

FFP

Fragile States Index 2014



The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, The Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers.

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Overview

The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, data from three primary sources is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Fragile States Index. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of painstaking expert social science research.

The 2014 Fragile States Index, the tenth edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2013 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2014 are not covered by the 2014 Index.

An Important Note

The Fragile States Index scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. For an explanation of the various indicators and their icons, please refer to page **10**.

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
For further analysis on all 178 countries, read FFP's Country Profiles online at www.statesindex.org.


The Fragile States Index Rankings 2014



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	91.	100	Micronesia	74.6		122.		Seychelles	63.7	152		Poland	42.1
	92.	前	Morocco	74.4		_ 122		Albania	63.6	153		Chile	42.0
	- 02		Cape Verde	74.1		= 123.		Brunei	63.6	Very S	table		
	= 93.	C+	Turkey	74.1		125.	♦	Brazil	61.4	154		Czech Republic	39.4
	95.		Dominican Republic	73.4		126.		Trinidad & Tobago	61.3	155	. •	Uruguay	37.9
	96.	220	Saudi Arabia	73.1	Le	ss St	able			156	. (•)	South Korea	36.4
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	98.	*	Vietnam	72.7		- 12/.		Kuwait	59.0	158	C:	Singapore	35.9
	99.		Gabon	72.2		129.		Mongolia	58.1	159		United States	35.4
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	104.		Armenia	71.3		134.		Bahamas	54.1	164		Belgium	32.0
	105.	3	Mexico	71.1		135.	X	Oman	53.1	165		Germany	30.6
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	108.	*	Ghana	70.7		138.	Ψ	Barbados	51.4	167	. 9	Austria	28.5
	109.	*	Suriname	70.6	Sta	able				168		Canada	27.4
١	Narnin	g				139.		Qatar	48.9	169	₩	Australia	26.3
	110.	*	Samoa	69.3		140.	8	Costa Rica	48.5	170		Ireland	26.1
	111.		Kazakhstan	68.5		141.		Hungary	48.3	171	. #	Iceland	25.9
	112.	€	Cyprus	67.9		142.		Latvia	48.0	172	. =	Luxembourg	24.6
	113.		Ukraine	67.2		143.		United Arab Emirates	47.6	173	. ₩∵	New Zealand	24.1
	114.	②	Belize	67.0		144.	•	Argentina	47.3	174	. 🛨	Switzerland	23.3
	115.		South Africa	66.6		145.		Mauritius	46.1	175	. #	Norway	23.0
	116.	$\Rightarrow \in$	Macedonia	66.4		146.		Slovakia	45.3	176	-	Denmark	22.8
	117.	(*	Malaysia	66.2		147.		Estonia	45.2	177		Sweden	21.4
	118.		Grenada	65.2		148.		Italy	43.4	Very S	ustain	able	
	119.	\times	Jamaica	64.9		149.		Lithuania	43.2	178	-	Finland	18.7
	120.		Bahrain	64.7		150.	ŵ.	Spain	43.1				
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The Fragile States Index in 2014





From Failed to Fragile: Renaming the Index

Krista Hendry



hen the Failed States Index (FSI) was first published in 2005, the use of the term "failed state" was designed to highlight and draw attention to the very real risk that people faced if their state failed to address the factors and conditions that we were measuring. While we all agreed that the term "failed state" was fraught with issues, mainly that we were not calling any country on the list failed, we knew it would likely get attention. And it did. Despite this, almost every year, we would revisit the name and think about whether we could change it finally. We had the attention and we knew people used the Index and waited eagerly for its release. Surely they would seek it out even if we changed the name? Yet the argument remained that if we wanted to get attention for all people who live in harsh conditions so that the international community, national governments, and local actors could work to improve those conditions, we had to keep people's attention.

Krista Hendry is Executive Director of The Fund for Peace.

In the last few years, however, we found that we ended up having more conversations about terminology than substance. The name also was being cleverly used by politicians in conflictaffected countries to try to dismiss the altogether as well as their responsibility to address the issues that it highlighted. Our primary purpose in creating the Index is to enable people to use it as a platform to discuss what is happening in their own countries. We also create it to encourage government responsibility, set priorities, and identify resources to face challenges. We didn't publish it every year to discuss what defined a "failed state;" we created it every year to help prevent the conditions that led to them. Overall our goal has always been to help improve human security in countries all over the world. So while the term certainly gained people's attention, it also became a distraction from the point of the Index, which is to encourage discussions that support an increase in human security and improved livelihoods.

Some of the issues highlighted in the Index are not easy topics to discuss. Some governments have failed their people catastrophically and some have done it intentionally and violently. Sometimes countries with very strong governments are the most repressive. Often, those are governments who choose to not have a social contract with the whole of their population and continue to choose their own interests, or the interests of a few, over the good of all. It is critical to call attention to those governments and the way they operate.

Other governments have weakness and pressures that, if they work with their populations, and with assistance from the international community, they can improve. They can fight and reduce corruption of all kinds. They can improve the delivery of public services and infrastructure. They can improve their tax systems and investment climates. They can investigate and prosecute human rights abuses. They can provide adequate training and civilian control of security forces so abuses are prevented. But they cannot do all this immediately and alone. Government is responsible to its people and for all of the issues just mentioned, but it needs a responsible and free media, a strong civil society, and an active business sector to help with all of this heavy lifting.

Over the last year, we had serious discussions with lots of people over the way the name was negatively impacting our ability to get the right kind of attention for the FSI. We work closely with governments in countries struggling under harsh conditions and lots of pressures, and it is not our intention to shame them. We want to be a partner for those governments who face some of the most pressures and help alleviate the conditions that can lead to violent conflict.

So, we are changing the name of the Index to make sure we can be a part of addressing those challenges and that the Index can be used, as one tool of many, to guide the development of priorities and measure improvements and unfortunately also when things get worse.

An Introduction to the Fragile States Index

The Methodology and the Twelve Indicators Explained



eak and failing states pose a challenge to the international community. In today's world, with its highly globalized economy, information systems and interlaced security, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe.

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises are ethnic conflicts. Some are civil wars. Others take on the form of revolutions. Many result in complex humanitarian emergencies. Though the dynamics may differ in each case, all of these conflicts stem from social, economic, and political pressures that have not been managed by professional, legitimate, and representative state institutions.

Fault lines emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict

through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state weakness and failure are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that create weak and failing states—and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects of state fragility.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. An interdisciplinary combination of qualitative research and quantitative methodologies is needed to establish patterns and acquire predictive value. Without the right data, it is impossible to identify problems that may be festering 'below the radar.' Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI), produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, the FSI — and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, The Fund for Peace collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

The FSI is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, data from three primary sources is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.

Millions of documents are analyzed every year. By applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators (which in turn include over 100 sub-indicators) that are the result of years of painstaking expert social science research.

The Fund for Peace's software performs content analysis on this collected information. Through sophisticated search parameters and algorithms, the CAST software separates the relevant data from the irrelevant. Guided by twelve primary social, economic and political indicators (each split into an average of 14 subindicators), the CAST software analyzes the collected information using specialized search terms that flag relevant items. Using various algorithms, this analysis is then converted into a score representing the significance of each of the various pressures for a given country.

The content analysis is further triangulated with two other key aspects of the overall assessment process: quantitative analysis and qualitative inputs based on major events in the countries examined. The scores produced by The Fund for Peace's software are then compared with a comprehensive set of vital statistics—as well as human analysis—to ensure that the software has not misinterpreted the raw data. Though the basic data underpinning of the Fragile States Index is already freely

and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources.

Social and Economic Indicators



Demographic Pressures

DP

Refugees and IDPs

REF

Uneven Economic Development **UED**

Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Natural Disasters
- Disease Environment
- Pollution
- Food Scarcity
- Malnutrition Water Scarcity
- Population Growth
- Youth Bulge
- Mortality

Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public services and has the potential to pose a security threat.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Displacement
- · Refugees per capita • IDPs per capita
- Refugee Camps

Displacement

- **IDP** Camps
- Absorption capacity Disease related to
- commitment to the social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

When there are ethnic, religious, or regional

GINI Coefficient

disparities, governments tend to be uneven in their

- Income Share of Highest 10%
- Income Share of Lowest 10%
- Urban-Rural Service Distribution
- · Access to Improved Services
- Slum Population



Group Grievance

GG

Human Flight and Brain Drain





When tension and violence exists between groups, the state's ability to provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Discrimination Powerlessness
- Communal Violence
- Sectarian Violence • Religious Violence
- Ethnic Violence

When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human capital. Those with

resources also often leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.

Human Capital

Includes pressures and measures related to: Migration per capita • Emigration of

Educated Population

Poverty and Economic Decline

Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction. between the "haves" and the "have nots".

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Economic Deficit
- Purchasing Power
- Government Debt Unemployment
- GDP per capita GDP Growth
- Youth Employment Inflation

Political and Military Indicators




State Legitimacy



Corruption and lack of representativeness in the government directly undermine social contract. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Corruption
- Government Effectiveness
- Political Participation
- Electoral Process
- Level of Democracy
- Illicit Economy
- Drug Trade
- Protests and Demonstrations
- Power Struggles

Public Services



- Policing
- Criminality

- Water & Sanitation
- **Education Provision**
- Literacy
- Infrastructure
- Quality Healthcare
- Telephony
- Internet Access
- · Energy Reliability
- Roads
- Press Freedom Civil Liberties

responsibility.

• Incarceration Religious

Persecution

- Political Freedoms
 - **Human Trafficking** Torture

When human rights are violated or unevenly

Includes pressures and measures related to:

protected, the state is failing in its ultimate

Executions

Human Rights and Rule of Law HR

- **Political Prisoners**

Security Apparatus



The security apparatus should have a monopoly on use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakened where this is affected by competing groups. Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Internal Conflict
- Small Arms Proliferation
- Riots and Protests
- Fatalities from Conflict
- Military Coups
- Rebel Activity
- Militancy • Bombings
- · Political Prisoners

Factionalized Elites

When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Power Struggles
- Flawed Elections
- Defectors
- Political Competition



External Intervention



When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.

Includes pressures and measures related to: Foreign Assistance

- Presence of Peacekeepers
- Presence of UN Missions
- Foreign Military Intervention
- Sanctions
- · Credit Rating

Fragile States Index 2014: Somalia Displaced as Most-Fragile State

J. J. Messner



s much as the 2014 Fragile States Index is significant for being the tenth anniversary of the Index (and for being the first to be named "Fragile States Index" rather than "Failed States Index"), it is especially notable for the change at the top: after six years in the number one position, Somalia has finally been overtaken, leaving South Sudan as the most fragile state in the world.

South Sudan made its debut in the then-Failed States Index in 2012. After gaining independence in the latter half of 2011, South Sudan was (albeit informally*) ranked fourth in its first appearance in the FSI, a ranking it retained in 2013, though with a worsened score. It now finds itself as only the fourth country to ever top the FSI. The country's independence, while initially giving cause for celebration, is now giving only cause for concern as its politics and leadership grows increasingly fractious, and mass killings - especially targeting specific ethnic groups - gains momentum. [See also our coverage on South Sudan beginning on page 15.]

South Sudan's spiral into first place has finally ended Somalia's six-year run atop the Index. But just because Somalia has earned some respite from being FSI's most fragile state, it does not mean that we should no longer be concerned. Somalia's score peaked in 2012, as the scourge of piracy off the Horn of Africa reached its apogee. As previous indices, Somalia continues to endure widespread lawlessness, ineffective government, terrorism, insurgency, crime, and abysmal development - but the country does appear to be on a slow trajectory of improvement, so there is cause for some hope.

Though South Sudan took first place on the Index this year, it was only the sixth mostworsened country. The most-worsened country for 2014 is Central African Republic, which was beset by civil war, widespread atrocities, and the deployment of a Frenchled peacekeeping force. [See also our coverage on the Central African Republic, page 19.] Following closely behind the Central African Republic was Syria, where the continued (and worsening) civil war plunged that country even deeper into the fragile end of the Index. After ranking 48th as recently as 2011, Syria now finds itself at 15th. Syria was also the third mostworsened country in both the 2012 and 2013 FSIs, demonstrating the freefall that the country is experiencing. In a similar situation is Libya, 2014's third-most worsened country. In the 2012 Index, Libya set a record for the most severe year-onyear worsening of a country in the history of the Index (a record that still stands), rising from 50th to 11th as the civil war's effects took hold. Libya stabilized somewhat in 2013 as it began to rebuild in the aftermath

of the Qaddafi era. Recently however, renewals of violence have seen Libya's situation worsens yet again.


Though there are plenty of countries about which to be concerned, there is also cause for optimism among many other countries. Despite plenty of coverage and continued concerns, particularly about its nuclear program, and despite being the target of wide-ranging sanctions, Iran nevertheless managed to be the most-improved nation in 2014, with the country stabilizing somewhat after recent political and social turmoil. [See also our coverage on Iran, page 14.] Quite coincidentally, the list of most-improved countries for 2014 was largely a collection of countries that have endured frosty relations with the United States in recent memory, including Iran, Serbia, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Bolivia, and China.

It could be easy to view the FSI as being relevant only to analysis of countries already considered to be weak and/or fragile. But this year's Index demonstrates that even developed countries are not immune to significant pressures. France was the 7th-most worsened country in 2014, largely as a result of a political and economic malaise, with a similar situation befalling the United States, which was tied at equal 8th most-worsened along with Singapore. Also within the top 20 most-worsened countries for 2014 were Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria.

Now that we have ten years of FSI data, we are able to demonstrate long-term trends. In the period since 2006, the greatest gains have been made by Bosnia-Herzegovina

How is the World Doing?

The chart below demonstrates the number of countries that either improve or worsen in their total FSI scores from year to year. Since 2010, more countries have improved their scores than have experienced a worsened score. This would suggest that, in general, that for the past few years, more countries have been improving than have been worsening. However, this trend has begun to slow in the past two years.



* The "margin of error" is considered to be +/- 0.2. Therefore, for us to consider a country to have improved or worsened, its score must change by +/- 0.3 or more.

and Indonesia. [See also our coverage on Bosnia-Herzegovina beginning on page 35.]

Interestingly, four of the top ten mostimproved countries over this period are constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia – along with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia ranks as the third-most improved and Croatia as tenth. Further, to the earlier point about the worsening experience by a number of developed countries, Germany is the only large, developed country to figure in the top -ten most-improved, with the only other developed nations joining it in the top 50 being Poland, the Baltic states, and South Korea.

Meanwhile, the long-term trends demonstrating the most-worsened countries over the past decade should come as no surprise. Libya is by far the most-worsened country, along with Senegal, Mali, Guinea Bissau, the Central African Republic, and Syria. Though Tunisia is widely regarded as having weathered the Arab Spring better than most of its regional neighbors, it has nevertheless experienced a significant amount of turbulence, leaving it the eighth-most worsened country in the past decade.

Perhaps one of the least obvious developments of the past decade has been the improving fortunes of Sierra Leone. In 2005, Sierra Leone ranked in the FSI's first ever Top 10. But in the intervening decade,

this formerly civil war-wracked country has managed to gradually rise again. This year, Sierra Leone has become the first ever country to exit the "Alert" category after having once been as high as the Top 10. Of course, this does not mean that Sierra Leone is out of the woods. But it does demonstrate how even countries that were once war-ravaged can slowly recover to increasing levels of stability. Liberia, too, also featured in that initial Top 10 in 2005, and its progress in the past decade has shown that it may well follow Sierra Leone out of the Alert category in the coming years. [See also our coverage on Sierra Leone beginning page 37.]

As important as it is to recognize what the 2014 FSI is telling us, it is also important to recognize what it is not telling us – well, at least not yet. Undoubtedly, many observers will likely look to Ukraine and wonder why, after the break-out of violence and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Ukraine ranks relatively comfortably at 113th place, having worsened by only 1.3 points since 2013. Or, why Iraq improved in 2014 while Islamists now seem to be on the verge of sparking a renewed civil war. Or, why Thailand is ranked 80th while now having been the subject of (yet another) military coup.

Of course, the FSI is very much a lagging 'indicator' in the way that rates of


unemployment or inflation are lagging indicators for an economy. The content analysis of over 40 million sources, along with the triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data, followed by verification, validation, and substantive analysis is a process that takes months. This means that by the time the data is finally assembled, events have continued to unfold - much of the tumult in Iraq, Thailand, and Ukraine occurred subsequent to the end of the 2014 FSI's sample period that ended on December 31st. Indeed, this situation is reminiscent of Libya in the 2012 FSI. As civil war raged in Libya, the country continued to rank as relatively stable in the FSI. While the conflict had progressed rapidly, critically for the FSI, the conflict had largely progressed after the December 31 cut-off for that year's


Nevertheless, two of the most destabilized countries in the first half of 2014 were registering worsening trends over the past 12 months - along with Ukraine's worsening, Thailand, another country to experience severe instability this year with its recent military coup, also saw its score slip by 1.9 points in the 2014 FSI, ranking as the tenth most-worsened country for 2014. And among all three countries, Iraq, Thailand, and Ukraine all experienced significantly worsening pressures in the past few years on the key indicators of Group Grievance, State Legitimacy, and Human Rights and Rule of Law. Though this year's instability of neither Iraq, Thailand, or Ukraine has yet registered in the 2014 FSI, it is clear that they were on the slide even before the current levels of stress took hold. Unless the situation in these countries improves markedly in the next six months, it is reasonable to expect that the scores of all three countries will slip significantly in the 2015 FSI.

The FSI continues to demonstrate some key lessons about development and stability. Countries like South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Syria demonstrate how all-consuming and damaging conflict is. Countries such as Libya and Tunisia further

Continued on page 28


16 0044		
Most Worsened for 2014		
Top 10 Most Worsened 2013-2014 (by Score) Move	2013 Score	2014 Score
+5.3 Central African Republic	105.3	110.6
+4.2 A Syria	97.4	101.6
+3.3 ▲ Libya	84.5	87.8
+3.1 ▲ Mozambique	82.8	85.9
+2.5 ▲ Philippines	82.8	85.3
+2.3 A South Sudan	110.6	112.9
+2.2 ▲ ■ France	32.6	34.8
Singapore	34.0	35.9
+1.9 🛕 { Thailand	75.1	77.0
United States	33.5	35.4
Top 10 Most Worsened 2013-2014 (by Rank)	2013	2014
Move		Position
13 🛕 🚾 Libya	54th	41st
10 🛕 Thailand	90th	80th
9 🛦 🄀 Mozambique	59th	50th
8 🔺 💮 Micronesia	99th	91st
7 A Philippines	59th	52nd
Turkmenistan	81st	74th
Central African Republic	9th	3rd
Peru	103rd	97th
6 🔺 Saudi Arabia	102nd	96th
Syria	21st	15th
(ř om Venezuela	89th	83rd
Most Worsened 5-Year Trend 2009-2014 (by Sco	ore) ₂₀₀₈	2013
Move	Score	Score
+18.4 ▲ Libya	69.4	87.8
+11.8 🛕 🔐 Syria	89.8	101.6
+11.1 🛕 📕 Mali	78.7	89.8
+9.9 🛕 🧑 Tunisia	67.6	77.5
+8.6 A Senegal	74.2	82.8
+7.3 ▲ Yemen	98.1	105.4
+6.5 🛕 Djibouti	80.6	87.1
+6.0 🛦 Greece	46.1	52.1
+5.9 ▲ Oman	47.2	53.1





- Syria's civil war continued to intensify over 2013. The Syrian Army and allied Hezbollah forces faced off over the course of the year with numerous rebel factions, all supported by different external actors. The government recaptured the town of Qusair, but lost a major stronghold in Khan al-Assal in the west of Aleppo province.
- In January, the Syrian government accused Israel of attacking a
 military research center in a series of jet strikes. The two countries
 exchanged fire later in the year in the Golan Heights. The EU
 agreed in May to not renew an arms embargo on Syria, opening
 the potential for EU countries to arm rebels though they have not
 done so openly as of yet. After pledging non-military aid to rebels
 in March, both the U.S. and U.K. suspended "non-lethal" aid in
 December after reports of Islamist rebels seizing bases from the
 Western-backed rebels.
- As fighting continued between the government and rebel forces, rumors that chemical weapons had been deployed in the Ghouta area of Damascus drew international attention. This was confirmed by UN weapons inspectors, who did not allocate responsibility of the attack. In an agreement, brokered by the U.S. and Russia, President Assad allowed international inspectors to begin the process of destroying Syria's chemical weapons.
- The brutal civil war shows little sign of slowing down or resolving anytime soon. With the escalation of violence, the level of human rights abuses and lack of political representation, Syria is likely to continue moving up the Index in the coming years.

Most	: Im	proved for 2014		
Ton 1	n Ma	ost Improved 2013-2014 (by Score)		
Mo		35t IIIIpioved 2013-2014 (by 3cole)	2013 Score	
-2.5	_	Iran	89.7	87.2
	`	Serbia	74.4	72.0
-2.4	•	Zimbabwe	105.2	102.8
		Cuba	72.8	70.8
-2.0	•	Mexico	73.1	71.1
		Bolivia	80.8	78.9
-1.9	Y	China	80.9	79.0
		Cote d'Ivoire	103.5	101.7
4.0		₩ Fiji	80.8	79.0
-1.8	•	Kyrgyz Republic	85.7	83.9
		C· Turkey	75.9	74.1
Top 10	0 Mc	ost Improved 2013-2014 (by Rank)	2013	2014
Mo	ove	F	osition	Position
10	▼	Kyrgyz Republic	48th	58th
9	▼	Belarus	81st	90th
		Georgia	55th	63rd
8	•	Mexico	97th	105th
		Serbia	92nd	100th
7	•	Iran	37th	44th
		C· Turkey	86th	93rd
		Cuba	101st	107th
6	•	Indonesia	76th	82nd
		【 <mark>₩</mark> Moldova	83rd	89th
		roved 5-Year Trend 2009-2014 (by Score	2005	
	ove	7:11	Score	Score
-11.2	•	Zimbabwe	114.0	102.8
-10.0	•	Moldova	85.1	75.1
-9.8	•	Coorgin	80.6	
-9.1		Georgia	91.8	82.7 66.4
-8.0 -7.7		Macedonia Brazil	74.4 69.1	61.4
-7.7		Poland	49.6	
-7.5	•	Polariu Bolivia	86.3	78.9
-7.4	•	Bosnia & Herzegovina	83.3	75.9
		Belarus	82.3	
-7.3	•	Indonesia	84.1	76.8
			0 1,1	. 5.0



Iran, despite its hefty domestic and international political issues and obdurate theocratic government, has taken several gradual but important steps to improve its standing on the world stage over the past year. These improvements, which occurred in all but one of the twelve indicators analyzed, have made it the 2014 Fragile States Index's most improved country.

- Because of an increase in total health care spending and guarded progress in performance and rapid and adequate emergency responses to two April 2013 tremors, the Demographic Pressures indicator has improved by 0.2 points. However, air pollution rates have risen and food shortages have presented numerous challenges for the Rohani administration.
- Global sanctions, hyperinflation, and high levels of unemployment have mitigated greater economic growth in Iran. In spite of these challenges, Iran's sizable market and greater desire to engage with global actors has slightly improved the country's Economy indicator.
- State Legitimacy and Security Apparatus indicators saw a decrease of 0.2 and 0.3 in a positive direction respectively, as Hassan Rohani's moderate-leaning presidency has made efforts to minimize civil unrest and some internal political conflicts.
- International economic sanctions are directly affecting Tehran's ability to develop the country economically and socially. Greater global engagement and movement towards fewer sanctions have, however, bettered the country's External Intervention score.

Statehood or Bust: The Case of South Sudan

Patricia Taft



t took three years, a slide from growing dysfunction to rapid escalation in violence, and more than a fair share of international hand-wringing to arrive at this place: South Sudan is the world's most fragile state. What occurred in the twelve months since the last Fragile States Index — when the world's newest country ranked fourth — to this year, where it is the chart-topper, is as complicated as the facets of state-building itself. Nonetheless, a few salient lessons might be culled even at this early stage, if not to prevent a further slide, but to at least manage expectations going into the future.

As Nate Haken and I wrote last year in an article about the crisis in South Sudan, in the case of state-building, wanting it badly enough still does not make it so. This was evident last year. For nearly a decade leading up to the 2011 declaration of independence, the cause of the nation and its citizens was one that was near and dear to the heart of two successive U.S. administrations and some of its most seasoned and effective thinkers and

policymakers. It was one issue, and at times seemingly the only issue, which appeared to cross partisan lines. Everyone could agree that this embattled African territory, and its people, deserved to finally be free, and not only from the brutal machinations of its overlord to the North. In order to secure this nation-building "win," both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations poured tons of aid into South Sudan, in every form imaginable. From military aid to food aid to the provision of technical expertise, America was South Sudan's biggest ally and backer, ardently midwifing the country into nationhood by whatever means necessary.

Of course, with such lofty expectations comes a kind of attachment that often leads to myopia or, at times, wholesale disillusionment with the realities of statebuilding itself. South Sudan, for all of its promise, was a nation that was built out of virtually nothing. Decades of warfare and a complete lack of infrastructure had left behind a state that was one in name only. It had virtually none of the capacities or functions of a nation other than a name and a flag. The question that preoccupied some the brightest lights in both administrations was, "How is South Sudan going to be a state?" This often missed one key element, specifically, "How is South Sudan going to function as a state?" And it was in the functioning, or lack thereof, that things began to unravel.

From the start, the cleavages between the leadership, represented by President Salva Kiir and former Vice President, Riek Machar, current leader of the opposition, were evident. Decades of personal history,

fraught with ugly political and tribal undercurrents, may have been temporarily shelved in the name of national unity but remained unresolved and simmering below the surface. When Kiir dismissed Machar and replaced most of the cabinet in July 2013, these cleavages became formalized, and the December 2013 clashes between soldiers loyal to each leader kicked off the current spasms of violence that have gripped the country ever since.

Institution-building, which was painfully slow even by the most clearheaded of estimates, came to a screeching halt as the gun once again replaced the pen. The capacity-building efforts of the U.S. as well as several other nations could not have possibly prepared the number of civil servants and trained military personnel needed to manage the crisis in an effective and timely manner. As it was, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), an entity supposed to be emblematic of national unity, but which fractured along ethnic lines in December, had been tasked with the impossible. Given the size of the country and the lack of roads and other critical infrastructure, expecting the SPLA to disregard decades of unaddressed interorganizational grievances and suddenly coalesce behind a largely imposed idea of a united South Sudan was a painfully flawed assumption. At the same time, despite years of effort in training cadres of South Sudanese civil servants and professionals, the fact remained that it is impossible to build a functioning state and functioning citizens overnight. Even in the most stable of environments, state-building is a long and arduous process. In the face of a renewed civil war, these delicate institutions

have the ability to collapse like a house of cards. This is what happened in South Sudan.

The most current figures leave very little doubt that the country is once again on the precipice of a full civil war, if not embroiled in one already. As of May 2014, according to estimates by the United Nations as well as other international donor and relief agencies, the number of displaced stands at over a million, with over 10,000 dead. In addition, it is estimated that over 80,000 people are sheltering at UN camps with over 300,000 having crossed into Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda to escape the fighting. Adding another layer of impending crisis, the UN has estimated that up to five million people, or half of South Sudan's population, is in need of humanitarian aid. With UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warning of a catastrophic famine in the coming months and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry voicing concern over an impending genocide, it seems that things are going to get much worse before they get better.

Of course, it is always much easier to criticize planning and lament missed opportunities in the aftermath of the outbreak of a crisis. Although there were surely missteps and the shortcomings of policies meant to deliver "statehood or bust," the amount of effort and dedication devoted to the birthing of South Sudan as a nation cannot be denied. Yet time and again, the realities of state-building seem far beyond either the appetite or the reach of most international efforts. As evidenced by the Index scores of several states in the Balkans this year, a hotbed of nationbuilding in the late 1990s and early 2000s, stability and viability take time. In most cases, it takes a lot of time; at least a generation. In the interim many things can go wrong, including a return to hostilities if not a full scale return to war. Ironically, the wars that gripped Sudan from 1983 until the ceasefire in 2005 were emblematic of that very fact.

So does this mean that we as the international community should stand by and do nothing as the world's most fragile states tear themselves apart? Of course not.

From both a national security as well as a humanitarian standpoint, allowing a country to unravel and kill and displace millions of people is insanity. Nevertheless, this naturally begs the question of what can be done? In the case of South Sudan, it seems that the current environment offers few options that are ideal. For example, despite a ceasefire that was violated almost immediately upon its inception, it appears that neither side at this junction perceives that it is "losing" and could be compelled to put down arms. In addition, neither side has articulated a vision for a solution to the current conflict. While the espoused ideals of national unity and statehood still find their way into press conferences and meetings convened by regional leaders, these appear to be little more than lip service meant to placate at best and buy more time for territorial and other war gains at worst.

In the meantime, South Sudan's economy, based on oil exports, has once again ground to a halt with signs that outside investors, including China, are growing weary with having their investments and infrastructure constantly under siege. South Sudanese businessmen, including a diaspora population that returned in the wake of independence, are also once again fleeing the country, further hampering the economy as well as removing a critical brain trust. And, as noted by the UN Secretary General in May as well as other international aid organizations, South Sudan may soon be facing its worst food crisis in years, with a combination of weather conditions and warfare making crop cultivation impossible. On most fronts, it seems, there is no end in sight to the current misery.

Yet there are a few causes for hope that while certainly not a panacea or cure-all may, with support, be able to staunch the current arterial flow. The first is the role that the region and its countries have played in South Sudan. From the start, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya have all had a strong interest in an independent and stable South Sudan and have lent pivotal support to the government in Juba. To be sure, without the intervention of Uganda as well its support to

several local, pro-SPLM, militias, it is likely that the government would have already lost Juba to opposition forces, as well as other territory. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African sub-regional body, has played a pivotal role from the outset in trying to negotiate an end to the crisis through peace talks and, as of this writing, formalizing plans to deploy a 2,500-strong peacekeeping force to augment the beleaguered United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). While each country may have their own reasons for becoming involved in the South Sudan crisis, thus far there has been a surprising show of regional cohesion and a willingness of both regional (the African Union) and subregional (IGAD) organizations to shoulder a significant amount of burden.

Beyond the regional level, the years of international involvement in the country also holds out the benefit of good offices, with individuals both in and out of government having had long standing relationships with key actors on both sides to the conflict. While the U.S. has been sharply criticized for taking too slow of an approach to dealing with the current crisis and not exerting enough pressure on the leadership, it does remain in a key position and thus can continue to remain involved and influential in the process. In addition to the American political leadership and highlevel individuals, grassroots American organizations and religious groups also have had a vested interest in a free and stable South Sudan for years. These relationships were a critical voice in lobbying for South Sudan's independence and can once again become a voice in lobbying for an end to the current bloodshed.

In that vein, South Sudanese civil society organizations are a much overlooked but critical component in the process. While elements of the political leadership continue to portray the crisis as one in which the country is fracturing along deep-seated ethnic lines, many civil society organizations have been pivotal in the creation of projects

Continued on page 38

The World's Ten Most Fragile States

Kendall Lawrence



dentifying and exploring the fragility of states creates the opportunity to address how they might be able to combat pressures in the future. Learning what pressures states have been able (or unable) to reduce in the past year gives insight into the capacities that exist (or do not) within each state and their governments.


The top ten are profiled to give context to why they fall on this end of the Index and


how they have changed since the previous year. Only two countries within the top ten saw a worsening in their individual scores, South Sudan and Central African Republic. Seven showed improvement and one experienced little change.

Though the top ten may seem like a dungeon from which there is no escape, with some countries seemingly doomed to inhabit the dubious list forever, the ten year trends of the Fragile States Index would demonstrate otherwise. Only three countries have been ranked in the top ten every year of the Index's existence: Sudan, D.R. Congo, and Somalia. Two of the countries in the first-ever top ten, back in 2005, are now well on the path to recovery, as Sierra Leone has gone from 6th in 2005 to 35th in 2014, and Liberia has moved from 9th in 2005 to 24th now. The experience of Liberia and Sierra Leone should demonstrate that fragility and instability is not a life sentence. And although neither Liberia or Sierra Leone are threatening to break-in to the Sustainable category any decade soon, this just goes to reinforce the generational and gradual nature of development.


Similarly, climbing out of the top ten is only one metric. Take Zimbabwe — it is ranked 11th this year, and has featured in the top ten in eight of the previous ten years, even ranking as high as second-most fragile country in 2009. Though a year-by-year view of Zimbabwe may imply some level of hopelessness, long-term trends actually demonstrate that it is the 24th most improved country on the Index in the past decade. Its rank may not have improved much, but its score has. Its lack of ranking movement is perhaps more indicative of a 'traffic jam' among similarly ranked countries than a lack of change.

Recovery and development is not linear. Some countries that leave the top ten may be back again. With the exception of the recently added South Sudan, every country in the top ten has improved year-on-year at some point. There is much to be concerned with in this current top ten. But there is always room — and capacity — for improvement.










Note: scores for 2006-2011 are those of Sudan, pre-separation

- Despite the international aid directed at South Sudan since its independence, the fledgling country has succumbed to the pressures of the region and to its own lack of internal capacity. The success the international community expected from South Sudan did not fully take into account the time and capacity that it takes to build a successful state.
- Ethnic tensions within the young country are manifesting in large-scale massacres and other gross human rights violations. Mounting internal pressures within the country's ruling party and its military culminated in an outbreak of massive violence, largely along group lines, in December 2013, leaving thousands dead and tens of thousands seeking refuge in UN compounds across the country. State legitimacy had deteriorated significantly after President Salva Kiir dismissed the entire cabinet including Vice President Riek Machar in July. Earlier in the year, he had dismissed Finance Minister Kosti Manibe and Cabinet Affairs Minister Deng Alor allegedly over a multi-million dollar financial scandal and lifted their immunity from prosecution.
- While oil flows resumed after a dispute over fees between South Sudan and Sudan had shut down production for more than a year, the economic situation in South Sudan remains dire. Taking the top spot on the Index for the first time, the country faces immense challenges with its fractured political structure and vast amounts of violence. It is unlikely that South Sudan will relinquish the top spot any time soon.



• This year marks the first time since 2008 that Somalia has not appeared at the top of the Index as the most fragile state. It improved its score from last year, continuing an overall positive trend. In January 2013, the United States recognized the government of Somalia for the first time since 1991, setting the stage for the UN Security Council to partially lift the arms embargo in March. The progress of the new government was hampered in December by a falling out between the President and the Prime Minister, causing the Prime Minister to lose a confidence vote in parliament.

UED ECO

SL PS HR


SEC FE EXT


- There has been a continued decrease in acts of piracy; however acts of terrorism by al-Shabaab increased from 2012. While al-Shabaab was forced to retreat from many of their strongholds in 2012, they increased activities and attacks in 2013 which triggered calls for increased UN troops, and an increase of 4,000 peacekeepers was authorized. The most notable attack by al-Shabaab did not happen within Somalia but was on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya in retaliation for Kenya's military presence in Somalia. The rise in attacks led the medical NGO, Doctors Without Borders, to shut down their operations within Somalia after 22 years due to the risk to their volunteers.
- Areas of the country remain some of the most dangerous places in the world. Considering this, Somalia has made a huge amount of progress. As the first year in the past six that it has not been number one on the Index, it is possible and even probable that Somalia will continue to improve over the coming years.

REF


GG HF

Central African Republic Rank Score Overall Trend 2013 Rank 2013 Score 3rd 110.6 9th 105.3







Central African Republic: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2014



- The CAR holds the distinction of the highest increase in its score
 over the past year, jumping from 9th to 3rd on the FSI, with each
 indicator across the board experiencing a worsening. The levels of
 religious violence across the country have caused over 200,000
 internally displaced persons and have sparked warnings of
 genocide by the international community. Clashes between
 Christians and Muslims have continued despite the deployment of
 French troops.
- After an attempt at a power sharing agreement with President Bozize's government in January 2013, Seleka rebels led by Michel Djotodia seized the capital in March. Djotodia proceeded to suspend the constitution and dissolve the parliament. After he was sworn in as president, he dissolved the Seleka coalition, although, many of the rebels have refused to disarm. Unable to control the fighters once under his command, turmoil and fighting have continued across CAR. Authorities in CAR issued an international arrest warrant for deposed President Bozize accusing him of crimes against humanity and incitement of genocide on May 31, 2013.
- UN Chief Ban Ki-moon stated in August that the CAR has suffered
 a "total breakdown of law and order" and the majority of humanitarian organizations have fled the country. In April 2014, the UN
 Security Council approved deployment of UN peacekeepers to
 support the African Union troops already on the ground.




D. R. Congo: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2014



- The Democratic Republic of Congo has reversed its upward trend on the Index this year and lowered its score for the first time since the 2011 FSI. While it appeared last year that the DRC might claim top of the Index, it has now dropped to the 4th spot. The largest improvement was in the security indicator. After the rampant violence that took place in 2012, this marked improvement in security is a surprising turn for the better.
- Following the ceasefire declared by the M23 rebels in February of 2013, warlord and alleged founder of M23, Bosco Ntaganda, surrendered to the U.S. in Rwanda. He was transferred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague to face prosecution. This was followed by an unprecedented UN Intervention Brigade of 3,000 to take action against rebels in the east of the country. This included the Democratic Forces for the Liberation for Rwanda. In December, the M23 rebels signed a peace deal with the DRC government.
- While the general security situation has improved, human rights abuses continue. Also, a rebel group led by self-proclaimed prophet Paul Joseph Mukungubila attacked State Television Headquarters, the international airport and Congolese Army Headquarters in Kinshasa.
- The country is moving in the right direction, but there is much left to be done before it can be claimed that it is out of the woods.





- Sudan has reversed a 3-year negative trend on the Index. Much of the improvement can be attributed to the cessation of hostilities with South Sudan. In March 2013, Sudan and South Sudan reached an agreement to resume pumping oil, a shutdown that began in January 2012. This agreement included promises to withdraw troops from the border, creating a demilitarized zone.
- While conflict with South Sudan has stopped, the country continues to have widespread instability. There was continued violence in the south and in Darfur, including an attack on a UN peacekeeping team killing seven and wounding another 17 in July, the deadliest single assault on the international force within Sudan. Two more UN peacekeepers were killed in December. Violence also continues in Blue Nile state with increased fighting between government soldiers and rebels.
- Large scale protests and demonstrations across the country over government cuts to fuel subsidies were met with violent crackdowns that killed scores in September. The harsh crackdown was accompanied by the closure of newspapers, continuing Khartoum's negative legacy with freedom of the press.
- Thirty members of the ruling National Congress Party announced plans to form a new party in October. This followed allegations of corruption and stagnation within the party leadership. President Bashir allegedly removed his first Vice-President and long-time ally Ali Osman Taha from his cabinet, though Bashir denied rifts in the government, claiming Taha had voluntarily resigned.



Chad has experienced little overall change in its total score on this
year's Index. It continues to face many of the same challenges it
has faced over the past years with a staggering lack of resources.
The country also suffers from an arid climate, an influx of
refugees, and persistent violence

UED ECO

SL PS HR SEC

FE EXT

- The impoverished country continues to receive significant numbers of refugees from its neighbors, including approximately 60,000 from Sudan fleeing the conflict in Darfur and 12,000 from the Central African Republic. Adding to the pressures on the state are the 150,000 Chadian citizens that returned to the country in 2013 after being expelled from Libya. Chad continues to receive this influx of people without significant improvements in infrastructure to support the additional population.
- Chad has stepped up its military support sending troops out across the African continent. In January, they sent troops to assist France in driving al-Qaeda allies from northern Mali. It also pledged to send more troops to the Central African Republic following the coup that took place in March. It was also elected to the UN Security Council.
- In May, political opposition and key military members were arrested after an alleged coup attempt. Former leader Hissene Habre was arrested in Senegal in July 2013 and faces charges for crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes by a special court set up by an agreement between Senegal and the African Union.

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
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
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Afghanistan: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2014



- Despite significant investments by a variety of actors, both international and national, Afghanistan remains one of the least stable countries in the world. Corruption, drugs and extremism continue to run rampant across the country.
- Command of all military and security operations was passed from NATO forces to the Afghan army in June of 2013. This has unfortunately not improved security within the country. While coalition causalities have decreased, Afghan military and civilian causalities have been on the rise. The UN has reported that the number of aid workers killed in Afghanistan more than tripled in 2013. The progress made on women's rights, especially those of abused women seeking justice, has stalled. There was some movement towards justice as two former Kabul Bank chiefs were arrested in March for their alleged role in a multi-million dollar fraud that had nearly collapsed the banking system in 2010.
- Afghanistan's political scene remains rife with corruption and abuse. Sixteen of twenty presidential candidates for the upcoming 2014 election were unable to run due to their checkered pasts. Economic growth within the country has decreased by at least 10%, while a UN Study finds that Afghanistan's opium cultivation and production have hit record levels. With about 1.6 million drug users, Afghanistan has one of the higher drug rates in the world. Planned talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban have created high levels of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan.



- Yemen's score on the FSI has improved for the first time since 2007. While the country still faces major challenges, it has made some progress. With the transitional government's tenure coming to an end, there are serious questions about post-transition reform specifically regarding elections and how to handle the southern part of the country, where only some secessionist movements are calling for a complete secession. The economy has improved slightly under the transitional government, but international finance organizations are calling for further economic reforms.
- In March, a much delayed national dialogue began with the aim of drafting a new constitution. While the dialogue would not be completed until January 2014, Yemeni political parties signed a document pledging a solution to grant some autonomy to the once-independent South. Fighting in the Sana'a region between Shiite Houthi rebels and the Sunni Salafis caused at least 55 deaths in four days in October, raising serious questions about the security situation in Yemen. There continues to be a large number of refugees and IDPs especially in the northern part of the country. This has added pressure to an already dire humanitarian crisis with high levels of malnutrition and lack of access to water.
- Al-Qaeda affiliates continued to operate within the country. The U.S. increased drone strikes against the terrorist organization, as the War on Terror continues to drive U.S. involvement in the region.

2013 Score




Overall Trend

2013 Rank

Haiti: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2014

Haiti


Rank



- The 2010 earthquake had caused a large spike in Haiti's score on the FSI 2011. This year, the country returned to a trend of improving in small increments following a slight setback last year. Despite the significant aid Haiti has received, the march towards progress has been slow and strenuous, and not always steady.
- A cholera epidemic has been sweeping across Haiti since late 2010. It has been strongly linked to a sewage link at a UN camp housing peacekeepers from Nepal, who allegedly were infected with the Asian strain of cholera when they arrived in Haiti after the earthquake. The lawyers representing the victims of the epidemic have filed a lawsuit against the UN demanding compensation. The UN has claimed legal immunity from these claims.
- Protests in November targeted President Martelly and his failure to hold local and legislative elections as well as the high cost of living and high levels of corruption within the nation. Protesters called for his resignation. In December, President Martelly took a step forward by agreeing to publish a new electoral law. He also gave up a plan to dismiss members of the Senate.
- The country took a step towards justice as the former dictator Jean -Claude Duvalier, known as Baby Doc, appeared in court for the first time in February to answer questions on his 15-year tenure as leader. Whatever the outcome of proceedings, the precedent of forcing former political leaders to answer for their actions is a positive step forward.



Pakistan: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2014



- Taking the last spot in the Top Ten this year, Pakistan has moved up the list not because of the worsening of its own score, but the improvement of others around it. Located in one of the most volatile regions of the world, Pakistan has immense internal and external pressures.
- In January, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf was arrested over corruption allegations dating back to 2010 and his time as a minister. Following his arrest and a large-scale protest led by cleric and anti-corruption campaigner Tahirul Qadri, the government agreed to dissolve parliament early and appointed a caretaker government to oversee elections.
- Nawax Sharif of the Muslim League-N was appointed Prime Minister in elections held in May, which had the largest voter turnout since 1970 despite attacks and intimidation carried out by the Taliban.
- There were a large number of bomb attacks over the year including the deadliest attack on Christians in Pakistan's history. In September, more than 80 people were killed in a double suicide bombing set off at a church in Peshawar. Taliban-linked Islamists claimed responsibility.

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Fragile States Index 2014: A-Z Country Scores by Indicator

			††† DP	REF	GG	(Î)	UED	EGO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	Į Į FE		Total
7th	<u></u>	Afghanistan	8.8	9.3	8.7	7.8	7.5	8.3	9.5	9.0	8.3	10.0	9.4	9.9	106.5
123rd	190	Albania	4.4	3.4	4.7	6.9	4.5	5.5	6.5	4.8	5.5	5.0	6.2	6.2	63.6
71st	e	Algeria	5.7	6.7	7.9	5.0	5.9	6.1	7.5	6.1	7.4	7.5	7.3	5.7	78.8
43rd	٩	Angola	9.0	7.5	7.1	6.0	9.5	5.4	8.0	9.1	7.0	5.8	7.2	5.8	87.4
127th	-	Antigua & Barbuda	4.9	3.3	4.1	7.6	5.3	4.5	5.8	4.1	4.7	4.9	3.7	6.1	59.0
144th		Argentina	4.2	2.3	5.3	2.7	5.7	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.4	3.3	2.8	3.9	47.3
104th		Armenia	4.7	6.7	5.7	5.7	5.3	5.8	6.7	4.4	6.8	5.6	7.4	6.5	71.3
169th	米	Australia	3.4	2.4	3.9	0.9	3.0	2.4	1.0	2.1	2.3	2.0	1.6	1.3	26.3
167th	*	Austria	2.7	2.3	4.6	1.8	3.7	2.2	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.4	2.7	1.7	28.5
76th	C•	Azerbaijan	5.4	7.6	6.7	4.7	6.2	4.4	8.3	5.3	7.7	7.0	7.9	6.6	77.8
134th		Bahamas	6.5	2.7	4.4	5.3	5.3	4.7	4.6	4.7	3.1	4.3	4.5	4.0	54.1
120th		Bahrain	4.9	2.9	7.6	3.3	5.4	3.5	7.9	2.5	7.8	6.2	7.1	5.6	64.7
29th		Bangladesh	7.6	6.9	8.7	7.2	7.5	7.0	8.4	8.4	8.0	7.8	9.3	6.0	92.8
138th	Ψ	Barbados	4.1	3.0	4.4	5.9	5.4	5.8	3.3	3.0	2.8	4.2	4.2	5.3	51.4
90th		Belarus	5.5	3.6	7.1	3.7	5.5	6.0	8.8	5.0	8.1	6.1	8.3	7.3	75.0
164th		Belgium	2.8	1.6	4.2	1.9	3.5	4.0	2.0	2.4	1.5	2.3	3.9	1.9	32.0
114th	②	Belize	6.2	4.6	4.4	6.8	6.5	5.6	6.0	6.1	4.4	5.5	4.3	6.6	67.0
74th		Benin	8.2	6.3	3.6	6.5	7.2	6.9	6.1	8.7	5.1	5.9	6.1	7.6	78.2
64th	FF	Bhutan	6.3	7.2	7.6	7.1	7.2	6.0	5.5	6.6	7.0	5.3	7.5	7.6	80.9
70th	6	Bolivia	6.6	4.3	6.8	6.1	8.6	5.9	6.9	7.0	6.0	6.4	8.0	6.3	78.9
86th	To Aller	Bosnia & Herzegovina	4.1	6.8	7.4	5.8	5.9	5.5	6.8	4.4	6.1	6.5	8.7	7.9	75.9
121st		Botswana	8.0	5.5	5.1	5.3	7.8	6.4	4.1	6.3	4.6	3.2	3.3	4.9	64.5
125th	♦	Brazil	6.7	3.6	5.6	3.8	8.0	3.6	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.6	4.9	3.0	61.4
123rd	-	Brunei Darussalam	4.5	3.0	6.2	4.9	7.8	3.1	7.1	2.5	7.4	5.6	7.4	4.1	63.6
133rd		Bulgaria	4.1	3.4	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.2	4.9	4.1	3.7	4.4	5.3	4.7	54.4
39th	*	Burkina Faso	9.0	7.6	5.3	6.6	8.1	7.4	7.8	8.8	6.5	6.9	7.3	7.7	89.0
21st	×	Burundi	8.7	9.0	8.1	6.5	7.5	8.8	8.1	8.6	8.0	7.4	7.9	8.5	97.1
40th	. Milk	Cambodia	7.5	6.1	7.3	7.2	7.4	6.1	8.4	8.0	7.9	6.3	8.6	7.7	88.5
27th	*	Cameroon	8.1	7.6	7.8	7.5	7.5	5.9	8.2	8.5	8.3	7.7	9.5	6.5	93.1
168th	*	Canada	2.7	2.3	3.4	2.2	3.2	2.1	1.2	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.5	1.3	27.4
93rd	-0-	Cape Verde	6.8	4.4	4.2	8.6	7.2	6.2	6.0	6.8	4.8	5.7	5.5	7.9	74.1
3rd		Central African Republic	8.7	10.0	9.5	7.0	9.4	7.8	9.5	9.7	9.5	9.9	9.7	9.9	110.6
6th		Chad	9.6	9.8	8.5	8.3	8.8	7.7	9.4	10.0	9.5	9.1	9.8	8.2	108.7
153rd	*	Chile	4.6	2.6	3.8	2.9	5.4	3.9	3.3	4.2	3.7	2.8	1.7	3.1	42.0
68th	*)	China	7.7	5.9	8.6	4.8	7.7	3.9	7.9	6.5	9.1	6.2	7.2	3.5	79.0
59th		Colombia	6.2	8.0	7.7	7.0	7.8	4.1	7.4	6.3	7.1	7.0	7.7	6.8	83.1
54th	(Comoros	7.3	4.8	5.3	7.5	6.7	8.3	7.1	8.2	6.9	7.5	7.5	8.0	85.1
4th		Congo (D. R.)	9.4	9.9	9.6	7.2	8.5	8.2	9.3	9.4	10.0	9.4	9.5	9.8	110.2
37th		Congo (Republic)	8.1	8.1	6.3	6.5	8.1	6.7	8.4	8.8	7.6	6.4	6.7	7.9	89.6
140th	8	Costa Rica	4.6	4.4	4.4	3.2	5.8	4.6	3.2	4.8	2.3	2.8	3.8	4.6	48.5
14th		Côte d'Ivoire	7.8	9.1	9.0	7.0	7.6	7.4	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.8	9.4	9.4	101.7

			††† DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	Ž FE	■XI	Total
136th	8	Croatia	3.5	5.2	5.6	4.6	4.1	5.0	3.7	3.2	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.7	52.9
107th		Cuba	5.9	5.0	4.8	6.0	5.9	4.8	6.8	4.9	7.0	6.0	7.2	6.5	70.8
112nd	€	Cyprus	4.3	4.2	7.3	4.8	6.7	6.4	5.6	3.3	3.6	4.7	7.9	9.1	67.9
154th		Czech Republic	2.4	2.3	3.8	3.1	3.5	4.8	4.2	3.4	2.4	2.3	4.3	2.9	39.4
176th		Denmark	2.8	1.4	3.4	2.0	1.8	2.2	8.0	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.4	1.9	22.8
45th	•	Djibouti	8.1	7.4	6.4	5.5	7.5	7.2	7.9	7.7	6.9	6.9	7.6	8.0	87.1
95th		Dominican Republic	6.5	5.6	6.1	7.9	6.6	5.5	5.7	6.5	5.8	4.9	6.5	5.8	73.4
79th	**	Ecuador	5.9	5.7	7.5	6.5	7.1	5.6	6.9	6.6	5.0	6.4	8.2	5.9	77.3
31st	8	Egypt	7.1	6.4	8.6	5.1	6.8	7.9	9.0	5.7	9.7	7.9	9.4	7.4	91.0
100th	w	El Salvador	7.1	5.6	6.0	6.6	6.9	6.2	5.6	6.4	5.8	6.1	4.3	5.4	72.0
52nd	1	Equatorial Guinea	8.0	3.6	6.6	6.3	8.8	4.2	9.7	7.4	9.5	7.2	8.2	5.8	85.3
23rd	(1)	Eritrea	8.5	7.3	6.4	7.5	7.2	8.0	8.8	8.4	9.2	7.6	8.1	8.5	95.5
147th		Estonia	3.6	3.2	6.2	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.3	2.5	2.8	5.5	3.0	45.2
19th	0	Ethiopia	9.4	9.0	8.9	6.7	7.3	7.4	7.1	8.9	8.0	8.1	8.7	8.4	97.9
68th	**	Fiji	5.0	3.7	7.3	7.3	7.1	7.0	7.8	4.8	7.2	7.0	7.9	6.9	79.0
178th	+	Finland	1.8	1.5	1.3	2.2	1.3	3.5	8.0	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.3	18.7
160th		France	3.0	2.5	6.4	2.2	4.0	4.5	2.1	1.8	2.2	2.6	1.9	1.6	34.8
99th		Gabon	6.9	5.3	3.6	5.5	7.0	5.1	7.7	7.1	6.6	5.1	7.1	5.2	72.2
59th		Gambia	7.9	6.7	3.7	7.4	7.1	7.5	7.5	7.8	8.3	5.2	6.8	7.2	83.1
63rd	: :	Georgia	4.9	7.2	8.0	5.5	6.2	6.3	8.7	5.1	6.1	7.6	9.5	7.6	82.7
165th		Germany	2.9	3.3	4.3	2.4	3.6	2.9	1.5	1.9	1.8	2.4	2.0	1.6	30.6
108th	*	Ghana	6.9	5.8	4.9	7.3	6.8	6.0	4.8	7.9	4.9	4.1	5.0	6.3	70.7
137th		Greece	3.5	1.9	5.1	4.1	4.0	6.5	6.4	3.6	3.7	4.2	3.5	5.6	52.1
118th		Grenada	5.5	3.5	3.9	8.2	5.6	6.1	6.2	3.9	4.0	5.3	5.6	7.4	65.2
66th	(4)	Guatemala	7.2	6.0	7.6	6.8	7.9	6.1	6.5	7.1	6.7	6.7	6.0	5.7	80.3
12th		Guinea	8.0	8.3	8.4	7.5	7.9	8.9	9.9	9.2	8.5	9.2	9.6	7.3	102.7
16th	*	Guinea Bissau	8.5	8.1	6.0	8.3	8.1	8.4	9.3	9.1	7.5	8.6	9.6	9.1	100.6
106th		Guyana	5.9	4.1	6.2	8.8	6.5	6.7	5.6	6.3	4.1	5.5	5.1	6.2	71.0
9th	***	Haiti	8.7	8.5	7.0	9.1	9.3	9.4	8.9	9.5	7.5	7.5	9.1	9.8	104.3
75th	141	Honduras	6.7	4.2	6.1	6.3	7.8	6.6	7.0	6.7	6.0	6.4	7.0	7.1	77.9
141st		Hungary	2.8	2.8	4.4	3.6	4.6	5.6	6.0	3.2	4.1	2.6	4.9	3.7	48.3
171st		Iceland	1.9	1.6	1.0	3.1	1.9	3.9	1.2	1.9	1.4	1.3	1.8	4.9	25.9
81st	0	India	7.7	5.1	7.8	5.2	7.8	5.7	5.3	7.0	5.6	7.9	6.8	5.0	76.9
82nd		Indonesia	7.4	5.9	7.6	6.0	6.6	5.5	6.5	6.0	6.2	6.5	7.0	5.6	76.8
44th	Ф	Iran	5.3	6.8	8.8	5.9	6.4	6.4	8.7	4.8	9.3	8.3	9.4	7.1	87.2
13th	July Mr.	Iraq	8.0	8.5	10.0	8.0	8.1	7.0	8.7	7.7	8.7	10.0	9.6	7.9	102.2
170th		Ireland	2.5	1.4	1.6	3.1	2.7	4.2	1.8	2.2	1.2	2.1	1.3	2.0	26.1
67th	*	Israel (including the West Bank)	6.3	7.1	9.7	3.5	7.2	4.0	6.6	5.6	7.1	6.8	8.1	7.5	79.5
148th		Italy	3.6	3.4	4.6	2.3	3.3	5.1	4.2	2.6	2.8	4.7	4.9	1.9	43.4
119th	$\succ\!\!<$	Jamaica	5.5	3.3	4.0	7.5	5.8	6.8	5.6	5.6	5.1	6.0	3.7	6.0	64.9
157th	•	Japan	4.7	3.4	4.1	2.3	2.1	3.6	2.0	2.4	3.3	1.9	2.6	3.9	36.3
83rd		Jordan	6.7	8.3	7.4	3.9	6.2	6.6	6.4	5.0	7.3	5.5	6.9	6.5	76.7
111th		Kazakhstan	5.1	3.8	6.5	3.9	5.0	5.9	7.7	4.8	7.2	6.0	7.6	5.0	68.5
18th		Kenya	8.7	8.2	9.3	7.8	8.0	7.9	8.4	8.2	6.8	8.2	9.3	8.2	99.0
127th		Kuwait	5.4	3.7	4.9	3.4	5.0	3.3	7.3	2.8	6.9	4.2	8.0	4.1	59.0
58th	0	Kyrgyz Republic	6.0	5.5	8.2	6.1	6.7	7.3	8.2	5.9	7.3	7.1	8.0	7.6	83.9
56th		Laos	7.4	5.9	6.0	7.1	6.6	5.8	8.6	7.4	8.0	6.3	8.3	6.9	84.3
142nd		Latvia	3.7	3.2	5.8	4.1	4.6	4.3	4.2	3.7	3.3	3.3	4.3	3.5	48.0

			††† DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	ĘĘ FE	■XI	Total
46th	*	Lebanon	6.0	8.6	8.9	5.7	6.0	5.6	7.3	5.7	6.8	8.6	9.3	8.4	86.9
72nd		Lesotho	8.0	5.2	4.7	7.1	7.0	8.2	5.7	8.2	5.1	4.9	7.0	7.5	78.6
24th	*	Liberia	8.5	9.1	6.5	6.9	8.0	8.0	6.9	9.3	6.3	6.8	8.3	9.7	94.3
41st	C+	Libya	5.7	5.7	7.5	5.5	6.4	6.1	8.5	7.4	8.7	9.2	8.1	9.0	87.8
149th		Lithuania	3.6	2.9	4.0	4.0	5.3	4.8	3.5	3.7	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.0	43.2
172nd		Luxembourg	2.0	1.7	2.8	2.4	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.3	2.3	3.4	1.9	24.6
116th	> €	Macedonia	3.8	5.0	7.3	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.8	4.1	4.2	5.7	7.0	5.9	66.4
59th		Madagascar	8.2	4.2	4.9	5.8	8.2	7.9	7.3	8.8	5.8	6.8	7.6	7.6	83.1
38th	•	Malawi	8.8	6.4	5.7	8.4	8.1	8.3	7.6	8.1	6.5	5.1	7.7	8.4	89.1
117th	<u>C</u>	Malaysia	5.5	4.5	6.2	4.8	5.6	3.9	6.6	4.6	6.9	6.5	7.0	4.1	66.2
88th		Maldives	5.7	5.0	4.9	5.9	4.2	6.7	8.4	6.4	7.4	5.8	8.3	6.7	75.4
36th		Mali	9.0	7.5	7.5	8.1	7.1	7.9	5.9	8.6	6.8	8.0	4.9	8.5	89.8
151st		Malta	3.1	4.9	4.0	4.3	3.2	3.9	3.8	2.6	3.6	3.7	2.0	3.9	43.0
28th	· ·	Mauritania	8.4	8.8	7.2	6.0	6.8	7.7	7.4	8.6	7.7	7.7	8.5	8.2	93.0
145th		Mauritius	4.4	2.5	3.5	3.9	4.6	4.4	3.8	4.1	3.7	3.1	3.2	4.9	46.1
105th	*	Mexico	6.7	4.3	6.1	5.6	6.9	4.9	5.8	6.3	6.0	7.6	5.1	5.8	71.1
91st	ala e	Micronesia	7.2 5.6	3.5	4.2	8.7	8.3	7.8 6.6	6.3	6.0	3.4	5.4	5.6	8.2	74.6
89th 129th	, <u>i.</u>	Moldova	5.8	2.5	6.2 4.0	2.8	5.6 6.5	4.6	4.8	6.0	5.7	6.9 4.3	7.8 5.5	7.4 6.2	75.1 58.1
131st	8 <u>₩</u>	Mongolia Montenegro	3.6	4.8	7.0	3.3	3.2	4.0	4.3	3.9	4.5	4.3	6.3	5.6	55.7
92nd	*	Morocco	5.7	5.6	6.8	7.3	6.6	5.6	6.6	5.9	6.5	6.0	6.6	5.2	74.4
50th	*	Mozambique	8.9	4.9	5.4	7.4	8.3	8.1	7.5	8.7	6.4	6.6	6.6	7.1	85.9
24th	*	Myanmar	7.3	8.2	9.3	5.3	8.1	7.0	9.3	8.3	8.0	8.0	8.6	6.9	94.3
103rd	•//	Namibia	7.1	5.8	5.6	6.8	8.4	6.8	4.1	7.0	4.6	4.6	3.5	7.2	71.5
31st	<u>k</u>	Nepal	7.8	7.6	9.0	6.2	7.8	7.1	7.6	7.4	7.6	7.3	8.3	7.3	91.0
166th		Netherlands	3.3	2.4	4.1	2.4	2.4	3.7	1.0	1.8	1.2	2.1	2.6	1.6	28.6
173rd	*:	New Zealand	2.4	1.2	3.8	2.2	3.1	3.9	0.5	2.1	1.1	1.4	1,1	1.3	24.1
73rd	A	Nicaragua	5.9	5.1	6.2	7.8	7.6	6.5	7.6	6.9	5.1	5.3	6.8	7.6	78.4
19th	•	Niger	9.3	8.2	7.5	6.6	7.9	8.1	7.8	9.3	7.3	8.4	8.9	8.6	97.9
17th		Nigeria	8.3	6.9	9.8	7.0	8.9	7.3	8.8	9.0	8.7	9.5	9.5	6.0	99.7
26th	0	North Korea	7.5	4.7	6.6	4.4	8.0	9.0	9.9	9.2	9.6	8.5	8.2	8.4	94.0
175th	#	Norway	2.3	2.2	3.7	1.9	1.7	2.0	0.5	1.7	1.6	2.8	1.1	1.5	23.0
135th	*	Oman	5.3	2.3	2.7	2.1	3.9	4.8	6.4	4.1	7.4	5.0	6.6	2.5	53.1
10th	C	Pakistan	8.8	8.8	10.0	6.9	7.6	7.5	8.5	7.6	8.6	9.9	9.5	9.3	103.0
131st	*	Panama	5.6	4.0	5.3	4.2	7.6	3.7	4.6	5.2	4.7	4.8	2.5	3.5	55.7
57th	4.	Papua New Guinea	7.6	4.9	6.6	7.3	9.3	6.6	6.6	9.0	6.3	6.4	7.1	6.4	84.1
102nd		Paraguay	5.8	2.7	6.2	4.9	8.7	5.4	7.4	6.4	6.0	6.2	7.8	4.1	71.6
97th	*		5.8	5.0	7.3	6.4	7.5	4.2	7.4	6.7	4.8	6.7	6.7	4.4	72.9
52nd		Philippines	7.8	7.7	8.3	5.9	6.3	5.7	7.3	6.9	6.4	8.8	8.0	6.2	85.3
152nd		Poland	3.6	3.1	4.1	4.7	3.8	4.0	3.5	3.1	2.8	2.6	3.8	3.0	42.1
162nd	(0)	Portugal	3.1	1.9	2.3	2.5	3.2	5.2	2.3	3.3	2.6	1.9	1.8	3.0	33.1
139th		Qatar	4.6	2.1	4.9	3.4	5.1	2.9	6.2	2.3	5.9	2.8	5.0	3.7	48.9
130th		Romania	4.0	3.0	6.6	4.4	5.0	5.7	6.1	4.6	4.2	3.8	5.2	4.3	56.9
85th		Russia	5.4	5.2	8.5	4.8	6.7	3.6	7.6	5.0	8.7	8.6	8.1	4.3	76.5
34th	_	Rwanda	8.0	8.2	8.5	7.2	7.9	6.7	6.5	7.5	7.8	5.9	8.2	8.1	90.5

			††† DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	Ž FE	,• (∃ X T	Total
110th	7	Samoa	6.5	2.4	4.8	8.9	5.7	6.2	6.0	5.1	4.8	5.5	5.1	8.3	69.3
87th	**	Sao Tome & Principe	6.9	4.6	4.8	8.2	6.6	8.1	6.6	6.2	4.1	5.8	6.3	7.6	75.8
96th	\$200 —	Saudi Arabia	6.0	4.9	7.7	3.4	6.1	3.9	8.1	4.0	8.8	6.9	8.0	5.3	73.1
62nd	*	Senegal	8.1	7.3	6.6	7.1	7.0	7.0	6.0	7.9	6.5	6.5	6.6	6.2	82.8
100th	W.	Serbia	4.2	6.5	8.0	5.0	5.6	6.4	5.8	4.4	5.2	6.2	8.0	6.7	72.0
122nd		Seychelles	5.4	3.4	4.8	5.2	6.3	4.9	6.0	3.5	4.9	6.4	5.7	7.2	63.7
35th		Sierra Leone	8.7	7.8	5.9	8.3	8.5	8.3	7.2	9.1	5.9	5.1	7.7	7.4	89.9
158th	(:)	Singapore	2.8	1.4	2.8	3.6	4.0	2.8	3.5	2.1	4.9	2.0	4.0	2.0	35.9
146th	#	Slovakia	3.1	2.3	5.6	4.5	4.3	5.4	4.0	3.2	3.0	2.6	3.7	3.6	45.3
163rd	•	Slovenia	2.4	1.6	3.6	2.9	4.2	3.9	2.9	2.3	2.3	2.4	1.6	2.5	32.6
47th	::/	Solomon Islands	8.2	5.2	6.8	6.0	8.6	7.5	7.0	7.9	6.0	6.7	8.0	8.5	86.4
2nd	*	Somalia	9.5	10.0	9.3	8.9	8.7	9.1	9.1	9.6	9.8	9.4	10.0	9.2	112.6
115th		South Africa	7.4	6.2	5.8	4.6	7.7	5.8	5.0	6.1	4.3	4.9	5.6	3.2	66.6
156th	(•)	South Korea	2.9	1.8	3.1	3.6	3.2	2.3	2.8	2.1	2.9	2.4	3.6	5.7	36.4
1st		South Sudan	9.1	10.0	10.0	6.8	8.9	8.8	9.7	9.9	9.9	9.9	10.0	9.9	112.9
150th	卷	Spain	3.0	2.0	6.1	2.7	3.8	5.3	3.4	3.0	2.2	3.6	6.1	1.9	43.1
30th])等[Sri Lanka	6.5	8.5	9.3	7.6	7.5	6.2	8.3	5.3	9.1	8.2	9.4	6.7	92.6
5th		Sudan	8.6	9.7	9.9	8.7	8.2	8.1	9.3	9.1	9.3	9.6	10.0	9.6	110.1
109th	*	Suriname	5.6	3.3	6.1	7.4	6.9	7.1	5.8	5.5	5.2	5.7	5.8	6.2	70.6
51st	√€ %	Swaziland	8.7	5.2	3.6	6.6	7.8	8.9	8.8	7.7	8.0	5.7	7.0	7.8	85.8
177th	+	Sweden	2.8	2.6	1.0	1.8	1.8	2.0	0.8	1.8	1.3	2.4	1.8	1.3	21.4
174th	+	Switzerland	2.4	1.8	3.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	0.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.0	1.6	23.3
15th	* *	Syria	6.0	10.0	10.0	6.9	6.9	6.7	9.8	7.2	9.9	10.0	9.6	8.6	101.6
55th	4	Tajikistan	7.5	5.1	7.0	6.1	5.9	7.7	9.0	6.2	7.9	7.1	8.4	6.7	84.6
65th		Tanzania	8.6	6.7	5.9	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.0	8.7	6.3	5.2	5.7	7.6	80.8
80th		Thailand	7.6	6.5	8.0	3.8	6.1	3.6	7.1	4.9	7.4	7.9	9.5	4.6	77.0
31st	>	Timor-Leste	8.8	7.1	6.8	6.7	6.4	8.2	7.7	8.5	5.7	8.0	8.3	8.8	91.0
41st	*	Togo	7.9	7.4	4.8	7.1	7.8	7.1	8.4	8.3	7.5	7.1	7.6	6.8	87.8
126th		Trinidad	5.2	3.3	4.4	7.8	5.8	4.6	5.3	5.1	4.9	5.4	5.6	3.9	61.3
78th	©	Tunisia	4.7	4.4	7.8	5.3	5.7	6.3	8.0	5.2	8.1	7.3	8.1	6.6	77.5
93rd	C+	Turkey	5.4	7.1	9.0	3.7	6.5	5.3	6.0	5.2	5.9	7.4	7.3	5.3	74.1
74th	9000 9	Turkmenistan	6.0	4.2	6.9	5.1	6.7	5.3	9.6	6.4	8.5	6.8	7.8	4.9	78.2
22nd	0	Uganda	8.7	8.7	8.3	6.9	7.6	7.3	7.8	8.3	7.6	7.9	8.9	8.0	96.0
113th		Ukraine	4.5	3.4	6.4	5.4	5.0	5.5	8.0	3.9	6.1	4.7	8.0	6.3	67.2
143rd		United Arab Emirates	4.2	2.5	4.0	2.7	4.5	3.4	6.7	3.2	6.5	3.1	3.6	3.2	47.6
161st		United Kingdom	2.8	2.7	5.3	2.1	3.4	4.0	1.7	2.4	2.1	2.8	3.5	1.5	34.3
159th		United States	3.3	2.4	4.5	1.2	4.5	3.1	2.4	2.5	3.5	2.7	4.0	1.3	35.4
155th	•	Uruguay	3.8	2.2	2.7	4.4	4.5	3.5	1.6	3.7	2.2	3.4	2.7	3.2	37.9
48th	(.:::	Uzbekistan	6.4	5.7	7.4	6.6	7.3	7.1	9.3	5.4	9.3	7.6	8.8	5.4	86.3
83rd	*	Venezuela	5.4	5.1	6.8	5.5	6.9	5.5	7.7	7.5	7.8	6.2	7.7	4.6	76.7
98th	*	Vietnam	6.2	5.0	6.0	5.5	5.8	5.7	8.0	5.5	7.6	5.1	6.9	5.4	72.7
8th		Yemen	9.1	9.0	9.3	7.3	7.8	9.1	8.9	8.5	9.0	9.5	9.4	8.5	105.4
49th	Ĭ	Zambia	9.3	7.2	6.0	7.7	8.3	8.0	7.7	7.9	6.8	4.7	5.7	6.9	86.2
11th		Zimbabwe	8.9	8.4	8.1	8.3	8.3	8.3	9.3	8.8	8.6	8.1	10.0	7.7	102.8

Fragile States Index 2014: Best and Worst by Indicator

Social and Economic Indicators

Sweden

1.8



8.9 8.9

South Sudan

Austria

Denmark

Switzerland

2.2

2.2

Guinea

Swaziland

8.9

8.9

Political and Military Indicators



Fragile States Index 2014: Somalia Displaced as Most-Fragile State

Continued from page 12

demonstrate that just when we think that conflict is over, it can for a long-time remain an ever-present specter that can continually threaten to re-emerge. The recent worsening of the United States, France, and Singapore also shows us that instability is

not exclusive to developing countries.

But the FSI also demonstrates that for all the negativity, there is actually more reason for optimism. Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina show us that recovery from conflict is possible, albeit over a long period of time — true fundamental change and

development takes a generation or more. We should also not ignore the fact that, for the fifth year in succession, more countries have either improved or remained steady from the previous year than have worsened, implying that overall the world is becoming a more stable place.

J. J. Messner is Director of Sustainable Development & Security at The Fund for Peace and is also Co-Director of The Fragile States Index.



FFP

Pragile States Index Decade
Trends, 2005-2014

The Fragile States Index Decade Trends



23.	Peru	-6.3
N/R	Trinidad & Tobago	-6.3
24.	Zimbabwe	-6.1
ome Impro	vement	
N/R	Bahamas	-6.0
25. 🛨	Vietnam	-5.9
25	Estonia	-5.8
=26.	Poland	-5.8
20 [Romania	-5.7
=28.	Ukraine	-5.7
N/R C	Maldives	-5.7
N/R	Solomon Islands	-5.6
N/R	Malta	-5.5
30.	Albania	-5.0
31.	Liberia	-4.7
N/R	Qatar	-4.7
32.	Slovakia	-4.6
33.	Venezuela	-4.5
N/R	Samoa	-4.5
34.	Nepal	-4.4
35.	Slovenia	-4.2
(Azerbaijan	-4.1
=36.	El Salvador	-4.1
3,571.5	Saudi Arabia	-4.1
	Bolivia	-4.0
=39.	Guatemala	-4.0
<u> </u>	Nicaragua	-4.0
N/R	United Arab Emirates	-4.0
-42	Ecuador	-3.9
=42.	Panama	-3.9
N/R	Timor-Leste	-3.9
44.	Laos	-3.6


		Bangladesh	-3.5
	=45.	China	-3.5
	:• ;	South Korea	-3.5
	N/R	Luxembourg	-3.5
	48.	Kazakhstan	-3.4
	N/R	Congo (Republic)	-3.4
	=49. ○	North Korea	-3.3
	-49.	Uruguay	-3.3
	N/R *	Suriname	-3.3
	51.	Tajikistan	-3.1
	N/R <mark>❸</mark>	Belize	-2.8
	N/R	Sao Tome & Principe	-2.8
	52. 🥌	Cyprus	-2.6
	N/R	Lesotho	-2.6
		Botswana	-2.4
	=53.	Czech Republic	-2.4
		Rwanda	-2.4
	N/R	Guyana	-2.3
	=56.	Myanmar	-2.2
	-30.	Sudan	-2.2
	58. *	Morocco	-2.1
IV	larginal Im	provement	
	=59. {	Denmark	-2.0
	-39.	Mexico	-2.0
	61.	Jamaica	-1.9
	62.	Kuwait	-1.8
	63.	Brazil	-1.7
	64.	Gabon	-1.4
	65.	Costa Rica	-1.1
	66.	Angola	-0.9
	=67.	Burkina Faso	-0.7
	-07.	Malawi	-0.7


Marginal Ch	nange	
	Papua New Guinea	-0.5
=69.	Togo	-0.5
71.	Paraguay	-0.4
	Haiti	-0.3
	Jordan	-0.3
=72. < <u>∰</u>	Mongolia	-0.3
C.	Turkey	-0.3
76.	Armenia	-0.2
77. C	Pakistan	-0.1
	Congo, D.R.	+0.1
*	Israel	+0.1
=67.	Malaysia	+0.1
	United Kingdom	+0.1
N/R ₩	Montenegro	+0.1
65.	🥻 Sri Lanka	+0.2
-(2)	Burundi	+0.4
=63.	Portugal	+0.4
(+	Finland	+0.5
-50	France	+0.5
=59.	Georgia	+0.5
	Netherlands	+0.5
Marginal W	orsening	
58.	Namibia	+0.8
57.	United States	+0.9
56. ©	Algeria	+1.0
N/R <mark>∴</mark>	Micronesia	+1.1
55.	Honduras	+1.2
54.	Equatorial Guinea	+1.3
-52	Egypt	+1.5
=52. {	Uganda	+1.5
51.	Hungary	+1.6

So	ome V	Vorsei	ning	
	50.		Thailand	+2.1
	49.	#	Austria	+2.4
	48.		Tanzania	+2.5
	47.		Chad	+2.8
		0	Iran	+3.2
	=45.		Sweden	+3.2
		**	Fiji	+3.3
	44.	<u> </u>	Cambodia	+3.5
	43.		Guinea	+3.7
	42.		Mauritius	+4.2
		*	Australia	+4.3
	=40. {	#	Canada	+4.3
		*	South Sudan*	+4.5
		√⊕ ′₁	Swaziland	+4.5
	39.	•	Switzerland	+4.6
	27	*	Cameroon	+4.7
	=37.	*	New Zealand	+4.7
		#=	Iceland	+4.8
	36.	(::	Singapore	+5.1
	35.	·	Mauritania	+5.2
	34.		Nigeria	+5.3
	33.	*	Spain	+5.7
	32.	@	Ethiopia	+6.0
V	orsen	ing		
	31.	>	Philippines	+6.1
	30.	#	Norway	+6.2
	29.	*	Lebanon	+6.4
	=27.	•	Argentina	+6.5
	=21.	•	India	+6.5
	26.	Ĭ	Zambia	+6.6
			Madagascar	+6.6

		Af,	ghanistan	+6.7
	=24.	So	malia	+6.7
	N/R	Dj	ibouti	+6.8
	23.	Ве	enin	+7.3
	N/R	Co	omoros	+7.3
	22.	Ire	eland	+7.5
	N/R	Ва	hrain	+7.7
ı	21.	Ве	elgium	+8.0
ı		Ita	ly	+8.3
ı	=19.	Jap	oan	+8.3
ı	18.	Ye	men	+8.8
ı	17.	Ga	ambia	+9.1
ı	16.	Or	man	+9.3
ı	15.	Ch	ile	+10.0
Sig	nifican	Wors	sening	
	14.	G ł	nana	+10.2
	13.	K e	nya	+10.4
		Ni,	ger	+10.9
	=11.	So	uth Africa	+10.9
	10.	Gr	eece	+11.0
	9.	M	ozambique	+11.1
	8.	Eri	itrea	+11.6
	7.	Tu	nisia	+12.1
	6.	Sy	ria	+13.0
	5.	Ce	ntral African Republic	+13.1
Cri	tical W	rseni	ng	
	-3 J <u>×</u>	Gu	iinea Bissau	+15.2
	=3.	Ma	ali	+15.2
	2.	Se	negal	+16.7
	1.	Lik	руа	+19.3

The Fragile States Index Decade Trends





Ten Years of the Fragile States Index

J. J. Messner



ow with ten years of data from the Fragile States Index (FSI), we have the opportunity to look back on a decade of trends. Though it is useful and informative to view countries' performances in a given year, it really is just a snapshot in time. Viewing short term trends from year-to-year does add some color to that analysis, but it still does not allow for the slow pace of change that development often entails.

The list of most-worsened countries of the past decade provides few surprises: Libya, for example, is the most-worsened country after enduring a civil war and subsequent instability. Of the top ten most-worsened of the past decade, seven are countries in the Top 50 of the 2014 FSI (with two others ranking not much better, at 62nd and 78th; Greece stood as the only Western nation in this grouping, at 10th-most worsened). But while it is important to be mindful of these negative trends, the list of most improved provides an illuminating insight into the steady development and improvement of

various countries, the progress of which has been, to a large extent, undetected.

Take the Balkans, for example. After years of conflict following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, four of those former constituent states are among the ten-most improved countries of the past decade. Similarly, of the 15 former constituent states of the Soviet Union, all but one has improved over the past decade, and ten of them are among the 30 most improved countries. Though, in fairness, that perhaps says more about their starting point in the economic and political system from which they emerged.

When viewing the FSI for a single year, it is easy to look at the Index and see a very simple division between poorer countries at the top and rich world countries at the stable end. And although that is true — for now — it does not take into account the nuance of gradual change. Sure, there are plenty of developing countries at the top of the FSI, but many of those same countries are those that are the most-improved of the past decade. Things are bad, but in many cases, they are getting better. Meanwhile, at the other end of the Index, 20 of the world's 30 richest countries (based on per capita GDP) either worsened or stagnated over the past decade.

Although there is plenty to be optimistic about in viewing the decade-long trends of the FSI, there are some warnings that should be heeded. Many of us would expect that the likes of Libya, Central African Republic, and Syria would rate among the most worsened. But also among that

Where Are They Now?				
	FSI Top 10, 2005 5 Rank		2014 Score	
1	Cote d'Ivoire	14th	101.7	
2	Congo, D.R.	4th	110.2	
3	Sudan	5th	110.1	
4	Iraq	13th	102.2	
5	* Somalia	2nd	112.6	
6	Sierra Leone	35th	89.9	
7	Chad	6th	108.7	
8	Yemen	8th	105.4	
9	Liberia	24th	94.3	
10	Haiti	9th	104.3	

grouping are what are generally accepted as the greatest hopes of the developing world: Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa. Frequently seen as the pillars of a new, emergent Africa, those countries are respectively the 14th, 13th, and 11th most-worsened countries of the past decade, giving significant warning of the mounting (and perhaps less detected) pressures that are building on those nations. Across the Atlantic, Chile, often regarded as one of the drivers of Latin American development, is the 15th-most worsened country of the past decade.

There is still plenty to be optimistic about, but the FSI's trends should serve as a warning — identify the pressures and address them through public policy and development actions before they get out of hand.

A Decade of Recovery: Bosnia and the Balkans Bounce Back

Laura Brisard



decade of Fragile States Index (FSI) data gives the opportunity to focus on the parts of the world that are truly improving. Two countries nearly tied for most-improved country of the past decade: Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) and Indonesia.

The Fund for Peace has previously covered the promising development of Indonesia, and it would appear that this trend is continuing. However, what makes BiH especially interesting is that it is not merely one single country that is leading the charts - it's part of an entire neighborhood of improvement.

Of the countries that have improved the most, one region of the world stands out: the Balkans and specifically, the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991-1992, followed by political turmoil and bloody civil war, led to the creation of five independent states -BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. After Kosovo and Montenegro declared independence from Serbia, the

number of former Yugoslav countries rose to a total of seven. Out of those seven countries, four of them are among the Top 10 most improved countries of the decade with BiH placing 1st, followed by Serbia at 3rd, Croatia at 9th, and Macedonia at 10th. Slovenia also ranked a respectable 35thmost improved. (Montenegro was only scored as a separate country beginning in 2007, and its ranking has remained steady since then; Kosovo is not included in the FSI as it is not a UN member.)

Over the past decade, the former Yugoslav countries have experienced a steady improvement. Slovenia and Croatia are both now member states of both NATO and the EU, with Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia having been granted candidate status for EU membership. All of the former Yugoslav countries, with the exception of Kosovo, are aspiring members of NATO, already working alongside the organization through peace programs. With the path to accession to these international bodies has come a program of political, economic and social reform, which has helped significantly in tackling core issues such as ethnic tensions, corruption and poverty. These efforts have certainly contributed to their overall score improvement in the FSI in the past decade.

Among the six former Yugoslav countries examined in the FSI, it is not surprising that Slovenia and Croatia have been faring better than their neighbors, ranking respectively 163rd and 136th. These two countries were the first to declare their independence from the former Yugoslavia in June 1991 and are today the only two which are members of both NATO and the EU. Another striking trend within this group of countries is the impressive trajectory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has become the most improved country of the decade on the Index.

In the first FSI, in 2005, BiH ranked 21st and was classified as being in the "Alert" category. In the decade since, BiH has managed to improve considerably, and although it still finds itself in the "High Warning" category with a score of 75.9, it has nevertheless improved its situation markedly, now being ranked 86th and earning the distinction of the mostimproved country in the Index's first decade.

This impressive progress, with a gain of 51 places in the rankings from 2006 to 2014 indicates how BiH is moving forward after the civil war in the former Yugoslavia that raged from 1992 to 1995. After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, like most of those former constituent states, the focus of BiH has shifted towards European integration. In the past ten years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made great strides in various areas, though the areas where the FSI has measured the most significant progress has been in terms of Demographic Pressures and External Intervention. The scores for Refugees and IDPs have also improved markedly. Of some concern however is that the country's score for Factionalized Elites has remained unchanged, and its Human Rights and Rule of Law score has actually worsened. Nevertheless, all other indicators have shown improvement.

BiH is frequently confronted with natural

Most Improved and Most Worsened Over the Past Decade

Most Improved Decade Trend 2006-2014* (by Move	Score) 2006 Score	2014 Score
-12.6 V Bosnia and Herzegovina	88.5	75.9
-12.4 V Indonesia	89.2	76.8
-11.8 🔻 Şerbia**	83.8	72.0
-11.6 🔻 🚾 Dominican Republic	85.0	73.4
-11.1 ▼	81.9	70.8
-10.6 ▼ Russia	87.1	76.5
-9.5 ▼ Belarus	84.5	75.0
-9.1 ▼ Germany	39.7	30.6
-9.0 ▼ Croatia	61.9	52.9
-8.7 ▼	91.8	83.1
Macedonia	75.1	66.4

Most Worsened Decade Trend 2006-2014* (by	Score) 2006	2014
Move	Score	Score
+19.3 ▲ Libya	68.5	87.8
+16.7 ▲ ■ ★ Senegal	66.1	82.8
+15.2 A Suinea Bissau	74.6	89.8
Guinea Bissau	85.4	100.6
+13.1 🛕 Central African Republic	97.5	110.6
+13.0 A Syria	88.6	101.6
+12.1 (Tunisia	65.4	77.5
+11.6 A	83.9	95.5
+11.1 🔺 🛌 Mozambique	74.8	85.9
+11.0 ▲ Greece	41.1	52.1

calamities, with floods and extreme temperatures, so the improvement in the country's Demographic Pressures indicator score may be somewhat surprising. This is a reflection of the country's improvements in human metrics such as life expectancy, a decline in child mortality and general overall health improvements, especially among the young. Other key social metrics, such as adult literacy, have also improved. Meanwhile, the country appears to be on


track to reach its goal of achieving universal primary education by 2015, with an additional significant increase of the enrollment in secondary school and higher education. Better access to drinking water and to the sewage system has further helped enhance the living conditions of the Bosnian population.

The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which put an end to the conflict and implemented the current division of BiH into three entities the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska and the Brčko District — established UN supervision of the implementation of the peace process, a role that it still performs today. Besides this supervision, various NATO- and European-led peacekeeping missions were deployed. From early 2005 however, the number of troops has decreased every year — in 2009 there were around 2,200 troops and by 2012 this number was down to 1,300. Foreign assistance has focused on issues related to governance, institutions and financial governance, mostly through financial assistance offered by the IMF, the World Bank or the EU. Recovery from conflict, and the drawdown in international intervention that accompanied it, has contributed heavily to the improvements in BiH's External Intervention score. Today, BiH relies less on foreign assistance than it formerly did.

The issue of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is still a current concern in BiH. However, the volume of refugees and IDPs has greatly decreased over the past decade. In contrast, the number of returnees increased for a few years before slowing down and decreasing, proving that a significant number of former refugees and IDPs have felt it safe to return to their homes. In 2007, there were about 3,600 returnees, in 2008; it had increased to 7,600. Considering the conflict ended almost 20 years ago, issues related to refugees and IDPs are not as urgent as they were in the years following the civil war. Notwithstanding, it was estimated that around 8,600 people still live in one of the 159 collective centers throughout BiH in 2012, proving that such issues are still current, even if the refugee and IDP situation in the country has improved overall.

Despite this remarkable improvement, BiH still faces many challenges, mainly remnants of its civil war. Peace-building and reconciliation processes are as important today as ever as the prosecution of war criminals has been too slow, a lack of reparations for civilian victims of war





^{*} Due to a small sample size in 2005, the trends are measured from 2006 onwards.

^{**} The scores for Serbia until 2007 were for the former state of Serbia & Montenegro

It Takes a Generation: West African Success Stories

Nate Haken



any truisms about peace-building incline towards pessimism. There is a "vicious cycle," a "conflict trap," "unintended consequences," the problem of "political will," and a slew of transnational "exogenous pressures" beyond the sphere of anyone's control. Certainly, the Fragile States Index (FSI) is often perceived as a buffet of bad news stories and cautionary tales with the same sorry countries at the top of the list year after year. But there are also cases of sustained and steady progress that give occasion for hope. Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa offer two lessons for peacebuilders working for lasting change.

The first lesson relates to myopia. Peace-building is a long term proposition. It has taken ten years for Sierra Leone to move out of the Alert category, where it was in the FSI 2005. If people are expecting fast results, they are bound to be disappointed. It takes a generation. The second lesson relates to tunnel vision. Effective peace-building takes a regional perspective because a state may be unitary in theory but the neighborhood


plays a major role in its trajectory. If these two lessons are internalized by those with a stake in peace and security in both public and private sectors, it will help peace-building actors to be more successful in promoting sustainable human security. Ten years from now, countries like Guinea and Zimbabwe could be emerging out of the Alert zone as well.

tight correlation between improvements in Liberia and in Sierra Leone is not surprising when you consider how interwoven their histories are. When the FSI was first being produced in 2005, both countries were just coming out of a decade of civil war. In Sierra Leone, the war was between the Charles Taylor-backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the government forces. It was triggered by economic mismanagement and political disgruntlement, fueled by blood diamonds and military coups. About half of the population was displaced and thousands were subjected to sexual assault and the amputation of their limbs. ECOWAS troops intervened in 1998 followed by UN troops in 1999. In 2001, the rebels began to disarm. Meanwhile, in Liberia, there were two civil wars, the first one from 1989-1996 between the Armed forces of Liberia and rebel groups led by Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson. The rebels ultimately defeated the government forces and Charles Taylor became president in 1997. Subsequently, a new constellation of rebels emerged, backed by Sierra Leone and Guinea. In 2003, ceasefire was signed, ECOWAS peacekeepers from Nigeria were deployed, and Charles Taylor resigned.

During the fifteen-year period of brutal

violence spreading through West Africa in the 1990s and early 2000s, the lessons people often took were that state failure is intractable and that ceasefires don't hold. Violence mutates and evolves, but never gets resolved in a lasting way. Conflict management is the best we can hope for. Even that may be Pollyannaish, considering the hard realities and imperatives of warlordism in states that simply cannot manage the social, economic, and political pressures on society in a legitimate, representative, and professional way. Conflicts only end when they burn out. Then they simmer. When the Sierra Leonean rebels disarmed in 2001 and Charles Taylor stepped down as president of Liberia in 2003, it was not a foregone conclusion that war would not break out again. There had been so many twists and turns along the way. Why should this time be any different? And yet, looking back across ten years of data, it is clear that from the mid-2000s on, the region has become much less fragile. Granted, in 2010 Liberia moved up a little, in part due to the crossborder issues with Cote d'Ivoire in the wake of election violence and the toppling of President Laurent Gbagbo. But in general, the trend was and is overwhelmingly positive. The hard work of peacekeeping was done by regional and international actors. But the harder work of peacebuilding was done at the community, county, and national levels by those with a stake in peace.

An index, which by definition is essentially an average of averages, is necessarily subject to caveat and qualification when using it to draw conclusions about such complex issues as regional, inter-state, cross



-border, intra-state, and localized conflict. But in this case the FSI does illustrate how long it takes to move a country safely out of the Alert zone: a generation. The cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone illustrate how closely knit neighboring countries can be. An unstable Liberia played a destabilizing role in Sierra Leone. Conversely, both countries stabilized together. When peacekeepers deployed in southern Sierra Leone in 2001, Charles Taylor lost control over the diamond industry there, weakening his hold on power in neighboring Liberia, setting the stage for his resignation.

Political leadership and the security services can only do so much. Ensuring that the positive trajectory continues is now in the hands of civil society. But businesses also have a huge stake in peace. According to World Bank data, after a decade of economic stagnation, Sierra Leone's GDP per capita turned around in 2000, more than tripling over the next ten years. The same thing happened in Liberia where the

GDP per capita has more than tripled since Charles Taylor resigned in 2003.

If the success in Liberia and Sierra Leone is to be sustained and replicated, it will take both public and private sectors at every level, understanding that all have a stake in peace and must therefore play their part. Through early warning, conflict sensitive development, peace messaging, capacity building, and multi-stakeholder collaboration, fragile states across the world can become more peaceful and more prosperous. Peace-building is not binomial. One is never finished building peace in a country. When successful, peace-building, as its name suggests, is a process that just keeps building upon itself in a never-ending exercise of constant improvement.

Nate Haken is Co-Director of the Fragile States Index and is Director of Conflict Early Warning and Assessment at The Fund for Peace.

A Decade of Recovery: Bosnia and the Balkans Bounce Back

Continued from page 36

crimes, and many enforced disappearances which have yet to be resolved. The divisions between the three main ethnicities which make up the country (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) are still an important issue. Further, smaller ethnic groups are not even represented politically. BiH is additionally

the most landmined country in Europe. Corruption continues to be widespread in public offices. Also, despite being the most improved country over the decade, BiH remains the most fragile country among the six former Yugoslav countries included in the FSI.

The overall improvement of BiH since our

first FSI was published in 2005 is striking because it displays the possibilities for conflict-affected states to progress and to overcome their challenges. BiH has evolved from a post-conflict country, under quasitotal international supervision, in which everything needed to be rebuilt, to a country which may soon be on the verge of joining the European Union and NATO.

Laura Brisard is a Research Assistant at The Fund for Peace.

Statehood or Bust: The Case of South Sudan

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meant to address such grievances as well as institute processes of reconciliation that is so critical to national stability. While most of the focus during the current crisis has been on the political leadership, those most deeply affected by the bloodshed are regular South Sudanese citizens on the ground. Continuing to empower civil society and support their efforts at reconciliation

may be the most effective way to disempower the divisive rhetoric from the top aimed at enflaming and exacerbating tensions.

While none of these efforts likely holds the ultimate solution, a combination of them might be the very best chance South Sudan has right now to keep from sliding further into the abyss. In the meantime, the fact that the world's newest state is now also its

most fragile should certainly give cause for consideration going forward on how we, as the international community, manage emerging states. Years of state-building, from the Balkans to Timor-Leste, seem to hold one repeating message: it takes a lot of time and a lot of resources. South Sudan may yet be one more reminder of the need to manage expectations from the onset, for all involved. And to be at the ready to provide a lot of triage. Fast.

Patricia Taft is Director of Transnational Threats at The Fund for Peace.

About The Fund for Peace



The Fund for Peace works to prevent conflict and promote sustainable security by building relationships and trust across diverse sectors and by developing innovative technologies and tools.

The Fund for Peace has worked in over 60 countries with a wide range of partners in all sectors: governments, international organizations, the military, non-governmental organizations, academics, journalists, civil society networks, and the private sector. Our projects include supporting grassroots organizations, developing national dialogues, and taking leadership roles in international initiatives.

A leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, The Fund for Peace focuses on fragile and conflict-affected situations. Our objective is to create





practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to those who can help create greater stability. Combining social science techniques with information technology, we have produced the patented Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), a content analysis software product that provides a conceptual framework and a data gathering technique for measuring conflict risk. Annually, we produce The Fragile States Index, a ranking of 178 countries across 12 indicators, that is published by *Foreign Policy* magazine.



We build early earning networks in complex environments to collect data and make this data available publicly for decision and policy makers to develop better informed and better coordinated approaches to peace-building. We advise companies operating in complex environments on how to ensure they operate responsibly, respecting and even promoting human rights and greater stability.

Most importantly, in all our work we strive to build capacity among local actors so they can ultimately develop and implement the solutions needed in their local context, because we believe that is key to truly sustainable human security.

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