

Y·E·S 2013

EUISS YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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Foreword

Since its inception and over the years, the EUISS has come to be appreciated for providing both practitioners and academics at all levels with regular yearly collections of official documents concerning, in particular, the early development and implementation of the Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Those 'Core documents' (vols. I-XI) soon became part and parcel of the toolbox of the still fledgling EU 'security community'.

This *Yearbook of European Security (YES)* intends to build on that tradition while offering its readers a richer menu of food for thought. Alongside a collection of relevant documents, the Yearbook includes a chronology of pertinent *facts* and a selection of relevant *figures* that, taken together, are intended to present a more comprehensive picture of what the EU has done (and how) in the security policy domain over the previous year – or years, as *YES 2013* exceptionally covers both 2011 and 2012, with a view to completing the annual series launched as far back as 2001.

Furthermore, the *Yearbook* will offer *mental maps*, so to speak. This year's map will cover the way in which (and the extent to which) governments across the world have developed 'strategic' thinking, i.e. functions, activities and even permanent centres devoted to analysing long-term trends at the global level and their policy implications. A broad historical overview is complemented by a few case studies, a broad typology of models of foresight conducted in various countries, and some tentative conclusions.

Acknowledgements

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Yet this first volume of the EUISS *Yearbook* would have never materialised without the dedication, competence and professionalism that Philip Worré infused in it by coordinating the whole team, in association with the internal staff, and assembling all the pieces of this new puzzle while meeting very tight deadlines. This has been

all the more remarkable as he achieved all that while still acting as Executive Director of ISIS Europe in Brussels, thus juggling different tasks (and locations) with consummate skill.

Antonio Missiroli
Paris, April 2013

Mapping



Foresight in governments – practices and trends around the world

Iana Dreyer and Gerald Stang¹
With the collaboration of Carole Richard

Introduction

This study provides the initial results of a survey of foresight activities undertaken by a select group of governments around the world.

The study was begun following the recent initiative by European Union (EU) institutions to build a joint foresight capacity (European Strategy and Policy Analysis System – ESPAS) that assesses long-term global trends to help them strengthen policy planning. In addition to contributing to the discussion about this new EU activity, the study is also intended to be of interest for the wider European policy planning community and to anyone interested in learning about how governments practise ‘the art of the long view’ (Schwartz, 1991).

This study looks at the way governments approach foresight, the issues they try to grapple with and the challenges they face in connecting foresight and policy. Its focus is on foresight exercises that look ten years or more into the future. The study does not include within its scope foresight activities undertaken at the initiative of business, academic or non-governmental organisations, though some government-led activities do involve these other actors.

Foresight work includes a range of activities related to the production of knowledge about possible futures. This knowledge is not of *the* future, nor *any* real future, but rather ‘the manufactured knowledge of [a] restricted number of possibilities’ (Sardar, 2010). The output of foresight work very often involves the creation of scenarios for the future which can be analysed for their likelihood and potential impact. Fore-

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sight also commonly uses practices such as ‘trend impact analysis’, ‘horizon scanning’, or the *Delphi method* (see Box 1).

This study presents an initial *tour d’horizon* of a limited number of countries who undertake foresight activities: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). The countries were chosen to represent a diverse selection of countries based on location, economic profile, power status and political regime. The analysis is based on desk research and interviews conducted with professionals in government, academia and think tanks. This study also looked at the foresight activities of a range of international organisations with mandates for public service and which interact with governments as sources of knowledge and policy advice. As foresight activity tends to be scattered across departments and not always made public, it was not possible to be exhaustive in our analysis of the countries in this study. Time constraints and language barriers may also have affected the outcome of the study.

The first part of the study identifies the main issues that governments grapple with and offers a preliminary historical overview to shed light on current practice. The second part compares the approaches to foresight taken by governments and the institutional setting for foresight activities. The third part tries to assess the conditions for fruitful foresight.

The quest for oracles

In order to understand what foresight is today, it is useful to delve into its history. Whereas rulers and governments have always had recourse to oracles, astrologers and other crystal ball-type methods of peering into the future, the professionalisation of foresight activity (under various names) can be traced to World War II and its aftermath. Military in its origin, the art of studying the future has spread to a greater number of areas, not least thanks to the contribution of intellectual movements operating outside established technocracies, and the transformation of the role of the state in recent decades.

Leviathan: from naked survival to economic competition

The first concern of government is ensuring the survival of the state itself. In that context, it is vital to know your enemy as well as yourself.

The American and Cold War origins of contemporary foresight

During World War II, the American military establishment developed analytical capacities to anticipate possible events. They studied not only military events, but anything that could affect military affairs, such as technological, demographic and political trends. The focus was completely on how to win the war. After World War II, foresight activities were shaped by the tensions of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Foresight activities were highly focused on ‘strategic’ issues related to national survival.

A ground-breaking role was played by the RAND Corporation. The world’s first ‘think tank’ (Missiroli and Ioannides, 2012), RAND was created by the American government in the 1940s but later became more independent while remaining at the heart of the American ‘security political nexus’ (Anderson, 2012). It developed the famous *Delphi method* (see Box 1), built big datasets and used scenario building, the bread and butter of foresight work. RAND has played a significant role in shaping modern foresight, developing game-theoretical models of decision-making and military scenarios, not least under the lead of nuclear-age theoretician Herman Kahn.

Expansion to Europe and the USSR

In Western Europe, foresight was developed from the bottom up in the 1950s and 1960s thanks to highly active and networked academics in France, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany. With the support of the US Ford Foundation and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, intellectuals like Bertrand de Jouvenel, founder of the *Futuribles* association and journal, could finance some of their activities. The motivation of many of these individuals was not security-linked (see more on this below), but foresight in military affairs also became a normal government activity, especially in France and the United Kingdom.

Foresight work also took place in Central and Eastern Europe beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviet Union developed foresight capacities during the Cold War, not least as a response to American foresight work. In the early 1970s, the scholar Igor Bethuzev-Lada introduced Western foresight methods in the USSR, though little is known of the process and the content of Soviet efforts, which were mostly classified. Russia today has maintained a capacity for foresight studies via the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

From confrontation to economic competition

The failure to anticipate the Vietnam War or how it was fought (via conventional and guerrilla warfare rather than a nuclear exchange), the social movements of the 1960s, and the oil shocks, economic crisis and Cold War *détente* of the 1970s all led to a diminished standing of, and declining interest in, military-centred foresight on strategic issues. After a temporary revival in the 1980s, interest in military foresight work waned following the end of the Cold War so that some scholars feared for its future. One wrote: ‘a spectre is haunting strategic studies – the spectre of peace’ (Betts, 1997). Military-centred foresight was losing standing at the same time as governments placed less emphasis on military issues in the race for international pre-eminence. Increased interest in economic competition became an overarching concern.

Box 1 - Key methodologies in foresight

A variety of foresight methodologies are used, individually or in combination, often to feed into a scenario-building process. Key methodologies include:

The Delphi method

The Delphi method is about constructing consensus among experts on predictions concerning a specific issue. It involves a structured and iterative process of brainstorming, generally with a series of questionnaires sent to selected experts in order to collect their predictions on various trends. This iteration usually leads to a consensus forecast, as expert opinions converge. A monitor filters and analyses the questionnaires to minimise interaction among the participants. The Delphi method promotes scenario development and helps multidisciplinary efforts to identify trends.

Horizon scanning

Horizon scanning is about detecting early signs of potentially important developments via systematic examination of potential threats and opportunities. It puts emphasis on new technology and its effects on the issue at hand. The method aims to filter out what is constant, what changes, and what constantly changes. It explores new issues as well as persistent problems and trends, including matters at the margins of current thinking that are likely to challenge past

assumptions. Horizon scanning is a good first step in assessing trends to feed into a scenario development process.

Trend impact analysis

Trend impact analysis extrapolates historical data into the future, while taking into account unprecedented future events. It involves systematically examining the effects of possible future events likely to affect the trend that is extrapolated. The events can include technological, political, social, economic and value-oriented changes. Expert opinions are used to identify future events that might cause deviations from the surprise-free projection and calibrate their likelihood and potential strength. Trend impact analysis provides a solid basis for building scenarios.

Different ways of approaching foresight

Normative vs. exploratory foresight: Normative foresight asks: what future do we want? Exploratory foresight explores what is possible regardless of what is desirable.

Qualitative vs. quantitative foresight: Qualitative ('soft data' such as interviews, discussions, reports) and quantitative ('hard data' such as figures and statistics) information can be combined and help orient, for instance, a scenario approach, thereby combining creativity with rigour.

Source: OECD website (modified)

The international environment today appears less based on confrontation among states, but on the competition of economic territories for capital and grey matter. The power of globalisation is such that the foresight undertaken by global business and financial actors influences directly how governments think and act. The 2003 forecast by Goldman Sachs that the economies of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) would together, by 2050, be larger than those of the G-6 (the US, Germany, Japan, the UK, France and Italy), is the global forecast that has probably most focused minds and influenced governments in the last decade. It even contributed to the creation of a BRICS coalition (including South Africa) whose strategic interests diverge strongly, but who reject Western dominance of the established international order. This rejection has not been expressed through the use of force but through cooperative economic action, such as the planned establishment

of a joint development bank to contest the pre-eminence of Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions.

Homo economicus: from planning to chasing technology and innovation

Macro-economic forecasting is a long-established practice which gave a significant impetus to the development of modern foresight activities.

Developing and expanding beyond macro-economic forecasts

Macro-economic forecasting has its origins in the first attempts at economic planning during the interwar period and was developed more systematically after World War II. The dominance of Keynesian macroeconomics in economic policy until the 1970s led to a build-up of dataset-based forecasting. Macro-economic forecasting, however, does not seek to look beyond more than a few years, and its limitations were revealed during the era of stagflation that followed the 1973 oil shock, and yet again following the onset of the economic crisis that engulfed the West in 2007. Yet some of its analytical and statistical methods have been useful in helping build models for long-term forecasts. These types of forecasts are used all over the world and are based on a variation of assumptions about the extent and nature of the workforce (demographics, education levels, etc.) and of the rate of capital accumulation in a country.

These rather easy-to-build static models, however, have their limitations. Possible shocks – such as the recent financial crisis – are not accounted for, leading to a recent flurry of new theorising around what Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007) has termed ‘Black Swan’ events. Building on the neoclassic economic growth model initially developed by Robert Solow, these new economic models generally take technological development in a country as a ‘given’. But it is the ability of a country to take up technology and to create new technologies that has proven to be one of the most important drivers of economic development and economic competition among countries in recent decades. This was understood quickly by the so-called ‘developmental states’ of East Asia, when the weaknesses of traditional development planning in developing economies had begun to be revealed. Governments in Japan, during the 1970s, and South Korea, during the 1990s, made it a strategic priority to climb the technology ladder. As part of their efforts, they imported the *Delphi method* from the US for their programming of publicly supported Research and Development (R&D) activities. This has served them rather well.

The centrality of science and technology (S&T) foresight today

Since the 1990s, science and technology (S&T) has been the principal area of foresight in which governments have invested around the world. It is the most common area of focus for foresight activities in Europe. It is also at the heart of EU foresight activities (see Box 2). It includes, for instance, the work of the Directorate-General for Research & Innovation (DG RTD), the EU parliamentary Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA), which is a member of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) network, and the establishment of the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies in Seville through the Foresight for the European Research Area (FORERA) team. Multiple individual member states have a strong S&T focus, including Germany, which in the early 1990s drew from the Japanese foresight experience to design its S&T policies in a move to better calibrate its research and innovation policies. A similar approach was taken by Sweden during its period of economic reforms in the 1990s. S&T foresight is also being copied in emerging markets across the world, though with generally limited success so far.

S&T foresight has evolved in recent years. This is seen clearly in the UK's foresight programme, which has shifted from narrow S&T foresight to the pursuit of activities which incorporate an understanding of the social context in which the S&T changes will take place. The goal is to help clarify how the social and economic setting will impact on the use and relevance of the predicted changes in S&T. Instead of focusing solely on advancements in agricultural biotechnology, for example, they are more likely to study food security and how it will be impacted by changes in technology. The goal is to create an evidence base to lead strategic planning. This inclusion of social contextualisation has been studied recently by long-established Japanese and Korean technology foresight programmes which are seeking to better integrate their work into wider planning efforts.

Other countries are developing new S&T foresight efforts with the goal of applying S&T to 'grand challenges'. South Africa, for example, has an increasing interest in using S&T foresight to deal with 'grand challenges' such as climate change. In Norway, the Norwegian Board of Technology addresses technological challenges and the possibilities opened up by new technology in all areas of society. In Australia, evidence-based technology foresight is being applied in sectors such as energy, sport and tourism by the new futures unit in the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO).

Behemoth: managing welfare states and scarce resources

The dominance of established systems of government-led, military-focused foresight was contested in the 1960s and 1970s by ‘futurologists’ from outside the US security nexus. One of these critics was the man who coined the term ‘futurology’ in the 1940s, Ukrainian-born Ossip Flechtheim, while at Columbia University. To Flechtheim and the community of futurologists of that era, futurology was not a science of prediction and a tool for rational policy, as conceived by the established programmes, but a means to reflect on the present based on utopian ideals. What united sociologist Daniel Bell (author of *Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress* in 1968 and *The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society* in 1973) in the US, Bertrand de Jouvenel in France, peace researcher Johan Galtung (co-author of *Mankind 2000*) in Sweden and sociologist Eleonora Masini in Italy was the betterment of the condition of mankind. Development issues, and social, political and environmental challenges, were prioritised in their work.

Their themes were progressively integrated into government foresight activities as the responsibility of governments for social matters – unemployment insurance, the expansion of public health systems, the development of extensive pensions systems – has grown significantly. Government departments across advanced economies now commonly implement or commission foresight activities in their key areas of interest. Since the 1990s, the rising scarcity of funding for expanding welfare states in the developed world has been a major driver of foresight work, which is seen as contributing to the development of targeted and cost-effective policies.

Natural resources, energy and ecology

With the 1973 oil shock and the ensuing decade of economic stagnation, a gloomier outlook was taken by both established and independent foresight experts. The security of energy supplies and the recurring theme of natural resource scarcity became a common feature of long-term foresight and forecasting. In the energy field, Western consumer economies established the International Energy Agency whose role, among others, is to issue forecasts and scenarios about global energy markets. National administrations also undertake their own work in that field. More recently, governments have focused on themes related to water and food, and the potential for conflicts arising from scarcity challenges.

The decade of stagnation and high oil prices also led to the emergence of an environmental ‘futurologist’ movement, starting with the Club of Rome and its 1972

Limits to Growth report. Environmental degradation and resource depletion have since become a recurrent theme in foresight activities, both by government and by interest groups contesting established policies. Climate forecasting, for example, has become strongly institutionalised with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 to do this work and inform policy-making in member states.

The case of Sweden, as a highly developed Nordic welfare state, is emblematic of this ‘new age’ type of government-sponsored foresight. By creating a Secretariat for Futures Studies in 1973, its government was one of the first movers in Europe on that front. The secretariat’s initial missions focused strongly on work in industrial society and on natural resources. In recent years, the secretariat, now called the Institute for Future Studies, focuses on institutional issues related to the ‘welfare society’. More recently, Sweden established a Commission on the Future, reporting to the Prime Minister’s office, which published a study on long-term issues related to sustainable growth, demographic trends, labour market integration, democracy, equality and social cohesion.

Back to Leviathan in a rapidly changing world?

Since the late 1990s, there has been growing interest in government foresight in many countries, particularly in relation to security issues. This interest in security-related foresight may be seen as related to changing perceptions about potential threats to which governments must respond. The rapid rise of China, for example, is focusing minds on the geopolitical power balance again and leading to a small revival of military-centred long-term strategic studies. The concurrent rise in perceived threats from terrorists and failed states is also leading to foresight work on security issues beyond the military. Richard Betts (1997) distinguished three dimensions of ‘strategic studies’: *military science*, which deals with technical issues and tactics; *strategic studies*, which deal with the interaction of ‘political ends and military means [under] social, economic, and other constraints’; and *security studies*, which are ‘potentially boundless’ and concern ‘everything that bears on the safety of a polity’. Today, practically every dimension of human life can thus be considered to affect the security of a state.

In this context of broad security worries, the recent surge in foresight activities has also seen the emergence of a new form of ‘grand strategy’ foresight activity: global, all-encompassing scenario building. Its most well-known incarnation is the *Global Trends* reports published regularly since 1997 by the US National Intelligence Coun-

cil (NIC). These reports, parts of which are accompanied by substantial outreach to the public, are aimed at helping US political leaders shape their policy orientations. The emergence of such ‘grand strategy’ reports since the late 1990s are intended to highlight the strategic challenges posed to established powers by a world where rapid change is induced by a globalising economy, the rise of new political powers and actors on the world stage, and financial and political turbulence. Reports of this type have been created by the British, French and Canadian militaries as well as by IMEMO in Moscow. The governments engaging in these efforts are mostly military ‘great’ powers (or former ones), for whom the interconnections between different spheres of human life matter for long-term strategy and military planning.

Broadly defined security worries also interest states beyond the traditional big players, such as Singapore. Newly prosperous, but very small, Singapore is an island state squeezed between rising powers in its region. Situated at a crucial crossing of key maritime trading routes and exposed to both conventional and less conventional threats to its security, Singapore rapidly developed foresight capacities in the 1990s. Similarly, Finland, the country that acted as sort of a buffer between the Soviet Union and Europe, and which underwent a major economic crisis in the early 1990s at the end of the Cold War, has also put foresight at the heart of government.

Which governments do what - and how

Different variables shape the organisation of foresight in government. The most important ones are discussed below. Table 1 provides a brief bird’s-eye view of the approaches taken by a selection of leading foresight countries from among those surveyed.

Haves and have-nots

Rich vs. poor

The availability of resources is a key variable for the pursuit of foresight activity. Our analysis shows that it is mostly developed countries who engage in foresight. Countries with large and well-resourced governments can pursue foresight activities which constitute only a small portion of total spending. They can experiment with non-essential programmes for which the value of the outputs may not be easily measurable. Poorer countries faced with immediate pressing problems related to poverty and basic security are less likely to devote precious resources to worrying about the problems of the distant future. Absolute wealth is not the only indicator

of interest in, and support for, government foresight, however. Norway, for example, is among the richest countries in the world on a *per capita* basis, but has not invested as much into government foresight work as other small countries like Finland and Singapore. At the sub-national level, regions and governments with more resources are also more likely to engage in foresight, as seen in Germany where the wealthiest *Länder*, such as Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Pfalz, are more likely to pursue foresight activities on their own.

Provision of resources, however, has not been consistent, even in those countries that have most enthusiastically joined the move toward increased use of foresight in the last decade. Foresight programmes have rarely been seen as essential work and funding has often been cut in times of austerity. Ensuring the survival of foresight programmes thus requires that the perceived value of investments into foresight be made clear to the decision-makers who fund the programmes and use the outputs. How much value a particular foresight project has will depend significantly on how the programmes and projects are designed and implemented.

Military vs. civilian

A related variable in the design and use of foresight programmes is the size of the particular organisation within government. Militaries, which often make up a large portion of government budgets, are more likely to have established and well-resourced foresight programmes. This is especially noticeable in the US, but is a trend that was identified for almost all countries in this study. This is partly due to the total amount of departmental resources available, but also due to the goals of the department and the nature of the spending. Militaries are more likely to be tasked with specific goals related to the protection of national sovereignty, for which the analysis of multiple future scenarios and potential future risks can provide important value for shaping strategic planning. Most of the ‘grand strategy’ foresight efforts looking widely at global trends, discussed above, were completed by militaries (UK, France, Canada). Militaries are also more likely to have large, long-term purchasing programmes (expensive military equipment) for which an understanding of likely future security environments is essential. Departments of agriculture, human resources or environment, for example, have historically had fewer resources. There are also potentially less severe consequences in the event of planning errors.

International cooperation and the complementary work of international organisations

Countries seeking to conserve resources can work on joint foresight activities or make use of foresight work by international organisations. The US and Singapore are notable for their involvement in issue-specific cooperative foresight meetings and projects. Other countries form joint foresight programmes, often focused on issues related to their region or to issues of international cooperation. Two examples are noteworthy: the cooperation between Australia and New Zealand through the Australasian Joint Agencies Scanning Network (AJASN) and the Australia New Zealand Horizon Scanning Network (ANZHSN) and the regional cooperation between Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland) through Nordic Foresight projects.

Intergovernmental organisations like the OECD and NATO have the best established foresight programmes among international organisations. The OECD is explicitly tasked with providing policy support to member governments, and has developed 'OECD Futures' as part of this role. For NATO, which works on intergovernmental cooperation among militaries, foresight activities are well established and include a Long Term Requirements Study, focused on technology and capabilities requirements, and a Multiple Futures Project similar to the 'grand strategy' efforts undertaken by member state militaries. Smaller contributors to NATO have been able to benefit from this shared intergovernmental capacity for foresight, and to limit their own investments in foresight work. As well as providing value to member states, international organisations use foresight activities to establish their own priorities. International organisations like development banks (the Asian and African Development Banks, the World Bank) or UN organisations (e.g. UNESCO) have done foresight projects in support of their own specific mandates, though these have generally been quite limited.

Box 2 – What about the EU?

The EU's foresight work has grown significantly in the past 20 years. Most of this work is driven by the European Commission, through the Directorate-General for Research & Innovation (DG RTD), the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the Seville-based Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), generally under the [Framework Programmes for Research](#) running over 7 years. In the European Parliament, the Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA), created in 1987, is a panel of MEPs responsible for carrying out external expert assessments of the impact of technologies for the use of Parliamentary committees. It is a member of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA), which is a network of technology assessment institutions specialising in advising parliamentary bodies in Europe. One core activity is the creation and management of networks of experts and institutions, in order to facilitate the sharing of information on foresight. Several of these activities also developed important foresight reports with input from external experts. These initiatives, networks and projects include:

- The [European Foresight Platform](#) (EFP) (2009-2012) (previously the European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN) (2004-2008)). It aims at building a global network to share knowledge about foresight, forecasting and other future studies methods in Europe and internationally. The EFMN database contains 1,916 foresight initiatives, 160 briefs and 124 other documents. The EFMN published 'Mapping Foresight – Revealing how Europe and other world regions navigate into the future', on foresight practices in Europe and other regions.
- [Foresight in the European Research Area](#) (FORERA): website for S&T foresight.
- [FOR-LEARN](#) (2005-2008): a tool to support mutual learning between foresight professionals, stakeholders and policy-making organisations in Europe.
- [ERA-Net](#) (since 2007): a network that aims to strengthen coordination in research, including foresight, within the EU.

- [iKnow](#) (2008-2011): a network of close to 2,000 members in 91 countries, ‘interconnecting Knowledge’ (iKnow) identifies issues, events and developments shaping the future of science, technology and innovation (STI) in Europe and other world regions.
- [SANDERA](#) (2009-2011): a project that examines the future impact of security and defence policies on the European Research Area.
- [ESPAS](#) (on-going): a quadrilateral inter-institutional project identifying global trends likely to shape the world towards 2030 and their implications for the EU.
- Other such projects include or have included in recent years: EU-GRASP, Global Europe 2050 and The EU in the World of 2030 (AUGUR), the evaluation of EU policies (DEMETER) and global changes impact (GLOBAL-IQ), the future of the Mediterranean area (MEDPRO), Science, Technology and Innovation (FARHORIZON, INFU, SESTI, CIVISTI), Visions on the European Research Area (VERA), work on post-carbon society (PACT, GILDED, PASHMINA), Social Platforms (SPREAD) and Forward-Looking Analysis of Grand Societal Challenges and Innovative Policies (FLAGSHIP).

Beyond formal foresight programmes, different EU Commission directorates also use foresight. The Directorate General for Energy, for example, has estimated future import dependency rates for hydrocarbons for the period leading up to 2030. Its recent *Energy Roadmap 2050* recommends a European policy strategy based on several scenarios on what the world of energy could be like in the coming decades.

Sources include: Tuomo Kuosa, *Practising Strategic Foresight in Government*, 2011; Graham H. May, ‘Foresight and futures in Europe: an overview’, *Foresight*, vol. 11, no. 5, 2009; EU Commission website

Key government approaches to organising foresight

Analysis vs. prescription

Our study suggests that wealthy countries in North America, Europe and Asia are more likely to pursue foresight with the aim of understanding the uncertain future, keeping the foresight analysis initially disconnected from any potential policy implications. The completed output of the foresight processes can then be used to

inform policy planning. This separation between the foresight phase and the policy application phase is not always distinct, as many programmes involve their target audience of policy planners and decision-makers within the foresight work to ensure that the programme outputs are relevant to this audience. The goal of not presupposing the results of the foresight efforts, however, is seen as central to the value of these programmes.

This model which separates foresight and policy responses is less common in developing countries and emerging economies (India, Indonesia, China, Brazil, South Africa), which are more likely to focus on producing centralised planning documents in which a prescribed vision for the future is created in accordance with government goals.

This difference highlights another variable in understanding foresight activity: interest in central planning. The Chinese government, for example, has produced 5-year plans since the early 1950s and initiated the 12th 5-year plan (now renamed ‘Guideline’) in 2011. These plans were largely economic and industrial wishlists put together by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) for the coming 5 years with limited forecast or foresight work to inform them. India, Indonesia and South Africa have engaged in similar planning exercises. As the economies of China and India have become increasingly liberalised in recent years, the importance of their 5-year planning has been reduced. Though this study found no government foresight work in China or India that was not explicitly tied into strategic planning documents, both governments have expressed interest in moving towards understanding long-term indicators that have not been pre-supposed to ensure they fit with central planning goals.

Another noted difference between the wealthy countries focused on analytical foresight and the countries that produce central planning ‘vision’ documents relates to their expectations for the future. Recent discussion with foresight experts highlighted that the perceived value of foresight for many Western states is to help react to the current economic crisis and to the recent geopolitical rise of non-Western powers. There is a sense of trepidation regarding uncertain waters that must be navigated. The discussion is reactive and focused on declining resources, rising challenges and resilience to external changes. Reports from developing countries which pursue planning programmes, on the other hand, speak more positively about the future. Regardless of the apparently limited accuracy of the wishlist-like planning documents, there is a feeling that the future is theirs to shape. The idea that foresight is for the fearful and planning is for the positive, however, is not an absolute

one. Modern foresight methods were developed in the US during the dynamic boom years following World War II and have continued through to today, through different periods of optimism and stagnation.

Centralised vs. decentralised

The degree of centralisation in government foresight programmes varies significantly among countries. Countries which have made concerted efforts to prioritise foresight efforts within their governments (the UK, Singapore, France, the Netherlands) often have central foresight agencies taking the lead on government efforts and responding to requests from central policy bodies. The best-established programmes feed directly to ministers or deputy ministers at high levels. The UK Foresight Office (UKFO), for example, is directed by the Chief Science Officer and reports directly to cabinet, while the French government has established a centralised Centre d'Analyse stratégique (CAS) working directly for the prime minister. Canada has established Policy Horizons Canada (PHC) which reports to a central committee of deputy ministers from across government, while Singapore has established a Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme as part of the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) directly within the Prime Minister's Office. These centralised offices do not have a monopoly on all foresight policy in government and governments with central foresight offices often also have strong foresight programmes in other departments. The centralised offices, however, often play a key role both in supporting top decision-makers and in training and capacity building for foresight in other departments across government.

Another group of countries have decentralised models (Finland, Germany, US, Italy, Switzerland) in which government departments, if they choose to do foresight work, generally act independently. For example, multiple departments of the US government, including Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the General Accountability Office (GAO) have dedicated foresight capacity for serving their different bureaucratic and political leaders. Individual US departments may also have multiple foresight activities. The US Air Force, for example, has at least three major centres of foresight activity, located in the Air Staff, Air University and the Air Force Research Institute, which are separate from the foresight work of the other branches of the military (army, navy) as well as from the central bureaucracy in the Department of Defense. In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) is the main federal government agency doing foresight (including the Futur programme) coexisting with approaches at the sub-national level, conducted by *Länder*.

External experts vs. in-house capacities

There are also differences in how countries make use of external consultants and agencies to do foresight work. In some countries with central planning agencies (India, Mexico, South Africa), foresight work by external agencies have been used to help inform government planning processes. The Indian defence department, for example, has contracted directly with external think tanks to do foresight reports on the Asian security environment. The EU also uses external consultants to implement much of their foresight work.

Other countries, including Norway, Japan, Korea and Russia, use arms-length research agencies with government connections rather than external consultants. Public policy foresight in Norway has historically been led by the Research Council of Norway, which operates with close ties to multiple government departments. Both Korea and Japan have special institutes for science and technology work.

China's complex planning environment involves extensive connections with semi-autonomous think tanks (none are truly independent) as well as internal departments to do horizon scanning and technology foresight. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), reporting to the State Council, and the National Research Center for Science and Technology for Development in the Ministry of Science and Technology have each performed 10 to 15 year technology foresight surveys. The China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), also of the State Council, completes strategic, political, economic and security studies, while the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has a Centre for Technology Innovation and Strategy Studies which has done futures work.

Countries such as Canada, Singapore, Switzerland, France and the UK, generally perform their foresight work internally, though with input into the process from outside experts. While using external consultants may provide more flexibility for budget-conscious governments, outsourcing prevents the build-up of foresight skills within government and does not allow for repeated, iterative processes that build continually on feedback from past foresight work.

Table 1*Foresight activities in surveyed countries - key features*

Country	Foresight is well-resourced and widely used	In-house or arms-length implementation	Central government foresight agency	Foresight in multiple departments	Established regularity of programmes/reports	Predominantly 'vision' planners
Australia		•		•		
Brazil		•				•
Canada	•	•	•	•	•	
China		•			•	•
Finland	•	•	•	•	•	
France	•	•	•	•	•	
Germany	•	•		•	•	
India					•	•
Indonesia						•
Italy				•		
Japan	•	•		•	•	
Mexico						•
Netherlands	•	•	•	•	•	
Norway		•				
Russia						•
Singapore	•	•	•	•	•	
South Africa				•		•
South Korea	•	•			•	
Sweden	•	•	•	•	•	
Switzerland		•			•	
UK	•	•	•	•	•	
US	•	•		•	•	

Conclusions: foresight and policy-making

Foresight is a useful tool to help look beyond pressing short-term issues and build policies for the long term. Integrating foresight into the policy process is not simple. But some criteria for success can be identified, which can ensure the viability and resilience of foresight programmes over the long run.

Overcoming entrenched short-termism

One of the core aims of foresight is to respond to the perceived fact that political leadership is too focused on short-term thinking and too responsive to the election cycle, weakening its ability to take decisions that matter for all in the medium to long run. Some argue that the institutional design of foresight activities is also too closely attached to the election cycle. In that regard, the ‘managed democracy’ of Singapore was cited as a country that can invest in foresight activities because its leaders are less beholden to an electoral calendar. This issue was highlighted by stymied efforts to develop an ‘Anticipatory Governance’ system in the US, which outlines a plan for building a centralised foresight capacity responsive to the executive branch of the federal government (Fuerth, 2012).

However, our review of foresight programmes around the world suggests that established electoral democracies are actually more likely to implement foresight programmes. The electoral calendar may be a relevant factor in the choice of government foresight and planning decisions, but not a decisive one. Foresight programmes tend to be designed precisely as a tool to overcome short-termism, while also engaging stakeholders and the public as part of a broader democratic process. In Finland, the parliament itself has a strong in-house foresight capacity independent of party-political interests.

Bringing together different epistemic communities

Practising foresight often involves bringing together different epistemic communities and connecting foresight to policy-making.

More than one foresight expert interviewed for this study suggested that there may be a cultural disconnection between established policy communities and foresight experts. Foresight experts interviewed expressed concern about a perceived lack of interest in, and support for, foresight activity. The work of foresight experts is often perceived by policy professionals as speculative and not relevant to their work.

The right institutional design for bringing together policy and futures expertise is also under debate. Is it useful to maintain a 'separateness' of the foresight experts from the policy community? And if so, how can their work best be articulated? One military foresight expert interviewed indicated that part of the success of his programme was related to the fact that it was not located in the main defence headquarters, but in a separate city where it was less distracted by the daily flow of other issues. This may indeed be helpful for foresight work, but the outputs from its programmes still need to be considered of value by the leaders back in the central organisation.

Sharing foresight expertise across departments in government is also quite a challenge. The case of military foresight programmes in some countries is illustrative in this regard. While there is some cooperation between military and civilian foresight projects, military foresight programmes in countries such as the UK, Canada, the US and Norway remain quite separate from work in other government departments. Cooperation is also often limited among different sections of the military in these countries. While military foresight efforts very often seek input from a wide range of participants, the high level of specificity in the mandates of many military foresight efforts seems to allow them to provide useful outputs for their local target audience, often a sub-departmental policy unit, but may inhibit cooperation on organisational/institutional issues. The often high turnover of uniformed military personnel being moved from posting to posting can also limit the accumulation of both foresight expertise and network contacts.

Making the relationship work between the decision-makers at the top, the established policy planners, and the foresight thinkers is another often-mentioned problem. Those foresight analysts most dismayed at the lack of foresight appreciation in their own governments decry the lack of senior leadership in getting established policy planners to accept the foresight community.

Linking foresight with policy-making

This survey has noted an increased professionalisation of foresight work, which has shifted back from being an activity pursued by a few 'outsider' futurologists to being applied in established policy planning departments across government. This professionalisation includes both standardisation of foresight methods and better application of foresight to specific, but not overly narrow, policy problems. It also includes slow movement towards more effective communication with policy audiences. It is a challenge to translate complex and sometimes nebulous future issues

into coherent documents that can usefully inform the policy process. A brief review of foresight reports and websites suggests that more work is required in this area. On the other hand, foresight experts argue that policy planners tasked with assisting decision-makers are more likely to feel comfortable providing decision-makers with overly simplistic 3-options models for policy decisions: a low, a high, and a middle (or moderate) option, for which the middle option is always preferred and recommended.

An important factor in the resilience of foresight programmes has been whether the target audience for the foresight work has had input into the design of the activities and the choice of projects. Programmes that look broadly towards the future, while leaving the onus on the audience to determine how to find value in the programme output, have struggled to win consistent support from funders and decision-makers. Few countries, for example, engage in open-ended global scenario foresight exercises. The leading government programme of this type, the NIC *Global Trends* project, has developed a global audience interested in seeing a view of the future from an American intelligence agency. Most other open-ended foresight activities looking broadly at global trends have generally been undertaken by leading Western militaries, with the goal of feeding into domestic military planning.

For each of these ‘global trends’ exercises, there is a balance to be struck among comprehensiveness (is everything happening in the world important?), coherence (how can we make sense of all this?) and relevance for policy. The best resourced and most well-established foresight programmes (the US, Singapore, the UK) generally have a clear focus on issues of importance for their pre-identified audience within the government. Not all successful foresight projects produce specific policy recommendations as part of their output. However their success is explained by the fact that they are generally run with input from members of their target audience. The latter will subsequently be in a better position to design the policy recommendations that flow from the foresight output.

Box 3 – Foresight programmes: main criteria for success

The results of our survey show that well-designed and successful foresight programmes are likely to meet most of the following criteria:

- Identify the target audience with precision. They should not be a ‘type’ of people or the ‘policy community’ but a specific, definable list of organisations and individuals.
- Include input from this target audience in setting the agenda and at different stages in the foresight process. Ensure that the output is targeted at them.
- Communicate clearly and directly in language accessible to the target audience.
- Maintain close ties with the senior decision-makers and policy-makers.
- Establish clear links between foresight topics and today’s policy agenda.
- Cooperate with the other agencies, domestically and internationally.
- Develop consistent, long-term sources of funding.
- Work iteratively. Foresight work often involves a wide group of participants, and converting their inputs into useful outputs is difficult without feedback loops.
- Establish programmes rather than one-off projects. There is a learning curve to doing foresight work. Programmes allow for learning processes and personnel continuity.
- Create scenarios. Use them. Create new scenarios based on feedback and verification.

Annex

Country	Organisation of government foresight: Examples from ten selected countries
Australia	Australia has recently begun to use government foresight systematically. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Australia's national science agency, has a dedicated team (CSIRO Futures) working on foresight in energy, transport and other fields. It produces 'Our Future World' updates every 2 years on global megatrends. Multiple other departments do some foresight work. Every 5 years, the Treasury department produces a report on long-term issues (40 year forecast) to help short-run decision-making. The establishment of the Strategic Policy Network with representatives from every department, led by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, may impact foresight use for strategic policy.
Canada	Multiple government departments have used foresight, and this has increased in the last few years with the creation of Policy Horizons Canada (PHC), a centralised agency for doing foresight work and building foresight capacity in government. PHC is directed by a high-level steering committee of deputy ministers and reports to the Privy Council. Parts of the Department of National Defence, including the Directorate of Future Security Analysis, use foresight for capabilities and personnel planning, primarily for internal audiences. Multiple other departments pursue some foresight work on economic, social and technological issues within their policy departments.
Finland	Foresight is well-integrated into Finnish policy planning. The Government Foresight Report, prepared through wide consultation by the Prime Minister's office, is prepared at the start of the mandate for a new incoming government. During the mandate, the Government Foresight Network develops a report on the Finnish Policy-Making environment and each ministry has dedicated staff to develop Ministries Futures Reviews. The Finnish Parliament's also has a 'Committee for the Future' to pursue and review foresight work.
France	France has the longest-established foresight programmes in Europe, with policy-focused foresight services in almost every department. The Centre d'Analyse stratégique (CAS) works directly under the Prime Minister to advise on policy formulation and implementation. The Senate has a delegation dedicated to foresight to reflect on socioeconomic transformations through scenario-building. The French defence department has a Délégation aux Affaires stratégiques (DAS) which carries out regular analyses of long-term international geostrategic issues.

Country	Organisation of government foresight: Examples from ten selected countries
Germany	Over the last 20 years, Germany has developed a decentralised mix of foresight projects in departments at federal and <i>Länder</i> levels. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) is the main government agency involved in foresight, including through its 'Futur' project on research planning. At both the national and regional levels, particularly in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, foresight projects (both internal to government and by external agencies) study a wide range of technological, industrial and social science issues.
Korea	Korea stands out for its active science and technology foresight activities, executed by the Korean Institute for Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP), and very focused on developing S&T capabilities. The defence department also pursues foresight through the Korean National Defence University. There has been recent discussion of the need to address the social context in which the S&T changes will take place.
Russia	Russia's past as a centrally-run superpower has endowed it with forecasting experience, but vision-focused planning efforts to define rather than understand the future remain the norm. Recent focus on technology foresight reflects an attempt to build a government-driven innovation strategy inspired by East Asia. The Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), an arms-length think tank, does influential economic and geostrategic foresight studies. The Kremlin-sponsored Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP) is a group of experts contributing to developing long-term visions (rather than foresight) on military and strategic issues.
Singapore	Singapore's foresight system is very well developed with distributed capabilities across the entire span of the public service and is a global centre for learning and planning about government foresight. There is a concerted effort to develop 'strategic anticipation' capacity across government and to actively use foresight outputs for policy planning. Every 5 years, the government formulates national scenarios for the next 20 years. The central element of foresight is the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme (including a think tank, solutions centre and experimentation centre), part of the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office. The Centre for Strategic Futures also plays a key role.

Country	Organisation of government foresight: Examples from ten selected countries
UK	<p>Government foresight in the UK is dominated by the UK Foresight Office, a central agency of government that reports directly to cabinet, and is headed by the Chief Scientific Advisor. It was originally dedicated to technology and industry but now has a broader thematic mandate to look at challenges for the future, pursuing major foresight projects, horizon scanning, and training activities across government. Separately, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) do foresight and horizon scanning for the Ministry of Defence.</p>
US	<p>Well-established, but decentralised foresight programmes are scattered throughout the US government. Many agencies (State, FEMA, Defence, Treasury, Energy, OMB and especially GAO) have strategic planning capacities that use foresight to varying degrees. The National Intelligence Council produces major Global Trends reports every 4 years. As the world's foremost producer and user of foresight work in the last half century, the US military has an array of strategic planning and intelligence organisations, in which foresight work is well entrenched to inform planning.</p>

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Timelines 2011 & 2012

Timeline 2011

Date	Title	Summary
01 January 2011	European External Action Service enters into operation	The EEAS becomes operational with the transfer of staff from the Commission and the Council.
04 January 2011	'Arab Spring' begins	Following the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor in December, protests in the country erupt, signalling the beginning of the 'Arab Spring'.
09-15 January 2011	South Sudan referendum	As a result of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, a referendum on independence from Sudan is held in South Sudan. The referendum passes with 99 per cent of the voters in favour.
14 January 2011	Tunisian regime ousted	Due to widespread violent protests, the Tunisian government dissolves and President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is forced to leave the country, putting an end to his 23 years of authoritarian rule.
25 January 2011	Egypt protests	Following the civil unrest in Tunisia, protests break out in Egypt.
05 February 2011	New START enters into force	The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) between Russia and the United States enters into force.
11 February 2011	Egypt power transfer to military	Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigns as a result of widespread protests, transferring power to the military.
16 February 2011	Libya protests begin	Protests erupt in Libya and are violently suppressed by the Gaddafi regime.
26 February 2011	UN Security Council reacts to Libya crisis	The UN Security Council issues Resolution 1970, demanding an end to the violence in Libya and implementing travel bans, asset freezes and an arms embargo.

Date	Title	Summary
28 February 2011	Council of the EU adopts Libya sanctions	The Council of the European Union adopts measures on Libya in response to the violent crackdown on anti-government rebels and civilians: trade restrictions, arms embargoes, travel bans and asset freezes.
11 March 2011	Tsunami hits Japan, killing thousands, causing Fukushima nuclear crisis	An earthquake and tsunami in Japan cause thousands of human casualties, widespread destruction and a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, leading to the vast release of radioactive materials. The nuclear incidents give rise to sentiments against nuclear power in Germany, Italy and Spain, among others.
14 March 2011	Crackdown on protests in Bahrain	The Bahraini government violently suppresses anti-government protests with the support of the Gulf Cooperation Council and declares a three month state of emergency.
15 March 2011	Syria protests begin	Anti-government protests begin in Syria's Daraa province.
17-19 March 2011	UN Security Council authorises Libya intervention	The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1973, authorising all measures necessary to protect civilians in Libya. A military intervention begins and a no-fly zone is established.
30 March 2011	UN Security Council demands transfer of power in Côte d'Ivoire	Following months of crisis and the outbreak of violence ensuing disputed presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1975, calling upon Laurent Gbagbo to transfer power to internationally recognised President Alassane Ouattara and imposing sanctions on Gbagbo and his close associates.
01 April 2011	Council of the EU establishes EUFOR Libya	The Council of the European Union adopts Council Decision 011/210/CFSP for EU military operation (EUFOR Libya) in support of humanitarian assistance operations in the ongoing Libyan crisis.

Date	Title	Summary
05 April 2011	Israel announces settlement expansion	Israel approves the building of 942 new housing units in East Jerusalem.
11 April 2011	Ivorian crisis ends	Former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo is arrested by supporters of Alassane Ouattara and with support from French troops, putting an end to the Ivorian crisis.
April 2011	Libya thought to have used cluster munitions	Libya is reported to have used cluster munitions in the fight against its own population.
01 May 2011	Death of bin Laden	An American military operation kills Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.
09 May 2011	Council of the EU adopts Syria sanctions	The Council of the European Union adopts Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP in regard to restrictive measures against Syria, imposing an arms embargo, travel bans and asset freezes on high-ranking political figures.
26 May 2011	Council of the EU reaffirms EUBAM Rafah mission	The Council reaffirms the political importance of EUBAM Rafah mission in the Gaza Strip and its continued support for the mission.
05 June 2011	Yemen president injured amid demonstrations	Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh travels to Saudi Arabia to be treated for an injury sustained during an attack on the presidential palace by anti-government protesters.
20 June 2011	Council of the EU adopts further Belarus sanctions	The Council of the European Union adopts Council Decision 2011/357/CFSP, strengthening existing sanctions and imposing an arms embargo on Belarus in response to the deteriorating condition of the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the country.
27 June 2011	UN Security Council authorises mission in Sudan	Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1990, the UNISFA peacekeeping mission is deployed to Abyei, Sudan.
08 July 2011	UN Security Council authorises mission in South Sudan	Resolution 1996 passes in the UN Security Council to establish the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.
09 July 2011	South Sudan declaration of independence	South Sudan formally secedes from Sudan and declares independence.

Date	Title	Summary
17 July 2011	NATO begins troop withdrawal from Afghanistan	In the Bamiyan province of Afghanistan, NATO transfers responsibility to Afghan forces: the first step in handing over military command of the country by 2014.
18 July 2011	Council of the EU extends Sudanese arms embargoes	As a reaction to the independence of South Sudan, the Council of the European Union issues Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP, amending the existing arms embargo to cover both Sudan and South Sudan.
20 July 2011	UN declares famine in Somalia	The United Nations declares a famine in two areas of Somalia.
28 July 2011	Council of the EU adopts Somali military forces training	The Council of the European Union adopts Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP to contribute to the military training of Somali security forces in extension of Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP.
02 August 2011	Obama signs Budget Control Act	US President Obama signs into law the Budget Control Act of 2011, implementing a trigger for US\$1.2 trillion in spending cuts, 50 percent of which affect the US defence budget.
04 August 2011	Israel approves settlement expansion	Israel approves the construction of over 900 new housing units in the settlement of Har Homa, East Jerusalem.
18 August 2011	EU demands Assad's resignation	The European Union and the United States demand Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's resignation due to the excessive use of force by the Syrian government against its civilian population.
20-28 August 2011	Gaddafi regime overthrown	Rebel forces take control of Tripoli and overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.
16 September 2011	UN Security Council establishes mission in Libya	The UN Security Council passes Resolution 2009, establishing the UN Support Mission in Libya.
23 September 2011	Council of the EU bans Syria investments	The Council of the European Union bans investment in the Syrian oil industry.
11 October 2011	Ukrainian Tymoshenko sentenced to jail	Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime minister of Ukraine, is sentenced to a seven year prison term for a gas deal brokered with Russia under her premiership in 2009. The European Union and Russia sharply criticise the verdict.

Date	Title	Summary
13 October 2011	Council of the EU expands Syria sanctions	The Council of the European Union adopts Council Decision 2011/684/CFSP, extending the restrictive measures against Syria put in place by Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP.
20 October 2011	Libyan civil war ends	The Libyan Civil War ends with the killing of Muammar Gaddafi in Sirte and the National Transitional Council taking control of the city.
20 October 2011	ETA announces end of violence	The Basque separatist group Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA) announces the end of all military activities and an end of violence.
23 October 2011	Palestine applies for statehood at UN	President Mahmoud Abbas applies for Palestinian statehood with the United Nations.
23 October 2011	Islamist party wins Tunisian elections	In the first post-revolution election, the Islamist An-Nahda Party gains 89 of 217 seats in the Tunisian parliament.
31 October 2011	NATO ends Libya intervention	NATO ends its mission in Libya pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2016.
31 October 2011	Palestine granted UNESCO membership	UNESCO's General Conference admits Palestine as a full member by a close vote to reach the necessary two thirds majority. 107 members vote in favour and 14 against, with 52 abstentions.
14 November 2011	Council of the EU adopts Horn of Africa strategy	The Council adopts the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa to guide the EU's engagement in the region.
19 November 2011	Egypt protests against military rule	In reaction to military rule, violent clashes between protesters and security forces erupt in Egypt in the run-up to the first parliamentary elections in decades.
23 November 2011	Yemen's Saleh agrees to resignation	Following violent clashes, sparked between protesters and government forces by his return, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen agrees to resign after elections are held within three months.
12 December 2011	Council of the EU establishes RMCB mission	The Council of the European Union establishes the Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RMCB) mission in the Horn of Africa, complementing the existing EU military missions in the region with a civilian mission.
15 December 2011	US declares official end to Iraq war	The United States formally declares the end of the Iraq war.

Date	Title	Summary
16 December 2011	Council of the EU expands Belarus sanctions	The Council of the European Union strengthens restrictive measures on Belarus, including travel bans and asset freezes, due to the continuing repression of civil society and political opposition.
17 December 2011	Kim Jong-il dies	Kim Jong-il dies at the age of 70 and his son Kim Jong-un takes over power in North Korea.
25 December 2011	OIC condemns Boko Haram violence	Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, condemns the violent attacks carried out by Islamist militants of Boko Haram in four towns in northern Nigeria.

Timeline 2012

Date	Title	Summary
20 January 2012	Boko Haram terrorists kill hundreds in Kano, Nigeria	Several hundred people are killed in the Nigerian city of Kano. The bombings were carried out by the jihadist military organisation Boko Haram ('Western education is forbidden'), which killed hundreds of civilians in the preceding months.
21 January 2012	Muslim Brotherhood wins Egypt elections	Islamist parties dominate Egyptian parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood wins 235 of 498 seats.
23 January 2012	EU expands Iran sanctions	The EU extends restrictive measures against Iran in protest of Iran's uranium enrichment activities. An embargo on the country's oil exports and asset freezes are agreed upon.
30 January 2012	EU endorses fiscal pact	EU leaders, except the Czech Republic's and the United Kingdom's, endorse the Fiscal Pact at the European summit in Brussels.
04 February 2012	UN Security Council Syria Resolution vetoed by China, Russia	China and Russia veto a UN Security Council resolution calling upon President Assad to resign.
27 February 2012	Al-Hadi succeeds Saleh in Yemen	Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, having previously agreed to resign in early 2012, is succeeded by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi.
28 February 2012	Annan appointed Syria Special Envoy	Kofi Annan is appointed Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League for Syria to promote a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
01 March 2012	Serbia granted EU candidacy status	Serbia is granted EU candidate status by the Council of the European Union.
04 March 2012	Putin elected Russian president	Vladimir Putin wins the presidential election in Russia. Demonstrations against alleged fraudulent elections break out.
16 March 2012	Timofti elected Moldova President	After two failed attempts, an independent judge, Nicolae Timofti, is elected President of Moldova with the opposition Communists boycotting the vote.

Date	Title	Summary
22 March 2012	Military coup d'état in Mali	Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré is overthrown by a military <i>coup</i> , which is harshly condemned internationally. Neighbouring countries impose sanctions in response.
26-27 March 2012	Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul	The second Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul, focusses on cooperative approaches to addressing the dangers of nuclear terrorism, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the protection of nuclear materials and facilities.
01 April 2012	National League for Democracy wins Burma/Myanmar elections	Burmese opposition politician and former political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi is elected to parliament and her National League for Democracy party wins the majority of seats in Burma/Myanmar.
06 April 2012	Tuareg declare independence of northern Mali	The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, a Tuareg rebel group, declares the independence of Azawad, northern Mali, from the rest of the country.
06 April 2012	Burma/Myanmar government in peace deal with rebels	The government of Burma/Myanmar signs a peace agreement with the Karen rebels as part of wider peace negotiations with ethnic groups.
12 April 2012	Coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau	Prior to the second round of presidential elections, factions of the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau stage a <i>coup d'état</i> as they arrest interim president Raimundo Pereira and presidential candidate Carlos Gomes Júnior. The events are met with international protest and the imposition of sanctions.
13 April 2012	Condemned North Korean satellite launch fails	North Korea's attempt to launch a satellite into orbit, condemned by the international community as a concealed intercontinental ballistic missile test (and hence in violation of UN Security Council resolutions), fails shortly after lift-off. The United States suspended the delivery of food aid in the run-up to the launch.

Date	Title	Summary
21 April 2012	UN Security Council establishes Syria mission	The UN Security Council Resolution 2043 is adopted, establishing the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor the implementation of the Kofi Annan Peace Plan for Syria.
26 April 2012	Taylor convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity	The Special Court for Sierra Leone finds Charles Taylor guilty on 11 counts of aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Sierra Leone civil war.
11 May 2012	Guinea-Bissau transitional government established	An agreement in Guinea-Bissau, under the auspices of ECOWAS, establishes a transitional government and appoints Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo as interim president.
21 May 2012	NATO Summit, Chicago	At its 2012 summit, held in Chicago, NATO announces the review of its deterrence posture, and makes statements on ballistic missile defence, future defence capabilities, counter-terrorism and the withdrawal of the ISAF force from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
18 June 2012	Council of the EU approves South Sudan mission	The Council of the European Union approves a new CSDP Mission, EUAVSEC, to strengthen airport security in South Sudan.
22 June 2012	Turkish jet shot down by Syria	Syrian forces shoot down a Turkish F-4 combat aircraft, claiming that it had breached Syrian airspace. NATO members consult on the situation in Syria.
24 June 2012	Muhammad Morsi wins Egypt presidential elections	Muhammad Morsi, candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, wins the Egyptian presidential elections.
29 June 2012	EU-Montenegro accession negotiations	EU accession negotiations with Montenegro commence.
30 June 2012	EUPM ends	The mandate for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina comes to an end after almost ten years.
27 July 2012	UN Arms Trade Treaty inconclusive	The UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty concludes without agreement on a text. It is resolved to reconvene in March 2013.
07 July 2012	National Forces Alliance wins Libya elections	In the first elections in Libya since the end of the revolution, the National Forces Alliance prevails over Islamist parties.

Date	Title	Summary
10 July 2012	EUJUST LEX-Iraq extended	The EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-Iraq) is extended until December 2013.
16 July 2012	EUCAP Sahel Niger launched	The CSDP civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Niger is launched in order to improve the capacities of the Nigerian Security Forces and contribute to facilitating stability, security and governance in the region.
16 July 2012	Council of the EU approves EUCAP Nestor	The Council of the European Union approves the launch of the CSDP mission EUCAP Nestor to support regional maritime capacity-building in the Horn of Africa and the states of the Western Indian Ocean.
18 July 2012	Israeli tourists killed in Bulgaria	Seven people die and several more are injured in a bomb attack on a bus in the Bulgarian city of Burgas. Hezbollah is later identified by the Bulgarian authorities to have carried out the attack.
31 August 2012	Brahimi appointed Syria Special Representative	Lakhdar Brahimi replaces Kofi Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and League of Arab States for the crisis in Syria.
17 September 2012	China, Japan in islands row	The Japanese purchase of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea from a private owner raises tensions with China as it triggers a series of diplomatic wrangling, subtextual military stand-offs and popular demonstrations.
27 September 2012	Attacks on Western embassies in Arab countries	A series of demonstrations and attacks target United States, German, United Kingdom and Swiss diplomatic missions in a number of Arab countries. They are largely thought to be in response to an anti-Muslim Youtube video produced in the United States.
14 September 2012	EUMM extended	The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia is extended until 14 September 2013.
01 October 2012	EUSEC RD Congo established	The seventh mandate of the EUSEC RD Congo is established to help Congolese authorities implement policies in compliance with human rights and good governance.

Date	Title	Summary
01 October 2012	Opposition coalition wins parliamentary elections in Georgia	Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream coalition wins the majority of seats in parliamentary elections. President Mikheil Saakashvili eventually accepts his party's defeat and agrees to the appointment of a new government.
04 October 2012	Syrian shells hit Turkey	Shelling from Syria hits a Turkish village, claiming civilian lives. Turkish forces retaliate by striking Syrian targets. NATO becomes involved and the UN Security Council condemns Syrian actions.
12 October 2012	EU receives Nobel Peace Prize	The EU receives the Nobel Peace Prize for advancing peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.
12 October 2012	UN Security Council requests Mali intervention plan	The UN Security Council requests that a plan for military engagement in Mali be presented to halt the southward advance of rebel forces.
16 October 2012	EU NAVFOR ATALANTA extended	The Council of the European Union decides to extend EU NAVFOR - Operation ATALANTA until December 2014 to continue to improve maritime security off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean.
28 October 2012	Ukrainian parliamentary elections unveil irregularities	The Party of Regions wins the highest number of parliamentary seats in Ukrainian elections that partially reveal, as found by an OSCE observer mission, an excessive role of money and abuse of power in the election process.
21 November 2012	Israel launches military operation against Gaza	As a reaction to renewed rocket fire on Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip, Israel launches Operation Pillar of Defence. A ceasefire agreement is reached a week later, brokered by the United States and Egypt.
29 November 2012	UN General Assembly grants Palestine non-member observer status	The UN General Assembly grants Palestine the status of non-member observer state. The resolution passes with 138 votes in favour, nine against, and 41 abstentions.
12 December 2012	North Korea launches satellite	North Korea launches a satellite into orbit. As the test deploys ballistic missile technology, it is considered by the international community to be in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874.

Date	Title	Summary
17 December 2012	UN Security Council issues terrorism resolution	The UN Security Council passes Resolution 2083 on the threats posed by terrorist acts to international peace and security.
20 December 2012	UN Security Council establishes Mali mission	The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2085 to deploy an African-led International Support Mission in Mali.



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core documents 2011 & 2012**

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Tunisia

Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle on the situation in Tunisia

Brussels, 10 January 2011, A 010/11

We are concerned about the events that have been taking place in Tunisia in recent days. In particular, we deplore the violence and the death of civilians. We express our sympathy to the families of the victims.

We call for restraint in the use of force and for the respect of fundamental freedoms. In particular, we call for the immediate release from detention of bloggers, journalists, lawyers and other detained people who peacefully demonstrated in Tunisia. We also call on Tunisian authorities to investigate the recent events and provide further information about them, and on all parties to engage in dialogue with a view to finding solutions to the problems raised by demonstrators.

The EU has a strong dialogue and broad cooperation with Tunisia and is engaged in a process of strengthening bilateral relations on a wide range of issues. This process of strengthening relations will require increased commitments from both partners on all issues, in particular in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms. We hope that our Tunisian partner will meet the ambitions and expectations placed in our relationship.

PRESS RELEASE, 3065th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 31 January 2011, 5888/1/11 REV 1 (en)

The Council discussed the situation in Tunisia and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council pays tribute to the courage and determination of the Tunisian people and their peaceful struggle to assert their rights and democratic aspirations. It regrets the violence, repression and loss of life during the recent disturbances. It reaffirms its total solidarity and its support for Tunisia and Tunisians in their efforts

to put in place a stable democracy, the rule of law and democratic pluralism with full regard for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. Today, thanks to the process of democratic transition, the partnership between Tunisia and the European Union is set to be strengthened to lend support to the affirmation of democracy and to economic and social reform.

3. The Council welcomes the commitments given by the transitional government and urges it to proceed with implementation of measures for the release of political prisoners, the legalisation of democratic political parties and associations and the widening of the role of civil society and the media, which are the first necessary steps towards democratisation and stabilisation of the country.

4. The Council welcomes the decision to hold democratic, free and transparent presidential and legislative elections as soon as possible. The European Union is ready, at Tunisia's request, to lend its political support and its legal, technical and material assistance in preparing and organising the electoral process, *inter alia* by sending a preparatory mission and by observing the elections.

5. In the context of greater regard for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Council also welcomes the creation of the High Commission for Political Reform and the national commissions set up to investigate the violence which took place during the demonstrations, as well as corruption. It stresses the importance of the integrity and independence of these commissions and is ready to offer them its assistance if required.

6. In consultation with the Tunisian authorities, the Council has adopted restrictive measures against individuals responsible for misappropriation of State funds.

7. The European Union is also ready to mobilise every instrument at its disposal to help ease the passage of political, economic and social reform in Tunisia, to strengthen its democratic institutions and to give greater support to civil society in the country. At the same time, the European Union intends, under the European neighbourhood policy, to update its strategy and assistance for Tunisia to reflect the new context and the aspirations of the Tunisian people, *inter alia* by bringing the talks on advanced status to a conclusion with the government that emerges from the forthcoming democratic elections, since such status constitutes a fundamental instrument for fully enhancing political, socio-economic and sectoral cooperation between the EU and Tunisia.'

The Council adopted a Decision on restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia, with the aim of preventing the diversion of public funds.

Joint statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Commissioner Štefan Füle, on the Constituent Assembly Elections in the Republic of Tunisia

Brussels, 28 October 2011, A 434/11


We have taken good note of the preliminary results of the elections announced by Mr. K. Jendoubi, Chairman of the Independent High Commission for the Elections.

We commend the candidates and parties that took part in the democratic process. We also congratulate the Ennahda party which obtained the highest percentage of votes. The EU looks forward to working closely with the new Constituent Assembly and the Tunisian authorities and institutions in responding to the Tunisian people's demands for democracy, freedom, social justice and dignity.

We thank the Election Observation Mission (EOM) led by Michael Gahler for its work and contribution to this process. We underline the words of Chief Observer Michael Gahler who said that the elections in Tunisia were an 'encouraging first step to democracy', and that they were generally well-conducted, underpinned by a strong political consensus, accompanied by extensive freedom of expression and organized in a transparent manner.

For the first time Tunisian citizens have had the opportunity to choose in a free and democratic manner their representatives and determine their own future. The newly elected Constituent Assembly will now have the key task of writing the new Constitution of the country. It will need to work in a spirit of consensus in order to build a new democratic State.

It is also important to recall the work of the transition authorities which have led Tunisia through a crucial and difficult period of its history, in particular the interim government led by Prime Minister Essebsi and the members of the High Authority



for the Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution and Political Reforms and of the Independent High Commission for the Elections (ISIE).

The EU remains fully committed to continue its political and financial support for the Tunisian society. In this regard the meeting of the Tunisia-EU Task Force last September showed Europe's strong support for Tunisia.

Finally, we regret the violent clashes that occurred after the announcement of the preliminary results of the elections and urge calm and restraint.

Egypt

PRESS RELEASE, 3065th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 31 January 2011, 5888/1/11 REV 1 (en)

The Council discussed the situation in Egypt and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council recognizes the legitimate democratic aspirations and grievances of the Egyptian population. These should be listened to carefully and addressed through urgent, concrete and decisive measures.

2. The Council deeply regrets the considerable loss of life during demonstrations in Egypt over the last few days. It also notes with deep concern the high number of people injured and arrested as well as the use of violence. The Council calls on all parties to show restraint and avoid further violence. It urges the Egyptian authorities to immediately release all peaceful demonstrators who have been detained. The Council also calls upon the Egyptian authorities to restore all communication networks without delay and to guarantee unhindered access to all media, including the Internet.

3. The Council urges the Egyptian authorities to respect and protect human rights including freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. It urges them to take appropriate measures to assure the security of all citizens and their property and to protect the cultural heritage. It calls for an immediate end to looting.

4. The Council urges the authorities to seek a peaceful and constructive way forward based on a serious and open dialogue with all political forces ready to abide by democratic norms and with civil society.

5. The Council urges the Egyptian authorities to embark on an orderly transition through a broad-based government leading to a genuine process of substantial democratic reform with full respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, paving the way for free and fair elections.

6. The Council reiterates its support for a democratic, pluralist and stable Egypt as a key partner of the EU, mindful of its important regional role, and sharing the goal

of building stability, peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean and Middle East region. The EU is committed to accompanying, through a partnership, the Egyptian transformation process by mobilising, reviewing and adapting existing instruments to support political, economic and social reforms. The EU stands ready to assist the Egyptian people in this transformation process, taking into account future developments.’

Joint statement by Herman Van Rompuy, Manuel Barroso and Catherine Ashton on recent developments in Egypt

14 February 2011

We welcome the decision made by President Mubarak today. By standing down, he has listened to the voices of the Egyptian people and has opened the way to faster and deeper reforms, and an orderly transition to democracy.

The EU salutes the courage of the Egyptian people who have pursued their campaign for democratic change peacefully and with dignity.

It is important now that the dialogue is accelerated leading to a broad-based civilian government which will respect the aspirations of, and deliver stability for, the Egyptian people.

An orderly and irreversible transition towards democracy and free and fair elections is the shared objective of both the EU and the Egyptian people.

Violence can never be accepted. Respect of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms is key.

The preservation of regional peace and stability should remain our shared priority.

The future of Egypt rightly remains in the hands of the Egyptian people. We call on Army to continue to act responsibly and to ensure that the democratic change takes place in a peaceful manner.

The EU stands ready to help with all its instruments.

Statement by EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on the situation in Egypt

Brussels, 26 November 2011, A 473/11

I am deeply concerned about the clashes that took place in recent days between demonstrators and security forces in Egypt. Violence must stop and the rule of law has to be maintained. An independent investigation into these disturbing events should be carried out. Those responsible have to be held accountable.

I deplore the heavy loss of life and the many injuries and I extend my profound condolences to the families of the victims. I also ask the authorities to release those detained for peacefully expressing their views and urge the authorities to honour their promise to end military trials for civilians. All political parties should reaffirm their commitment to the democratic process that Egypt has embarked upon. The swift shift of power to civilian rule is a key element of the transition and should happen as soon as possible on the basis of an inclusive dialogue. I take good note of the important commitments made by the SCAF in this regard.

I remain confident that the Egyptian people and the authorities will find a way to move peacefully forward on their path towards democracy. The upcoming elections are a very important step and I hope they can go ahead as planned.

Sudan & South Sudan

PRESS RELEASE, 3065th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 31 January 2011, 5888/1/11 REV 1 (en)

The Council had a short discussion on Sudan and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council welcomes the timely, peaceful and credible conduct of the Southern Sudan Referendum as a crucial step in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It congratulates the people of Southern Sudan on their determination in turning out to vote in such large numbers which significantly surpassed the 60% threshold. The Council commends the parties to the CPA as well as the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission and the South Sudan Referendum Bureau for their leadership in this process and recalls how instrumental the support and assistance provided by the United Nations has been, including the leadership shown by UNMIS.

2. The Council commends the ongoing work of the EU election observation mission to monitor the referendum process. It notes the preliminary statement issued by the EU EOM on 17 January 2011 welcoming the peaceful and credible process and overwhelming turnout.

3. The Council welcomes the announcement of the preliminary results of the Referendum on South Sudan. These show an overwhelming vote in favour of secession. Pending the announcement of the final results, the Council reiterates the EU’s commitment to respect the wishes of the people of Southern Sudan and welcomes the commitment of the Government of Sudan to do so, as reaffirmed at the High Level Meeting on Sudan in Addis Ababa today. It urges both parties to the CPA to continue to ensure the safety and security of all peoples in Sudan.

4. The Council stresses the EU’s continued engagement with both North and South, regardless of the outcome of the Referendum.

5. The Council urges all parties to quickly resolve all outstanding CPA and post-Referendum issues, including Abyei, citizenship arrangements and the holding of Pop-

ular Consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. It welcomes the launching of Popular Consultations in Blue Nile.

6. The Council remains particularly concerned about the delay in resolving the issue of Abyei. It welcomes the recent accord between local tribal leaders and the subsequent agreement on migration and security arrangements as an encouraging step. It urges the parties to the CPA to resolve the future status of Abyei through peaceful dialogue ensuring an equitable and sustainable solution.

7. The EU continues to support the efforts of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan to facilitate negotiations between the parties to the CPA and stands ready to provide any further assistance that is required.

8. The Council remains deeply concerned about the increasing violence in Darfur which has resulted in 43 000 newly displaced persons. It deplores the kidnappings of aid workers, which have impacted severely on the provision of any kind of assistance to vulnerable populations. The Council urges all parties to cease hostilities and ensure full and unhindered access for UNAMID and humanitarian workers.

9. The Council stresses the need for genuine engagement by all parties, including the armed movements, in the Doha peace process leading to a comprehensive and inclusive peace settlement on Darfur. It hopes that the Doha peace process will lead to a positive outcome in the near future.

10. The Council recalls the obligation of the Government of Sudan to cooperate with the International Criminal Court pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1593.

11. The Council will continue to follow the situation in Sudan closely.'

Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the South Sudan's Independence Day celebration, 9 July 2011

Brussels, 9 July 2011, A 273/11

It is a great honour to be here in Juba to celebrate the birth of the Republic of South Sudan. This is my first visit to Juba. I'm sure it will not be the last.

The European Union and its Member States warmly congratulate the people of South Sudan on their independence. I would also like to congratulate His Excellency President Salva Kiir on having been sworn in as the President of the Republic of South Sudan.

The EU was a witness to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The peaceful Referendum was a true reflection of the democratically expressed wishes of the people of South Sudan. On this historic day, the European Union and its 27 Member States welcome the Republic of South Sudan as a new independent state.

Creating a new state is never easy. The European Union itself includes a number of nations, some created by the separation of a single state into two, which only came into existence, less than twenty years ago. We know this can be achieved peacefully, but we know it is a challenge.

So we understand that the world's newest state will require international support to become a secure, peaceful and prosperous country, able to meet the needs and expectations of its people. We will be your partner in achieving this, not just now, but for the long term. This partnership will be focussed on helping the people of South Sudan, through working together with their government. This is why it is important for South Sudan's leaders to embrace pluralism and diversity and lay the foundation for a democratic, fair and inclusive society, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights.

I would like to acknowledge the constructive role of the people of Sudan and their Government in accepting the outcome of the Referendum on southern independence. What is important now is to build on this in developing good neighbourly relations and to go the extra mile in resolving outstanding issues. Fighting must be brought to an end. It is clear that both Sudan and South Sudan will succeed and develop only if the other one is able to do so too. The EU and its Member States are keen to support you both in this.

We also commend the United Nations, the African Union, IGAD and other international partners for their support to the peace process in Sudan, particularly the outstanding roles played by President Mbeki, Prime Minister Meles and Haile Menkerios. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission too has played an important part.

It is therefore with great pleasure that I reiterate our congratulations to the Republic of South Sudan and our determination to support a peaceful and prosperous future for the peoples of the two Sudans, north and south.

It seems to me entirely appropriate that you have chosen the far-sighted Fish Eagle as your national crest and justice, liberty and prosperity as your national motto. Liberty you have already achieved. Justice you must hold on to. Prosperity will come.

Thank you.

Libya

Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on Libya

Brussels, 23 February 2011, 6966/1/11 REV 1

The European Union expresses its grave concern by the situation unfolding in Libya. We strongly condemn the violence and use of force against civilians and deplore the repression against peaceful demonstrators which has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. These brutal mass violations of human rights are unacceptable.

The EU reiterates its call for an immediate end to the use of force and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population, including through national dialogue. All restrictions of freedom of expression, including the internet, and of peaceful assembly must be lifted immediately. The will of the people in Libya must be respected and the EU stands by them.

We welcome the UN Security Council statement of 22 February 2011, which calls on the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population and which calls on the Libyan authorities to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. We also welcome the Arab League statement of 22 February.

Immediate access should be provided for international human rights monitors and humanitarian agencies. The EU is ready to supply humanitarian aid where needed.

The EU also urges the Libyan authorities to ensure the safety of all foreign nationals, and to facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave the country.

The EU also welcomes the UN Security Council's call for a transparent, credible and independent investigation into events in Libya and the holding of a special session of the UN Human Rights Council on 25 February.

In this context, the EU stresses that those responsible for the brutal aggression and violence against civilians will be held to account. The EU has decided to suspend negotiations with Libya on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement and is ready to take further measures.

The Candidate Countries Croatia*, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Iceland+, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

* Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland continues to be a member of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Speech before the Human Rights Council

Geneva, 28 February 2011, SPEECH/11/127

Mr President, Dear Ministers, Dear colleagues,

We meet at a time of historic change. Across the Middle East and beyond, people are standing up for that core human aspiration: to be able to shape their own lives, politically and economically.

They want their fundamental rights respected. They want dignity, accountability, justice and jobs. We must heed these calls. For they are just – and will not go away.

This Council therefore has a grave responsibility: to ensure that our oft-stated intentions are translated into real action, real progress

What matters in the end is not the number of resolutions passed, but results in the real world.

Right now, our attention is focused on Libya – and rightly so. The fact that so many colleagues from across the world have gathered here today tells us something big.

That what is going on – the massive violence against peaceful demonstrators – shocks our conscience. It should spring us into action.

I am pleased that last Friday (25 February), this Council held a special session on Libya, showing an ability to react to events in real time. It was striking and welcome that this came about because so many groups had mobilised for it – from Asia, Latin America, as well as Eastern and Western Europe. This is the United Nations at its best.

The outcome last Friday was a strong one. I am pleased that the Council concluded on Friday to form an independent international inquiry – and also backed work underway in New York to suspend the membership of Libya of this Council. These are important steps. But clearly more is needed.

This morning too, the message is clear: we condemn the grave human rights violations committed in Libya. The violence and repression must stop. Those responsible must be held to account. This is not just the EU's position. It is the view of the international community and its highest authority: the UN Security Council.

On Saturday, the Security Council unanimously adopted a strong Resolution, with important mandatory measures such as an arms embargo, a travel ban and asset freezes for those responsible. EU members of the Security Council worked hard to achieve an outcome that reflects the extreme urgency and severity of the situation.

Accountability and justice are essential - that is why I am pleased that agreement was found in the Resolution to refer the investigation of the on-going crimes to the International Criminal Court.

As EU we will of course ensure swift implementation of these Security Council's measures. We are already working on EU restrictive measures that should come into effect very soon.

Of course, it is not just in Libya that we need to ensure respect for basic human rights. I recently made several visits to countries across the Mediterranean where people are claiming their rights and insisting that the old ways of doing things simply won't do.

I met with government officials, members of opposition parties, civil society organisations, women's groups and youth representatives.

I went to Tunis where I met groups that had never been allowed to be in the same room before; and to Cairo where I met the young people who had been in Tahrir square. My aim was to listen and this is what I heard:

‘This is our country and our revolution. We want real change – and for the system to recognise the significance of the change.’ Also: ‘This is the beginning. We need to take time to get the transition right.’ And then: ‘We want help. To ensure we get the first real election of a ruler in 7000 years. But more than that, to get genuine democracy, not just on the day we cast our ballots, but the weeks and months after that too.’ ‘We want jobs, economic opportunities and social justice, only then can we be really free’.

We can and must salute the courage of people in the region for the peaceful and dignified way in which they have advanced their core demands.

But we can and must do more: to offer our full support. Only to do what people from the region ask us to. From a position of humility knowing that our own histories are full of dark pages, and that our own path to deep democracy wasn’t linear or easy.

But with the conviction that in the on-going transitions, full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms is key. Because it is the only way to get sustainable security, justice and prosperity.

Mr President,

Human rights, we often say, are universal. That is why all violations, wherever they take place, are our concern and must be addressed by this Council.

We know that in several countries, people’s rights are at risk: in Iran where we have seen a steep rise in executions; in Belarus where we are deeply concerned at the number of political prisoners, in the Democratic Republic of Congo where there are distressing reports of sexual violence - and many other places besides.

The EU is also deeply concerned at the situation in the Middle East, including the occupied Palestinian Territories. We are working hard reach our long-standing aim: a negotiated solution leading to two states.

Sometimes this Council has seemed resolved only to be irresolute.

Some of the achievements of the Council perhaps do not receive the attention they deserve. Take the recent work on freedom of association; or the mechanism to promote the elimination of laws and practices that discriminate against women.

Still, this Council has some way to go in living up to the mandate it was given by the UN General Assembly. That is why we want a real, substantive outcome of the Review process now underway concerning the work of this Council.

The test of success is simple: it is not per se whether we pass resolutions or create new procedures – vital though they are.

These are the inputs. What truly matter are the outputs. The real test is whether we make a difference on the ground: whether all the people of Libya, Iran, Cote d'Ivoire and Belarus, Burma/Myanmar and DPRK are able to enjoy free speech, fair elections, the rule of law, equal rights and impartial administration.

Mr President,

The European Union is sometimes accused of trying to “export” so-called European values to other countries. I reject that accusation. The rights to free speech, freedom of assembly, justice and equality are not European rights: they are universal rights. We must never fall into the trap of believing that people in Africa, Asia or Latin America are less passionate about their rights.

Allow me to quote Kofi Annan’s 2005 report, “In larger freedom”. “Human rights are as fundamental to the poor as to the rich, and their protection is as important to the security and prosperity of the developed world as it is to that of the developing world”.

We are meeting today precisely because those rights inspire people in every part of the globe. What is true is that many countries lack the institutions that are able to defend and promote those rights. That is why one of the great challenges facing us is to help countries build those institutions that will anchor and ensure full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law.

Mr President,

We are living through historic times, and it is easy to be dazzled by the promise of change. Just as important is where we go from here, so I should like to look ahead to a possible direction of travel.

To live up to our promises, we need to narrow the gap:

- between the magnitude of the challenges facing us and the minutiae of our political debates;
- between the expectations of those who put us here and our ability to deliver;
- between vaulting statements of universal principles and individual lives;
- between the serenity of Geneva and events just two hours flight from here.

I repeat: what matters is not per se the number of resolutions passed but the results we achieve together on the ground.

Thank you very much.

Remarks by Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in the margins of the Human Rights Council

Geneva, 28 February 2011, A 080/11

Today, we have adopted additional accompanying restrictive measures on Libya such as an embargo on equipment which might be used for internal repression and we're looking at individuals under the travel restrictions and the assets freeze. We had already started work as you know on these restrictive measures – assets freeze, travel bans and arms embargo – prior to the Security Council resolution.

The crisis in Libya, the events that have unfolded in North Africa and the Middle East require a comprehensive and a coordinated response. We can't act in isolation and I've always said that the international community is much more effective if it operates together.

So it's in that context that I've come to Geneva to hold discussions with a number of our key international partners. In particular, I met with US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton this morning, with Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, and

later today I will see Russian Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkish Minister Ahmet Davotoglu.

But I am also here to address the UN Human Rights Council because human rights is what I call the silver thread that runs through everything that we do in the External Action Service and it's at the core of our response to the developing situations in Libya and beyond.

So we're working closely, hand-in-hand with the United Nations and I remain in touch with Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. It is especially important that we continue to try and assess the humanitarian needs and get ready to deploy emergency assistance especially in Libya and of course to ensure that we keep our concerns about getting our citizens out of the country.

We are trying to respond in real time to the crisis and of course to avoid the civil war that we fear and making contingency plans to respond to the potential flow of refugees to neighbouring and to European countries.

Finally just to add that I also met today for the first time Dr Salehi, the new Foreign Minister of Iran and I'll be meeting with ministers from Côte d'Ivoire this afternoon as part of my ongoing work. Thank you.

Baroness Ashton, the moves that you will take today, that the EU will take today, is that enough to help the people of Libya right now, or is this going to be something retroactively looking back and calling for accountability?

You know we have to do whatever we can right now to try and support people, the calls that we make the desire to see the violence stop to stop the repression are real. And as much as action as we can take now we are going to try and do and we recognise that that is going to be so important. It is also going to be important to get ready for the humanitarian aid and that we are also getting ready to move on. But our thoughts are with the people of Libya right now.

There has been much talk about a no fly zone over Libya. Have you talked with Madam Clinton about this issue and with your other colleagues?

This is an issue that is currently being discussed. There is no decision yet being made on it. As you can imagine it's quite a complex issue, so it is part of the ongoing discussions and of course we'll let you know when any decisions are taken on that. Thank you.

PRESS RELEASE, 3078th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 21 March 2011, 7781/11

The Council held an in-depth discussion on the situation in Libya and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council expresses its concern at the present situation in Libya and condemns the gross and systematic violation of human rights, violence and brutal repression perpetrated by the regime against the Libyan people. It recalls the UNSC decision to refer these issues to the ICC. It confirms that the EU’s main aim is the protection of the civilian population and support for the possibility for the Libyan people to realise their aspirations for a democratic society. To this end Colonel Gaddafi has to relinquish power immediately.

2. The Council expresses its satisfaction after the adoption of UNSCR 1973 and underlines its determination to contribute to its implementation. It also welcomes the Paris Summit as a decisive contribution to its implementation. While contributing in a differentiated way, the EU and its Member States are determined to act collectively and resolutely, with all international partners, particularly the Arab League and other regional stakeholders, to give full effect to these decisions.

3. The Council has adopted today additional further restrictive measures against the Libyan leadership in the form of additional autonomous designations of person and entities with a view to preventing further funding of the regime. On the basis of the UNSC Resolution, the Council is working on the further strengthening of the measures with a view to their adoption ahead of the European Council on 24/25 March 2011.

4. The Council and the EU Member States will support actions provided for by UNSCR 1973 necessary to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack. It notes that the EU will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to all those affected. The EU recalls its readiness to help Libya build a constitutional state and develop the rule of law.

5. The EU is ready to provide CSDP support to humanitarian assistance in response to a request from OCHA and under the coordinating role of the UN. Such actions will fully respect the UN guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA).

6. The Council asks the High Representative to develop further planning in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1973 and the European Council Declaration of 11 March 2011, on support for humanitarian assistance/civil protection operations including by maritime means for this purpose. This should be in close co-ordination and complementarity with the UN, NATO and others. As part of this process, the Council invites the High Representative to continue contacts with the UN Secretary-General and countries of the region, including Egypt and Tunisia. This process should be undertaken as a matter of urgency in order to allow further consideration by the Council by the end of the week. It took note of the offer by Italy to provide OHQ.

7. The EU and the Member States underline once more their solidarity as regards those Member States most directly concerned by migratory movements and reiterate their readiness to provide the necessary support as the situation evolves, in line with the European Council declaration.’

The Council also added a further 11 individuals to the EU travel ban and asset freeze list and a further nine entities to the asset freeze list. (see p. 19).

Council decides on EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya

Brussels, 1 April 2011, 8589/11

The Council adopted today 1 a decision on a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (“EUFOR Libya” operation).

The decision provides that the EU will, if requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), conduct a military operation in the framework of the Common security and defence policy (CSDP) in order to support humanitarian assistance in the region. More specifically, EUFOR Libya, if requested by the UN, will:

- contribute to the safe movement and evacuation of displaced persons,
- support, with specific capabilities, the humanitarian agencies in their activities.

The operation aims to underpin the mandates of UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 regarding the availability of humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilian populations.

Rear Admiral Claudio GAUDIOSI (Italy) has been appointed EU Operation Commander of EUFOR Libya. The Operational Headquarters (OHQ) of EUFOR Libya will be located in Rome, Italy.

The decision adopted today sets out the legal framework for the future operation. The decision to launch EUFOR Libya will be adopted by the Council following approval of the Operation Plan and the Rules of Engagement.

EUFOR Libya will, unless the Council decides otherwise, terminate no later than four months after reaching initial operating capability. The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUFOR Libya will be EUR 7,9 million.

PRESS RELEASE, 3101st Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 20 June 2011, 11824/11

The Council discussed the situation in Libya and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The EU is unwavering in its commitment to protecting Libyan civilians, including through the intensification of pressure on the Libyan regime. In this context, the EU notes the lifting of the Misrata siege by the TNC, the extension of the operation to enforce UNSC Resolutions (UNSCR) 1973 and the continuing defections from the Kadhafi regime. Time is not on Kadhafi’s side. He has lost all legitimacy to remain in power. The EU endorses the call of the Contact Group that the time has come for a new chapter where Libyans can choose their own future. The EU strongly supports the work of the UN Special Envoy al-Khatib to initiate this new chapter.

2. The EU is firmly committed to the full implementation of UNSCRs 1970 and 1973. More than three months after their adoption, the Kadhafi regime remains in constant breach of its obligation to protect Libyan citizens. The EU is working closely with the UN Special Envoy for Libya as the focal point for the political transition process. It welcomes the Joint Chairs’ Conclusions of the meeting of the International Contact Group held in Abu Dhabi on 9 June which demonstrated the continuing resolve of the international community to protect civilians from the

Kadhafi regime. The Cairo meeting on 18 June underlined the resolve of the international organisations to work together under the leadership of the UN and reaffirmed their readiness to assist the Libyan people during the transitional period. Both the Abu Dhabi meeting and the Cairo meetings of the UN, LAS, OIC, AU and the EU demonstrate the unity of purpose and the strong commitment of the international community to achieve a cease-fire linked to, and followed by a genuine and inclusive political process based on a clear commitment to national reconciliation and unity of post-Kadhafi Libya. Kadhafi must relinquish power immediately and the cease-fire must be genuine, verifiable and include an unconditional cessation of the use of force against civilians, as well as the withdrawal and return to their barracks of military forces from besieged and occupied cities.

3. The EU condemns the violations of human rights and the breaches of international humanitarian law perpetrated by the regime on a daily basis. Evidence has already been collected by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court of Kadhafi's crimes. Additional evidence is being gathered by the International Commission of Inquiry on the human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law in Libya mandated by the UN Human Rights Council, which published its report on the 1st of June. There can be no impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The EU calls on the remaining followers of the Kadhafi regime to disassociate themselves from such crimes as well as from the regime.

4. The EU remains concerned about the humanitarian situation, particularly in Misrata and the Western mountains. Humanitarian organisations must be granted unhindered access throughout Libya without delay. The EU as a whole has already committed 136 million euro in humanitarian assistance and reiterates its commitment to deliver it to all Libyans and people in need in an impartial and non-discriminatory manner. If requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the EU will conduct a CSDP operation "EUFOR Libya" to support humanitarian assistance in the region.

5. The EU condemns the Kadhafi forces' violations of the international border of, and its attacks into, Tunisia. The EU acknowledges the disruptive impact of the Libyan crisis on all its neighbours. The EU will continue its co-operation with these neighbouring countries to help alleviate the humanitarian, social, economic and security challenges created by the Libyan crisis.

6. The EU has decided to step up its sanctions against the Kadhafi regime by adding six port authorities under the regime's control to the EU asset freeze list. In this

way, the EU is taking further action against the military arsenal used by the regime against its own citizens. Humanitarian shipments will be exempt from this measure. The list of targeted persons and entities remains under constant review.

7. The EU welcomes the “Road to Democratic Libya” presented to the Contact Group by the Transitional National Council (TNC), which reinforces its commitment to the principles of inclusion and representation, as well as its importance as a key political interlocutor representing the aspirations of the Libyan people. The EU supports the TNC’s vision for a new Libya, and recognises the important steps taken to improve its organization and accountability. It must also continue its commitment to address alleged violations of international law, including of human rights, committed in the areas under its control. The EU is ready to assist the TNC in developing its capacity to assume its responsibilities and uphold the rule of law throughout the areas under its control.

8. The EU acknowledges the urgent financial needs of the TNC in order to serve the Libyan people. It welcomes the announcement, at the Abu Dhabi meeting, that the Temporary Financial Mechanism (TFM) is now operational. The EU welcomes the specific contributions of France and Italy. The mobilisation of international resources, including, where possible, through the use of Libyan frozen funds in compliance with the provisions of the relevant UNSCRs, is key to support an inclusive transition process aiming at fostering national reconciliation and fulfilling the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. Measures in this regard will respect the rule of law.

9. Working in coordination with the UN, the World Bank and other actors, notably regional organizations, the EU has started to mobilize its resources to support the political transition and will also do so on post-conflict reconstruction. The EU is committed to supporting the building of a democratic Libyan state, respectful of the international human rights standards, the rule of law and good governance principles. On the basis of Libya’s needs and demands, the EU will explore ways, to combine all its actions to support the stability of the country, and the security and prosperity of its citizens as they strive to build a new sovereign and democratic state. The Council encourages the High Representative and the Commission to continue their work in this regard so as to be ready to act as the situation allows.’

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the fall of Sirte and reports of the death of Colonel Gaddafi

Brussels, 20 October 2011, A 420/11

The fall of Sirte marks the end of the Gaddafi era. Libya is now under the full control of National Transitional Council forces. After ten months of extraordinary sacrifices, the Libyan people can say with pride and confidence that they have shaken off a regime that terrorised and oppressed for more than 40 years. They can now look to the future.

Reports of Colonel Gaddafi's death have not yet been confirmed. If confirmed, his death brings closure to a tragic period in the lives of so many Libyans.

Libya is entering a process of transition. It is important that its leadership unites to build a democratic future for the country in full respect for human rights. While the crimes of the past must be addressed, the leadership must also seek a path of national reconciliation. The EU has stood by the Libyan people during these struggles. We have been present in Tripoli and Benghazi. We have provided substantial humanitarian assistance. We have already supported civil society and we are now working with international partners to respond to Libya's post-conflict needs. The EU will remain a strong and committed partner in the future.

For more information see attachment.

EU support to Libya

From the start of the Libyan crisis, the EU has stood by the people of Libya in their quest for freedom. Together with the international community, it will continue to help Libya's process of democratic transition and economic reconstruction.

The broad, comprehensive and swift response of the EU covers a wide range of short- to long-term actions.

Humanitarian assistance

The EU has provided more than €156.5 million in humanitarian support – with €80.5 million coming from the EU budget. It has mobilised EU civil protection teams and assets to alleviate the plight of civilians both in Libya and at its borders. Since the beginning of the crisis, the European Commission's humanitarian teams have been working on the ground with humanitarian part-

ners to ensure that priority needs are met and aid is adequately coordinated both in Libya and in neighbouring countries.

Support to the democratic transition and economic development

Following the setting up of a Liaison Office in Benghazi (21 May) designed to coordinate Member State activities and give immediate support to the National Transitional Council and civil society, a new EU office has been opened in Tripoli, which is soon to become an EU Delegation.

Beyond tackling the most pressing humanitarian needs, the EU is already preparing both immediate measures to support the stabilisation priorities of the National Transitional Council (NTC), as well as longer-term support programmes. It was agreed at the international conference in Paris on 2 September 2011 that the EU will conduct the needs assessment for the following sectors: border management; strengthening civil society and women's rights, and media/communications, while the UN and the World Bank, with which the EU is working very closely, will lead assessments in other areas. An ongoing EU mission in Libya that began on 10 September started preparation of the needs assessments and on planning the provision of immediate support, in close collaboration with the NTC. The EU has already deployed experts in communications, civil society, border management and security, and procurement.

In addition to its humanitarian assistance, the European Commission can make up to €25 million available for immediate stabilisation needs, including through the re-activation of programmes in the field of migration that were suspended when conflict began. Building on activities already underway with the NTC and civil society groups (initially launched in the Benghazi area), this includes:

- *Short-term technical assistance to the NTC to build up state institutions;*
- *Strengthening respect for human rights and democratisation;*
- *Strengthening civil society and re-building of livelihoods through civil society;*
- *Health: support for urgent needs resulting from the conflict;*
- *Migration: support to issues related to displaced people and border controls;*
- *Security sector.*

The European Commission is ready to refocus medium term funding foreseen for Libya of €60 million on the needs of the new Libyan authorities in areas such as democratisation and civil society, public administration capacity building and social and economic development. This longer-term support programme will be prepared together with the new Libyan authorities.

Libya is a resource-rich country. In parallel with assistance, steps have been taken to lift restrictions on a range of economic entities which, previously under the control of the regime, were subject to sanctions.

Towards a long lasting partnership

The EU also stands ready to resume negotiations on a Framework Agreement which can serve as a basis for political, economic, social and cultural dialogue and cooperation with the new Libya, whenever the new authorities decide that is the right moment to do so. The same principle applies to the possibility of having Libya joining regional initiatives where the EU is involved.

The developments in Libya are giving fresh momentum to the Arab Spring. The European Union stands by the people in the region and supports their democratic aspirations and choices. This is reflected in the Communication of the Commission and the High Representative ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ (8 March 2011), which lays the foundation on which that support will be built in coming years, as well as in their Communication ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ which gives orientations of the new European Neighbourhood Policy (25 May 2011).

PRESS RELEASE, 3124th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 14 November 2011, 16756/11

The Council discussed the situation in Libya and adopted the following conclusions:

1. ‘The EU welcomes the Declaration of Liberation of Libya made on October 23, which marks the beginning of a new era for the country and its people. It also welcomes the appointment of Abdurrahim al-Keib as Libya’s new Prime Minister and looks forward to the rapid appointment of a Transitional Government. It recognises the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people expressed during the revolution, and encourages the continuation of reconciliation efforts. It also reiterates its call for this transition to be inclusive and to pave the way for the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and democratic principles to which Libyan people aspired during the revolution, such as fundamental freedoms, respect for human rights, gender equality, including participation of women in the political process, and non discrimination.
2. The EU encourages the National Transitional Council to pursue its calls for justice and respect for human rights in line with its Constitutional Charter. It notes

with concern reports of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law including revenge attacks and summary executions. It welcomes the commitment of the Libyan authorities to take action to bring an end to such acts, to carry out thorough and impartial investigations into any such incidents and ensure that those responsible for violations of human rights are held accountable. The EU welcomes the promise of cooperation between the Libyan authorities and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Commission of Inquiry of the UN Human Rights Council, as well as the International Criminal Court.

3. The EU notes the end of Operation Unified Protector in Libya and expresses appreciation for the critical role it has played in the protection of civilians. It also recalls that it has taken swift action to implement the provisions on UNSCR 2016 (2011) on the termination of the No-Fly Zone.

4. The EU underlines its concerns regarding the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types in line with UNSCR 2017 (2011), in particular Man-portable air defence system (MANPADS) and chemical weapons stockpiles in Libya and the danger of their dissemination across the region. It stresses the need for a response based on close coordination with international partners and countries of the region, and it recalls the relevance of the EU Sahel Strategy in this regard.

5. In full respect of the principle of Libyan ownership and in cooperation with the UN, the EU is ready to combine all its instruments, including CSDP if appropriate, in order to provide further assistance to the new Libya across a range of sectors, as already set out in the FAC Conclusions of 10 October. Together with the Libyan authorities and the international community, the EU will continue to work to lift restrictions on Libyan assets frozen abroad in conformity with the wishes and needs of the Libyan people and the relevant UNSCRs. A quick re-launch of the Libyan economy is needed to support the transition process. The EU will continue to respond to requests for humanitarian assistance.

6. The Council reaffirms its readiness to support Libya during the transition and welcomes the inauguration of an EU Delegation to Libya by High Representative Ashton.

7. The EU is committed to deepening and strengthening its relationship with the Libyan people and looks forward to the participation of Libya within the European Neighbourhood Policy and regional initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean.'

Yemen

PRESS RELEASE, 3078th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 21 March 2011, 7781/11

The Council expresses its utmost concern at the situation in Yemen and the increasing level of violence. It strongly condemns the use of force against protestors and deeply deplors the injuries and loss of life caused. It urges the security forces to refrain from the use of violence immediately. Should the safety of demonstrators not be ensured, the Council and Member States will review their policies towards Yemen. The Council calls on all parties concerned to ensure respect for humanitarian aid principles and provide unimpeded access to people in need.

It is the responsibility of the Yemeni authorities to ensure respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Those responsible for loss of life and injuries caused should be held accountable for their actions and brought to justice.

To achieve an orderly political transition, the Council urges the government of Yemen and all parties to engage in constructive, comprehensive and inclusive dialogue, without delay.

The EU reiterates its view that political and economic reforms are essential for the future of Yemen and remains ready to support the Yemeni people in this respect.

PRESS RELEASE, 3101st Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 20 June 2011, 11824/11

The Council discussed the situation in Yemen adopted the following conclusions:

‘The European Union continues to view events in Yemen with extreme concern, following weeks of violence and turmoil that have inflicted substantial suffering on the Yemeni people.

The European Union condemns recent attacks, including that of 3 June on the Presidential compound and urges all parties to cease all hostilities, respect international human rights standards and abide by a permanent ceasefire, throughout the coun-

try. The EU is closely monitoring developments. Violence cannot resolve the issues that confront Yemen. Those who stand in the way of peace must be held accountable and those responsible for violence against peaceful protesters must be brought to justice.

The EU supports Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi's commitment to respect the ceasefire process, to demilitarize Yemen's cities and to ensure proper protection for any further peaceful protests and demonstrations. The EU also emphasizes the importance of proceeding with an orderly and inclusive political transition in Yemen in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, to respond to the legitimate interests of all Yemen's people. The EU calls on the Yemeni leadership to follow through on their commitment to this transition.

In this context the EU underlines its serious concern at the impact of the current political impasse on the humanitarian situation in Yemen, including the internal displacement of many thousands as a result of fighting.

The EU recalls its view that the authorities in Yemen must meet the challenge of restoring order in a manner which complies fully with international human rights standards. The EU welcomes the announced mission of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and encourages the Government of Yemen to ensure the free and unhindered access to the country that they have promised to grant the mission. The EU welcomes the cross regional statement on Yemen by the Human Rights Council and looks forward to a dialogue during its 18th session.

The EU remains ready, alongside other international partners, to provide assistance and necessary political support for the implementation of Yemen's transition.'

Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the signature of the agreement for political transition in Yemen

Brussels, 23 November 2011, A 469/11

I welcome the signature in Riyadh today of the agreement for political transition in Yemen, signed by President Saleh himself and key representatives of Yemen's ruling and opposition parties. I commend the tireless efforts of all those who have worked for this outcome, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The agreement is only the beginning, but it is a very important beginning. It allows the Yemeni people the much needed hope that their country can turn a page in its history and embrace a new future.

In line with UN Security Council Resolution 2014, I call on all political groups to help implement the agreement in good faith. It should become the foundation for a reconciliation process which reaches out to all Yemenis and enables a peaceful democratic transition to take place. It is time for all sections of Yemeni society to set aside their differences and make every effort to meet the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people. I have the utmost admiration for the courage of all those Yemenis who have pursued their campaign for democratic change peacefully and with dignity. Nobody should now stand in the way of this unique opportunity to move forward.

The EU, together with its international partners, will continue to help and support the Yemeni people in their efforts to build a more democratic and prosperous future.

Bahrain

PRESS RELEASE, 3078th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 21 March 2011, 7781/11

The Council is extremely concerned at the serious and deteriorating situation in Bahrain, and deplores the loss of life and the escalation of violence. The European Union urges all security forces in the country not to use violence against the demonstrators. It calls on demonstrators to refrain from deliberately intimidating actions.

The Council is equally concerned by reports that opposition figures have been arrested. The Government and the security forces must respect and protect the human rights of peaceful protestors, including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. The authorities must also ensure full access for all to emergency medical treatment in accordance with international standards.

The Council also calls on all parties to enter into meaningful and constructive dialogue without delay or preconditions, with a view to bringing about reforms.

Syria

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria

Brussels, 26 March 2011, A 126/11

I am appalled and extremely concerned by the situation in Syria. Despite the latest announcement of improved political freedoms and restraint, violent repression of demonstrators has continued in several cities. I strongly condemn the brutal repression, including the totally unacceptable use of violence and live ammunition, which must cease now.

I urge the authorities to exercise the utmost restraint across the country and to meet the legitimate demands and aspirations of the people with dialogue and urgent political and socio-economic reforms. The state of emergency must be lifted and political prisoners and human rights defenders must be released without delay. Human rights and fundamental freedoms must be respected and protected by the authorities and security forces.

PRESS RELEASE, 3082nd Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 12 April 2011, 8741/1/11 REV 1

1. The Council is extremely concerned at the situation in Syria. It deplores the many deaths resulting from ongoing violence, strongly condemns the use of force by the security forces against peaceful demonstrators and urges the authorities to exercise restraint. The Council calls for the immediate release of those arrested in connection with the peaceful demonstrations. The Council calls on the Syrian authorities to investigate the deaths of protestors and to bring those responsible to account through a fair and transparent process.

2. The Council calls on the Syrian authorities to respond urgently to the legitimate demands of the Syrian people including through the lifting of the state of emergency. It underlines the importance of a clear and credible programme of political reform and that the announced intention for political reforms must be more ambitious and backed by a concrete timetable for their implementation. It takes note of

the appointment of a new Prime Minister and looks forward to the formation of a new government that should urgently launch the necessary reforms.

3. The Council notes the announced formation of a number of committees to review legislation and expects them to produce substantive proposals towards an inclusive, open and representative government. The Syrian authorities must abide by their international commitments with regard to ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including freedom of assembly, expression and media. The Council calls on the Syrian authorities to release without further delay all political prisoners and human rights defenders.

4. The Council will monitor events closely and stands ready to review its policies towards Syria as appropriate, including by supporting, once launched, a genuine process of reform.

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on restrictive measures against Syria

Brussels, 9 May 2011, 9912/1/11 REV 1

The EU has decided to impose restrictive measures against Syria and persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria.

These measures include an embargo on arms and equipment that may be used for internal repression, as well as an asset freeze and a travel ban targeting a list of thirteen individuals.

The EU measures respond to the escalation of the Syrian authorities' violent crackdown, including by military means, that has led to the killing, injury or arrest of Syrian citizens for their participation in peaceful protests. This is clearly inconsistent with the universal principles of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The aim of these measures is to achieve a change of policy by the Syrian leadership without further delay. The EU urges Syria to put an immediate end to violence and swiftly introduce genuine and comprehensive political reform, the only way to provide peace and stability for Syria in the long term. Failing that, the EU will consider extending the restrictive measures in light of the developments, including at the highest level of leadership.

The EU calls again President Bashar Al-Assad to choose the path of reform and national inclusive dialogue and avoid further bloodshed whilst the door remains open.

The EU Foreign Ministers will revert to the situation in Syria at their meeting later this month.

PRESS RELEASE, 3101st Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 20 June 2011, 11824/11

The Council had an in-depth discussion on recent developments in Syria and repercussions in neighbouring countries. It adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The EU condemns in the strongest terms the worsening violence in Syria. The EU deplors that the Syrian authorities have not responded to the calls to immediately stop the violence and engage in meaningful reforms. The EU considers that the ongoing violent repression in Syria constitutes a threat to internal and regional stability.

2. The EU regrets the loss of life, mostly of peaceful protestors, as stated in the Preliminary report of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in Syria. The Report contains allegations of human rights abuses, including torture. The EU expresses its condolences to the families of the victims and salutes the unwavering courage of the Syrian people. The EU calls on the Syrian authorities to immediately end violence. The EU calls on demonstrators to uphold the peaceful nature of protests. The EU also calls for an independent, effective and transparent investigation as requested by the UNSG to hold those responsible for the violence to account.

3. The EU notes with grave concern reports of army activities, notably in northern Syria and the city of Jisr al-Shughour, and of the thousands of people displaced due

to the violence. It urges the Syrian authorities to allow immediate and unconditional access by humanitarian agencies to all affected areas. It also urges the Syrian authorities to cooperate fully with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, including by granting its mission access to Syria, as requested by the UN Human Rights Council on 29 April.

4. Stressing that the current crisis can only be settled through a political process, the EU reiterates its calls on the Syrian authorities to launch a credible, genuine and inclusive national dialogue and meaningful political reforms without delay. The EU emphasizes that for such a process to take place, the Syrian authorities must stop the violence, put an immediate end to arbitrary arrests and intimidations, release all those arrested in connection with protests, as well as other political prisoners who remain in detention despite the recent amnesty announced by President Al-Assad. Such a process is also the only way to provide stability for Syria in the long term, by initiating a peaceful transition to democracy, based on national unity and respectful of the rights of all citizens.

5. The EU is concerned that the lifting of the state of emergency on 21 April is not implemented on the ground and deplores the fact that the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression continue to be constantly violated. President Al-Assad's credibility and leadership depend on the implementation of the reforms he himself announced publicly without taking any step since then to fulfil his commitments.

6. The EU emphasises that the Syrian authorities must ensure that access by the Syrian people to basic goods and services is not interrupted.

7. The EU also urges the Syrian authorities to allow immediate and unhindered access to international human rights monitors, and to independent and international media. The Syrian people should not be deprived of access to free media, including the Internet.

8. The situation has affected neighbouring countries. The EU stands ready to assist in addressing the humanitarian situation. The EU acknowledges the efforts by Turkey and other regional partners on the different aspects of the crisis, in particular the humanitarian aspects, and will work with them to address the situation in Syria.

9. The EU continues its diplomatic efforts with partners from the international community to ensure that the UN Security Council assumes its responsibility in relation to the situation in Syria and its regional implications, condemns the ongoing violence and urges the Syrian authorities to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.

10. Until there is an end to unacceptable violence against the civilian population, and decisive progress towards fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, the EU will maintain its current policy.

11. In this respect, the EU is actively preparing to expand its restrictive measures by additional designations with a view to achieving a fundamental change of policy by the Syrian leadership without delay. The Council recalls that restrictive measures target individuals and entities responsible for, or associated with, the violent repression against the civilian population.'

Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on EU action following the escalation of violent repression in Syria

Brussels, 18 August 2011, 13488/1/11 REV 1

The EU condemns in the strongest terms the brutal campaign Bashar al-Assad and his regime are waging against their own people. In recent weeks the Syrian leadership has stepped up its violent crackdown against peaceful protesters and resorted to large-scale use of military force in the cities of Hama, Deir al-Zour and Lattakia. This has led to the killing or injury of many Syrian citizens. Further casualties and new refugees were reported after the Palestinian camp of al-Ramal was attacked. These developments are unacceptable and intolerable.

The EU has repeatedly emphasised that the brutal repression must be stopped, detained protesters released, free access by international humanitarian and human rights organizations and media allowed, and a genuine and inclusive national dialogue launched. The Syrian leadership, however, has remained defiant to calls from the EU as well as the broad international community including Syria's own neighbours. This shows that the Syrian regime is unwilling to change. The President's promises of reform have lost all credibility as reforms cannot succeed under perma-

ment repression. The EU notes the complete loss of Bashar al-Assad's legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people and the necessity for him to step aside.

At the same time, the EU is proceeding to further action. We have been reaching out to our partners in the region and calling for a Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on Syria. The addition of further names to the list of those targeted by the EU restrictive measures is under preparation. Moreover, the EU is moving ahead with discussing further restrictive measures that will broaden its sanctions against the Syrian regime. By these efforts we continue to aim at assisting the Syrian people to achieve their legitimate aspirations.

The Candidate Countries Croatia*, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Iceland+, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration.

* Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland continues to be a member of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area

PRESS RELEASE, 3124th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 14 November 2011, 16756/11

The Council discussed the situation in Syria.

In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council suspended further disbursements of project loans to the Syrian government from the European Investment Bank as well as the bank's technical assistance contracts for sovereign projects in Syria. It also added 18 persons responsible for human rights violations to the list of those targeted by an asset freeze and travel ban pursuant to decision 2011/273/CFSP and regulation 442/2011. For more information, see press release 16724/11.

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'The European Union continues to be deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in Syria where according to the United Nations more than 3,500 people have been killed since March. The EU again condemns in the strongest terms the ongoing brutal repression and widespread human rights violation.

The Council discussed today the situation in Syria as well as the outcome of the Arab League meeting that took place last Saturday in response to the failure of the Syrian government to implement the Arab League plan to which Syria committed on 2 November. The EU deplors that once again the Syrian government has not lived up to its own commitments, pursuing instead the repression against its own people.

The European Union welcomes the efforts of the Arab League to end violence and bring about the democratic transition that the Syrian people have bravely demanded in the last eight months. The European Union salutes and fully supports the decisions taken by the Arab League meeting on 12 November, which show the increasing isolation of the Syrian regime.

The European Union will continue to press for strong UN action to increase international pressure and urges all members of the Security Council to assume their responsibilities in relation to the situation in Syria.

In the light of the continued repression in Syria, the EU has decided today to place new restrictive measures against the regime, by suspending the disbursement of European Investment Bank loans and by targeting additional individuals responsible or associated with the repression and supporting or benefiting from the regime. In line with the European Council Conclusions of 23 October, the EU will continue to impose additional and more comprehensive measures against the regime as long as the repression of the civilian population continues.

The EU stresses its strong support to the Syrian people and welcomes the ongoing efforts by the Syrian opposition to establish a united platform and to work for a shared vision for the future of Syria and the transition to a democratic system. The EU stands ready to engage with representative members of the opposition which adhere to non-violence and democratic values such as the Syrian National Council. The European Union shares the vision of those who strive peacefully for a life in freedom and dignity, committed to rule of law and human rights.

The EU demands that the Syrian authorities immediately grant access to humanitarian agencies and workers and to fact-finding missions, in particular from the independent international commission of inquiry appointed by the Human Rights Council in August, and to allow independent and international media to operate in Syria without restrictions.

The EU strongly condemns attacks on diplomatic premises. The Syrian authorities are under an international obligation to ensure the protection of diplomatic missions and personnel in Syria in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.’

Côte d'Ivoire

PRESS RELEASE, 3082nd Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 12 April 2011, 8741/1/11 REV 1

The Council discussed the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. Following the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo, the EU welcomes the declaration of President Ouattara that he intends to pursue a policy of reconciliation and reconstruction in Côte d'Ivoire. It appeals to all parties to refrain immediately from any further acts of violence or intimidation. The EU stresses the need for full cooperation with the legitimate authorities in the swift re-establishment of law and order throughout the country. It is imperative to create as soon as possible conditions in which all citizens can, without fear or harassment, return to their homes and work, and resume a normal life in peace and security. The EU pledges its support for the creation of those conditions and for the restoration of social and political harmony. This is an historic opportunity.

2. The EU welcomes President Ouattara's commitment to achieving national reconciliation. It stands ready to support the work of the proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and encourages President Ouattara to form an inclusive, broad-based government representative of all the regions and all strands of political opinion in the country. The reconciliation process will lay the foundations of the country's recovery. To this end, the EU acknowledges the importance of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and the reform of the security sector. It urges the International Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations established by the UN Human Rights Council on 25 March 2011 to investigate the allegations of such violations as swiftly and thoroughly as possible. As the EU has said repeatedly on previous occasions, all those found responsible for such crimes must be held accountable for their acts. In this context, it welcomes President Ouattara's commitment to fight impunity and to support the work of the International Commission. Impunity cannot be allowed to undermine the re-establishment of public confidence in the government and the security forces.

3. The EU considers that the united stance of the International Community has been crucial in the resolution of this crisis. It recognises the unity of purpose demonstrated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the African Union (AU). The United Nations (UN) has also played a particularly crucial part. The EU welcomes the essential and continuing role of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), assisted by the French force "Licorne", in protecting the civilian population in Côte d'Ivoire in line with its mandate and UN Security Council resolution 1975.

4. The EU affirms its willingness to support the rapid economic reconstruction of the country. In order to assist the re-launch of the economy of Côte d'Ivoire and in response to the public request of President Ouattara, the Council has decided to lift restrictive measures on the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro, the Ivorian Refining Company and the Coffee and Cocoa Trade Management Committee with immediate effect. In consultation with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, it will consider lifting further measures to reflect the changing circumstances. The EU is preparing a comprehensive recovery package, in consultation with President Ouattara's Government, using the full range of its instruments. It will resume its development assistance programmes in full as soon as possible and will examine the possibility of delivering some quick-disbursing assistance to meet immediate needs.

5. The EU remains seriously concerned at the humanitarian situation in the country and its impact on neighbouring countries, in particular Liberia. The EU will work closely with the UN and other international agencies to alleviate the suffering of those displaced by the conflict or in need of essential supplies where they live. In addition to the EUR 30 million already provided by the Commission and bilateral contributions of Member States, the EU is committed to providing further humanitarian assistance as required. It is essential to ensure a secure humanitarian space for the urgent and efficient delivery of humanitarian aid.

6. The EU deeply regrets the unnecessary loss of life and destruction of economic prosperity that has accompanied the current crisis. It is important not merely for Côte d'Ivoire but for the whole region that, with the restoration of accountable government, the country can re-establish its stability, peace and prosperity, so that shat-

tered lives can be re-built, families be re-united and normal life be resumed. The EU will continue to work with all countries of the region to reduce poverty, stimulate growth and support accountable government and the respect of human rights.’

On 8 April, the Council lifted the EU assets freeze on the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro, the Ivorian Refining Company and the Coffee and Cocoa Trade Management Committee. The decision and regulation are published in the Official Journal of the EU today.

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 348/2011 of 8 April 2011 implementing Regulation (EC) No 560/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.

Council Implementing Decision 2011/230/CFSP of 8 April 2011 implementing Decision 2010/656/CFSP renewing the restrictive measures against Côte d’Ivoire.

Horn of Africa

EUTM Somalia extended

Brussels, 28 July 2011, 13303/11

The Council adopted today a decision extending for a year EUTM Somalia, the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military mission that contributes to the training of Somali Security Forces.

Under the decision, Colonel Michael Beary is appointed EU Mission Commander with effect from 9 August 2011 and the mission will provide two six-month training periods.

The mission, first launched in February 2010 under the command of Colonel Ricardo Gonzales Elul, will continue to contribute to the development of the Somali security sector through the provision of military training to the National Security Forces (NSF).

The Somali Transitional Federal Government has expressed its appreciation for the EU's support and reiterated Somalia's full commitment to building a command and control structure for the NSF, to protect the civilian population and to integrate different militias and clan forces into the NSF.

Other members of the international community, particularly the United Nations, the African Union, the United States of America and Uganda have also stated their satisfaction with the support provided by EUTM Somalia in the build-up to a professional and unified Somali NSF.

Training will now focus in particular on developing the command and control structures, specialised capabilities and self-training capacities of the Somali NSF, with a view to transferring EU training expertise to local actors. It will continue to take place mainly in Uganda. Elements of EUTM Somalia will also be based in Nairobi and Brussels.

The Decision enters into force on the day of its adoption, which is by written procedure.

The EU's contribution in the area of training of Somali security forces is part of a comprehensive EU approach to the situation in Somalia, that links political, security and development engagement. To that end, the EU is currently exploring further actions in support of the maritime capacity development in Somalia and the region. The EU will also continue to help stabilize Somalia by providing support to vital and priority areas such as development, assistance to the population and capacity-building support, in addition to ongoing EU counter piracy operation EUNAVFOR-Atalanta and humanitarian assistance. The EU gives priority to activities that promote peace and recovery for the Somali people.

PRESS RELEASE, 3124th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 14 November 2011, 16756/11

The Council debated the situation in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia.

The Council adopted a strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, which is to guide EU action for greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government in the region. The strategic framework sets out five areas for EU action: building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth, and supporting regional economic cooperation.

Horn of Africa

The Council adopted the following conclusions on the Horn of Africa:

1. 'Underlining the importance attached by the EU to its relations with the Horn of Africa, the Council has adopted today a Strategic Framework to guide the EU's engagement in the region. It welcomes the High Representative's proposal to appoint an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn of Africa, focusing in the first instance on Somalia, the regional dimension of the conflict and piracy, and looks forward to the development of action plans to support implementation of the Strategic Framework.
2. The EU's long-term commitment to the Horn of Africa is rooted in the region's geo-strategic importance, the EU's desire to support the welfare of the people of the Horn and to help lift them from poverty into self-sustaining economic growth. Instability in the region poses a growing challenge not only to the security of its

peoples but also to the rest of the world. Continued EU engagement will be in support of both regional efforts, including through the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), and national efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and justice, good governance based on the democratic principles of inclusion, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The Strategic Framework also recognises the need to protect European citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region, including terrorism, piracy and the proliferation of the arms. It also identifies a number of common challenges such as climate change and migration.

3. The EU remains deeply concerned about the humanitarian crisis affecting several countries in the Horn of Africa. Building on existing support provided to date (over €760 million), the EU will continue to provide neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations and calls for increased assistance from and coordination of all donors. The Council calls on all parties to ensure safe and unhindered access by humanitarian actors in accordance with international humanitarian principles.

4. The Council highlights the need to address the underlying causes of the current humanitarian crisis, in particular structural food insecurity, recurrent drought and conflict. The EU will continue to support the countries of the region in strengthening their national capacities through disaster risk reduction strategies and long-term development cooperation programmes in the areas of drought-preparedness, agriculture, rural development and food security. The effectiveness of such support is, however, dependent upon local ownership and the political commitment of the countries of the region to put structural policies in place to support sustainable agricultural and livestock production, including cross-border movements, natural resource management, in particular water resources, as well as trade and regional integration.

5. Piracy off the coast of Somalia continues to negatively impact on international maritime security and regional and international economic activities. The Council remains committed to the commendable work of the EU naval counter-piracy operation, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which provides protection to World Food Programme and AMISOM shipping, and contributes to deterring piracy and protecting vulnerable shipping. The EU will advance work to enhance the capacity of Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa region to fight piracy, including through further strengthening of maritime capacities as well as prosecution and detention capacities. The EU will continue to work towards the tracking of financial flows from piracy. The EUSR

for the Horn of Africa will contribute to developing and implementing a coherent, effective and balanced EU approach to piracy, encompassing all strands of EU action.

6. The Strategic Framework, in Annex, sets out the way in which the EU will pursue its strategic approach, working in partnership with the region itself and key international partners.’

[...]

Somalia

The Council adopted the following conclusions on Somalia:

1. ‘The EU remains concerned about the situation in Somalia and its regional implications and is actively engaged in alleviating the consequences of the worsening humanitarian situation, restoring security and contributing to peace, development and internal reconciliation in the country. The famine has expanded to six regions of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, and threatens to further expand across the south affecting nearly half of the population. The EU appeals to all concerned that international humanitarian actors should be given free and safe access to all in need of assistance. The EU will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable population and encourages others to do so.

2. The EU condemns the continued attacks on Somali civilians by Al Shabaab, including the bomb attacks of 4 and 18 October in Mogadishu. It is particularly concerned about the extension of such attacks to neighbouring countries, including Kenya, and the kidnap of European citizens and calls for their immediate release. Such attacks threaten not just neighbouring countries but the international community as a whole. The EU supports efforts to counter the threat of such attacks, consistent with international law; in this respect the EU reminds all parties of their obligations to protect civilians and safeguard humanitarian access in full accordance with international humanitarian principles. Recalling that military action alone will not create lasting security in Somalia, the EU underlines the need for coordination of all military and security actions in Somalia with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to ensure that military action against Al Shabaab is consolidated in the context of a sound civil and political strategy able to ensure a sustainable peace.

3. The EU reaffirms its commitment to continue political and financial support for AMISOM and encourages AU efforts to secure additional donors. It praises the commitment and bravery of the AMISOM peacekeeping troops who, together with the security forces of the TFG, have paid a high price to help build security in Mogadishu. The EU encourages AMISOM and the TFG forces to continue their efforts to prevent civilian casualties and to further develop their capacities to protect civilians and their human rights. The EU underlines that its support must be matched by complementary political efforts by the TFG, including initiatives to demonstrate peace dividends to people in safe, freed areas of the Somali capital.

4. Consistent with its commitment to assist the development of the Somali security sector, the EU has recently decided to extend the EU training mission (EUTM Somalia) for the provision of military training to the National Security Forces (NSF) of Somalia, with a special emphasis on the strengthening of the chain of command and self-training capacities of the NSF. The mandate will be carried out in cooperation with the TFG, Uganda, AMISOM, the US and others. The EU commends the efforts and commitment of the first intake of trained Somali soldiers in the recent security developments in Mogadishu.

5. The EU welcomes the outcome of the consultative meeting held in Mogadishu from 4 to 6 September, where key Somali leaders including representatives of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), of the regions of Puntland and Galmudug, as well as of the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a group signed together a "Roadmap for Ending the Transition".

6. The EU will continue to participate actively in the Technical Committee established to monitor progress on the Roadmap and reiterates that the pace and degree of such progress will determine the extent of continued or additional EU support to the TFIs.

7. Recalling the recommendations of the International Contact Group meeting on Somalia in Copenhagen, 29-30 September, the EU appeals to all signatories of the Roadmap to implement the agreed tasks emphasising: a viable constitutional process, a sustained attempt at reconciliation; effective parliamentary reform, the development and implementation of a National Security and Stabilisation Plan as well as an effective maritime security and counter piracy policy. The EU recognizes that these tasks are interdependent and it is committed to provide targeted support for their full implementation, provided the TFIs demonstrate the political will to deliver effectively, improve financial transparency and accountability, and take effective action to tackle corruption. The EU is concerned about the pace at which the

Roadmap is being implemented and urges the TFIs to immediately implement the priority transitional tasks.

8. The EU stresses, in particular, the importance of a credible and inclusive constitutional consultation process leading to a constitutional framework being in place by the end of the transition period, i.e. August 2012. The successful conclusion of the political transition process will require full, transparent and broad-based Somali ownership. The EU notes the potential challenges in involving an increasing number of internally displaced persons in the consultation process. In this context, the EU encourages the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to pursue a process of outreach and reconciliation with local and regional actors, civil society including women, religious and community leaders as well as other groups who are willing to engage constructively in the process to return the rule of law and constitutional government to Somalia.

9. In addition the EU calls on the TFG to do all it can to combat terrorism and commits to support the TFG in these efforts.

10. Already the largest donor to Somalia, the EU is increasing its development assistance to central, regional and local actors to consolidate a civilian strategy to build stable and accountable governance, improved livelihood opportunities and the provision of basic services. Regions of Somalia such as Puntland, Somaliland, as well as other local actors, including Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, will be further supported by the EU as long as they continue to make progress in providing services, enhancing the Somali reconciliation process, combating Al Shabaab and developing their cooperation with the TFIs and other regional actors. The EU will ensure that its efforts in these regions are coordinated with other international actors.

11. The EU also underlines the need for a comprehensive approach to address piracy, including through capacity building in the maritime, judicial and penitentiary sectors, with a special emphasis on Somalia. To this end, it encourages the strengthening of cooperation between the TFG and the regions of Puntland, Galmudug and Somaliland.

12. The EU calls for further efforts to streamline and strengthen the coordination of all actors and international donors to Somalia. The establishment of the proposed Joint TFG-Donor Financial Management Board needs urgent attention.

13. The Council considers a sustained presence in Mogadishu will facilitate support to the Somali peace process, and invites the HR and the European Commission to examine how this may be assured in ways compatible with the security situation.'

Fight against piracy: Council launches EU action to strengthen maritime capacities in the Horn of Africa

Brussels, 12 December 2011, 18321/3/11 REV 3

The Council today approved the concept for a new Common Security and Defence Policy mission to support regional maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean states. This decision kicks off operational planning for the mission.

The mission is part of the EU's comprehensive approach to fight piracy and instability in the region. Its objective is to strengthen the capacity of states in the region to effectively govern their territorial waters and to reinforce their capacity to fight piracy.

The new mission has two main tasks: strengthening the sea-going maritime capacities in the countries in the region (with the exception of Somalia) and, in Somalia, the training of a coastal police force as well as the training and protection of judges. Specific activities to execute those tasks are to give expert advice on legal, policy and operational matters concerning maritime security; coast guard training to develop the ability to enforce laws on the sea; and procurement of the necessary equipment.

Support will be offered to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles as well as to Somalia, in particular to the regions of Puntland, Somaliland and Galmudug. Training is to take place both in the Djibouti regional training centre as well as in the countries concerned.

The mission is embedded in the recently adopted EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, setting out priority actions for the EU in that region. It is also complementary with two other CDSP missions in the region: EUNAVFOR Atalanta, contributing to the repression of piracy and to the protection of food aid shipments, and EUTM Somalia, training Somali security forces.

The actual start of operations is subject to a separate Council decision.

Middle East

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Israeli decision to expedite settlement activity

Brussels, 2 November 2011, A 442/11

I am deeply concerned by the latest Israeli decisions to expedite settlement activities in response to Palestinian accession to UNESCO.

Israeli settlement activity is illegal under international law including in East Jerusalem and an obstacle to peace. We have stated this many times before.

We call on Israel to reverse this decision and call on both sides to continue their engagement with the Quartet on advancing peace efforts.

Council reinforces restrictive measures concerning Iran

Brussels, 1 December 2011, 17877/11

Given the EU's increasing concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme and the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts, the Council has today strengthened the EU restrictive measures against that country.

The Council added 143 entities and 37 persons to the list of those subject to a freeze of their assets and economic resources in the EU and to a ban from entering the Union.

The measures target entities and individuals directly involved in Iran's nuclear activities, which are in violation of UN Security Council resolutions; entities and individuals owned, controlled or acting on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line; and members of as well as entities controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

Today's measures come in addition to already existing EU restrictive measures, adopted in response to concerns about Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

Asia & Pacific

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 24/25 MARCH 2011, CONCLUSIONS

Brussels, 20 April 2011, EUCO 10/1/11

We express our deepest condolences for the large-scale loss of life in Japan and our solidarity with the Japanese people and government. The thoughts of EU citizens are with the many thousands of bereaved families and the hundreds of thousands of people who now have to rebuild their lives and communities. We commend the swift and decisive action taken by the Japanese authorities. Recalling the enduring friendship and close political and economic relations that link the EU to Japan, we are determined to stand by Japan as it strives to overcome the challenges it faces.

[...]

27. The European Union will support Japan as it strives to overcome the challenges it faces after the earthquake and the tsunami that struck it with such tragic consequences.

28. Following an initial request from the Japanese government, it is mobilising relief supplies for the affected population. It stands ready to provide further support if requested. More generally, the EU is interested in developing its cooperation with Japan on disaster relief.

29. The European Union commends the swift and decisive action taken by the Japanese authorities in response to disorder on financial markets. It welcomes the action taken by the G7 on the yen. It stands ready to cooperate fully with Japan to address the economic and financial consequences of these events, including in the framework of the G8 and the G20.

30. Looking to the future, the European Council reiterates the strategic importance of the EU/Japan relationship. The forthcoming summit must be used to strengthen this relationship and bring forward our common agenda, including through the potential launch of negotiations for a free trade agreement on the basis that Japan is willing to tackle inter alia the issue of non-tariff barriers and restrictions on public procurement.

31. In this connection, the European Council stresses the need to fully draw the lessons from these events, and to provide all necessary information to the public. Recalling that the energy mix is the competence of Member States, it calls for work to be taken forward as a matter of priority on the following aspects:

- the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed, on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment (“stress tests”); the European Nuclear Safety Regulatory Group (ENSREG) and the Commission are invited to develop as soon as possible the scope and modalities of these tests in a coordinated framework in the light of lessons learned from the accident in Japan and with the full involvement of Member States, making full use of available expertise (notably from the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association); the assessments will be conducted by independent national authorities and through peer review; their outcome and any necessary subsequent measures that will be taken should be shared with the Commission and within the ENSREG and should be made public; the European Council will assess initial findings by the end of 2011, on the basis of a report from the Commission;
- the priority of ensuring the safety of nuclear plants obviously cannot stop at our borders; the EU will request that similar “stress tests” be carried out in the neighbouring countries and worldwide, regarding both existing and planned plants; in this regard full use should be made of relevant international organisations;
- the highest standards for nuclear safety should be implemented and continuously improved in the EU and promoted internationally;
- the Commission will review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations and will propose by the end of 2011 any improvements that may be necessary. Member States should ensure the full implementation of the Directive on the safety of nuclear installations. The proposed Directive on the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste should be adopted as soon as possible. The Commission is invited to reflect on how to promote nuclear safety in neighbouring countries;
- consequences for the world and for the EU need to be closely monitored, paying particular attention to the volatility of energy and commodity prices, in particular in the context of the G20.

Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the death of Democratic People's Republic of Korea leader Kim Jong Il

Brussels, 20 December 2011, A 525/11

In its dealings with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the well-being of the people of that country has always been of paramount importance for the EU.

It is my hope that the new leadership will work to improve the situation of the country, in particular by taking early steps to reduce tensions, pursue dialogue, fulfil previous commitments and improve the economic situation.

The EU is ready to continue working with its international partners and with the DPRK in pursuit of these goals.

The EU Neighbourhood

Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.

Brussels, 8 March 2011, COM(2011) 200 final

INTRODUCTION

The events unfolding in our southern neighbourhood are of historic proportions. They reflect a profound transformation process and will have lasting consequences not only for the people and countries of the region but also for the rest of the world and the EU in particular. The changes now underway carry the hope of a better life for the people of the region and for greater respect of human rights, pluralism, rule of law and social justice – universal values that we all share. Movement towards full democracy is never an easy path – there are risks and uncertainties associated with these transitions. While acknowledging the difficulties the EU has to take the clear and strategic option of supporting the quest for the principles and values that it cherishes. For these reasons the EU must not be a passive spectator. It needs to support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right. European countries have their own experience of democratic transition. The European Union has a proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from autocratic regimes to democracy, first in the South and more recently in Central and Eastern Europe. While respecting what are primarily internal transformation processes, the EU can offer expertise - that of governments, the European Institutions (European Commission and European Parliament), local and regional authorities, political parties, foundations, trade unions and civil society organizations. There is a shared interest in a democratic, stable, prosperous and peaceful Southern Mediterranean.

We believe that now is the time for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its Southern neighbours. This new approach should be rooted

unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values. The demand for political participation, dignity, freedom and employment opportunities expressed in recent weeks can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious political and economic reforms. The EU is ready to support all its Southern neighbours who are able and willing to embark on such reforms through a **‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’**. The commitment to democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law must be shared. The Partnership must be based on concrete progress in these areas. It must be a **differentiated approach**. Despite some commonalities, no country in the region is the same so we must react to the specificities of each of them.

A **‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’** should be built on the following three elements:

- democratic transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption
- a stronger partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with a particular focus on the young
- sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development especially support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health and education systems and development of the poorer regions.

This Communication explains what the EU has done to address the short-term consequences of recent events in North Africa. It then spells out our approach to the longer term process of turning into reality the tremendous hopes that have been voiced in the region. It will be developed by listening, not only to requests for support from partner governments, but also to demands expressed by civil society.

A radically changing political landscape in the Southern Mediterranean requires a change in the EU's approach to the region – the underlying themes of differentiation, conditionality and of a partnership between our societies are part of the ongoing review of the European Neighbourhood Policy on which we will present a joint Communication in April.

1. *OUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE*

- Humanitarian aid (EUR 30 million)
- Facilitating consular cooperation and evacuation
- Frontex joint operations
- Drawing on the EUR 25 million EU External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund
- High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) visits to Tunisia and Egypt; international co-ordination meeting in Brussels
- Support for Democratic transition

Our first concern has been to respond rapidly and effectively to the immediate challenges of the evolving situation in our Southern Neighbourhood and to address and pre-empt the risks of further bloodshed and hardship.

EUR 30 million has been made available in **humanitarian aid** by the Commission to tackle the most immediate humanitarian needs in Libya and of displaced persons at the Tunisian and Egyptian borders. With this aid, we are providing medical and food aid, shelter and other necessities. Commission experts are on the ground and contingency planning is taking place to ensure a rapid response in case the situation deteriorates further. Vigilance is necessary as the humanitarian crisis threatens to escalate to neighbouring countries both in the Maghreb and sub Saharan Africa as people flee from Libya. The Commission will increase financial support if needs on the ground so require it and we encourage EU Member States to continue to respond in a similar fashion.

Close consular cooperation has been maintained between all Member States and the EU and appropriate EU mechanisms, including the Situation Centre in the EEAS, have been activated to allow rapid exchange of information and most effective use of resources. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism (MIC) was activated on 23 February to facilitate the evacuation of EU citizens by way of an air and sea bridge. The EU Military Staff has been supporting this overall effort. The Commission is cooperating

with international organisations (UNHCR, International Organisation for Migration, IOM) to help people who want to leave Libya get back to their home countries. Use of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) instruments for strengthening the short-term action could be considered.

The Commission has mobilised its instruments to support Italy, and other Member States if needed, in case a massive influx of migrants from North Africa were to materialise. This response includes operational measures and financial assistance. The **Frontex** joint operation HERMES 2011 was launched on 20 February, with assets and experts from a number of Member States. If required, Frontex operations could be strengthened to help deal with possible new inflows. The Commission is ready to mobilise i.a. financial assistance from funds such as the External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund which amount to EUR 25 million in total.

In **Tunisia**, EUR 17 million was allocated for immediate and short-term support for democratic transition and assistance to impoverished inland areas. This includes support to establish an appropriate legal framework for the holding of **elections** and for an EU Election Observation Mission in support of the work of the National Commission for Constitutional Reform and Elections. It also covers additional support for civil society. Further support for democratic reform will be provided through the Instrument for Stability. Following her visits to Tunisia and Egypt, the HR/VP convened an international meeting on 23 February providing the opportunity to compare notes with main partners and major International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on developments in the region. The meeting reconfirmed that the efforts of the international community must be closely coordinated and aligned with and guided by the priorities expressed by the Tunisians and the Egyptians themselves.

For **Egypt**, it would be premature to announce a support package until the authorities are ready to make a request for assistance and define priority needs. The EU is ready to mobilise support in line with those priorities when they are ready.

In **Libya**, the EU has been firm in its condemnation of the acts perpetrated by the Gaddafi regime. It immediately suspended negotiations of the EU-Libya framework agreement and all technical cooperation.. In addition to the UN sanctions, on 28 February the EU adopted further restrictive measures such as an embargo on equipment which might be used for internal repression and autonomous designations under the travel restrictions and assets freeze. Additional measures have been proposed.

2. ADAPTING OUR APPROACH

- Reviewing and adjusting EU Neighbourhood Policy
- Moving towards advanced status in Association Agreements
- Enhancing political dialogue

The EU response to the changes taking place in the region needs to be more focused, innovative and ambitious, addressing the needs of the people and the realities on the ground. Political and economic reforms must go hand-in-hand and help deliver political rights and freedoms, accountability and participation. The EU should be ready to offer greater support to those countries ready to work on such a common agenda, but also reconsider support when countries depart from this track.

This new approach, a **'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity'** represents a fundamental step change in the EU's relationship with those partners that commit themselves to specific, measurable reforms. It is an **incentive-based approach** based on more differentiation ("more for more"): those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU. Support will be reallocated or refocused for those who stall or retrench on agreed reform plans.

More concretely, closer political co-operation means advancing towards higher standards of human rights and governance based on a set of minimum benchmarks against which performance will be assessed. **A commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections should be the entry qualification for the Partnership.** It also means closer cooperation in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and more joint work in international fora on issues of common interest. The EU will continue to offer its commitment and support to the peaceful resolution of disputes within and between States in the region. The Partnership should be underpinned by enhanced political dialogue. The EU will step up bilateral political dialogue at all levels, as soon as local conditions allow, with a strong focus on human rights and political accountability.

Partner countries carrying out the necessary reforms can expect to **resume negotiations** on Association Agreements with the aim of achieving "advanced status" which allows for significantly strengthened political dialogue and increased links between the partner country and EU institutions. This will encompass deeper engagement on mobility and improved market access to the EU.

3. DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTION BUILDING

- Expanding support to civil society
- Establishing a Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility
- Support Social Dialogue Forum

The EU is ready to support the democratic and constitutional reform processes. Judicial reform, enhanced transparency and the fight against corruption are of particular importance in this process, both to encourage foreign and domestic economic investment and to demonstrate to people a visible change in their daily lives. We are ready to make expertise available, through instruments such as twinning and TAIEX, to support capacity building with a particular focus on strengthening government institutions that can ensure the consolidation of change, including at regional and local level. Our expertise in electoral assistance will also be fully mobilised to accompany the electoral processes in Tunisia and, if requested by the authorities in Egypt.

A thriving **civil society** can help uphold human rights and contribute to democracy building and good governance, playing an important role in checking government excesses. A range of non-government (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) can provide much-needed support for the reforms and involvement in areas close to citizens' concerns such as human rights, the environment, social and economic development. This is an area where we should seek to maximize the assistance that Member States can offer at short notice to develop a platform for civil society, political parties, trade unions and associations. This could be set up with EU funding and with the support of EU political parties, trade unions, foundations and relevant NGOs. Women have played an important role in the changes in the region and gender aspects will play an important role in future EU support.

The April review of the European Neighbourhood Policy will make proposals for the reinforcement of the EU's support to civil society organisations in our neighbourhood. This will include dedicated support for civil society (a **Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility**) aimed at developing the advocacy capacity of CSOs and increasing their ability to monitor reform and participate effectively in policy dialogues.

Social dialogue between trade unions and employers plays an important role in sustaining reform efforts. New trade unions and employers associations are now

emerging. This provides an opportunity for more effective social dialogue. It should be supported through the Euro-Mediterranean Social Dialogue Forum which will facilitate exchange between the Mediterranean social partners on key employment and social issues and will support capacity building.

The EU is already supporting public administration reform aimed at streamlining and strengthening of basic policy processes, budget formulation and the capacity to raise domestic funding through efficient, fair and sustainable tax systems and administrations. With a view to supporting better the fight against corruption and illicit financial flows and to improving sound financial management, these programmes should also target transparency and accountability in public administration.

4. TACKLING THE CHALLENGES OF MOBILITY

- Conclude Mobility Partnerships
- Reinforce local Schengen cooperation
- Make full use of improvements in EU Visa Code

People-to-people contacts are important to promote mutual understanding as well as business, which will benefit the cultural and economical development of the entire Mediterranean region and the integration of migrants in the EU.

A key element in this is the strengthening of **capacity building** in the Mediterranean countries on borders/migration/asylum and more effective law enforcement cooperation to improve security throughout the Mediterranean.

Mobility Partnerships should be launched with partner countries. They aim to provide a comprehensive framework to ensure that the movement of persons between the EU and a third country is well-managed. They cover initiatives such as visa and legal migration arrangements; legal frameworks for (economic) migration; capacity building to manage remittances and for efficient matching of labour demands and needs, return and reintegration programmes, upgrading of the asylum systems to EU standards etc. In return for increased mobility, partners must be ready to undertake increasing capacity building and provide appropriate financial support for border management, preventing and fighting against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, including through enhanced maritime surveillance; the return of irregular migrants (return arrangements and readmission agreements)

and for enhancing the capacity and abilities of law enforcement authorities to effectively fight trans-border organised crime and corruption.

In the short-term, the Commission will work with Member States on **legal migration legislation and visa policy to support the goal of enhanced mobility, in particular for students, researchers and business persons**. Cooperation under Local Schengen Cooperation should be reinforced and full use should be made of practical improvements and flexibilities for visa applicants within the EU Visa Code, including the issuing of multiple entry visas to bona fide travellers and specific groups (such as researchers, students and business persons). The negotiation of short stay visa facilitation agreements with Southern Mediterranean Countries should be envisaged following a differentiated, evidence-based approach. Financial support will be provided, if needed. **The Commission calls on the colegislators to adopt rapidly the Directives on third country seasonal workers and intracorporate transferees, which will also contribute to enhancing mobility to the EU.**

In the long-term, provided that visa facilitation and readmission agreements are effectively implemented, gradual steps towards visa liberalisation for individual partner countries could be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the overall relationship with the partner country concerned and provided that conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place.

5. PROMOTING INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

- Promote Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) and Job Creation
- Seek agreement of Member States to increase EIB lending by EUR 1 billion
- Work with other shareholders to extend the EBRD mandate to countries of the region
- Promote job creation and training

The unrest in several Southern Mediterranean countries is clearly linked to economic weaknesses. Many of the economies are characterised by an unequal distribution of wealth, insufficient social and economic reform, limited job creation, weak education and training systems which do not produce the skills needed on the labour market. as well as low level of regional trade integration.

There is a need for the countries of the region to re-invigorate their economies to deliver sustainable and inclusive growth, development of poorer regions and job creation. Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) have a critical role to play in job creation. To thrive, they need a sound regulatory framework, conducive to business and entrepreneurship. The EU is ready to support this through policy dialogue and cooperation under the Euro Med industrial work programme. This should be accompanied by integrated employment and social policies, including matching of training initiatives and labour market needs, social dialogue, provision of social safety-nets and transformation of the informal sector.

The International Financing Institutions (IFIs) can contribute to this effort. Funding could come from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and, if other non-EU shareholders agree, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EIB has been active in the region for over 30 years, its operations being implemented under the umbrella of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). FEMIP is active in nine countries in the Southern Mediterranean, focussing on investments in infrastructure and support for the private sector. In addition to accelerating the implementation and approval of projects currently in the pipeline, the EIB could provide around EUR 6 billion to the Mediterranean region in the coming three years **if the Council approves the additional lending envelope** of EUR 1 billion which was recently proposed by the European Parliament. **The Commission supports this increase in the lending mandate and calls on the Council to reach an agreement rapidly on the increase.**

The Council is also invited to adopt the Commission proposal of May 2008 on EIB reflows. This would allow the EIB and other financial intermediaries to re-invest funds under FEMIP reflowing from previous financing operations in favour of the private sector. In the immediate future this arrangement would generate approximately EUR 120 million now and up to EUR 200 million by 2013.

The EBRD, not currently active in the Southern Mediterranean, could extend operations if the Bank's statutes were amended. If agreed by all shareholders this could allow an annual EBRD business activity of an initial EUR 1 billion to be reached with the Bank's existing resources. **The Commission supports the extension of EBRD operations and calls on EU Member States and other shareholder governments to support it urgently.**

These initiatives will not come at the expense of lending to other countries of operation in the Eastern neighbourhood for example.

6. ENSURING MAXIMUM IMPACT OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT

- Adopt Pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin
- Approve rapidly agreements on agricultural and fisheries products
- Speed up negotiations on trade in services
- Negotiate Deep Free Trade Areas

Trade and investment are engines for growth and help to reduce poverty. They bring people together, securing ties between nations and contributing to political stability. However, for trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to deliver their potential, they must be embedded in a sound business climate, which, in turn, requires a strengthening of the rule of law and the judiciary, tackling corruption and overhauling administrative procedures.

The countries in the region are at different stages in their trade and investment relations with the EU. Some (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan) are relatively well advanced; others (Syria, Algeria, Libya) much less. The EU has free trade agreements with the whole of the region except for Syria and Libya. These agreements provide free market access for industrial products. The EU has recently upgraded preferential market access for agricultural and fisheries products, with Egypt and Jordan in particular, and several other agreements in this field are being negotiated or at the approval stage, for example, with Morocco. With Morocco, there has also been an exchange of offers to liberalise services, but the issue of labour mobility is a major stumbling block.

The EU's measures in support of trade and investment should best be calibrated to the situation in each country, including the pace and breadth of reforms more generally, also given the current level of volatility in the region. In the short to medium term, the EU could set itself the following goals to.

- accelerate the conclusion and EU approval of trade liberalisation agreements, notably on agricultural and fisheries products with Tunisia and Morocco;
- launch negotiations on agreements on conformity assessment and acceptance of industrial products;
- accelerate on-going bilateral negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in services (including visa facilitation for persons from specific professional categories);

- conclude the single regional **Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin** in 2011. This should be accompanied by a rapid revision of the rules of origin themselves. A point of reference for these reforms is the recently adopted regime for GSP beneficiaries. **The Commission calls on the Council to adopt urgently its pending proposals on the single regional Convention, after consultation with the European Parliament.**

In the medium to long term, the common objective which has been agreed in both regional and bilateral discussions with Southern Mediterranean partners is the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, building on the current Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and on the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans. They should form part of a broader comprehensive package in support of democratic and economic reforms. Negotiations should be started with countries that are clearly engaged in such a process of political and economic transformation. Beyond the mere elimination of import duties, these agreements should foster, in a progressive manner, closer integration between the economies of our Southern Mediterranean partners and the EU single market and would include actions such as regulatory convergence. Particular priority should be given to measures in areas such as competition policy, public procurement, investment protection, sanitary and phytosanitary measures.

7. ENHANCING SECTORAL CO-OPERATION

- Establish an EU-South Mediterranean Energy Community
- Launch an Agricultural/rural development support programme
- Increase participation in education programmes
- Develop the Internet and other communication technologies

The Southern Mediterranean is strategically important for the EU in terms of **security of gas and oil supplies** from some of the countries but also more broadly in terms of transit from the region and beyond. There is clear potential for building an EU-Mediterranean partnership in the production and management of renewables, in particular solar and wind energy, and in having a joined-up approach to ensuring energy security. Joint renewable energy investments in the Southern Mediterranean in line with the EU's 2050 decarbonisation scenario could offer the possibility of a new partnership provided that the right market perspective is created for electricity imports.

It is desirable to open a credible perspective for the integration of the Southern Mediterranean in the EU internal energy market based on a differentiated and gradual approach. In the mid to long term, this would mean establishing a form of ‘EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Community’ starting with the Maghreb countries and possibly expanding progressively to the Mashreq. Extending the Energy Community Treaty with the Union’s Eastern and South-Eastern neighbours, or building on its experience, this community should cover relevant parts of the EU’s energy legislation with a view to promoting a real and reliable convergence of South Mediterranean partners’ energy policies with EU policy.

Education should be a key focus of EU activities in the region. Tackling high levels of illiteracy is key to promoting democracy and ensuring a qualified workforce to help modernise the Southern Mediterranean economies. Exchanges at university level are valuable, and fuller use should be made of Erasmus Mundus, Euromed Youth and Tempus to increase substantially the number of persons from Southern Mediterranean partner countries participating in these programmes. Vocational Education and Training (VET) also has an important role to play in addressing disparities. This should include the identification of the key strategic components on an integrated VET policy by organising national debates with key stakeholders. Exchanges of best practices on programmes enhancing the skills of unemployed people should also be encouraged.

Tourism is a key component of GDP in many of the countries in the South Mediterranean. The EU should seek to extend its existing initiatives “European Destinations of Excellence (EDEN)”, promoting sustainable tourism models and Calypso, promoting off-season tourism to these countries. The protection and promotion of cultural diversity is important and the EU is committed to further develop cultural initiatives with the South Mediterranean region.

Recent events in the Southern Mediterranean combined with rising food prices have demonstrated the urgency for the EU to help its partner countries to improve the efficiency and productivity of its **agricultural sector** and assuring the security of food supply. The Commission could support rural development through a new initiative – a **European Neighbourhood Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development**. The programme would build on EU best practice in developing rural areas. It would integrate investment support and building up of administrative capacities so as to facilitate the modernisation of the agricultural production aligned to EU quality and food safety standards. It could be developed in close cooperation with the FAO, World Bank and possibly EIB.

In the area of **transport**, cooperation should focus on modernising air traffic management and on improving aviation safety and security to create a Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Area. This will include extending the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS) to the Mediterranean partners. Cooperation with the Mediterranean partners in the implementation of a Mediterranean Maritime Strategy should enhance maritime safety, security and surveillance.

The use of **electronic communications technologies** - on top of satellite broadcasting - greatly facilitated the wave of upheavals in the Mediterranean countries. The widespread use of mobile phones combined with social networking via internet - showed the importance of information society tools and technologies to the circulation of information. In countries where the circulation of information is partially restricted such tools can greatly contribute to the democratisation of societies and the creation of public opinion through the promotion of freedom of expression.

While some regulatory reforms have been undertaken, in many of the southern Mediterranean countries the regulatory environment is still insufficiently developed to exploit the full growth and productivity potentialities of the Information and Communications Technology sector. The main critical factors which remain to be addressed are the creation of truly open markets (which often remain quasi monopolies), the establishment of independent regulators, the creation of a level playing field and of competitive conditions for market players, efficient management of spectrum and safeguards of users' privacy and security.

Moreover, ensuring the security, stability and resilience of the Internet and of other electronic communication technologies is a fundamental building block in democracy. It is necessary to avoid arbitrarily depriving or disrupting citizen's access to them. Given the trans-border and interconnected nature of electronic communications technologies, including the Internet, any unilateral domestic intervention can have severe effects on other parts of the world. The Commission will develop tools to allow the EU, in appropriate cases, to assist civil society organisations or individual citizens to circumvent such arbitrary disruptions.

8. REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The dramatic events unfolding in the region may not be necessarily spread evenly across the region and effects of change may vary significantly. The regional dimension has taken on increased importance and regional cooperation will be important in mitigating negative spillovers.

Now, more than ever, changing dynamics in the region mean that urgent progress on the **Middle East peace process** is vital. The EU should also work in close co-operation with its partners in assisting political and social change in the region. Turkey in particular has a crucial role to play both as an important regional player and as a compelling case of multiparty democracy in a country with a predominantly Muslim population.

A fresh view of the regional situation demands that the positive elements of the Barcelona process together with those of the Union for the Mediterranean be integrated in a new approach. The regional co-operation which proved to be most effective was on projects that delivered concrete benefits – in environment, energy, in transport, in trade and in social dialogue.

Regional economic integration should be encouraged. The EU will support projects which promote freer trade between the countries of the region, regulatory approximation, a strengthening of economic governance as well as the infrastructures needed for increased regional trade.

The idea behind the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean was a positive one – that of a high level partnership between the two shores of the Mediterranean. However we have to recognise that its implementation did not deliver the results we expected. The UfM needs to reform to fully realise its potential. It needs to work more as a catalyst bringing States, International Financial Institutions and the private sector together around concrete projects generating the jobs, innovation and growth that are so badly needed in the region. It should help create the right conditions for progress in the Middle East Peace Process. But, one should not be conditional on the other. Partner countries' participation in these projects could follow the principle of variable geometry depending on their needs and interests. The High Representative and the Commission are ready to play a bigger role in the Union for the Mediterranean in line with the Lisbon Treaty.

9. EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

- Refocusing bilateral programmes of the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
- Providing additional funding

Approximately EUR 4 billion is currently available for the period to the end of 2013 to support our Southern neighbours under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. The largest part of this assistance is delivered through bilateral assistance programmes. While many of the programmes underway or in the pipeline address the three priorities in the 'Partnership', the magnitude of recent changes in the region requires an extensive screening and the possible re-focussing of EU aid, in discussion with partner countries.

We have already made clear to both Tunisia and Egypt that we are ready to consider carefully full re-focussing of our bilateral programmes for 2011-13 (respectively EUR 240 and EUR 445 million) to better meet the current challenges and to ensure that our response meets peoples' legitimate aspirations. More generally, throughout the region, programmes will be screened in close cooperation and partnership with the beneficiary countries. We call on Member States to follow a similar screening exercise for their bilateral programmes to achieve maximum impact of EU aid. Within the present budgetary situation, we also consider that the present events will require unprecedented efforts to achieve maximum co-ordination and consistency between Member States' efforts, as well as with the EU. We will also continue to seek maximum interaction and co-ordination with International Financial Institutions.

The screening and re-focussing of assistance is the first step in providing support to help partner governments to consolidate reform and socio-economic development. While no meaningful needs assessment is yet possible, the reform process will require considerable support. This will come from the current EU budget¹.

Specific attention will also be paid to the encouragement of private sector investment from the EU into the southern Mediterranean. To this end, the Commission will continue to leverage loans from the EIB's FEMIP as well as from other IFIs, through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) which provides grant sup-

1. Within Heading 4 of the 2007-2013 multiannual financial framework including, if necessary, through the Flexibility Instrument and Emergency Aid Reserve.

port for infrastructure investment and private sector development². **In view of the considerable contribution by the Commission to the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, Member States are encouraged to contribute to replenishing this instrument.**

Private foreign direct investment supported through such financial instruments should also benefit from strong investment protection provisions and the Commission will provide an information tool and develop an investment protection framework for European companies interested in investment in the southern Mediterranean.

Finally, macroeconomic assistance may be necessary for some countries which are likely to face short-term difficulties, resulting from the impact of the crisis on trade, investment and tourism flows as well as the disruption of domestic production. Should the IMF have lending programmes in place and provided that external financing needs are confirmed, the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy would be eligible for **EU Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)**.

10. CONCLUSIONS

These are first proposals to build a new partnership to support change in the Southern Mediterranean. Immediate and short term help should be accompanied by longer term assistance when each country is ready to indicate what it needs from its EU partners.

The European Union in its dual dimension of a community of democratic member states and a union of peoples has had to overcome historical hurdles. This success story was possible when hope triumphed over fear and freedom triumphed over repression. This is why there is deep understanding in the EU for the aspirations of the peoples in the Southern Neighbourhood. The EU wants to support them in building real democracies and peaceful and prosperous societies. Each country and people will of course choose their own path and make their own choices. It is rightly for them to decide and not for us to seek to impose solutions. This Communication underlines the determination of the EU in supporting them on their journey to a better future.

2. The potential of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) in leveraging funds is huge. For the 2007-2010 period, NIF grants allocated to approved projects were leveraged by a factor of 17. This potential should be further exploited in the coming years.

Annex 1 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Association Agreement

These refer to contractual relationships between the European Union (EU) and a non-EU country. Association Agreements may promote the establishment/strengthening of regular dialogue and close relations on political and security matters; gradual liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital; economic cooperation with a view to encouraging economic and social development and regional economic integration; social, cultural and human dialogue. The legal base for the conclusion of the association agreements is provided by Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE). The Treaty on European Union (TEU) makes a specific reference to agreements with neighbouring countries in Article 8(2).

The concept of “advanced status” under the Association Agreements means a strengthening of political cooperation and new opportunities in economic and trade relations, progressive regulatory convergence as well as strengthened cooperation with certain European agencies and programmes.

Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)

A free trade agreement covering a wide array of trade-related issues (“comprehensive”) and aiming at eliminating ‘behind the border’ obstacles to trade through processes of regulatory approximation, thus partially opening/extending the EU internal market to the other party. It is currently offered only to ENP countries.

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

Proposed by the Commission in 2003-2004 as a framework policy through which an enlarged EU could strengthen and deepen relations with its 16 closest neighbours (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine) with a view to counteracting risks of marginalisation for the neighbouring countries which had not participated in the historic 2004 enlargement and therefore ensuring the strengthening of a shared area of prosperity, stability and security. A review of the ENP is scheduled for adoption in April 2011.

ENP Action Plans

These documents are negotiated with and tailor-made for each country, based on the country's needs and capacities, as well as their and the EU's interests. They jointly define an agenda of political and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term (3-5 years) priorities. They cover political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, sectors (such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) and a human dimension (people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health). The incentives on offer, in return for progress on relevant reforms, are greater integration into European programmes and networks, increased assistance and enhanced market access.

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)

Since 2007 the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is the legal base for assistance to ENP countries and Russia - supporting the agreed priorities in the ENP Action Plans, as well as the Strategic Partnership with Russia, replacing previous instruments for the Eastern Neighbours and Russia and for the Mediterranean Partners respectively.

Barcelona Process

Framework policy launched in 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the then 15 EU members and 14 Mediterranean partners as the base for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which has evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean. The partnership was organised into three main dimensions: political and security dialogue; economic and financial partnership; social, cultural and human partnership. With the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the Barcelona Process essentially became the multilateral forum of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners while complementary bilateral relations are managed mainly under the ENP and through Association Agreements signed with each partner country.

Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP)

This facility brings together EIB loans guaranteed by the EU budget and other services provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to assist the economic development and the integration of the Mediterranean partner countries. Activities

are focused on two priority areas: support for the private sector and creating an investment-friendly environment.

European Investment Bank (EIB)

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the European Union's financing institution. Its shareholders are the 27 Member States of the Union, which have jointly subscribed its capital. The EIB's role is to provide long-term finance in support of investment projects. Inside the European Union the EIB supports the EU's policy objectives in the following areas: small and medium-sized enterprises; cohesion and convergence; the fight against climate change; environmental protection and sustainable communities; sustainable, competitive and secure energy; the knowledge economy; trans-European networks. Outside the EU, the EIB is active in over 150 countries to implement the financial pillar of EU external cooperation and development policies (private sector development, infrastructure development, security of energy supply, and environmental sustainability).

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD)

established in 1991 in response to major changes in the political and economic climate in central and eastern Europe, the ERBD is an international financial institution that supports projects from central Europe to central Asia by investing primarily in private sector clients whose needs cannot be fully met by the market, with a view to fostering transition towards open and democratic market economies. Its area of operations has been recently extended to Turkey.

FRONTEX

Is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Based in Warsaw, it is a specialised and independent body tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security.

Maghreb

The term generally refers to the five North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania, plus the disputed territory of Western Sahara - although it is most commonly used for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Mashreq

This refers to the region of countries to the east of Egypt and north of the Arabian Peninsula (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the occupied Palestinian territory), although it is commonly used to include Egypt as well.

A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy

Brussels, 25 May 2011, COM(2011) 303

Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

A new response to a changing Neighbourhood

To the East and South of the European Union (EU) lie sixteen countries³ whose hopes and futures make a direct and significant difference to us. Recent events have brought this into sharper relief, highlighting the challenges we face together. The overthrow of long-standing repressive regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; the ongoing military conflict in Libya, the recent violent crackdown in Syria, continued repression in Belarus and the lingering protracted conflicts in the region, including in the Middle East, require us to look afresh at the EU's relationship with our neighbours. The encouraging progress made by other neighbours, for example by Republic of Moldova in its reform efforts, Ukraine in the negotiations of the Association Agreement or Morocco and Jordan in their announcement of constitutional reform, need also to be supported. The Lisbon Treaty has allowed the EU to strengthen the delivery of its foreign policy: co-operation with neighbouring countries can now be broadened to cover the full range of issues in an integrated and more effective manner. This was a key driver for initiating a review, in consultation with partner countries and other stakeholders, of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in summer 2010. Recent events throughout the Southern Mediterranean have made the case for this review even more compelling. The EU needs to rise to the historical challenges in our neighbourhood.

3. The European Neighbourhood includes Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

Since its inception in 2004, the ENP has promoted a variety of important initiatives, particularly on the trade and economic front, which have allowed the EU and its neighbours to develop stronger relationships in virtually all policy fields, from energy to education, from transport to research. These are now the subject of exchanges and co-operation between the EU and its neighbours. EU assistance has increased and is better targeted. But there is room for improvement on all sides of the relationship. Recent events and the results of the review have shown that EU support to political reforms in neighbouring countries has met with limited results. There is for example a need for greater flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and reform needs – whether they are experiencing fast regime change or a prolonged process of reform and democratic consolidation. Co-ordination between the EU, its Member States and main international partners is essential and can be improved.

A new approach is needed to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the countries and societies of the neighbourhood: to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links.

The ENP should be a policy of the Union with the Member States aligning their own bilateral efforts in support of its overall political objectives. Equally, the European Parliament has a central role to play in helping to deliver some of its central objectives. And beyond that, the ENP should serve as a catalyst for the wider international community to support democratic change and economic and social development in the region.

This partnership with our neighbours is mutually beneficial. The EU is the main trading partner for most of its neighbours. Sustainable economic development and job creation in partner countries benefits the EU as well. Likewise, managed movement of people is positive for the entire neighbourhood, facilitating the mobility of students, workers and tourists, while discouraging irregular migration and human trafficking. Active engagement between the EU and its neighbours in areas such as education, strengthening and modernising social protection systems and advancing women's rights will do much to support our shared objectives of inclusive growth and job creation.

The new approach must be based on mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It will involve a much higher level of differentiation allowing each partner country to develop its links with the EU as far as its own aspirations, needs and capacities al-

low. For those southern and eastern neighbours able and willing to take part, this vision includes closer economic integration and stronger political co-operation on governance reforms, security, conflict-resolution matters, including joint initiatives in international fora on issues of common interest. In the context of the southern Mediterranean, the Commission and the High Representative have already laid out their proposal for a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity⁴ with such partners.

The new approach, as described above, aims to:

- (1) provide greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy – the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service – and other civil and human rights that many Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
- (2) support inclusive economic development – so that EU neighbours can trade, invest and grow in a sustainable way, reducing social and regional inequalities, creating jobs for their workers and higher standards of living for their people;
- (3) strengthen the two regional dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy, covering respectively the Eastern Partnership and the Southern Mediterranean, so that we can work out consistent regional initiatives in areas such as trade, energy, transport or migration and mobility complementing and strengthening our bilateral co-operation;
- (4) provide the mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver these objectives.

The partnership will develop with each neighbour on the basis of its needs, capacities and reform objectives. Some partners may want to move further in their integration effort, which will entail a greater degree of alignment with EU policies and rules leading progressively to economic integration in the EU Internal Market. The EU does not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political reform, but it will insist that each partner country's reform process reflect a clear commitment to universal values that form the basis of our renewed approach. The initiative lies with the partner and EU support will be tailored accordingly.

4. COM (2011) 200 of 8.03.2011.

Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU. This enhanced support will come in various forms, including increased funding for social and economic development, larger programmes for comprehensive institution-building (CIB), greater market access, increased EIB financing in support of investments; and greater facilitation of mobility. These preferential commitments will be tailored to the needs of each country and to the regional context. They will recognise that meaningful reform comes with significant upfront costs. It will take the reform track record of partners during the 2010-12 period (based on the annual progress reports) into account when deciding on country financial allocations for 2014 and beyond. For countries where reform has not taken place, the EU will reconsider or even reduce funding.

The EU will uphold its policy of curtailing relations with governments engaged in violations of human rights and democracy standards, including by making use of targeted sanctions and other policy measures. Where it takes such measures, it will not only uphold but strengthen further its support to civil society. In applying this more differentiated approach, the EU will keep channels of dialogue open with governments, civil society and other stakeholders. At the same time and in line with the principle of mutual accountability, the EU will ensure that its resources are used in support of the central objectives of the ENP.

The resources that the EU and its international partners are mobilising in support of the democratic transitions in the neighbourhood must cover both the immediate and urgent needs as well as the medium- and longer-term requirements.

1. TO SUPPORT PROGRESS TOWARDS DEEP DEMOCRACY

We shall:

- adapt levels of EU support to partners according to progress on political reforms and building deep democracy.

1.1. Supporting 'deep democracy'

A functioning democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are fundamental pillars of the EU partnership with its neighbours. There is no set model or a ready-made recipe for political reform. While reforms take place differently from one country to another, several elements are common to building deep and sustain-

able democracy and require a strong and lasting commitment on the part of governments. They include:

- free and fair elections;
- freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media;
- the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial;
- fighting against corruption;
- security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.

Reform based on these elements will not only strengthen democracy but help to create the conditions for sustainable and inclusive economic growth, stimulating trade and investment. They are the main benchmarks against which the EU will assess progress and adapt levels of support.

1.2. A partnership with societies

We shall:

- establish partnerships in each neighbouring country and make EU support more accessible to civil society organisations through a dedicated Civil Society Facility
- support the establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy to help political parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners
- promote media freedom by supporting civil society organisations' (CSOs') unhindered access to the internet and the use of electronic communications technologies
- reinforce human rights dialogues.

A thriving civil society empowers citizens to express their concerns, contribute to policy-making and hold governments to account. It can also help ensure that economic growth becomes more inclusive. Key to making any of this happen is the guarantee of the freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Another challenge is to facilitate the emergence of democratic political parties that represent the broad spectrum of the views and approaches present in society so that they can compete for power and popular support. This challenge of fostering civil society and pluralism is felt throughout the neighbourhood but is particularly acute for

countries engaged in fast political change or where repressive political regimes continue to stifle pluralism and diversity.

In order to address this situation and support political actors striving for democratic change in their countries (especially political parties and non-registered NGOs or trade unions and other social partners), the High Representative and the Commission support the establishment of a European **Endowment for Democracy**⁵. This Endowment will seek to bring greater influence and consistency to the efforts of the EU, its Member States and several of the large European political foundations that are already active in this field.

Civil society plays a pivotal role in advancing women's rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities as well as environmental protection and resource efficiency. The EU will support this greater political role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. In-country EU Delegations will seek to bring partner countries' governments and civil society together in a structured dialogue on key areas of our co-operation. EU funding for such actions could be delivered through the establishment of a dedicated **Civil Society Facility** for the neighbourhood.

Media freedom and free access to information are key elements of functioning democracies. Social networks and new technologies play a significant role in promoting democratic change. EU support is already available through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Additional tools may be developed to allow the EU, in appropriate cases, to assist civil society organisations or individual citizens to have unhindered access to the internet and other forms of electronic communications technologies, as well as independent media in print, radio and television.

Commitment to **human rights and fundamental freedoms** through multilateral treaties and bilateral agreements is essential. But these commitments are not always matched by action. Ratification of all the relevant international and regional instruments and full compliance with their provisions, should underpin our partnership. This includes a strong commitment to promoting gender equality, in line with the major role once again played by women in recent events in the South, fighting against all forms of discrimination, respecting freedom of religion and protecting the rights

5. While the objectives and financial and managerial modalities of this Endowment will be different from the other democratisation tools, they shall be applied with a view to reinforce synergies and coherence.

of refugees and beneficiaries of international protection. Reinforced **human rights dialogues** will allow monitoring of commitments in this area, including addressing cases of human rights violations. Boosting cooperation with the Council of Europe could also help in promoting compliance.

Parliaments can build links between our societies. The EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly (the joint Assembly of the European Parliament and counterparts from Eastern Partnership countries), the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and Joint Parliamentary Committees between the European Parliament and partner countries' Parliaments constitute an essential forum for dialogue and increased mutual understanding between decision-makers. Parliamentarians can also bring a meaningful contribution to enhancing reform efforts and monitoring commitments in each country's ENP Action Plan, including on major political and human rights issues.

1.3. Intensifying our political and security co-operation

We shall:

- enhance EU involvement in solving protracted conflicts
- make joined-up use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other EU instruments
- promote joint action with European Neighbourhood Policy partners in international fora on key security issues.

The Lisbon Treaty provides the EU with a unique opportunity to become a more effective actor. Nowhere is this more relevant than in our neighbourhood. But rising to the challenge requires that EU and Member States policies be much more closely aligned than in the past, in order to deliver the common message and the coherence that will make our actions effective. EU instruments and policies will be effective only if properly backed by Member States policies. Business as usual is no longer an option if we want to make our neighbourhood a safer place and protect our interests.

The persistence of protracted conflicts affecting a number of partner countries is a serious security challenge to the whole region. EU geopolitical, economic and security interests are directly affected by continuing instability. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other conflicts in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, the Republic of Moldova and Western Sahara continue to affect sizeable populations, feed radi-

calisation, drain considerable local and international resources, and act as powerful impediments to reform.

The EU is already active in seeking to resolve several of these conflicts. The EU is part of the Quartet on the Middle East. It co-chairs the Geneva talks directed at peace and security in Georgia. It participates as an observer in the “5+2” talks on the Transnistrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova. It would be ready to step up its involvement in formats where it is not yet represented, e.g. the OSCE Minsk Group on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU intends to enhance its support for confidencebuilding and outreach to breakaway territories, for international efforts and structures related to the conflicts, and, once that stage is reached, for the implementation of settlements. It will also continue to oppose border changes brought about through use of military force. Many of the instruments we use everywhere in the neighbourhood to promote economic integration and sectoral co-operation could also be mobilised to support confidence-building and conflict-resolution objectives. The EU is also ready to develop, together with the relevant international organisations and key partners, post-conflict reconstruction scenarios which could act as a further incentive in the resolution of conflicts by showing the tangible benefits of peaceful settlements.

Where the EU is already engaged operationally on the ground, e.g. with the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, the EU Border Assistance Mission in Republic of Moldova/Ukraine, or the EU Police Mission and the EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah in the occupied Palestinian territories, further steps will be taken to exploit the synergies between this operational presence and the efforts to promote reforms. In particular, wherever it is appropriate, the EU will offer to back partner countries' efforts to reform their justice and security sector reforms with rule of law missions or other Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instruments that they will consider useful.

Looking beyond conflict resolution, the EU will make full use of the Lisbon Treaty's provisions in addressing other security concerns and specific common interests, e.g. energy and resource security, climate change, non-proliferation, combating international terrorism and trans-border organised crime, and the fight against drugs. It will engage with ENP partner countries to undertake joint actions in international fora (e.g. UN, international conferences) on CFSP issues, as well as other global issues.

2. TO SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

We shall:

- support partner countries' adoption of policies conducive to stronger, sustainable and more inclusive growth, to the development of micro, small and medium-sized companies and to job creation
- strengthen industrial cooperation and support improvements to the business environment
- help to organise events to promote investment
- promote direct investment from EU SMEs and micro-credit
- build on the pilot regional development programmes to tackle economic disparities between regions
- launch pilot programmes to support agricultural and rural development
- enhance the macro-economic policy dialogue with partners making the most advanced economic reforms
- improve the effectiveness of Macro-Financial Assistance by streamlining its decision-making process
- enhance dialogue on employment and social policies.

2.1. Sustainable economic growth and job creation

Economic and social challenges in our neighbourhood are immense. Poverty is rife, life expectancy is often low, youth unemployment is high and the participation of women in political and economic life is low in several countries of the region. Natural capital is being eroded and the rising food and energy prices have severe effects across the neighbourhood. Most partner countries have weak and poorly diversified economies that remain vulnerable to external economic shocks. The immediate objectives are therefore creating jobs, boosting growth, improving social protection and revitalising sectors affected by recent crises (such as tourism). Tackling these challenges is crucial to ensure the sustainability of political reforms and can also contribute to reaching the Millennium Development Goals. Feeble growth, rising unemployment and an increased gap between rich and poor are likely to fuel instability.

The ENP will continue encouraging partner countries' adoption of policies conducive to stronger and more inclusive growth. This includes support for efforts to improve the business environment such as simplifying procedures and catering to

small and medium-sized businesses and to promote employability. Partner countries' efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law and to fight corruption will also have a positive impact on the business environment, facilitating increased foreign direct investment and technology transfer which in turn stimulate innovation and job creation. The EU will pay particular attention to the challenge faced by countries emerging from political change – helping to organise initiatives such as investors' conferences to clarify national investment priorities and seek to build **investors' confidence**. A powerful signal for investors and traders would also be an **enhanced investment protection scheme**. The Commission will explore options to provide legal security to investors in neighbouring countries.

To provide additional support for SMEs the Commission will also discuss with the EIB and other stakeholders the possible role for the **European Investment Fund**⁶ in partner countries and will examine measures, including **guarantees** to promote direct investment from EU SMEs and microcredits.

The Commission can also contribute to addressing high unemployment and poverty through **pilot programmes supporting agricultural and rural development**, as well as pilot regional development programmes, drawing on the EU's extensive experience in these fields.⁷

The regional development programmes can contribute to addressing economic imbalances and disparities between regions that undermine the capacity of a country's economy as a whole. The current pilot programmes will help members of the Eastern Partnership identify appropriate structures and activities to address these challenges, within their territories and if appropriate cross-border with their neighbours in the region. A similar approach will be explored for the southern neighbourhood.

Policy dialogue will continue on macro-economic governance and budgetary sustainability. This **macro-economic dialogue** will be enhanced with those partners that go furthest in their economic integration with the EU and be based on a review of macro-economic policies and key structural reforms. This will be accompanied by an enhanced **dialogue on employment and social policies**.

6. The EIF has specific experience as a provider of risk financing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in EU and enlargement countries and an extensive network of business contacts. It is therefore ideally placed to promote investments of EU SMEs in partner countries.

7. The scope of the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD) included in the Communication "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the southern Mediterranean" - COM(2011) 200 - will be expanded to also cover the eastern neighbourhood.

The **Macro-Financial Assistance** (MFA) instrument may be mobilised to assist partner countries to address short-term balance-of-payments difficulties. In the short term this is most relevant to those dealing with the immediate economic and social impact of the recent political changes. The Commission will propose a Framework Regulation in order to make the decision-making process of MFA allocation more efficient, provide a more transparent legal basis for this instrument and refine some of its criteria.

2.2. Strengthening trade ties

We shall:

- negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with willing and able partners
- further develop trade concessions, especially in those sectors most likely to offer an immediate boost to partners' economies.

Most of our neighbours rely on the EU as their main export market and import source. Trade in goods and services is a powerful instrument to stimulate economic growth, enhance competitiveness and support economic recovery. It is therefore essential that we establish with each of them mutually beneficial and ambitious trade arrangements matching their needs and their economic capacities.

The main and most effective vehicle for developing closer trade ties is the **Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area** (DCFTA). DCFTAs provide for the gradual dismantling of trade barriers and aim for regulatory convergence in areas that have an impact on trade, in particular sanitary and phytosanitary rules (SPS), animal welfare, customs and border procedures, competition and public procurement. They are designed to be dynamic in order to keep pace with regulatory developments in the EU's Internal Market. For the most advanced partners, a DCFTA can lead to a progressive economic integration with the EU Internal Market. Through progressive approximation of EU rules and practices, DCFTAs require a high degree of commitment to complex and broad-ranging reforms. This requires strong institutional capacity. The reforms can be politically challenging and require the involvement of the business community as well as other interested parties. To embark on negotiations, partner countries must be WTO members and address key recommendations enabling them to comply with the resulting commitments. They must also have made sufficient progress towards common values and principles.

Trade mostly relies on a bilateral approach between the EU and each partner. This allows the most advanced countries to move faster and is consistent with the differentiation principle. The principle is also consistent with the long-term vision of an economic community emerging between the EU and its ENP partners.⁸ Regional economic integration is important to boost trade between partners and develop wider economic networks. In the longer term, such a community would be based on a common regulatory framework and improved market access for goods and services among ENP partners and the EU. Such an approach would consider allowing partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary, an efficient public administration and have made significant progress towards eradicating corruption, into the **non-regulated area of the Internal Market for goods**. This could only happen once participating countries have reached a sufficient level of administrative and legal reliability.

In the shorter term, for those partners not ready or willing to embark on DCFTA negotiations, other measures can be taken to boost and facilitate trade. Taking into account the circumstances and level of ambition of each partner country, the EU will seek to extend trade concessions in existing agreements or ongoing negotiations, notably in those sectors best positioned to provide an immediate boost to partners' economies including asymmetry in the pace of liberalisation to take into account the circumstances of each partner country. Greater market access for goods can be achieved through Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAAs), which will allow free movement of industrial products in specific sectors through mutual acceptance of conformity certificates. The ACAAs aim to cover all sectors where the legislation is harmonised at EU level. A partner having reached that stage would in fact become part of a free trade area for industrial products between the EU, the EEA and Turkey. Close cooperation with European bodies and organisations in the areas of standardisation, conformity assessment, and metrology can facilitate ACAAs' implementation. In order to speed the preparation of ACAAs, the Commission is ready to enhance the technical support given to our partners. ACAAs are likely to be signed with Tunisia and Egypt already in 2011.

Further progress could also be made to encourage trade flows between partner countries as well as with the EU. The rapid implementation of the new Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin will be one important element

8. See COM(2006) 726, 4.12.2006, Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy.

for the partners in the South. The Commission will examine how the Convention can be extended to other ENP partners and will make appropriate proposals.

The EU will continue to support reforms to help partners build their capacities, through providing public sector expertise, including through Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes or other mechanisms such as twinning and TAIEX⁹. This will help partners meet standards for food safety, animal and plant health and animal welfare and hence enhance their export potential. Likewise, in order to assist the agricultural sectors to modernise, the EU will offer rural development programmes so as to assist inter alia in improving agricultural and food product quality.

2.3. *Enhancing sector co-operation*

We shall:

- enhance sector co-operation, with a particular focus on knowledge and innovation, climate change and the environment, energy, transport and technology
- facilitate partner countries' participation in the work of selected EU agencies and programmes.

Enhanced cooperation can take place in all sectors relevant to the Internal Market, ranging from social policy and public health to consumer protection, statistics, company law, research and technological development, maritime policy, tourism, space and many others. Co-operation and exchange will be stepped up significantly, in line with the more-for-more approach, in the following areas:

- The EU will propose to neighbouring partners to work towards the development of a **Common Knowledge and Innovation Space**. This would pull together several existing strands of cooperation: policy dialogue, national and regional capacity-building, co-operation in research and innovation, and increased mobility opportunities for students, researchers and academics. In parallel co-operation in the area of **higher education** will be expanded through increased support for **student and academic staff mobility** within university partnerships (un-

9. TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument managed by Commission services. TAIEX supports partner countries with regard to the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is largely demand-driven and facilitates the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise to address issues at short notice; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taix/what-is-taix/index_en.htm

der Erasmus Mundus) and structured cooperation for university modernisation (through Tempus).

- The EU will join up efforts with its neighbours on **climate change** by enhanced co-operation to address low-carbon development and improve resilience to climate impacts (adaptation), with a view to implementing the Cancun agreement and moving towards a comprehensive global climate regime. The EU and partner countries should also pursue a higher level of **environment protection**¹⁰ aimed at enforcing higher standards of air and water quality, improved environmental governance, higher resource efficiency, protection of biodiversity and ecosystems and supporting the necessary infrastructure investments.
- **Energy** co-operation will be stepped up through increased energy policy dialogue aiming at further market integration, improved energy security based on converging regulatory frameworks, including on safety and environmental standards, the development of new partnerships on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, and nuclear safety. In the medium term this could lead to extending the Energy Community Treaty to neighbours not yet party to it or, building on its experience, establishing a complementary ‘EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Community’.
- The Commission will propose a new framework for **transport** co-operation, aiming at closer market integration in the transport sector, notably extending trans-European transport networks (TEN-Ts) to partner countries, addressing administrative bottlenecks with a focus on safety and security issues (including issues such as air and rail traffic management and maritime transport), and enhancing co-operation with various EU transport agencies.
- The Commission also supports a more strategic approach and cooperation on **maritime affairs**, aiming at enhancing cooperation across maritime sectors and allowing for sustainable economic development.
- Recent developments in the South Mediterranean countries have shown the importance of **information and communication technologies** as tools for political and social change. Cooperation with partner countries will therefore be stepped up to support the development of a digital economy, using ICT to tackle national and global challenges.

Finally, the EU will further facilitate partner countries’ participation in the work of EU agencies and the EU programmes which are open to them¹¹. This has been on offer for some years and has led to some co-operation in areas such as drugs moni-

10. In its Communication on the EU 2020 Initiative “Resource efficient Europe” COM(2011)21, the Commission highlighted the need to cooperate closely with key partners including those in neighbourhood.

11. COM(2006) 724, 4.12.2006

toring or aviation safety. The Commission will put together a list of programmes in which partners may participate as a matter of priority, with a focus on those offering opportunities for youth and people-to-people contacts. It will also support partner countries in fulfilling the legislative pre-requisites for participating in EU agencies and provide support for covering some of the associated costs of participation.

2.4. Migration and mobility

We shall:

- pursue the process of visa facilitation for selected ENP partners and visa liberalisation for those most advanced
- develop existing Mobility Partnerships and establish new ones
- support the full use by Member States of opportunities offered by the EU Visa Code.

Mobility and people-to-people contacts are fundamental to promoting mutual understanding and economic development. They are indispensable for trade, especially in services, as well as for exchanging ideas, spreading innovation, tackling employment and social issues, establishing strong relationships between companies, universities and civil society organisations.

Labour mobility is an area where the EU and its neighbours can complement each other. The EU's workforce is ageing and labour shortages will develop in specific areas. Our neighbourhood has well-educated, young and talented workers who can fill these gaps. In attracting this talent, the EU is conscious of the risks of brain drain, which could require additional mitigating support measures.

Partner countries are also important countries of origin and transit for irregular migrants. Cooperation on fighting irregular migration is essential to reduce the human suffering and diminished security that is generated. Such cooperation will be one of the conditions on which Mobility partnerships will be based.

The ENP aims to develop a mutually beneficial approach where economic development in partner countries and in the EU, well-managed legal migration, capacity-building on border management, asylum and effective law-enforcement co-operation go hand in hand. This approach is in line with the three pillars of the EU Global

Approach and the recently adopted Communication on migration¹²: better organising legal migration, maximising the positive impact of migration on development, enhancing capacity-building in border and migration management. The promotion and respect of migrants' rights are also an integral part of the approach.

Mobility Partnerships provide the comprehensive frameworks to ensure that the movement of persons between the EU and a third country is well-managed. These partnerships bring together all the measures which ensure that mobility is mutually beneficial. They provide for better access to legal migration channels and to strengthen capacities for border management and handle irregular migration. They can include initiatives to assist partner countries to establish or improve labour migration management, including recruitment, vocational and language training, development and recognition of skills, and return and reintegration of migrants.¹³ With a view to enhancing the mobility of citizens between partner countries and the EU, in particular for students, researchers and businesspeople, the Commission calls on Member States to make full use of the opportunities offered by the EU Visa Code. It will examine ways to support them in this process and to monitor implementation. In this context the possibilities to waive the visa fee and to issue multi-entry visa to the categories of visa applicants referred to should be underlined.

So far amongst our neighbours, Mobility Partnerships have been established with the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. The Commission believes that various countries in our neighbourhood would be good candidates for such partnerships. The Commission will seek to conclude negotiations with Armenia and prepare for the launch of negotiations with e.g. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt¹⁴.

The EU will continue to assist Ukraine and Republic of Moldova in their efforts to implement visa liberalisation action plans. Along with the visa facilitation and readmission agreements in force or under elaboration with Eastern Partnership countries, the EU should also seek to conclude visa facilitation agreements, simultaneously with readmission agreements, with partner countries in the South. All such agreements will require co-operation with the EU on migration, mobility and security. Specific measures will need to be taken to prevent irregular migration, manage their borders effectively, ensure document security and fight organised crime, including trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants. In the long-term,

12. COM(2011) 248 final, 4.5.2011

13. The Commission will finance capacity-building under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

14. In line with the Communication on a Dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries - COM(2011)292/3

gradual steps towards visa liberalisation should be considered on a case-by-case basis, where conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place.

Concerning asylum, the EU will contribute to strengthening international protection in the region by continuing the implementation of the Regional Protection Programme for Belarus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Circumstances allowing, it will also start implementing the Regional Protection Programme for Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Other initiatives by individual ENP partners in this area will also be supported. Resettlement of refugees in the EU must be an integral part of the EU's efforts to support neighbouring countries confronted with significant refugee flows.

3. TO BUILD EFFECTIVE REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

While fully recognising their diversity, the EU offers partnership to each individual neighbour through a single policy, based on mutual accountability. The eastern and southern dimensions of the ENP seek to complement that single policy by fostering regional cooperation and developing regional synergies and responses to the specific geographic, economic and social challenges of each region. They build on the different historical legacies of past EU policies towards the regions. In the South, fifteen years of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation across all areas of the relationship have been complemented recently by the Union for the Mediterranean. The Eastern Partnership has significantly boosted relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours over the past two years.

3.1. Strengthening the Eastern Partnership

We shall:

- move to conclude and implement Association Agreements including DCF-TAs
- pursue democratisation
- pursue the visa facilitation and liberalisation process
- enhance sectoral cooperation, notably in the area of rural development
- promote benefits of the Eastern Partnership to citizens
- increase work with civil society and social partners.

The establishment of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has strengthened mutual relations with partner countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. It has helped to initiate and consolidate a difficult process of change. The region has seen general progress towards democracy over the past decade, including situations of regime change. The region continues to face major economic challenges – it is poor, with significant differences between individual countries, and susceptible to external factors and influences.

The degree to which the partners have addressed key elements of the Eastern Partnership varies (for example respect for universal values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; continuous efforts to reform; and a strengthened focus on the resolution of protracted conflicts). While some are clearly committed to reaching its full potential, others have only made piecemeal progress. The EU will ensure that partners most advanced and committed to the democratic reforms that underpin the Eastern Partnership benefit the most from it. At the same time, Eastern Partnership instruments need to be better tailored to the situations of individual countries, based on experience following this first phase of implementation – notably by identifying tools to bridge the long period required to negotiate far-reaching and complex Association Agreements.

Association Agreements (AAs), most of which include DCFTAs, offer each Eastern Partnership country the opportunity to choose the level of ambition it wishes to pursue in driving forward integration and reform. With sustained commitment and support by the EU, partner countries can use the Agreement for regulatory and institutional convergence. They include alignment with EU laws, norms and standards leading progressively to economic integration in the internal market.

Association Agreement negotiations have started with five partner countries and provide a sound political basis for advancing relations. DCFTA negotiations within the framework of the AA have started with Ukraine and will start with other partners as relevant conditions are met. In spite of their relatively small size, and therefore the limited trade exchanges between Eastern Partnership countries and the EU, DCFTAs are of high priority for the EU as efficient tools to reinforce the political and economic links between the EU and its Eastern neighbours. In order to help partner countries develop the administrative capacity required for in-depth reforms, the Eastern Partnership also provides for Comprehensive Institution-Building (CIB) programmes. To complement this, Pilot Regional Development Programmes are the newest EU instrument to assist partners in addressing

economic, social and regional imbalances. They will help partners to establish appropriate structures and activities to address regional challenges.

Some EaP countries attach great importance to their European identity and the development of closer relations with the EU enjoys strong public support. The values on which the European Union is built – namely freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – are also at the heart of the process of political association and economic integration which the Eastern Partnership offers. These are the same values that are enshrined in article 2 of the European Union Treaty and on which articles 8 and 49 are based.

People-to-people contacts are an important part of the partnership. The EU will continue to assist Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova in their efforts to implement **visa liberalisation** action plans. These Plans could become models for other Eastern Partnership countries. In the meantime, Eastern Partnership countries should fully exploit opportunities offered by visa facilitation.

Eastern partners have benefited from five flagship initiatives¹⁵ in the areas of border management, SME development, energy cooperation, civil protection and environmental governance. These programmes will now be adapted to better support bilateral partnership objectives. For example, work under the Integrated Border Management flagship initiative is increasingly geared towards supporting partners in fulfilling the conditions for visa facilitation and liberalisation. Boosting the visibility of the Eastern Partnership's bilateral and multilateral activities is important to explain their benefits to the general public. To help increase regional solidarity, the EU should develop its support for sub-regional cooperation that concentrates on specific subjects involving fewer partners. The multilateral framework has to be used more strategically to advance bilateral relations between our partners, including in the area of conflict resolution.

In line with the aim of the renewed ENP to focus on links between societies, the EU will promote more intensive engagement with stakeholders, including parliaments in the framework of EURONEST, established by the European Parliament; regional actors in cooperation with the Committee of the Regions; business leaders, in the frame of an Eastern Partnership Business Forum; and civil society and social

15. These are: Integrated Border Management; Small and Medium Enterprises; Regional Electricity Markets, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Sources; Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters; Environmental Governance.

partners building on the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and its national platforms.

Co-operation under the Eastern Partnership will continue with policy dialogue in areas such as:

- education, youth and culture: expanding participation in programmes such as Erasmus Mundus, Tempus, Youth in Action and eTwinning; opening of future new EU programmes such as Lifelong Learning to Eastern Partnership countries; follow-up of the Special Action Culture Programme 2009-10 and of the Eastern Partnership Culture Programme;
- transport: connecting infrastructure networks of the EU and its Eastern partners;
- energy, environment, climate change: intensified dialogue, following the establishment of the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (EESP), and accession to the European Energy Community Treaty by Ukraine and Republic of Moldova in order to strengthen co-operation on energy security;
- knowledge sharing, research and information society: full integration of the research and education communities in the region within the e-infrastructure (e.g. the GÉANT panEuropean data network for networking, and the European Grid Infrastructure for grids and distributed computing).
- customs and law enforcement issues on the basis of Strategic Frameworks for Customs Cooperation with Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Belarus as well as co-operation in the area of fight against smuggling;
- rural development measures (in line with the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development);
- employment and social policies;
- justice, freedom and security on the basis of the Justice and Home Affairs Eastern Partnership Action Plan to be presented later this year under the Stockholm Programme¹⁶, including mobility partnerships;
- Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

EU Member States, third countries and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have shown interest in furthering the goals of the Eastern Partnership and supporting projects of strategic importance. Additional resources are being mobilised from the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), bilateral partners and IFIs, in particular the EIB, the EBRD and the World Bank. Such co-operation should be pursued

16. Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme - COM(2010) 171: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF>.

dynamically, building on the establishment of the SME Facility, the EIB's Eastern Partners Facility and its Eastern Partnership Technical Assistance Trust Fund to which the EU and Member States are invited to contribute.

The Eastern Partnership Information and Co-ordination Group gathers IFIs and third countries interested in donor coordination and more generally in the development of Eastern Partnership, including Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. This informal cooperation will be intensified in line with the interests of Eastern Partnership partners.

The second Eastern Partnership Summit will take place in September 2011 in Warsaw. The European Commission and the High Representative will subsequently put forward a roadmap to guide the future implementation of the Eastern Partnership, drawing on the results of the Summit.

3.2. Building the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean

We shall:

- undertake Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes similar to those implemented with the eastern partners
- launch a dialogue on migration, mobility and security with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt (as a first step towards a Mobility Partnership)
- strengthen Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation
- launch pilot programmes to support agricultural and rural development
- focus the Union for the Mediterranean on concrete projects with clear benefits to populations of the Mediterranean region
- advance sub-regional cooperation
- enhance dialogue on employment and social policies.

The ENP must provide an ambitious response to the momentous changes currently ongoing in the Southern Mediterranean region. The joint Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean¹⁷, issued on 8 March outlined first elements of the EU's offer of a new partnership with partners engaged in building democracies and extensive reforms. The three main directions along which the EU intends to further develop its relations with its Mediter-

17. COM(2011) 200.

anean partners are carried over into this communication: democratic transformation and institution-building; a stronger partnership with the people; and sustainable and inclusive economic development. Through its different policies and instruments, the partnership will be comprehensive and wide, but will be more clearly differentiated according to the specific needs as well as the level of ambition of each partner. The EU is already engaged in a process of strengthening relations with a number of partners, notably through granting ‘advanced status’¹⁸.

Those partners that want to establish a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the EU are expected to make progress on the key elements highlighted in section 1.1. The long-term vision for our most advanced Mediterranean partners is close political association with the EU and economic integration into the Internal Market. In the short term, the following options will be available to partners making progress on reforms.

To support democratic transformation, **Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes** similar to those implemented with its Eastern neighbours will be set up: they will provide substantial expertise and financial support to build the capacity of key administrative bodies (customs, enforcement agencies, justice) and will be targeted in priority towards those institutions most needed to sustain democratisation.

To build a **stronger partnership with people**, the Commission will launch a dialogue on migration, mobility and security with e.g. Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt (as a first step towards a Mobility Partnership). These proposals are further detailed in the Communication on migration, mobility and security in the southern neighbourhood¹⁹. School co-operation (eTwinning), student and academic staff mobility within university partnerships (Erasmus Mundus), structured cooperation for university modernisation (Tempus), and mobility of Young People (Youth in Action) will also be expanded to provide a better support to the youth. New initiatives may also be promoted in the field of culture.

In the short term, to build **sustainable and inclusive economic development**, the EU will step up efforts to enhance the trade provisions of the existing Association Agreements by concluding the ongoing negotiations on agriculture and those on

18. The advanced status, based on the good implementation of the ENP Action Plan, was granted to Morocco in 2008 and to Jordan in 2010. It could be extended to other ENP Southern countries making progress in reforms. Depending on the country it may entail the strengthening of political and security cooperation, trade concessions and greater integration in the EU Internal Market and additional financial support for reforms. It is based on a new and more comprehensive Action Plan.

19. COM (2011) 292/3

services and the right of establishment. Selected southern neighbours will also be given the opportunity to enter into preparations for future DCFTA negotiations. To accompany the structural adjustments linked to market opening and promote inclusive growth, the Commission will finance pilot programmes for agricultural and rural development and, drawing on the experience of the Eastern Partnership, pilot regional development programmes.

The Commission will promote industrial cooperation at Euro-Mediterranean level by continuing to implement the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise, by adapting the Charter to the needs of SMEs in line with the EU's Small Business Act and by sharing good practices and opening activities and networks in priority sectors (textiles, tourism, raw materials). It will enhance dialogue on employment and social policy and encourage effective social dialogue including through the Euro-Mediterranean Social Dialogue Forum. Regulatory cooperation on a regional level could facilitate trade exchanges and improve the investment climate. The development of an efficient, safe, secure and sustainable multi-modal Trans-Mediterranean Transport Network will also contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic development. The Commission is already working with the EIB and the International Maritime Organisation to identify pilot actions to improve cooperation between maritime sectors in the Mediterranean.

The **Union for the Mediterranean** (UfM) which complements the bilateral relations between EU and partners should enhance its potential to organise effective and result-oriented regional cooperation. It further ensures the inclusive character of regional cooperation in the Mediterranean by including actors such as Turkey and the Western Balkan countries. The High Representative and the Commission are ready to play a bigger role in the UfM in line with the Lisbon Treaty. Revitalising the UfM requires a switch to a more pragmatic and project-based approach. The UfM Secretariat must operate as a catalyst to bring states, the EIB, International Financial Institutions and the private sector together around concrete economic projects of strategic importance and generating jobs, innovation and growth throughout the region. Partner countries' participation in these projects could follow the principle of variable geometry depending on their needs and interests. Co-financing for specific infrastructure projects from the EU budget could be provided through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility. In the current economic and political context, flagship projects identified at the Paris Summit remain fully relevant, notably the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the de-pollution of the Mediterranean or the development of Motorways of the Sea and land highways, the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative. To support sustainable development, implementation

of existing regional agreements such as the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean should be given greater priority.

Finally, **sub-regional co-operation** involving fewer neighbours and concentrating on specific subjects can bring benefits and can create greater solidarity. Sub-regional cooperation in the Maghreb could be advanced, for example through supporting greater physical interconnection. The EU will put forward specific proposals in the near future, including on ways to support the possible opening of borders in the region.

4. A SIMPLIFIED AND COHERENT POLICY AND PROGRAMME FRAMEWORK

4.1. Clearer priorities through stronger political steering

We shall:

- Focus ENP Action Plans and EU assistance on a smaller number of priorities, backed with more precise benchmarks.

Bilateral relations between the EU and each of its neighbours have become stronger in recent years. Close and intensive dialogue has developed not only on general political matters but on all specific areas of our co-operation. These very close relationships and a higher level of commitment call for much stronger political dialogue and co-operation. The Lisbon Treaty provides the means for the European Union to deliver coherent and consistent policies and programmes by bringing together strands of EU foreign and assistance policy that were previously run by different institutions.

There is a consensus among partner countries and Member States that more substantive Association Councils would allow for more in-depth discussion at political level. But political dialogue need not be reduced to a yearly discussion in the Association Council: more frequent and more ad hoc opportunities should be envisaged when conditions so require. A more continuous and more intimate political dialogue is key to establish the confidence and trust required to tackle our common challenges. In addition, the Commission intends to enhance dialogue on sectoral policies (such as energy, education, youth, migration and transport) with their Ministerial counterparts in partner countries.

While **ENP Action Plans** remain the framework for our general cooperation, the EU will suggest to partners that they focus on a limited number of short and medium-term priorities, incorporating more precise benchmarks and a clearer sequencing of actions. The EU will adapt the priorities for its financial assistance accordingly. This list of priorities will set the political pace and help both the EU and each neighbour to produce key deliverables, within a mutually agreed timeframe. This will also allow better linking of policy objectives and assistance programming. Building on that basis programming documents can be simplified and focus on identifying Action Plan priorities requiring particular EU assistance.

Further simplification of provision of financial assistance will also be sought in drafting the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) regulation in the context of the next multi-annual financial framework, in order to translate the need for a more flexible and more focused delivery of financial assistance into practice.

In parallel, the EU will continue to report on an annual basis on progress in line with the Action Plans. Reports will put greater focus on democracy and a stronger link between the outcomes measured in these reports, assistance and levels of financial support will be developed over time.

4.2. Funding

We shall:

- re-focus and target foreseen and programmed funds in the ENPI as well as other relevant external policy instruments in the light of this new approach
- provide additional resources of over EUR 1 billion until 2013 to address the urgent needs of our neighbourhood
- mobilize budgetary reinforcement from various sources
- swiftly proceed with submitting concurring budget proposals to the Budget Authority (transfers for 2011, Amending Letter for 2012, re-programming for 2013).

Implementing the new approach of the neighbourhood policy based on mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law requires **additional resources of up to EUR 1242 million until 2013**. These resources are in addition to the EUR 5700 million provided under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for 2011-2013. In the event of new emergencies, funding of actions targeted at the region

under thematic instruments and crisis intervention mechanisms in the EU budget constitute fresh resources. Financial support will be provided to further reinforce the partnership with people across the region, support sustainable and inclusive growth, cover the additional needs stemming from the democratic transformation of partner countries, advance the achievement of Millennium Development Goals and fund the new initiatives stemming from this review, notably in the areas of partnership with societies, rural and regional development (see sections 3.1 and 3.2 above). This includes an amount of up to EUR 250 million stemming from reflows from older loan and risk-capital operations to be made available to the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) to promote growth and employment by financing new operations and to support the long-term financing needs of SMEs. To that effect, the Council should adopt the Commission proposal to amend Article 23 of the ENPI regulation.

These additional resources will be provided through reallocations from within Heading 4 of the 2007-2013 multi-annual financial framework, and by making use of the unallocated margin under the expenditure ceiling in 2012 and - to the extent necessary - through the Flexibility Instrument. The Commission will submit an Amending Letter to Draft Budget 2012 shortly.

The Commission is currently reflecting on how best to integrate the overall country situation regarding democracy, accountability, the rule of law and sound financial management into its decisions on budget support arrangements, and will outline its approach in the upcoming Communication on budget support. This should also provide the necessary flexibility to tailor levels and types of support to each partner's reform track record.

4.3. Involving the EIB and EBRD

We shall:

- secure additional loan possibilities by the EIB and the EBRD, including an extension of the latter's mandate to selected Southern partners.

To support large infrastructure projects that can help connect the EU with its neighbourhood, boost development and address key energy, environment and transport challenges, it is important to ensure that the European Investment Bank and other regional development banks such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have sufficient financial resources. The Commission supports the in-

crease in the external mandate of the EIB for both eastern and southern neighbours as well as the extension of the EBRD mandate to selected southern Mediterranean countries. The EIB and EBRD can deliver on EU policy objectives together by maximising their comparative advantages. EBRD operations in the Southern Mediterranean countries should support EU policy objectives and should not lead to a transfer of resources from operations in the EU Eastern Neighbourhood.

The adoption of the revised EIB external mandate would provide for increased EIB lending under EU guarantee across the EU Neighbourhood. In particular, if the Council approves the additional lending envelope of EUR 1 billion proposed by the European Parliament, the EIB could provide almost EUR 6 billion to the Mediterranean countries over 2011-2013. The necessary funds up to 90 million will be mobilised to provide the budgetary guarantees needed to match the increase in EIB loans towards the Mediterranean region.

4.4. *Planning for 2013 and beyond*

We shall:

- promote more flexible and simpler aid delivery under the post-2013 successor to the present ENPI;
- step up efforts of co-ordination between the EU, its Member States and other key IFIs and bilateral donors.

In its July 2010 conclusions on the ENP the Council acknowledged “the need to accompany market opening, economic integration and regulatory convergence as well as the process of strengthening bilateral relations, throughout the neighbourhood, with appropriate financial support, technical assistance and capacity building” and indicated that it “will return to the issue of financial support in the context of discussions on the next multi-annual financial framework”. The Commission will reflect the renewed ENP vision and medium term objectives in its proposals for the post-2013 EU Multiannual Financial Framework²⁰. The key source of funding, the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), will provide the bulk of financial support to partner countries, essentially through bilateral, regional and cross border co-operation programmes. Its level of funding will need to reflect the ambitions of the revised ENP. It should be increasingly policy-driven and provide for increased differentiation, more flexibility, stricter conditionality and incentives for best per-

20. The Commission’s proposals will be tabled later this year.

formers, reflecting the ambition of each partnership (e.g. DCFTA negotiations). EU assistance could also be increasingly implemented by devolving it to partner countries provided that the financial rules of the Union are respected and EU financial interests protected.

To maximise external support for the reform agenda agreed in the context of ENP the EU will step up efforts of co-ordination with EU Member States, other bilateral donors, the EIB, the EBRD and the international finance institutions. This can take the form of joint programming, joint co-operation initiatives and co-financing programmes and projects. To improve EU assistance co-ordination, the EEAS and Commission services will consider the possibility of launching pilot joint programming exercises with interested Member States in the countries of the southern neighbourhood undergoing democratic transition.

CONCLUSIONS

Our neighbourhood offers great opportunities for mutually beneficial integration and co-operation, for example large and well-educated working populations, sizeable markets still to be developed, and win-win solutions in energy security. Cooperation with our neighbours is the only means to take on the challenges and threats that do not respect borders – such as terrorism, irregular migration, pollution of our common seas and rivers. It allows us to tackle sources of instability and conflict in the region.

Several neighbours in the East and in the South have embarked on an ambitious path of transition during the last decade. They need support to consolidate these processes. Others have joined the process only recently. They also need our urgent assistance and they can benefit from the lessons learnt by other partners. It is in the EU's own interest to support these transformation processes, working together with our neighbours to anchor the essential values and principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, a market economy and inclusive, sustainable development in their political and economic fabric.

The new approach to the ENP set out in this Communication is a step in this direction. The Commission and the High Representative call on the Council and the European Parliament to endorse both its overall thrust and the concrete proposals it puts forward. We now intend to pursue our consultations with our neighbours on the best way to translate this new approach into each individual partnership.

The challenges are many, and fully meeting them may take time. What we are aiming for together is a democratic, prosperous and stable region where more than 800 million people can live, work and shape their own country's future, confident that their freedom, their dignity and their rights will be respected.

PRESS RELEASE, 3101st Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 20 June 2011, 11824/11

European Neighbourhood Policy review

The Council had a broad discussion on the EU's neighbourhood, in response to the European Neighbourhood Policy Review presented by the High Representative and the Commission on 23 May 2011, and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. Welcoming the publication of the Joint Communication on a new response to a changing Neighbourhood of 25 May 2011, the Council thanks the High Representative and the Commission for this response to its invitation of 26 July 2010 to initiate a reflection on the future implementation of the ENP. The Council also welcomes the consultations that were held in view of the Joint Communication.

2. The new approach of the EU will be based on mutual accountability and shared commitment to universal values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. The partnership between the EU and each of its neighbours will reflect their needs, capacities and reform objectives. It will be based on joint ownership and differentiation. Such a partnership may lead those countries that are willing and able to move further to closer political association and progressive economic integration into the EU Internal Market. Action Plans and equivalent documents will be used more effectively by focusing on a limited number of priorities with a clearer sequencing of actions, incorporating clearer objectives and more precise benchmarks, and be pursued with closer political steering. This will help partners prioritising reforms and will allow better linking of policy objectives and assistance programming.

3. The Council agrees on the need to provide greater support to partners engaged in building deep and sustainable democracy, to support inclusive economic development and to strengthen both the Eastern and the Southern dimensions of the ENP, in particular in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It underlines that stronger political cooperation, closer economic integration and in-

creased EU support, will depend on progress towards reforms. They will be tailored to the needs of partners willing to undertake reforms and to cooperate effectively with the EU in all relevant domains, and may be reconsidered where reform does not take place. These principles would equally apply to all ENP partners. The Council invites the High Representative and the Commission to design the appropriate mechanisms and instruments that will help deliver these objectives.

4. The Council welcomes the emphasis in the Joint Communication on a partnership with societies. It invites the High Representative and the Commission to put forward concrete proposals in support of civil society, including on a European Endowment for Democracy and a Civil Society Facility, to develop new means for the EU to support the development and functioning of deep and sustainable democracy in the neighbouring countries, in full coherence with existing instruments and structures.

5. Recognising the economic benefits of enhancing trade in goods and services, the potential for increased investment flows and the importance of progressive economic integration with the EU Internal Market, the Council supports the EU continuing to pursue such integration through the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with ENP partners, as proposed in the Joint Communication, as soon as conditions are met. The launching of DCFTA negotiations requires WTO membership and thorough preparation based on key recommendations. The Council expects rapid progress in the ongoing DCFTA negotiations with Ukraine and notes the good progress made by some of the other Eastern partners towards implementing key recommendations. It welcomes the adoption today of the negotiating directives of DCFTA with the Republic of Moldova. As regards the Southern Mediterranean, the Council encourages initiatives aimed at enhancing trade and investment relations with partners engaged in democratic and economic reforms. To this end, the Council invites the Commission to submit recommendations for negotiating directives for DCFTAs with selected Southern Mediterranean partners. The Council agrees that in the context of ongoing or future negotiations, the EU will seek to improve market access opportunities including, where appropriate, by extending trade concessions, taking into account the particular circumstances of each partner country.

6. Well-managed mobility of people is crucial for mutual understanding, business links and economic growth both in the EU and in the partner countries. Recalling the European Council Declaration of 11 March 2011 and the Justice and Home Affairs Council Conclusions of 9 June 2011, the Council invites the Commission

to pursue and intensify work with partners in this field on the basis of the Global Approach to Migration. The EU will prepare the launch of negotiations for Mobility Partnerships with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, as a first group, as proposed by the Commission in its Communication of 25 May 2011. The EU will seek to fully utilise the potential of the EU Visa Code for bona fide travellers between the EU and all partners. In line with the JHA Council conclusions of 9 and 10 June, the EU will consider to launch, on a case by case basis, readmission and visa facilitation agreements with Southern partners and EU engagement will depend inter alia on effective cooperation against illegal migration including on readmission and border management.

Recalling its conclusions on the Eastern Partnership of 25 October 2010, the EU will seek to conclude negotiations for a Mobility Partnership with Armenia and will also seek to launch negotiations on visa facilitation agreements in parallel with readmission agreements with Belarus, for the benefit of the population at large, as well as with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Council welcomes the entering into force of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Georgia. The Council welcomes the presentation of the progress reports on the implementation of the Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova Visa Liberalisation Action Plans, which could serve as useful models also for the other eastern partners bearing in mind the specificity and progress of each country, in line with the Prague declaration and subsequent Council Conclusions.

7. The Council invites the High Representative and the Commission to implement the proposals of the Communication regarding sector cooperation in close cooperation with other initiatives existing in the neighbourhood. The EU will also facilitate partner countries' participation in EU programmes and agencies.

8. Significantly increased financial support of up to EUR 1.242 billion to address the urgent needs and to respond to the new challenges and transformations underway in the Neighbourhood will be decided in accordance with the normal budgetary procedures and without prejudice notably to the Multiannual Financial Framework. The Council looks forward to the Commission proposal to the budgetary authority in that respect. Such resources shall be allocated taking fully into account partner countries' needs, their readiness to engage in reforms and their progress towards deep and sustainable democracy as defined in the Communication. The Council asks the Commission, in connection with the EIB, to consider how risk capital operations could be reinforced in the neighbourhood, taking into account sound budgetary management. The Council also underlines the need to reprioritise existing resourc-

es and reaffirms its support for the increase in lending from the EIB. The Council also reaffirms its support for the extension of the EBRD area of operations to those Southern partners engaged in democratic transition and appeals to other major donors and international financial institutions to contribute to this effort.

9. In the context of the enhanced approach to the ENP, the Council looks forward to the Commission proposal to establish under the next multi-annual financial framework a new European Neighbourhood Instrument which is based on a simplified programming, is increasingly policy driven and provides for increased differentiation on the basis of a “more for more” approach, including the flexibility to allow for greater targeting of resources in line with reform performance and needs and will reflect the new level of ambition of the policy. The new instrument will also support regional cooperation and Cross Border Cooperation at the EU external border and in this regard the Council also underlines the importance of flexible mechanisms for effective implementation. The Council will revert to these issues in the context of the discussions on the next multiannual financial framework.

10. The Council looks forward to the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw on 29-30 September 2011 with the view to enhancing the relations between the EU and the Eastern partners. The Eastern Partnership seeks to accelerate political association and economic integration as laid out in the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit of 7 May 2009, based on the shared principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. These values are adhered to by all the Member States of the European Union. The Council acknowledges the European aspirations and the European choice of some partners. The Council also invites the High Representative and the Commission to propose a roadmap to guide the further implementation of the Eastern Partnership, drawing on the results of the Summit and taking into account the further implementation of flagship initiatives and concrete projects, and including proposals on how to enhance regional cooperation.

11. The Council underlines the importance of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which complements the bilateral relations between EU and partners in the South and should be enhanced to organise effective and result-oriented regional cooperation through concrete projects. The Council welcomes the nomination of Mr. Youssef Amrani as Secretary General of the UfM Secretariat. The Council reiterates its support to the UfM Secretariat that should operate as a catalyst to bring states, the EIB, International Financial Institutions and the private sector together around

concrete projects of strategic importance and support job generation, innovation and growth throughout the region.

12. The ENP will have to live up to the new challenges in the Southern Neighbourhood. Transitions may be long and difficult, nonetheless the Council underlines the strong commitment of the EU and Member States to accompany and support concrete efforts by the governments genuinely engaged in political and economic reforms, as well as the civil societies. In this respect, the Council encourages the High Representative and the Commission to ensure that the ongoing implementation of the 8 March Communication on a Partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, in line with the related European Council Conclusions, takes into account the new approach set out in the new response to a changing Neighbourhood. The Council welcomes the setting up of the Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean by the High Representative which will enhance the EU's efforts to foster coherent international support for the strengthening of democracy and inclusive economic development in the Mediterranean region. It also welcomes the High Representative's proposal for an EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean region and stresses that the EUSR should start working as soon as possible. The Council welcomes the Deauville Partnership and the G8 support to the countries in democratic transition.

13. The Council encourages the High Representative and the Commission to seize the opportunities provided by the Lisbon Treaty to enhance EU involvement in the resolution of the protracted conflicts, taking into account existing formats, and pursue joint efforts to enhance regional security in our neighbourhood, making joined-up use of Common Foreign and Security Policy and other EU instruments. It calls on Partner Countries to increase their efforts to resolve conflicts and to make best use of the EU's support.

14. The Council agrees that Member States should complement and reinforce EU support in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy with national support programmes, while ensuring close co-ordination. It also encourages the European Commission to intensify coordination with other donors and international finance institutions.

15. The Council looks forward to the implementation of the new response to a changing Neighbourhood and invites the High Representative and the Commission to report in 2012.'

PRESS RELEASE, 3101st Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 20 June 2011, 11824/11

Eastern neighbourhood – Belarus

The Council discussed the situation in Belarus and adopted the following conclusions:

1. Recalling its Conclusions of 31 January 2011, the statements by High Representative Ashton on the situation in Belarus of 18 February, 12 April and 14 and 26 May as well as the Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 18 March 2011, the EU expresses its deep concern at the deteriorating human rights, democracy and rule of law situation in Belarus.

2. The EU strongly condemns the detention, trials and sentencing on political grounds of representatives of civil society, the independent media and the political opposition, including former presidential candidates, Nyaklyayew, Rymashewski, Sannikaw, Statkevich and Uss in the aftermath of 19 December 2010 Presidential elections. The EU reiterates its calls for the immediate release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners. It underscores its deep concern at reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in Belarusian prisons, and urges the authorities to respect international commitments endorsed by Belarus, notably the absolute prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

3. The EU deplores the continuing deterioration of media freedom in Belarus, including the lawsuits filed by the Ministry of Information to close two of Belarus' largest independent newspapers, *Nasha Niva* and *Narodnaya Volya*, the trial of the journalist Poczobut, and the cancelled licence of radiostation Autoradio. It calls on Belarus to end the ongoing politically motivated persecution and harassment of democratic forces, independent media, civil society and those defending them.

4. The Council urges Belarus to respect internationally recognised diplomatic immunities and privileges of EU diplomatic representations and their personnel in Minsk and to stop the ongoing harassment and intimidation.

5. The EU remains determined to address the human rights situation in Belarus, including in international fora such as the UN Human Rights Council and the OSCE. The Council welcomes the successful adoption of the resolution on the situation on human rights in Belarus at the 17th session of the UN Human Rights Council and

calls on Belarus to implement it fully. The EU reiterates its regret at the lack of cooperation by Belarus in the framework of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism and notes with concern the findings of the OSCE Rapporteur's Report on Belarus regarding Belarus' fulfillment of its OSCE commitments in the human dimension.

6. In view of recent developments, the Council has decided to designate additional persons to travel restrictions and assets freeze. The Council has furthermore decided to impose an embargo on Belarus on arms and on materials that might be used for internal repression. It has also decided to freeze the assets of three companies linked to the regime.

7. The Council agrees that the extension of European Investment Bank operations to Belarus should only proceed if and when the EU is able to give a sufficiently positive assessment of the human rights and rule of law situation. The Council welcomes the outcome of the recent European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Country Strategy Update, which implies a recalibrating of EBRD assistance away from the Belarusian central authorities in favour of non-state and local actors implementing projects in areas which benefit the population at large. The Council expresses its hope for conditions to be re-established in Belarus that would allow the country to enjoy the full benefits of EIB and EBRD support.

8. The EU reiterates its strong commitment to strengthening its engagement with the Belarusian people and civil society. It welcomes that the EU assistance strategy towards Belarus has been revised in order to further strengthen support to civil society and that the EU's special assistance package is reaching full implementation speed, providing notably support to repressed individuals, NGOs, media and students. Donor coordination will continue, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of aid to Belarusian civil society in the years ahead.

9. Recalling the importance it attaches to people to people contacts to the benefit of Belarusian population at large, the Council takes positive note of the ongoing work to fully use the existing flexibilities offered by the Visa Code, in particular the possibility for Member States to waive and reduce visa fees for certain categories of citizens. In the same spirit, the Council also welcomes the Commission's formal invitation to Belarus to start negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements, on the basis of negotiation directives adopted by the Council on 28 February, and calls on the Belarusian authorities to engage constructively.

10. The EU will continue to closely monitor the situation in Belarus. The EU reiterates its commitment to the policy of critical engagement, including through dialogue and the Eastern Partnership, and recalls that the development of bilateral relations is conditional on progress towards respect by Belarus for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. At the same time, and in the light of further developments, the EU stands ready to consider further targeted measures in all areas of cooperation, as appropriate.”

For the decision on further restrictive measures against the Belarus regime: see below under the ‘Other items approved section’.

[...]

Belarus – restrictive measures

The Council decided to strengthen its restrictive measures against Belarus in view of the deteriorating human rights, democracy and rule-of-law situation there.

It imposed an arms embargo and an export ban on materials that might be used for internal repression.

The Council also decided to add further names to the list of individuals subject to the EU travel restrictions and assets freeze and to freeze the assets of three companies linked to the regime.

The Decision and the Regulation will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on Tuesday, 21 June 2011.

Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the verdict in the case of Ms Yulia Tymoshenko

Brussels, 11 October 2011, 15394/1/11 REV 1

The EU is deeply disappointed with the verdict of the Pechersk District Court in Ukraine in the case of Ms Yulia Tymoshenko. The verdict comes after a trial which did not respect the international standards as regards fair, transparent and independent legal process which I repeatedly called for in my previous statements. This unfortunately confirms that justice is being applied selectively in politically mo-

tivated prosecutions of the leaders of the opposition and members of the former government. It is especially disappointing for a country that currently holds the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

The EU urges the competent Ukrainian authorities to ensure a fair, transparent and impartial process in any appeal in the case of Ms Tymoshenko and in the other trials related to members of the former Government. The right of appeal should not be compromised by imposing limitations on the defendants' ability to stand in future elections in Ukraine, including the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.

The EU will reflect on its policies towards Ukraine. The way the Ukrainian authorities will generally respect universal values and rule of law, and specifically how they will handle these cases, risks having profound implications for the EU-Ukraine bilateral relationship, including for the conclusion of the Association Agreement, our political dialogue and our co-operation more broadly.

The Candidate Countries Croatia*, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Iceland+, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.

* Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

+ Iceland continues to be a member of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.

Transatlantic relations

Statement by Catherine Ashton, European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on ratification by the Russian Federation Council of the START Treaty

Brussels, 26 January 2011, A 028/11

I congratulate the Russian State Duma and Federation Council on their ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the US.

In approving the treaty today, the Russian parliament has paved the way for the United States and Russia - which possess 95 percent of global stockpile of nuclear weapons - to make progress in fulfilling their disarmament commitments set in this landmark agreement.

Both countries are showing that they are willing to enhance global security by reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads and their delivery systems and by establishing a verification system to the benefit of both sides.

The ratification of the new START treaty will strengthen arms control and the global non-proliferation regime. The European Union has long stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to all these issues. A combined effort by the international community is required to strengthen disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, which are joint security interests for all.

In this context, the European Union reiterates its full support to efforts of the Governments of the United States and Russia.

Statement in New York by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the death of Osama Bin Laden

New York, 2 May 2011, A 170/11

Here in New York, it is impossible not to be reminded of the murderous legacy of Osama Bin Laden. He and the Al Qaeda network have been responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent people across the world, including the Arab world.

The special operation carried out last night in Pakistan directed at Osama Bin Laden's hideout represents a major blow against both Al Qaeda and terrorist activities worldwide. We need to remain vigilant in our efforts to completely disable the Al Qaeda network, as the threat of retaliatory action remains serious.

I would like to congratulate the US, pay tribute to its determination and efficiency in reducing the threat posed by terrorists and underline the close cooperation between the EU and US in the fight against terrorism.

I would like to emphasize that Pakistan is an important partner of the European Union and that Pakistan's role for security and stability is crucial to the region as a whole.

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Syria

PRESS RELEASE, 3142nd Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 23 January 2012, 5592/12

The Council discussed the situation in Syria and adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The European Union remains deeply concerned about the deteriorating situation in Syria and the widespread and systematic violations of human rights and calls again for an immediate end to the violence. The EU is particularly concerned by the recent escalation of violence and reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of the brutal crackdown by the Syrian government which risks exacerbating even further the spiral of violence, sectarian clashes and militarization. President Assad must step aside immediately to allow for a peaceful and democratic transition.

2. The EU strongly condemns the bombs attacks in Damascus on 23 December 2011 and on 6 January 2012 causing scores of deaths and injuries. Any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation and by who-soever committed. The EU also condemns the attack on 11 January that killed a French journalist and several Syrian civilians, injuring many more people, including a Dutch journalist. The EU calls for light to be shed on this attack. The Syrian authorities have a responsibility to guarantee the safety of journalists in their country. The press must be allowed to carry out its vital role of providing independent information on the events in Syria without fear of violence or repression.

3. The EU welcomes the League of Arab States' resolution of 22 January and its initiative to seek UNSC support for a political solution. The EU is deeply concerned by the Syrian authorities' lack of cooperation and urges them to fully comply with the League of Arab States' Action Plan and their commitments undertaken in that respect, to completely stop acts of violence against civilians, free political detainees, remove troops, tanks and weapons from cities, and allow independent observers and the media, to freely travel in and report on Syria.

4. The EU recalls its support to the League of Arab States' efforts to end the cycle of violence in Syria, and to the deployment of its monitoring mission, including

through the setting up of the LAS situation room. The EU welcomes the UN readiness to provide training and assistance to the League's monitors and encourages the League to accept UN assistance to ensure technical support for the mission.

5. The EU welcomes the League of Arab States' decision to extend its observation mission and to reinforce its capacity to report independently on the situation in Syria. The EU takes note of the League of Arab States' decision to appoint a Special Envoy for Syria.

6. The EU condemns in the strongest terms the attacks on the League of Arab States' mission monitors and calls for an impartial and swift investigation into the events. The mission must be able to act safely and with independence and to access all detention facilities.

7. Given the Syrian regime's continued use of violence against civilians, the EU has today designated further 22 individuals and 8 entities to be subject to restrictive measures. The EU will continue its policy of imposing additional measures against the regime, not to the civilian population, as long as repression continues. Following the assessment of EU Member States, the listing of designated persons who have dissociated themselves from the repressive policy of the regime will be reconsidered. The EU calls on the international community to join its efforts to target those responsible for or associated with the violent repression and those who support or benefit from the regime.

8. The EU reiterates its strong support to the Syrian people and encourages the Syrian opposition to make all efforts to strengthen coordination on the way forward in order to realise an orderly transition to a Syria that is democratic, stable, inclusive and that guarantees minority rights. It supports the efforts of the League of Arab States in this respect. The EU will continue to engage with representative members of the Syrian opposition, such as the SNC, which adhere to non violence, inclusiveness and democratic values.

9. The EU reiterates its strong concerns about the deteriorating living conditions of the Syrian people in a great number of localities affected by the unrest. The Syrian authorities must immediately alleviate the suffering of the population living in these areas, respect and protect the wounded and sick, guarantee unhindered access to medical care without any discrimination or reprisal and refrain from intimidation of those providing medical assistance. The Syrian authorities must allow full and unimpeded access of relief personnel from international humanitarian

organisations for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance.

10. The EU urges all members of the UN Security Council to uphold their responsibilities to end the violence against the Syrian population and support the Syrian people in their desire for freedom and political rights. The EU welcomes the establishment by the UN Human Rights Council of a Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Syria and urges the Syrian Government to fully cooperate with the Rapporteur. The EU recalls the main findings of the report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry which stated that crimes against humanity may have been committed in the country. The EU looks forward to the next debate of the UN Human Rights Council on Syria on the 12 March 2012.'

In response to the continuing human rights violations, the Council reinforced the EU's restrictive measures against the Syrian regime.

Council tightens restrictive measures on Syria

Brussels, 23 January 2012, 5537/12

In response to the unacceptable repression by the Syrian regime on the Syrian people, the Council today reinforced the EU's restrictive measures against those responsible for the human rights violations.

The Council added 22 persons responsible for human rights violations and eight entities financially supporting the regime to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and a ban from entering the EU.

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton said: *'Today's decision will put further pressure on those who are responsible for the unacceptable violence and repression in Syria. The message from the European Union is clear: the crackdown must stop immediately. We will continue to do all we can to help the Syrian people achieve their legitimate political rights.'*

This brings the total number of entities targeted by an asset freeze to 38 and the number of people subject to an asset freeze and a visa ban to 108. In response to the widespread human rights violations, the EU has gradually imposed a comprehensive set of restrictive measures on Syria, including an arms embargo, a ban on the import of Syrian crude oil and on new investment in the Syrian petrol sector.

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton following the veto of the UNSC Resolution on Syria

Brussels, 4 February 2012, A 44/12

We deeply regret that due to the renewed veto of the Russian Federation and China the Security Council was unable to support the call of the League of Arab States for an inclusive, Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence. The EU continues to support all efforts of the League of Arab States and calls once more on all members of the UNSC to assume their responsibilities. The time has come to speak with one voice and demand an end to the bloodshed and speak out for a democratic future for Syria. We condemn the ongoing bloodshed and stand by the Syrian people against the repressive regime. We call on President Assad to end immediately the killing of civilians, withdraw the Syrian army from besieged towns and cities and step aside in order to make room for a peaceful transition for the sake of his country.

PRESS RELEASE, 3157th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2012, 7849/12

Syria

The Council discussed the latest developments in Syria and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The European Union is increasingly appalled by the unfolding situation in Syria and recalls the European Council conclusions on Syria of 1 and 2 March 2012. The EU strongly condemns the continued brutal attacks and systematic human rights violations by the Syrian regime, including the use of heavy weaponry in civilian areas, which risk exacerbating further the spiral of violence, sectarian clashes and militarisation, and endanger the stability of the region. President Assad must step aside to allow for a peaceful and democratic transition. The EU also condemns recent bomb attacks in Damascus and Aleppo causing scores of death and injuries. Acts of terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances.

2. The European Union reiterates its deepest concerns at the increasingly worsening humanitarian plight of the Syrian civilian population as a result of continuous and widespread violence. The Syrian authorities must grant immediate, unimpeded

and full access of humanitarian organisations to all areas of Syria in order to allow them to deliver humanitarian assistance and medical care. In this regard, the EU welcomes the recent visit of USG Valerie Amos to Syria and her efforts to agree a clear framework of humanitarian access with the Syrian authorities and takes note of the start of the preliminary humanitarian assessment in Syria. It also welcomes the outcomes of the Syria Humanitarian Forum, held in Geneva on 8 March, as well as the UN Security Council statement of 1 March 2012, deploring the humanitarian situation in Syria. It fully supports measures aimed at ensuring a coordinated, rapid and effective humanitarian response of the international community. In the light of growing needs, the EU and Member States have increased their financial support to humanitarian organisations and will continue to mobilise the necessary assistance. The EU is greatly concerned by reports of anti-personnel land mines being laid along the Syrian borders aiming to prevent Syrians from fleeing.

3. The EU welcomes the recent visit to Damascus of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States Kofi Annan and urges the Syrian authorities to cooperate fully with him. The EU recalls its full support for his mission and his efforts to stop violence and facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive dialogue leading to a political solution that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people on the basis of the UN General Assembly resolution of 16 February 2012 and League of Arab States resolutions, in particular those of 22 January, 12 February and 10 March 2012.

4. The EU reiterates its call for the UN Security Council to agree urgently on a resolution on Syria in order to obtain the cessation of violence, immediate and unhindered humanitarian access and leading to a political process in response to the aspirations of the Syrian people. It calls on all members of the Security Council, particularly Russia and China, to work together in an effort to stop the violence and to support fully the implementation of the League of Arab States resolutions. The EU welcomes the UNSC Presidential Statement of 21 March expressing its gravest concern at the deteriorating situation in Syria and full support to the efforts of the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the LAS, Kofi Annan.

5. The EU welcomes the outcome of the debate of the UN Human Rights Council on Syria on 12 March 2012 and the adoption of the HRC resolution on 23 March 2012 on the human rights situation in the country and the extension of the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry. There must be a full investigation of the findings of the Commission of Inquiry which pointed to crimes against humanity and other gross violations of human rights committed in the

country. The EU reaffirms that there should be no impunity for the perpetrators of such alleged crimes.

6. The European Union supports the Syrian opposition in its struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy for the Syrian people. The EU stands ready to step up its engagement with all representative members of Syrian opposition which adhere to non violence, inclusiveness and democratic values as they make progress to form a broad and inclusive platform. The Syrian National Council, recognised by the EU as a legitimate representative of Syrians, and other representatives of the opposition must unite now in the peaceful struggle for a new Syria that is democratic, pluralistic, stable and guarantees human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and where all citizens enjoy equal rights regardless of their affiliations, ethnicity, belief or gender. To this end, the EU urges all representative members of the opposition to set up an inclusive coordination mechanism under the auspices of the League of Arab States and to agree on a set of shared principles for working towards an orderly and peaceful transition .

7. Given the Syrian regime's continued use of violence against civilians, the EU approved today further designations of persons and entities to be subject to restrictive measures. The EU will continue its policy of imposing additional measures targeting the regime, not the civilian population, as long as repression continues. The EU will also continue to urge the international community to join its efforts, in taking steps to apply and enforce restrictive measures and sanctions on the Syrian regime and its supporters. It calls on all Syrians to disassociate themselves from the repressive policy of the regime in order to facilitate a political transition.

8. As soon as a genuine democratic transition begins, the EU is ready to develop a new and ambitious partnership with Syria across all areas of mutual interest, including by mobilising assistance, strengthening trade and economic relations and supporting transitional justice and the political transition.'

Given the Syrian regime's continued use of violence against civilians, the Council reinforced EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime.

PRESS RELEASE, 3159th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 23 April 2012, 8772/12

The Council took stock of developments in Syria. It adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The EU welcomes the unanimous adoption of the UNSC resolution 2042 on 14 April authorising the immediate deployment of an advance team of up to 30 unarmed military observers and of the UNSC resolution 2043 on 21 April establishing the full UN supervision mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with an initial deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers as well as an appropriate civilian component, to monitor a cessation of armed violence and to monitor and support all aspects of the joint UN-League of Arab States Special Envoy Kofi Annan's six point proposal. The EU calls for an immediate and full implementation of the UNSC resolutions. It also calls on all the Members of the UN Security Council to continue to support Kofi Annan in his efforts and ensure that the fully-fledged UN observation mission in Syria is deployed expeditiously and operationalised without delay. It is crucial that UNSC Members use all their influence to ensure that the UNSC resolutions are fully implemented.

The EU strongly urges the Syrian government to allow the effective operation and deployment of the mission and its advance team and allow full freedom of movement, access and communication including agreement on the use of air assets. The EU and its Member States are ready to provide support that might be requested to guarantee the success of the observer mission.

2. The EU reaffirms its full support to the Joint UN-League of Arab States Special Envoy Kofi Annan's mission and his six point Plan. A complete cessation of violence is an essential step in the full implementation of this Plan. The EU recalls its full support for the Special Envoy's efforts to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive dialogue leading to a political solution that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people on the basis of the UN General Assembly resolution of 16 February 2012 and League of Arab States resolutions, in particular those of 22 January, 12 February and 10 March 2012.

3. Recalling its previous Council conclusions on Syria, the European Union remains deeply concerned about the fragility of the situation in Syria with reports of the use of heavy weaponry in civilian areas. The EU urges the Syrian government to imple-

ment its commitments in their entirety and to show a visible and verifiable sign of change by withdrawing all troops and heavy weapons from population centres to their barracks to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence. The EU strongly condemns the systematic and widespread violations of human rights by the regime. It recalls that all those responsible for human rights violations should be held accountable. It calls upon all parties in Syria to cease immediately violence in all its forms.

4. The European Union reiterates its concerns about the humanitarian plight of the Syrian civilian population. The Syrian authorities must grant immediate, unimpeded and full access of humanitarian organisations to all areas of Syria in order to allow them to deliver humanitarian assistance including medical care. The EU calls on all parties to cooperate fully with the UN and relevant humanitarian organisations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. The EU welcomes the efforts made by neighbouring countries to host Syrian refugees who fled violence in Syria. The European Union and its Member States will continue to assist in providing them with dignified living conditions. The EU also welcomes the outcome of the Syria Humanitarian Forum, held in Geneva on 20 April, calling for increased access and scaling up of humanitarian capacities to meet the identified humanitarian needs.

5. The European Union remains committed to the Syrian opposition's struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy for the Syrian people. It reconfirms its engagement with the Syrian opposition seeking non violent, democratic and inclusive change. The EU welcomes efforts by the Syrian National Council (SNC) and other opposition groups to articulate a common vision for the foundations of a new Syria. The EU calls on the SNC and other opposition groups to continue to support fully the Annan Peace Plan, and to put in place an all-embracing opposition platform under the auspices of the Arab League to advance their common vision for working towards an inclusive, orderly and peaceful transition in Syria.

6. The EU approved today further sanctions, imposing restrictive measures on export of further goods and technology which may be used for repression and banning the export to Syria of luxury goods. The EU will continue its policy of imposing additional measures targeting the regime, not the civilian population, as long as repression continues. The EU will also continue to urge the international community to join its efforts, in taking steps to apply and enforce restrictive measures and sanctions on the Syrian regime and its supporters. In this context, the EU welcomes the first meeting of the international working group on sanctions which was held in Paris on 17 April.

It calls on all Syrians to dissociate themselves from the repressive policy of the regime in order to facilitate a political transition.

7. As soon as a genuine democratic transition begins, the EU is ready to develop a new and ambitious partnership with Syria across all areas of mutual interest, including by mobilising assistance, strengthening trade and economic relations and supporting transitional justice and the political transition.'

In view of the gravity of the situation in Syria, the Council reinforced once more EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime.

PRESS RELEASE, 3166th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 14 May 2012, 9110/12

The Council adopted the following conclusions on Syria:

1. 'The EU reiterates its call on the Syrian authorities to fully and immediately comply with the Joint UN-League of Arab States Special Envoy Kofi Annan's plan as endorsed by UNSC resolutions 2042 and 2043 and abide by all their commitments to the UN. The EU recalls that the main responsibility for the ceasefire and the successful implementation of the plan lies with the Syrian authorities. The Syrian government must ensure without delay the necessary conditions for an effective operation and full and fast deployment of the UN observation mission, including full freedom of movement and agreement on the use of air assets. It must fully withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from population centres. The EU is deeply concerned about the continued violence in Syria, including the recent deadly bomb attacks, notably the ones in Damascus on 10 May. Acts of terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances.

2. The EU underlines that a complete cessation of violence by all parties is an essential step in the full implementation of Kofi Annan's Plan, whose crucial goal is to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive dialogue leading to a political solution that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly and League of Arab States.

3. The EU recalls its full support to Kofi Annan's six point plan, welcomes the progress to date to deploy members of the UN supervision mission to Syria (UN-

SMIS) and urges continued prompt deployment of the full mission. It recalls that the Syrian authorities are responsible for ensuring the security and safety of the mission. The EU and its Member States are providing support to the mission, as requested by the UN. The EU calls on all States concerned, and in particular the Members of the UN Security Council, to continue to support Kofi Annan and use all their influence to ensure that the UNSC resolutions 2042 and 2043 are fully implemented. The EU underlines that the six-point plan is not an open-ended offer and that the plan and the deployment of UNSMIS constitute the best opportunity to support a peaceful solution to the crisis. It recalls that the UNSC remains seized of the matter.

4. The EU remains extremely concerned by the human rights situation in Syria, in particular the systematic and widespread human rights violations committed by the regime. It condemns the Syrian government's increased use of targeted assassinations and arbitrary detentions as a means of repressing all opposition. The Syrian regime must immediately release all political prisoners and human rights defenders, and ensure freedom to demonstrate peacefully. The EU recalls that all those responsible for human rights violations should be held accountable.

5. The EU calls on all sides to respect the safety of humanitarian workers and deplores the death of two humanitarian workers killed on 24 and 26 April. The EU reiterates its call on the Syrian authorities to grant immediate, unimpeded and full access of humanitarian organisations to all areas of Syria in order to provide relief to the one million people identified as in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN Humanitarian Response Plan needs to be implemented immediately and humanitarian capacities in the country strengthened. The EU continues to support the efforts made by neighbouring countries to host Syrian refugees who fled violence in Syria.

6. The European Union remains committed to the Syrian people's struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy. The EU urges all opposition groups to continue to support Kofi Annan's efforts and to be ready to provide leadership and engage in a national political process as foreseen in the six point plan endorsed by UNSC. The Syrian National Council and other opposition groups must pursue their efforts to put aside their differences and to agree on a set of shared principles and mechanism under the auspices of the League of Arab States for working towards an inclusive, orderly and peaceful transition in Syria.

7. The EU approved today further designations of individuals and entities to be subject to restrictive measures. The EU will continue its sanctions policy targeting the regime, not the civilian population, as long as repression continues. The EU will also continue to urge the international community to join its efforts, in taking steps to apply and enforce restrictive measures on the Syrian regime and its supporters. It calls on all Syrians to dissociate themselves from the repressive policy of the regime in order to facilitate a political transition.’

In view of the gravity of the situation in Syria, the Council once more reinforced restrictive measures against the Syrian regime.

PRESS RELEASE, 3179th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, 11688/12

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. ‘The European Union strongly condemns the brutal violence and massacres of civilians, many of them children and women, such as in the town of Houla on 26 May, and in the villages of Qubair and Maarzaf in Hama province on 6 June. It is also appalled by reports on the use of children as human shields. The EU welcomes the UN Human Rights Council resolution adopted on 1 June, condemning the deteriorating human rights situation in Syria and the horrific killings in Houla. It urges the Syrian regime to end immediately the killing of civilians, withdraw the Syrian army from besieged towns and cities and to allow for a peaceful transition for the sake of the country. President Assad has no place in the future of Syria. The EU looks forward to the outcome of the investigation by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria into the massacre in Houla. The EU urges the Syrian authorities to fully and immediately cooperate with the Commission. The EU recalls that all those responsible for widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations must be held accountable.

2. The EU recalls its full support to Joint UN- League of Arab States Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s mission and his six-point plan. It welcomes the full deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), but regrets that the escalation of violence led to the suspension of UNSMIS observation activities on 16 June. It recalls that the Syrian authorities are responsible for ensuring the security and safety of the mission and for facilitating the resumption of the unobstructed work of the mission. It strongly condemns the attacks against UN monitors.

3. The EU condemns all actions aimed at obstructing the implementation of Annan's six point plan. It reiterates that the main responsibility for the ceasefire and the implementation of the plan lies with the Syrian authorities. The EU warns against further militarisation of the conflict and sectarian violence which will bring enormous suffering to Syria and risks having a tragic impact on the region. The EU calls on all parties to refrain from using violence and in particular on the regime to fully implement the Annan plan. The EU recalls that the six-point plan is not an open-ended offer.

The European Union condemns the unacceptable shooting down by Syria of a Turkish military plane on 22 June. It offers its sympathies to the families of the airmen involved, and commends Turkey's measured and responsible initial reaction. The European Union notes that this is a matter which needs to be investigated thoroughly and urgently. It calls on Syria to cooperate fully with Turkey and allow full access for an immediate investigation, and for the international community to give its support to such efforts. The European Union urges Syria to ensure that it complies by international standards and obligations.

4. The EU calls on all the States concerned, and in particular the Members of the UN Security Council, to continue to support Kofi Annan and use all their influence to ensure that UNSC resolutions 2042 and 2043 are fully implemented. The EU calls for united action by the UNSC to add more robust and effective pressure, including the adoption of comprehensive sanctions under Chapter VII. In this respect, it welcomes Annan's efforts to work with key international partners exercising a positive influence in the region to move the political process forward. The EU takes note of the discussion on Syria during the EU-Russia Summit on 3-4 June and reiterates the importance of Russia's engagement in support of a peaceful political process which must lead to a democratic transition.

The EU looks forward to the next meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People Group that will be held in Paris on 6 July to maintain international pressure on the Syrian regime and support Annan's six- point plan.

5. The European Union remains committed to the Syrian people's struggle for freedom, dignity, democracy and human rights. The EU continues to urge the Syrian National Council and other opposition groups to put aside their differences and to agree on a set of shared principles and start working towards an inclusive, orderly and peaceful transition in Syria. A stronger and more united opposition that repre-

sents a credible alternative for all Syrians is essential. The EU calls on all opposition groups to actively and fully support the implementation of the Annan plan.

6. The EU welcomes the outcome of the third Syria Humanitarian Forum held on 5 June. The EU calls on the Syrian authorities to fully cooperate and ensure the rapid implementation of the humanitarian response plan, including immediately allowing full unhindered and safe access to humanitarian workers and delivery of humanitarian aid. The EU fully supports the humanitarian initiative to urgently evacuate non-combatants and the wounded from Homs and calls on all parties to allow the evacuation of children, women, elderly and injured from conflict zones. The EU will continue to support the efforts made by neighbouring countries to host Syrian refugees who fled violence in Syria.

7. The EU approved today the designation of new persons and entities to be subject to restrictive measures. The EU will continue its policy of imposing additional measures targeting the regime, not the civilian population, as long as repression continues. The EU will also continue to urge the international community to join its efforts, in taking steps to apply and enforce restrictive measures on the Syrian regime and its supporters. In this context, the EU welcomes the second meeting of the International Working Group on Sanctions which was held in Washington on 6 June. It calls on all Syrians to dissociate themselves from the repressive policy of the regime in order to facilitate a political transition.’

In response to the escalating violence in Syria, the Council once more reinforced EU sanctions against the Syrian regime once more.

Council conclusions on Syria, 3191st FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Luxembourg, 15 October 2012

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The European Union stands by the Syrian people in its courageous struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy. The use of force by the Syrian regime against civilians, including by heavy weapons and aerial bombardments, has reached unprecedented levels and can only exacerbate further the violence and endanger the stability of the whole region. The EU recalls that the priorities should be to end oppression,

stop all violence, deliver humanitarian aid for all those in need, prevent further regional instability and be prepared for the post-conflict period.

The EU underlines that those whose presence would undermine the political transition should be excluded and that President Assad, in this regard, has no place in the future of Syria.

The EU remains committed to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria.

2. The European Union remains deeply concerned by the spill-over effects of the Syrian crisis in neighbouring countries in terms of security and stability. The EU strongly condemns the shelling by Syrian forces of the Turkish territory, particularly on the border town of Akçakale on 3 October. The EU calls on all to prevent escalation. The EU calls again on the Syrian authorities to fully respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all neighbouring countries.

3. Recalling that the main responsibility for the current crisis lies with the Syrian authorities, the EU warns against further militarisation and radicalisation of the conflict and sectarian violence which can only bring further suffering to Syria and risks having a tragic impact in the region. In this regard, the EU expresses concern about the protection of civilians, in particular vulnerable groups and religious communities. The intensification of violence and the recent series of terrorist attacks demonstrate the urgent need for a political transition that would meet the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people and bring stability in Syria. In this regard, the EU is deeply concerned about the increasing influx of weapons into Syria and calls on all States to refrain from delivering arms to the country.

The continuation and escalation of the crisis in Syria poses a threat to the wider regional stability.

4. The EU reiterates its full support for the endeavours of Lakhdar Brahimi as Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States for Syria and stands ready to strengthen its cooperation with him. The EU emphasises the need to focus international and regional efforts to solve the Syrian crisis through a political solution and calls on key actors in the region and all members of the UN Security Council to uphold their responsibilities and support Brahimi's efforts.

The EU looks forward to the next meeting of the Friends of Syrian People Group to be held in Morocco to maintain international pressure on the Syrian regime.

5. In view of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation and of the approaching winter, the EU recalls the moral imperative to step up assistance to all affected populations throughout Syria and neighbouring countries. The European Union expresses solidarity with the affected populations and neighbouring countries that have welcomed the refugees. The EU will continue to provide assistance and calls on all donors to increase their contributions to the latest UN appeals for funding humanitarian assistance and refugee assistance. The European Union urges donors to report their assistance and coordinate with the United Nations (OCHA) in order to maximise the effectiveness of the aid effort. All parties should allow full and safe access for the delivery of humanitarian aid in all parts of the country, and respect international humanitarian law. The European Union urges all parties to the conflict to respect in full their legal and moral obligations to protect civilians.

Particularly alarmed by the dramatic and growing difficulties in the access in Syria to medical services, the EU urges all parties to commit themselves to respect in full the inviolability of all medical facilities, medical personnel and vehicles in respect of applicable international humanitarian law.

6. The EU is appalled by the deterioration of the situation in Syria and in particular by the widespread and systematic violations of human rights, international humanitarian law and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities. In line with the UN Human Rights Council resolution on Syria adopted on 28 September, the EU calls upon all parties to put an end to all forms of violence and to take special measures to protect vulnerable groups such as children, as well as women and girls subject to gender based violence.

The EU welcomes the extension of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and its strengthening through the nomination of two new members, Carla del Ponte and Viti Muntarbhorn. The EU reaffirms its support to the Commission's investigations into alleged violations of international human rights law with a view to hold to account those responsible for such violations, including for those that may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes according to the definition of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The EU underlines the importance of documentation of the widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations and recalls that all those responsible must be held accountable. The EU reiterates its call to the Syrian authorities to cooperate fully with the Commission of Inquiry including by granting it full, immediate and unfettered access to the whole Syrian territory.

7. The EU recalls that an inclusive and coordinated opposition is essential to start a political transition. The EU continues to urge all opposition groups, inside and outside Syria, to put aside their differences and to agree on a set of shared principles and start working towards an inclusive, orderly and peaceful transition in Syria and to build upon the agreement on the “National Pact” and on a “Common Political Vision for transition in Syria”. The EU will continue to work closely with the League of Arab States and facilitate further dialogue initiatives to complement its efforts to encourage the opposition towards forming an inclusive common platform. All Syrians must have a place in the new Syria and enjoy equal rights, regardless of their origin, affiliations, religion, beliefs or gender.

8. The EU commits to strengthening its support in building the capacity of civil society to participate in a future Syria, in line with the legitimate demands of the Syrian people for a more free, open and inclusive political system involving all Syrians. In this context, the EU also acknowledges the importance of the work of the local civilian bodies throughout Syria.

9. The EU approved today additional restrictive measures against Syria. The EU stands ready to engage with those seriously committed to a genuine democratic transition. The EU will continue its policy of imposing additional measures targeting the regime, not the civilian population, as long as repression continues. The EU will also continue to urge the international community to join its efforts, in taking steps to apply and enforce restrictive measures on the Syrian regime and its supporters. In this context, the EU welcomes the fourth meeting of the International Group on Sanctions which was held in The Hague on 20 September. It calls on all Syrians to dissociate themselves from the repressive policy of the regime in order to facilitate a political transition.

10. The EU commits to working closely and comprehensively with international partners on planning to ensure the international community is ready to provide rapid support to Syria once transition takes place. In this respect, the EU underlines the importance of the establishment of a transitional body. The EU welcomes the second meeting of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of the Syrian People which was held in Berlin on 4 September 2012.

The EU expresses concern about the destruction of Syrian cultural heritage.

As soon as a genuine democratic transition begins, the EU stands ready to develop a new and ambitious partnership with Syria across all areas of mutual interest, in-

cluding by contributing to a post-conflict needs assessment, mobilizing assistance, institution building, strengthening trade and economic relations and supporting transitional justice and the political transition.

11. Issues related to pressure created on the EU external borders will be addressed by the next Justice and Home Affairs Council'.

Given the intensifying violence in Syria, the Council reinforced EU sanctions against the Syrian regime.

Mali

PRESS RELEASE, 3157th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2012, 7849/12

Sahel

The Council took stock of the implementation of the EU strategy for security and development in the Sahel region and discussed the challenges for the region.

It adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. One year after the presentation of an EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and in the context of the turbulent events in the wider region coinciding with a new food crisis, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to contribute to the development of a peaceful, stable and prosperous Sahel region.

2. The Council firmly condemned attempts to seize power by force in Mali. It called for an immediate end of violence and the release of State officials, the protection of civilians, the restoration of civil, constitutional government and for the holding of democratic elections as planned. The EU will work closely with the African Union and ECOWAS. The Council invited the Commission to take precautionary measures in the implementation of EU development cooperation as the situation warrants. The Council underlined that direct support to the population will continue as well as humanitarian aid.

3. Underlining the importance of respect for the territorial integrity of Mali, the Council repeated its call for an immediate ceasefire in northern Mali and for an inclusive dialogue which the EU stands ready to support.

4. The Council expressed deep concern about the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel region. It underlined its determination to support Sahel countries, in partnership with regional organisations and other international partners, in their efforts to fight against the interlinked challenges of poverty, terrorism, violent extremism and organised crime and to address spill-over effects of the recent crisis in Libya. In this context, the Council welcomed progress over the last 12 months in the implementation of the Strategy and the coordinated use of all EU instruments in

the fields of development, governance, rule of law, migration and security to support the socio-economic development of Mali, Mauritania and Niger and to strengthen their capacities to deal with the scourges of terrorism and organised crime, including the trafficking of drugs and human beings.

5. The Council encouraged the strengthening of ongoing regional cooperation to accompany national strategies to promote the stability and development of the countries concerned. In this context, the Council welcomed the increased engagement of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations in support of regionally-owned processes and stressed the need to continue close consultation with regional organisations including the AU and ECOWAS.

6. In recognition of the particular security challenges faced by the States in the region, the Council approved the Crisis Management Concept for a civilian CSDP Advisory, Assistance and Training mission in Sahel, with an operational focus in Niger, to support Gendarmerie, Police Nationale and Garde Nationale to enhance their level of interoperability and law enforcement capacity, in particular to fight terrorism and organised crime while fully respecting Rule of Law and Human Rights. It underlined the need for taking forward operational planning without delay, with a view to deploy the mission by the end of summer 2012.

7. The fragile security of the region has been further exacerbated both by a deepening food and nutrition crisis affecting 15 million people and the humanitarian consequences of the conflict in northern Mali and the resulting high numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees whose safety and access to humanitarian assistance should be ensured. The EU has provided early humanitarian assistance for an amount of 123.5 million Euros and together with Member States will continue to provide such assistance to respond to the urgent needs of the most affected populations in the Sahel countries and the wider region. To this effect, an additional amount of 9 million Euros is being mobilised to provide emergency assistance to people affected by the conflict in northern Mali.

8. National ownership, regional solidarity, flexible funding, donor coordination and strengthened dialogue between humanitarian and development actors are essential

to overcome the long-standing chronic food and malnutrition problems in the region and to build resilience. Building on national initiatives the EU is committed to stepping up its support to the countries in the region in their efforts to avert this type of crisis in the future and to achieve sustainable food and nutrition security. In this context, the EU plans to allocate an additional 164.5 million Euros to reinforce and complement existing development actions on food security in the region.

9. The Council invited the High Representative and the European Commission to accelerate implementation of the Sahel Strategy and to report regularly on progress.’

The Council also approved the crisis management concept for a possible civilian CSDP mission to improve capacities to fight terrorism and organised crime in the Sahel region, initially focussing on Niger. The mission would advise the authorities on detailed plans to implement the Nigerien security strategy and provide specialised training for all relevant security actors of Niger. The adoption of the crisis management concept launches operational planning for the mission.

Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the coup d'état in Mali

Brussels, 22 March 2012, A 142/12

I condemn the apparent coup d'état in Bamako and the suspension of the republican institutions of Mali. I call for the reestablishment of the constitutional order and the holding of democratic elections as soon as possible. I reaffirm the commitment of the European Union to democratic principles, rule of law, and military subordination to the civil power.

In this crucial period for Mali, marked by a rebellion in the North, I call on all parties to show responsibility to ensure respect for human life, fundamental freedoms and the integrity of the country.

PRESS RELEASE, 3159th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 23 April 2012, 8772/12

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The Council recalls its conclusions of 22-23 March 2012 on Sahel firmly condemning the seizure of power by force in Mali and calling for an immediate end to violence, the protection of civilians and the restoration of civil, constitutional government.
2. The Council stands firmly behind the efforts of ECOWAS and the countries of the region to restore constitutional order in Mali and supports the continued engagement of President Ouattara in his capacity as President of ECOWAS and President Compaoré as mediator. In this context, it welcomes the signature of a Framework Agreement on 6 April 2012 for the restoration of constitutional order and urges all Malian stakeholders to ensure its timely implementation.
3. As the first steps towards the restoration of legitimate civilian administration, the Council is encouraged by the inauguration of Dioncounda Traoré as interim President, the appointment of Cheick Modibo Diarra as interim Prime Minister and the release of detained Ministers. The Council expects the rule of law to be respected and that extra-judicial arrests will cease.
4. The EU will monitor closely progress in the transition process in Mali. It stands ready to provide support to the civilian-led transition, including an electoral process involving all the people of Mali, in close cooperation with ECOWAS, the African Union and other international partners. EU development cooperation currently on hold will be resumed in line with progress towards the full restoration of constitutional order. In the meantime, ongoing direct support to the population will continue as well as humanitarian aid.
5. The Council supports the commitment of the interim President, ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations and the international community to preserve the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. It repeats its call for an immediate end to violence and to abuses of human rights in the north of the country. It urges all rebel groups to seek a peaceful solution through a political process that respects the territorial integrity of Mali.

6. The Council is deeply concerned by the growth of Al Qa'ida and close affiliates' presence in the north of Mali and the increased terrorist threat that it implies. It condemns all terrorist activities.

7. The Council is alarmed by the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Mali and the wider Sahel region due to serious food shortages. Exacerbated by insecurity and the lack of access for humanitarian aid, the situation of the civilian population in the north of the country gives rise to particular concern of the risk of a major humanitarian disaster. The Council is gravely concerned by reports that significant numbers of people are being forced to flee the north in circumstances involving frequent violations of human rights. It calls on all parties to fully respect international humanitarian law and human rights and to allow immediate, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid and international humanitarian workers. The Council commends neighbouring states for their ongoing assistance in compliance with their obligations under international humanitarian law.

8. Recent developments in Mali and the broader security, development and humanitarian challenges in the region confirm the importance of security sector reform and accelerated implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel including the deployment of the proposed civilian CSDP mission to Niger by July 2012.'

Council conclusions on the situation in Mali, 3191st FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Luxembourg, 15 October 2012

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The European Union (EU) remains concerned about the serious political and security crisis affecting Mali, in particular the situation in the north of the country, marked by the emergence and consolidation of a haven for terrorists, the oppression of local populations, human rights violations, particularly against women, the destruction of cultural heritage and the development of organised crime. This situation poses an immediate threat to the Sahel region and those living there, who are already suffering from an acute food crisis, as well as to West and North Africa and to Europe.

2. The EU welcomes the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 2071 and the increasing international attention being focused on the Sahel and Mali, as also evidenced by the high-level meeting held in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 2012 and the development of a UN integrated strategy for the Sahel. It also welcomes the appointment of the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy and declares its intention to work closely with Romano Prodi. The EU calls for the mechanism for coordination with Mali's key partners to be extended in order to increase the effectiveness of support for the transition process on the political, security and economic fronts. To this end, the EU welcomes and stresses the importance of the meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group on Mali scheduled to be held in Bamako on 19 October 2012, at the initiative of the African Union (AU) and in consultation with the United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

3. The EU is determined to support Mali in restoring the rule of law and re-establishing a fully sovereign democratic government with authority throughout Malian territory, for the benefit of the whole population. The EU welcomes the formation by the President of the Republic of Mali of a new Government of National Unity, as well as the efforts to mobilise the international community, notably the AU and ECOWAS, made by these new authorities in their contacts with all partners, in particular the EU.

4. In accordance with the principles approved by ECOWAS and the Support and Follow-up Group co-chaired by the UN and AU, and by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2056 and 2071, the EU calls on the Government of National Unity to draw up a consensual road map as soon as possible, in consultation with all the political and civil society groups, to fully restore constitutional order and national unity. In particular this road map should allow the organisation of a democratic and credible electoral process, the prompt start of an inclusive national dialogue, including representatives of the northern populations, to prepare the re-establishment of the authority of the State in the north as peacefully as possible, and the reorganisation of the army under civilian control.

5. The EU reaffirms its commitment to contribute to the efforts being made by Mali to resolve this crisis, in cooperation with its regional and international partners, and accordingly to fully mobilise all its instruments within the framework of the EU strategy for security and development in the Sahel. Further to this:

- As soon as a credible road map has been adopted, the EU will gradually resume its development cooperation in the light of tangible progress. In the interim period, the EU will continue its operations to assist local populations and the democratic transition.
- The EU is prepared to support an inclusive national dialogue within Mali, aimed at the restoration of the rule of law in northern Mali, and to contribute to the stabilisation and reconstruction measures that such a dialogue would help give direction to.
- The EU and its Member States pledge to pursue their humanitarian efforts and will continue to monitor closely developments in the humanitarian situation in Mali and in neighbouring countries. The European Commission is prepared to significantly increase the amount of its aid in order to better meet the people's needs. The EU recalls the obligation to ensure that all humanitarian actors have free and unhindered access to vulnerable groups in the northern areas of the country.
- The Council invites the High Representative (HR) and the European Commission to examine other measures or additional actions which could help reduce the effects of the Mali crisis and its impact on neighbouring countries, and increase the resilience of vulnerable groups.
- The EU recalls the possibility of adopting, in close conjunction with ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, targeted sanctions against those involved in the armed groups in northern Mali and those hindering the return to constitutional order.
- In response to the request received from Mali and ECOWAS, the EU is convinced of the need for a rapid response to the security challenges and terrorist threat, within a framework to be defined by the United Nations Security Council. In this regard, the Council welcomes the HR's preliminary work on ways in which to provide possible support for rebuilding the Malian army's capacities, in line with the political objectives and action plan established by the international community and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071.
- The Council invites the HR and the European Commission to examine support for the involvement of regional partners, in particular the AU and ECOWAS, for example by providing rapid support in the field of planning. Subject to ECOWAS submitting a finalised concept, the Council invites the HR and the European Commission to examine the possibility of additional support, including financial support, such as mobilising the Peace Facility for Africa.
- The Council also requests that work on planning a possible CSDP military operation be pursued and extended as a matter of urgency, in particular by developing a crisis management concept relating to the reorganisation and training

of the Malian defence forces, taking account of the conditions necessary for the success of any such mission, which include the full support of the Malian authorities and the definition of an exit strategy. This planning should take place in close collaboration with the organisations, in particular the UN, AU and ECOWAS, States and actors concerned, in order to ensure that their respective actions complement each other. The Council invites the HR to develop the crisis management concept ahead of its meeting on 19 November, and to present her recommendations at that meeting.

- As part of a global approach, the Council calls for use to be made of potential synergies with other EU actions in the region, in particular the EUCAP SAHEL Niger mission and its regional focus.’

Iran

PRESS RELEASE, 3142nd Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 23 January 2012, 5592/12

The Council exchanged views on Iran and its nuclear programme.

It adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'Recalling the European Council conclusions of 9 December 2011 and the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 1 December, the Council reiterates its serious and deepening concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme and in particular over the findings on Iranian activities relating to the development of military nuclear technology, as reflected in the latest IAEA report. The recent start of operations of enrichment of uranium to a level of up to 20% in the deeply buried underground facility in Fordow near Qom further aggravates concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's acceleration of enrichment activities is in flagrant violation of six UNSC Resolutions and eleven IAEA Board resolutions and contributes to increasing tensions in the region. The Council calls upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, including in the context of the planned visit by its Deputy Director General for Safeguards.

2. Iran continues to refuse to comply with its international obligations and to fully co-operate with the IAEA to address the concerns on its nuclear programme, and instead continues to violate those obligations. In this context and in accordance with the Council conclusions of 1 December 2011, the Council has agreed additional restrictive measures in the energy sector, including a phased embargo of Iranian crude oil imports to the EU, in the financial sector, including against the Central Bank of Iran, in the transport sector as well as further export restrictions, notably on gold and on sensitive dual-use goods and technology, as well as additional designations of persons and entities, including several controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

3. The Council again reaffirms the longstanding commitment to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance with the dual-track approach. The Council stresses that the restrictive measures agreed today are aimed at affecting

the funding of Iran's nuclear programme by the Iranian regime and are not aimed at the Iranian people. The Iranian regime itself can act responsibly and bring all sanctions to an end.

4. The Council reaffirms that the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran's legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT. Supporting the ongoing efforts by the EU High Representative and reaffirming the importance of close co-operation with the E3+3, the Council urges Iran to reply positively to the offer for substantial negotiations, as set out in the High Representative's letter of 21 October 2011, by clearly demonstrating its readiness to engage in confidence building measures and, without preconditions, in meaningful talks to seriously address existing concerns on the nuclear issue.'

At the same time, the Council adopted a package of restrictive measures targeting the sources of finance for the Iranian nuclear programme.

Council conclusions on Iran, 3191st FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Luxembourg, 15 October 2012

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The Council reiterates its serious and deepening concerns over Iran's nuclear programme and the urgent need for Iran to comply with all its international obligations, including full implementation by Iran of UNSC and IAEA Board of Governors' Resolutions.

2. The Council condemns the continuing production of enriched uranium and expansion of Iran's enrichment capacity, including at the Fordow site, and continued heavy-water activities in breach of UNSC and IAEA Board of Governors' Resolutions, as reflected in the most recent IAEA report. The Council notes with particular con-

cern Iran's obstruction of the IAEA work towards the clarification of all outstanding issues, including with respect to the possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme. Therefore, the Council welcomes the adoption with overwhelming majority by the IAEA Board of Governors of its Resolution on 13 September 2012 deciding that Iran's cooperation was essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

3. Iran is acting in flagrant violation of its international obligations and continues to refuse to fully co-operate with the IAEA to address the concerns on its nuclear programme. In this context, and in coherence with previous European Council and Council conclusions, the Council has agreed additional restrictive measures in the financial, trade, energy and transport sectors, as well as additional designations, notably of entities active in the oil and gas industry. In particular, the Council has agreed to prohibit all transactions between European and Iranian banks, unless authorised in advance under strict conditions with exemptions for humanitarian needs. In addition, the Council has decided to strengthen the restrictive measures against the Central Bank of Iran. Further export restrictions have been imposed, notably for graphite, metals, software for industrial processes, as well as measures relating to the ship building industry.

4. The restrictive measures agreed today are aimed at affecting Iran's nuclear programme and revenues of the Iranian regime used to fund the programme and are not aimed at the Iranian people. The Iranian regime itself can act responsibly and bring these sanctions to an end. As long as it does not do so, the Council remains determined to increase, in close coordination with international partners, pressure on Iran in the context of the dual track approach.

5. The Council reaffirms the longstanding commitment of the European Union to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance with the dual track approach.

6. The Council reaffirms that the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement, which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran's legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT, and fully taking into account UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors' Resolutions. The Council welcomes the determination for a diplomatic solution expressed by E3+3 Foreign Ministers on 27 September in New York and fully endorses the efforts led by the High Representative on behalf of the

E3+3 in this regard. E3+3 have made a credible and substantial confidence building proposal for negotiations guided by the agreed principles of reciprocity and a step by step approach. The Council urges Iran to engage constructively, by focussing on reaching an agreement on concrete confidence building steps, negotiating seriously and addressing the concerns of the international community.’

Egypt

PRESS RELEASE, 3179th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, 11688/12

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The EU welcomes the peaceful conduct of Presidential elections and congratulates Mohammed Morsi on his election as President of Egypt. The EU congratulates the Egyptian people for this significant milestone in Egypt's democratic transition and historic moment for the people, the country and the region. The EU looks forward to working with President Morsi and welcomes his statement that he intends to form an inclusive government that governs on behalf of all the Egyptian people and reaches out to all political and social groups.
2. The EU reiterates its full support to Egypt's democratic transition and underlines the need for a full and swift hand-over to civilian authorities, and recalls previous commitments in this regard. The EU stresses the fundamental importance of the democratic process and institutions and separation of powers, as well as the duty to respect the rule of law and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion or belief. In this context, the EU recalls the important role of an active and independent civil society as a key component of any democratic society.
3. The EU is seriously concerned about recent developments, in particular the dissolution of the Parliament and the Constitutional Declaration by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of 17 June, which delay and hinder the transition and full handover to civilian rule.
4. The EU emphasises the importance of an inclusive and transparent drafting process of Egypt's new Constitution, which should reflect the aspirations of the Egyptian people for dignity and justice by ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and safeguard the democratic separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

5. The EU stresses that security and public order should be maintained with restraint and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. While the end of the State of Emergency on 31 May was an important step forward, the EU is concerned about the decree issued on 13 June granting the military broad powers of arrest and detention of civilians for a wide range of offenses.

6. The EU fully recognizes the serious social and economic challenges Egypt is facing and reiterates the EU's readiness to provide assistance, in close partnership with Egypt's new democratic authorities in coordination with the international community. In this context, the EU underlines the importance for Egypt to engage in the necessary social and economic reforms, to allow the effective use of available international assistance and to improve the business environment.

7. Egypt remains a key partner in the region. The EU stresses therefore the importance of Egypt's continued commitment to the goal of building stability, peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean and Middle East region.'

Middle East Peace Process

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on further escalation of violence in Israel and Gaza

Brussels, 16 November 2012, A 517/12

I am deeply concerned at the escalating violence in Israel and the Gaza Strip and deplore the loss of civilian lives on both sides. The rocket attacks by Hamas and other factions in Gaza which began this current crisis are totally unacceptable for any government and must stop. Israel has the right to protect its population from these kinds of attacks. I urge Israel to ensure that its response is proportionate.

I spoke with leaders in the region including PM Netanyahu and with the Egyptian President's office and Under Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. I stressed the need to prevent a further escalation and more loss of life. In my discussions I made the point that we must move forward in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict so that millions of people in the region can finally live in peace and security. I hope Egyptian PM Kandil in his visit to Gaza today will be able calm the situation.

Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, 3209th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Brussels, 10 December 2012

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. In light of recent developments and taking into account previous Council Conclusions, the European Union firmly believes that now is the time to take bold and concrete steps towards peace. The parties must engage in direct and substantial negotiations without pre-conditions in order to achieve a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ending all claims.

2. The European Union reaffirms its position that clear parameters outlining the basis for negotiations are key elements for a successful outcome. All parties must avoid acts which undermine confidence and the viability of a two-state solution. The European Union underlines the urgency of renewed, structured and substantial

peace efforts in 2013 and, towards this end, it is ready to work with the US and other international partners, including within the Quartet. There will be no sustainable peace until the Palestinians' aspirations for statehood and sovereignty and those of Israelis for security are fulfilled through a comprehensive negotiated peace based on the two-state solution. The European Union recalls that the Arab Peace Initiative provides regional support for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. The European Union will work with those who are willing to join in such a quest for peace, stability and prosperity.

3. The European Union is deeply dismayed by and strongly opposes Israeli plans to expand settlements in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, and in particular plans to develop the E1 area. The E1 plan, if implemented, would seriously undermine the prospects of a negotiated resolution of the conflict by jeopardizing the possibility of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state and of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states. It could also entail forced transfer of civilian population. In the light of its core objective of achieving the two-state solution, the EU will closely monitor the situation and its broader implications, and act accordingly. The European Union reiterates that settlements are illegal under international law and constitute an obstacle to peace.

4. Recalling its parameters for the resumption of negotiations between the parties, as set out in previous Council Conclusions, including in December 2009, December 2010 and May 2011, the European Union reiterates that it will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties. The European Union expresses its commitment to ensure that – in line with international law – all agreements between the State of Israel and the European Union must unequivocally and explicitly indicate their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, namely the Golan Heights, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Recalling its Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions adopted in May 2012, the European Union and its Member States reiterate their commitment to ensure continued, full and effective implementation of existing European Union legislation and bilateral arrangements applicable to settlement products.

5. The European Union calls on Israel to avoid any step undermining the financial situation of the Palestinian Authority. Any such action by Israel would undermine existing cooperation mechanisms between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and thus negatively affect the prospects of negotiations. Contractual obligations, notably under the Paris Protocol, regarding full, timely, predictable and transparent transfer of tax and custom revenues have to be respected.

6. On 29 November, the UN General Assembly voted in favour of resolution A/RES/67/19 on the granting of non-member observer State status in the United Nations to Palestine. The European Union calls on the Palestinian leadership to use constructively this new status and not to undertake steps which would deepen the lack of trust and lead further away from a negotiated solution.

7. The European Union welcomes the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Israel which followed several days of intense violence and commends the efforts of Egypt and all those who engaged in mediation. This tragic escalation of hostilities underlined very clearly the unsustainable nature of the status quo with regard to the situation in the Gaza Strip. Fully recognising Israel's legitimate security needs, the European Union reiterates its call for the immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from the Gaza Strip, the situation of which is unsustainable as long as it remains politically and economically separated from the West Bank. It is vital that all parts of the ceasefire agreement are implemented. The European Union is committed to facilitating the social and economic development of the Gaza Strip. Equally, the issue of illegal weapons' transfer into the Gaza Strip has to be effectively addressed as a matter of urgency. The European Union expresses its readiness to make use of its instruments in support of the parties' efforts, including the possible reactivation, in the appropriate way, of the EUBAM Rafah mission. The European Union underlines its readiness to explore further ways to address the situation in the Gaza Strip, including with concerned parties in the region, in line with UNSC Resolution 1860 (2009).

8. The European Union reiterates its call for intra-Palestinian reconciliation behind the strong leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, in line with the principles set out in his speech of 4 May 2011, as an important element for the unity of a future Palestinian state and for reaching a two-state solution.

9. The European Union reiterates its fundamental commitment to the security of Israel, including with regard to vital threats in the region. The European Union will never stop opposing those who embrace and promote violence as a way to achieve

political goals. The EU finds inflammatory statements by Hamas leaders that deny Israel's right to exist unacceptable. The European Union will never cease its efforts to combat terrorism which seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of societies through indiscriminate acts of violence against civilians.

10. It is in the fundamental interest of the European Union to support peace and democracy in the entire region and a strategic priority to see an end to this conflict which will continue to undermine peace and security along the EU southern borders, as long as it remains unresolved.'

Afghanistan

PRESS RELEASE, 3166th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 14 May 2012, 9110/12

Ahead of the NATO summit on 20 May, the Council discussed the EU engagement in Afghanistan and adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The Council welcomes the progress made in Afghanistan's transition process. The upcoming international meetings in Chicago on 20 and 21 May, Kabul on 14 June and Tokyo on 8 July offer the opportunity to shape the further course of transition and international engagement after 2014. The Council affirms the importance of the international community taking a holistic view of post-2014 engagement, given the correlation between security and long-term development in Afghanistan.
2. Recalling its conclusions of 14 November 2011, the Council reaffirms the long-term commitment of the EU and its Member States to support Afghanistan during transition and the decade of transformation. This commitment requires a reciprocal and genuine effort by the Afghan authorities to meet the reform obligations agreed at the Kabul and Bonn Conferences. The Council welcomes the opening of negotiations on the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development, which should provide a framework for relations in the coming years and strengthen mutual accountability.
3. The EU expects the Afghan authorities to reassure the international community regarding implementation of their commitments to improve political and economic governance.

The Council calls on the Afghan Government to ensure the holding of inclusive and credible presidential and parliamentary elections. The EU stands ready to continue supporting Afghan efforts to reform the electoral system and to strengthen the independent electoral institutions.

The EU underlines the importance of an Afghan-led, inclusive peace process and an outcome that respects the principles set out in the Bonn Conference Conclusions of December 2011.

The Council underlines the role of an independent and active civil society for the future of Afghanistan and welcomes the considerable development and scope of non-governmental organizations in the country. The Council recommends to build on the dialogue process initiated at the Bonn conference. Progress on these matters should be regularly evaluated and reviewed.

The Council calls on the Afghan Government to guarantee respect for human rights, in particular those of women and children, and to increase the opportunities for women to participate fully in the labour force.

The Council attaches importance to reinforcing the justice sector, which is essential as the counterpart of a strengthened civilian police force; as a guarantee that human rights will be respected; and in order to establish a legal system capable of protecting the rights of economic operators.

The Council also urges the Afghan Government to act on the IMF's recommendations following the collapse of the Kabul Bank, and to take steps to improve its public financial management, including establishing a transparent system of flows of public finances from donors to central government and from central government to provinces, and advancing public administration reform. In this context, it is essential that Afghanistan uses international support effectively to achieve fiscal sustainability. Undertaking the necessary steps to facilitate adequate private sector development to sustain the economic income of Afghanistan is an important prerequisite for long term engagement of the international donor community. Without adequate economic development shared by the population, all other progress in the country may be hampered.

4. The NATO Summit and other international meetings in Chicago on 20 and 21 May will notably focus on long-term support to Afghanistan's army and police. Capable, sustainable and affordable Afghan National Security Forces will be key to increasing security in Afghanistan reinforcing the confidence of the Afghan people, the international community and external investors in Afghanistan's institutions of state. An adequate level of security, including for our personnel, will also remain

vital for the EU and other donors to be able to deliver assistance effectively throughout the country.

5. Planning for the security sector must ensure that the size, structure and missions of the Afghan National Police allow for a refocus on civilian policing and rule of law capabilities. The Council recalls that assuring the professionalism and quality of the Afghan police is a higher priority than funding sufficient numbers alone. Fair and impartial policing is essential if human rights, especially those of women and children, are to be promoted. The Council invites the Afghan Government to endorse a professionalisation plan, specifying the measures and resources for its implementation.

6. Civilian policing will remain the key focus of EU assistance in the security sector. The Council reiterates the importance of continued cooperation and coordination between EUPOL, NATO and Member States' training missions throughout Afghanistan. The Council recalls its previous agreement to an extension in principle of the mandate of EUPOL AFGHANISTAN until the end of 2014. The Council reiterates the EU's commitment to support Afghanistan's efforts in strengthening policing and the rule of law beyond 2014 and intends to address this matter at an early date.

7. The Council restates its support for the 'Heart of Asia' process initiated at the Istanbul conference in November 2011 and welcomes progress by countries in the region in defining confidence building measures to be agreed at the 14 June Kabul Ministerial Conference. The Council reiterates that the initiative must be owned by the countries of the region. Continued and enhanced regional cooperation will be an important element in increasing stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. It notes the conclusions of the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) Ministerial meeting in Dushanbe on 26-27 March. Greater stability will support the continued voluntary return and sustainable reintegration of the Afghan refugee population as part of a comprehensive regional approach.

8. As agreed in November 2011, the EU will engage actively with partners to support strengthened regional political and economic cooperation. The Council reiterates its readiness to support confidence-building measures where there is both political and financial buy-in from the countries of the region, in particular in areas where the EU has proven competence, such as strengthening capacities in border management, counter-narcotics and supporting collaborative efforts to promote trade,

economic cooperation and development. Taking into account the results of the Kabul Conference, the EU will further consider, in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, the possible development of ways to deepen its regional engagement in the framework of a comprehensive approach.

9. The EU welcomes the Declaration of the 3rd Ministerial Conference of the Paris Pact Initiative in Vienna on 16 February, and emphasises the importance of continued and enhanced efforts at national, regional and global level to combat the production and trafficking of illicit drugs.

10. The Tokyo Conference should focus on advancing existing mutual commitments by the international community and the Afghan Government to ensure the viability of the Afghan state up to transition and throughout the Decade of Transformation. For their part, the Afghan Government must make progress against IMF benchmarks and other vital governance reforms. The EU will advocate a progressive approach in the form of a roadmap, matching donors' alignment with the Afghan Government's national priority programmes with progress on issues such as governance and human rights. Progress should be regularly evaluated and reviewed.

11. At Tokyo, it will be important to consider future modalities for donor funding as the tasks of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Transition Support Teams are progressively reduced. The EU and its Member States will strive to coordinate more efficiently their assistance to Afghanistan. The EU will also actively promote better use of international mechanisms, including the International Contact Group the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), in coordination with UNAMA. The EU and its Member States will seek to establish common positions for these meetings. The EU will review its action in Afghanistan following the Tokyo conference. The EU will promote synergies among Member States in order to enhance its impact in Afghanistan.

12. The EU intends to reallocate an increased share of its bilateral support for governance in Afghanistan for 2012-2013 for the Afghan National Police through the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). It is essential to ensure that LOTFA is efficiently, transparently and accountably managed.

13. In line with the EU and its Member States' long term commitment, the EU will continue to prioritise Afghanistan, making an enhanced contribution to support for the country, in the context of fulfilment by the Afghan authorities of their re-

form obligations agreed at the Kabul and Bonn Conferences. The EU will maintain a balance between support to governance, including significant support to an effective Afghan civilian police force and the rule of law, and also to the social and productive sectors, with a continued emphasis on capacity building. The Council expects this to be accompanied by increased support from other donors.’

Burma/Myanmar

PRESS RELEASE, 3142nd Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 23 January 2012, 5592/12

The Council debated the EU response to the reforms undertaken in Burma/Myanmar.

It adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The Council welcomes the remarkable programme of political reform undertaken by the Government and Parliament in Burma/Myanmar, together with its commitment to economic and social development. These changes are opening up important new prospects for developing the relationship between the European Union and Burma/Myanmar. The EU stands ready to respond accordingly.
2. The EU considers that the recent release of a substantial number of political prisoners marks a crucial step forward and clearly shows the determination of the Government to continue on the path of reform.

The Council also welcomes the Government's efforts to seek peace with ethnic groups; the legislation permitting trade union activity, establishing freedom of assembly and loosening censorship of the media; as well as the creation of a Human Rights Commission. These elements are essential steps towards establishing a democratic state under the rule of law.

3. The Council welcomes the dialogue between President U Thein Sein and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the changes to the Electoral Law adopted by the Parliament. The Council is pleased by the NLD's decision to register as a political party and, together with other parties, contest the by-elections on 1 April. The EU attaches particular importance to the free and fair conduct of these elections.

4. The EU welcomes the resolve by the Government to engage with ethnic groups through an inclusive political process, thus bringing to an end the armed conflicts in the country, including the recently concluded cease-fire with the Karen National Union. The Council underlines the need for all actors concerned to establish a credible and sustained process for handling the difficult issues involved in securing

long-term peace and national reconciliation. It stresses the importance of improved humanitarian access, especially to areas affected by ethnic conflicts.

5. The Council notes the commitment by the Government to continue and complete these reforms, notably by the unconditional release of the remaining political prisoners within the next few months and by the free and fair conduct of the by-elections. The Council also welcomes the Government's continued commitment to credibly addressing the ethnic conflicts through an inclusive political process. The Council confirms that the ongoing reform process has already led to improved relations between the EU and Burma/Myanmar and that this, together with meeting the above mentioned expectations, would lead to the further easing or lifting of the restrictive measures, in the Council's Decision by the end of April. The Council decides, as a first step, that restrictive measures (visa ban) concerning the President, the vice-Presidents, cabinet members and the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament should be suspended and mandates relevant working groups to implement it, and to consider further steps. A further review of the Council's Decision imposing restrictive measures is ongoing.

6. The European Union wishes to assist Burma/Myanmar in advancing reforms. It will promote economic development through increases in assistance to reduce poverty and build capacity, and through strengthened sectoral dialogue with the Government. The EU invites progressive engagement by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to support Burma/Myanmar in developing its strategy. The EU stands ready to back the peace processes with the ethnic groups, for example through financial assistance for the process of the reintegration of returnees. The Council looks forward to a visit by the High Representative to the country. It also reaffirms its full support for her decision to open an EU Office in Yangon and looks forward to its early opening.'

PRESS RELEASE, 3159th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 23 April 2012, 8772/12

The Council held an in-depth discussion of the situation in Burma/Myanmar. It adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The European Union has followed with respect and appreciation the historic changes in Myanmar/Burma over the past year and encourages the wide-ranging reforms to continue under President U Thein Sein, the Government and the Par-

liament, in a developing partnership with political and civil society actors, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. These reforms will need time to implement and to bear fruit. The foundation for development is legitimate government, the rule of law and national reconciliation. The EU praises the peaceful nature of the process and the readiness of the parties to work towards the same goals, with a shared vision for political, social and economic reforms.

2. It also welcomes the concrete steps taken towards these ends:

- the overall transparent and credible conduct of the by-elections on 1 April, resulting in the election of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and members of the National League for Democracy party, which will support steps towards national reconciliation;
- the progress on changes in law and practice to enable freedom of assembly and of association and to eliminate the use of forced labour;
- the release of a substantial number of political prisoners and the Government's willingness to work on open cases;
- the Government's efforts to conclude cease-fire arrangements with armed groups in the ethnic regions, in particular with Karen National Union, and its readiness to look towards wider and more durable political settlements.

3. These and other unprecedented developments allow the EU to open a new chapter in its relations with Myanmar/Burma. The Council therefore welcomes the upcoming official visit of the High Representative to the country, marking a new beginning in bilateral relations, as highlighted by the opening of an EU Office in Yangon.

As a means to welcome and encourage the reform process, the Council will suspend restrictive measures imposed on the Government, with the exception of the arms embargo, which it will retain. The Council will monitor closely the situation on the ground, keep its measures under constant review and respond positively to progress on ongoing reforms.

4. In this regard, the EU still expects the unconditional release of remaining political prisoners and the removal of all restrictions placed on those already released. It looks forward to the end of conflict and to substantially improved access for humanitarian assistance, in particular for those affected by conflict in Kachin State and along the Eastern border, as well as to addressing the status and improving the welfare of the Rohingyas.

5. The EU wants now to enter into an active collaboration with Myanmar/Burma as a whole, with a view to assisting the reform process and contributing to economic, political and social development.

6. On the basis of the discussion the EU Development Ministers will have in May, the EU will continue to engage in a dialogue and cooperation with the authorities and other stakeholders, including in the following areas:

- the EU looks forward to collaborating with the central and local authorities and others concerned to support the process of bringing peace and stability to ethnic regions and to open a long-term perspective for their development, as part of national reconciliation;
- the EU and its Member States have announced significant new funding for economic and social development, democratic transformation and the strengthening of civil society and the public administration's capacity at central and regional level, in order to help improve governance and to establish an effective administration in a democratic and inclusive state;
- the EU stands ready to assist all actors in their endeavour to strengthen the rule of law and the respect for human rights. In this regard, the EU looks forward to working with the legislature and the national Human Rights Commission. The EU will also work with the authorities, including the Election Commission, in reviewing the electoral system with a view to the general elections in 2015.

In all these areas, donor coordination will be important and the EU looks to the Myanmar/Burma authorities to show leadership in this, fostering a wide-ranging consultation with all stakeholders, including political parties, regional authorities and civil society, applying principles such as participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability. This will be discussed at the next Foreign Affairs Council/Development.

7. The EU recognises the vital contribution the private sector has to make to the development of Myanmar/Burma and would welcome European companies exploring trade and investment opportunities. This should be done by promoting the practice of the highest standards of integrity and corporate social responsibility. These are laid out in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, UN guiding principles on business and human rights and the EU's own CSR strategy 2011-2014. The EU will work with the authorities, the private sector and the people of Myanmar/Burma to create the best possible regulatory environment.

8. The Council supports reinstating the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for Myanmar/Burma as soon as possible once the required conditions are fulfilled, following the assessment of the International Labour Organisation.

9. The EU also welcomes the willingness of the Government to address environmental risks, in particular those related to deforestation and the loss of biodiversity. It therefore encourages the Government to begin a dialogue with the EU on ways to ensure the sustainable management of Myanmar/Burma's forests and harvesting of timber in compliance with national legislation, consistent with fighting poverty and securing livelihoods. It will work with the authorities to promote transparency and accountability in extractive industries as well as in environmental protection, in particular through Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT).

10. The EU now looks forward to a future in which it will be able to collaborate constructively with the Government and the people of Myanmar/Burma to foster unity and build prosperity.'

North Korea

Statement by EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, concerning the DPRK’s “satellite” launch

Brussels, 13 April 2012, A 168/12

I am deeply concerned about the dangerous and destabilising actions undertaken by the DPRK today. Regardless of its stated purpose, today’s attempted launch is a clear violation of the DPRK’s international obligations as set out in particular under UN Security Council Resolution 1874.

I call upon the DPRK to abide by its obligations under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT, and its commitments towards denuclearisation under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. I also urge DPRK to refrain from any action that could further increase regional tensions.

The EU is ready to continue working with its international partners, with a view to contributing to the pursuit of lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Statement by EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, concerning the DPRK’s “satellite” launch

Brussels, 12 December 2012, A 571/12

The launch from DPRK earlier today is another step in a long-running attempt by the DPRK to acquire ballistic missile technology and is thus a clear violation of the DPRK’s international obligations, in particular under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

I urge the DPRK to comply, without delay, fully and unconditionally with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT, and its commitments towards denuclearisation under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks.

The EU will consider an appropriate response, in close consultation with key partners, and in line with UNSC deliberations, including possible additional restrictive measures.

Sudan & South Sudan

PRESS RELEASE, 3159th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 23 April 2012, 8772/12

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. 'The EU is deeply concerned about the escalating conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.
2. The EU calls on the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to stop immediately attacks on each other's territory, whether directly or through proxies, cease hostilities, withdraw all security personnel from Abyei and avoid further provocative actions, including inflammatory rhetoric. It urges both sides to establish the joint border verification and monitoring mechanism without further delay.
3. In this context and following international condemnation of the seizure and occupation of Heglig by the South Sudanese armed forces, the EU welcomes the recent statement by the Government of South Sudan that it is withdrawing its forces from Heglig. It calls on South Sudan not to mount any further such attacks and urges the Government of Sudan not to attack SPLA forces as they withdraw.
4. The EU condemns continued aerial bombardments and reported ground incursions into South Sudan by the Sudan Armed Forces.
5. The use of force will not resolve any of the outstanding issues between the two countries. The EU urges both to return to the existing negotiating process under the auspices of the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and renew their efforts in good faith to reach agreement through peaceful dialogue.
6. The Government of Sudan and the SPLM North must engage in an inclusive political process to resolve the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
7. The EU calls on the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan, as an immediate first step, to honour their Memorandum of Understanding on Non-Aggression and Cooperation signed in Addis Ababa on 10 February 2012. This is essential to allow the peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues.

8. The EU strongly supports efforts by the African Union and the AUHIP, in cooperation with the United Nations and other international partners, to ensure that both Governments urgently take the steps outlined above.’

EUAVSEC South Sudan to strengthen aviation security in South Sudan

Luxembourg, 18 June 2012, 11610/12

The Council today gave the green light for a new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to strengthen the aviation security at Juba international airport: EUAVSEC South Sudan. This civilian mission responds to an invitation by South Sudan and is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach, a strategy to assist South Sudan in becoming a viable, stable and prosperous state.

EU High Representative Catherine Ashton said: *‘The EU is committed to supporting peace, security and development in South Sudan. EUAVSEC South Sudan will work to raise the security at Juba airport to internationally accepted standards. This is important for the economic development of South Sudan and for the efforts to prevent the airport from becoming a target for terrorism.’*

South Sudan is landlocked and heavily dependent on air traffic. Improving airport security will enable the increased flow of people and goods, as well as boost trade. In particular, EUAVSEC South Sudan will train and mentor security services, provide advice and assistance on aviation security, as well as support the coordination of security activities. The mission will not have any executive tasks.

EUAVSEC will last for 19 months and its headquarters will be in Juba, South Sudan. Up to 64 personnel will be deployed, with activities starting in September 2012. A budget of EUR 12.5 million has been allocated.

Guinea-Bissau

PRESS RELEASE, 3159th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Luxembourg, 23 April 2012, 8772/12

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. ‘The European Union strongly condemns the coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau. It demands the immediate reestablishment of the legitimate government, the completion of the interrupted democratic electoral process and the immediate restoration of constitutional order.
2. Self-appointed transitional institutions will not be recognised, nor any kind of arrangement which would allow the armed forces to continue to threaten or control the civilian powers. The EU rejects the establishment of a so-called “Transitional National Council”.
3. The freedom and security of all citizens must be ensured and perpetrators of human rights violations be held accountable. The EU calls for the immediate and unconditional release of those held in illegal detention and an end to violence and intimidation against political leaders and civil society representatives.
4. The EU acknowledges the decision of the African Union to suspend Guinea-Bissau, and firmly supports the efforts of the UN, ECOWAS and CPLP to restore stability, democracy and respect for human rights there.
5. The EU is ready to impose restrictive measures against individuals who continue to engage in or provide support for acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Guinea-Bissau.’

The EU Neighbourhood

PRESS RELEASE, 3157th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2012, 7849/12

Belarus

The Council debated the situation in Belarus and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. Recalling the Council conclusions on 31 January 2011 and 20 June 2011, the Council reiterates its grave concern about the continued lack of respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law in Belarus, and regrets that further repressive measures have taken place.

2. As the political prisoners have not been released and rehabilitated, and against the background of the further deterioration of the situation, the Council decided to designate additional persons responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, to the list of those subject to travel restrictions and assets freezes. The Council also decided to designate further businessmen and companies benefitting from or supporting the regime and will agree further such designations at upcoming Council meetings if all Belarusian political prisoners are not released. The EU’s restrictive measures remain open and under constant review.

3. The EU calls for the immediate release and rehabilitation of all remaining political prisoners. It condemns the rejection of the appeal of human rights defender and political prisoner Ales Byalyatski as well as the sentencing to two years in prison of Syarhei Kavalenka. The EU is deeply concerned about reports of torture and inhumane prison conditions of political prisoners, such as of former presidential candidates Andrei Sannikaw and Mikalay Statkevich and activists Dzmitry Bandarenka, Dzmitry Dashkevich and Mikalay Awtukhovich. The Council reminds the Belarusian authorities of their obligation under international law to ensure the respect of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and of their responsibility to investigate reports thereof.

4. Recalling the statement of HR Ashton of 17 March 2012, the EU strongly condemns the execution of Uladzislaw Kavalyow and Dzmitry Kanavalaw. The EU reiterates its call on the authorities of Belarus to join a global moratorium on the death penalty as a first step towards its universal abolition. The EU opposes capital punishment under all circumstances.

5. The EU reiterates its call on the Belarusian authorities to stop all harassment of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, journalists and civil society, and not to hinder their freedom of movement. The EU also condemns the suppression of non-violent protests and the systematic use of the judicial system as a means of repression, including against peaceful protesters. It is furthermore strongly concerned about the introduction of new legislation that will further restrict the Belarusian citizens' freedoms of assembly, association and the free flow of information on the internet, as well as the provision of support to civil society.

6. The Council again urges Belarus to respect internationally recognised diplomatic immunities and privileges of EU diplomatic representations and their personnel in Minsk and to stop the ongoing harassment and intimidation.

7. In the context of the upcoming 2014 World Ice Hockey Championship, the EU will keep International and National Ice Hockey Federations informed about its deep concerns as regards the lack of respect by Belarus for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles.

8. The EU reiterates its firm commitment to strengthening its engagement with the Belarusian people and civil society and to supporting the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people. The Council welcomes that the EU is now launching a "European dialogue on modernisation" with the Belarusian society on necessary reforms for the modernisation of Belarus and on the related potential development of relations with the EU, as well as possible EU support in this regard.

9. The EU calls on the Belarusian authorities to follow up on their previously announced intention to initiate a national dialogue with civil society and the opposition to pave the way for the holding of parliamentary elections in 2012 in line with international norms and standards. The EU calls on the Belarusian authorities to cooperate within the OSCE in view of a re-opening of the OSCE field presence in Belarus, and to adhere to and implement OSCE commitments across all three dimensions, in particular in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

10. The EU reiterates its readiness to launch negotiations for visa facilitation and readmission agreements which would enhance people-to-people contacts to the benefit of the Belarusian population at large, and strongly regrets the unconstructive position of the Belarusian authorities in not responding so far to the letter sent in June 2011 inviting them to start negotiations. In order to facilitate the issuing of visas to the Belarusian public, the Council welcomes that the EU Member States will strive to make optimal use of the existing flexibilities offered by the Visa Code, in particular the possibilities to waive and reduce visa fees for certain categories of Belarusian citizens or in individual cases. The Council recalls the possibilities of facilitating movement of persons living in border areas, and calls on the authorities of Belarus to take the necessary steps for the entry into force of all local border traffic agreements with its neighbouring EU member states in accordance with the EU acquis on local border traffic.

11. The Council will continue to follow closely the situation in Belarus. The Council reiterates its commitment to the policy of critical engagement, including through dialogue and the Eastern Partnership, and recalls that the development of bilateral relations is conditional on progress towards respect by Belarus for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU remains willing to assist Belarus to meet its obligations in this regard.'

Against the background of the further deterioration of the situation in Belarus, the Council strengthened EU sanctions against the Belarusian regime.

Joint statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on the parliamentary elections in Ukraine

Brussels, 29 October 2012, A 480/12

We followed closely the pre-electoral period and Sunday's voting process in Ukraine. The turnout shows Ukrainian citizens' attachment to a democratic and pluralistic society. Vote counting is not yet fully completed.

We take full note of the International Observation Mission's preliminary findings on the conduct of the elections - which present a mixed picture with several shortcomings - and of the difficulties faced by the local electoral observers. The final assessment will also depend on post-electoral developments, which we will watch

closely. It is therefore particularly important that the Ukrainian authorities ensure proper conduct in the coming stages of the electoral process, notably as regards the remaining vote count, tabulation of results and following up on possible electoral complaints.

We expect that the future Verkhovna Rada will fully reflect the will of the Ukrainian voters, as expressed during Sunday's elections.

We reiterate our regret that the consequences of trials that did not respect international standards have prevented opposition representatives from standing in the parliamentary elections, and call on the authorities to address this matter and take further steps to reform the judiciary to avoid their recurrence.

Our engagement with Ukraine towards political association and economic integration remains based on its respect for our common values. We are committed to continue to work towards using the full potential of our relations for the benefit of the citizens of Ukraine and the EU.

Common Security and Defence Policy

PRESS RELEASE, 3157th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2012, 7849/12

Military Capabilities

The European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board met in the margins of the Council.

The Council adopted the following conclusions on the pooling and sharing of military capabilities:

‘1. The Council emphasizes the urgent political necessity to retain and develop the military capabilities for sustaining and enhancing CSDP. European cooperation on pooling and sharing of military capabilities represents a common response to European capability shortfalls, aiming at enhancing operational effectiveness in a context of financial austerity and a changing strategic environment. Military capabilities and the political will to generate forces underpin the EU’s ability to contribute to security and stability through operational engagement.

2. In this context the Council welcomes the significant progress on concrete cooperative initiatives facilitated by the European Defence Agency (EDA) such as on Air-to-Air Refuelling, Medical Support, Training (Counter-IED, Helicopter Training Programme, Air Transport Crew, Fast Jet and Naval) and Maritime Surveillance. The EDA Steering Board on 22 March 2012 endorsed a Political Declaration on Air-to-Air Refuelling and welcomed a Declaration of Intent for the establishment of Multinational Modular Medical Units. These projects, as well as other collaborative projects established by Member States within bilateral or regional frameworks, constitute a package of concrete initiatives developed so far as part of the Ghent process for strengthening defence cooperation. They underline the strong commitment of Member States to strengthen European military capabilities and demonstrate the added value of European actions and efforts in that regard and the longterm

potential of pooling and sharing, bearing in mind the upcoming NATO Chicago Summit.

3. The Council also calls for further efforts in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Future Military Commercial Satellites (SATCOM), Smart Munitions, and Naval Logistics and encourages continuous work on Training and Education facilitated by the EUMS.

4. The Council welcomes the cooperation between the EU and NATO on military capability development for crisis management, in particular the Pooling and Sharing and Smart Defence initiatives. It notes with satisfaction the productive contacts between the staffs of the two organisations, and strongly encourages these contacts to continue in a transparent manner in order to avoid duplication, ensure coherence and mutually reinforcing capability development.

5. While significant progress has been made, the Council reiterates the need for a more sustainable and structured policy on Pooling and Sharing in the longer term. Systematic cooperation will require a change of mindset and continuous political momentum and commitment. The Council encourages Member States, in the very early stages of their national processes, to systematically explore the possibility for Pooling and Sharing solutions.

6. In the context of further developing the systematic approach to Pooling and Sharing, the Council welcomes the work conducted in the framework of the EDA on enablers for multinational cooperation. Pooling demand, harmonising procedures for qualification/ certification, and sharing surplus equipment, will support capability improvements and reduce through-life costs. Noting the potential of “Save and Reinvest”, the Council invites EDA to explore this further.

7. Acknowledging the wider implications of defence for technology, innovation and growth, the Council notes with concern the overall reduction of defence Research and Technology investment and its implications on Europe’s ability to develop future defence capabilities. The Council reiterates its commitment to cooperation in Research and Technology. It encourages the EDA and the Commission to pursue synergies with European policies and in particular in the field of Research and Technology, including regarding the new European Framework Programme for Research and Technology (Horizon 2020). This will contribute to strengthening the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base.’



European Union

State of the Union 2012 Address

Strasbourg, 12 September 2012

Mr President,

Honourable Members,

I. Analysis of the situation

It is an honour to stand before you today to deliver this third State of the Union address. At a time when the European Union continues to be in crisis.

A financial and economic crisis. A social crisis. But also a political crisis, a crisis of confidence.

At its root, the crisis results from:

- Irresponsible practices in the financial sector;
- Unsustainable public debt, and also;
- A lack of competitiveness in some Member States.

On top of that, the Euro faces structural problems of its own. Its architecture has not been up to the job. Imbalances have built up.

This is now being corrected. But it is a painful, difficult, effort. Citizens are frustrated. They are anxious. They feel their way of life is at risk.

The sense of fairness and equity between Member States is being eroded. And without equity between Member States, how can there be equity between European citizens?

Over the last four years, we have made many bold decisions to tackle this systemic crisis. But despite all these efforts, our responses have not yet convinced citizens, markets or our international partners.

Why? Because time and again, we have allowed doubts to spread. Doubts over whether some countries are really ready to reform and regain competitiveness. Doubts over whether other countries are really willing to stand by each other so that the Euro and the European project are irreversible.

On too many occasions, we have seen a vicious spiral. First, very important decisions for our future are taken at European summits. But then, the next day, we see some of those very same people who took those decisions undermining them. Saying that either they go too far, or that they don't go far enough. And then we get a problem of credibility. A problem of confidence.

It is not acceptable to present these European meetings as if they were boxing events, claiming a knockout victory over a rival. We cannot belong to the same Union and behave as if we don't. We cannot put at risk nine good decisions with one action or statement that raises doubts about all we have achieved.

This, Honourable Members, reveals the essence of Europe's political crisis of confidence. If Europe's political actors do not abide by the rules and the decisions they have set themselves, how can they possibly convince others that they are determined to solve this crisis together?

II. The challenge – a new thinking for Europe

A crisis of confidence is a political crisis. And, the good thing is that, in a democracy, there is no political problem for which we cannot find a political solution.

That is why, here today, I want to debate with you the fundamental political questions - where we are now and how we must move forward. I want to focus on the political direction and the vision that shall inspire our policy decisions.

I will of course not list all these individual decisions. You are receiving the letter I addressed to the President of the European Parliament, and that sets out the Commission's immediate priorities. We will discuss them with you before adopting the Commission Work Programme later in the autumn.

My message to you today is this: Europe needs a new direction. And, that direction cannot be based on old ideas. Europe needs a new thinking.

When we speak about the crisis, and we all speak about the crisis, have we really drawn all the consequences for our action? When we speak about globalisation, and we all speak a lot about globalisation, have we really considered its impact on the role of each of our Member States?

The starting point for a new thinking for Europe is to really draw all the consequences of the challenges that we are facing and that are fundamentally changing our world.

The starting point is to stop trying to answer the questions of the future with the tools of the past.

Since the start of the crisis, we have seen time and again that interconnected global markets are quicker and therefore more powerful than fragmented national political systems. This undermines the trust of citizens in political decision making. And it is fuelling populism and extremism in Europe and elsewhere.

The reality is that in an interconnected world, Europe's Member States on their own are no longer able to effectively steer the course of events. But at the same time, they have not yet equipped their Union - our Union - with the instruments needed to cope with this new reality. We are now in a transition, in a defining moment. This moment requires decisions and leadership.

Yes, globalisation demands more European unity.

More unity demands more integration.

More integration demands more democracy, European democracy.

In Europe, this means first and foremost accepting that we are all in the same boat.

It means recognising the commonality of our European interests.

It means embracing the interdependence of our destinies.

And it means demanding a true sense of common responsibility and solidarity.

Because when you are on a boat in the middle of the storm, absolute loyalty is the minimum you demand from your fellow crew members.

This is the only way we will keep up with the pace of change. It is the only way we will get the scale and efficiency we need to be a global player. It is the only way to safeguard our values, because it is also a matter of values, in a changing world.

In the 20th century, a country of just 10 or 15 million people could be a global power. In the 21st century, even the biggest European countries run the risk of irrelevance in between the global giants like the US or China.

History is accelerating. It took 155 years for Britain to double its GDP per capita, 50 years for the US, and just 15 years for China. But if you look at some of our new Member States, the economic transformation going on is no less impressive.

Europe has all the assets it takes. In fact much more so than previous generations faced with similar or even greater challenges.

But we need to act accordingly and mobilize all these resources together.

It is time to match ambitions, decisions, and actions.

It is time to put a stop to piecemeal responses and muddling through.

It is time to learn the lessons from history and write a better future for our Europe.

III. Response to the situation – the ‘decisive deal for Europe’

What I demand and what I present to you today is a Decisive Deal for Europe. A decisive deal to project our values, our freedom and our prosperity into the future of a globalized world. A deal that combines the need to keep our social market economies on one hand and the need to reform them on the other. A deal that will stabilise the EMU, boost sustainable growth, and restore competitiveness. A deal that will establish a contract of confidence between our countries, between Member States and the European institutions, between social partners, and between the citizens and the European Union.

The Decisive Deal for Europe means that we must leave no doubt about the integrity of the Union or the irreversibility of the Euro.

The more vulnerable countries must leave no doubts about their willingness to reform. About their sense of responsibility. But the stronger countries must leave no doubts about their willingness to stick together. About their sense of solidarity.

We must all leave no doubts that we are determined to reform. To reform together.

The idea that we can grow without reform, or that we can prosper alone is simply false. We must recognise that we are in this together and must resolve it together.

This decisive deal requires the completion of a deep and genuine economic union, based on a political union.

Economic union

Let me start with Europe's economy.

Firstly, we need growth. Sustainable growth.

Growth is the lifeblood of our European social market model: it creates jobs and supports our standard of living. But we can only maintain growth if we are more competitive.

At the national level it means undertaking structural reforms that have been postponed for decades. Modernising public administration. Reducing wasteful expenditure. Tackling vested interests and privileges. Reforming the labour market to balance security with flexibility. And ensuring the sustainability of social systems.

At the European level, we need to be more decisive about breaking down barriers, whether physical, economic or digital. We need to complete the single market.

We need to reduce our energy dependence and tap the renewable energy potential.

Promoting competitiveness in sectors such as energy, transport or telecoms could open up fresh competition, promote innovation and drive down prices for consumers and businesses.

The Commission will shortly present a Single Market Act II. To enable the single market to prosper, the Commission will continue to be firm and intransigent in the defence of its competition and trade rules. Let me tell you frankly: if it was left to the Member States, they will not resist pressure from big corporations or large external powers.

We need to create a European labour market, and make it as easy for people to work in another country as it is at home.

We need to explore green growth and be much more efficient in our use of resources.

We have to be much more ambitious about education, research, innovation and science.

Europe is a world leader in key sectors such as aeronautics, automotives, pharmaceuticals and engineering, with global market shares above a third. Industrial productivity increased by 35% over the last decade despite the economic slowdown. And today, some 74 million jobs depend on manufacturing. Every year start-up firms in the EU create over 4 million jobs. We need to build on this by investing in our new industrial policy and creating a business environment that encourages entrepreneurship and supports small businesses.

This means making the taxation environment simpler for businesses and more attractive for investors. Better tax coordination would benefit all Member States.

We also need a pro-active trade policy by opening up new markets.

This is the potential of Europe's economy. This is the goldmine that is yet to be fully explored. Fully implementing the Growth Compact agreed at the June European Council can take us a long way.

And we could go further, with a realistic but yet ambitious European Union budget dedicated to investment, growth and reform. Let's be clear. The European budget is the instrument for investment in Europe and growth in Europe.

The Commission and this Parliament, indeed all pro-European forces, because most member States support our proposal, must now stand together in support of the right multi-annual financial framework that will take us to 2020. It will place little burden on Member States, especially with our proposed new own resources system. But it would give a great boost to their economies, their regions, their researchers, their students, their young people who seek employment, or their SMEs.

It is a budget for growth, for economic, social and territorial cohesion between Member States and within Member States.

It is a budget that will help complete the single market by bridging gaps in our energy, transport and telecoms infrastructure through the Connecting Europe Facility.

It is a budget for a modern, growth-oriented agriculture capable of combining food security with sustainable rural development.

It is a budget that will promote a research intensive and innovative Europe through Horizon 2020. Because we need this European scale for research.

This will be a real test of credibility for many of our some Member States. I want to see if the same Member States who are all the time talking about investment and growth will now support a budget for growth at the European level.

The budget is also the tool to support investment in our growth agenda, Europe 2020, which we need now more than ever before. Europe 2020 is the way to modernise and preserve the European social market economy.

Our agenda of structural reform requires a major adjustment effort. It will only work if it is fair and equitable. Because inequality is not sustainable.

In some parts of Europe we are seeing a real social emergency.

Rising poverty and massive levels of unemployment, especially among our young people.

That is why we must strengthen social cohesion. It is a feature that distinguishes European society from alternative models.

Some say that, because of the crisis, the European social model is dead. I do not agree.

Yes, we need to reform our economies and modernise our social protection systems. But an effective social protection system that helps those in need is not an obstacle to prosperity. It is indeed an indispensable element of it. Indeed, it is precisely those European countries with the most effective social protection systems and with the most developed social partnerships, that are among the most successful and competitive economies in the world.

Fairness and equity means giving a chance to our young people. We are already doing a lot. And before the end of the year, the Commission will launch a Youth Pack-

age that will establish a youth guarantee scheme and equality framework to facilitate vocational training.

Fairness and equity also means creating better and fairer taxation systems.

Stopping tax fraud and tax evasion could put extra billions into the public purse across Europe.

This is why the Commission will fight for an agreement on the revised savings tax directive, and on mandates to negotiate stronger savings tax agreements with third countries. Their completion would be a major source of legitimate tax revenues.

And the Commission will continue to fight for a fair and ambitious Financial Transactions Tax that would ensure that taxpayers benefit from the financial sector, not just that the financial sector benefits from taxpayers. Now that it is clear that agreement on this can only happen through enhanced cooperation, the Commission will do all it can to move this forward rapidly and effectively with those Member States that are willing. Because this is about fairness. And fairness is an essential condition to make the necessary economic reforms socially and politically acceptable. And above all fairness is a question of justice, social justice.

In the face of the crisis, important decisions have been taken. Across the European Union, reform and consolidation measures are being implemented. Joint financial backstops are being put in place, and the European institutions have consistently shown that they stand by the Euro.

The Commission is very aware that in the Member States implementing the most intense reforms, there is hardship and there are – sometimes very painful – difficult adjustments. But it is only through these reforms that we can come to a better future. They were long overdue. Going back to the status quo ante is simply impossible.

The Commission will continue to do all it can to support these Member States and to help them boost growth and employment, for instance through the re-programming of structural funds.

Allow me to say a word on Greece. I truly believe that we have a chance this autumn to come to the turning point. If Greece banishes all doubts about its commitment to reform. But also if all other countries banish all doubts about their determination to keep Greece in the Euro area, we can do it.

I believe that if Greece stands by its commitments it should stay in the Euro area, as a member of the European family.

Securing the stability of the Euro area is our most urgent challenge. This is the joint responsibility of the Member States and the Community Institutions. The ECB cannot and will not finance governments. But when monetary policy channels are not working properly, the Commission believes that it is within the mandate of the ECB to take the necessary actions, for instance in the secondary markets of sovereign debt. Indeed, the ECB has not only the right but also the duty to restore the integrity of monetary policy. It is of course for the ECB, as an independent institution, to determine what actions to carry out and under what conditions. But all actors, and I really mean all actors, should respect the ECB's independence.

I have spoken about the economic measures that we must implement as a matter of urgency. This is indispensable. But it is not sufficient. We must go further.

We must complete the economic and monetary union. We must create a banking union and a fiscal union and the corresponding institutional and political mechanisms.

Today, the Commission is presenting legislative proposals for a single European supervisory mechanism. This is the stepping stone to a banking union.

The crisis has shown that while banks became transnational, rules and oversight remained national. And when things went wrong, it was the taxpayers who had to pick up the bill.

Over the past four years the EU has overhauled the rulebook for banks, leading the world in implementing the G20 commitments. But mere coordination is no longer adequate – we need to move to common supervisory decisions, namely within the Euro area.

The single supervisory mechanism proposed today will create a reinforced architecture, with a core role for the European Central Bank, and appropriate articulation with the European Banking Authority, which will restore confidence in the supervision of the banks in the Euro area.

It will be a supervision for all Euro area banks. Supervision must be able to look everywhere because systemic risks can be anywhere, not just in so-called systemically

relevant banks. Of course, this in a system that fully engages the national supervisors.

The package comprises two legal texts, one on the ECB and the other on the EBA, which go together. It is clear that this parliament will have a crucial role to play in the adoption of the new mechanism, and after that in its democratic oversight.

This is a crucial first step towards the banking union I proposed before this House in June. Getting the European supervisor in place is the top priority for now, because it is the precondition for the better management of banking crises, from banking resolution to deposit insurance.

In parallel the Commission will continue to work on the reform of the banking sector, to make sure it plays its role in the responsible financing of the real economy. That means improving long term financing for SMEs and other companies. It means rules on reference indices, so we do not again see the manipulation of bank interest rates affecting companies and mortgage holders alike. It means legislation to ensure that banks give a fair deal to consumers and another look at the structure of banking activities to eliminate inherent risks.

In all of this, the role of this Parliament is essential. The Commission endeavours to work in close partnership with you.

But there is a second element of a deeper economic union: it is the move towards a fiscal union.

The case for it is clear: the economic decisions of one Member State impact the others. So we need stronger economic policy co-ordination. We need a stronger and more binding framework for the national decision making for key economic policies, as the only way to prevent imbalances. While much has been done here, for instance through the six-pack and the Country-Specific Recommendations, further steps are crucial to combine specific conditions with specific incentives and to really make the economic and monetary union sustainable.

To deliver lasting results, we need to develop a fully equipped Community economic governance together with a genuine, credible Community fiscal capacity.

We do not need to separate institutions or to create new institutions for that. Quite the contrary: for this to be effective and quick, the best way is to work with and through the existing institutions: The European Commission as the independent

European authority, and overseen by the European Parliament as the parliamentary representation at the European level.

And it is in such a framework that over time, steps for genuine mutualisation of debt redemption and debt issuance can take their place.

So economic reform coupled with a genuine economic and monetary union: these are the engines to get our boat moving forward.

The Commission will publish a blueprint for deepening the economic and monetary union still this autumn.

This blueprint will be presented to this House. Because these questions must be discussed with and by the representatives of the people.

At the same time, it will inform the debate at the December European Council that will be prepared by the report that the President of the European Council, myself and the Presidents of the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup have been asked to present.

Our blueprint will identify the tools and instruments, and present options for legal drafting that would give effect to them, from policy coordination to fiscal capacity to debt redemption. And, where necessary – as in the case of jointly and severally guaranteed public debt – it would identify the treaty changes necessary, because some of these changes require modifications to the Treaty. It will present a blueprint for what we need to accomplish not only in the next few weeks and months, but in the next years.

Political union

Ultimately, the credibility and sustainability of the Economic and Monetary Union depends on the institutions and the political construct behind it.

This is why the Economic and Monetary Union raises the question of a political union and the European democracy that must underpin it.

If we want economic and monetary union to succeed, we need to combine ambition and proper sequencing. We need to take concrete steps now, with a political union as a horizon.

I would like to see the development of a European public space, where European issues are discussed and debated from a European standpoint. We cannot continue trying to solve European problems just with national solutions.

This debate has to take place in our societies and among our citizens. But, today, I would like to make an appeal also to European thinkers. To men and women of culture, to join this debate on the future of Europe. And I make this appeal to you. This is the house of European democracy. We must strengthen the role of the European Parliament at the European level.

And we need to promote a genuine complementarity and cooperation between the European and national parliaments.

This also cannot be done without strengthening European political parties. Indeed, we have very often a real disconnect between political parties in the capitals and the European political parties here in Strasbourg. This is why we have to recognise the political debate is cast all too often as if it were just between national parties. Even in the European elections we do not see the name of the European political parties on the ballot box, we see a national debate between national political parties. This is why we need a reinforced statute for European political parties. I am proud to announce that the Commission has adopted a proposal for this today.

An important means to deepen the pan-European political debate would be the presentation by European political parties of their candidate for the post of Commission President at the European Parliament elections already in 2014. This can be done without Treaty change. This would be a decisive step to make the possibility of a European choice offered by these elections even clearer. I call on the political parties to commit to this step and thus to further Europeanise these European elections.

A true political European Union means we must concentrate European action on the real issues that matter and must be dealt with at the European level. Let's be frank about this not everything can be at the same time a priority. Here, some self-criticism can probably be applied.

Proper integration is about taking a fresh look at where is the most appropriate level of action. Subsidiarity is an essential democratic concept and should be practiced.

A political union also means that we must strengthen the foundations on which our Union is built: the respect for our fundamental values, for the rule of law and democracy.

In recent months we have seen threats to the legal and democratic fabric in some of our European states. The European Parliament and the Commission were the first to raise the alarm and played the decisive role in seeing these worrying developments brought into check.

But these situations also revealed limits of our institutional arrangements. We need a better developed set of instruments – not just the alternative between the «soft power» of political persuasion and the «nuclear option» of article 7 of the Treaty.

Our commitment to upholding the rule of law is also behind our intention to establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office, as foreseen by the Treaties. We will come with a proposal soon.

A political union also means doing more to fulfil our global role. Sharing sovereignty in Europe means being more sovereign in a global world.

In today's world, size matters.

And values make the difference.

That is why Europe's message must be one of freedom, democracy, of rule of law and of solidarity. In short, our values: European values.

More than ever our citizens and the new world order need an active and influential Europe. This is not just for us, for the rest of the world it is important that we succeed. A Europe that stands by its values. And a Europe that stands up for its belief that human rights are not a luxury for the developed world, they should be seen as universal values.

The appalling situation in Syria reminds us that we cannot afford to be by-standers. A new and democratic Syria must emerge. We have a joint responsibility to make this happen. And to work with those in the global order who need to give also their co-operation to this goal.

The world needs an EU that keeps its leadership at the forefront of development and humanitarian assistance. That stands by open economies and fights protectionism. That leads the fight against climate change.

The world needs a Europe that is capable of deploying military missions to help stabilize the situation in crisis areas. We need to launch a comprehensive review of European capabilities and begin truly collective defence planning. Yes, we need to reinforce our Common Foreign and Security Policy and a common approach to defence matters because together we have the power, and the scale to shape the world into a fairer, rules based and human rights' abiding place.

IV. Treaty change, 17/27 dimension and expanding public debate

Federation of nation states - Treaty change

A deep and genuine economic and monetary union, a political union, with a coherent foreign and defence policy, means ultimately that the present European Union must evolve.

Let's not be afraid of the words: we will need to move towards a federation of nation states. This is what we need. This is our political horizon.

This is what must guide our work in the years to come.

Today, I call for a federation of nation states. Not a superstate. A democratic federation of nation states that can tackle our common problems, through the sharing of sovereignty in a way that each country and each citizen are better equipped to control their own destiny. This is about the Union with the Member States, not against the Member States. In the age of globalisation pooled sovereignty means more power, not less.

And, I said it on purpose a federation of nation states because in these turbulent times these times of anxiety, we should not leave the defence of the nation just to the nationalists and populists. I believe in a Europe where people are proud of their nations but also proud to be European and proud of our European values.

Creating this federation of nation states will ultimately require a new Treaty. I do not say this lightly. We are all aware how difficult treaty change has become. It has to be well prepared.

Discussions on treaty change must not distract or delay us from doing what can and must be done already today.

A deep and genuine economic and monetary union can be started under the current Treaties, but can only be completed with changes in the treaties. So let's start it now but let's have the horizon for the future present in our decisions of today.

We must not begin with treaty change. We must identify the policies we need and the instruments to implement them. Only then can we decide on the tools that we lack and the ways to remedy this.

And then there must be a broad debate all over Europe. A debate that must take place before a convention and an IGC is called. A debate of a truly European dimension.

The times of European integration by implicit consent of citizens are over. Europe cannot be technocratic, bureaucratic or even diplomatic. Europe has to be ever more democratic. The role of the European Parliament is essential. This is why the European elections of 2014 can be so decisive.

Before the next European Parliament elections in 2014, the Commission will present its outline for the shape of the future European Union. And we will put forward explicit ideas for Treaty change in time for a debate.

We will set out the objectives to be pursued, the way the institutions that can make the European Union more open and democratic, the powers and instruments to make it more effective, and the model to make it a union for the peoples of Europe. I believe we need a real debate and in a democracy the best way to debate is precisely in elections at the European level on our future and our goals.

17/27 dimension

This is not just a debate for the Euro area in its present membership. While deeper integration is indispensable for the Euro area and its members, this project should remain open to all Member States.

Let me be very clear: in Europe, we need no more walls dividing us! Because the European Union is stronger as a whole in keeping the integrity of its single market, its membership and in its institutions.

No one will be forced to come along. And no one will be forced to stay out. The speed will not be dictated by the slowest or the most reluctant. This is why our proposals will be based on the existing Union and its institutions, on the Community method. Let's be clear – there is only one European Union. One Commission. One European Parliament. More democracy, more transparency, more accountability, is not created by a proliferation of institutions that would render the EU more complicated, more difficult to read, less coherent and less capable to act.

Expanding public debate

This is, Honourable Members, the magnitude of the decisions that we will need to make over time.

That's why I believe we need a serious discussion between the citizens of Europe about the way forward.

About the possible consequences of fragmentation. Because what can happen sometimes is to have, through unintended consequences, to have fragmentation when we do not want it.

About what we could achieve if leaders avoid national provincialism what we can achieve together.

We must use the 2014 election to mobilise all pro-European forces. We must not allow the populists and the nationalists to set a negative agenda. I expect all those who call themselves Europeans to stand up and to take the initiative in the debate. Because even more dangerous than the scepticism of the anti-Europeans, is the indifference or the pessimism of the pro-Europeans.

V. Conclusion: is this realistic?

To sum up, what we need is a decisive deal to complete the EMU, based on a political commitment to a stronger European Union.

The sequence I put before you today is clear.

We should start by doing all we can to stabilise the euro area and accelerate growth in the EU as a whole. The Commission will present all the necessary proposals and we have started today with the single supervisor to create a banking union, in line with the current Treaty provisions.

Secondly, we will present our blueprint on a deep and genuine economic and monetary union, including the political instruments, and this will be done still this autumn.

We will present here again all proposals in line with the current Treaty provisions.

And thirdly, where we cannot move forward under the existing treaties, we will present explicit proposals for the necessary Treaty changes ahead of the next European Parliamentary election in 2014, including elements for reinforced democracy and accountability.

This is our project. A project which is step by step but with a big ambition for the future with a Federation as our horizon for Europe.

Many will say that this is too ambitious, that it is not realistic.

But let me ask you - is it realistic to go on like we have been doing? Is it realistic to see what we are seeing today in many European countries? Is it realistic to see taxpayers paying banks and afterwards being forced to give banks back the houses they have paid for because they cannot pay their mortgages? Is it realistic to see more than 50% of our young people without jobs in some of our Member States? Is it realistic to go on trying to muddle through and just to accumulate mistakes with unconvincing responses? Is it realistic to think that we can win the confidence of the markets when we show so little confidence in each other?

To me, it is this reality that is not realistic. This reality cannot go on.

The realistic way forward is the way that makes us stronger and more united. Realism is to put our ambition at the level of our challenges. We can do it! Let's send our young people a message of hope. If there is a bias, let it be a bias for hope. We should be proud to be Europeans. Proud of our rich and diverse culture. In spite of our current problems, our societies are among the most human and free in the world.

We do not have to apologise for our democracy, our social market economy and for our values. With high levels of social cohesion. Respect for human rights and hu-

man dignity. Equality between men and women and respect for our environment. These European societies, with all its problems, are among the most decent societies in human history and I think we should be proud of that. In our countries two or three girls do not go to prison because they sing and criticise the ruler of their country. In our countries people are free and are proud of that freedom and people understand what it means to have that freedom. In many of our countries, namely the most recent Member States, there is a recent memory of what was dictatorship and totalitarianism.

So previous generations have overcome bigger challenges. Now it is for this generation to show they are up to the task.

Now is the moment for all pro-Europeans to leave business as usual behind and to embrace the business of the future. The European Union was built to guarantee peace. Today, this means making our Union fit to meet the challenges of globalization.

That is why we need a new thinking for Europe, a decisive deal for Europe. That is why we need to guide ourselves by the values that are at the heart of the European Union. Europe I believe has a soul. This soul can give us the strength and the determination to do what we must do.

You can count on the European Commission. I count on you, the European Parliament. Together, as Community institutions, we will build a better, stronger and a more united Europe, a citizens' Union for the future of Europe but also the future of the world.

Thank you for your attention.

Joint statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace prize to the European Union

Brussels, 12 October 2012, EUCO 186/12

It is a tremendous honour for the European Union to be awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. This Prize is the strongest possible recognition of the deep political motives behind our Union: the unique effort by ever more European states to overcome war and divisions and to jointly shape a continent of peace and prosperity. It is a Prize not just for the project and the institutions embodying a common interest, but for the 500 million citizens living in our Union.



At its origins the European Union brought together nations emerging from the ruins of devastating World Wars – which originated on this continent – and united them in a project for peace. Over the last sixty years, the European Union has reunified a continent split by the Cold War around values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

These are also the values that the European Union promotes in order to make the world a better place for all. The European Union will continue to promote peace and security in the countries close to us and in the world at large. We are proud that the European Union is the world's largest provider of development assistance and humanitarian aid and is at the forefront of global efforts to fight climate change and promote global public goods.

This Nobel Peace Prize shows that in these difficult times the European Union remains an inspiration for leaders and citizens all over the world.







**The EU security policy
toolbox:
facts and figures**



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1. Thematic instruments

1.1. Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)

The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) was established following Council Regulation (Euratom) no 300/2007 of 19 February 2007,¹ replacing and widening the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme,² which had been established to help prevent nuclear incidents in the former USSR satellite states.

The INSC aims to fund actions from a broad range of stakeholders and cover the promotion and development of an effective regulatory framework for nuclear safety (including materials and radiation protection). It also allows for the provision of technical support to nuclear stakeholders in 15 countries (at national, local or regional level with private companies, NGOs, the Joint Research Centre (JRC), EU agencies and international organisations).

Adopted following the ordinary legislation procedure³ and based on the multiannual strategy programme,⁴ €524 million have been allocated to the INSC for the 2007-2013 period. The Instrument is implemented through annual action programmes. A margin of manoeuvre is preserved as it is possible to engage in emergency or support measures without clear prior indications in the multiannual strategy paper. For example, a nuclear incident requires urgent safety measures and cannot be planned explicitly into a multiannual strategic programme.

On 25 January 2013, a new cooperation mechanism⁵ was established between the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁶ Once adopted, the new multiannual financial framework should have a budget of €560 million for the period 2014-

1. See: Council Regulation n°300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:081:0001:0010:EN:PDF>.

2. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_central_asia/r17003_en.htm.

3. Previously known as 'co-decision procedure', the ordinary procedure is the main legislative procedure of the EU decision-making process; it gives the same political weight to the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. See: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/0080a6d3d8/Ordinary-legislative-procedure.html>.

4. See: Commission decision on the revised strategy for Community Cooperation Programmes in the field of Nuclear Safety for the period 2010-2013, C(2009) 9822: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/nuclear_safety/docs/2010_2013_revised_strategy_en.pdf.

5. See: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/organisations/iaea_en.htm.

6. See: <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/eucontribution.pdf>.

2020, which would represent a rise of 6.8 percent compared to the previous multiannual financial framework.

1.2. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

Adopted following Council Regulation (EC) no. 1889/2006 and funded through the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has a budget of €1.104 billion for the period 2007-2013.

EIDHR's operational range is wide, as it is also open to various organisations and non-legal entities and can even be implemented without the agreement of the government of a third country. It acts as a complementary tool of the Instrument for Stability (IFS) and indirectly finances the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Supporting a diversity of stakeholders (from civil society to UN bodies, and from international organisations to EU election observation missions), its governance is adapted to its objectives: to support and strengthen the international and regional framework for promoting and supporting human rights by strengthening civil societies and not necessarily working at the governmental/national level.

On 25 June 2012, the EU adopted its Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy which sets out principles to integrate the human rights dimension in all EU external policies: from development cooperation to CSDP and the area of freedom, security and justice.⁷ In addition, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, the first thematic EU Special Representative, took office on 1 September 2012 in order to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of EU human rights policy.⁸ With a very flexible mandate, the EUSR will be able to contribute to the implementation of the Union's human rights policy, including by providing recommendations and inputs to the formulation of relevant EU policies. He will also regularly meet all the human rights stakeholders: from academia and civil society to government representatives and international organisations, as well as EU heads of missions and other EUSRs.

7. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/

8. See Council decision 2012/440/CFSP. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:200:021:0023:EN:PDF>.

1.3. Instrument for Stability (IfS)

Established in the framework of EC regulation 1717/2006 and complementing the rapid reaction mechanism,⁹ the Instrument for Stability (IfS) finances two types of action depending on the situation on the ground.¹⁰

The short-term component, which represents 72 percent of the total IfS funds, aims to restore the necessary conditions for the implementation of other EU instruments. The short-term component is thus only dedicated to crisis situation response and prevention, and includes a wide range of actions such as supporting the development of democratic and pluralistic state institutions, supporting socio-economic measures to promote equitable access to and transparent management of natural resources in a situation of crisis, promoting and defending respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of the victims of armed conflict .

The long-term component, which takes place in a post-crisis environment and more stable situation, covers three main objectives: the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, capacity-building in terms of cross-border threats (e.g. terrorism, illicit trafficking of people, drugs, firearms and explosive materials, sensitive chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials proliferation) and pre-/post-crisis preparedness. Due to its non-programmable nature, the short-term component is usually not included in the strategic papers which apply only to the long-term component.

The IfS is managed by the Foreign Policy Instrument Unit II, which, although an EC service, acts under the responsibility of the HR/VP of the Commission. The EEAS provides the strategic programmes on the long-term component which are then implemented by FPI or DEVCO. For the 2007-2013 period, the IfS has a budget of €2.062 billion.

Following the Foreign Affairs Council's Conclusions of 17 January 2013, the IfS has been used to allocate €20 million to restore and stabilise the situation in Mali by enabling the redeployment of civilian police, supporting the Malian government with training and technical assistance, promoting dialogue and reconciliation at the local level and contributing to the first phases of the electoral process.

9. See: Rapid Reaction Mechanism: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/r12701_en.htm.

10. See: Chantal Lavallée, *L'instrument de stabilité – au service de l'approche globale de l'UE*, ISSUE Briefs n° 15, 8 March 2013: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_15.pdf.

1.4. Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI)

Established in the framework of Council regulation 1934/2006, the financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised and other high-income countries and territories focuses on economic, financial and technical cooperation.

With a budgetary allocation of €172 million over the 2007-2013 period, the top three priorities of the ICI 2011-2013 programme, which is valued at €77,645,000,¹¹ are:

- **Public diplomacy:** support is provided to the EU Centre,¹² public policy think tanks and research institutes
- **Business cooperation:** Strengthening the presence of Europeans companies in key markets which are difficult to penetrate
- **People-to-people links:** Enhancing mutual understanding between people by strengthening cooperation in the field of education and civil society.

Based on multiannual cooperation programmes, the ICI is implemented by the EC according to adopted annual action programmes. It covers grants, financing agreements or employment contracts while the range of entities eligible for funding include partners countries, international and regional organisation and EU bodies including agencies.

The ICI does not allow the EU to cooperate with new emerging economies¹³ on certain challenges (such as climate change or the need to promote sustainable development at all levels despite the widening of ICI to developing countries. Therefore a new partnership instrument was proposed in 2011 and should be launched when the next MMF is adopted, probably in the course of 2013.

11. Source: Multiannual programme for cooperation with industrialised countries and other high-income countries and territories (2011-2013): http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ici/docs/com_2011_2046_en.pdf.

12. In order to promote greater understanding and increase awareness of the EU, its institutions and its policies 35 European Union Centres have been launched in Universities in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. See: http://eeas.europa.eu/eu-centres/index_en.htm.

13. Indeed article 2.2 of Council regulation 1934/2006 provides that the scope of the instrument should be limited to 'countries and territories listed in the Annex (...) the Commission shall amend the list in the Annex in accordance with regular OECD/DAC reviews of its List of developing countries'. But countries like India, China and Brazil are progressively moving beyond the status of developing nations.

1.5. Partnership Instrument

The Partnership Instrument is a new tool which is not yet operational but which is intended to overcome the limits of the ICI, allowing the EU to develop cooperation with strategic partners/emerging economies on topics of interest for the EU:

*It will finance activities to support the projection of EU policies abroad through bilateral cooperation and common approaches to challenges, economic partnerships and business cooperation, public diplomacy activities and networks, people-to-people links; the conduct of policy discussions and joint activities with individual partner countries; and the promotion of trade and investment and regulatory convergence with strategic partners.*¹⁴

According to the proposal for a regulation establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries¹⁵ which is currently awaiting a first reading by the European Parliament,¹⁶ this new instrument would be based on the combination of the following three articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU): Articles 212(2), 207(2) and 209(1). Once adopted, it should completely replace the ICI and be funded through the new MFF. According to the current proposal, the financial reference amount planned should be approximately €1.131 billion. The Partnership Instrument should enter into force on 1 January 2014 and last until 31 December 2020.

1.6. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)¹⁷

Replacing the previous instruments for pre-accession¹⁸ and established following Council regulation 1085/2006, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) provides financial support to the enlargement countries in their preparations for EU accession. With a €11.5 billion budget, the IPA works through multiannual frameworks/documents which are translated into annual programmes and implemented

14. Source: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 'A Budget for Europe 2020 - Part II: Policy files'; COM(2011) 500 final, 29 June 2011. See: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/fin_fwk1420/MFF_COM-2011-500_Part_II_en.pdf.

15. Source: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries - {SEC(2011) 1475 final}; {SEC(2011) 1476 final}. See: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/documents/prop_reg_partnership_instrument_en.pdf.

16. See: Procedure file of the Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with third countries: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2011/0411\(COD\)&l=EN#tab-0](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2011/0411(COD)&l=EN#tab-0).

17. See in particular: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Instrument for Pre- Accession Assistance (IPA) Revised Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework for 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/miff_adopted10-10-12_en.pdf.

18. The three previous instruments were: the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession, the PHARE programme for countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD). Turkey has also had a special pre-accession instrument.

in various ways (from centralised to decentralised and joint/shared management). The different programmes are decided and implemented by the respective EC DG according to five main components:

1. Transition assistance & institution building [DG Enlargement]
2. Cross-border cooperation [DG Enlargement]
3. Regional development [DG for Regional and Urban Policy]
4. Human Resources development [DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion]
5. Rural development [DG Agriculture and rural development]

There currently are six candidate countries: Croatia (whose Accession Treaty was signed on 9 December 2011 and is expected to become a member state on 1 July 2013), Iceland, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo are also regarded as potential candidates and are able to participate in activities under the two first IPA components.

1.7. EC Guarantees for Lending Operations

Established following Council regulation 480/2009, the Guarantee Fund for External Actions aims to protect the EU against financial risks related to loans (e.g. MFA) granted to third states. The objective is to protect European budget appropriations and to contribute to compliance with budgetary discipline.

Concretely, if a country does not respect its financial commitment *vis-à-vis* its debtors, the fund intervenes to pay the EU's and EIB's creditors, who were guarantors, in order to avoid direct financial risks for the EU budget. The management of the fund is entrusted to the EC and it is safeguarded as financing of the fund is guaranteed as compulsory expenditure from the general budget of the EU, according to the last inter-institutional agreement.

As of 31 December 2011, the net assets of the fund amounted to €1,755,434,096.¹⁹

19. Source: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guarantees covered by the general budget - Situation at 31 December 2011 - {SWD(2012) 347 final}. See: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201301/20130109ATT58737/20130109ATT58737EN.pdf>.

1.8. Instrument for Humanitarian Aid

The European Union (EU) is often quoted as being the biggest humanitarian aid donor in the world, and this constitutes an important aspect of the EU's external relations. This effort, based on several key documents such as the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid,²⁰ the framework partnership agreement with humanitarian organisations²¹ and the partnership with the United Nations,²² seeks also to promote the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

Established following Council regulation 1257/96, the instrument for humanitarian aid aims to provide emergency assistance and support to victims of natural disasters, outbreaks of fighting or other comparable circumstances. The instrument can be activated at the request of a wide range of actors (including NGOs).

The measures, which cannot last longer than six months, are grant-financed and cover a range of issues, from supplying items during emergencies situations to the improvement of its own implementation process. In this framework, the Director of the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) is in charge of primary emergency humanitarian actions (with a maximum amount of €3 million and a maximum duration of three months), the European Commission (EC) is responsible for the managing and monitoring of the instrument and for the actions relating to emergency operations up to €30 million for a maximum of six months as well as non-urgent decisions up to a maximum of €10 million.

1.9. Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)

Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) is a policy-based financial instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support to partner third countries. It takes the form of medium/long-term loans or grants, or a combination of these, and complements the financing provided in the context of the International Monetary Fund's reform programme. In 2011/2012, the recipient countries were: Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Egypt, Kosovo, Armenia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/humanitarian_aid/ah0009_en.htm.

21. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/humanitarian_aid/r12600_en.htm.

22. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/humanitarian_aid/r10007_en.htm.

MFA commitments and payments in 2011-2012²³

(values in euro)	2011	2012 (indicative)
Appropriated commitments for grants in the budget	104,868,567	95,550,000
Commitments, total	393,476	88,350,000
OAs, PEFA studies, ex-post evaluations	393,476	350,000
MFA Georgia (proposed)		23,000,000
MFA Kyrgyz Republic (proposed)		15,000,000
MFA Egypt (possible)		50,000,000
MFA Kosovo (possible, end-2012 or 2013)		t.b.d.
Uncommitted budget allocations	104,475,091	n.a.
Appropriated MFA grant payments in the budget	88,552,647	79,050,000
Payments, total	55,236,767	74,350,000
OAs, PEFA studies, ex-post evaluations	236,767	350,000
MFA Armenia	35,000,000	
MFA Moldova	20,000,000	30,000,000
MFA Georgia (proposed, first payment)		11,500,000
MFA Kyrgyz Republic (proposed, first payment)		7,500,000
MFA Egypt (possible, first payment)		25,000,000
Unused allocations for grant payments	33,315,880	4,700,000
Loan MFA disbursements, total	126,000,000	705,000,000
Armenia	26,000,000	39,000,000
Serbia	100,000,000	
Other, including Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina (active) and Egypt (possible)		666,000,000

MFA = macro-financial assistance; OA = operational assessment; PEFA = public expenditure and financial account-ability

23. Source: Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2011, COM(2012) 339 final, Brussels, 28 June 2012.

1.10. Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)

Established in the framework of regulation 195/2006, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) replaces a large number of instruments created over time and as needs arose²⁴ and is structured around three main components.

The first component which is financially the most important is dedicated to geographic programmes and covers various forms of cooperation with 47 developing countries: from the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals to assistance in post-crisis situations.

The second component includes all the thematic programmes related to food security, migration and asylum, environment and the roles of non-states actors and local authorities in development.

Finally the last component covers the specific accompanying measures dedicated to the 18 African, Caribbean and Pacific ‘Sugar Protocol’ countries.²⁵

With a €16.9 billion budget over the 2007-2013 period (€10.057 billion for the geographic programmes, €5.596 billion for the thematic programmes and €1.244 billion for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries), the DCI is managed through annual and multiannual action programmes.

1.11. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)

Established in 2007 following the EC regulation 1638/2006, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (ENPI) supports the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and provides funding for actions promoting good governance and economic development in ENP partner countries, with the purpose of facilitating and speeding up the transition to democracy, market economy, sustainable development and adoption of human rights norms.

24. The TACIS Programme (2000-2006) which aimed to promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_central_asia/r17003_en.htm. The ALA programme provided financial aid and cooperation with countries in Asia and Latin America.

25. In parallel with the Cotonou agreement, the Sugar Protocol has incorporated preferential trade arrangements with the EU for certain ACP countries: Barbados, Belize, Republic of Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

With a €11.2 billion budget for the 2007-2013 period, the ENPI supports in particular political, economic, social and sectoral reform, while also backing regional and local development and participation in Community programmes such as INVEST in MED, a Euro-Mediterranean network of organisations committed to investment promotion and trade facilitation, or the FLEG programme which supports governments, civil society and the private sector in the development of sound and sustainable forest management practices.

In addition, the ENPI has several specific provisions regarding cross-border cooperation (to which 5 percent of the budget is allocated), good governance programmes and the sharing of information between the participants.²⁶

26. Article 16 of regulation n°1638/2006 provides that: 'Community financing may also cover expenditure associated with the preparation, follow-up, monitoring, auditing and evaluation activities directly necessary for the implementation of this regulation and for the achievement of its objectives, e.g. studies, meetings, information, awareness-raising, publication and training activities, including training and educational measures for partners enabling them to take part in the various stages of the programme, expenditure associated with computer networks for the exchange of information and any other administrative or technical assistance expenditure that the Commission may incur for the management of the programme.'

2. The EU as a global player

In order to facilitate an overview of EU policies and priorities in this domain, all instruments that have external action aspects have been regrouped in a single part of the EU budget: under Heading 4 ('EU as a Global Player'). Nevertheless, some instruments remain based on the multiannual framework programme while others are only based on annual programmes or crisis situations.

The table below shows a compilation of figures from the EU budget dedicated to external instruments and policies. Heading 4 of the budget, 'EU as a Global Player', includes the CFSP budget line which covers crisis management operations (CSDP missions), European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs), non-proliferation and disarmament missions, and other preparatory actions.

2.1. Budget Heading 4: the EU as a global player²⁷

(values in millions of euro)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013 (estimated)
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)	2,446	2,114	2,157	1,464	1,253	1,350	1,634
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)	1,403	1,510	1,455	1,486	1,394	1,318	1,472
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	1,984	1,922	1,931	1,953	2,028	2,048	2,042
Instrument for Stability	44	126	142	150	173	200	216
Humanitarian aid	729	869	774	947	1,009	792	828
Macroeconomic assistance	20	40	16	101	55	79	97

27. Source: *EU Budget 2011 – Financial report*, Annex II.

(values in millions of euro)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013 (estimated)
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	89	192	314	251	303	303	321
EC guarantees for lending operations	0	0	92	94	139	260	156
Emergency aid reserve	0	0	0	0	0	90	110
Industrialised Countries Instrument	10	16	13	20	19	20	19
Democracy and Human Rights	129	117	127	154	129	154	140
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation	51	73	77	89	70	66	71
ICI+						9	18
Other actions and programmes	165	172	678	611	331	245	169
Decentralised agencies	21	38	13	19	20	20	21
TOTAL	7,091	7,191	7,788	7,340	6,921	6,955	7,312
TOTAL EU BUDGET	112,377	113,070	112,107	120,490	126,497	129,088	137,924


2.2. Heading 4 of EU Budget in 2012-2013: commitments and payments

(values in euro)	Budget in 2012		Budget in 2013		Difference in %		Difference	
	Com- mitment Appropri- ations	Payment Appropri- ations	Com- mitment Appropri- ations	Payment Appropri- ations	Com- mitment Appropri- ations	Payment Appropri- ations	Com- mitment Appropri- ations	Payment Appropri- ations
IPA	1,865, 925,450	1,338, 296,525	1,863, 517,789	1,212, 009,347	-0.10%	-9.40%	-2, 407,661	-126, 287,178
ENPI	2,321, 368,576	1,327, 964,311	2,467, 782,527	1,285, 300,321	6.30%	-3.20%	146, 413,951	-42, 663,990
DCI	2,584, 156,944	2,042, 736,110	2,640, 379,755	1,878, 518,161	2.20%	-8%	56, 222,811	-164, 217,949
ICI	24, 121,000	19, 954,828	23, 500,000	18, 385,754	-2.60%	-7.90%	-1, -621,000	-1, 569,074
ICI+	30, 500,000	8, 361,937	47, 900,000	7, 363,722	57.00%	-11.90%	17, 400,000	-998,215
Democracy and human rights	176, 125,000	150, 008,116	177, 067,000	130, 085,504	0.50%	-13.30%	942,000	-19, 922,612
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation	77, 330,000	66, 184,313	78, 876,000	65, 553,343	2.00%	-1%	1, 546,000	-630,970
Instrument for Stability	309, 278,000	200, 392,185	325, 417,000	162, 934,359	5.20%	-18.70%	16, 139,000	-37, 457,826
Humanitarian Aid	848, 978,500	832, 774,986	865, 257,000	781, 210,372	1.90%	-6.20%	16, 278,000	-51, 564,614
Macro-financial assistance	95, 550,000	60, 050,000	94, 550,000	56, 339,890	-1.00%	-6.20%	-1, 000,000	-3, 710,110
CFSP	362, 964,000	302, 777,340	396, 332,000	316, 794,119	9.20%	4.60%	33, 368,000	14, 016,779
EC guarantees for lending operations	260, 170,000	260, 170,000	155, 660,000	155, 660,000	-40.20%	-40.20%	-104, 510,000	-104, 510,000

(values in euro)	Budget in 2012		Budget in 2013		Difference in %		Difference	
Emergency Aid reserve	258,937,000	90,000,000	264,115,000	80,000,000	2.00%	-11.10%	5,178,000	-10,000,000
Others actions and programmes	168,328,000	246,295,890	162,732,140	151,920,368	-3.30%	-38.30%	-5,589,860	-94,375,522
Decentralised agencies	20,044,530	20,044,530	20,026,500	20,526,500	-0.10%	2.40%	-18,030	481,970
TOTAL	9,403,777,000	6,966,011,071	9,583,118,711	6,322,601,760	1.90%	-9.20%	179,341,711	-643,409,311


Source: European Union, General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2013: the figures, Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg, 2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2013/budget_folder/FINAL_EN_DG_BUDG_general_budget_2013.pdf.

2.3. EU Budget - IPA, ENPI, DCI, Humanitarian Aid and CFSP in 2012-2013²⁸



28. Source: European Union, 'General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2013: the figures', Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg, 2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2013/budget_folder/FINAL_EN_DG_BUDG_general_budget_2013.pdf.

2.4. EU Budget - other external instruments in 2012-2013²⁹



The EU budget does not include the European Development Fund (EDF) which remains the main instrument/aid for development cooperation in the ACP/OCT States. The EDF has a budget of 22,682 million euro for the period 2008-2013 which is financed outside the EU budget framework.


29. Source: European Union, General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2013: the figures, Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg, 2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2013/budget_folder/FINAL_EN_DG_BUDG_general_budget_2013.pdf.

3. CFSP Budget

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013 (estimated)
CFSP Budget (in millions of euro)	192	314	251	303	303	321
Annual Evolution		36%	-20%	20%	0%	5.90%
% European Union as global player budget section	2%	4%	3.40%	4.30%	4.30%	4.30%
% of EU Budget	0.10%	0.02%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%


In order to show a clear link between policies and the financial resources associated with the same policies, each policy has been grouped in chapters of the budget. All the policies related to external relations are grouped in chapter 19 of the EC budget.³⁰ The Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) is included in the 19:03 chapter of Heading 4 ‘Global Europe’, and is structured into six budgetary lines.

- 19 03 01: Civilian Crisis Management
- 19 03 02: Non Proliferation and Disarmament
- 19 03 03: Conflict resolution and other stabilisation measures³¹
- 19 03 04: Emergency measures
- 19 03 05: Preparatory and follow-up measures
- 19 03 06: European Union Special Representatives




30. Chapter 19 is subdivided into: 19:01 Administrative expenditure for external relations policy areas; 19:02 Cooperation with third countries in the area of migration and asylum; 19:03 CFSP; 19:04 EIDHR; 19:05 Relations and cooperation with industrialised non-member countries; 19:06 Crisis response and global threats to security; 19:08 ENP and relations with Russia; 19:09 Relations with Latin America; 19:10 Relations with Asia, Central Asia and Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Yemen); 19:11 Policy strategy and coordination for ‘External Relations’ policy area; 19:49 expenditure on administrative management of programmes committed in accordance with the former financial regulation.

31. This budgetary line has not appeared in the EU budget since 2011.




Source: EUISS research; CFSP budget reports.

Crisis Management Operations financed in 2010-2012



■ EUMM Georgia	22,600,000	23,900,000	20,900,000
■ EULEX Kosovo	89,164,882	160,123,600	111,000,000
■ EUPOL Afghanistan	54,600,000	60,500,000	56,870,000
■ Others	67,219,890	69,549,324	101,239,094


Other CFSP Actions financed in 2010-2012



■ Non-Proliferation	22,235,000	2,497,700	17,197,028
■ EUSR	17,065,000	31,050,612	14,941,850
■ Others	178,086	132,190	582,731

Source: EUISS research; CFSP budget reports.

3.1. CSDP civilian missions and military operations in 2010-2012³²



32. Source: Council of the European Union.
See: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=fr>.


The table below shows the financial commitments mentioned in the Council legal documents of the eleven ongoing CSDP missions.³³ However, the figures do not correspond to those mentioned in the final EU budget nor in the joint actions implementing the council decisions as they have been recalculated on a monthly basis for the purpose of annual comparison and evolution monitoring.

3.2. Civilian missions in 2010-2012

(values in euro)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010-2013
EULEX Kosovo	56,785,715	141,428,571	128,300,000	55,500,000	382,014,286
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN	49,911,111	47,466,666	39,123,332	28,435,000	164,936,109
EUMM Georgia	39,700,000	5,975,000	23,150,000	15,675,000	84,500,000
EUJUST LEX Iraq	16,550,000	24,775,000	27,200,000	13,575,000	82,100,000
EUSEC DR CONGO	12,175,000	13,350,000	11,650,000	12,566,666	49,741,666
EUPOL COPPS	6,870,000	8,250,000	9,415,000	4,665,000	29,200,000
EUCAP NESTOR			9,533,333	13,346,667	22,880,000
EUPOL CONGO	2,164,167	2,212,500	2,702,500	5,062,500	12,141,667
EUAVSEC South Sudan			3,947,368	7,894,736	11,842,104
EUCAP SAHEL			3,625,000	5,075,000	8,700,000
EUBAM RAFAH	2,164,167	2,212,500	2,702,500	490,000	7,569,167
TOTAL	186,320,160	245,670,237	261,349,033	162,285,569	855,624,999

33. Methodology: Amounts have been adapted and recalculated on a monthly basis to present figures by years. The figures might not correspond but the different amounts are expected to be close to the final accurate amount.

CSDP budget for civilian operations - by region



3.3. Military operations in 2010-2012³⁴

Operation	Amount of common cost (in euro)	Regions
EUFOR Althea	71,700,000	Wider Europe
EU Atalanta	8,300,000	Africa
EUTM Somalia	4,800,000	Africa

34. Source: Council Joint Actions EUFOR ALTHEA 2004/570/CFSP; EU ATALANTA 2008/851/CFSP; EUTM Somalia 2010/96/CFSP. In addition, following the Council decision 2013/34/CFSP, EUTM Mali was launched in February 2013 with an amount for common costs of €12 300 000.

3.4. Non-proliferation and disarmament actions in 2010-2012³⁵

2010

Legal Basis	Action	Commitment (in euro)
2009/1012/CFSP	Support of EU activities to promote the control of arms exports	787,000
2010/179/CFSP	Support of SEESAC arms control activities in Western Balkans	1,600,000
2010/336/CFSP	EU activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-UNIDIR)	1,520,000
2010/430/CFSP	Establishing a European network of independent think tanks	2,182,000
2010/461/CFSP	EU activities in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO)	5,280,000
2010/585/CFSP	EU support for the IAEA activities in the area of nuclear security ... (IAEA V)	996,000
2010/765/CFSP	EU action to counter the illicit trade of SALW by air (SIPRI)	900,000

2011

Legal Basis	Action	Commitment (in euro)
2010/799/CFSP	Confidence-building process - Zone free of WMD - Non-proliferation consortium	347,700
2011/428/CFSP	UNODA activities in support of UN programme of Action on SALW	2,150,000

35. Source: Six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2012/I) & Twelfth Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (2011/II). In addition, a comprehensive list of EU actions in terms of non-proliferation and disarmament can be found at: http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/documentation/documents/index_en.htm#Bookmark5.

2012

Legal Basis	Action	Commitment (in euro)
2012/121/CFSP	Activities to promote EU-China-Africa dialogue and co-operation on conventional arms controls	830,000
2012/166/CFSP	Support of activities of OPCW - EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD	2,140,000
2012/281/CFSP	International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities	1,490,000
2012/421/CFSP	Support of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)	1,700,000
2012/662/CFSP	OSCE - Small Arms and Light Weapons	890,000
2012/662/CFSP	UNDP - Small Arms and Light Weapons	790,000
2012/422/CFSP	WMD Free Zone II	352,000
2012/423/CFSP	Missile proliferation (HCOC II)	930,000
2012/699/CFSP	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO V)	5,185,028
2012/700/CFSP	Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 (AP Landmines II)	1,030,000
2012/711/CFSP	Control of Arms Export (COARM Outreach)	1,860,000

Total 2010-2012

Year	Total commitment (in euro)
2010	22,235,000
2011	2,497,700
2012	17,197,028
2010-2012	41,929,728

4. Financing CSDP missions

According to the TEU Article 41, § 2: *‘the Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise’*. This article makes a clear distinction between military and civilian operations.

Military operations

Based on Article 41, §3 of the TEU, the financing mechanism of CSDP military operations, known as Athena, is intended mainly to provide funds for rapid response operations. The complete list of costs covered by Athena (including transport, infrastructure, medical services, lodging, fuel, etc.) is stated in four lists annexed to the Council decision 2011/871/CFSP, which amends the Council decision 2008/975/CFSP. Personnel and other items are financed on a *‘costs lie where they fall’* basis.

Athena is managed by a trio composed of an administrator, an operation commander and an accounting officer. Their actions remain under the responsibility of a special committee composed of one representative from each participating member state, as well as EEAS and EC representatives. A permanent revision procedure has been set up and each presidency has at least one meeting on the evolution of the Athena mechanism.

Athena makes the distinction between common costs (including those incurred in preparation for or following operations) and operational costs which are directly related to operations. All the costs not explicitly covered by Athena remain under the responsibility of the participating member states, even if the special committee can decide to include it in part B of annex III.³⁶ EU exercise costs are also included even if capital acquisition, planning and preparatory phase of exercises, transports, barracks and lodging for forces are not included.

Until now, the Athena mechanism has been used for only five European Union military operations: EUFOR Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad/RCA & EUTM Somalia/Mali.

36. ‘Operational Common Costs Relating to the Active Phase of a Specific Operation, Borne by Athena when the Council so decides’. Source: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1381208/at3.pdf>.

Civilian operations

Civilian operations are financed directly by the EU budget. Usually, the financial references are included in the Council decision establishing the mission and are revised following recommendations on expanding the mission.

The available funds are combined in the 'EU as global player' section of the budget. For 2011, the €303 million budget accounted for 4 percent of the section total and only for 0.2 percent of the total

4.1. Athena Mechanism

Legal Basis: 2011/871/CFSP; 2008/975/CFSP; 2007/384/CFSP; 2007/91/CFSP; 2005/68/CFSP; 2004/925/CFSP; 2004/197/CFSP

Operations	Legal Basis	Cost Covered	Financial amount of reference (in euro)
CONCORDIA FYR	2003/92/ CFSP	Expenditure related to transportation for the forces as a whole shall not be eligible for payment as common costs.	4,700,000
ARTEMIS DRC	2003/423/ CFSP	Barracks and lodging for the forces as a whole, as well as expenditure related to transportation of the forces as a whole, shall not be eligible for payment as common costs.	7,000,000
EUFOR Althea	2004/570/ CFSP	Barracks and lodging for the forces as a whole shall not be eligible for payment as common costs. Expenditure related to transportation for the forces as a whole shall not be eligible for payment as common costs	71,700,000

Operations	Legal Basis	Cost Covered	Financial amount of reference (in euro)
EUFOR DR Congo	2006/319/ CFSP	Barracks and lodging for the forces as a whole shall not be eligible for payment as common costs. Expenditure related to transportation for the forces as a whole shall not be eligible for payment as common costs. Art 31,3§ = 70%	16,700,000
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA	2007/677/ CFSP	Art 33, 3§ = 50 %	99,200,000
EUNAVFOR	2008/749/ CFSP	Art 33, 3§ = 30 %	60,000
EU Atalanta	2008/851/ CFSP	Art 33, 3§ = 30 %	8,300,000
EUTM Somalia	2010/96/ CFSP	Art 32, 3§ = 60 %	4,800,000
	2011/483/ CFSP	Art 32, 3§ = 30 % Until 09/08/2011 Art 25,1§ = 60 % From 09/08/2011 Art 25,1§ = 30% From 01/01/2013 Art 25,1§ = 100%	4,800,000

According to **Article 25, 1§** the Member States must pay their contributions at the level of 30 percent of the reference amount decided, unless the Council decides on a different percentage.

Article 32, 3§ provides the possibility for the administrator/commander to pay expenses for the operation concerned up to 30 percent on the day of legal document adoption unless the Special Committee decides another percentage.

Article 33, 3§ provides the possibility for the Special Committee to determine a depreciation rate for equipment, infrastructure and other assets which have been financed in common.

5. CSDP agencies' budgets


The table below shows the annual total expenditures of each CSDP agency in relation to the member states' contributions. Figures have been gathered from official websites, annual reports and through internal requests.^{37 38}

(values in euro)	EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)	European Security and Defence College (ESDC)	EU Satellite Centre (EUSC)	European Defence Agency (EDA)
Legal Basis	2001/554/CFSP 2006/1002/CFSP	2008/550/CFSP	2001/297/CFSP 2011/555/CFSP	2004/551/CFSP
2008	5,001,236	<i>'Each Member State, EU institution, EU agency and institute forming the ESDC network shall bear all costs related to its participation in ESDC, including salaries, allowances, travel and subsistence expenses and costs related to organisational and administrative support of the ESDC training activities.'</i>	14,493,992	27,500,000
2008 MS contributions	3,803,490		11,558,487	24,275,000
2009	4,864,313		15,917,631	29,200,000
2009 MS Contributions	3,940,423		12,200,335	27,686,000
2010	4,854,779		16,384,802	31,000,000
2010 MS Contributions	4,020,812		12,333,393	28,712,988
2011	6,029,821		16,891,617	30,530,850
2011 MS Contribution	4,020,812		12,333,393	29,033,945


37. For the EUISS, figures reflect only operational costs. Member States' contributions figures do not include contributions to pension scheme.

38. The EUISS's 2011 budget includes the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) project. See in particular: ESPAS Report, *Global Trends 2030 – Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World*; available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/espas-report-global-trends-2030-citizens-in-an-interconnected-and-polycentric-world/>

Annual total expenditure of the EDA in relation to member states' contributions



Annual total expenditure of the SatCen in relation to member states' contributions



6. Partnership Agreements

According to TEU Article 37, the EU can conclude agreements with non-EU Member States (MS) or with international organisations in the field of CFSP, including CSDP.

EU-UN

EU-UN cooperation in the field of CSDP has been particularly strong in the areas of crisis management since 2003, when the EU launched Operation Artemis and EUPM BiH took over policing Bosnia and Herzegovina from the United Nations International Police Task Force (UNIPTF). A joint consultative mechanism, the EU-UN Steering Committee, was set up that year following the first Joint Declaration on EU-UN co-operation in Crisis Management signed in 2003.³⁹ EU-UN cooperation deepened in 2007 with the publications of a second joint statement encouraging regular senior-level dialogue between the EU troika and the UN Secretariat, as well as regular exchanges of views between the UN Secretariat and the EU's Political and Security Committee.

EU-NATO

EU-NATO relations are one important feature of the institutional structure of CSDP. This partnership is important for both organisations as the EU does not have the range of planning capabilities (such as a permanent HQ) that NATO has, and as NATO does not have the civilian expertise which adds value in many missions, following the general adoption of a comprehensive approach in military operations.

The 'Berlin Plus' arrangements, are at the core of this partnership, and cover EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities. Operations carried out in the framework of this arrangement, adopted in 2003, include Operation EUFOR Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides these operational aspects, EU-NATO cooperation includes institutional aspects. On the one hand, a special EU cell has been created within the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to better prepare EU operations relying on NATO

³⁹. See in particular: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_2768_en.htm.

common assets and capabilities. On the other hand, NATO is regularly invited to informal EU defence ministerial meetings.

In the capabilities development field, an EU-NATO capability group, composed of NATO allies and non-NATO EU Member States that have a security agreement with NATO, was set up in Brussels in May 2003 with the task of regularly exchanging information on requirements common to both organisations, if both organisations so wish and if appropriate. The EDA's Pooling and Sharing initiative and the NATO's Smart Defence initiative proved that this area of cooperation should be further developed in order to avoid any expensive duplication of efforts in the future.

One of the main remaining issues is the question of information sharing between the EU and NATO. Three EU Member States currently do not participate as full members of NATO (Ireland, Cyprus and Austria). In addition, as the Cyprus territorial dispute is not yet resolved, Turkey is maintaining its veto on an increase in its cooperation with the EU. For the moment Cyprus still has no security agreement with NATO. This implies also that there is currently no agreement concerning the sharing of information between the two organisations although a specific agreement on the security of information has been signed within the Berlin Plus agreements. In addition, the European Council of Copenhagen stated that Berlin Plus arrangements could no longer be used by EU Member States which are not part of both organisations or part of the NATO Partnership for Peace.⁴⁰ Consequently, the Berlin Plus agreements have been transformed into various bilateral security agreements and the EU is much less willing to improve cooperation without the full participation of its Member States.

40. Source: Copenhagen European Council Conclusions – Annex 2 : http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf .

6.1. Third States - Framework Agreements

In order to avoid defining third state participation conditions on a case-by-case basis, framework agreements with non-EU Member States allow for better cooperation with these states during European Union crisis management operations.

Once negotiated, these agreements have to be approved by the Council and the third states following internal procedures.

- **Norway:** Signature 03/12/2004 – Entry in force 01/01/2005
Council decision 2005/191/CFSP (JO L67/1 – 14.3.2005)
- **Iceland:** Signature 21/02/2005 – Entry in force 01/04/2005
Council decision 2005/191/CFSP (JO L67/1 – 14.3.2005)
- **Ukraine:** Signature 13/06/2005 – Entry in force 01/05/2008
Council decision 2005/495/CFSP (JO L182/28 – 13.7.2005)
- **Canada:** Signature 24/11/2005 – Entry in force 01/12/2005
Council decision 2005/851/CFSP (JO L315/20 – 1.12.2005)
- **Turkey:** Signature 29/06/2006 – Entry in force 01/08/2007
Council decision 2006/482/CFSP (JO L189/16 – 12.7.2006)
- **Montenegro:** Signature 22/02/2011 – Entry in force 04/04/2012
Council decision 2011/133/CFSP (JO L57/1 – 2.3.2011)
- **USA:** Signature 17/05/2011 – Entry in force 01/06/2011
Council decision 2011/318/CFSP (JO L143/1 – 31.5.2011)
- **Serbia:** Signature 08/06/2011 – Entry in force 01/08/2012
Council decision 2011/361/CFSP (JO L163/1- 26.6.2011)
- **New Zealand:** Signature 18/04/2012 – Entry in force 01/05/2012
Council decision 2012/315/CFSP (JO L160/1 – 21.6.2012)
- **Albania:** Signature 05/06/2012 – Entry in force after completion of Albanian internal procedures
Council decision 2012/344/CFSP (JO L169/1 – 29.6.2012)
- **Moldova :** Signature 13/12/2012 – Entry in force after completion of Moldovan internal procedures
Council decision 2013/12/CFSP (JO L8/1 – 12.1 2013)

The framework agreements signed with Romania and Bulgaria are no longer relevant since the last EU enlargement in 2007.

In addition, in the framework of Operation EUFOR Althea, several agreements were drawn up (See BIH/1/2004; BIH/5/2004; BIH/13/2008) with:

- Dominican Republic
- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- Chile
- The Argentine Republic
- Morocco
- The Swiss Confederation.

7. European Union Special Representatives (EUSR)

‘Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.

If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions.’

TEU - Article 28 (1)

‘The Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. The special representative shall carry out his mandate under the authority of the High Representative.’

TEU (Consolidated) - Article 33

Geographical areas covered by the EU Special Representatives in 2013



7.1. List of EUSRs by regions/issues, periods and total amount spent⁴¹

The table below shows the number of EUSRs per region/issue over a set period of time and the total amount allocated for the execution of their mandates. Figures have been gathered and recalculated by the author for comparison purposes.

Each EUSR has to finance its office, staff, equipment, and the operational costs of its mission with the financial reference amount mentioned in the related Council decisions.

Region/Issue	Periods	Total Period	Number of EUSRs	Total (in euro)
African Union	From 06/12/2007 to 01/11/2011 From 01/01/2011 to 30/06/2012 From 01/07/2012 to 30/06/2013		2	8,985,000
Horn of Africa	From 01/01 to 30/06/2012 From 01/07/2012 to 30/06/2013		1	5,570,000
Kosovo	From 01/05/2011 to 30/09/2011 From 01/02/2013 to 30/06/2013		3	7,525,000
Human Rights	From 07/2012 to 06/2013		1	712,500
Middle East Process	From 01/02/2013 to 30/06/2013		2	8,688,000
Afghanistan	From 10/12/2001 to 10/06/2002 From 03 to 31/08/2010 From 01/09/2010 to 31/08/2011 From 01/09/2011 to 30/06/2012 From 01/09 to 30/06/2013		3	18,770,000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	From 01/09 to 30/06/2012 From 01/07/2012 to 30/06/2013		4	20,760,000
South Caucasus/ Crisis in Georgia	From 01/09/2011 to 30/06/2012 From 01/7/2012 to 30/06/2013		4	17,203,000
Central Asia	From 01 July 2012 to 30/06/2013		3	7,732,850
African Great Lakes Region	From 03/1998 to 28/02/2007	107 months	1	5,446,500

41. Source: European External Action Service.

Region/Issue	Periods	Total Period	Number of EUSRs	Total (in euro)
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	From 29/10/2001 to 28/02/2002 From 21/10/2002 to 30/06/2004 From 01/02/2004 to 31/07/2004 From 01/08/2004 to 31 October 2005 From 17/10/2005 to 29/02/2008	21 months	6	2,105,000
Sudan	From 19/04/2007 to 31/08/2010 From 01/09/2010 to 31/08/2011 From 01/09/2011 to 30/06/2012 From 01/07/2012 to 30/06/2013	39 months	2	11,585,000
Moldova	From 03/2005 to 02/2007 From 5/02/2007 to 28/02/2011		2	6,853,000
Southern Mediterranean Region	From 18/07/2011 to 30/06/2012 From 01/07/2012 to 30/06/2013		1	1,800,000
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe			2	850,000
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	From 08/06/1998 to 11/10/1999	16 months	1	1,000,000
Palestinian Territories	From 04/1997 to 05/2002	36 onths	1	3,600,000

7.2. EU Special Representatives 2011-2012

Name	First Name	Nationality	Period of the mandate	Location	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
Quince	Gary	UK	From 1 September 2011 to 30 June 2012	African Union	715,000	2011/621/CFSP
			From 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013		680,000	2012/390/CFSP
Rondos	Alexander	EL	From 1 January to 30 June 2012	Horn of Africa	670,000	2011/819/CFSP
			From 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013		4,900,000	2012/329/CFSP
Žbogar	Samuel	SI	From 1 February to 30 June 2013	Kosovo	2,410,000	2012/39/CFSP
Lambrinidis	Stavros	EL	From July 2012 to June 2013	Human Rights	712,500	2012/440/CFSP
Reinicke	Andreas	DE	From 1 Feb. 2012 to 30 June 2013	Middle East peace process	1,300,000	2012/33/CFSP
Usackas	Vygaudas	LT	From 22 March to 31 August 2010	Afghanistan	2,500,000	2010/168/CFSP
			From 1 September 2010 to 31 August 2011		4,515,000	2010/439/CFSP
			From 1 September 2011 to 30 June 2012		3,560,000	2011/427/CFSP
			From 1 September 2012 to 30 June 2013		n.a.	n.a.

Name	First Name	Nationality	Period of the mandate	Location	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
Sorensen	Peter	DK	From 1 Sept 2011 to 30 June 2012	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,740,000	2011/426/CFSP
			From 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013		5,250,000	
Flor	Patricia	DE	From 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013	Central Asia	1,120,000	2012/328/CFSP
Lefort	Philippe	FR	From 1 September 2011 to 30 June 2012	South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia	1,758,000	2011/518/CFSP
			From 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013		2,000,000	
Leon Gross	Bernardino	ES	From 18 July 2011 to 30 June 2012	Southern Mediterranean Region	855,000	2011/424/CFSP
			From 01 July 2012 to 30 June 2013		945,000	
Mardsen	Rosalind	UK	From 1 September 2010 to 31 August 2011	Sudan	1,820,000	2010/450/CFSP
			From 1 September 2011 to 30 June 2012		955,000	
			From 01 July 2012 to 30 June 2013		1,900,000	2012/325/CFSP

Source: European External Action Service. See: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm.

7.3. Former EURs

Name	First Name	Nationality	Mandate	Region/ Organisation	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
Morel	Pierre	FR	From October 2006 to 30 June 2012	Central Asia	470,000 925,000 1,100,000 998,000 800,000 924,850	2005/588/CFSP 2006/118/CFSP 2006/670/CFSP 2008/107/CFSP 2008/900/CFSP 2009/130/CFSP 2010/112/CFSP 2010/443/CFSP 2011/425/CFSP
Vervaeke	Koen	BE	From 6 December 2007 to 1 November 2011	African Union	1,200,000 2,090,000 1,850,000 1,850,000 1,280,000 715,000	2007/805/CFSP 2008/403/CFSP 2008/898/CFSP 2010/119/CFSP 2010/441/CFSP 2011/621/CFSP 2011/697/CFSP
Gentilini	Fernando	IT	From May to 30 September 2011	Kosovo	690,000	2011/270/CFSP
Ajello	Aldo	IT	From 25 March 1996 to 28 February 2007	African Great Lakes Region	510,000 580,000 440,000 820,000	2000/792/CFSP 2002/962/CFSP 2003/447/CFSP 2004/530/CFSP 2005/96/CFSP 2006/122/CFSP

Name	First Name	Nationality	Mandate	Region/ Organisation	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
(Lord) Ashdown	Paddy	UK	From 03 June 2002 to February 2006	Bosnia and Herzegovina	200,000	2002/211/CFSP 2004/569/CFSP 2005/97/CFSP 2005/825/CFSP
Brouhns	Alexis	BE	From 21 October 2002 to 30 June 2004	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	350,000	2002/832/CFSP 2002/963/CFSP 2003/446/CFSP 2003/870/CFSP
Brylle	Torben	DK	From 19 April 2007 to 31 August 2010	Sudan	1,700,000 2,000,000 1,800,000 1,410,000	2007/238/CFSP 2007/108/CFSP 2007/809/CFSP 2008/110/CFSP 2009/134/CFSP 2010/110/CFSP
Busek	Erhard	AT	From 19 February 2001 to June 2008	Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe	Special financial arrangement with the EC	2001/915/CFSP 2002/964/CFSP 2003/449/CFSP
Jacobovits	Adriaan	NL	From March 2005 to February 2007	Moldova	278,000 1,030,000	2005/265/CFSP 2006/120/CFSP
Eriksson	Nils	SE	From April 1997 to May 2002	Palestinian Territories	3,600,000	97/286/CFSP 99/440/CFSP

Name	First Name	Nationality	Mandate	Region/ Organisation	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
Feith	Pieter	NL	From 4 February 2008 to 30 April 2011	Kosovo	380,000 645,000 1,660,000 1,230,000	2008/123/CFSP 2009/137/CFSP 2010/118/CFSP 2010/449/CFSP 2011/119/CFSP
Fouéré	Erwan	IE	From 17 October 2005 to 29 February 2008	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	725,000	2006/123/CFSP 2007/109/CFSP
Gonzalez	Felipe	ES	From 8 June 1998 to 11 October 1999	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	1,000,000	98/375/CFSP 1999/75/CFSP 1999/665/CFSP
Haavisto	Pekka	FI	From 29 July to 31 December 1999	Sudan	850,000	1999/553/CFSP
Hom- bach	Bodo	DE	From 29 July to 31 December 1999	Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe	850,000	1999/345/CFSP 1999/523/CFSP
Inzko	Valentin	AT	From March 2009 to 31 August 2010	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,200,000 2,350,000 3,700,000	2009/181/CFSP 2010/111/CFSP 2010/442/CSFP
Jessen- Petersen	Soren	DK	From 1 February to 31 July 2004	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia		2004/86/CFSP 2004/531/CFSP
Peter Klaiber	Klaus	DE	From 10 December 2001 to 10 June 2002	Afghanistan	Covered by Germany	2001/875/CFSP

Name	First Name	Nationality	Mandate	Region/ Organisation	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
Kubiš	Ján	SK	From 18 July 2005 to 5 July 2006	Central Asia	470,000 925,000	2005/588/CFSP 2006/118/CFSP
Lajcak	Miroslav	SK	From 18 June 2007 to 28 February 2009	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,530,000 770,000 2,900,000	2007/427/CFSP 2007/87/CFSP 2008/130/CFSP
Léotard	François	FR	From 29 June to 29 October 2001	The former Yugo- slav Republic of Macedonia	Covered by France	2001/492/CFSP
Le Roy	Alain	FR	From 29 October 2001 to 28 February 2002	The former Yugo- slav Republic of Macedonia	Covered by France and the Council	2001/760/CFSP
Mizsei	Kalman	HU	From 15 February 2007 to 28 February 2011	Moldova	1,100,000 1,310,000 1,280,000 1,025,000 830,000	2007/107/CFSP 2008/106/CFSP 2009/132/CFSP 2010/108/CFSP 2010/448/CFSP
Moratinos	Miguel Angel	ES	From 25 November 1996 to 30 June 2003	Middle East peace process	2,137,000	96/676/CFSP 2002/497/CFSP
Morel	Pierre	FR	From 25 September 2008 to 31 August 2011	Crisis in Georgia	390,000 445,000 517,000 502,000 700,000	2008/760/CFSP 2009/131/CFSP 2009/571/CFSP 2009/956/CFSP 2010/106/CFSP 2010/445/CFSP

Name	First Name	Nationality	Mandate	Region/ Organisation	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
Otte	Marc	BE	From 01 February 2008 to March 2009	Middle East Peace Process	793,000 1,030,000 560,000 1,200,000 1,300,000 1,190,000 730,000 585,000	2003/537/CFSP 2003/873/CFSP 2004/534/CFSP 2005/99/CFSP 2006/119/CFSP 2008/133/CFSP 2009/136/CFSP 2010/107/CFSP 2010/447/CFSP
Petritsch	Wolfgang	AT	From 30 March to 29 July 1999	Kosovo	510,000	1999/239/CFSP
Roumeliotis	Panagiotis	EL	From 31 May 1999 to 31 May 2000	South East Europe	550,000	98/633/CFSP 1999/361/CFSP
Sahlin	Michael	SE	From 1 August 2004 to 31 October 2005	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	530,000 500,000	2004/565/CFSP 2005/98/CFSP
Schwarz-Schilling	Christian	DE	From 1 February 2006	Bosnia and Herzegovina	770,000	2006/49/CFSP
Semneby	Peter	SE	From February 2006 to February 2011	South Caucasus	2,960,000 2,800,000 2,510,000 1,855,000 1,410,000	2006/121/CFSP 2008/132/CFSP 2008/796/CFSP 2009/133/CFSP 2010/109/CFSP 2010/449/CFSP

Name	First Name	Nationality	Mandate	Region/ Organisation	Amount (in euro)	Legal Basis
Sequi	Ettore Francesco	IT	From 15 June 2009 to 31 March 2010	Afghanistan and Pakistan	215,000	2005/724/CFSP
					675,000	2006/123/CFSP
Heikki	Talvitie	FI		South Caucasus	725,000	2007/109/CFSP
					645,000	2008/129/CFSP
					305,000	2009/129/CFSP
					568,000	2009/706/CFSP
					340,000	2010/156/CFSP
					310,000	2010/444/CFSP
Van de Geer	Roeland	NL	From 14 February 2007 to 31 August 2011	African Great Lakes Region	Covered by Finland	2003/496/CFSP
					299,000	2003/872/CFSP
					396,000	2004/532/CFSP
					370,000	2005/100/CFSP
					1,025,000	2007/112/CFSP
Vendrell	Francesc	ES	From 25 June 2002 to 28 February 2009	Afghanistan	1,370,000	2008/108/CFSP
					1,425,000	2009/128/CFSP
					1,065,000	2010/113/CFSP
					1,520,000	2010/440/CFSP
					794,000	2002/496/CFSP
635,000	2003/448/CFSP					
1,330,000	2004/533/CFSP					
1,653,000	2005/95/CFSP					
					2006/124/CFSP	
					2008/131/CFSP	
					2008/481/CFSP	

Source: European External Action Service. See: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/former-special-representatives/index_en.htm.

8. List of civilian CSDP-related guidelines, concepts and other documents

Type	Area	Title	Document	Status
Guideline	Civilian Administration	Basic Guidelines for Crisis Management missions in the field of Civil Administration	02/01/9369	PSC Noted
Guideline	Rule of Law/ Human Rights	Checklist to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the planning and conduct of ESDP Operations	12068/06	PSC Noted
Concept	Civ-Mil	Civil Military Coordination (CMCO)	14065/03	PSC Noted
Concept	Civ-Mil	Civil Military Coordination (CMCO)	14457/03	PSC Noted
Concept	Civilian Response Teams	Civilian Response Teams	15371/09	Council Noted
Concept	Civ-Mil	Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO): Possible solutions for the management of EU Crisis Management Operations - Improving information	13218/5/06	PSC Noted
Guideline	Civ-Mil	Civil-Military Coordination: Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU Crisis Management Operations	8926/06	PSC Noted
Related document	Gender	Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security	15671/1/08	Council Adopted

Type	Area	Title	Document	Status
Concept	Rule of Law/ Human Rights	Comprehensive EU concept for missions in the field of Rule of Law in crisis management, including annexes	9792/03	PSC Noted
Concept	Monitoring	Concept for EU Monitoring missions	14536/03	PSC Endorsed
Concept	Police	Concept for rapid deployment of police elements in an EU-led substitution mission.	05/02/8508	PSC Noted
Concept	CS/NGO	Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities	15779/09	Council Adopted
Concept	Mission Planning and Control	Concept paper on procedures for the termination, extension and refocusing of an EU civilian crisis management operation	5136/06	PSC Noted
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	Council conclusions on the EU Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child	16457/07	Council Adopted
Concept	Monitoring	Draft Concept for ESDP Border missions in the framework of Civilian Crisis Management	16137/06	PSC Noted
Guideline	Rule of Law/ Human Rights	Draft Council Conclusions on EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders	10056/1/04	PSC Noted
Concept	Mission Planning and Control	Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning	13983/05	PSC Noted
Concept	SSR/DDR	Draft EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)	13727/4/06	PSC Noted
Concept	Training	Draft EU training Concept in ESDP	11970/04	PSC Noted
Concept	Training	Draft EU Training Policy in ESDP	14176/2/03	PSC Noted

Type	Area	Title	Document	Status
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	Draft General review of the Implementation of the Checklist for the Integration of the Protection of Children affected by Armed Conflict into ESDP Operations	9822/08	Council Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management	9919/07	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Draft Guidelines for ESDP Crisis Response Information Activities	13817/02	PSC Noted
Guideline	Civil Protection	Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in CSDP Missions and Operations	13047/2/10	PSC Noted
Concept	Civ-Mil	Draft Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management	10310/07	PSC Noted
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	Ensuring protection? European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders	16332/2/08	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Equipment lists for EU police missions	8776/02	PSC Noted
Concept	Police	EU Comprehensive Concept for Strengthening of Local Police Missions	9535/02	PSC Noted
Concept	Civilian Administration	EU Concept for Crisis Management Missions in the field of Civilian Administration	15311/03	PSC Noted
Concept	SSR/DDR	EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)	12566/4/05	PSC Noted
Concept	SSR/DDR	EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)	12566/4/05	PSC Noted
Concept	Civ-Mil	EU Exercise Concept	9329/04	PSC Noted
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	EU Guidelines on Children Affected by Armed Conflict	10019/08	PSC Noted
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries	16526/08	PSC Noted

Type	Area	Title	Document	Status
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty: revised and updated version	10015/08	PSC Noted
Concept	Police	European Union Concept for Police Planning	6923/02	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Generic Standards of Behaviour for ESDP Operations	05/03/8373	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Guidelines for allowances for seconded staff participating in EU civilian crisis management missions	7291/09	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Guidelines for Command and Control structure for EU Police Operations in civilian aspects of crisis management	13306/01	PSC Noted
Guideline	Lessons Learned	Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons learned and best practices in civilian ESDP missions	14702/08	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Guidelines for Police Command and Control aspects of EU crisis management	02/01/7854	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions	17110/01	PSC Noted
Guideline	Training	Guidelines on Training and Selection Criteria for Personnel in EU Police Missions	13308/01	PSC Noted
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	Guidelines to EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment - An update of the Guidelines	8590/08	Council Noted
Guideline	Police	Handbook for Police Officers deploying to EU Police Missions	12572/1/03	PSC Noted
Guideline	Crisis Management	Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management	13609/07	PSC Noted

Type	Area	Title	Document	Status
Concept	Rule of Law/ Human Rights	Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP	15782/3/08	PSC Noted
Concept	Rule of Law/ Human Rights	Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP	11932/2/05	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Information activities in the area of ESDP - principles and tasks ahead	12424/02	PSC Noted
Concept	Mission Planning and Control	Initial Concept of Mission Support for ESDP Civilian Crisis Management Missions	12457/06	PSC Noted
Concept	Mission Planning and Control	Initial Concept of Mission Support for ESDP Civilian Crisis Management Missions	12457/06	PSC Noted
Concept	Crisis Management	Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management	12730/03	PSC Noted
Concept	Mission Planning and Control	Lead State Concept	10715/07	PSC Endorsed
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and other EU policies	10076/06	PSC Noted
Concept	Rule of Law/ Human Rights	Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP	11936/4/06	PSC Noted
Guideline	Police	Police Aspects of Fact Finding Mission (FFM)	9735/02	PSC Noted
Concept	Crisis Management	Policy of the EU on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty on EU	9490/06	PSC Noted
Guideline	CS/NGO	Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	10114/1/08	PSC Endorsed
Related document	Mission Planning and Control	Report on planning and mission support capability for civilian crisis management	13835/03	PSC Noted
Concept	SSR/DDR	Security Sector Reform - draft document on deployable European expert teams	14576/1/08	PSC Noted

Type	Area	Title	Document	Status
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Standard language for planning documents and legal acts for civilian ESDP operations	11277/07	PSC Noted
Guideline	Mission Planning and Control	Standardisation and interoperability	13307/01	PSC Noted
Guideline	Crisis Management	Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU Crisis Management	11127/03	PSC Noted
Guideline	Humanitarian Issues	The EU Guidelines on the Promotion of International Humanitarian Law	15246/05	Council Adopted
Guideline	Training	Training Requirements relevant to ESDP - Review 2007	15919/1/07	PSC Noted
Concept	Rule of Law/ Human Rights	Transitional Justice and ESDP	10300/1/06	PSC Noted

Source: EEAS, <https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu/startapp.aspx>

9. Restrictive measures (sanctions)

Map of current EU sanctions in 2013



Based on article 24 of the consolidated version of TFEU but also based on the relevant Council decisions, restrictive measures are a CFSP instrument imposed by the EU on countries, organisations and individuals with the purpose of achieving the objectives of EU external action indicated in TEU article 11.

Three types of sanctions exist. The EU applies arms embargoes, economic and financial sanctions, and restrictions on admission (visa facilitation), following the adoption of a UNSC resolution, a violation of common values by a partner (e.g. UDHR in Egypt) or through an EU unilateral decision (e.g. Syria).⁴²

Table of current EU sanctions in February 2013

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Afghanistan	2011/486/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related materiel - ban on provision of certain services - freezing of funds and economic resources - restrictions on admission
	753/2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources of natural or legal persons, entities and groups that are part of or associated with the Taliban - ban on provision of certain services to natural or legal persons, entities and groups that are part of or associated with the Taliban

42. See: Charlotte Beaucillon, 'Comment choisir ses mesures restrictives ? Guide pratique des sanctions de l'UE,' *Occasional Paper* n°100, EUISS, Paris, December 2012, available at : <http://www.iss.europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-page/article/comment-choisir-ses-mesures-restrictives-guide-pratique-des-sanctions-de-lue>. See also: Ondrej Ditych, *Good cop or bad cop? Sanctioning Belarus*, EUISS Briefs n°14, 4 March 2013, available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_14.pdf.

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Belarus	2012/642/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related material - ban on exports of equipment for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - restrictions on admission of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) natural persons responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, or any person associated with them; (b) natural persons benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka regime - freezing of funds and economic resources of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them, (b) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka regime, legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them
	765/2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) persons, entities and bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, natural or legal persons, entities and bodies associated with them, legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them, (b) persons, entities and bodies benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka regime, legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by them

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2011/173/CFSP	- restrictions on admission of (i) persons whose activities: (a) undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (b) seriously threaten the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; or (c) undermine the Dayton/Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace and the Annexes thereto, including measures established in the implementation of the said Agreement; and: (ii) persons associated with them - freezing of funds and economic resources of (i) persons whose activities: (a) undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (b) seriously threaten the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; or (c) undermine the Dayton/Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace and the Annexes thereto, including measures established in the implementation of the said Agreement; and (ii) natural or legal persons associated with them.
	1997/193/CFSP	- restrictions on admission of persons who committed certain acts of violence at Mostar
China	Declaration of European Council, Madrid, 27.6.1989	Embargo on Arms

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Democratic Republic of Congo	2010/788/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related matériel against non-governmental entities and individuals operating in DR Congo - ban on provision of certain services - freezing of funds and economic resources of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) persons and entities who act in violation of the arms embargo and related measures, (b) leaders of foreign armed groups operating in the DR Congo who impede disarmament and the voluntary repatriation or resettlements of combatants, (c) leaders of Congolese militias who impede the participation of combatants in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes, (d) leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflict, (e) individuals or entities committing serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict, (f) individuals or entities obstructing provision of humanitarian assistance to the eastern part of the DR Congo or access to such assistance, (g) individuals or entities supporting armed groups in the eastern part of the DR Congo through illicit trade of natural resources, (h) individuals or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated individual or of an entity owned or controlled by a designated individual, (i) individuals or entities who plan, sponsor or participate in attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on admission of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) persons who act in violation of the arms embargo and related measures, (b) leaders of foreign armed groups operating in the DR Congo who impede disarmament and the voluntary repatriation or resettlements of combatants, (c) leaders of Congolese militias who impede the participation of combatants in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes, (d) leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflict, (e) individuals committing serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict, (f) individuals obstructing provision of humanitarian assistance to the eastern part of the DR Congo or access to such assistance (g) individuals supporting armed groups in the eastern part of the DR Congo through illicit trade of natural resources (h) individuals acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated individual or of an entity owned or controlled by a designated individual (i) individuals who plan, sponsor or participate in attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers - repeal of Common Position 2008/369/CFSP

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Côte d'Ivoire	2010/656/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related matériel - ban on exports of equipment for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - restrictions on admission of certain persons who constitute a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons who constitute a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire - list of relevant persons subject to restrictions on admission and of relevant natural or legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictions on admission and freezing of funds and economic resources (Annex I) - import ban on diamonds
	174/2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ban on exports of equipment for internal repression
	560/2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons who constitute a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire
Egypt	2011/172/CFSP	freezing of funds and economic resources of persons identified as being responsible for the misappropriation of Egyptian State funds, and natural or legal persons, entities and bodies associated with them
	270/2011	freezing of funds and economic resources of persons identified as being responsible for the misappropriation of Egyptian State funds, and natural or legal persons, entities and bodies associated with them

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Eritrea	2010/127/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related materiel - ban on provision of certain services - inspection of and prior information requirement on certain cargoes to and from Eritrea - embargo on supplying arms and related matériel to persons and entities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) having acted in violation of the arms embargo against Eritrea, (b) providing support from Eritrea to armed opposition groups which aim to destabilise the region, (c) obstructing implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1862 (2009) concerning Djibouti, (d) harbouring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organising, training or inciting individuals or groups to perpetrate acts of violence or terrorist acts against other States or their citizens in the region, (e) obstructing the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group re-established by UN Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008) - ban on provision of certain services to these persons and entities - freezing of funds and economic resources of persons and entities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) having acted in violation of the arms embargo against Eritrea, (b) providing support from Eritrea to armed opposition groups which aim to destabilise the region, (c) obstructing implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1862 (2009) concerning Djibouti, (d) harbouring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organising, training or inciting individuals or groups to perpetrate acts of violence or terrorist acts against other States or their citizens in the region (e) obstructing the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group re-established by UN Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008),

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on admission of natural persons (a) having acted in violation of the arms embargo against Eritrea, (b) providing support from Eritrea to armed opposition groups which aim to destabilise the region, (c) obstructing implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1862 (2009) concerning Djibouti, (d) harbouring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organising, training or inciting individuals or groups to perpetrate acts of violence or terrorist acts against other States or their citizens in the region, (e) obstructing the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group re-established by UN Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008)
	667/2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (arms embargo related) ban on provision of certain services - prior information requirement on certain cargoes to and from Eritrea - (arms embargo related) ban on provision of certain services to listed persons, entities and bodies - freezing of funds and economic resources of listed persons, entities and bodies
Republic of Guinea (Conakry)	2010/638/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related materiel - ban on exports of equipment for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - restrictions on admission - freezing of funds and economic resources
	1284/2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ban on exports of equipment for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - freezing of funds and economic resources
Guinea-Bissau	2012/285/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on admission - freezing of funds and economic resources - repeal of Council Decision 2012/237/CFSP
	377/2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Haiti	94/315/CFSP	- prohibition to satisfy certain claims in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No 917(1994) (NB. Common Position 94/681/CFSP has repealed the remainder of the restrictive measures)
	1264/1994	- prohibition to satisfy claims with regard to contracts and transactions whose performance is affected by the measures taken in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 917(1994), 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and 875 (1993)
Iran	2011/235/CFSP	- restrictions on admission of (i) persons responsible for serious human rights violation in Iran and (ii) persons associated with them - freezing of funds and economic resources of (i) persons responsible for serious human rights violations
	359/2011	- freezing of funds and economic resources of (i) persons responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran and (ii) persons, entities and bodies associated with them
	2010/413/CFSP	embargo on arms and related materiel - embargo on nearly all dual-use goods and technology - embargo on certain goods and technology which could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns - prohibition of procurement from Iran of arms and related materiel, nearly all dual-use goods and technology and certain other goods and technology

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (arms and other embargoes related) ban on provision of certain services - (arms and other embargoes related) ban on certain investment - controls on export of certain other sensitive goods and technology - control on provision of certain services - control on certain investment - embargo on key equipment and technology for the oil and natural gas industries - ban on provision of certain services (to the oil and natural gas industries) - ban on certain investment (in the oil and natural gas industries) - ban on certain Iranian investment (nuclear industry) - ban on new commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran - restrictions on transfers of funds to and from Iran - restrictions on establishment of branches and subsidiaries of and cooperation with Iranian banks - restrictions on provision of insurance and re-insurance - restrictions on issuance of and trade in certain bonds - vigilance over business with Iran - inspection of and prior information requirement on cargoes to and from Iran - restrictions on access to EU airports for certain cargo flights - ban on provision of certain services to certain vessels and aircraft - restrictions on admission of listed natural persons - freezing of funds and economic resources of listed persons, entities and bodies - measures to prevent certain specialised teaching or training - prohibition to satisfy claims made by certain persons, entities or bodies

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - one of two lists of targeted persons and entities (restrictions on admission (as regards natural persons) and freezing of funds and economic resources, Annex I)
	276/2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on nearly all dual-use goods and technology - embargo on certain goods and technology which could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns - prohibition of procurement from Iran of nearly all dual-use goods and technology and of certain other goods and technology - (arms and other embargoes related) ban on provision of certain services - (arms and other embargoes related) ban on certain investment - controls on export of certain other sensitive goods and technology - control on provision of certain services - control on certain investment - embargo on key equipment and technology for the oil and natural gas and petrochemical industries - ban on provision of certain services (to the oil and natural gas and petrochemical industries) - ban on certain investment (in the oil and natural gas and petrochemical industries) - import ban on crude oil and petroleum products - import ban on petrochemical products - ban on provision of certain services, including transport (related to crude oil, petroleum products and petrochemical products from Iran) - ban on trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with the Government of Iran

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ban on provision of new Iranian banknotes and coins - ban on certain Iranian investment (nuclear industry) - restrictions on transfers of funds to and from Iran - restrictions on establishment of branches and subsidiaries of and cooperation with Iranian banks - monitoring of activities of EU branches and subsidiaries of credit and financial institutions domiciled in Iran - enhanced vigilance as regards transactions of EU financial institutions with credit and financial institutions domiciled in Iran and with the latter's branches and subsidiaries - restrictions on provision of insurance and re-insurance - restrictions on issuance of and trade in certain bonds - prior information requirement on cargoes to and from Iran - restrictions on access to EU airports for certain cargo flights - ban on provision of certain services to certain vessels and aircraft - freezing of funds and economic resources of listed persons, entities and bodies - ban on provision of specialised financial messaging services to those subjected to the freezing of funds and economic resources - prohibition to satisfy claims made by certain persons, entities or bodies - repeal of Regulation (EU) No 961/2010

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	2010/800/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related materiel - ban on exports of certain goods and technology listed by the UN - additional embargo on certain goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes - prohibition of procurement of arms, related materiel and other goods and technology listed by the UN - ban on provision of certain services - ban on exports of luxury goods - ban on new commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the DPRK - restrictions on admission - freezing of funds and economic resources - ban on public provided financial support for trade where such support could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes - enhanced monitoring of the activities of EU financial institutions with banks domiciled in DPRK and their subsidiaries, branches and other financial entities outside DPRK - inspection of and prior information requirement on cargoes to and from DPRK - ban on provision of bunkering and ship supply services - measures to prevent certain specialised teaching or training <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - commitment to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, ballistic missiles and their means of delivery, related materials and technology - repeal of Common Position 2006/795/CFSP

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
	329/2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ban on exports of certain goods and technology listed by the UN - ban on import and purchase of goods and technology listed by the UN - ban on exports of luxury goods - ban on provision of certain services - freezing of funds and economic resources
Lebanon	2006/625/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related materiel - ban on provision of certain services
	1412/2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ban on provision of certain services
	2005/888/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on admission of persons suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organising or perpetrating of the murder of former Prime Minister of the Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005 - freezing of funds and economic resources of those persons - commitment to cooperate with international investigation into that murder
	305/2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources
Liberia	2011/137/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related materiel - embargo on equipment which might be used for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - prior information requirement on cargoes to and from Libya - restrictions on admission of listed natural persons - freezing of funds and economic resources of listed persons, entities and bodies - prohibition to grant certain claims to listed persons and entities and any other persons and entities in Libya, including the government of Libya

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
	204/2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on equipment which might be used for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - prior information requirement on cargoes to and from Libya - freezing of funds and economic resources of listed persons, entities and bodies - prohibition to grant certain claims to the government of Libya
	2004/698/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - protection of economic operators against claims affected by measures taken in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 883(1993)
	3275/1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - prohibition to satisfy claims with regard to contracts and transactions whose performance is affected by the measures taken in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 883(1993)
Moldova	2010/573/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on admission of persons responsible for the campaign against Latin script schools in the Transnistrian region
Myanmar (Burma)	2010/232/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related matériel
Somalia	2010/231/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - confirmation of embargo on arms and related matériel - ban on provision of certain services - inspection of and prior information requirement on certain cargoes to and from Somalia - embargo on supplying arms and related matériel to certain persons and entities - ban on provision of certain services to these persons and entities - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons and entities - restrictions on admission of certain natural persons - repeal of Common Position 2009/138/CFSP
	356/2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons and entities - ban on provision of certain services to these persons and entities

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
	147/2003	ban on provision of certain (arms embargo related) services
Sudan	2011/423/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on admission of individuals who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, violate the UN arms embargo and/or are responsible for offensive military over flights in and over the Darfur region - freezing of funds and economic resources of such individuals - embargo on arms and related materiel - ban on provision of certain services - repeal of Common Position 2005/411/CFSP
	1184/2005	- freezing of funds and economic resources
	131/2004	- ban on provision of certain services
Syria	2012/739/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related matériel - embargo on equipment which might be used for internal repression - embargo on certain goods which might be used for the manufacture and maintenance of products which could be used for internal repression - ban on provision of certain related services - control of export of certain other goods which might be used for the manufacture and maintenance of equipment which might be used for internal repression - control of provision of certain services - import ban on arms and related materiel - ban on provision of certain related services - embargo on telecommunications monitoring and interception equipment - ban on provision of certain services (related to such equipment) - import ban on crude oil and petroleum products - ban on provision of certain services (related to crude oil and petroleum products)

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on key equipment and technology for the oil and natural gas industries - ban on provision of certain services (to the oil and natural gas industries) - ban on provision of new Syrian banknotes and coins - ban on trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with the Government of Syria - embargo on luxury goods - ban on certain investment (in the oil and natural gas industries, in construction of power plants for electricity production) - prohibition to participate in the construction of new power plants for electricity production - restraint on commitments for public and private financial support for trade with Syria and ban on new long-term commitments of Member States - ban on new commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Syria - prohibition for the European Investment Bank to make certain payments - restrictions on issuance of and trade in certain bonds - restrictions on establishment of branches and subsidiaries of and cooperation with Syrian banks - restrictions on provision of insurance and re-insurance - restrictions on access to airports in the EU for certain flights - inspection of and prior information requirement on certain cargoes to Syria - restrictions on admission of certain persons - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons, entities and bodies - prohibition to satisfy claims made by certain persons, entities or bodies - repeal of Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
	36/2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on equipment which might be used for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - embargo on telecommunications monitoring and interception equipment - ban on provision of certain services (related to such equipment) - import ban on crude oil and petroleum products - embargo on key equipment and technology for the oil and natural gas industries - ban on provision of certain services (to the oil and natural gas industries) - ban on provision of new Syrian banknotes and coins - embargo on equipment used in the construction of new power plants for electricity production - ban on provision of certain services (related to the construction of such power plants) - ban on certain investment (in the oil and natural gas industries, in construction of power plants for electricity production) - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons, entities and bodies - prohibition for the European Investment Bank to make certain payments - restrictions on issuance of and trade in certain bonds - restrictions on establishment of branches and subsidiaries of and cooperation with Syrian banks - restrictions on provision of insurance and re-insurance - prohibition to satisfy claims made by certain persons, entities or bodies - repeal of Regulation (EU) No 442/2011

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
	2005/888	- restrictions on admission of persons suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organising or perpetrating of the murder of former Prime Minister of the Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005 - freezing of funds and economic resources of those persons - commitment to cooperate with international investigation into that murder
	305/2006	- freezing of funds and economic resources
Tunisia	2011/72/CFSP	- freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds, and natural or legal persons or entities associated with them
	101/2011	- freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds, and natural or legal persons or entities associated with them
USA	1996/668/CFSP	- protection against certain effects of sanctions applied by the USA
	2271/1996	- protection against certain effects of sanctions applied by the USA
Yugoslavia	2000/696/CFSP	- restrictions on admission of former President Milosevic and natural persons associated with him - freezing of funds of these persons
	2488/2000	- freezing of funds of former President Milosevic and certain other natural persons - repeal of Regulations (EC) Nos 1294/1999 and 607/2000 and of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 926/1998
	94/366/CFSP	- prohibition to satisfy certain claims in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No 757 (1992)
	1733/1994	- prohibition to satisfy claims with regard to contracts and transactions the performance of which was affected by UN Security Council Resolution No 757 (1992) and related resolutions

Countries	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Zimbabwe	2011/101/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related matériel - ban on exports of equipment for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - restrictions on admission - freezing of funds and economic resources - repeal of Common Position 2004/161/CFSP
	314/2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ban on exports of equipment for internal repression - ban on provision of certain services - freezing of funds and economic resources

Entity	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
Terrorist Groups	2002/402/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - embargo on arms and related matériel - ban on provision of certain services - freezing of funds and economic resources - restrictions on admission
	881/2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources of persons and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and Al Qaida - ban on provision of certain services - repeal of Regulation (EC) No 467/2001
	2001/931/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons, groups and entities with a view to combating terrorism - ban on provision of financial services - commitment of Member States to afford each other police and judicial co-operation
	2580/2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons, groups and entities with a view to combating terrorism - ban on provision of financial services
	2005/671/JHA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - exchange of information concerning terrorist offences (Article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP refers)

Entity	Legal basis (Council decisions/Common Actions/Common Positions/Council regulations)	Measures
	2001/930/CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - commitment to criminalise wilful provision or collection of funds for terrorist acts - commitment to freeze funds and economic resources - commitment to take measures to suppress support to terrorists (targeting recruitment and supply of arms) - commitment to give early warning and to take other steps to prevent terrorist acts - commitment to deny safe haven - commitment to establish participation in financing, planning, preparation and perpetration of terrorist acts, or in supporting terrorist acts, as serious criminal offences - commitment to prevent movement of terrorists - commitment to take measures to prevent counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents - commitment to provide assistance in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings - commitment to exchange of information to prevent commission of terrorist acts - commitment to accede to relevant international conventions (listed in annex) - commitment to prevent abuse of refugee status

Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf. Last updated on 21 February 2013

In addition, a consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to financial restrictive measures made by the EU Credit Sector federation and the EC, can be found at: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list_en.htm.





Annexes

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1. UN Security Council Resolutions: 2011 votes

Document			Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto		
19 January 2011	S/RES/1967 (2011)	on authorization of the deployment of additional military personnel and capacities to the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 30 June 2011	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y		N
16 February 2011	S/RES/1968 (2011)	on extension up to 3 months of the temporary redeployment of infantry companies and an aviation unit from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y		N
18 February 2011	Draft resolution S/2011/24	Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question	Y	Y	Y	Y	14	1 (US)	0	0	N		Y (US)
24 February 2011	S/RES/1969 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) until 26 Feb. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y		N

Document			Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto		
26 February 2011	S/RES/1970 (2011)	on establishment of a Security Council Committee to monitor implementation of the arms embargo against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
03 March 2011	S/RES/1971 (2011)	on withdrawal of military personnel providing security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
17 March 2011	S/RES/1972 (2011)	on arms embargo against Somalia and provision of humanitarian assistance	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
17 March 2011	S/RES/1973 (2011)	on establishment of a ban on flights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya airspace	Y	Y	A	Y	10	0	5 (BR, CN, DE, IN, RU)	Y			N
22 March 2011	S/RES/1974 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 23 Mar. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N

Document			Voting											
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
30 March 2011	S/RES/1975 (2011)	on targeted sanctions against individuals meeting the criteria set out in resolution 1572 (2004) on arms embargo against Côte d'Ivoire	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
11 April 2011	S/RES/1976 (2011)	on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
20 April 2011	S/RES/1977 (2011)	on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on extension of the mandate of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons until 25 Apr. 2021	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
27 April 2011	S/RES/1978 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) until 9 July 2011 and on preparations for the establishment of a successor mission	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N

Document			Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto		
27 April 2011	S/RES/1979 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 Apr. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
28 April 2011	S/RES/1980 (2011)	on renewal of measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1572 (2004), 1643 (2005), 1946 (2010) and 1975 (2011) on sanctions against Côte d'Ivoire and on extension of the mandate of the UN Group of Experts until 30 Apr. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
13 May 2011	S/RES/1981 (2011)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 July 2011	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
17 May 2011	S/RES/1982 (2011)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) on the Sudan until 19 Feb. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N

Document			Voting											
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
07 June 2011	S/RES/1983 (2011)	on impacts of HIV/AIDS epidemic in conflict and post-conflict situations	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
09 June 2011	S/RES/1984 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2009) concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 June 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	14	0	1 (LB)	Y				N
10 June 2011	S/RES/1985 (2011)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 12 June 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
13 June 2011	S/RES/1986 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 15 Dec. 2011	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N

Document			Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto		
17 June 2011	S/RES/1988 (2011)	on establishment of a new Sanctions Committee concerning Individuals and Entities and Other Groups and Undertakings associated with the Taliban	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
17 June 2011	S/RES/1989 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and the establishment of a new Al-Qaida sanctions list	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
27 June 2011	S/RES/1990 (2011)	on establishment of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
28 June 2011	S/RES/1991 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 30 June 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
29 June 2011	S/RES/1992 (2011)	on redeployment of logistics and military personnel from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N

Document				Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
29 June 2011	S/RES/1993 (2011)	on extension of the terms of office of permanent and ad litem judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
30 June 2011	S/RES/1994 (2011)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 31 Dec. 2011	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
06 July 2011	S/RES/1995 (2011)	on <i>ad litem</i> judges and elections for the presidency of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
08 July 2011	S/RES/1996 (2011)	on establishment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
11 July 2011	S/RES/1997 (2011)	on withdrawal of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
12 July 2011	S/RES/1998 (2011)	on children and armed conflict	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
13 July 2011	S/RES/1999 (2011)	on admission of the Republic of South Sudan to membership in the United Nations					nv	nv	nv	Y				N

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
27 July 2011	S/RES/2000 (2011)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 July 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
28 July 2011	S/RES/2001 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for a period of 12 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
29 July 2011	S/RES/2002 (2011)	on re-establishment of the UN Monitoring Group Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1519 (2003) on arms embargo against Somalia for a period of 12 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
29 July 2011	S/RES/2003 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 July 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
30 August 2011	S/RES/2004 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until 31 Aug. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting											
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
14 September 2011	S/RES/2005 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL) until 15 Sept. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
14 September 2011	S/RES/2006 (2011)	on reappointment of Hassan Bubacar Jallow as Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for a term with effect from 15 Sept. 2011 until 31 Dec. 2014	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
14 September 2011	S/RES/2007 (2011)	on reappointment of Serge Brammertz as Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for a term with effect from 1 Jan. 2012 until 31 Dec. 2014	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
16 September 2011	S/RES/2008 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 Sept. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
16 September 2011	S/RES/2009 (2011)	on establishment of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N

Document			Voting											
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
30 September 2011	S/RES/2010 (2011)	on renewal of the authorization to Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment until 31 Oct. 2012 of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and on extension of the logistical support package for AMISOM	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
04 October 2011	Draft resolution S/2011/612	Middle East situation	Y	Y	Y	Y	9	2 (CN, RU)	4 (BR, IN, LB, ZA)	N				Y (CN, RU)
12 October 2011	S/RES/2011 (2011)	on extension of the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) until 13 Oct. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
14 October 2011	S/RES/2012 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 Oct. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N

Document				Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
14 October 2011	S/RES/2013 (2011)	on decision for Judge Bakhtiyar Tuzimukhamedov to work part-time at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
21 October 2011	S/RES/2014 (2011)	on the situation in Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
24 October 2011	S/RES/2015 (2011)	on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
27 October 2011	S/RES/2016 (2011)	on termination of the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 to 12 of resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
31 October 2011	S/RES/2017 (2011)	on measures to prevent the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types in Libya	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
31 October 2011	S/RES/2018 (2011)	on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N

Document			Voting											
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
16 November 2011	S/RES/2019 (2011)	on authorization to establish for a further period of 12 months a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a legal successor to stabilization force (SFOR)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
22 November 2011	S/RES/2020 (2011)	on acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
29 November 2011	S/RES/2021 (2011)	on renewal of measures on arms, transport, finance and travel against the Democratic Republic of the Congo imposed by resolution 1807 (2008) and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) until 30 Nov. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
02 December 2011	S/RES/2022 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 16 Mar. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N

Document			Voting									
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting				
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
05 December 2011	S/RES/2023 (2011)	on measures against Eritrea and expansion of the mandate of the Monitoring Group re-established by resolution 2002 (2011)	Y	Y	Y	Y	13	0	2 (CN, RU)	0	Y	N
14 December 2011	S/RES/2024 (2011)	on expansion of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y	N
14 December 2011	S/RES/2025 (2011)	on renewal of measures on arms and travel imposed by resolution 1521 (2003) and extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1903 (2009) concerning Liberia for a period of 12 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y	N
14 December 2011	S/RES/2026 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 19 July 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y	N

Document			Voting											
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting						
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
20 December 2011	S/RES/2027 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) until 15 Feb. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
21 December 2011	S/RES/2028 (2011)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 June 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
21 December 2011	S/RES/2029 (2011)	on extension of the terms of office of permanent and ad litem judges to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) until 30 June 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
21 December 2011	S/RES/2030 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) until 28 Feb. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N
21 December 2011	S/RES/2031 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) until 31 Jan. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y				N

Document			Voting											
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting				Total Voting							
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto			
22 December 2011	S/RES/2032 (2011)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for a period of 5 months	Y	Y	Y	Y			15	0	0	Y		N

Source: United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET)

BR = Brazil; CN = China; DE = Germany; FR = France; IN = India; LB = Lebanon; PT = Portugal; RU = Russia; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States of America; ZA = South Africa; Y = Yes vote; N = No vote; A = Abstention; Adp = adopted; nv = no vote taken.

In 2011, the UNSC non-permanent membership comprised Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, and South Africa.

2. UN Security Council Resolutions: 2012 votes

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
12 January 2012	S/RES/2033 (2012)	on enhancing the relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
19 January 2012	S/RES/2034 (2012)	on the date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice					nv	nv	nv	Y	N	
04 February 2012	Draft resolution S/2012/77	Middle East situation - Syria	Y	Y	Y	Y	13	2 (CN, RU)	0	N	Y (CN, RU)	
17 February 2012	S/RES/2035 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) until 17 Feb. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
22 February 2012	S/RES/2036 (2012)	on addition of tasks to and expansion of the logistical support package for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 31 Oct. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto		
23 February 2012	S/RES/2037 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) until 31 Dec. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
29 February 2012	S/RES/2038 (2012)	on appointment of Hassan Bubacar Jallow as Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals with effect from 1 Mar. 2012 for a term of 4 years	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
29 February 2012	S/RES/2039 (2012)	on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
12 March 2012	S/RES/2040 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for a further period of 12 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
22 March 2012	S/RES/2041 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 23 Mar. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
14 April 2012	S/RES/2042 (2012)	on authorization of the deployment of an advance team of up to 30 unarmed military observers to the Syrian Arab Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
21 April 2012	S/RES/2043 (2012)	on the establishment of a UN Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
24 April 2012	S/RES/2044 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 Apr. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
26 April 2012	S/RES/2045 (2012)	on measures on arms and related materiel, the renewal of measures imposed by paras. 9 to 12 of Security Council resolution 1572 (2004) and para. 6 of resolution 1643 (2005) against Côte d'Ivoire and on extension of the mandate of the UN Group of Experts until 30 Apr. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
02 May 2012	S/RES/2046 (2012)	on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto		
17 May 2012	S/RES/2047 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for a period of 6 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
18 May 2012	S/RES/2048 (2012)	demanding the restoration of constitutional order and on measures against military personnel of Guinea-Bissau	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
07 June 2012	S/RES/2049 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
12 June 2012	S/RES/2050 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts as specified in resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 12 July 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N
12 June 2012	S/RES/2051 (2012)	on the situation in Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y			N

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
27 June 2012	S/RES/2052 (2012)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 31 Dec. 2012	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
27 June 2012	S/RES/2053 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 30 June 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
29 June 2012	S/RES/2054 (2012)	on extension of the terms of office of judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
29 June 2012	S/RES/2055 (2012)	on increase of the size of the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
05 July 2012	S/RES/2056 (2012)	on the situation in Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
05 July 2012	S/RES/2057 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) through 15 July 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
19 July 2012	S/RES/2058 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 Jan. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	13	0	2 (AZ, PK)	Y	N	
19 July 2012	Draft resolution S/2012/538	Middle East	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	2 (CN, RU)	2 (PK, ZA)	N	Y (CN, RU)	
20 July 2012	S/RES/2059 (2012)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS) for a final period of 30 days	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
25 July 2012	S/RES/2060 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea referred to in para. 3 of resolution 1558 (2004) until 25 Aug. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
25 July 2012	S/RES/2061 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for a period of 12 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
26 July 2012	S/RES/2062 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 July 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
31 July 2012	S/RES/2063 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 July 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	14	0	1 (AZ)	Y	N	
30 August 2012	S/RES/2064 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until 31 Aug. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
12 September 2012	S/RES/2065 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) until 31 Mar. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
17 September 2012	S/RES/2066 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 Sept. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
18 September 2012	S/RES/2067 (2012)	on the situation in Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
19 September 2012	S/RES/2068 (2012)	on children and armed conflict	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	0	4 (AZ, CN, PK, RU)	Y	N	
09 October 2012	S/RES/2069 (2012)	on extension of the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) until 13 Oct. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
12 October 2012	S/RES/2070 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 Oct. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
12 October 2012	S/RES/2071 (2012)	on the situation in Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
31 October 2012	S/RES/2072 (2012)	on authorization to the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment until 7 Nov. 2012 of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting									
			EU Voting					Total Voting				
Date	Reference	Title	UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto	
07 November 2012	S/RES/2073 (2012)	on authorization to the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment until 7 Mar. 2013 of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and on extension of the logistical support package for AMISOM	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
14 November 2012	S/RES/2074 (2012)	on authorization of the establishment of a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR ALTHEA) as a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control for a further period of 12 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
16 November 2012	S/RES/2075 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 31 May 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
20 November 2012	S/RES/2076 (2012)	on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	
21 November 2012	S/RES/2077 (2012)	on acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N	

Document			Voting								
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting			Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto
28 November 2012	S/RES/2078 (2012)	on renewal of measures on arms, transport, finance and travel against the Democratic Republic of the Congo imposed by resolution 1807 (2008) and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) until 1 Feb. 2014	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N
12 December 2012	S/RES/2079 (2012)	on renewal of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions on Liberia and extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to para. 9 of resolution 1903 (2009) for a period of 12 months	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N
12 December 2012	S/RES/2080 (2012)	on extension of the terms of office of permanent judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) until 31 Dec. 2014	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N

Document			Voting										
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting					Total Voting					
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto		
17 December 2012	S/RES/2081 (2012)	on extension of the terms of office of permanent and ad litem judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) until 31 Dec. 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	14	0	1 ^(RU)	0	Y		N
17 December 2012	S/RES/2082 (2012)	on measures imposed against individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y		N
17 December 2012	S/RES/2083 (2012)	on extension of the mandate of the Office of the Ombuds-person and on measures imposed against individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y		N
19 December 2012	S/RES/2084 (2012)	on renewal of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 June 2013	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	0	Y		N

Document			Voting								
Date	Reference	Title	EU Voting				Total Voting				
			UK	FR	DE	PT	Y	N	A	Adp	Veto
20 December 2012	S/RES/2085 (2012)	on authorization of the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of 1 year	Y	Y	Y	Y	15	0	0	Y	N

Source: United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET)

AZ = Azerbaijan; CN = China; DE = Germany; FR = France; PK = Pakistan; PT = Portugal; RU = Russia; UK = United Kingdom; ZA = South Africa; Y = Yes vote; N = No vote; A = Abstention; Adp = adopted; nv = no vote taken.

In 2012, the UNSC non-permanent membership comprised Azerbaijan, Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, and Togo.

3. Votes on membership (UNESCO) and status (UNGA) of Palestine


36th UNESCO General Conference – 11th Plenary Meeting, Resolution 9.1 on Palestinian membership [October 31, 2011]


67th United Nations General Assembly – 44th Plenary Meeting, Resolution 67/19 on Observer Status for Palestine at the UN [November 29, 2012]

Country	UNESCO Vote on Palestinian Membership	UNGA Vote on Palestinian Status
EU Member State		
Austria	Yes	Yes
Belgium	Yes	Yes
Bulgaria	Abstain	Abstain
Cyprus	Yes	Yes
Czech Republic	No	No
Denmark	Abstain	Yes
Estonia	Abstain	Abstain
Finland	Yes	Yes
France	Yes	Yes
Germany	No	Abstain
Greece	Yes	Yes
Hungary	Abstain	Abstain
Ireland	Yes	Yes
Italy	Abstain	Yes
Latvia	Abstain	Abstain
Lithuania	No	Abstain
Luxembourg	Yes	Yes
Malta	Yes	Yes
Netherlands	No	Abstain
Poland	Abstain	Abstain
Portugal	Abstain	Yes
Romania	Abstain	Abstain

Country	UNESCO Vote on Palestinian Membership	UNGA Vote on Palestinian Status
Slovakia	Abstain	Abstain
Slovenia	Yes	Abstain
Spain	Yes	Yes
Sweden	No	Yes
United Kingdom	Abstain	Abstain
Acceding Country		
Croatia	Abstain	Abstain
Candidate Countries		
Iceland	Yes	Yes
Montenegro	Abstain	Abstain
Serbia	Yes	Yes
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Abstain	Abstain
Turkey	Yes	Yes
Potential Candidates		
Albania	Abstain	Abstain
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Abstain	Abstain
Non-EU Members		
Norway	Yes	Yes
Switzerland	Abstain	Yes

4. EEAS flowcharts





EEAS Organisational Chart, February 2013

5. Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
ALA	Asia and Latin America
AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bn	billion
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COASI	EU Asia-Oceania Working Party
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO (DG)	Development Cooperation
DG	Directorate General
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence College
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFMN	European Foresight Monitoring Network
EFPP	European Foresight Platform

EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
EPTA	European Parliamentary Technology Assessment
EU	European Union
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUR	euro
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLEG	Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
FPI	Foreign Policy Instrument
GAO	General Accountability Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HQ	Headquarters
HR	High Representative (of the Union for Foreign Affairs)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICI	Industrialised Countries Instrument
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IMEMO	Institute of World Economy and International Relations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INSC	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation

IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JRC	Joint Research Centre
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFA	Macro-Financial Assistance (to non-EU countries)
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in DR Congo
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NSCI	Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCT	Overseas, Countries and Territories
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PHARE	Pologne Hongrie Aide à la reconstruction économique
PSC	Political and Security Committee
R&D	Research and Development
S&T	Science and Technology
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPARD	Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
SATCEN	Satellite Centre
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STOA	Science and Technology Options Assessment
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEU	Treaty on European Union

TFUE	Treaty on the Functioning of European Union
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIPTF	United Nations International Police Task Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VP	Vice President
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction



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