enhanced EU sensemaking capacity to deal with transboundary crises, but there seems to be little evidence that member states recognise the EU's 'value added' in this arena. It is not even clear whether *member states need joint sensemaking at the EU level.* More research is required to find out what member states want when it comes to joint sensemaking.
4. *How are the EU systems connected to other external systems?* The modern crisis does not respect boundaries. That prompts the question of how the EU's sensemaking capacity should be connected to that of other countries and international organisations. How would the EU fit into a 'global network of crisis rooms'?
5. *Is it possible to develop better tools, given the institutional complexities of the EU?* While the glass may be half empty, it should be noted that many efforts at reform have been undertaken in recent years. Promising new initiatives, including ARGUS II and the IPCR, are under way. It is therefore entirely possible that the EU will further enhance its sensemaking capacity in the coming years.

If there is one recommendation to make, it would pertain to the formulation of a shared vision of what joint sensemaking is needed and what role the EU should play in its creation and facilitation. Such a 'sensemaking philosophy' would take into account the functional requirements of transboundary crisis management, as well as the needs of member states. It would guide the assessment, consolidation and improvement of the sensemaking systems currently in place.

A feasible way forward would be to initiate pilot projects built around small exercises. This would help develop a common language that would facilitate a discussion about known and novel threats in times of crisis. It would prompt a search for best practices, which may be found in other international organisations and federal systems that have dealt with the challenge of sensemaking. Building shared sensemaking for crisis management is a difficult challenge, but one the EU will have to address if it is to play its part in the coordination of transboundary crisis responses.

ANNEX 1. LIST OF SYSTEMS AND TOOLS SURVEYED IN THIS STUDY

1	Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) - DG SANCO
2	Anti-piracy monitoring service (MARSURV-1) - European Maritime Safety Agency EMSA
3	ARGUS - DG SG
4	CleanSeaNet - EMSA
5	Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) - DG ECHO
6	Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) - DG MARE (under development)
7	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) - Frontex
8	Consular Online Website (CoOL) - EEAS Consular Crisis Management
9	Copernicus- European Space Agency
10	Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) - DG HOME
11	Crop yield forecasting system (AGRI4CAST) - Joint Research Centre JRC, used by DG AGRI
12	Customs Information System (CIS I & III) - OLAF
13	DG SANCO internal crisis intranet - DG SANCO
14	Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) - European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECDC
15	Early Warning Mechanism - DG ENERGY
16	Early Warning System (Joint Report) - DG Justice (EMDDA and EUROPOL)
17	Early Warning System on Conflict Prevention - EEAS Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Unit (not yet rolled out)
18	ECDC Epidemic Intelligence Unit - ECDC
19	Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) - DG ECHO
20	Emergency Response Coordination Portal (ERC Portal) - DG ECHO
21	ENSEMBLE - JRC
22	Epidemic Intelligence Information System (EPIS) - ECDC
23	EU Delegation Reports - EEAS
24	EU Long Range Identification and Tracking System Cooperative Data Centre (EU LRIT CDC) - EMSA
25	EU MS Intelligence - EEAS
26	EU Special Representatives Reports - EEAS
27	Europe Media Monitor News Brief (EMM) - JRC
28	European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) - Frontex

29	European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) - JRC
30	European Coordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) - JRC (on request by DG MOVE)
31	European Cybercrime Centre (E3C) - Europol
32	European Drought Observatory - JRC
33	European Flood observatory (EUFO) - JRC
34	European Flooding Awareness System (EFAS) - JRC
35	European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) - JRC
36	European Migration Network (EMN) - DG HOME
37	European Patrol Network - Frontex
38	European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP) - JRC
39	European Union Notification System for Plant Health Interceptions (EUROPHYT) - DG SANCO
40	Europol 24/7 Operational Centre- Europol
41	Europol Analysis System (EAS) - Europol
42	Europol Platform for Experts (EPE) - Europol
43	Fingerprint database (EURODAC) - DG HOME
44	Frontex One-Stop-Shop (FOSS) - Frontex
45	Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) - Frontex
46	Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC) - European Global Satellite Navigation System Agency GSA
47	Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) - DG ECHO & UN OCHA
48	Global flood detection system - JRC
49	Global Flooding Awareness System (GloFAS) - JRC (experimental)
50	Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) - DG RADIO and JRC
51	Health Emergency & Disease Information System (HEDIS) - DG SANCO
52	Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF) - DG SANCO
53	Information and Coordination Network (ICONET) - Frontex
54	Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) Web Platform - Council Civil Protection Unit
55	Integrated Situational Analysis and Awareness (ISAA) - EEAS/COM
56	Intelligence Centre (Intcen) - EEAS
57	Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) - Frontex
58	Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) - DG ECFIN

59	Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics (MAOC (N))
60	Maritime Support Services Centre - EMSA
61	Marsur- European Defence Agency EDA (emerging)
62	Medical Intelligence System (MedISys) - JRC/DG SANCO
63	ODIN- EEAS
64	Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) - DG HOME
65	Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats (RAS-BICHAT)- DG SANCO
66	Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) - DG SANCO
67	Rapid alert system for non-food dangerous products (RAPEX) - DG SANCO
68	Rapid Alerting System for Chemical Health Threats (RAS CHEM)- DG SANCO (not yet implemented)
69	Risk Management Unit- European Network and Information Security Agency ENISA
70	SafeSeaNet - EMSA
71	Satellite Centre (Satcen)
72	Schengen Information System (SIS I & II) - DG HOME
73	Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) - Europol
74	Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS) - European Environment Agency, EEA
75	Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) - EEAS MS Intelligence and Intcen
76	Situation Room 24/7 - EEAS
77	Strategic Analysis and Response Centre (STAR) - DG HOME
78	Systemic Model of Banking Originated Losses (SYMBOL) - JRC
79	Tarîqa - EEAS Situation Room
80	The European Surveillance System (TESSy) - ECDC
81	Threat Tracking Tool (TTT) - ECDC
82	Water level forecast system (LISFLOOD) - JRC
83	Vessel Detection System (VDS) - JRC
84	Visa Information System (VIS) - DG HOME



Crowdsourcing: crisis response in the digital age

Christian Dietrich and Patryk Pawlak

16

In 2013, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the tornadoes in the United States and Cyclone Cleopatra in Sardinia served as a stark reminder that natural disasters can strike anywhere, at any time. In addition to the loss of life they cause, they inflict a heavy economic toll, including damage to infrastructure, crops, private property and disruption of business continuity. They cause further harm to societies through hunger, unemployment, crime, disease, social unrest and environmental damage. According to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, the costs of natural disasters amounted to over $100 billion per year between 2010 and 2012.

It is of paramount importance to make use of all available resources in crisis and disaster situations to mitigate humanitarian, social and economic fallout. With almost 7 billion mobile phone subscriptions worldwide and almost 40% of the global population connected to the internet, information and communication technologies, coupled with crowdsourcing, are increasingly proving to be valuable tools in crises when decisions need to be made fast and under great uncertainty.

FAR FROM THE MADDING CROWD …

Crowdsourcing – the practice of obtaining information, ideas and services from large (online) networks of people – has two main dimensions. Digitally connected communities can be used to either generate – whether intentionally or as a by-product of another activity – or analyse data. The process fundamentally relies on mobile phones, internet-capable devices, digitally connected volunteers and online applications.

Where volunteerism and access to such technologies coexist, 'netizens' become substantial sources of information. By leveraging distributed networks of users to obtain volunteer-generated information, crowdsourcing regularly outpaces traditional channels of information and distinguishes itself by the provision of a high degree of local context and interactivity. As such, it is not a mere tool to obtain information, but also a means whereby affected communities can provide another perspective on an evolving situation.

FIGURE 1. DATA SUPPLY CHAIN



Source: Author's compilation based on the crisis rooms conference presentation by Nathaniel Manning (USHAHIDI).

Crowds as knowledge generators

Participants in these 'crowds' are often tasked with compiling information about specific events through individual submissions of data. Many of the better-known examples of crowdsourcing thus produce so-called 'crowd-maps' which foster situational awareness at a high temporal and spatial resolution.

For instance, the crisis-mapping platform Ushahidi was born out of a volunteer project in the wake of the violence that ensued from the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections. As a reaction to biased news coverage, Ushahidi leveraged the intersection of social activism and citizen journalism. The platform enabled people to report incidents of violence via text message, email, a dedicated Twitter hashtag, and an online form. Where possible, these reports were subsequently verified by the Ushahidi team on the basis of information available from aid agencies and non-governmental organisations on the ground.

Ushahidi rapidly developed into an open-source tool that has since been used in a plethora of locations and contexts. A Japanese version, called Sinsai.info, was launched only four hours after the earthquake that struck in March 2011, allowing the population to geo-tag and map reports from Twitter and categorise them by types of available

resources: evacuation shelters, operating food stores, petrol stations, and locations for charging mobile phones.

Crowds as sources

Openly available exchanges between users of social media like Twitter and Facebook are often valuable sources of information. While engaging in such forms of communication, individuals are not necessarily aware that the content they create contributes to a broader knowledge-generation effort.

FIGURE 2. SCREENSHOT OF THE USHAHIDI MAP ON SINSAI.COM

In the wake of the earthquake that levelled much of Haiti's most populous areas in early 2010, mobile phone networks were restored within days after the tremor damaged and destroyed a substantial number of mobile phone towers. This enabled crowdsourcing to be deployed as an information-gathering tool at an early stage. An expanding network of international volunteers initially captured, organised and shared the knowledge that was accessible through news media, social networks and blogs. This intelligence proved to be crucial for response teams on the ground in grasping the scope of the crisis.

Subsequently, the full spectrum of crowdsourcing services was deployed to support the disaster response and reconstruction. The effort became more substantial and structured once people began contributing consciously by supplying, sorting and locating the information. The resulting geospatial data on trapped persons and medical emergencies, for instance, were openly accessible and used in particular by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the US Coast Guard.

Similarly, the Haitian cholera outbreak later that year, which has since led to thousands of deaths and a spread of the infectious disease to surrounding countries, could have been detected by public authorities up to two weeks earlier if the information circulating in non-traditional channels such as blogs and social networks had been taken into

account. Taking such data more seriously would have also painted a clearer picture of the spread of the outbreak.

Crowds as analysts

The response to the Haiti earthquake was undoubtedly a catalyst, as it illustrated that the knowledge held by disaster-affected communities is key to effective response operations. Ever since, satellite images and other kinds of imagery have increasingly attracted the attention of crowdsourcing platforms. Digital volunteers map areas by tagging remotely sensed imagery, constituting a type of crowdsourcing that breaks down a large task into smaller ones. The sheer number of participants makes all the difference in the successful performance of these micro-tasks.

FIGURE 3. SCREENSHOT FROM TOMNOD



Tomnod is a web interface owned by satellite imagery provider DigitalGlobe that lets users tag overhead images. This image shows Tonga after a cyclone struck the archipelago.

Between 2010 and 2012, a famine in southern Somalia left over a quarter of a million people dead and saw hundreds of thousands abandon their homes to flock to urban areas. A partnership initiated by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) managed an online platform that let users tag different types of housing structures. Based on these data, the UNHCR obtained a better population estimate for the Afgooye corridor, just outside Mogadishu, home to the largest concentration of internally displaced persons on earth. The marginal contributions of numerous volunteers allowed for an inexpensive yet no less accurate analysis that did not require additional staff on the ground.

Crowds as communities

The proliferation of *ad hoc* crowdsourcing initiatives has resulted in their gradual institutionalisation. The Standby Task Force (SBTF), created in 2010, currently comprises some 1,000 'crisis mappers' from over 70 countries. Established by a widely dispersed group of dedicated volunteers, SBTF provides crowdsourcing, mapping, and data analysis during crises, which has made it a valuable resource for a range of organisations.

FIGURE 4. SCREENSHOT OF THE HOT MAP FOR HAIYAN



Additional expertise is created through consortia of volunteer and technical communities such as the Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN). DHN provides an interface between humanitarian organisations and informal volunteer networks. It was most recently activated by OCHA to perform a rapid damage and needs assessment in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. OCHA is a major partner of DHN and regularly provides funds to support its activities.

There is, of course, an inherent risk that leaving citizen investigators to their own devices can become a double-edged sword. During the search for images of the bombers at the Boston marathon in April 2013, users of social news website *reddit* and imageboard website *4chan* wrongly accused several bystanders in an incident that displayed blatant racial profiling.

To avoid similar problems, crowdsourcing processes are usually monitored, and organisations tend to adopt codes of conduct or guidelines for collaboration. In general, the higher the level of public interest and participation in such projects, the higher the quality of the information retrieved. Stronger participation also makes the process less prone to being hijacked. Additional measures to improve the accuracy of data include performance and reputation-based user ratings as well as checking individual data against a range of other sources and against the average crowd output.

Examples of crowd-sourced disaster response: Typhoon Haiyan

Actors: a number of traditional and non-traditional actors took part in providing humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the typhoon:

- The *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)* is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. For the first time, OCHA deployed officials charged specifically with coordinating crowd-sourced mapping with volunteer groups in the case of Typhoon Haiyan.
- The *Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT)* applies the principles of open-source and open-data sharing for humanitarian response and economic development. OpenStreetMap (OSM) is a project to create a free and open map of the entire world, built entirely by volunteers surveying with GPS, digitising aerial imagery, and sharing existing public sources of geographic data.
- The *Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN)* is an umbrella group of 16 volunteer technology organisations created in 2012 to act as an interface between those groups and conventional humanitarian organisations. DHN brings together expertise in geographical information systems, online mapping, data analysis and statistics. It also develops user-friendly tools that enable untrained volunteers to contribute to responses.
- *Standby Task Force (SBTF)* organises digital volunteers into a flexible, trained and prepared network ready to deploy in crises. The concept for the Task Force was launched in 2010 to streamline online volunteer support for crisis mapping and to provide a dedicated interface for the humanitarian community.

Data collection: national space agencies and commercial satellite-image providers generate the majority of the geographical and imagery data sets needed by mappers in a disaster response. The European Union's Copernicus Emergency Management Service (GIO-EMS) published its first imagery within 36 hours of Haiyan's landfall. HOT's volunteers used that data to furnish maps with more than two million annotations. They feature locations of damaged and intact buildings, blocked and open roads, and the locations of key infrastructure such as hospitals. SBTF and other widely distributed networks of volunteers tapped more than one million tweets, text messages and other social-media items to track the unfolding disaster.

Data management: OSM disposes of a long-standing and technically sophisticated framework for mapping data that is applied to humanitarian ends through HOT. MicroMappers, a new tool to sift through tweets and pictures to locate and evaluate damage, represents an example of social innovation that uses social media analysis and hosts an online interface.

Data processing: MicroMappers used machine-learning software to forage for tweets relevant to relief and response. It reduced the number of tweets in need of manual tagging by volunteers by around 80%. Algorithmic, statistical and expert analysis of the data provided by MicroMappers and overhead imagery analysis initiatives consolidates and increases the reliability of the data. Data from satellite image analysis is aligned with geospatial maps at this stage.

Data sharing: Most crowdsourcing is reciprocally open in that anyone can partake and the product of the collective effort is openly available. Raw and visualised data, such as OSM's maps, were furthermore shared with specific governmental and non-governmental disaster management organisations.

Decision-making: Many relief organisations, including OCHA and *Médecins Sans Frontières*, worked in the Philippines on the basis of continually updated maps generated by more than 1,000 OSM-volunteers from 82 countries. HOT was one of the ten digital volunteer organisations officially tasked by OCHA and the Philippine Red Cross.

Sources: Nature, OCHA, Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team, Digital Humanitarian Network, Standby Task Force

MOBILISING THE NETIZENS

These examples provide just a snapshot of the plethora of existing volunteer, start-up and experimental projects. As a practice still in the making, the means and ends of investing in crowdsourcing will eventually have to be addressed by policymakers in a more coherent framework in order to maximise its use and utility while mitigating its shortcomings.

Harnessing the cumulative knowledge amassed by a crowd and translating its findings into practice is still a learning process. In return for more trust in the accuracy and reliability of crowd-sourced data, verification methods must be reviewed. Eventually, traditional state actors will have to learn to work with the broader community of netizens.

This may imply partially shifting from (actively) gathering information – which, in a crisis, is often overwhelming – to facilitating the process and (reactively) verifying the output.

It is evident, however, that the knowledge generated by large networked online communities can be used to substantially inform policy choices in emergencies. Using crowdsourcing proactively can therefore help unlock vast potential resources and, most importantly, help save lives and meet basic humanitarian needs.

Linking crises, disasters and conflicts

17

Catherine Sheahan

Disasters and conflict often occur together. Although there may not be a direct causal link between the two, 'common tendencies' or effects can be seen across countries when both converge.[1]

The risk of conflict can increase during or after a disaster, stemming, for example, from a scarcity of resources, such as a limited supply of clean water, food, and necessary supplies. This is especially true in countries where competition over resources already exists.[2] In addition, conflict zones often diminish the capacity for disaster prevention and mitigation (i.e. early-warning mechanisms and disaster preparedness) and so can increase the risks and devastating effects of disasters. A 2011 UNDP study pointed to governance as the key enabler in disaster management. In developing countries, weaker institutions can hinder disaster recovery and lead to, or indeed reignite, conflict. Furthermore, climate change may also affect the occurrence of natural disasters and conflict.

To gain a better understanding of the relationship between disasters and conflict, it is useful to map both. To this end, the present chapter uses data from EM-DAT: the International Disaster Database at The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (for disasters; according to the number of people killed and affected by natural disasters) and records from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Battle-Related Deaths Dataset vol. 5, 2013 (for conflicts; according to best estimates of battle deaths per year). The chapter maps the impact of natural disasters on conflict by comparing the impact of the 2008 Indian Ocean tsunami on the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The study also assesses how conflict impacts on the way natural disasters are dealt with by mapping the occurrence of both in Somalia from 2004-2012. Finally, the study briefly explores the relationship between climate change, disasters and conflict by comparing vulnerability to climate change globally and battle-related deaths from 2007-2012.

DEFINING DISASTERS

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) describes disasters as 'situations' or 'events', not always sudden, which 'overwhelm local capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for external assistance'.

1. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, *Disaster Conflict Interface: comparative experiences*, 2011. See also: Overseas Development Institute, *When disasters and conflicts collide: Improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention,* February 2013.

2. Dawn Brancati, 'Political Aftershocks: The Impact of Earthquakes on Intrastate Conflict', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51(5), 2007, pp. 715-43.

Disasters can be caused by nature or by humans, either intentionally or unintentionally. Furthermore, the consequences of natural disasters can be exacerbated by conditions on the ground, such as a famine during a conflict, or vice versa. Although no two disasters are the same, a few defining features exist, including at a minimum: human suffering; material loss; and the need for external assistance to maintain social, ecological, economic and/or political stability.

Defining the *scope* of a disaster, however, can be a more difficult task, as considerations can often be stakeholder-dependent. For instance, following a disaster, an economist may be concerned with the financial damage, while a public health official may worry about the risk of an epidemic. When defining the scope of a disaster it is also useful to consider levels of analysis.

For a disaster to be entered into the EM-DAT database at least one of the following criteria must be met:

- A death toll of ten or more
- At least 100 people affected
- A declaration of a state of emergency by the relevant authority
- A request by the national government for international assistance

The EM-DAT database breaks disasters down into types. Natural disasters are generally classified under five headings: geophysical, meteorological, hydrological, climatological and biological. Although it does not specifically label 'man-made disasters' it does outline the types of technological disasters attributed to man: industrial, transport and miscellaneous. Complex disasters are also classified to include famine and refugee movement.

Natural disasters

- Geophysical – earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, volcanic activity
- Meteorological – cyclone, storm, wave surges
- Hydrological – flood, avalanches
- Climatological – extreme temperature, drought, wildfire
- Biological – epidemic, insect infestation, animal stampede

Man-made disasters

- Industrial – accidents in industrial buildings, explosions, oil spills
- Transport – air, boat, rail and road transport
- Miscellaneous – fire, building collapse
- Complex disasters – famine, refugee movement

DEFINING CONFLICT

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines an armed conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths each year.'

It defines battle-related deaths as referring to deaths caused by warring parties that can be directly related to combat. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities, urban warfare (e.g. bombs, explosions and assassinations), and bombardments of military bases, cities and villages. All fatalities incurred in an attack are counted as battle-related deaths. The target of the attack must be the military forces or party representatives, but civilians caught in the crossfire are also counted.

THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON CONFLICT

The impact of natural disasters on conflict has been identified in the scholarship and is summed up in Table 1. Natural disasters tend to exacerbate pre-existing conflicts, with only a few cases in which disasters have led to conflict resolution.[3] The 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean had different effects on the conflicts in Sri Lanka and the Aceh region in Indonesia.

3. Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2013.

TABLE 1. IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON CONFLICT

Grievances	Natural disasters can increase the risk of conflict over grievances, e.g. resource competition and inequality. Conflict, notably civil war, can be caused by diminished state capacity, especially in poverty-stricken states*
Opportunity	(1) Economic opportunity. Post-disaster, some groups can seize the opportunity to secure certain resources (2) Political opportunity. Natural disasters can provide an opportunity to use power to manipulate aid distribution or to facilitate military game plans
Feasibility	Natural disasters can affect the feasibility of conflict, i.e. they can alter the opportunity cost of conflict. They can affect state capacity to cope with disaster, increase grievances or provide opposition groups with fuel to recruit fighters by providing employment, food security, etc

* James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1, February 2003, pp.75-90.

Source: Adapted from Overseas Development Institute Study, 2013

Case study: Sri Lanka

- In Sri Lanka, conflict in the long-running civil war increased in intensity two years after the tsunami. A ceasefire agreement in place since 2002 between the government and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) collapsed in 2006. Figure 1 illustrates the consequential increase in battle-related deaths from 2006, reaching a peak in 2008.[4]
- The conflict eventually came to an end in 2009 when the military defeated LTTE.

FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS AND BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS 2000-2008



4. Unless otherwise indicated, all diagrams and maps were prepared by the author on the basis of data from the International Disaster Database at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and records from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).

- Grievances over the unequal distribution of aid fuelled tensions in the country. LLTE demanded power to distribute aid in areas under their control, through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which was less transparent and undermined government procedures.[5]
- The government was accused of directing aid away from Tamil-controlled areas. In addition plans for a Post-Tsunami Operational Management System, devised as a way for both the government and LLTE to distribute aid fairly and efficiently, never came into fruition. Nationalist groups saw the political opportunity to denounce the System as a means to legitimise LLTE and garner support for subsequent national elections.
- In terms of feasibility, LTTE saw their renewed popularity as an opportunity to pursue secessionist goals.

Case study: Aceh

- In the immediate and medium-term aftermath of the tsunami in Aceh, conflict ceased.
- Figure 2 charts the region's progression towards peace with battle-related deaths declining from a peak of 738 in 2004 to zero recorded deaths in 2006.
- The disaster provided a political opportunity to engage with the Free Aceh Movement. The Movement agreed to a unilateral ceasefire four days after the tsunami with a peace agreement following in 2005.
- The disaster put the Aceh region in the media spotlight and provided both sides with opportunities to advance goals.[6]

FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS AND BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS 2000-2008



5. International Crisis Group, 'Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process', *Asia Report* no. 124, 28 November 2006.

6. Arno Waizenegger and Jennifer Hyndman, 'Two Solitudes: post-tsunami & post-conflict Aceh', *Disasters,* vol. 34, no. 3, 2010, pp. 787-808.

- 'Disaster diplomacy',[7] which uses disaster recovery as a way to introduce peace talks between both sides, included discussions and the 2005 Peace Agreement, focusing on greater access to resources.[8] However, a draft had been in place before the disaster which may have affected the feasibility of renewed conflict.

THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON DEALING WITH NATURAL DISASTERS

Repeated cycles of conflict can impact on disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response (Table 2). It can also cause the effects to spread across borders. For example, Somalia has seen almost two decades of conflict. Between 2008 and 2012 the country experienced three major droughts (2008, 2010, and 2012) and floods every year. These disasters severely affected livestock and food production, so much so that in 2011 the UN declared parts of South Somalia to be in a state of famine.

TABLE 2. IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON DEALING WITH NATURAL DISASTERS

Governance	Conflict weakens governance. Pre-disaster it can increase vulnerability to disaster as it reduces capacity for disaster preparedness,* e.g. weak institutional capacity may mean that building codes are not properly enforced, poor infrastructure can increase risk of damage. Post-disaster, weak governance can impede disaster response, e.g. inefficient or corrupt aid distribution.
Displacement	Violent conflict leads to displacement. Often settlement occurs in high-risk areas. Both conflict and natural disasters destroy infrastructure and so can hinder relocation prospects.
Competition over resources	Post-disaster there may be difficulty with distributing aid effectively, rebel-controlled areas may make it difficult for government or international aid organisations to enter certain areas.

* Peter Walker, Ben Wisner, Jennifer Leaning and Larry Minear, 'Smoke and mirrors: deficiencies in disaster funding', *BMJ*, vol. 330(7485), January 2005, pp. 247-50.

Source: Adapted from Overseas Development Institute Study, 2013.

7. Ilan Kelman, *Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters affect Peace and Conflict* (London: Routledge, 2011).

8. Jennifer Hyndman, 'Siting conflict and peace in post-tsunami Sri Lanka and Aceh, Indonesia', *Norwegian Journal of Geography*, vol. 63, no. 1, 2009, pp. 89-96.

Case study: Somalia

- Somalia is one of the world's most fragile states. Since the downfall of President Barre in 1991, the country has at times been leaderless and the government frequently contested. The rise of piracy and Islamist insurgency in the mid 2000s further drained capacities away from disaster preparedness.

- Figure 3 shows the relationship between disasters in Somalia and conflict. Battle-related deaths ranged from 114 in 2004 to a peak of 2,620 in 2012. Similarly, the number of people affected by disasters rose dramatically with each drought in 2008, 2010, and 2012. (The number of people affected is calculated in the year the disaster occurred, this may account for the fluctuation. The number of people affected in the intervening years was below 50,000).

- Somalia experienced high levels of displacement and refugee movement, a consequence of both disaster and conflict during those years. These created an internally displaced population of 1.1 million, with almost 1 million refugees further displaced in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen.[9] Displacement has put additional strain on the capacities and stability of these neighbouring countries. For example, in 2013, escalating tensions in already strained refugee camps in Kenya prompted hundreds of Somali refugees to flee the Dadaab camp and return home.[10]

FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS AND BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS 2000-2008



- In 2009, the US delayed the disbursement of millions of dollars of aid over concerns that UN contractors were funneling aid money to support Islamist insurgents. The effects of this were widespread as rebel-controlled areas comprised over 60% of the country.[11]

9. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Somalia Consolidated Appeal 2013-2015*, 2012.

10. UNOCHA, *Somalia: Humanitarian Snapshot*, 2012.

11. Jeffry Gettleman, 'U.S. Delays Somalia Aid, Fearing It Is Feeding Terrorists', *New York Times*, 1 October 2009.

Case study: climate change

There were three times as many natural disasters from 2000 to 2009 as there were from 1980 to 1989. The growth is mainly in climate-related events, accounting for nearly 80% of the increase. Furthermore, the scale of disasters has expanded owing to increased rates of urbanisation, deforestation and environmental degradation, and to intensifying climate variables.[12] Figure 4 highlights places most vulnerable to climate change. Vulnerability was calculated by a combination of (i) exposure to climate-related natural disasters and sea-level rise and (ii) human sensitivity, in terms of population patterns, development, natural resources, agricultural dependency and conflicts. It also assesses future vulnerability by considering the adaptive capacity of a country's government and infrastructure to combat climate change. The Index highlights developing countries as most vulnerable to climate change. Conflict follows a similar geographical pattern (figure 5), with developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, most affected between 2007 and 2012.

FIGURE 4. CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY INDEX 2014



Source: Maplecroft.

12. Jennifer Leaning and Debarati Guha-Sapir, 'Natural Disasters, Armed Conflict, and Public Health', *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 369, no. 19, November 2013, pp.1836-42.

FIGURE 5. BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS IN YEARS 2007-2012



Source: Author's compilation.

AREAS OF FURTHER INTEREST

Although the links between disasters and conflict may not be strong enough to establish a direct causal relationship, from the brief analysis above, it is clear that common tendencies do in fact occur across space and time. Figures 6 and 7 map battle-related deaths and the number of people killed and affected by natural disasters over a 12-year period. These may provide a useful basis for further analysis of links between the two.

The comparison shows many areas of overlap, for example in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. As discussed above, the overlap has many mitigating factors such as weak governance, institutional capacity, and grievances.

Good governance and adequate distribution of resources may account for why some regions that experience disaster (e.g. Australia) do not experience conflict.

FIGURE 6. BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS 2000-2012



Source: Author's compilation.

FIGURE 7. NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED AND AFFECTED BY DISASTER 2000-2012



Source: Author's compilation.

Overview of crisis rooms

Julia Manchin

18

There is a growing consensus among crisis-response and early-warning practitioners on the need for closer cooperation. However, views regarding the extent, desired methods and scope of this cooperation vary. The most fundamental step towards better connectivity and cooperation among crisis rooms is an understanding of the different actors, their mandates, organisational structures and activities. What follows is a description of selected crisis rooms, situation rooms and early-warning mechanisms, and their basic features, activities and mandates.

METHODOLOGY

Between November 2013 and February 2014, the EU Institute for Security Studies conducted a survey among different crisis rooms to determine what their structure and working methods are and what analytical products they provide. The questionnaire also sought to identify their shortcomings and needs, and asked for recommendations for improved cooperation. The information presented is based on interviews with the head of the body concerned where possible, and on data presented on the organisations' official websites, with additional input from the '*Towards a Global Network of Crisis Rooms*' conference.

RESULTS

The most frequently shared and relevant concerns and suggestions included the following:

1. *Better knowledge of other actors:* Almost all interviewees concluded that in order to have better cooperation among crisis rooms, actors needed to have a better understanding of other actors' work in the field: the scope of their work; their methods of operation as well as the specific issues they work on at a given time. Several actors suggested that, although it is useful to have general knowledge about other crisis rooms' mandates and operations, it would be even more beneficial to have direct personal connections and networks with them. All in all, there is a clear need to continue to jointly organise seminars and conferences in order to facilitate informal connections between centres.
2. *Obstacles to cooperation*: The last section of the questionnaire focused on perceived obstacles to cooperation and on recommendations for improved connectivity among crisis rooms. One of the most common concerns was the limited extent to which information and analysis is shared, due to the fact that crisis rooms do not

have the authority or a mandate to share information and products automatically, even when an analysis was based on open sources. Several crisis rooms cited a lack of political leadership that would call for a more open and constructive engagement between crisis rooms concerning emerging risks and crises.

3. *Quality of information:* While some actors cited a lack of information about certain situations or events as a major problem, others argued that with an abundance of information available, the problem was often one of not knowing whether it was relevant to a given situation.

4. *Framework for cooperation:* There was a wide variety of views regarding the optimal framework for cooperation among crisis rooms. Most agreed that a mechanism to share information in a restrictive environment would be beneficial, but there were also arguments against institutionalising such a process, and many emphasised that a good working relationship and informal connections were essential regardless of any framework. Some interlocutors even suggested that a well-functioning informal network among practitioners would ultimately be of more value than a formal structure. Several argued for a simple and flexible structure to be set up for information sharing among crisis rooms, which would enable pragmatic interaction and decision-making to be swift and effective. According to most interlocutors, even without a mandate to share information,, productive interaction through desk-to-desk connections is already a reality.

5. *Training:* When asked what type of joint training would be beneficial for crisis rooms, suggestions included common training on: determining early-warning signs; methods of information sharing; ways to cooperate in a timely manner; methodologies for providing assessments on a strategic level and sharing 'lessons learned', especially across regions and between countries affected by different types of conflicts.

6. *Shortcomings:* In several cases, the gap between warning and response remains an important issue, although this was not the case in crisis rooms with directly integrated response mechanisms or in crisis rooms with a direct link to decision-makers. The majority of interviewees cited inadequate knowledge and experience of systematic social media monitoring as a shortcoming within their unit or department. Regional organisations at times face sensitive national and regional political environments and a lack of trust in and among their members, which can create challenges to monitoring and analysing situations in member states.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SURVEY

The globalised and trans-national nature of crises has led to the widely accepted understanding that effective response to crises similarly needs to be trans-national, multidimensional and well-coordinated among different actors. Necessary improvements towards more effective response to emergencies entail better-orchestrated efforts of actors in the crisis prevention and response field.

Earlier initiatives to create an informal network of crisis rooms included the *Club of Budapest*, started in 2007 by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the conference '*Open Source Intelligence and Modern Diplomacy*', and later endorsed by the European Commission. The *Club of Budapest* aimed to foster dialogue and create a community of trust among European intelligence and security professionals. Through a series of 10 conferences, common exercises and a platform, Intelipedia, that it set up to facilitate open source intelligence sharing, the *Club of Budapest* strengthened informal networks between professionals from the early warning, risk analysis and crisis response fields, and eased everyday cooperation among them.

Another initiative which functioned as a vector for the creation of informal networks among EU players was VIRTUOSO (Versatile Information Toolkit for End-Users Oriented Open-Sources Exploitations), an FP7-funded project sponsored by the European Commission, which created an integrated toolkit to enhance the use of open source intelligence in the security field. The *Eurosint Forum* (a pan-European network of over 400 intelligence professionals working in agencies and administrations across the member states and EU institutions) participated in the promotion of VIRTUOSO, and still continues to develop informal networks on the basis of a new FP7 Grant through the RECOBIA project (Reduction of Cognitive Bias in Intelligence Analysis), which aims to improve the quality of intelligence analysis by reducing the negative impact of cognitive biases in such analysis).

The 2013 *Towards a Global Network of Crisis Rooms* conference brought together crisis and conflict prevention and response actors from around the globe. The conference provided for extensive debate on the necessary steps to enhance early warning and response capabilities.

Our study, as well as the opinions presented at the conference, suggested that there is no clear consensus on the scale of necessary cooperation among crisis response practitioners. In theory most actors support the sharing of information, but the more pragmatic questions regarding the type of information and analysis to share, the methods

of information sharing and the inclusiveness of such an endeavour proved to be more divisive.

Most crisis rooms operate using classified information, which was cited as one of the basic factors that complicate any automatic sharing of information throughout our interviews and during the conference as well. However, representatives of several regional organisations argued that often the information used for risk assessments and analyses is not classified, and thus could and should be shared with other actors. They found the limited information and assessment sharing of larger organisations (especially the UN and NATO) a counterproductive practice. Several regional organisations suggested that, even in cases where classified information is used, the creation of a less detailed, shareable version of reports would require little effort, but would be beneficial to other organisations.

A secure platform connecting crisis rooms across regions could be the next step towards better cooperation. As suggested by several actors, such a web-based secure platform could allow for crisis rooms to upload information on the issues they focus on in a given period of time, including a short assessment of key risks and early warning signs. Crisis rooms would be able to interact with one another through the platform and have a more comprehensive overview of what others deem most important in a given period of time; they would have access to comments on 'hotspots', the 'watch lists', and risk assessments of other actors.

Limitations of current research

Due to the limited scope of our current survey, this research does not provide a full overview of either crisis rooms or early warning systems. It also does not fully explore and present the European External Action Service's three early warning systems, located in: (1) the Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments Division; (2) the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), which includes both civilian intelligence analysis (EU INTCEN) and military intelligence (EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate) and (3) the EU SITROOM in the EEAS. We present international organisations' crisis rooms, but several organisations have more than one crisis room or situation room, and some of the crisis rooms presented here operate within a larger system dedicated to early warning and response.

Recommendations for further research

For a more complete overview of crisis rooms, early warning mechanisms and hybrid organisations, additional research is needed. Further research should be based on an expanded questionnaire. There should be more thorough examination regarding the information used by crisis rooms, including the use of classified intelligence, subscription services (such as Stratfor, Jane's Intelligence, Oxford Analytica etc.), but also the use of open source intelligence. A more comprehensive questionnaire should ask for detailed descriptions of the given unit's use of technology; it should explore the use of geospatial imagery, communications tools, and the use of special software for analysis as well as for data mining. The number of international and regional organisations and countries included in the study should also be enlarged. Clarification regarding each crisis room's definition of 'early warning' should be sought, and there should be further inquiries about the various types of analyses (especially early warning analysis vs. scenario analysis) conducted within a given unit. To shed more light on perceptions on limits to cooperation between crisis rooms, further research should include an in-depth interview process that would seek to identify the level of trust existing between crisis rooms, and other crisis response practitioners.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

		1. CEWS	2. CEWARN	3. ECOWARN
Mandate	Event monitoring	✓	✓	✓
	Evidence base for decision-makers	✓	✓	✓
	Early warning and/or scenario building	✓	✓	✓
	Integrated response mechanism[2]			
	Coordination of crisis response[1]			
Analysis	Field-based monitoring	✓	✓	✓
	Indicator-based analysis	✓	✓	✓
	Quantitative analysis	✓	✓	✓
	Qualitative analysis	✓	✓	✓
	Regular products	✓	✓	✓
	Provides recommendations for decision-makers	✓	✓	✓
Source	Open sources	✓	✓	✓
	Systematic social media analysis			
	Use geospatial information (GIS)	✓	✓	

1. Although the unit does not initiate, authorise or direct crisis response it coordinates the preparation for crisis response, and/or coordinates within the organisation's relevant departments and outside actors during the response.

2. The unit includes an institutionalised mechanism, which allows it to set off response to a crisis. The unit can call upon a larger system of response within the organisation to support its efforts, but it also has the authority to initiate and activate crisis response.

1. African Union (AU)/Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

Structure

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) of the African Union (AU) is under the responsibility of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division, one of the three divisions located in the AU's Peace and Security Department. The other two divisions are the Conflict Management and Post Conflict Reconstruction Division, and the Peace Support Operations Division.

The CEWS Chairperson reports to the Peace and Security Council, the AU's standing decision-making body, whose responsibilities are defined as 'the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts'. The geographical focus of the CEWS is the 54 member states of the African Union.

The CEWS has an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC), which is also connected to the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. CEWS is mandated to share information and analysis with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); South African Development Community (SADC); Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM); and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). Since the early-warning mechanisms at the RECs are at different levels of development and have various operational capacities, structural cooperation has not yet become fully institutionalised.

Mission

The CEWS's mandate is to anticipate and prevent conflicts on the African continent. Its OMC collects and analyses data on emerging conflicts and crises in Africa. Its aim is to inform decision-making on emerging threats, risks and crises.

Analysis

The OMC monitors events and uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis to prepare foresight reports on evolving threats to security. It has several web-based tools and modules to identify trends and point to risks and vulnerabilities. The OMC's sources

include both primary sources (field missions and liaison offices) and open sources (media, social media and secondary analysis).

Products

CEWS produces daily and weekly reports as well as less regular thematic reports and short- and medium-term situation updates. Recommendation for action is not necessarily a part of these products, but can be included.

2. ECOWARN/ Economic Community of West African States, Early Warning and Response Network

Structure

ECOWARN is the early warning mechanism of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organisation with 15 member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) was implemented in 2003, in accordance with the Protocol adopted by ECOWAS in 1998.

The Early Warning Directorate comes under the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, along with the Peace Keeping and Security Directorate, and the Political Affairs Directorate. It is composed of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC), four zonal bureaus (in Gambia, Benin, Burkina Faso and Liberia) and 30 field monitors across member states. The member states are clustered into four groups, roughly corresponding to the conflict systems in the region. The ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is responsible for ECOWARN. She is one of seven commissioners at the ECOWAS Commission, the main decision-making and regulatory body of ECOWAS.

Mission

ECOWARN's aim is to prevent and mitigate conflicts in the West African region. It is mandated to conduct monitoring, early warning and analysis before a crisis erupts, during its course and after it has been resolved.

Analysis

ECOWARN's information gathering and conflict monitoring is strongly field-based, with a wide set of indicators that trace a range of human security issues. The information, uploaded through a web-based tool, is analysed initially at zonal bureaus and then forwarded to the OMC. The Early Warning System uses six different web-based modules to facilitate information flow between field monitors, the OMC, experts from member states, and related UN offices. ECOWARN mainly targets events data and provides forecasts for up to six months.

While at the start of its operation the OMC conducted mostly qualitative analysis, due to the sensitive regional political environment, an additional quantitative element was added for a more objective result. Early warning reports are prepared based on emerging threats and risks from weighing indicators and the results of events monitoring.

Products

ECOWARN prepares regular situation reports covering the region, and monthly policy briefs with a recommendation for action forwarded to the ECOWAS Commission. Countries are ranked according to their vulnerability to threats of insecurity, and the highest-ranking ones are the focus of policy briefs. In the event of a significant incident that could have an impact on regional security, an incident report is also prepared. Thematic reports are occasionally issued, with cooperation from other Directorates. Analysis and conclusions are shared with the Political Affairs Directorate and the Commission, which is responsible for decision-making and response.

3. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)/Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

Structure

IGAD is a regional organisation in Eastern Africa, with eight member states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. Its common mechanism for conflict prevention and mitigation, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was set up in 2002 by IGAD member states. CEWARN is also linked to the AU's CEWS and is a part of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

CEWARN operates at the regional, national and local levels. At the regional level, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, which consists of delegates from foreign ministries, IGAD's Executive Secretary and the Director of Political Affairs, meets twice a year to exchange views and information on crisis prevention. The Technical Committee on Early Warning (TCEW), made up of the heads of the National Conflict Early Warning and Response Units – including security officials, members of parliament as well as civil society actors – is located in the relevant ministries of member states. TCEW reviews consultative reports of CEWARN mechanisms, and supports cooperation between national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs). CEWARN assists and facilitates cooperation among CEWERUs, and coordinates and manages a database on early warning. At the national level, CEWERUs collect information and prepare analysis on early warning and response, with possible scenarios. Selected national research institutes also support CEWARN in information collection and analysis. Local Committees, which consist of representatives from the government and from non-governmental organisations, have a crucial role in coordinating the collection and dissemination of information. Field monitors collect and report information relevant to their area of reporting.

Mission

CEWARN's aim is to provide effective early warning on emerging crises and conflicts in the IGAD region to relevant governmental and non-governmental decision-makers. This is defined as providing in-depth and timely analysis and assessment and the timely and targeted dissemination of this knowledge to key decision-makers. Its geographical focus is concentrated on three regions: the Karamoja Cluster, the Somali Cluster and the Dikhil Cluster. CEWARN has also built up a Rapid Response Fund, to provide a pool of funding available for short-term prevention and de-escalation projects and immediate response to conflicts.

Analysis

CEWARN's early-warning methodology is based on an early-warning program, FAST International, developed by Swisspeace. It uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis, and has an indicator-based monitoring system and a strong local network for information gathering. For the first decade of its operations, CEWARN focused on conflicts between pastoralist groups, but this has been expanded to include other types of violent conflicts in CEWARN's 2012-2019 Strategy Framework. CEWARN's information collection and monitoring is strongly field-based.

Products

CEWARN prepares regular alerts and reports on crisis early warning. Scenario building and various options for preventing and/or responding to conflicts are also included in these.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: CRISIS ROOMS, SITUATION ROOMS

		1. AHA CENTRE[4]	2. CDEMA[5]	3. EEAS SITCEN	4. ICRC SCMU	5. INTERPOL CCC	6. LAS	7. NATO EADRCC[6]	8. NATO SITCEN
Sources	Use geospatial information (GIS)	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
	Systematic social media analysis			✓	✓	✓			✓
	Open sources	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Analysis	Provides recommendations for decision-makers	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	
	Regular products	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Qualitative analysis			✓	✓		✓		✓
	Quantitative analysis			✓	✓				✓
	Indicator-based analysis			✓	✓		✓		
	Field-based monitoring				✓				
Mandate	Coordination of crisis[1] response	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	
	Communications centre[2]			✓		✓		✓	✓
	Integrated response mechanism[3]	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	
	Early warning and/or scenario building	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		
	Evidence base for decision-makers	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Event monitoring	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

	Mandate					Analysis						Sources		
	Event monitoring	Evidence base for decision-makers	Early warning and/or scenario building	Integrated response mechanism[3]	Communications centre[2]	Coordination of crisis[1] response	Field-based monitoring	Indicator-based analysis	Quantitative analysis	Qualitative analysis	Regular products	Provides recommendations for decision-makers	Open sources	Systematic social media analysis	Use geospatial information (GIS)
9. OSCE/ CPC	✓	✓			✓					✓	✓		✓		
10. UNOCC	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

1. Although the unit does not initiate, authorise or direct crisis response it coordinates the preparation for crisis response, and/or coordinates within the organisation's relevant departments and outside actors during the response.

2. The unit facilitates around the clock communication for the organisation it serves, and connects it with other departments, relevant actors and institutions and at times the public as well.

3. The unit includes an institutionalised mechanism, which allows it to set off response to a crisis. The unit can call upon a larger system of response within the organisation to support its efforts, but it also has the authority to initiate and activate crisis response.

4. Monitors natural disaster-related threats and crises.

5. Monitors natural disaster-related threats and crises.

6. Monitors natural disaster-related threats and crises.

1. ASEAN/Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA)

Structure

The AHA Centre was established in 2011 and is an intergovernmental organisation of ten ASEAN member states (Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Philippines, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia). The AHA centre is connected to National Focal Points (NFPs) in all member states, and works as a central organiser for disaster response among them; it collects and manages data from NFPs and conducts regional-level risk assessment. The NFPs comprise the heads or other high-ranking officials of national disaster-management offices. They regularly interact and meet twice a year.

The AHA Centre has at its disposal the Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), which can be deployed in the event of a natural disaster. The ERAT consists of staff from national disaster offices and other organisations in member states who have completed special ERAT training. ERAT is a standby resource, which can be called into action upon request from AHA.

Mission

The AHA Centre was created with the aim of better preparing for, managing and responding to natural disasters in the region. The AHA Centre prepares aggregate regional disaster situation analysis, and coordinates response and relief measures among its member states.

Activities

The AHA Centre dispatches data and information to NFPs on a regular weekly basis and provides them with flash updates and situation updates. The NFPs themselves then proceed to analyse and use the data for their own purposes. In case there is a need for a regional joint emergency response, NFPs can request coordination and assistance from the AHA Centre.

The AHA Centre operates with a Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS) which gathers data on hazards from international and regional sources and facilitates interagency and intra-agency information sharing. The DMRS receives its information

in two ways: either through the live streaming of automatic updates from several sources, such as the Joint Taifun Centre, or through manual updates.

Upon request from an affected member state, the AHA Centre coordinates response to disasters. The AHA Centre has a certain amount of funds that it can allocate to affected regions. Once accepted by the affected member state, any offer for assistance and aid from another member state would also be coordinated through the Centre.

2. Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)

Structure

The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) is a regional organisation in the Caribbean with 18 participating states: Anguilla, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Haiti, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands. It was formerly known as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency, which was renamed and assigned an extended mandate in 2009. CDEMA is led by a Council (made up of participating states' heads of government), a Technical Advisory Committee (National Disaster Coordinators and delegates from specialised regional seismic/meteorological/hydrologic organisations) and a Coordinating Unit (under an appointed Executive Director).

Mission

CDEMA was set up to provide for the coordination of disaster relief in the region. Its main tasks are the mitigation of losses relating to natural disasters in participating states, coordination of disaster-related information to intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and working with national governments to enhance their policies on disaster loss reduction both domestically and regionally.

Activities

CDEMA coordinates between regional focal points that consist mostly of meteorological, seismic and hydrological institutes. It gathers information from these regional specialised institutes and from specialised agencies, which engage in early warning on floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. CDEMA takes this information to participating states to explore and map out their capacities and potential needs in case of a natural

disaster. They also advise the Chairman of the Council on possible strategies and involvement in affected areas. CDEMA has an emergency assistance fund that is available upon request for an affected participating state and after the Council's decision.

While CDEMA encourages and supports regional focal points and participating states to upgrade their technologies to have real-time geospatial imagery and other tools, not all participating states have such equipment, which often complicates information sharing.

3. European External Action Service (EEAS)/EU SITROOM

Structure

The Situation Room EU SITROOM was created in 2012 by merging assets derived from two pre-existing facilities (the European Council's SITCEN and the European Commission's DG RELEX Crisis Room). It is located in the European External Action Service's (EEAS) Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department and, along with the Crisis Platform and the Crisis Management Board, forms part of the EEAS Crisis Response System. It serves all the relevant EU institutional actors: the High Representative, the President of the European Council, the EEAS and the EU's CSDP missions and Special Representatives.

Mission

The EU SITROOM conducts constant global monitoring of events and crises. It also has an early-warning dimension, and alerts on emerging political, social and natural disasters. It also serves as the communications hub for the EU High Representative. The Situation Room supports EU political decision-making in the area of complex crises.

Analysis

The EU SITROOM monitors events globally, provides an SMS alert service in support of both the HQs and delegations, and uses analytical methods (including scenario analysis) to filter, rank and evaluate information. The EU SITROOM however does not write analytical reports. It uses both qualitative and quantitative methods and a variety of sources: open sources (media, social media and satellite imagery), regular and *ad hoc* reporting from (141) EU delegations around the world and regular reports from CSDP

Missions. The EU SITROOM is connected to crisis rooms in member states and EEAS field missions, as well as international organisations.

The EU SITROOM early warning section is connected to the Duty area and on a weekly basis reviews a list of countries and regions at risk. This list contains indications for the Duty Officers on the issues to be monitored in the given country or region. This work is further supported by statistical quantitative analysis. The EU SITROOM exchanges its risk assessment list with both SIAC and the Conflict Prevention Division. In specific instances the EU SITROOM performs scenario analysis in support of a delegation or in support to the top hierarchy of the EEAS.

Products

The EU SITROOM prepares a daily brief on worldwide international relations issues (HR Headlines) and an EEAS Delegation Press Review (compiled by the Press Offices of the EEAS Delegations Network). It also supports EU Crisis Platforms and compiles Crisis Response Factsheets.

4. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/Security and Crisis Management Support Unit

Structure

The Security and Crisis Management Support Unit (SCMSU) is located in the Department of Operations which oversees all ICRC field missions and activities. The Department is responsible for operational policies, global analysis and the coordination of the organisation's field activities. A number of National Red Cross Societies have made rapid deployment agreements with the ICRC and provide resources for adequate and timely response.

Mission

The SCMSU provides global monitoring, risk assessment and early warning. It is in charge of activating various rapid response mechanisms in the event of a crisis. These mechanisms include the Rapid Response Mechanism and the Critical Incident Mechanism.

Analysis

The Unit conducts constant international monitoring, based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The risk analysis and assessment of emerging threats is founded on field-based reporting and internal information, as well as open sources.

Products

The SCMSU prepares security and safety incident reports and situation updates. The ICRC supports and consults with the UN Security Council, provides pre-deployment briefings for UN peacekeeping missions, and holds joint workshops on training, and international humanitarian law in regards to UN peacekeeping.

5. International Criminal Police Organisation/Command and Coordination Centre

Structure

The Command and Coordination Centre (CCC) is located in the General Secretariat at INTERPOL headquarters, with additional centres in Buenos Aires (since 2011) and Singapore (not yet fully operational). INTERPOL has National Central Bureaus in all of its 190 member states.

Mission

The CCC's purpose is to provide constant media monitoring and uninterrupted contact with member countries. The CCC also has coordinating functions across units within the organisation, and is in charge of mobilising response to crises.

Activities

Described as a 'first point of contact' at INTERPOL, the CCC follows events, conducts media monitoring and monitors open sources. In special cases, as during INTERPOL's EU-funded Relinc project in Libya, the CCC staff conducted special monitoring and scenario-building to ensure the safety of its staff on the ground.

Products

The information gathered and/or received by the CCC is ranked and prioritised according to the relevant threat level it poses, and subsequently distributed to all member states in the form of alerts and notices through a secure internal web-based system, the I-24/7, which connects all National Central Bureaus. The Operations Room at the CCC is equipped with a live geographic information system (GIS) and uses I-link, an operations system that supplements I-24/7 to better connect global police information networks.

The CCC is also responsible for the organisation of response; it has the power to convoke *ad hoc* crisis committees and Incident Response Teams. Incident Response Teams can be deployed in times of both humanitarian and man-made crises, if requested by a member state. Deployment time is 12 to 24 hours, and the team consists of police staff from CCC as well as additional staff with expertise specific to the given incident.

6. League of Arab States (LAS)/Crisis Room

Structure

The League of Arab States (LAS) is a regional organisation with 21 member states. The Crisis Room was set up in November of 2012, funded in part by the EU's Instrument for Stability (€1.9 million). The Crisis Room is located at the LAS headquarters in Cairo and is part of the Media Department.

Mission

The aim of the Crisis Room is to monitor events in its member states and to provide early-warning analysis and information to decision-makers regarding an emerging or ongoing crisis.

Analysis

After its first year of operation, the Crisis Room prepares mainly qualitative analysis. The Crisis Room mostly relies on open sources, media and secondary analyses, as well as internal experts and LAS mission reports. Having received training and technical assistance from the EU, the Crisis Room operates with tools and structures provided by the EU, such as the Tariqa open source intelligence platform.

Products

The analytical products prepared by the Crisis Room include two daily alerts in English and Arabic, general weekly bulletins and weekly bulletins on specific crises, alerts, flash reports and analytical reports on crises which include risk analysis, scenario analysis and recommendations for action.

The recommendations and analyses prepared by the Crisis Room are shared internally with all departments and with the Secretary General directly.

7. NATO/Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

Structure

Established in 1998 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is the organisation's main mechanism for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The EADRCC is located at NATO headquarters in Brussels, in the Operations Division's International Staff.

The EADRCC has at its disposal the non-standing Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU), which has a multinational civil and military element. The EADRCC administers the Civil Expertise Catalogue: a list of experts, assets and potential capabilities in national ministries or the private sector across allied countries, which can be called upon by military commanders.

NATO's humanitarian assistance efforts are closely aligned with the work of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Mission

The EADRCC coordinates response to humanitarian crises in the Euro-Atlantic area. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, its mandate was expanded to include response to consequences of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents (CBRN) as well, and later extended to response to requests for assistance in natural disaster relief from countries where NATO had been militarily involved.

Activities

The EADRCC's role is to coordinate assistance for humanitarian disaster relief and response among member countries and partners. Requests from NATO member states and partner countries for humanitarian assistance go through the EADRCC.

The Centre maintains a database on information relating to assistance called Aid Matrix, which tracks the assistance offered by national and international actors, the assistance accepted by an affected country, as well as other operational information on the ground and in the assistance process. Updates and reports from this database are provided to NATO member states and partners, and uploaded to the NATO website.

The EADRCC also conducts disaster exercises with Partnership for Peace and other partner countries, and provides capacity building and training for the participants.

8. NATO/Situation Centre (SITCEN)

Structure

The Situation Centre (SITCEN) is located in NATO Headquarters and comes under the responsibility of the Secretary General for Operations. It has both military and civilian staff, and is connected to the International Staff (civilian) and International Military Staff (military) leadership at the HQ.

The SITCEN is connected to a similar structure at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre, and to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), another 'crisis room' within NATO which focuses on humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

Mission

The SITCEN collects information and monitors events globally to ensure the preparedness and situation awareness of the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee and supports them through the exchange and dissemination of information.

Activities

The SITCEN collects and disseminates information on political, economic, terrorist and military matters. It uses both external and internal sources, classified as well as open sources.

The SITCEN distributes briefings for the Command Group daily, daily and weekly reports on NATO operations, and occasional special reports. The geographic unit within SITCEN provides GIS services to the HQ.

9. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)/ Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)

Structure

The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) is under the direction of the OSCE Secretariat and provides support to both the Secretariat and OSCE field missions in early warning and conflict prevention. The CPC consists of a situation room, which operates 24/7, and is part of the operations service together with the planning and analysis team.

Mission

The CPC's main purpose is to create situational awareness within the organisation, and to serve as a link between field missions and member delegations and the Secretariat. The CPC acts as a communications hub between the Secretariat and member states, and between capitals.

Analysis

The CPC prepares qualitative political analysis and activity reports that closely follow the organisation's field missions. CPC uses mainly open sources as well as expert input from the Political Department. It is working on implementing more systematic tracking of social media. The tools used at CPC include software to track and confirm event trends.

Products

The CPC produces regular products: daily briefings in the morning and in the afternoon; weekly briefs and occasional special monitoring.

The early-warning reports are shared with both the field presence and the Secretary General, but the CPC does not provide recommendation for action. The early-warning reports can also be presented to the Permanent Council for further action, although this process is rarely used.

10. United Nations (UN)/Operations and Crisis Centre

Structure

The Operations and Crisis Centre (OCC) was established at the UN headquarters in 2013 by ten UN agencies and offices and staffed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). Its Watch Room monitors UN missions worldwide.

Mission

The aim of the OCC is to provide an integrated briefing and reporting system among its stakeholders and to serve as a constant communications hub for the organisation's senior leadership. The OCC supports the coordination of the different UN agencies' response to crisis.

Analysis

The OCC monitors events and collects information, which it analyses and disseminates to all relevant UN agencies. Its sources are both open sources, and internal UN sources, such as satellite imagery from the UNITAR Operational Satellite Applications Program (UNOSAT).

Products

The OCC prepares daily operational reports and briefings and produces alerts in case of major incidents. The UNOCC receives input daily from the Peacekeeping Situation Centre shared by the DPKO and DFS.

HYBRID STRUCTURES

1. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project (PAPEP)

The UNDP's Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project is a specialised unit within the organisation, and focuses on anticipation of political developments in the Latin American regions and the Caribbean.

Structure

PAPEP is a UNDP project within the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC). It has been operational since 2003, and has worked in 16 countries across the region. It operates through a network of high-level local experts, and draws on a variety of stakeholders to produce prospective analysis.

Mission

PAPEP's goal is to provide strategic political analysis with possible scenarios and consequence analysis for decision-makers at the national level; public officials, politicians, economic leaders, social leaders; and also for internal (UNDP) decision-making.

Analysis

PAPEP brings together different actors and stakeholders both in its information gathering and analysis process. It uses social science data collection techniques to study the perceptions of key national stakeholders on possible future developments. PAPEP uses a variety of sources, including local experts, analysts, structured interviews, Delphi questionnaires, and opinion polls. PAPEP gains insight into a wide range of perspectives and points to emerging trends across the region. It conducts focus groups with local political analysts and experts (voice of the experts); leaders from the political elite from across the political spectrum, as well as major economic and social stakeholders (voice of the leaders); and ordinary citizens (voice of the people).

PAPEP focuses on possible future political developments, and scenario building and analysis of existing and possible future trends in political development are therefore a crucial part of the project.

Products

PAPEP prepares several types of products, including short- and medium-term reports; Prospective Political Analysis Reports; Institutional Roadmaps; Public Policies and Development Project Assessments and Political Situations. Since PAPEP focuses on longer-term trends and political developments, the timeframe for PAPEP's analysis spans years rather than months, with a maximum length of 3 to 5 years, while its short-term prospective analysis has a time frame of 9 months to 1 year.

PAPEP shares its results and consults with a variety of stakeholders and decision-makers at the national level; high-level political actors, public officials, economic and social leaders as well as social movements and civil society actors. They also work to inform international development actors and their decision-making.

After preparing their analysis, PAPEP brings together political, social and economic actors to facilitate dialogue and interaction between them, with a view to encouraging consensus-based political decisions and outcomes.

2. Organization of American States (OAS)/Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions

The Organization for American States does not have a permanent crisis room, but its Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions functions as a political monitoring unit, and focuses on political stability and crises in its member states.

Structure

The Organisation of American States (OAS) is a regional organisation with all the independent states of the Americas as members (35). The Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions within the OAS is in the process of setting up and developing an early-warning system. The OAS has organized a 'temporary crisis room' before (for Haiti), but it does not have a permanent standing crisis room. The political analysis structure focuses on threats to governments and democratic stability in the region.

Mission

The aim of the Department is to provide a guide to decision-makers on political developments and to prevent political crises and instability in accordance with the Charter of the OAS, which calls for the organisation to 'strengthen peace and security' on the continent and 'promote and consolidate representative democracy'. The Department supports observation missions in member states and is also responsible for special missions (Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia; Mediation Capacity Building Project; Good Offices Mission in Ecuador and Columbia, etc.), and provides logistical support and personnel for these.

Analysis

The political and prospective analysis team at the OAS monitors both inter-state relations and intra-state political situations within its member states. Using a series of indicators to measure the stability of a given country, the team monitors the development of a set of issues and political crises.

They use both qualitative and quantitative tools and a variety of sources to analyse political environments: open sources (media, social media and secondary analysis), Delphi groups, opinion polls, stakeholder analyses and political reports from national offices in member states.

Products

The analytical products prepared by the Department provide an overview of the political environment of their member states with weekly bulletins, and prospective analyses that identify trends and draw up possible scenarios.

The analysis is relayed directly to the office of the Secretary General or the Secretary of Political Affairs, and via email to country representatives and country specialists.

COUNTRIES

		1. CANADA	2. FRANCE	3. GERMANY	4. SLOVAKIA	5. SWEDEN	6. UK	7. US
Sources	Use geospatial information (GIS)	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
	Systematic social media analysis	✓	✓	✓			✓	
	Open sources	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Analysis	Provides recommendations for decision-makers	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
	Regular products	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Qualitative analysis	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
	Quantitative analysis	✓	✓				✓	
	Indicator-based analysis	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	
	Field-based monitoring							
Mandate	Coordination of crisis response	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
	Communications centre		✓	✓		✓		✓
	Integrated response mechanism	✓	✓				✓	
	Early warning and/or scenario building	✓	✓			✓	✓	
	Evidence base for decision-makers	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Event monitoring	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS							

1. Canada: Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)

Structure

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) was set up in 2005 and is under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. START facilitates 'whole-of-government' policy and response to humanitarian crises and conflicts around the globe, and deploys civilian experts in crisis situations (Canadian Police Arrangement, Justice Rapid Response and Peace Operations).

Mission

START's task is to coordinate the Canadian government's response to conflicts and crisis around the world. Its responsibilities include peacebuilding, conflict prevention and mediation, response to natural disasters and working towards long-term resilience in post-conflict areas. START is also responsible for conflict early warning and the coordination of Canadian crisis-management efforts in fragile states. START provides policy advice on humanitarian crisis response and capacity building.

Analysis

START's Crisis Warning and Response prepares early-warning analysis. Through an indicator-based method, it provides assessments of potential threats, risks and vulnerabilities. START uses both internal, classified and open source intelligence for its analysis.

Products

A key element of START's risk assessments and analyses is a guideline for the different types of actions the Canadian government might take in order to prevent and mitigate conflicts.

2. France: Crisis Centre

Structure

The Crisis Centre was set up in 2008, and is located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the supervision of the minister. It has a Situation Centre, which conducts constant monitoring and analysis, a Humanitarian Action Mission, which is responsible

for response and management of humanitarian emergencies, and an Emergency Operations Centre, which coordinates between ministries to ensure the safety of French nationals in case of an emergency abroad.

The Crisis Centre also acts as a hub for coordinating among different actors involved in humanitarian crisis response, including private and civil sector actors as well. The Emergency Operations Centre has at its disposal the Emergency Situation Support Unit, which manages crisis units in Paris and coordinates operational teams abroad in times of crisis.

Mission

The Crisis Centre monitors threats and emerging risks and launches response in certain cases. The Crisis Centre focuses on humanitarian crises and supports the French authorities' response to emergencies by preparing response plans and scenarios.

Analysis

The analysis conducted at the Centre covers both man-made and natural crises and disasters. The monitoring and alert service at the Crisis Centre uses both classified and open sources (media, social media, blogs and think tanks). The analysis draws on a variety of sources, including the primary sources of embassies and consulates. The analysis prepared by the Centre not only ensures more informed decision-making on the part of the French authorities but also directs more detailed monitoring to countries it deems especially vulnerable and with higher levels of security risks.

Products

The Crisis Centre prepares two daily summaries on emerging crises and additional reports and situational updates on ongoing and emerging crises. The Crisis Centre also prepares safety plans for French consulates and embassies, in close coordination with the Ministry of Defence.

In the event of a major crisis, the Crisis Centre can activate so-called 'Crisis Units', which are temporary structures that bring together all actors in a crisis-management situation and facilitate a more coordinated and informed response effort.

The Humanitarian Action Mission within the Crisis Centre coordinates response both within the government and with international organisations and NGOs. It provides

financial assistance and can deploy human and material resources to affected parties, both in acute and chronic crisis situations.

3. Germany: Crisis Response Centre

Structure

Located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Crisis Response Centre (CRC) works directly with the deputy minister. The CRC serves as the first point of contact for the Foreign Office, and coordinates between government departments, ministries and international organisations. The CRC consists of three parts: the Monitoring Centre, the Crisis Task Force and the Citizens Services Unit.

The Crisis Centre is closely connected and often works in cooperation with the Early Warning Unit, but it is the Crisis Response Centre that handles all the management and operational tasks related to crisis response.

Mission

The main goal of the Centre is to facilitate immediate and effective reaction to crises and emergencies on the part of the German government. It is responsible for crisis management, crisis planning for embassies and missions abroad, monitoring potential crises in the short term and preparing response to them.

Activities

In case of crises abroad, coordination in crisis response is organised most often at the senior official level or at the level of deputy ministers and, on rare occasions, at the ministerial level. The CRC's Citizen Services Unit provides information to the public on consular matters and country specific issues. The CRC also issues travel and safety advice.

The task of the CRC is focused more on events and crisis monitoring and organisation of action rather than on analysis. On political matters, the CRC follows both day-to-day reporting, as well as broader developments. The CRC focuses in more detail on areas where developing events might lead to a crisis or could pose a serious threat. The most important sources for the CRC's monitoring are embassy reports, intelligence report-

ing and open sources (media). If needed, the CRC has access to more specific analysis undertaken by other units within the Foreign Ministry.

In special cases, the CRC has a forecasting dimension as well. In the context of Afghanistan it has structured meetings and looks at potential developments in the medium term.

In the event of an emergency, the CRC is immediately available with a reserve staff of 200. It brings together representatives of ministries, criminal police and other security services as well as relevant development organisations to outline possible courses of action to them and to prepare contingency plans together with them. Often, the recommendations put forward here are based on previous scenarios that the CRC has worked out or on knowledge drawn from previous similar experiences.

4. Slovakia: MFA Crisis Management Department

Structure

The Crisis Management Department was established in 2009 and is directly under the supervision of the minister of foreign affairs. The Department has a staff of four, and works in close cooperation with other crisis rooms and situation centres within the government, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence, and is also in contact with international partners. In cases of large-scale emergency situations, the government sets up a non-permanent inter-ministerial situation centre.

Mission

The Department's tasks include monitoring of events and providing up-to-date analysis for the minister, supporting embassies in crisis management, and ensuring civil protection at the Ministry. The Department is also responsible for issuing travel advice, and providing an SMS service to citizens abroad.

Analysis

The Department provides reviews on potential sources of risk and proposes its risk analysis to the minister. The main sources for its analysis are internal, with input from embassies and consulates abroad, reports from the Analysis and Planning Departments, as well as open sources (media and blogs).

The Foreign Ministry and the Department are in the process of setting up a 'Risk Management Portal', which would provide risk evaluation and risk profiles. It would also provide advice and analysis on mitigation measures and crisis-management support on both man-made and natural threats.

5. Sweden: Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat

Structure

The Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat is under the direction of the prime minister's office, and works as the main coordinating centre for communication among ministries and the entire government. Along with the Secretariat, the Director-General for Crisis Management, a Strategic Coordination Group and individual ministries' crisis management organisations are all involved in ensuring that the Swedish government's response to crises is well prepared, effective and timely.

Mission

The Secretariat collects, assesses and analyses information and prepares early-warning analysis. The Secretariat is also responsible for providing training for the ministries and government agencies both at the local and regional level to ensure crisis preparedness. In case of a crisis, the Secretariat supports the government in its crisis-management efforts by evaluating the possible impact of the crisis and if needed, launching crisis-management action within the government. Following a crisis, the Secretariat conducts an evaluation of the response delivered.

Analysis

The Secretariat prepares early-warning analyses, and monitors potential threats and crises. The majority of the information they use is open source, and when necessary, they conduct social media monitoring and consult opinion polls as well. The Secretariat does not systematically conduct quantitative analysis, but it has access to both the quantitative and qualitative reports and analyses, prepared by other departments.

Products

The Secretariat produces regular daily and weekly analytic products, as well as other policy intelligence reports. Recommendation for action in these reports is not standard, but can be included. The audience for the information and analysis prepared by the Secretariat is the Cabinet office.

6. United Kingdom: Civil Contingencies Secretariat

Structure

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) is within the Cabinet Office, directly under the supervision of the Security and Intelligence Coordinator. The CCS works on the national, regional and local levels and with the public, private and civil sectors.

Mission

The stated mission of the Secretariat is to enhance the UK's capacity to 'absorb, respond to and recover from' both man-made and natural crises and disasters. It is responsible for planning national crisis response, and managing preparation and response to most national civil disruptive challenges. It also conducts risk assessment, preparation and planning for threats, crises and disasters.

Analysis

The CCS conducts mostly qualitative analysis, using both classified and unclassified information systems for data collection. The CCS uses social media monitoring and taps into the internal reporting and analyses from other governmental departments.

Products

The Secretariat's short-term analysis (maximum 6 months) provides assessments of risks and threats for ministers. Short-term analysis includes a thorough and detailed assessment of the possible impact the given risk could have on society, the economy and services. Medium-term analysis (maximum 5 years) identifies risks and is part of the National Risk Assessment, which has a public version, the National Risk Register as well. It aims to inform about capabilities and necessary capability development relevant

to a given threat. Longer-term analysis (maximum 20 years) focuses on trends; these warnings and recommendations are included in the National Security Strategy.

Conclusions from the assessment and analysis of crises are seamlessly connected to response, as the CCS also organises national response to crises.

7. United States: Department of State Operations Centre

Structure

The State Department's Operations Centre (OC) was established in 1961. The OC is under the Executive Secretariat and has a direct connection to the Secretary of State. It consists of two parts, the Watch (24/7) and the Crisis Management Support Team.

The OC is connected to operations centres within several other agencies of the US government. The OC serves the State Department and the Secretary of State and ensures that all US embassies worldwide are well informed and as prepared for a crisis as possible.

Mission

The tasks of the OC are to provide the latest and best-sourced information for the Secretary of State, to facilitate communication between relevant international and domestic actors and to organise the State Department's response to crisis situations.

Analysis

The OC conducts mostly qualitative analysis, and uses a variety of sources, including open sources (media, social media and secondary analysis) as well as internal governmental information from other departments.

In case a crisis erupts, the OC Crisis Management Support (CMS) unit coordinates across government agencies and departments, and can convene a task force, monitoring group(s) and/or a virtual monitoring group. While the task force itself provides recommendations for action, the OC analysis aims only to inform decision-makers on situations and events.

In case of a domestic emergency or crisis, the CMS unit would also support contingency planning by setting up a task force responsible for channelling international assistance.

Products

The OC prepares two daily briefings for the Secretary of State, situation reports and if needed, special briefings. The OC also serves as a communications centre for the State Department, connecting it with governmental departments, embassies and consulates and any foreign actors that the Secretary of State needs to come into contact with to conduct foreign policy.

Definitions, controversies and challenges

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Andrea Ricci

DEFINITIONS

Definitions are major sources of controversy in the practice of crisis management. Professionals often invoke time constraints and implicit knowledge processes as reasons for not devoting adequate efforts to clearly framing the elements which explain and clarify the context to which terms refer.

The result is a plethora of *working definitions* which often turn out to be the root cause of sub-optimal performance or, more specifically, lack of coordination and dispersion of resources. The term *early warning*, for example, is often (controversially) used to describe the act of transmitting crucial new data or information to a given hierarchy as swiftly as possible. It is also used with quasi-exclusive reference to *systems* and complex analytical methods.

In reality, the adjective *early* refers to *anticipatory* warnings: it is an alert about something that does not yet exist (but may occur in the future). Early warning, therefore, is intrinsically all about uncertainty. It emerges through some form of analytical work which may take the form of something as sophisticated as statistical cluster analysis or expert-based scenario analysis, but it can also be the fruit of human intelligence (HUMINT) or the filtering of information by an individual duty officer who skillfully separates the few relevant weak signals from a flood of interpreted sources.

Other forms of controversy derive from *authoritative definitions*, namely those definitions that are proposed by some established power, be that military, civilian or stemming from non-state actors. As authorities and leaders often compete with one another, these definitions end up being used, in a quite persuasive way, to defend budgets and/or enlarge competence perimeters.

Some of these authoritative definitions are those related to:

- 'crisis management' itself, which some view as a purely military-driven discipline, others as falling under the category of humanitarian emergency, and others again as driven by the panoply of non-violent conflict transformation techniques
- the 'comprehensive approach', which some see not as an efficient fusion of resources coordinated by the highest political authority but as a hierarchical mechanism which creates operational coordination by subordinating all other instruments to a dominant overarching one

- 'complex' crises, which some view as a useful category to create operational hierarchies within the community of responders and across the gamut of procedures.

The idea that there are *complex* and *simple* crises is not only particularly unhelpful conceptually and ethically (complex or simple for whom?), but it is also detrimental to the formulation and implementation of appropriate crisis response measures.

Crises always behave like 'wicked problems': they are challenges which are difficult (and sometimes impossible) to deal with as they often comprise entangled or interdependent issues, fast evolving variables, and/or require highly interdisciplinary competences. References to categories like *complex* or *simple* often hide the crisis responders' profound state of unpreparedness (*vis-à-vis* 'complex' crises) or, alternatively, reveal their modest level of commitment or exposure to risk (*vis-à-vis* 'simple' ones).

The impact of this inappropriate terminology on practice is quite damaging as it fosters a natural tendency to do 'too little too late' or to simplify responses by relying on models and formulas that are ill-suited to the situation at hand.

Crises cannot be dealt with simplistically. Crises require complex responses. And responses to crises should always test the limits of an administration's capacity to deal with a number of elaborately interconnected interventions, implemented by an equally extensive and interconnected network of players.

INTERACTION, COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

The number of existing entities involved in crisis monitoring and response (the so-called crisis rooms or situation rooms) is a matter of permanent controversy. Critics often suggest that these structures are either too numerous and self-duplicating or that they do not cooperate and do not coordinate enough.

Crisis rooms are like fire extinguishers or emergency exits. They contribute – in practice –to the safety procedures of a given administration. They are *mission-critical* to the life (and survival) of a state. Any administration with serious operational responsibilities in managing a form of hazard should have a crisis/situation room. So it should come as no surprise that these types of structures are being set up more and more frequently, particularly in developed countries and/or large administrations. The issue is not the number of rooms, but their scope and interaction.

Facilitating cooperation between these structures and enhancing their coordination can be achieved – the theory suggests – through three mechanisms:

- a *market*, where competing powers provide positive externalities to all players, either because they facilitate alternative opportunities for coordination, or because they provide alternative sources of information or alternative methods to deploy scarce resources in a potentially more efficient way
- a *network*, which technically creates both 'Aristotelian' unity (the theatrical unity of time, place and action) and unity of efforts
- a *leadership*, which reduces the individual freedoms of each actor, imposes a centripetal dynamic to the system, and acts as a deterrent to free riding.

Practice at micro level reveals that without leadership it is hard to overcome the centrifugal drive which develops under stress. This dynamic is facilitated and sometimes boosted by confusion (which occurs all the time), fear (which occurs most of the time), and the occasional risk of free riding. These three factors impact on all players.

The excellent problem-solving resources they offer notwithstanding, network features – in particular social media and videoconferencing – are still considered too 'extracurricular' in the administrative culture of many governmental structures (diplomatic services being among the most conservative ones in this respect) in terms of working practices. Julia Manchin's survey in this volume provides clear evidence of this.

The military is often an exception in the dynamics described above, as both leadership and technological awareness abound there. Unless the military operate in intervention-prone countries, however, their real capacity to influence the overall management of a crisis is often impaired by the fact that the crisis response 'market' is much larger: several civilian centres of gravity compete with the military in any significant crisis response.

The 'crisis platform' model (whose perimeter is similar to the crisis cell that exists in French Préfectures or to the US President's Situation Room) clearly contributes to achieving better interaction, cooperation and coordination, but it is not a panacea. Indeed, practice shows that tensions and controversies build up rapidly in the very first hours of a crisis as competing coordination mechanisms develop (turf wars), trying to capture market segments of both resources and attention, but *de facto* also yielding massive amounts of information.

Finally, platforms cannot operate without leadership, network and prior awareness (or training) of all the players around the table. Job mobility often weakens the chances

of gathering around any table a large array of the best experts available to tackle the situation. The result is that the network (or platform) operates at the speed of its weakest link.

Increasing the size of the network, the platform and the market could be a solution. Moving from the micro to the macro level, from the national to the regional and international level, can indeed help address the shortcomings of a given crisis response system: if you cannot get the answer at home, you seek it elsewhere.

This logical argument seems to prove that it is economically advantageous for crisis responders to unite in clusters, communities and networks. Some argue that – considering the number of crisis structures per country – these networks already exist. The evidence, however, shows the contrary. While ER physicians (who are members of the International Federation for Emergency Medicine) will meet in June 2014 in Hong Kong for the fifteenth time, the first truly global conference on crisis rooms was organised in December 2013 in Brussels.

The difference in behaviour between these two communities can be explained in many ways: some suggest that an 'emergency culture' is sorely lacking in many public administrations; others contend that certain industrial interests ('big pharma') have greater leverage on practitioners than other industrial groups (although this is open to dispute); some others point out that the first decade of the twenty-first century has been exceptional in terms of both conflicts, terrorist acts and disasters – so that it is not too surprising to note a belated awakening to the importance of cooperative crisis management.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Nothing affects the community of crisis responders more than information and intelligence. Yet there still is no agreement on:

- how much information is really available
- how such information should be collected
- who should deal with analysis
- what should be expected from the intelligence world
- what working definitions (open source information, open source intelligence, information sharing, situation awareness) actually mean for practitioners in an acute crisis.

Many assume that staffers in high-tech crisis rooms have high levels of situational awareness because of the vast amount of information at their disposal – in other words, because of their access to various types of media, their close contact with the diplomatic network, and their capacity to check this information, drawing also on the expertise of partners. Controversies arise when the onset and the unfolding of a crisis suddenly awaken all players from the illusion of monitoring and control and all assumptions are proven wrong by reality.

In practice, the amount of available information is *de facto* reduced considerably:

- when certain technologies do not form part of the working culture of the operational team (specifically short-wave radio, news satellite channels and social media data-mining applications)
- when crowdsourcing is considered 'extracurricular' and operators are instructed not to use Twitter sources or to be wary of their potential as a vehicle for disinformation
- when there is partial or complete ignorance of modern sourcing constraints (information overload) as well as opportunities (advanced photojournalism, documentary filming, investigative journalism based on spy-cameras, geo-referenced applications, external databases, old and new social media, basic online translation)
- when the social proof bias, coupled with the confirmation bias, induces duty officers to use only sources they know and which their superiors consider acceptable
- when the diplomatic network does not succeed in channelling information and assessments effectively because several parallel networks are activated, a plethora of originators spread facts and assessments to a limited number of recipients, or no one thinks of video-conferencing as a good way to do more with less
- when partners are not consulted either because there is no conceivable reciprocity and people are reluctant to be 'in another person's debt', or because the matter is perceived as sensitive and sharing thoughts would not fit with the organisation's culture.

Nobody has a monopoly over information collection or analysis. Various segments of an administration cannot be impeded from organising collection efforts during a critical situation. Similarly, it is impossible to force people to stop writing about that

information, let alone thinking about it. In practice, it is impossible to isolate and insulate information monitoring and filtering from analysis. There is no real situational awareness without some form of (implicit or explicit) analysis. In a crisis, everyone is busy with sense-making and everyone aspires to define a possible response to events – a response valid not only for each team but for the entire organisation.

Diversity and disagreement nourish deliberation, but both have to be tuned to the combined effect of market, network and leadership. If some form of leadership manages to emerge in a critical situation, diversity and disagreement can generate a very powerful scenario analysis and bring the whole organisation forward.

Practice shows that secret intelligence and/or classified information is not necessarily available in the acute phases of a crisis. This may happen because of a 'strategic surprise' (failure of early warning processes); because collection assets cannot be redeployed in a new theatre fast enough to provide 'just-in-time' intelligence; or because regulation framing the use of secret intelligence slows down transmission enough to force crisis responders to seek answers by alternative means.

The best alternative to secret intelligence is open source intelligence. However, as some experts have commented, 'the importance of open sources in the intelligence process is a matter of dispute and is ultimately tied to some basic questions about the nature of intelligence'.[1] The dominant view is actually that open source information can be easily obtained because it is publicly available.

This point is related to the legal status of the process itself: collecting open source information/intelligence is lawful, whereas the collection of secret intelligence entails breaching the law protected by the *raison d'état*. This said, most practitioners still fail to realise that open source information is characterised by limited distribution or access. Nobody prevents anyone from reading social media exchanges concerning Maidan Square, for instance, but these are in either Russian or Ukrainian and they are not necessarily concentrated in Twitter but rather scattered across half a dozen PhP online forums that are only accessible to those that can open the first few doors in the collection process. 'What is closed can be deducted from what is open. One therefore needs to know the world of open sources, all the world of open sources, and also in permanence the new worlds which are being opened on a daily basis': this is how Claude Silberzahn, one of the Heads of the French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure

1. Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2002).

(DGSE), summarises the real-time information context in which crisis responders (and other types of information professionals) have to operate.

Against this background, it becomes clear that information-sharing is a necessity, driven also by the fact that, during a crisis, the barrier between open and closed sources of information shifts rapidly – and constantly. Trust, therefore, is an essential element for crisis responders, even if the information is unclassified, and even if the whole process is lawful (in European terms): crisis responders must know at every moment what to expect from their interlocutors, and such trust must be nourished at every moment.

FROM EARLY WARNING TO EARLY ACTION

A critical performance factor for all crisis rooms is the extent to which they are integrated into the overarching governmental response mechanism. Manchin's comparative overview of European and third country crisis rooms reveals that the level of integration is far from being uniform.

This integration can be hard or soft. An example of 'hard' integration is when the room is part of a larger directorate which directly controls the funds that enable crisis response projects (e.g. SSR, mediation, PCNA/PDNA) to go forward. Another type of hard integration is when the crisis room is actually attached to the Prime Minister's or the President's office – in other words, when it is part of the operating structure of the highest available political authority.

By contrast, 'soft' integration prevails when the crisis room is placed at the same level as the geographical and thematic units of, say, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this type of integration, the room's information and analysis cannot shape by themselves the eventual consensus on 'what needs to be done'. Situation assessment alone cannot generate the alignment of actions by crisis responders across the government board.

Both soft and hard integration may generate frictions or disputes to various degrees, but a bargaining process always materialises – and this is strongly influenced by the resources, skills and services available within (or generated by) a situation room.

In this respect, crisis rooms really behave like Special Forces. If Special Forces are not 'special' enough – if they are not used in the right context; if they are not led by the right type of command; if they do not tackle the key strategic questions – they risk turning from assets into liabilities. If Special Forces fail to deliver that special 'added value', they

draw opposition and hostility from other military services which compete with them for resources, attention and leadership.

Crisis response structures should help lead the whole organisation forward in partnership with geographic and thematic services. They help lead not only because of their location (very close to the decision-making hubs) and the support they get from the hierarchy, but also because they have a distinctive specialised dimension: they have more training, better tools, greater motivation. If they do not, problems arise.

One of the most controversial issues in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management is the value of indicators of a potential or mounting crisis. A lot has been written by specialists of strategic surprise or surprise attacks on the root causes of the failed nexus between warning and action. Practice suggests that three action categories enabling the controversy to be resolved can be highlighted:

- *Cognitive dimension:* our modern Information Society forces information specialists from all sectors to operate in a dysfunctional attention economy. Strong signals trigger the exponential decline of weak signals. Attention is always insufficient when the targets are in the hundreds and the sources in the thousands. There is also a widening gap between the information we can get hold of and the information we do understand. And the tendency to conform to the dominant discourse (or the social proof bias) creates barriers to the theoretically free movement of early warning information within a given organisation. Evidence increasingly shows that failure originates equally from policy, in addition to collection or analysis.
- *Sourcing:* sourcing is structurally weak as sources evolve constantly and very rapidly. Too often signals flagged up by NGOs are not sufficiently taken into account by governmental structures.
- *Decision-making:* information collection is still very dependent on a representative system. A source must represent a community of interests in order to be formally inserted in working practices. This safety procedure is risky because it assumes that, in a dangerous situation, one can afford to refuse information on *formal* grounds, even if the *substance* of the information appears critical for decision-making purposes. And even when information is diligently collected through specific information hubs, it often fails to reach those who really need to know: the warning flow is broken, and so is the chain of command of early action.

Borrowing a metaphor from medicine, nothing can treat this known pathology of any large organisation better than *acupuncture*: to bridge early warning with early action one needs to understand where the meridian is located, where to insert needles and which type of needle to use.

In other words, good channels of communication – coupled with adequate technology – are critical for both early warning and preparedness for early action. If these prerequisites are in place, the risk of confusion is mitigated and the speed of response is increased.

Annex

Programme

3 DECEMBER 2013

09:00 - 11:00
High-level opening (plenary session)
Opening speech: Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary-General, EEAS
Moderator: Graham Hutchings, CEO, Oxford Analytica
Agostino Miozzo, Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, **EEAS**
Dong-ik Shin, Deputy Foreign Minister, **Republic of Korea**
Haifa Abu Ghazaleh, Assistant Secretary-General for Media and Communication, **League of Arab States**
Albert Ramdin, Assistant Secretary-General, **Organization of American States**
Christine Beerli, Vice-President, **International Committee of the Red Cross**
Amir Mahmoud Abdulla, Deputy Executive Director, **World Food Programme**

11:30 – 12:45
Round Table A - Enhancing Early Warning and Preparedness - Part 1
Moderator: Carlos Hernandez Ferreiro, Chief Executive, The European Network of Implementing Development Agencies
Agostino Miozzo, Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, **EEAS**
Paola Testori-Coggi, Director-General, Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Affairs, **European Commission**
Stefano Manservisi, Director-General, Directorate-General for Home Affairs, **European Commission**
Jean-Louis de Brouwer, Director Humanitarian & Civilian Operations, Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, **European Commission**
Joëlle Jenny, Director for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention, **EEAS**
Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, **Council of the European Union**

ROUND TABLE A - ENHANCING EARLY WARNING AND PREPAREDNESS

Three emerging questions to be considered for session discussions:

- On what topics (system design, information collection, analysis, links to response) can sharing experiences enhance the performance of individual early-warning systems/ crisis rooms?
- What are the shared interests and challenges that can drive better cooperation between early warning systems and crisis rooms?
- What are examples of good practice cooperation between early-warning systems and crisis rooms? What has made such cooperation successful?

Rapporteur: Florence Gaub, EU Institute for Security Studies

11:30 - 12:45
Round Table B - Information Sharing/Communication - Part 1
Moderator: Federica Bicchi, Lecturer in International Relations of Europe, London School of Economics
Peter Tallantire, Deputy Director, Civil Contingency Secretariat, Cabinet Office, **United Kingdom**
Franscesca Tardioli, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Planning, **North Atlantic Treaty Organisation**
Jan Alhadeff, Head of Unit, Civil Protection, **General Secretariat of the Council of the EU**
Nathaniel Manning, Director of Business Development, **USHAHIDI**
Onyinye Onwuka, Programme Officer/Analyst, Early Warning Directorate, **Economic Community of West African States**

ROUND TABLE B - INFORMATION SHARING / COMMUNICATION

Three emerging questions to be considered for session discussions:

- What opportunities exist to make shared use of 'big data' across crisis rooms / in their information collection and analysis processes?
- Is a tactical use of crisis room information appropriate for some crises?
- What are the opportunities and challenges associated with the sharing of information between crisis rooms?

Rapporteur: Patryk Pawlak, EU Institute for Security Studies

13:00 – 13:30
Speech by Baroness Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission

14:30 - 17:00
Round Table A - Enhancing Early Warning and Preparedness - Part 2
Moderator: David Nyheim, Director of International Conflict and Security Consulting Ltd.
Matthias Leitner, Chief of Conflict Prevention Centre, **Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe**
Gladys Sonto Kudjoe, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **South Africa**
Micaela Schweitzer-Bluhm, Director Crisis Management Support Division, Department of State, **United States**
Heinz Krummenacher, Director, **Swiss Peace**
Richard Atwood, Director of Research, **International Crisis Group**
Santiago Roura, Executive Vice-President INDRA and Chairman of the Board of Directors, **European Organisation for Security**
Antonio Vigilante, Director, and Mireia Villar Forner, Senior Policy Advisor, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, **United Nations Development Programme**

14:30 - 17:00
Round Table B - Information Sharing/Communication - Part 2
Moderator: Hélène Lavoix, Director, Red (team) Analysis Society
Petros Mavromichalis, Head of Division, EU Situation Room, **EEAS**
Hugo Martinez, Secretary-General, **Integration System for Central America**
Christian Buck, Head of Crisis Reaction Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Germany**
Hesham Youssef, Senior Advisor to the Secretary-General, **League of Arab States**
Francisco Gustavo Rosas Hernandez, Executive Coordinator, **Centre for Investigation and National Security**
Antonella Spada, Coordinator PAPEP and Fernando Calderon, Independent Expert, **United Nations Development Programme**

4 DECEMBER 2013

09:00 - 11:00
Round Table C – Strengthening Civilian-Military Cooperation - Part 1
Moderator: Dina Douay, Director of Crisis Department, League of Arab States
Annika Elmgart, Director, Deputy Head, Department for Crisis Preparedness, Ministry of Defence, **Sweden**
Paul van Den Berg, Senior Corporate Expert, **Cordaid** (Concord)
Lionel Le Cleï, Director of Strategy and Development, **Thales**
Lt. Gen. Gilles Rouby, Military Representative of France to NATO and EU, **France**
Burcu San Sonumut, Head of Section Civilian-Military Planification, **NATO**

ROUND TABLE C - STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION

Three emerging questions to be considered for session discussions:

- How can crisis rooms contribute to better civil-military information-sharing in complex crises?
- What role should crisis rooms play in fostering a shared-problem understanding/in the development of comprehensive responses to complex crises?
- What are the challenges and benefits of cooperation between "operation rooms" (military) and "crisis rooms" (civilian)?

Rapporteur: Eva Gross, EU Institute for Security Studies

09:00 - 11:00
Round Table D - Cooperating on a Global Scale: Constraints and Opportunities - Part 1
Moderator: Graham Hutchings, CEO, Oxford Analytica
Janos Budai, Ambassador of Hungary in Syria, **Club of Budapest**
Theo Bot, Deputy National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism and Security, **The Netherlands**
Alexander Polyakov, Director of Situation Centre, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, **Russian Federation**
Massimo Piva, Senior Vice-President, **Selex**
Catherine Woollard, Director, **European Peacebuilding Liaison Office**
Verena Nowotny, Partner at Gaisberg Consulting, **Club of Venice**

ROUND TABLE D - TOWARDS A GLOBAL NETWORK - COOPERATING ON A GLOBAL SCALE: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Three emerging questions to be considered for session discussions:

- What are the obvious areas where collaboration between crisis rooms would add value?
- What are the drivers and obstacles to making such collaboration happen?
- How do inter-connected and strengthened crisis rooms fit within a broader strategy to bolster the global crisis response architecture?

Rapporteur: Thierry Tardy, EU Institute for Security Studies

11:30-13:00
Round Table C – Strengthening Civilian-Military Cooperation - Part 2
Moderator: Magnus Ekengren, Associate Professor, Swedish National Defence College
Victoria Bataclan, **Head of the Mission of the Philippines to the EU**
Rear Admiral Bruce Williams, Deputy Director-General, EU Military Staff, **EEAS**
Rory Keane, Head of the United Nations Liaison Office for Peace and Security, **UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs and Field Support**
Joerg Hillman, Capability Manager Engagement, **European Defence Agency**
Pierre Reuland, Special Representative to the EU, **INTERPOL**

11:30-13:00
Round Table D - Cooperating on a Global Scale: Constraints and Opportunities - Part 2
Moderator: Arjen Boin, Professor of Public Governance and Crisis Management, Utrecht School of Governance
Nicola Delcroix, Head of Division, Consular Affairs, **EEAS**
Didier Le Bret, Director of National Crisis Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **France**
Claudio Taffuri, Head of Crisis Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Italy**
Delilah Al Khudhairy, Head of Unit, Joint Research Center, **European Commission**
Anthony Craig, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch, **World Food Programme**
Sébastien Babaud, Project Manager, **Capacities for Peace (Saferworld – Conciliation Resources)**

14:30 - 17:00
Presentations by Rapporteurs from the Round Tables & Closing remarks (Plenary session)
Moderator: Antonio Missiroli, Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
Rapporteur: Florence Gaub, Senior Analyst (Middle East and North Africa, Security Sector Reform, the Arab world), **EUISS**
Rapporteur: Patryk Pawlak, Senior Analyst (EU Internal Security, Justice & Home Affairs, CSDP), **EUISS**
Rapporteur: Eva Gross, Senior Analyst (Transatlantic Forum, India and AfPak, CSDP), **EUISS**
Rapporteur: Thierry Tardy, Senior Analyst (CSDP, UN Peacekeeping, UN-EU Relations, Security Governance in Africa), **EUISS**
Agostino Miozzo, Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, **EEAS**
Conclusions (EU Presidency): Remigijus Motuzas, First Deputy Chancellor of the Government, Lithuania

List of Participants

EU MEMBER STATES

Last name	First name	Position
Austria		
Agathonos	Philipp	Head of Unit for Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention
Marschik	Alexander	Ambassador, PSC Representative, Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU
Schuller	Simone	Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU
Somogyi	Andreas	Deputy Head of Desk - citizens' service
Belgium		
Debrabandere	Régine	Manager, International Services, Belgian Development Agency
Desprets	Filip	Counsellor
Els	Candaele	Attaché
Furst	Paul	Expert
Kenes	Axel	First Secretary of Embassy
Lallement	Eric	Attaché à la Chancellerie, Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU
Lavaux	Sophie	Duty Manager
Mouchart	Caroline	Deputy Director
Peinen	Siegfried	First Secretary of Embassy
Stroobants	Serge	Major (GS), Chair of World Politics, Belgian Royal Military Academy
Thys	Lieselotte	Intern
Tilemans	Michel	Ambassador, PSC Representative, Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU
Bulgaria		
Angelov	Angel	Head of Crisis Management department
Kamenov	Roumen	Ambassador, PSC Representative, Permanent Representation of Bulgaria to the EU
Neychev	Stefan	Senior Expert, Ministry of Defence

Last name	First name	Position
Tzatchev	Nikolay	Director of the 'Situation Centre' Directorate
Croatia		
Kirigin	Nebojša	Ministry of Interior
Krajčak	Ines	Ministry of Interior
Skračić	Vice	Head of Division for Peacekeeping Missions and Operations
Estonia		
Eenma	Raine	Adviser
Kroon	Andrus	Deputy Head of Department, Ministry of the Interior.
Kuuskmäe	Tiit	Expert
Punnik	Tarmo	Director General of Consular Department of the MFA of Estonia
Rugam-Rebane	Eleka	Government Adviser
Finland		
Härkönen	Timo	Director of Government Security
Hyysalo	Jussi	Prime Minister's Office
Kekäle	Petri	Crisis Communications Coordinator, Government Communications
Korhonen	Jarkko	Situation Awareness Coordinator, Prime Minister's Office
France		
Chambon	Florence	Project leader for European Consular Cooperation
Dreanic	Alan	Projects Director, FEI
Geley	Flora	Project Manager, FEI
Jaunet	Marie-Christine	Police Cooperation Attaché
Jouvence	Luc	Advisor
Le Bret	Didier	Director of National Crisis Centre
Migoux	Arnaud	Counsellor PMG at Permanent Representation of France to the EU
Müller	Cécile-Liv	Desk officer - CFSP-CSDP-Civilian & Military Synergies
Rouby	Gilles	Military Representative of France to NATO and the EU
Vesco	Jean-Marc	Colonel, French Military Representation

Last name	First name	Position
Germany		
Buck	Christian	Head of Crisis Reaction Centre
Kruschke	Stefan	First Secretary
Przybylla	Caroline	Project Manager, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
Greece		
Georgiou	Spyridon	Civil protection Attaché, Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU
Mantzila	Alexandra	First Counsellor, Head of Crisis Management Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hungary		
Budai	Janos	Ambassador
Grafjodine Varga	Gabriella	Second Secretary
Kovács	Tamás Iván	Ambassador of Hungary to Belgium and to Luxembourg
Tokovicz	József	Brig. Gen, Head of MoD Defence Administration Office
Varga	Attila	Colonel, Management support director
Ireland		
Carpenter	Peadar	Director, Consular Services, DFA
Italy		
D'Angelo	Tiziana	Crisis Room, MFA
Taffuri	Claudio	Head of Crisis Unit, MFA
Latvia		
Baiza	Davis	Counsellor
Eihenbaums	Kārlis	Press Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lithuania		
Geda	Edgaras	Civil Protection Attaché
Labanauskas	Dalius	Head of National Security and Crisis Management Unit at the Office of the Government
Landsbergis	Gabrielius	Counsellor of Foreign and EU Affairs Unit
Motuzas	Remigijus	First Deputy Chancellor of the Government
Vainalavicius	Donatas	First Secretary, Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the EU

Last name	First name	Position
Luxemburg		
Lamesch	Max	Humanitarian Assistance Desk
Malta		
Agius	Alfred	Development Officer
Coleiro	Peter Paul	Operations Manager
Mifsud	Etienne	Communications
Netherlands		
Bot	Theo	Deputy National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism and Security
Breugem	Jacob (Jaap)	Senior Project Manager, VNG International
Sluiter	Judith	Head of Communication Unit, National Crisis Centre
Timmermans	Marieke	First Secretary, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU
Poland		
Kaczmarek	Jerzy	Head of Section - Operations Centre
Kawczynski	Mariusz	Expert
Romania		
Ilie	Aurelia	JHA Counsellor
Sirbu	Mihai	Head of Consular Section, Embassy of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Slovakia		
Zsoldos	Peter	Ambassador, Director, Crisis Management Dept, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
Slovenia		
Horvat	Nataša	Counsellor for Civil Protection
Žel	Roland	Director General, Defence Affairs Directorate (DAD)
Spain		
Garijo	Miguel	Civcom Delegate
Villegas	Alfonso	Situation Office Manager
Yuste Arenillas	Rafael	Situation Office Manager
Sweden		
Åhman	Teresa	Defence Counsellor
Bergholm Söder	Anna Maria	Director of Department, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

Last name	First name	Position
Björkander	Anna	Deputy Head of Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law
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This list is non-exhaustive and contains only the information provided by participants who agreed to appear on it.

Abbreviations

AAR	After Action Review
AHA	ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
ARF DiREx	ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCA	Crisis Coordination Arrangements
CCC	Command and Coordination Centre
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CECIS	Common Emergency Communication and Information System
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIWIN	Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network
CMS	Crisis Management Support
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
COSMIC	Contribution of Social Media in Crisis Management
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CPFI	Civil Protection Financial Instrument
CRC	Crisis Response Centre
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFS	Department of Field Support
DG	Directorate-General
DG ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DG SANCO	Directorate-General for Health and Consumers

DMRS	Disaster Monitoring and Response System
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAC	East African Community
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EADRU	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit
EASBRICOM	Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECDC	European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)
ECOWARN	Economic Community of West African States Early Warning and Response Network
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
EERC	European Emergency Response Capacity
EOC	Emergency Operation Centre
ERAT	Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
ERCC	Emergency Response Coordination Centre
EU SITROOM	EU Situation Room
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EWRS	Early Warning and Response System
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GIS	Geographic Information System
HQ	Headquarters
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPCR	Integrated Political Crisis Response
ISAA	Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis
JRC	Joint Research Centre
LAS	League of Arab States
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFP	National Focal Point
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OC	Operations Centre
OCC	Operations and Crisis Centre
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMC	Observation and Monitoring Centre
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAPEP	Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios Project
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RAN	Radicalisation Awareness Network
RBLAC	Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	South African Development Community
SCMSU	Security and Crisis Management Support Unit
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIAC	Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity
SITCEN	Situation Centre
SSR	Security Sector Reform
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
TCEW	Technical Committee on Early Warning
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TTX	Table Top Exercise
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund (formerly United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund)
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research

UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOSAT	United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Programme
WFP	World Food Programme

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In recent years, the EU's crisis management policy has gradually broadened in range and scope, as it seeks to adapt its response mechanisms to the increasingly complex crises facing the world today.

In this regard a major role is played by crisis coordination centres or 'crisis rooms' which are generally perceived as secluded high-tech locations where huge TV monitors and computer screens collect and process data, imagery and information from the outside world in real time, and convey their findings to decision-makers 24/7.

This book brings together key elements from an international conference devoted to challenges and opportunities for cooperation between crisis rooms that was organised by the European External Action Service in December 2013. The conference brought together perspectives from leading regional and international organisations and represented a major stepping stone as well as a springboard for the ongoing efforts of crisis responders worldwide to establish their own 'security community'.

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