PARADOX OF STATE FRAGILITY:
EXPLORING THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF
BANGLADESH

Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan
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Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his deep gratitude to his research supervisor Professor Neil Cooper of the Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, United Kingdom for his meticulous and detailed guidance, encouragement and useful critiques of this research. The author also greatly acknowledges the role of Dr Owen Greene and Professor Jim Whitman of the University of Bradford for enlightening him on the issues of ‘fragile state and security development nexus’ and ‘global governance’ through their insightful class lectures.

This research would have been impossible without the indulgence and support of Bangladesh Air Force and the Chevening Scholarship program that facilitated the author’s post graduate studies at the University of Bradford. Finally, the author wishes to thank his family for their never-ending support and encouragement throughout the process of completing this research.
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Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>Authority Legitimacy and Capacity (dimensions of a state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>Bangladesh Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBS</td>
<td>Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGMEA</td>
<td>Bangladesh Garment Manufacturer and Exporter Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIISI</td>
<td>Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>BIPSS</td>
<td>Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>Bangladesh Shongbad Shongtostha (Bangladesh News Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAST</td>
<td>Conflict Assessment Software Tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTG</td>
<td>Care Taker Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFP</td>
<td>Country Indicators Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Centre for Policy Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISE</td>
<td>Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSH</td>
<td>Child Survival and Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>Development and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (of United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence (of the United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBCCI</td>
<td>Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSAM</td>
<td>Fragile States Assessment Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTO</td>
<td>Foreign Terrorist Organization</td>
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</table>
FY              Financial Year
GATT        General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GFC          Global Financial Crisis
GDP          Gross Domestic Product
GlIs         Global Institutions
GPI           Global Peace Index
GoB           Government of Bangladesh
GSP          Generalized System of Preferences
GTI           Global Terrorism Index
GWoT         Global War on Terrorism
HIIs          Horizontal Inequalities
HDI           Human Development Index
HDR           Human Development Report
HRW         Human Right Watch
FSI           Failed State Index
FP             Foreign Policy
ICISS         International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDA          International Development Agency
IMET          International Military Education and Training
IMF           International Monitory Fund
IOs           International Organizations
IOM            International Organization of Migration
IR           International Relations
LIC          Low Income Countries
LICUS        Low Income Countries Under Stress
LIFC         Low Income Fragile Country
LDC           Least Developed Countries
MDGs         Millennium Development Goals
MFA          Multi Fibre Agreement
MIFC          Middle Income Fragile Country
MNCs          Multinational Corporations
MPI          Multidimensional Poverty Index
NADR         Non-proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs
NGO         Non Governmental Organization
OECD          Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC           Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PMO         Prime Minister’s Office (of Bangladesh)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PMSU</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (of United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRDE</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect (UN accord)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMG</td>
<td>Ready Made Garments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGACA</td>
<td>Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAR</td>
<td>Stolen Asset Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troops Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIB</td>
<td>Transparency International Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICFA</td>
<td>Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIPS</td>
<td>Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCAC</td>
<td>United Nations Convention Against Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nation Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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</table>
Meaning of Bengali Words

‘Amra shobai taleban, Bangla hobe Afghan’: ‘We are all Taleban and we will make Bangladesh like Afghanistan’

Awami Leage (AL): A Major Political Party in Bangladesh

Bertho Rashtro: Failed State

Bangabandhu: Friend of Bengal (i.e. Shiekh Mujubur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh)

Bangladesh Jatoyotabadi Dol: Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) a major political party in Bangladesh

Hartal: strike/ shut down

Islami Oikya Jot (IOJ): An Islamic Political Party in Bangladesh

Jama’atul Mujahideen, Bangladesh (JMB): A banned (militant) Islamic Political Party in Bangladesh

Jamat-e Islami (JI): An Islamic Political Party in Bangladesh

Jatiyo Party: Name of a Political Party in Bangladesh

Jongi: Militant/extremist

Purbo Bangla (East Bengal) Communist Party (PBCP): A banned (militant) Political Party in Bangladesh

Shontrash: Terrorism

Shongothon: Organization
Preface

This monograph is about how the external factors affect state fragility. At the heart of this research lies the question: "How do the global security and economic structures affect state fragility in the context of Bangladesh? The concept of ‘fragile states’ and the potential problems arising out of weak, failed or collapsed states in a highly interconnected and globalized world have captivated the academia and policy makers in recent times arriving at varied conclusions. It is a timely attempt by the Group Captain Mohammad Zahidul Islam Khan, a Chevening Scholar, to investigate this seemingly universalized, yet under-theorized concept of state fragility. Exploring state fragility from an external dimension is challenging as most literatures in this field attribute state weakness or failure to the domestic factors. It is perhaps one of the very few qualitative research papers that situates Bangladesh in the overall fragile states literature challenging its validity and demonstrate how the international political, security and economic structures affects the 156 million people of the country and their aspiration to have a better life and benefit from the global wealth.

The concept of ‘weak’ or ‘fragile states’ is not new. However, the idea that states could fail or be unable to function as independent entities was often considered anathema to the raison d’être of decolonization and offensive to the notion of self-determination. Soon after the Cold War, the agenda of ‘failed’ states gained prominence and accelerated its growth particularly after the event of 9/11. Since then, the antithesis of ‘stateness’ manifested by ‘fragile states’ has been labelled by many as the single-most important problem for international order. The author of this monograph questions the underlying narratives of such characterization of states as ‘fragile’ and attempts to reveal the paradoxical nature of the concept by revealing the nature and role of the international
structures. Central to his argument is to incorporate the externalities (i.e. geopolitics, effect of market access, tariff barriers, political and economic engineering, duplicitous role of globalization etc) in our assessment of states’ performance. Terming the agenda of ‘fragile states’ as a ‘social construction’, the author urges us to consider the deeply unequal global playing field to arrive at a more nuanced picture of the world in general and the ‘fragile states’ in particular.

From an academic point of view, several intriguing thoughts espoused in this research stands out as enlightening and unique. First, navigating through the highly contested literatures on ‘fragile states’ this paper provides a clear understanding and distinction amongst different terminologies that are often (loosely) used to denote state fragility. Adding clarity to our thoughts, it distinguishes and defines ‘weak’, ‘failed’, ‘failing’, ‘collapsed’ states. All such specific and partial concepts of state failures are broadly construed under the concept of ‘fragile state’ in the paper. Rightly thus the paper contends: ‘state fragility is a continuum’ and ‘all states can be fragile’-- while some state can be more fragile than the other at a particular time/dimension. Second, by defining ‘fragile states’ as “the extent to which the actual practice and capacities of states differ from their idealized images engendered by global factors” the author implies that measuring state fragility should include not only the internal dimensions but also the external factors that may privilege or constrain a particular state. It highlights that the ‘relational’ and ‘structural’ attributes of modern states are embedded in a larger global system and any measurement of state fragility is by default connected to the international environment. Third, the exhaustive review of fragile states’ literature together with an in-depth examination of different oft-cited state fragility indexes is an invaluable part of this research. Situating Bangladesh in different Fragile State Indexes/Literature, this paper vividly exposes their limitations and difference in ranking. The conclusion drawn that all these fragility indexes are ‘state centric, internally oriented snapshot based on flexible criteria, lacking the ability to capture country specificity’, surely calls for a fresh look at these indexes and their underlying narratives. Finally from a security-development perspective, author’s argument that the dominant narrative of global war on terrorism privileged the ‘freedom from fear’ strand of human security (as opposed to ‘freedom from want’) causing substantial diversion of development assistance and attention of international community to address the fragile state problematique is worth pondering.
The monograph is organized in five chapters. **Chapter 1** deals with the theories, significance, and methodological issues. **Chapter 2** sets the tone of a promising read ahead by defining state fragility and its links with international structures drawing relevance from development economics, comparative politics and international relations literature. However, it is perhaps Chapter 3 and 4 that help the reader to interpret the theory and connect the dots in the context of Bangladesh. Exposing the interlocking character of international security structure and state fragility, **Chapter 3** remind us that “in fragile context, the concept of security oscillates with the state’s ability in meeting the goals and interests of dominant power.” Such contention is amplified by analyzing Bangladesh’s journey from an initial secular-socialist orientation to the process of Islamization and how the narratives of global war on terrorism in a post 9/11 era has been used (or abused) by the domestic, regional and global players contributing to state fragility. Author’s assertion that the external influence and incentives metamorphosed into Bangladesh’s domestic politics making the concept of national security ‘ambiguous’ and transforming it into ‘regime security’ and/or consolidation of the regime’s political power while fulfilling the need of dominant external actors in post 9/11 era, is well argued and worth pondering. **Chapter 4** investigates the effects of global economic structure on Bangladesh. This chapter highlights Bangladesh's economic progress, achievement of MDGs and the shimmering prospect of becoming the ‘Next 11’. It also observes that the shift in Bangladesh’s economy from the agricultural base to a service economy (bypassing the manufacturing) together with its outward orientation and the requirements of foreign capital and the markets remains critical for Bangladesh. Comparing and contrasting Bangladesh’s market access, workers’ wage, effect of implementing TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and the overall political economy, the chapter reveals the exploitative nature of international division of labour, proliferation of mercantile interest, a monopolistic bourgeoisie and the growth of a parasitic domestic polity in Bangladesh who are dependent on external linkage resulting in the leakage of potential economic surplus through endemic corruption. **Chapter 5** is the conclusion and suggests a way forward. It contends that the current fragility indexes needs to be reformed to capture global political economy, interests and duplicitous role of globalization. As a way forward, the author suggests scaling back international ambitions, opening up market access, removing trade barriers, establishing independent global risk assessment to determine the pace and time of liberalization, selective and
controlled migration, forging partnership for higher education and a complete reversal of current security priorities in fragile environment. The footnotes, illustrations, tables and annexes used in the paper add to its richness and surely will benefit any avid reader. The interim summary placed after each chapter is also very helpful.

My congratulations to the researcher for sharing his work under the banner of Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies. I believe this monograph will surely inspire the scholars and current architects of the fragility indexes to reform the indexes taking due considerations of externalities and also help to realign the international community’s reform agenda in fragile states. Perhaps more importantly, it will provide a better understanding to the people and policymakers in Bangladesh about the paradox of state fragility. We remain firmly committed to providing a platform for sharing thoughts and ideas on such issues in coming days.

Major General A N M Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd)
President
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies
The seemingly universalized concept of ‘fragile states’ and the associated models of indexing them based on domestic indicators reflect our quest to quantify and measure states’ performance. What we measure affects what we do. They also become an inseparable part of our vision of the world. Thus it is important that we measure it right, if at all. This research investigates the underlying narratives of categorizing states as ‘fragile’ from a global perspective by exploring the role of international structures on state fragility in the context of Bangladesh. It defines states fragility as: the extent to which the actual practice and capacities of states differ from their idealized images engendered by global factors. Highlighting the effects of global systemic forces on the structural and relational aspects of ‘fragile states’ the paper demonstrates the paradoxical nature of the concept. It contends that a comprehensive approach encapsulating not just the domestic factors but also the global political economy, interests and the duplicitous role of globalization engendered by the integration into the global structures is central to any measurement of state performances.

In the context of Bangladesh, the paper demonstrates that the pressure and incentives from powerful external actors buttressed by domestic compulsions and expediency changed the initial socialist-secularist orientation of the country embracing free-market economy as well as providing space for Islamization. A disarticulated and abrupt economic liberalization, together with restrictive and conditional global market access, trade barriers, exploitative labour market, and structural adjustment programs trapped Bangladesh in lasting external dependency. It also created a parasitic domestic polity dependent on external linkage and changed the social capital contributing to state fragility. The external factors metamorphosed into domestic politics, distorting the concept of national security into regime security and consolidation of regime’s domestic political power.
As a way forward, the paper suggests scaling back international ambitions, particularly in the dimension of economic engineering, opening up market access, removing trade barriers, establishing independent global risk assessment to determine the pace and time of liberalization, selective and controlled migration, forging partnership for higher education and a complete reversal of current security priorities in fragile environment emphasizing life welfare. Such a tall order can only be achieved, if the international community gets serious and acts on enlightened self interest.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

1.1 The concept of state fragility lies in the problematic 'dual nature of state': one that portrays the idealized 'strong image' and the actual 'practice' of the state (Milliken and Krause, 2002, Migdal, 2001, 1988). The state's duel nature exists in considerable tensions and evolves through the dynamic interactions of various actors within the state, society and the ever increasing pressure of global structures (Migdal, 2001; Buzan and Little, 2000). Under such a dynamic continuum, the institutions, functions and processes of a state may differ from its 'idealized image' rendering it fragile in a particular (or all) dimensions at a given time. State fragility, thus in broad sense, is a 'matter of degree not kind'; it is the 'extent to which the actual practice and capacities of states differ from their idealized images' engendered by global factors (Carment, et.al 2010). Irrespective of their varied nature and types, all states can be fragile to some extent (FSI 2012; Rotberg, 2004).

1 Migdal (2001) argues that the 'strong image' of state is relatively unproblematic but there is always a deficit of that image in reality (pp.15-23). Milliken and Krause (2002) opined that from the outset, the modern state aspired to be "an ideal of sovereign territoriality" (emphasis in original) but was seldom achieved; "even Western European states today do not always reach the Weberian pinnacle" they added (p.755).

2 Notwithstanding the difference between the term 'global' and 'international', they are used interchangeably in this paper.

3 Migdal (2001) opines that states through interaction between various actors are in constant state of 'becoming' (a strong state). Buzan and Little (2000) stress the influence of international structure on shaping, making and remaking of states.

4 The Failed State Index (FSI, 2012, p.13) relegated Japan outside the 'sustainable' range following the Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdown that overwhelmed Japanese
similarities of modern states include their ‘physical base’, ‘institutional expression’ and the less tangible ‘idea of state’ holding the territory-polity-society package together (Buzan, 2007). The relative performances of states are often measured in three broad internal dimensions: authority, legitimacy and service delivery capacity (ALC)⁵ (Stewart and Brown, 2010; Cerment et. al. 2010). The summative function of these three dimensions - derived through different indicators reflecting domestic political, economic, governance, security, social, environmental, demographic issues etc capture state fragility.

1.2 But states in the international system do not operate in isolation. Buttressed by the globalization process, powerful global factors are at play, generating strong constraints⁶ affecting ‘fragile state’s’ development (OECD, 2012, 2013; Clapham, 1996, 2002; Chauvet and Collier, 2006; Willet 2011). The ‘heightened sensitivity and lower resilience’ makes ‘fragile states’ particularly, more vulnerable to the global factors (Chandler, 2005, 2001). Many ‘fragile states’ who derived their legitimacy from the international system rather than from domestic society are faced with the ‘unaccountable ambition’, 'non-negotiable objective of economic engineering' and ‘interventionist’ global governance affecting their progress (Pugh, et al, 2011, Crocker,2003). Drawing parallel with Erysichthon⁷ from Greek mythology (who was cursed to suffer unending hunger for violating the sacred grove of Demeter), Pugh et al. (2010), contend that, irresponsible governance ‘from above’ has no limit and permits an ‘unending quest' suggesting ‘scaling back international ambition’ (pp.394-5). Paradoxically, the mutually constitutive links between the (domestic) agents and the (international) structures represented by global institutions (GIs), actors, multinational companies (MNCs), etc and their consequent effects (Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005; Patrick, 2011; Wendt,1992) are rarely quantified to measure state fragility in different ‘fragile states’ indexes.

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⁵ ALC dimension are highly correlated (correlation coefficients higher than 0.70 and 0.80 in absolute value in some instances) with other indexes. See Carment (2010) p.120.

⁶ The OECD (2012) paper outlines eight global factors relating to the economic, political, social and security dimensions. Willet (2011) highlights the effect of trade liberalization and the static model of comparative advantages prescribed by World Bank (WB). (pp.70-71)

⁷ Erysichthon, in spite of continuously eating and selling his possessions including his daughter, could never satisfy his hunger and was driven to eat his own limbs.
1.3 The fact that *domestic drivers* dominate the existing measurement of state fragility is not a criticism but a *limitation* of the measurement architecture. In a world that is as much ‘social’ as it is ‘material’, the international structures manifested by the GIs, norms, rules and regimes reflects the ‘identities and interests’ of the powerful actors (Collins, 2010). Incorporating externalities like the effect of market access, tariff barriers, political and economic engineering etc could offer a more nuanced picture of state capabilities continuum. Thus the agenda of ‘fragile state’ can be viewed as a *social construction*, as it does not consider the deeply unequal global playing field. The objective of this research is neither to reject the domestic drivers nor to invent a new index to measure state fragility. It aims to explore the links of state fragility with international structures using Bangladesh as a case study. The paper seeks to answer: ‘how do the external politico-security and economic factors affect the internal dynamics and causes of ‘fragility’ in the context of Bangladesh?’

2. Significance of the Research

2.1 There are profound *academic* and *normative* reasons to research state fragility. First, the concept of state fragility came to spotlight after the Cold War⁸ and accelerated its growth particularly after 9/11 (Newman, 2007, 2009). The antithesis of ‘stateness’ manifested by ‘fragile states’ has been labelled as the ‘single-most important problem for international order’⁹ (Fukuyama, 2004). With the deepening and widening concepts of security, (Ullman, 1983) problematized by the ‘securitization of development’, (Duffid, 2010) and the culture of ‘threat inflation’ (Thrall and Cramer 2009) -- the *de jure equality* enjoyed by the ‘proxies’ and ‘battlegrounds’ of the Cold War has been replaced by *de facto inequality* and the associated notion of international (humanitarian) interventions (Herbst, 1997; Pupavac, 2001). Under the ambit of responsibility to protect (R2P), fixing ‘fragile state’s has become the ‘central pillar in extending

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⁸ As Helman and Ratner (2000) recalls, during Cold War, the idea, that ‘states could fail and simply unable to function as independent entities-was anathema to the raison d’être of decolonization and offensive to the notion of self-determination (emphasis added). pp. 27–53.

⁹ The United States (US) National Security Strategy 2002 stated that US is ‘now more threatened by weak and failing states than we are by conquering ones.’ Similar claims have been made in the United Kingdom (UK) and other western countries and were supported by several studies and analytical reports. (Patrick and Brown, 2006, p.1, Duffid, 2010, pp.120-125).
the west’s external sovereign frontier’ in the post 9/11 scenario (Duffid, 2010, p.160). From an academic point of view, such a profound shift merits interrogation by any student of social science/international relations (IR).

2.2 Second, there are profound normative reasons to investigate state fragility because a vast majority of world’s poor, totalling over a billion, lives in ‘fragile states’ (Chandy and Gertz 2011; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, DFID 2005). Contrasting the image of an ‘insured life’ in the rich countries, the image of poverty, violence, corruption, poor Millennium Development Goal (MDG) achievements, pandemic disease, paltry infrastructure and fractured politics depict life in most ‘fragile states’ (FP, 2013; Garfinkle, 2005; Hass, 2003). Yet, as Susan Willet (2010) contends, ‘if Africa, East Asia and Latin America were each to increase their share of world exports by 1 percent, the resulting income gains could lift 128 million people out of poverty (p.73)’. Thus, if we want to send ‘poverty to the museum’ investigating state fragility and its links with externalities, in addition to the current focus on internal drivers of fragility, remains paramount. The ‘relational’ aspects that encapsulates domestic state-society relationship, international, regional and local pressures, political economy and the interdependence engendered by the global economy (OECD, 2012, 2013, Alexander, 2010, Cooper, 2010) merits due attention. Any effort to lift the ‘bottom billion’ is as much a coherent and rational function of external ‘structures’ as it is of the internal institutions and ‘agency’(Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, Collier, 2007).

2.3 Finally, being exposed to the compelling literature of the ‘fragile state’s security and development nexus’ triggered my personal interest in undertaking this research to better comprehend the widely oscillating perceptions about my country. Describing the richness of Bengal in Mughol era, the 16th century French traveller François Bernier accounted that Bengal was abound with

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10 By 2014, half of the world’s poor will be living in ‘fragile states’. However, from 2005-10, the number of poor people in the world have fallen by nearly half a billion. Poverty estimate is based on World Bank (WB) figure of $1.25/ day; list of fragile state based on FSI of Fund for Peace. (Emphasis added, Chandy and Gertz 2011,pp. 3, and 10-11)

11 Seventy-five per cent of the global GDP is accounted for the 14 percent of world’s population in the rich countries (Willet, 2010, p.73). Also see Duffid (2010), pp.16-18

12 Bernier’s account is based on his visits to Indian subcontinent between 1656-68. He contended that the pre-eminence ascribed to Egypt as the most fertile and wealthy country by the historians is rather due to Bengal. 'In regard to valuable commodities of a nature to attract foreign merchants, I am acquainted with no country where so great a variety is found’ he wrote (Constable (1891) pp.438-45)
'every necessity of life' and an 'unparallel rich country' exporting silk, rice, cotton, sugar, etc inducing many Europeans 'to seek asylum in this fertile kingdom' (Constable, 1891). However, more recently, it has also been dubbed as a 'test case of development' (Faaland and Parkinson, 1976), a 'failing' 'fragile' state (FSI, 2009, OECD, 2012), a 'laboratory for innovative solution in developing world' (Belt, 2011), a 'bottomless political basket' (Bayes 2013) etc by many observers. Such contrasting perceptions reflect not only the heavily slanted viewpoints and boundaries around knowledge production on Bangladesh but also the underlying structural factors that facilitate or constrain development to overcome fragility. Notwithstanding the role of 'agency' and domestic drivers of fragility, my quest is to examine the role of international structures in creating the 'dysfunctional state' that stands between the 152 million people of Bangladesh and their aspiration to benefit from global wealth and a better life.

3. Brief Literature Review

3.1 The literature on state fragility is highly fragmented and overlapping among three broad streams of social science: development economics, comparative politics and IR. Following the introduction of the phrase by Helman and Ratner\(^\text{14}\) (1993), 'fragile states' became an indispensable part of international lexicon particularly after 9/11. Academics and policy makers alike have drawn attention to the complex relationships between state fragility, poverty and terrorism with varied conclusions. Some accept the idea of 'fragile states' uncritically and recognize them as the greatest challenge to international security calling for paradigm change in international security (Ignatieff, 2002; Wolfensohn, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004; Rabasa et al. 2007). Others are sceptical about the concept’s analytical value on epistemological grounds and find it difficult to objectively define, identify and analyse with methodological rigor (Call, 2008, 2010; Newman 2009, Beehner and Young, 2012). And there are some who reject the idea as a politicized, ethnocentric, hegemonic concept with

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\(^{13}\) Bernier reported that the rich exuberance, together with the beauty and amiable disposition of the native women, has given rise to a proverb among western asylum seekers that 'the Kingdom of Bengal has a hundred gates open for entrance, but not one for departure'. \textit{ibid.} p.438.

\(^{14}\) It is claimed that current discourse on fragile states originated from Helman and Ratner’s first use of the term in their Foreign Policy article. (Beehner and Young, 2012)
interventionist connotations\(^{15}\) (Chandler, 2005; Boas and Jennings 2007, Pugh et al. 2011). Adding to the slanted and contradictory literature, Bangladesh has also been ranked differently in various fragility indexes. Domestic socio-economic indicators, governance, poverty,\(^{16}\) corruption,\(^{17}\) environmental issues etc dominates such image of Bangladesh ignoring the role of GIs and structures. Paradoxically, Bangladesh is also one of the six countries that has shown substantial progress defying conventional prediction and ‘reshaping ideas about how to attain human development’ (HDR, 2013, p.2). Goldman and Sachs placed Bangladesh in their list of ‘Next 11’ with high potentials to become one of the world’s largest economies. Navigating through such contradictory images this paper intends to provide a comprehensive understanding of the effects of external drivers of fragility in the context of Bangladesh to fill the void in existing literatures.

4. Methodology

4.1 It is primarily a desk-based analytical research using both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources include books, journals, articles and reports of international standard. Publications with questionable reliability (like Wikipedia) have not been used and due consideration on biasness, time and context has been given while using ‘gray literatures’\(^{18}\) to ensure relevancy and authenticity. Primary data has been taken from the official websites of ministries/organizations/national parliament, elections commission etc.\(^{19}\) To offset my own biasness as a Bangladeshi, I have relied on reading wide range of literature, guidance from my supervisor and remaining critical. The

\(^{15}\) Boas and Jennings (2007) urges the interventionist west to cease its interference in affairs of the global periphery, or at least abandon the pretence of altruism (pp. 475–85) also See Chandler (2006) p.63-65.

\(^{16}\) Poverty rate in Bangladesh is highest in South Asia (58 per cent) measured in terms of Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) (HDR, 2013).

\(^{17}\) Transparency International (TI) ranked Bangladesh at 144th out of 174 countries in 2012 (TI, 2012). It is also amongst the top 10 exporters of illicit capital which is estimated to be US$ 34 billion between 1990-2008 (OECD, 2012a, 2013, p.7. Kar and Freitas, 2011).

\(^{18}\) Refers to the mass of information that falls outside the mainstream published journals.

\(^{19}\) Includes Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Bangladesh Bank, WB, World Trade Organization, Asian Development Bank, TI, different ‘fragile state’ ranking index, USAID, different UN websites including UNDP, UN DESA, OECD, Political Instability Task Force reports, DfID etc.
publications used are primarily in English; however, some materials in Bengali (without any need of interpreter) have also been consulted.

5. Structure

5.1 The primary research question is: "How do the global security and economic structures affect state fragility in the context of Bangladesh? To address this question, first, Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature, situates Bangladesh in different fragile states indexes to reveal the paradoxical nature of the existing measurement architecture of state fragility. Chapter 2 also conceptualizes state fragility and the international structures highlighting that the effects of global structures on both structural and relational aspects of a ‘fragile state’ are inseparable part of measuring state fragility. Chapter 3 explores the effects of international security structure on Bangladesh’s socio-political orientation highlighting its consequence with an emphasis on the post 9/11 scenario. Chapter 4 investigates the effects of global economic structure on the state fragility of Bangladesh. Highlighting the structural and relational aspects, it establishes how the global economic structure is linked to the concept of state fragility in the context of Bangladesh. The concluding chapter (Chapter 5) sums up the findings and outlines a way forward. It contends that the current fragility indexes needs to be reformed to capture global political economy, interests and duplicitous role of globalization. As a way forward in addressing state fragility, it suggests scaling back international ambitions, opening up market access, removing trade barriers, establishing independent global risk assessment to determine the pace and time of liberalization, selective and controlled migration, forging partnership for higher education and a complete reversal of current security priorities in fragile environment emphasizing ‘life welfare’. Such a tall order is possible only if the international community gets serious and acts on enlightened self interest.
Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALIZING STATE FRAGILITY AND ITS LINKS WITH INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES

1. Preamble

1.1 Part I of this chapter reviews the literature including different state fragility indexes to situates Bangladesh in the exiting ‘fragile states’ debates and reveals the paradox of state fragility as a natural extension. Part II conceptualizes state fragility leading to a definition of ‘fragile states’ and the international structures. It then outlines the links of international structures with state fragility providing a framework of analysis for the remaining chapters.

PART I. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Overview

1.1 The literature on state fragility is fragmented and characterized by cross-pollination amongst development economics, comparative politics and IR. The potential literature is vast. This review focuses on the relevant discourses with an emphasis on various oft-quoted fragility indexes. But first a brief mention of nomenclatures used to denote ‘fragile states’ which includes\textsuperscript{20}: weak state

\textsuperscript{20} Carment et.al, (2010) attributes part of the academic dis-jointness on state fragility to the different nomenclatures (p.8).
(Migdal, 1988), quasi state (Jackson 1990), collapsed states (Zartman, 1995),
anocracies (Russet 1995, Mansfield and Snyder 1995), phantom/anarchic/
captured/aborted anaemic state (Gros 1996) new trusteeship (Fearon and
Laitin, 2004), illegitimate states, insecure states (Call, 2008, 2010) etc. With the
speared of democracy, fragile states were also equated with delegative
democracies (O’Donnel, 1994), illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 1997), people’s
democracy (Manwaring, 2002) etc. Aid agencies preferred terms evolved from:
difficult partner, (OECD, 2001) Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS)
(World Bank, 2002), poor performer (Aus Aid 2002), difficult environment
(Torres and Anderson, 2004), weak performer (ADB 2007), to ‘fragile states’
as ‘fragile’ is also politically provocative and sensitive21 (Nguyen, 2006). With
regard to Bangladesh, the country is recognized as a Least Developed Country
(LDC) in the UN. It is also categorized as ‘developing’ and aspiring to become
a ‘middle income country’ by 2021 in government literature (GoB 2011, 2013).
However, the confrontational politics in Bangladesh have often prompted
many including the opposition to label the country as a ‘failed state’ (bertho
rashtro).22 The overlapping contours of state fragility together with the
fragmented nomenclatures and cross-pollination amongst different streams
are not a critic of the idea but a challenge to conceptualize state fragility.

2. Political Science Literature

2.1 The literature in political science stream can be traced back to the theories
of state and democratization. The uni-linear assumption and optimism about
political and social development was challenged by Huntington who
Introducing the concept of ‘weak states’ Migdal (1988) opined that the image

21 For example Nguyen’s (2006) rejects such labeling of Timor Leste. USAID suspended its
promising ‘Measuring State Fragility’ and associated project in 2006 and never released
a comparative list of fragile states due to the sensitivity and political implications
associated with such official ranking (Rice and Patrick, 2008, p.6).

22 For example, the Acting General Secretary of the main opposition party in Bangladesh
termed that the ruling Awami League (AL) government has turned the country a failed
state (bertho rashtro) in several occasions. See Chaudhury, 2013.
Figure 2.1: Relations between weak Third World States and their Societies


of ‘stateness’ set for the Third World countries were ‘unrealistic’ (p.5). Summarizing his arguments through a model (figure 1), he emphasized that with the spread of the world economy and effect of colonial rule, there are very ‘slim prospects for qualitative leaps in the consolidation of social control on the parts of states in societies that now have fragmented social control’ (pp.268). Jackson (1990), introduced the controversial concept of ‘quasi states’ while Vallings and Moreno-Torres (2005) identified weak political institutions as the central drivers of state fragility. The ‘consolidation school of democratization’ (Diamond, 1994; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring et al. 1992) emphasized on ‘institutional’ and ‘ideational transformation’ to consolidate democracy and state building. This however appeared problematic as many of the democratizing countries of 90’s remained in the ‘gray zones’ owing to significant structural and contextual obstacles. The literature on theories of democratization established two cardinal issues relating to the fragile state problematic: first it underlines the complex, mutually causal relationship that exists between regime type and political stability stressing the advantages of democratic regimes. Second, it highlights the conceptual division between the activities of state-building and democratization. Political competition amongst the elites and the relational feature of the state and the society came

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23 The term is borrowed from Carment, et al (2010), and refers to the dense web of theoretical and practical problems in addressing the issue of fragile states and its multi-linear causalities.
into prominence through the political science literature to measure state fragility.

3. IR Literature

3.1 The widening and deepening concept of security\(^{24}\) in the post cold-war era, prompted researchers and prominent security schools (Copenhagen School, Newman, Ignatieff, Waever, Buzan, Ullman) to focus on the unstable part of the world assessing their effect on international security. Following the events of 9/11 and the declaration of an indefinite Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) accelerated their efforts as threats from ‘fragile states’ and ‘ungoverned territory’ became more pronounced. (Rabsa et al. 2007). Linking terrorism with fragile states became ‘conventional wisdom’ (Patrick 2006). Plethora of literature emerged connecting failed and weak states with host of dangers from terrorism to weapons proliferation, organized crime, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophes, energy insecurity etc (Crocker 2003; Rotberg, 2002, 2003, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Lockhart and Ghani, 2008). Meanwhile the concept of human security\(^{25}\) placed ‘individual’ as the ‘referent object’ replacing the ‘state’ for the first time (ICISS, 2001) raising controversy and limiting the power of state (Duffid, 2010, Chandler 2011). Publications/resolutions like Responsibility to Protect (R2P),\(^{26}\) Agenda for Peace, United Nations (UN) high level panel on threats, challenges and change etc became important tools to legitimize state-building/intervention efforts in fragile and conflict affected countries. (Pugh et al, 2011).

3.2 Human security was further divided into two streams: ‘freedom for fear’ highlighting dangers to citizens of fragile states arising from endemic violence and conflict (Ignatieff 2002; ICISS, 2001) and ‘freedom from want’ tradition drawing attention to the socio-economic challenges, (Branchflower et al 2004). In the context of Bangladesh, and most other LDCs, it is perhaps the

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\(^{24}\) For an excellent schematic account of the drivers for the widening-deepening approaches of security see Buzan and Hansen (2009) p.225

\(^{25}\) ICISS (2001) defines human security as ‘the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms (emphasis added, p. 15)

\(^{26}\) R2P was finalized before 9/11. The current situation in Syria, however, underscores the difficulty of reconciling humanitarian ideals with geopolitical concern. It has also raised the question whether the events in Syria means the end of R2P regime. See Patrick (2013)
'freedom from want' that would matter most. However, the ‘freedom from fear’ stream is more privileged in terms of international community’s attention due to the perceived risk they pose to rich countries (Beehner, and Young 2012). Leveraging from the concept of ‘mutual vulnerability of weak and strong’ (ICISS 2001), ‘fixing fragile states’ no longer appeared ‘as external coercion but a matter of administrative assistance for ‘good governance’/‘institutional capacity-building’ (Chandler, 2005). Wolfensohn (2002, p18) attempted to bridge the two viewpoints on human security suggesting more effective state policies ‘addressing economic exclusion, poverty and underdevelopment to root out terrorism’. Pugh et.al (2011) offered a more emancipatory concept of ‘life welfare’ - an advance of human security paradigm. Placing welfare rather than security at the centre stage, they argued for distributive justice, positive discrimination for the poor within the framework of ‘social contract’ allowing optimisation of life potentials (p.8). Despite such diverse understandings, the conflict oriented fragility indexes, remains focused on the domestic factors and biased towards ‘freedom from fear’ stream.

4. Development Economics Literature

4.1 From the beginning, economics literature recognize the externalities and multi-linear causality of state fragility. Early economic theories of modernization and growth (Rostow 1960), structuralism (Singer 1950; Gershenkron 1962), neoclassical structural adjustment (Friedman 1970, Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati 1982) etc were paralleled by the writings of Baran (1957), Sweezy (1946, 2000) Sen (1984, 1999) Frank (1967), Dos Santos (1973) introducing dependency theory and ideas like ‘economic surplus’,

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27 Policy makers viewed that state’s rights of sovereignty can coexist with external intervention and state-building. For example, in 2006, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that the new ‘transformational diplomacy’ initiative intended to help build and sustain democratic, well governed states so that they will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. (quoted in Patrick, 2007, p.644 )

28 Baran (1957) defined economic surplus as the difference between output and consumption in a given society. He also introduced three variants: actual, potential and planned economic surplus and argued that the economic orientation of peripheral economics towards potential surplus instead of planned surplus to register growth creates dependency on foreign markets and links the domestic ruling class to the resource predation.
entitlement approach', stressing economic development as a means rather than an end and linking it with the broader agenda of social actualization. The recognition of the 'Tolstoy effect' in 'fragile state' context, subsequently led to a more focused research emphasizing the role of political stability (Gupta, 1990), governmental policy, institutions (Gurr, 1993), horizontal inequalities (HIs) (Stewart, 2001, 2008) and establishing their causal links with state fragility (Stewart and Brown, 2009, 2010).

4.2 Linking externalities with development, Stiglitz (2000, 2003), Torres and Anderson (2004), Willet (2011), etc suggests scaling back international 'ambition', encouraging local ownership and refraining from abrupt economic liberalization in fragile states. Calling for an inclusive and equitable global economic system within the framework of Monterrey model, Torres and Anderson (2004) suggests better international partnerships while Willet (2010) calls for the liberalization of agricultural sectors of rich countries to resolve development challenges faced by 'fragile states'. Development institutions like World Bank (WB), World Trade Organization (WTO), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Department for International Development, United Kingdom (DfID, UK), Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Inequality (CRISE), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) sponsored researches also pursued various avenues emphasizing human rights, HIs and social exclusion, the MDGs and poverty reduction to overcome state fragility.

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29 Sen (1984) Defined entitlement as 'the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces' (p.497). See Devereux (2001) for a critique and counter critique of Sen’s argument.

30 Refers to Leo Tolstoy's quote in Anna Karenina, "happy families (i.e. developed states) are all alike" while "every unhappy family (i.e. fragile states) is unhappy in its own way".

31 Unlike vertical inequality, HIs is the inequality between culturally defined groups and includes dimensions like political, economical and social. (See Stewart, 2008)

32 Stiglitz’s (2003) Globalization and Its Discontents is essentially an indictment of the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the U.S. Treasury Department, and related international institutions that push dogmatic "free market" policies onto developing countries.

33 Monterrey Consensus, agreed in an International Conference on 'Financing for Development' in 2002 is aimed at eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable economic growth and development through an inclusive, equitable global economic system. (UN 2003)
4.3 Combining with the evolving thinking of state fragility and conflict analysis, a new generation country specific assessment tools using ‘political-economy analysis’ also emerged. Chief amongst them are UK’s Drivers of Change Analysis, SIDA’s Power Analysis, and the Netherlands’ Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA). Arguably, going beyond the façade of the state, these tools explore the underlying factors that shape the formal and informal relationships between the state and organized groups to assess the incentives that drive politicians and policy makers contributing to state fragility. However, their focus on the relationships of power within society and between state and society classifies them more as a tool to assess ‘governance’ and not the effects of external actors. (Slotin et. al, 2010, pp.8-9).

4.4 In sum, the multi-linear causality of state fragility/weakness is inherent to the development economics literature recognizing both internal and external dimensions. It also highlights the intimate link of state fragility with policy, politics, stability and economics. Despite such rich understanding and recognition of multi-linear relationships, most measurement tools including the oft-cited fragile/failed/weak state indexes ignores the external factors and capture the domestic one’s only.

5. Fragility Indexes

5.1 Different fragility indexes (see annex 2A) with varied orientations constitutes an important part of the literature and signifies efforts of universalizing the emergent and under theorized concept of fragile state problematique. However, none of these indexes could predict the Arab Spring (Margolis, 2012) reflecting the fallacy under theorization of the concept. Table 2.2 situates Bangladesh in some of the most cited fragility indexes. The WB’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating (2002)

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34 Incorporating elements of Stability Assessment Framework as used by the Dutch government, SGACA was later modified as Fragile States Assessment Methodology (FSAM).

35 Factors include history, geography, sources of government revenue, deeply embedded social and economic structures etc. See, Clingendael Institute (2008) p.5 and Unsworth, p.1

36 Out of 13 indexes listed in annex A, seven provides global ranking.


38 CPIA is a cross-country econometric regression of a development outcome, often defined as growth against a number of “right hand side” variables. See Tang (2009) for a critical evaluation of CPIA
groups Low Income Countries (LIC) under 1st to 5th quintiles. Around thirty countries with harmonized average CPIA rating of 3.2 or less, or housing the UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission for past three years are considered as fragile. According to the CPIA index Bangladesh ranks amongst the top (in 1st quintile) in terms of policies for social inclusion and equity while its ranking on governance (i.e. public sector management and institutions) is in 3rd quintile and portfolio performance is in 4th (IDA, 2003,pp.12-3). Such contradiction in rating with regards to Bangladesh has been

Table 2.2: Situating Bangladesh in Fragile State Indexes/Literatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragility Index / Literature (Year) And Indicators</th>
<th>Ranking (Score / 'Category')</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (WB) Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (2002)</td>
<td>Second Quintile (3.48)</td>
<td>Countries with CPIA scores 3.2 or below or housing UN/regional troops are categorized as fragile state. Limited to IDA recipient countries only. Bangladesh stands as a paradox as it ranks in the 1st quintile (amongst the best) for Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity, in 2nd quintile for Economic Management, in 3rd quintile for Structural Policies and Public Sector Management and Institutions, and in 4th quintile for Portfolio Management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund for Peace Failed State Index (FSI) (2012)</td>
<td>29th (92.2) ‘Warning’</td>
<td>Ranking amongst 177 countries. High Score indicates weaker state (Max score 120) Bangladesh's highest score (8.9) in Fractional Elite and Group Grievance; Lowest score</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development, Group Grievance, Human Flight and Brain Drain Poverty and Economic Decline</th>
<th>(5.9) in External intervention (Measured in terms of Foreign Assistance, Presence of Peacekeepers, Presence of UN mission, Foreign Military intervention, credit rating, sanctions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brookings Institute Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (2008)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators: Economic, political, security, social welfare and GNI per capita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th (5.64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Quintile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 144 countries. Low Score indicates weaker state. Max possible score 10. lowest Score (3.52) in Political followed by Social Welfare (5.98) and highest in Economic (6.08) dimension.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) (2011)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators: Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity dimensions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th (197)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranking amongst 197 countries. High score = Weaker state. Bangladesh’s highest score in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Fragility Index and Matrix (2011) by Centre for Systemic Peace</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators: Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Security, Political, Economic, Social dimensions.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 164 countries. Max score 25 = extreme fragility, 0 = no fragility. No fragility in security effectiveness and economic legitimacy (Green) but high fragility in economic effectives (Red), moderate in social dimension (Orange)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Peace Index (GPI) 2013 by Institute for Economics and Peace</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 qualitative and quantitative indicators measuring: Level of safety and security in society, Extent of domestic or International conflict and the degree of militarisation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.159)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total 168 countries. Afghanistan 158 (3.440)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
dubbed by the advisory panel member of Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IGE) Ravi Kanbur as “Bangladesh Paradox” raising the question: “how come a country with such poor governance ratings does so well on social indicators” (Tang, 2009, p. xxiv, p.64). This also reflects the inability of CPIA to capture country specificity. Baliamoune-Lutz and MacGillivary (2011) also reports inaccuracies in CPIA scores to classify fragile states applying fuzzy transitions.

5.2 The brooking institute’s index is limited to ranking 141 developing countries according to their relative performance. Bangladesh’s score in social welfare is just above the bottom quintile (5.98/10). However, another Booking’s study on global poverty estimates that, between 2005-2015, the number of poor people in Bangladesh will be reduced by a staggering 42.8 million (Chandy and Gertz, 2011, p.5 ). The report hails the current 6.3 percent GDP growth rate of Bangladesh and contends that it would result in lifting quarter of its population out of poverty by 2015 (p.7). This equally raises the question as to how a country with such poor social welfare record can be so successful in poverty alleviation?

5.3 The conflict oriented fund for peace Failed State Index (FSI 2012) ranks Bangladesh at 29th position. It uses sophisticated conflict assessment software

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collapsed, Failed, Failing and Weak states</td>
<td>Fragile State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in the list</td>
<td>Categorizes 46 countries. But does not include Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Categorizes Bangladesh as one of the fragile states in no particular order.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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40 The report proposes changes and assesses that Bangladesh would gain most and her revised PBA (Performance-based Assessment) score would increase 1.6 percent (Tang, 2009, p. 37).

41 Baliamoune-Lutz and MacGillivary (2011) reports inaccuracies of the CPIA with respect to 11 countries including Bangladesh (pp. 33-43).

42 Measured in terms of child mortality, primary school completion, undernourishment, access to improved water and sanitation facilities and life expectancy. (Rice and Patrick, 2008, pp.35-36)

43 The report hails worldwide poverty alleviation efforts and contends that by 2015, the poverty rate is expected to fall below 40 percent. (Chandy and Gertz 2011, pp.1-8)
tools\textsuperscript{44} that scans news, United States (US) State Department reports, independent studies, and corporate financial filings, related to the indicators. The reliance on selective press reports for scores of different indicators raises question about its full transparency (Rice and Patrick, 2008). Canada’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) ranking\textsuperscript{45} is based on over 70 indicators grouped under six clusters reflecting the ALC dimensions of statehood. It ranks Bangladesh at 40th position. Although, Carment et al. (2010,p-79), recognize the importance of externalities and relational aspects in measuring fragility, the data used in the index remains internally oriented.

5.4 The Centre for Systemic Peace’s fragility index captures ‘effectiveness’ and ‘legitimacy’ across four dimensions of state functions using 16 data sources\textsuperscript{46} (Marshall and Cole 2011, pp.28-29). It identifies a state as ‘fragile’ if it lacks effectiveness or legitimacy in a number of dimensions and as ‘failed’ or ‘likely to fail’ if it has lost both (p.29). It reports no fragility for Bangladesh in the security effectiveness and economic legitimacy dimension. Bangladesh is also amongst the countries that have shown the largest improvements (8 points) in their fragility score (p.23). The Global Peace Index (GPI) (2013) puts Bangladesh as the 3\textsuperscript{rd} peaceful country in South Asia (p.14) based on the indicators listed in table 2.2. It attributes Bangladesh’s downgraded global ranking (105th)\textsuperscript{47} to the political violence due to the ongoing war crime tribunal (p.14). Rotberg (2004), using a broad set of indicators, classifies states along collapsed, failed, failing and weak (p.46-49). His index attributes ‘human agency’ rather than ‘structural/institutional inefficiencies’ to state fragility and defines state weakness principally as a function of conflict and human insecurity (p.10). Rotberg however, does not place Bangladesh in any of the stated categories.

5.5 Evidently, the indexes are state centric, internally oriented snapshot of fragility of particular year/dimensions. Both the development (i.e. CIFP, CPIA,

\textsuperscript{44} The Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) is based on comprehensive social science methodology and uses data triangulation method and critical review to obtain final scores.

\textsuperscript{45} Funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIFP has maintained a database on state fragility since 1977.

\textsuperscript{46} Index includes all countries having a population of 500,000 or more in 2010. Using ‘effectiveness’ and ‘legitimacy’ dimensions to assess state fragility was originally developed at the University of Maryland’s IRIS center for the USAID program. The matrix was later specifically designed and applied by Marshall and Cole and reported annually in the Global Report series since 2007.

\textsuperscript{47} Compared to GPI 2008, Bangladesh’ score has increased by 3 per cent.
Brookings) and conflict/stability oriented (PITF, FSI, GPI, Centre for Systemic Peace) indexes emphasize on respective dimensions resulting varied ranking. Even within the conflict/stability orientated indexes, various ‘ranking’ of Bangladesh reflects the use of flexible criteria and limitation of capturing country specificity. Increased political violence -- a recurring phenomenon in Bangladesh during election year is attributed to the security dimension while Bangladesh’s contribution in peace keeping missions as the highest troops contributing country has no scope to be considered. The effect of the volatility of international market that severely affected the agricultural sector growth in Bangladesh is not/cannot be captured in the indexes. Indeed, these indexes do not (or cannot) measure the effects of global political economy. Thus the ‘ranking’ produced by these indexes need to be understood as narrative constructs which, to borrow from Robert Cox, are ‘always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981).

6. Literature on Bangladesh Context


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48 Bangladesh is one of the highest TCC in UN missions. The FSI and CPIA count the UN troops presence within the country but not the opposite. See UN 2012 and Buerk (2006).
49 Registered only 2.5 percent growth in 2012 (lowest in past 6 years). (BB, 2013)
50 Publication of Transparency International (TI)’s Corruption Perception Index is a well-known media exercise by the TI- Bangladesh chapter often leading to court cases.
51 Sen (1984) devotes a chapter on the 1974 famine in Bangladesh. See pp.131 -151. His other writings also refer Bangladesh to draw inference.
being determined not by any elected bodies ...but by bureaucratic global institutions’. Focusing on the identity, security, political economy, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil societies activities in Bangladesh, academics like Lawrence (1979), Huq (1984), Baxter (1997), Van Schendel and Zürcher (eds.) (2001), Jahan (eds) (2001), Murshid (2001), Sharma (2001), provides valuable insights that can be extrapolated to understand the relational aspects (i.e. state-society-polity bondage engendered by external actors) of state fragility in Bangladesh context.

6.2 Following 9/11, a wave of new literature emerged connecting Bangladesh with GWoT. While Perry’s (2002) article52 in the Time magazine put Bangladesh in spotlight, a book by the Indian journalist Karlekar (2005) claimed Bangladesh to be the next Afghanistan. However, others like Sharma (2001), Ali (2003, 2004), Islam, (2008), Sobhan, 2008, Vaughn (2007, 2008, 2010), Van Schendel (2009), Lewis (2011), provides more nuanced picture. Challenging the conventional wisdom, Ali (2003) opines that the rise of Islamist in Bangladesh it part of a historical ‘conservative islamization process’53 with no supranational agenda or threat (p.316). Disagreeing with Karlekar (2005), Lewis (2011,p.9) offers a corrective view of Bangladesh by assessing the current state of democracy and economy in an age of neo-liberalism. Institutes like Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), Bangladesh Bank (BB), offers important perspective to examine fragility. For example, Murtoza and Das (2007) , in their BB paper reports positive but weak empirical evidence about the impact of trade liberalization on growth in Bangladesh. Several CPD papers (Deb, 2005; Ferrer, 2006) also deal with EU market access, trade barriers and their impact on Bangladesh. BIISS publications (Islam, 2009), Hussain (2007) provides important insights on national security issues of Bangladesh.

52 In a highly controversial report, Alex Perry (2002) of the Time magazine claimed that 150 members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda with arms and ammunitions entered Bangladesh on the night of December 21, 2001 in a ship at Chittagong. Denying the report, Bangladesh’s the then foreign minister termed it as ‘totally fictitious and [a] figment of someone’s imagination.’ The magazine was banned from reporting in the country for some time.

53 Ali (2003) argues that crisis of hegemony in ruling block (in Bangladesh) and the politics of expediency have given space to the Islamist and it has been an historic process. (p.302)
7. How this Research Aims to Contribute to the Understanding of Fragility?

7.1 Though the effects of external factors on state fragility are well recognized in the qualitative literature (Bernar, 1957, Stiglitz, 2000, 2003; Torres and Anderson 2004; Willet, 2010; Cooper, 2010; Pugh et al, 2010; OECD 2012; UNDP 2013; Patrick, 2007), their manifestation in different quantitative indexes as well as in the context of Bangladesh is underestimated or absent projecting a skewed picture that dominates the general understanding on fragility. Exploring state fragility from an external perspective, this paper would provide a comprehensive understanding of external drivers of fragility in the context of Bangladesh to fill the void in existing literatures. The aim is not to disregard the internal factors of fragility or invent a new index but to enhance our understanding and trigger debates. Leveraging the interdisciplinary nexus of fragile state problematique, this research also incorporates the IR, economics and political science literatures to explore state fragility from an external dimension to strengthened internal capacity. By revealing the facade behind this seemingly universalized, under-theorized concept of state fragility, it is hoped that the research will (i) inspire the current architects of the fragility indexes to reform the indexes taking due considerations of externalities (ii) realign the international community's reform agenda in fragile states, and (iii) provide a better understanding to the people and policymakers in Bangladesh about the paradox of state fragility.

8. The Paradox of State Fragility

8.1 Evidently, the existing fragile state definitions are based on flexible criteria and mostly internally oriented. Many definitions have focused on stability/violence, while other focus on poor governance, corruption, and low administrative capacity sidelined the enduring strains of a hostile international environment faced by governments that are compounded by weak capacity at home. For example, the fund for Peace FSI ignores the fact both failed and

54 For example Moreno-Torres (2005) lists 'the international system' amongst the seven 'other drivers of fragility. Mohammad (2006) cites the abhorrent practice of consultancy boom in Bangladesh that remain in the heart of ignoring/understating the effect and pressure of global structures (p. 1462)

55 Indeed, in the context of Bangladesh, there is apparently no literature that explicitly compares and contrast different fragility index and examines state fragility.
strong states can have ‘pockets of governance’ and ‘zones of failure.’ Ignoring such spatial variation and treating the states like an ‘on/off switch’ creates a false dichotomy.\(^{56}\) (Beehner and Young 2012). The tendency of the stability oriented fragility indexes to ‘reflexively lump all areas outside of western norms of rule and sovereignty’ as failed, fragile, or ungoverned is evident mainly because of their perceived threat. Newman’s (2009) and Wyler’s (2008) (qualitative) comparison further explains the discrepancies of different fragility indexes; Newman (2009) reveals that, though Bangladesh ranks 12th (in 2008) in FSI, it does not appear within 40 lowest ranking states in other indexes (p.427).\(^{57}\) Wyler\(^{58}\) (2008) also reaches similar conclusions (p.33). Indeed such ranking can be foolhardy at a time when forces of globalisation and ‘creeping sovereignty gap’ are challenging the traditional notions of statehood and ‘surviving itself stands as a great accomplishment for some states’ (Clapham, 1996, Patrick, 2007).

8.2 Global factors like terms of trade, protectionism, the volatility of international markets, and abrupt economic liberalization due globalization pressure are not considered in these indexes. Fragile states are more sensitive to such economic factors. Terms of trade (both export and import prices) remain one of the major sources of exogenous volatility for LICs and about half of the growth volatility in LICs are linked to such exogenous factors; yet fragility indexes like CPIA, FSI etc do not address such vulnerabilities (Alexander, 2010). The indexes also ignore the ideational process and the ‘relational’ attributes of states. While it is possible to measure state fragility from ‘structural’ indicators, the ‘relational’ approach is also important as it encapsulates territory-state-society relationships, international, regional and local pressures, political economy and the interdependence engendered by integration in the global economy.

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\(^{56}\) Beehner and Young (2012) also points out to the dubious weight assignment (of Fund for Peace FSI) to the 12 components of the measurement, cobbled together without a clear aggregation plan.

\(^{57}\) Newman’s (2009, p.427) comparison is based on the state failure ranking of 40 lowest state using data from FSI (Fund for Peace), Global Peace Index (Vision of Humanity), Human Development Index (UNDP), Index of State Weakness (Brookings Institution), State Fragility Index (Center for Systemic Peace).

PART II: CONCEPTUALIZING STATE FRAGILITY

1. What is State?

1.1 As discussed in chapter-1, state fragility lies between the idealized 'strong image' and the 'weak practices' of the state. The problem however is how and who defines this 'idealized image' of the state and measures it against what criteria. Conceptualizing state fragility, thus, essentially starts with examining the 'state' and its 'strong image'. Most literature derives the 'strong image' of state from the Westphalian concept of 'stateness'\(^{59}\). The Westphalian state is a territorially defined socio-political entity\(^{60}\) codified as internally sovereign and externally recognized by other states (Easton, 1953, Holm, 1998). Amidst varied nature and types, the fundamental similarities of modern states includes their 'physical base', 'institutional expression' and the less tangible 'idea of state' holding the territory-polity-society package together (Buzan, 1991). However, under the strains of globalisation and weak capacity at home, "surviving" itself has become a great "accomplishment" for 'fragile states' (Clapham, 1996). The larger global system exerts 'both positive and pernicious' impacts on the resilience and vulnerability of 'fragile states' (Patrick, 2007). This greatly affects their role as stipulated in the Westphalian model of statehood to provide 'political goods' -- a stable and secure environment to their citizens through enacting binding legislation, exercising coercive force over sovereign territory to maintain law and order and basic services as part of a social contract (Collins, 2010). States as the basic unit of international structure are to fulfil a range of domestic and international responsibilities that are increasingly becoming difficult for 'fragile states' engendered by global factors. This leads us to defining 'fragile states'.

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59 Newman (2009) contends, that the functioning, liberal (western) state are taken as ideal "to define and measure weak and failed statehood" and to rank states in declining categories of effectiveness the further they stray from this ideal." (p.426). Migdal (1988), also contends that in post colonial era western power became not only the bêtes noires but also models to be emulated (p.4).

60 'State' has remained the basic unit of international system with increasing recognition to address fragility, despite pluralists' attempt to dispense the idea of 'state' and characterization of it as a 'metaphysical spook'. (Little, 1991, 1996, Fox 1975, Wilde 1995).
2. Existing Definitions of State Fragility

2.1 There is no agreed definition of ‘fragile states’. Most definitions of state fragility originated from the aid agencies. WB defines ‘fragile states’ as those where ‘weak state policies and institutions undermines countries’ capacity to deliver services to their citizens, control corruption, or provide for sufficient voice and accountability’ and at the same time risk ‘conflict and political instability’ (WB, 2005, p. 1). Focusing on service delivery, UK, DfID defines fragile states as ‘countries where the government cannot or will not deliver its basic functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’ (DfID, 2010, 2005). Countries that continue to provide an acceptable level of services, despite being in conflict, (i.e. Morocco) do not fall into DfID’s ‘fragile states’ list. OECD defines ‘fragile states’ where ‘state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’ (OECD–DAC, 2007). Emphasizing territorial control, security and basic services provisions, USAID refer to a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states as ‘fragile’. It defines ‘states in crisis’ as those in which the ‘central government does not exert significant control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory where legitimacy of the government is weak or non-existent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk’ (USAID, 2005, p. 1).

2.2 Amongst the academics, Helman and Ratner (who said to have first coined the phrase in 1993) define failed states as those ‘utterly incapable of sustaining (themselves)’ and ‘simply unable to function as independent entities.’ Citing unending civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation, they classified three groups of failed/failing states arguing that all three lacked their viability as states. Failed states, though an uncertain concept (Finn, 2008) as it ‘begs the question of what the core functions of states actually are’ (Clapham, 2002, p.755), exhibits flawed institutions, deteriorating or destroyed infrastructure, loss of authority in large section of territory etc (Rotberg, 2004). Weak states are defined as those ‘where the ability to provide adequate amount of political goods is diminished or is diminishing’ (Rotberg, 2004, p.4). Collapsed states, on the other hand exhibit a vacuum of authority, ‘reducing the state as a mere geographic expression’ where ‘the structure,
authority (i.e. legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and security is obtained through the rule of the strong and the 'citizens' become mere 'inhabitants' (Rotberg, 2004, p.9; Zartman 1995, p.1). Collapsed is the extreme version of state weakness and encompasses 'institutional' failure as opposed to 'functional' failure (Milliken and Krause, 2002). Thus at the very core, every failure of the state relates to the lack of manifestation of the 'idea of the state' and 'governmental legitimacy' (Clapham, 1996, p.14; Buzan, 1991) measured against its idealized image from a domestic perspectives.

3. State Fragility and GWoT

3.1 After 9/11, fragile states have been perceived by some as the 'greatest security challenge' to international order. (9/11 Commission Report; Hass, 2003; Straw, 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; Garfinkle, 2005; Rice, 2005; Rabasa et al 2007; Newman, 2007;). However, the empirical basis of linking global terrorism with state fragility remains highly contested (GTI 2012; Patrick 2006; Newman, 2009; Hansen 2011). According to Global Terrorism Index (GTI 2012) after 9/11, global terrorism remained below the late 1970s trend, only to increase significantly after the US invasion of Iraq. GTI (2012) also did not find significant correlation of terrorism with important drivers of fragility like poverty, governance, business environment, equitable distribution of resources etc. (pp.6-7). Other points out that even the non-state actors like al-Qaeda would require certain semblance of order, normalcy, and predictability to operate (Beehner and Young 2012, Patrick, 2006) A research by Aidan Hehir reveals that the top 20 countries (except Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan) in FSI between 2005 -2011 do not exhibit significance presence of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) (Hansen, 2011, p.2); half of them do not even have any FTOs. Among 35 countries ranked in 'alert status' by FSI (2011), only six are considered as 'safe heavens' for FTOs signifying that weak state structure alone cannot be a sufficient explanation for the presence of terrorist groups.

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62 For example, during the 1994 genocide of Rwandan state 'failed' but not 'collapsed' because it was the highly disciplined agents of the 'state institution' murdering people with hideous efficiency. Thus Institution was there, it was just doing the opposite task. (Clapham, 2002, p.776)

63 Measured in terms of the total number of terrorist attacks and fatalities.
3.2 Yet, following the declaration of GWoT, developed countries have revised their defence strategies and resource allocation elevating the anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism activities as primary missions and securitized development in fragile and conflict-affected region (Wyler, 2008, Duffid, 2010). Such preference to the ‘freedom from fear’ tradition over the ‘freedom from want’, subdues the interest of the people living in ‘fragile states’ as their welfare is no longer of primary concern (Carment, et, al 2010, p.15). Thus, any reform agenda of international community regarding ‘fragile states’ remains limited to addressing the political economy operating within the country with no or little regards to the global inequality, geopolitical contestation etc making such efforts little more than ‘training a goldfish in the desert’ and questions the underlying narrative and concept of state fragility (Pugh et al, 2010, Cooper 2010).

4. State Fragility Defined

4.1 The concept of fragile states exists between the gaps of myths of statehood and reality -- and such gaps exist in every state. Partially adapting from Carment et al (2010 p.84), his paper defines state fragility as the extent to which the actual practices and capacities of states differ from their idealized image engendered by global structures. This definition has two distinct hallmarks; first it implies that ‘idealized image’ of the state is embedded in a larger global system and many exerts both positive and pernicious impacts. Disregarding the external drivers of state fragility, most ‘fragile states’ definitions are internally focused as they derive the ‘idealized image’ of state from the one reified in both state theory and international law (Carment et al, 2010, p.84). Second, any fragility index originating from the proposed definition would require measuring external and internal dimensions that may entice incorporating both ‘relational’ and ‘structural’ attributes affecting a particular state. Carment et.al’s CIFP index

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64 UK national defence strategy paper states ‘currently, most of the major threats and risks emanate from failed or fragile states’ . . .They have the potential to destabilize the surrounding region (2008; p.14). Successive US National Strategy Paper also recognizes that fragile states can threaten regions of interest to the US, their allies, and friends (2005; pp.2-3).

65 Between 2001 -2008, estimated total expenditure on GWoT was US $800 bn (Cooper and Mutimer, 2012, p.7)

(and other indexes alike) does not include that. Over 70 indicators used in CIFP index (to measure ALC dimensions) ignore *relational aspects of global political economy*. In an interconnected world, ‘structurally’, the summative function of state’s ALC dimensions determine its strength/weakness, while ‘relationally’ the intensity and degree at which ‘the idea of state’ can hold and bind and hold the ‘territory-polity-society package’ together amidst growing pressure of international structures and global political economy remains equally pertinent.

4.2 While the ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’ and ‘weak’ states can be more distinctive, the boundaries of ‘fragile states’ are wide and overlap *all categories of states* (Figure 2.3). ‘Fragile states,’ thus, can be broadly understood as a concept within which one might place various specific and partial concepts of state fragility. It is a continuum, not of degree. Some state can be more fragile than the other at a particular time/dimension Thus, Bangladesh with contrasting performances

*Figure 2.3: Venn diagram Conceptualizing State Fragility*

Source: Adapted from Carment et al, 2010, p.7)
fits within the boundaries of fragile states. Pocket of weakness or zones of failures, inability to overcome overwhelming odds (i.e. natural disaster/nuclear accident, financial crisis) etc also places developed states closer to the contours of ‘fragile states’. Indeed, developed states when confronted with such overwhelming odds that saturate her capacity can also be called as fragile for that period of time.\textsuperscript{67}

5. International Structures Defined

5.1 Structure implies the ‘principles of arrangement of the parts in a system, and how the parts are differentiated from each other’ (Buzan and Weaver 2003, p.6). Institutionals portray GIs, actors, and regimes\textsuperscript{68} as constituent parts of the international structures and define them as ‘a relatively stable set of identity and interest’, often taking the form of rules and norms (Collins, 2010, p.59, Keohane, 1988, p.384; Mearsheimer, 2006). They are a ‘recognized pattern of behaviour and practices around which exceptions converge’, laying out the way in which state should cooperate and compete’ (Mearsheimer, 2006, p.570).

5.2 Premised upon an anarchic international system, Realists view GIs as arenas for acting out power polarity. GIs largely mirrors the power distribution of international system and relegates international regimes, rules, and norms as mere ‘intervening variables’. Balance of power remains the ultimate ‘independent variable’ in the process of international conflict and cooperation (Mearsheimer, 2006, p.589 Collins, 2010). Contesting the Realists’ view, liberalists\textsuperscript{69} opine that cooperation among states is more likely and promotes rules that would constrain states. Liberalists view contributed to the rise of many international regimes and norms promoting globalization and free market economy only to be paralleled by distributive injustice of global wealth, widening inequality, creating new types of border control, protectionism, regulations and surveillance affecting the global south including Bangladesh\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67} For example, USA following Hurricane Katrina was relegated in the FSI index.

\textsuperscript{68} In the institutionalist’s literature ‘regime’ and ‘institutions’ are often used interchangeably. The terms ‘multilateralism’ is also synonymous to international institutions as it depicts a generic institutional form in IR between three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principle of conduct (Ruggie, 1993, pp. 570-71).

\textsuperscript{69} Jones (2009; p.291) explains how the long barbed wire fencings erected by India along her borders with Bangladesh privileges the ‘freedom from fear’ tradition of human security. Muhammad (2006) explains how liberal practice of globalization and the profit motive of the free market capitalism have endangered the environment, people’s lives, common property, local authority, biodiversity as well as diversity of culture in Bangladesh and to grow affluence and poverty in parallel.
(Jones 2009; Muhammad, 2006; Sobhan, 1981). Pertinently, this paper uses both realist and liberalist view while exploring the effects of international security structure (chapter 3) and economic impact (chapter 4) of GIIs in Bangladesh context.

6. International Structures and State Fragility

6.1 Notwithstanding the internal dynamics, academics and practitioners alike have consistently stressed the connection of global political economy with the domestic drivers of fragility. UN official Sergio Vieira de Mello (2003) contended that at the core of state fragility is a combination of ‘direct armed aggression, covert military intervention, encouragement of proxy warfare, exploitative multinational trade and business practices, or reckless economic destabilization.’ Helen Clerk, the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) Administrator, echoes such view, calling for a critical look at the global governance institutions to promote a fairer, more equal world. Describing such institutions as ‘out dated’ and increasingly becoming a hindrance (HDR 2013, p.v) she calls for greater transparency and accountability enabling the inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable people affected by global challenges for

Figure 2.4: Global Factors and State Fragility Relationships

![Figure 2.4: Global Factors and State Fragility Relationships](source: Author’s compilation from OECD (2012, 2012a) Patrick, (2011))
greater decision-making power. Others have noted that although state fragility is often a function of sins of omission or commission by foreign governments, corporations, most analysis of state fragility to date has focused on internal shortcomings (OECD, 2012; Patrick 2007). Thus identifying and ameliorating such external ‘systemic forces’ exacerbating institutional weaknesses within fragile stages remains critical.

6.2 Recognizing the duplicitous role of globalization and the developed world in enabling both licit and illicit activities, recent OECD documents (2012, 2012a) identifies eight global factors highlighting their effects on the security and socio-economic dimensions of ‘fragile states’. Highlighting similar factors Patrick (2011) adds the tendency of: overlooking good governance in resource-rich countries, pushing for elections in volatile political situations, sustaining demand for narcotics/illicit commodities and providing financial safe havens for kleptocrats to stash their ill-gotten gains by the developed world are all important part that can exacerbate state fragility. Taken together these can be categorized into structural and relational aspects of global factors that affect ‘fragile states’ internal political, security, economic and social dimensions. The structural aspects can take the form of abrupt economic liberalizations, grafting (western style) democracy, restricting market access etc while the global political economy, geopolitical interests, illicit money flows, natural resource predation etc reflects the relational aspects (Figure 2.4). The relevant aspects of this relationship are explored in subsequent chapters in the context of Bangladesh.

70 Factors include: international trade barriers, transnational organized crime, markets for military goods and services, engagement with non state armed group, radical ideas and modern technology, migration from/to fragile states, economic and financial liberalization, and post conflict economic aid and growth OECD also classifies the fragile state in two categories; Low Income Fragile States (LIFS) and Middle Income Fragile States (MIFS). The later is further subdivided into upper and lower middle income groups. Bangladesh, an LDC by UN standard is categorized under LIFS (OECD, 2012, pp.17-18).
Chapter 3

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
STRUCTURE AND STATE FRAGILITY:
BANGLADESH CONTEXT

1. Preamble

1.1 A state’s authority to monopolize violence to provide security and deliver the ‘political good’ to its citizens fulfilling its social contract rests on a complex web of systemic and structural factors. The systemic aspects of security, originating at regional/international level, can shape the domestic security orientations and priorities affecting the relational and structural aspects in ‘fragile states’.71 This chapter situates Bangladesh in the international security system highlighting the role of external actors in reshaping the socialist-secular orientation of the country and its consequence. Second, the narrative of GWoT is examined to explore its effects on the regional and domestic context of Bangladesh. (For better assimilation, a chronology of major events in Bangladesh is placed at annex 3A).

2. Bangladesh in The International Security System

2.1 The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 stands as the first and only example of succeeding to forcibly create a new state propelled by ethnic-linguistic

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movement in the Cold War era. Despite wide condemnations of the atrocities and brutal suppression by the Pakistani military on the Bengali people\textsuperscript{72} of the then East Pakistan, all western democratic countries voted alongside Pakistan in the UN (US DoD, 1971; Baxter, 1997; Sharma, 2001). Thus, the birth of Bangladesh was amidst ‘international disproval’.\textsuperscript{73} Despite USA’s despatch of the 8th fleet towards the Bay of Bengal in December 1971,\textsuperscript{74} regarded by the Indians as a ‘bluff’,\textsuperscript{75} it was the\textit{Soviet veto} that killed two UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions facilitating the birth of Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{76} Thus the importance of ‘external actors’ has been manifested in the context of Bangladesh from the beginning. Despite Pakistan’s adoption of a Hallstine Doctrine\textsuperscript{77} (i.e. it would break diplomatic tie with any country that recognizes Bangladesh), Bangladesh was recognized by 98 countries including the USA by March, 1973, thereby succeeding in solidifying its international position. However, China and some Arab states including Saudi Arabia opted to wait. Bhutto’s (the then Pakistani Prime Minister) visit to Dhaka, as part of an Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) initiative, to invite Bangabandhu (father of the Bengali

\textsuperscript{72} Large scale demonstrations, concerts in major western cities and graphic reporting of Pakistani brutality failed to change the western government’s position in the UN. Even the US consulate in Dhaka, in a telegram on March, 1971 complained: ‘we, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in order to salvage our nation’s position as a moral leader of the free world.’ (See US State Dept 2006; Arpi (2006), Jahan, (2001), Baxter (1997).


\textsuperscript{74} Dispatch of the fleet reportedly had three objectives: intimidate the Indian government, encourage China for military moves and an assurance to US allies in the region against any Soviet move.

\textsuperscript{75} The Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was reportedly undaunted and showed ‘little interest’ to this ‘American bluff’. Indian attitude also needs to be viewed from the fact that India concluded a 25-year treaty with the (erstwhile) USSR (in August 1971), a significant counterpoise to avert any possible retaliation by any strong adversary. See Arpi, (2006).

\textsuperscript{76} Soviet veto gave the precious time required for a swift military offensive by the Indians.

nation) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to the OIC summit held at Lahore, Pakistan in 1974,\(^\text{78}\) was in fact a de facto recognition to Bangladesh. However, the formal exchange of ambassadors did not take place until Mujib was killed in a coup on 15 August 1975, succeeded by Mushtaq and the subsequent takeover of power by General Zia.

2.2 Faced with the bitter reality of rebuilding a war-torn country, the spectre of a famine and the dynamics of global and regional politics, the socialist-secularist orientation enshrined in the constitution of Bangladesh\(^\text{79}\) was gradually diluted. Between 1972-76, Bangladesh on average had to spend an additional US$ 227 million to cover its food gap and US$ 84 million in its petroleum and crude oil bills (Sobhan, 1979, p.1974). Though the socialist orientation did not mean a Soviet style system,\(^\text{80}\) several influential leaders including the finance minister Tajuddin\(^\text{81}\) had strong leftist inclination; Mujib, under pressure to accept assistance from any source had to overrule Tajuddin’s advice and subsequently dropped him from the cabinet. Bangladesh’s attempt to pursue a middle ground in a bi-polar world under Mujib’s regime was not easy. USA retaliated when Bangladesh wanted to export jute to Cuba.\(^\text{82}\) The ships with food grains under the US PL-480 program delayed unloading resulting a sharp decline in the food stocks thus challenging the regime’s ability to tackle the famine of 1974 (Sobhan, 1979). The trade off with Pakistan on war

\(^{78}\) Mujib refused to attend the summit unless Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. (Baxter, 1997)

\(^{79}\) The four pillars of Bangladesh’s 1972 Constitution were: nationalism, socialism, secularism, and democracy. Consequently most industries were nationalized after the war.

\(^{80}\) Mujib’s vision was to pursue a single party dominated parliamentary democracy as opposed to Soviet style governance or the British colonial tradition of ‘vice regal’ system (Jahan, 2000, pp.8-9).

\(^{81}\) Tajuddin, one of the main architects of the Bangladesh government in exile (as Mujib was in prison in West Pakistan during the whole period of liberation war) reportedly suggested to channel US aid through WB to be accepted by Bangladesh. Mujib overruled such suggestion. Tajuddin later had to resign from the Cabinet by the instruction of Mujib in 1974. (See Banglapedia, 2006)

\(^{82}\) US Ambassador, in his ‘urgent’ meeting with the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh drew the attention to a report that the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation had contracted to sell jute bags to Cuba worth a few million dollars. This was seen to be prejudicial to the further commitment of US PL 480 food aid. In the background of a dwindling food stocks of only 56,000 tons in 1974 and the beginning of severe monsoon rains promising floods, Bangladesh heeded to the US pressure (Sobhan, 1979, p. 1078).
crimes charges in exchange for the repatriation of Bengalis held in Pakistan and diplomatic recognition also turned out to be problematic as the issue still drags as part of Bangladesh’s factional politics (Jahan, 2001) and the resulting political violence has been captured in different indexes while assessing fragility.

2.3 The secularist principle of the constitution was also scrapped and ‘traded’ for aid/ assistance from the rich Islamic countries and to draw ‘legitimacy’ by the successive military regimes (1975-1990) of Zia and Ershad (Huq, 1984, Jahan, 2001). Islam was declared as the ‘state religion’ and strengthening relations with Muslim countries became a constitutional obligation. Such changes secured the much needed supplies of oil and opened up opportunities for the migrant workers to the Middle East boosting remittance inflow. Bangladesh returned to democracy in 1991. Successive elected governments upheld the Islamic identity of the state albeit stressing equal rights for other religions (Billah, 2013). The country that was created in 1971 on its ‘Bengali identity’ as opposed to ‘Muslim identity’ alone, saw the integration of Islam into politics setting the stage for islamization and factionalizing the society in Bangladesh at a time (in 2001) when the powerful narrative of GWoT emerged following the events of 9/11.

2.4 Buttressed by a Supreme Court verdict, the 15th amendment of the Constitution, promulgated in 2011 is viewed as the strongest attempt to revive the secularist notion of the constitution. However, it also retains the Islamic identity but prohibits the ‘misuse of religion for political gains’ and forming organizations that aims to conduct extremist activities within or outside the country. This was interpreted differently. While the election commission asked

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83 The 10th amendment of the constitution (in 1989) stated ‘The state religion of the Republic is Islam.’ It also added that: ‘State shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity’.

84 Remittance from 8 million migrants is the biggest source of foreign money inflow in Bangladesh accounting for about $11 billion in 2009-2010 of which $7.22 billion was sent from the Arab countries. In 2013, remittance from Saudi Arabia alone was US$3684 m while US$987.5m was from UK. See BB (2013), Azad and Rahman (2011).

85 The Supreme Court verdict (in 2010) annulled, amongst other, the religion based politics. However, the 15th amendment retains ‘bismillah’ (in the name of Allah) and Islam as the ‘state religion’ in the constitution offering contradictory interpretations. Some view it as a new lease of life to Islamic parties, others opine that retaining Islam as ‘state religion’ has not ‘snatched away the secular character of the constitution’. Billah (2013), Hashmi (2011), Chowdhury (2013a).

86 See article 12 (c) and 38 (d) of the constitution of Bangladesh. The 15th Amendment added more stringent and specific terms like ‘extremist’ (jongi) and terrorism (shontrash) to form any organization (shongothon).
three registered Islamic political parties to change their charter as it contradicted the court verdict, the government declared that it has no intention of banning religion-based political parties (Hashmi, 2011). Nevertheless, Bangladesh’s image as ‘moderate Muslim majority country’ practicing (illiberal) democracy has been favourably contrasted with Pakistan by the international community (Lewis, 2010). Bangladesh opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, contributed troops to the coalition forces during the first Gulf War but refrained from troop commitments in the recent invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan despite US requests.

2.5 The shift from the initial secularist-socialist orientation in lieu of external incentives/legitimacy and internal political expediency affected the state-society bondage as it heralded an era of identity politics in Bangladesh (Huq 1984; Jahan, 2001; Murshid 1997 2001; Van Schendel 2001; Vaughan, 2007). The political space created for the Islamist could not be revoked even by the (secularist) democratic regimes. The narrative of GWoT has been used as a tool for strengthening and consolidating the regime security and political power granting the Islamist to operate within the existing constraints of socio-political reality.

3. Effect of GWoT on Bangladesh

3.1 The GWoT was presented by President Bush as a global fight of the righteous, civilized people versus the evil, barbaric people (Gregory 2004; Harvey 2003). Bush’s coinage of the term ‘either with us or with them’ is succinctly interpreted as ‘either you stand with civilization and good (us), or with barbarism and evil (them). Choose. And to those nations that choose wrongly, beware’ (Hirsh, 2002 pp. 18-43). Such powerful narratives under an ‘either/or’ version in international politics had major implications for Bangladesh.

3.2 First, as a Muslim majority country, Bangladesh, conceivably came to the spotlight following the US led GWoT and perceived by some as the ‘heaven of terrorists’ (Buerk, 2005a,b). As a result, the government was confronted with an ‘image crisis’. Every incident at home and in the region by the Islamists were connected to portray the country as the ‘hotbed of terrorism’ equating it with the ‘next Afghanistan’ (BBC 2006, Karlerar, 2005; Perry, 2002). Political slogan like “Amra shobai Tleban, Bangla hobe Afghan” (we are all Taliban and Bangladesh will become Afghanistan) by a handful of extremist made headlines in many western and Indian news media (NDTV, 2007; Jones, 2009). Indian Journalist
Hironmoy Karlekar (2005) also added to the narratives by writing a book: Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? However, the data from the national election between 1991-2008 (Figure 3.1) suggests that, vote for the Islamic parties oscillated between 4.7 percent to 14.55 percent winning only 2 (in 2008) and 19 (in 2001) seats in the 300 member parliament. With such a meagre support,

Notes: In 2001, Jatiyo Party participated under the banner of Islami Jatiya Oikya Front (United Islamic Front).


it is hard to imagine the real political prospect of the Islamist in Bangladesh. Notwithstanding the influence of Islam on the social and political culture, Bangladesh’s two major political parties (i.e. Bangladesh Awami League and Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Dol) that combined accounts almost 70-80 percent votes have never declared to establish sharia law. Instead, ‘a distinct Bengali Muslim identity prevails within the postcolonial nationalist setting’ (Lewis, 2010, p.5).

Yet, the narratives of the GWoT accorded heightened importance to the political activities of Islamic parties, their agendas and (perceived) connections with al Qaida and other FTOs dominating the sound bites and contributing to the

![Table 3.1: Votes in National Elections By Political Parties 1991-2008 (in terms of percentage of total valid votes polled)](image)

90 Figures include votes obtained by participating Islamic parties: Jamat-e Islami (JI), Islami Oikya Jot (IOJ), Jaker Party, Muslim League, Bangladesh Islamic Front, Jamate Olema Front, Jamiate Ulamae Islam, Bangladesh Khelafat Andolon, Islami Shasantantra Andolon, in respective year’s election.
image of Bangladesh as a ‘fragile state’.

3.3 Second, the GWoT encouraged successive regimes in power to position their political difference as part of the fight to curb political opponents, civil liberties and consolidate power. As a ‘good partner’ of the GWoT, the government easily securitized issues, fast tracked legislations and amendments. After two such amendments, the current Anti-Terrorism Act of Bangladesh allows sweeping power to the authorities to seize ‘suspicious accounts’ and arrest people on terrorism cases without any court order (Khan, 2013). The opposition claim that such measures were against the principles of natural justice and would be used against political opponent and not terrorist. More importantly, the 15th amendment banning ‘terrorist organizations’ and religion based politics, also annulled the provision of election time neutral care-taker government (CTG) – the main reason for the current political unrests in Bangladesh (Nazrul, 2013). Attaching the CTG issue with the 15th amendment arguably reflects the tendency of the regime to consolidating internal political power leveraging external pressure, which are keen to see such ban of Islamist organization, inclusive in the 15th Amendment.

3.4 Third, the GWoT also changed the nature and trend of US assistance in the region (Lum, 2008, Vaughn, 2010). Before 2002, India and Bangladesh were the largest recipients of US bilateral aid in South Asia (table 3.2). After GWoT, Pakistan became the foci of US assistance, leaving Bangladesh as one of the least aid recipient country in the region. Although health, development and economic assistance dominate US assistance to Bangladesh, the allocation

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91 HRW (2013), reports that the situation has worsened in 2012 as ‘the government has narrowed political and civil society space.” Secretary of Adhikar, a human rights group was arrested in 2013 following their reporting that claimed ‘61 people were killed by the law enforcing agency’ during their operation to flash out the Hefajet-e Islami, a pro-Islamist group on the night of 4-5 May staging a protest in Dhaka. The Daily Star (2013) and HRW 2013.

92 It also allows materials published on the internet, chats and conversation in social media as evidence in the court, a substantive change from existing Evidence Act of Bangladesh.

93 The CTG is responsible for holding free, fair and neutral elections once the party in power completes their five year terms. Last three democratic elections were held under CTG and were considered largely as free and fair. The Supreme Court in their verdict (that propelled government’s initiative for the 15th amendment) also observed that the provision of CTG (comprising elected members of the parliament) may remain for next two general elections. (Nazrul, 2013)
on security dimension is also increasing in recent times (see table 3.3). The allocation in anti-terrorism account (NADR) increased from nil in 2003 to US$ 6,301 thousands in 2008 (table 3.4). Fund allocation in IMET (International Military Education & Training) and FMF (Foreign Military Financing) also has an upward trend.

3.5 Fourth, for many, GWoT narrative paralleled the Cold War framework: the declared enemy ‘terrorism’ substituting for ‘Islamic extremism’ as ‘communism’ substituting for the ‘Soviet Union’ (Hussain, 2009). Such an interpretation is reinforced by various formal and informal channels involving the madrasas, global media and internet, affecting the state-society-polity bondage.

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94 For a global picture of US foreign assistance see Patrick and Brown (2009) where they show that the core bilateral development aid amounts to a relatively small percentage of proposed U.S. outlays, with only 5% devoted to DA and 6% for CSH. While support for foreign militaries amounts to nearly a fifth of all requested U.S. aid.
3.6 This however is not same as saying that there are no extremist activities in Bangladesh. Many small Islamic and leftist extremist groups operate in Bangladesh. On August 17, 2005, Jama’atul Mujahideen, Bangladesh (JMB) carried out near-synchronized blasts of improvised explosive devices in 63 out of 64 administrative districts targeting government buildings that killed two persons. Their alleged demand was to replace the secular legal system with Islamic *sharia* courts. Government arrested hundreds of senior and mid-level JMB leaders. Six top leaders were tried and sentenced to death for their role in...
the murder of two judges (BBC, 2007). The government also made numerous well-publicized seizures and arrests of persons alleged to be associated with terrorist organizations including, JMB, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami, Hizb-Ut-Towhid, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba etc.

3.7 From a regional perspective, the GWoT also helped India in framing the Muslim majority Bangladesh as the ‘enemy other’. India quickly fenced large section of her 4096 km border with Bangladesh that used to be lightly guarded for most part of the past 60 years. (Kabir 2005). The construction of fence was authorized in 1986 but only five per cent was completed by 2000 due various reasons including the resistance from West Bengal (Jones, 2009, p.292). However, after 9/11 the resistant disappeared. Despite India’s midwifery role in 1971 and the cultural link between the people of the West Bengal and Bangladesh, the central government of India spent over US$ 4bn to rapidly fence the border between 2002-2008, ‘to curb illegal crossing by suspected Islamic extremists’, human trafficking, smuggling of arms, ammunition, explosive etc.(Van Schendel 2005; Islam, 2009). As a result, parts of Indo-Bangladesh border have become notoriously fortified and has increased border killing by the Indian security forces - a prime source of contention between the two countries.\footnote{Several small militant groups operate in Bangladesh. While majority of them are Islamic, the Purbo Bangla Communist Party (PBCP), a left wing extremist group has also been active but less pronounced in the terrorism discourse. In 2008 alone, out of 125 recorded micro terrorism related incident, 45 were attributed to the PBCP (See Islam, 2009, p.46). It is also reported that Jamaat-e Islami may also have had ties to Harkat ul-Jihad-I-Islami, which itself has ties to Al Qaeda.}

Leveraging the longstanding communal tension between the Hindus and the Muslims, the ‘enemy other’ coming from Bangladesh was represented as posing a global and interconnected threat under the rubric of GWoT (Jones, 2009). Different Indian media routinely reported the presence of extremists in Bangladesh and several terrorism incidents were linked to the ‘terrorists operating from Bangladesh’ (PTI, 2008, NDTV, 2007 Hindustan Times, 2006). Conceivably, such social construction by the mainstream Indian media and literature are used to measure the security dimension of state fragility portraying a skewed picture about Bangladesh (See annex 3B for the indicators of measuring fragility in security dimensions).

\footnote{It is reported that 68 Bangladeshis were killed in the first three months of 2010 by Indian Border Security Forces (BSF). The case of Felani (a Bangladeshi women) killed by BSF and the body was hanged in the border fence was widely used by the political parties in Bangladesh contributing to anti-Indian sentiment. (Jones, 2009, Vaughn, 2011)}
4. Chapter Summary

4.1 In fragile context, the concept of security oscillates with the state’s ability in meeting the goals and interests of dominant power. Such reality is exemplified by the historical transformation of Bangladesh’s secular-socialist orientation. At the beginning, the economic compulsions and the need for external/internal legitimacy by successive military regimes linked the external actors into domestic arena. This however, did not end with the democratization. The external influence and incentives metamorphosed into the domestic politics and the concept of national security became ambiguous and transforms into regime protection and consolidation of the regime’s political power while conforming to the dominant narratives of GWoT fulfilling the need of external powers. Attaching the terrorism related provisions to the controversial 15th amendments of the constitutions, fast tracking the anti terrorism laws allowing sweeping power for the authorities served dual purpose – satisfying the external actors and strengthening regime’s power domestically. The narrative of GWoT, translated in the form of rapid border fencing by India and associated killing of innocent Bangladeshis by projecting them as the ‘enemy other’. All such actions contributed in factionalizing the society, increasing border and internal conflicts, human rights abuse, extremist incidence etc and feeding data to different state-centric fragility indexes without any attribution of their links to external factors and underlying causes.
Chapter 4

GLOBAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND STATE FRAGILITY: BANGLADESH CONTEXT

1. Bangladesh in Global Economy

1.1 Situated in the periphery of the global economy, Bangladesh has a relatively low level of interaction with the world economy (Muhammad, 2006). Yet, the economic dimension remains central to the socially constructed concept of 'fragile state'. With an exception in 2008-09, Bangladesh's economy registered 6 percent GDP growth for a decade now. This resulted in an increase of per capita GDP from US$ 487 in FY 2006-07 to US$ 748 in FY 2010-11 (see annex 4A for Bangladesh's major economic data). The country has also made 'solid progress' towards achieving some of the MDGs by the 2015 deadline, particularly in the MDG-4 (child mortality), MDG-6 (disease control), and the poverty targets under MDG-1. However, achievements in other MDGs have been less impressive. Horizontal inequality, particularly between regions, has worsened (UNDAF, 2011, p. 7). Although, the initial impact of the recent global financial crisis (GFC) has been rather muted, the effects are making...

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97 Bangladesh's import and export together account for only 0.08 per cent of world merchandise trade. However, the external sector remains critical for the economy (Rahman, 1995, p.93)

98 For a detail account of Bangladesh’s MDG achievements see TPR 2012, pp. 6-7 and GoB, 2011.

99 While the WB relates the magnitude of impact of GFC with the ‘extent of liberalization’ the saving grace for Bangladesh to survive GFC was quite the opposite; ‘the lack of a liberalized capital account, prevented dramatic capital outflows’ and deterred increased vulnerability. (Murshed, 2009, p.1)
themselves felt now, manifested in declining exports and migration of labour, growing number of sick industries, industrial unrest exacerbating poverty and unemployment and jeopardizing achieving MDG targets (Murshed, 2009; UNDAF, 2012).

1.2 The integration of Bangladesh’s peripheral economy into the global system has been a collaborative effort involving not only the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market but also powerful actors, GIs and MNCs creating an ambiguous notion of development100 (Sobhan, 2000, 1990, Thomas, 2000) affecting both the relational and structural aspects of state fragility.101 However, such aspects are absent in different fragility indexes that accords conflicting score to Bangladesh’s economic performance (see annex 4B). While Bangladesh’s ‘economic legitimacy’ shows ‘no fragility’, the ‘Effectiveness’ of the economy is rated highly fragile (Marshall and Cole, 2011). Under such contrasting picture, this chapter examines the effect of global factors on the structural aspects of Bangladesh’s economy. Second, it discusses the relational aspects highlighting the political economy and how the development itself contributed to the growth of external linkages, dependency and domination of the domestic polity of Bangladesh affecting state fragility. But first an overview of the external actors in Bangladesh and their programs is in order.

2. Global Actors in The Bangladesh Economy

2.1 The integration of Bangladesh’s economy with the global capitalism has been pioneered through various programmes sponsored by GIs (Table 4.1). Despite political changes through violent/democratic means, the economic policy and ideology of Bangladesh enjoyed remarkable continuity. Arguably, the decisive involvement in ’assisting’ governments by the GIs (i.e.WB, IMF, WTO, UNDP, USAID, ADB) has been instrumental for such continuity (Sobhan, 2004, Muhammad, 2006). Buttressed by the economic interest of regional/global

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100 The current development model is also labelled as ‘hoax’, a framework of ‘ameliorating the problems’ rather than searching alternative modes of ‘social transformation’. (Thomas, 2000, p.3)

101 Muhammad (2006, pp. 1459-64) opined that global factors has affected the ‘environment, people’s lives, common property, local authority, biodiversity as well as diversity of culture’; Sobhan (2004, pp.327-28) contended that the process of development has itself contributed to a dependent and parasitic domestic elites protecting and surviving through their external linkages. Jahan (1990) and Lewis (2011) also highlight political economy and its links with externalities.
powers and MNCs the programmes pioneered by them have been crucial to shape the direction and orientation of the economy.

Table 4.1: Programmes Initiated in Bangladesh by GIs at Different Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s and after</td>
<td>Poverty Alleviation Program</td>
<td>Creating new institutions and civil society compatible with the philosophy of GIs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s and after</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP)</td>
<td>Shift from Import substitute to export oriented model. Deindustrialization, deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization and expansion of service sector. Economy entrapped in 'low savings- low investment-low growth'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>GATT Agreement</td>
<td>Opening up common properties to the profit making activities. Gradual imposition of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Division of labour, wage discrimination. Able to enjoy Special and differential treatment for LDC (article 27) Establishment of Free Trade Zones, EPZs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 and after</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP)</td>
<td>Sugar coated SAP Proliferation of NGOs, microfinance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement (TICFA) with the United States</td>
<td>Facilitate deeper bilateral trade with US Imposition of IPR reinforced No assurance/ deadline on tariff reduction (currently 15.7% on RMG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Effect on Structural Aspects

3.1 Confronted with acute land scarcity, abundant labour surplus and poverty, resulting in a poor economic record by international standards, Bangladesh, under WB and IMF advice, shifted her economic orientation from import substitution to an export orientated strategy in the mid 80's (Love, 1995, p.16). The country resorted to the Structural Adjustment (SAP), set up by the IMF in 1987, providing highly concessional but extremely conditional loans for development (Bhattacharya, 1995). Operating under strict IMF and WB guidelines, with negligible national inputs, the program failed to meet all three major targets related to growth, investment and savings (p.63-29). Meanwhile, with deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization, inherent to SAP and WB/IMF advice, Bangladesh’s economy shifted from the agricultural base to a service economy. This transformation, *bypassing the manufacturing*, played a significant role in making Bangladesh’s economy ‘fragile’ (Muhammad, 2006, Murshid, 2009, Sobhan, 1993). First, it slowed down the pace of industrialization. The severe decline in the agricultural contribution to GDP (around 17.7 per cent in last 20 years) was not matched by a dynamic industrialization but almost entirely by the growth of real estate, Ready Made Garment (RMG), the service sectors, increasing external dependency. Second, a drastic fall in traditional export items like jute, tea and leather products resulted in deindustrialization as well as a decline in *adding real value* to the economy. Third, the RMG that now dominates export sector has only 25 percent of *value added component* (Muhammad, 2006). Thriving under cheap labour, concessional arrangements like Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA),

102 In 1987, WB categorized Bangladesh as one of the ‘most inward-oriented economy’; Using price distortion index, Dodaro (1991) ranked Bangladesh at the 2nd highest position (after Ghana). Such projections arguably presented a strong case for the shift in economic policy. (Love, 1995, pp.16-21)

103 Bangladesh was one of the first among the 36 countries to resort to SAP. See Bhattachariay, (1995, pp.63-69), for a detail analysis of Bangladesh’s experience with SAP.

104 In 2004, agriculture accounted for only 18 per cent of GDP as opposed to previous 60 % (GoB, 2004).

105 In 90s’, the growth of industries slowed down by 8.5 percent (Khan, 2000, p.250)

106 Adamjee Jute Mills, the largest in the subcontinent was closed. As opposed to RMG sector, the traditional export items added more value to the economy. (Khan, 2000, pp.261-64)

107 Bangladesh’s RMG sector is worth $15 billion annually and accounts for more than three-quarter of its export and services some well known Western brand.
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) facilitated the boom\(^\text{108}\) in RMG at the expense of export diversification. Such a static model of economy arguably 'trapped' Bangladesh in external dependency and made it more vulnerable to the shocks of the volatile international commodity market (Khan, 2000, Joarder et al 2010). This was felt in 2012 when overall agriculture sector output declined significantly to 2.5 percent\(^\text{109}\) (growth in the crops and horticulture sub-sector was only 0.9%) due to rising production costs linked to the higher prices of fuel and fertilizer in the global market (BB, 2013).

3.2 The issue of market access in developing countries has made Bangladesh’s struggle to overcome fragility in the era of globalization, to borrow from Cooper (2010), more like ‘training a goldfish in the desert’. While Bangladesh had to substantially reduce its effective tariff,\(^\text{110}\) remove import restrictions,\(^\text{111}\) liberalized economy, her access to markets in developed countries still remains conditional (Michalopoulos and Ng, 2012; Deb, 2005; Ara and Rahman, 2010). Major portion of Bangladesh’s RMG export to US remains outside the GSP scheme and are slapped with a 15.3 per cent duty on entry which erodes its price competitiveness (The Daily Star, 2013).\(^\text{112}\) In 2001 alone, on imports of US$ 2.5bn RMG product from Bangladesh, the USA collected duties of US$ 331m—slightly more than the US$ 330m it collected on US$30bn of imports from France (Smith, 2002). The duty free quota free (DFQF) access to the European Union (EU) market for Bangladeshi RMG is privileged by the relaxation of the ‘rules of origin’ clause.\(^\text{113}\) What if this is withdrawn?

\(^{108}\) The post MFA impact (i.e. after 2004) was not that severe primarily because of government’s stimulus package, lowest wage rate, lower export price, and getting the GSP facilities. (See Joardar et al, 2010). USA scrapped the GSP facilities for Bangladesh in 2013; the impact remains to be seen.

\(^{109}\) In FY 2011, this was 5.7 percent of GDP. See BB, 2013.

\(^{110}\) Though the ‘bound rate of tariff’ in Bangladesh 116.1 per cent the ‘applied rate’ is only 26.7 per cent and further reduced to 14 percent in 2012. See Michalopoulos and Ng, (2012), p.4.

\(^{111}\) As per WTO requirement, all balance of payment related import restrictions were withdrawn in 2009. However, ban on certain items for religious and social morals remains. (TPR, 2012)

\(^{112}\) Bangladesh has DFQF access in all developed countries except in the USA. The share of export to the USA was 22.3 per cent in FY 2011-12 and over 40 percent in EU countries (TPR, 2012).

\(^{113}\) Introduced in 2011, it allows Bangladesh to export goods under DFQF regime having 70 percent foreign inputs in it.
Exporting agricultural products under EU’s everything but arms (EBA) is also linked to the farm liberalisation negotiations at WTO, amendments in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary rules and the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy etc (Ferrer, 2006). Bangladesh is also the only LDC country to be affected by the anti-dumping law. India imposed anti dumping duty on Bangladeshi batteries while Brazil moved for the same on jute yarn (Miranda et al, 1998; Prusa 2005). Such externalities hit hard and ‘traps’ countries like Bangladesh that aspire to escape ‘fragility’; However, these factors are rarely qualified and measured in different fragility indexes.

3.3 Under the rubric of globalization, the mobility of labour did not take place along with that of capital. Foreign investors in the RMG sector were interested only to accrue the benefit from the quota that Bangladesh enjoyed as an LDC and to exploit the cheap labour market (table 4.2) together with their local partners. This model reflects the exploitative nature of globalization and adds very little to the net earnings (Sobhan, 1993; Jahan 2001).\textsuperscript{114} A sewing machine operator in Bangladesh earns US$ 584 per year compared to US$ 22,418 in Australia, US$ 22,402 in the UK and US$ 891 in China (WDR 2013, p. 356). Half of the employed people in Bangladesh are not satisfied with their life resulting in street protests, labour unrest, and clashes.

\textsuperscript{114} Even with the high growth in RMG the export/GDP ratio was not up to the mid-60s level when jute was the main export. The real earning from RMG has been less dramatic (Sobhan, 1998 p. 927. also see Dorado, (1991) p.9.
Table 4.2: Comparison of Wages in Selected Occupations and Countries (1995\textsuperscript{115} US$/Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Eng.</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus Driver</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Selection of countries are based on FDI and Export Market orientation of Bangladesh.

Source: Author’s Compilation from WDR 2013, pp. 356-59

The collapse of the Rana Plaza in Savar, in 2013, caused over 1000 deaths. This resulted in a more intrusive approach of enforcing inspections, and regulatory regime by both internal and external actors without a serious effort to improve wage/living conditions and the appetite of profit making by both the factory owners and the foreign buyers under the capitalist model.

3.4 The rise of protectionist measures including the implementation of TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) also affects the structural aspects of Bangladesh’s economy.\textsuperscript{116} Following the recent negotiation at WTO, LDCs are required to enforce TRIPS by 2021. Even those who view TRIPS as ‘a powerful incentive for innovation’\textsuperscript{117} benefitting the ‘whole

\textsuperscript{115} Data of sewing machine operator and chemical engineer of UK is of 2005 (1995 data not available). All other data are of 1995 as the data for 2005 is not available for all the countries.

\textsuperscript{116} Evenett (2012) reports that at least 110 ‘protectionist measures’ have been implemented, 89 of which were imposed by G20 members since the G-20 summit in Mexico (pp.3-6). By 2021, Bangladesh is required to make all the existing laws on IPR compatible with TRIPS agreement.

\textsuperscript{117} However, global innovative activities are concentrated in a handful of developed countries with top ten countries accounting for 84 per cent of global R&D activity. See Auriol, 2012, p. 2.
mankind’, remains apprehensive about its adverse effect fearing the norms of global governance and the reality that the LDCs are net importers of technology (Reichman, 2007, p.71, Auriol, 2012). The doctrine of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) is better captured by Chomsky (1994) in his book World Orders, Old and New, ‘Such doctrines -- which the US and other rich countries never accepted when they were developing, up to recent years – are designed to ensure that US-based corporations control the technology of the future, including biotechnology, which, it is hoped, will allow state-subsidized private enterprise to control health and agriculture, and the means of life generally, locking the poor majority into dependence on high-priced products of Western agribusiness, biotechnology, the pharmaceutical industry, and so on (emphasis added, pp. 182-183). The signing of TICFA (Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework Agreement) between US and Bangladesh this year has re-enforced implementation of IPR (The Daily Star, 2013). Implementation of IPR alone will allow the US companies to gain US$61bn a year from the Third World countries (Chomsky, 1994). LDCs are also faced with a second battle at home as the MNCs and developed countries continued pressurizing them for adopting a higher IP standard then originally stipulated in the TRIPS.

4. Relational Aspects: The Political Economy

4.1 The political economy of Bangladesh between 1970s-1990s was fairly simple involving the urban based political leaders, senior bureaucracy and the military with big farmers in the countryside as 'silent partner' (Blair, 2001, p.190). With the integration of the global economy, this has expanded to include new players (Figure 4.3) as well as changing the character of the old one’s having strong external linkage. With the explosive growth of the RMG sector, the business community was the first to enter into the political economy as a major player. Organizations like the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce (FBCCI) and Bangladesh Garment Manufacturer and Exporter Association (BGMEA) became major actors influencing state policies on regulating exports, imports, license granting import duty collection etc (Sobhan, 2004, Jahan, 2001).

Figure 4.3 Political Economy of Bangladesh
Their initial infiltration into the system has been mainly through the contribution of money to political parties and later by actively contesting in elections and becoming ‘political leaders’. The percentage of ‘businessmen lawmakers’ has increased from less than 30 percent in 1970’s to 56 percent in the current parliament (Jahan and Amundsen 2012). The prohibitive expense of election campaigns in Bangladesh, as in most countries, is pushing people with fewer means out of politics, increasingly transforming the parliament a rich men’s club. The growing commercialization of power, centred around 150-200 business entities and conglomerates has emerged as a major player following the abrupt economic liberalization and privatization process (Kochanek, 2001). By early 2000’s Military has been increasingly side lined and remained passive while the police and other para-military are showing signs of making inroads to fill in the vacuum with their tangential linkage with rural and urban elites/ politicians and assertive role in the political economy of Bangladesh.

4.2 The process of development has itself contributed to the growth of

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118 Most businessmen turned politicians found it to be cost effective to obtain party nomination and contest in election rather than continue making contribution to the party. (Kochanek, 2001) p.174

119 For an excellent account of the growing commercialization of power in Bangladesh, see Kochanek(2001) pp.149- 178.
external linkages, dependency and domination of the domestic polity creating an indigenous bourgeoisie, whose entire fortunes are tied up with access to external resources in the name of development (Sobhan, 2000). Such a pattern of 'dependent development' has in turn contributed to inequality and hindered any significant expansion of the reproductive forces. Indeed as Bangladesh's leading economist Rehman Sobhan (1981) observes, 'the parasitic and unproductive character of the dependent bourgeoisie has accentuated the need for external resource flows to both sustain subsistence consumption and to feed the growing appetites of the aspirant bourgeoisie (p.327).’

The incapacity of the system to involve the masses in the development and demand accountability further facilitated the bourgeois to accumulate wealth using the external resource flow through integration of global economy as a vehicle.

4.3 Secondly, such economic reorganization has also induced social and institutional changes (Feldman, 2001). The big farmers/land lord that was once the part of the political economy transformed into rural elites. The new rural elites derive their wealth from government contracts, trade and petty business secured through a patron-client relationship with the political party in power. In the urban area, businessmen multimillionaires became the new elites thriving on RMG, real-estate, buying house related business. This brought changes in the nature of social capital and relations. The traditional exchange relations were based on reciprocity and obligations. The comodification of social dynamics created new exchange relations that was based on exchange of equivalents and attached no expectations or obligations to continue the relations after the exchange (Feldman, 2001, p.231). Such change in social capital, though essentially an internal issue, were leveraged by externalities that are hard to quantify and put to measure in the fragility indexes.

4.4 Thirdly, NGOs with established external connection became a new player to the political economy of Bangladesh. As of July 2013, there were 2,239 NGOs in Bangladesh expanding their activities around 85 percent of the country's village and covering almost 55 million people as beneficiaries (Zohir, 2013).

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120 Mitra (1984) contests Sobhan's view suggesting that outside actors can hardly be held responsible if there is 'wholesale debauchment of the moral structure within the ruling hegemony'. Annulling Sobhan's apprehensions that Bangladesh's link with rich nation is likely to prove 'increasingly unviable', Mitra opines that Bangladesh's strategic geography will always inspire 'some outsiders willing to bail out Bangladesh and shore up its existing superstructure. (pp. 795-796).

121 In rural areas, business, not land, became the determinant of economic status (Muhammad, 2006).
The big NGOs in Bangladesh have largely remained autonomous in their agenda settings. NGO's efforts in poverty alleviation, micro-finance, women's empowerment, advocacy for good governance, environment, human rights issues etc has been largely positive. Their role in providing social service to people, who remains beyond the reach and capacity of the state, has been commendable. However, three points on the NGO issue: First, under the rubric of micro-finance, many of these NGOs have graduated into a 'quasi-commercial enterprises, acting like corporate bodies' (Zohir, 2005). The amount of total loan disbursement by some of the major NGOs surpasses government's allocations. Considering such trend, it might be legitimate to ask whether the NGOs activities in Bangladesh hold the potential to undermine the state in certain circumstances. Second, there are indications that the major political parties have already established beachheads in some of the major NGOs drawing them into the factionalized political scenario in Bangladesh (Blair 2000, p.215). Third, notwithstanding its success, the model to fight poverty through micro-credit pioneered by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh remains open to question. The source of poverty, arguably, originates in the structural injustice that underwrites the political economy of Bangladesh (Sobhan, 2001). Micro finance is perhaps simply adding on poverty related projects and building safety nets for the victims of economic reform. In an unjust social order, such projects are unlikely to produce a sustainable assault on poverty or the empowerment of the poor. Thus, the NGOs, with their relative independence in agenda setting are not far removed from the notion of providing 'stability' to the donor-state relationship in aid-dependent countries protecting West's external sovereign frontier (Duffid, 2010 p.170).

5. Chapter Summary

Grameen Bank alone has a total member of over 8.35 million.
The big NGOs in Bangladesh include Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) founded by Sir Fazle Hasan Abed, Grameen Bank, led by Professor Muhammad Yunus, Proshika etc Grameen Bank stopped taking donor money since 1997. However, it has several other business entities that are related with foreign MNCs. As Sobhan (1996) opines, 'big NGOs generate their own agendas and virtually every donor feels honoured to be invited to finance them.' (p.26)

In 1998 the total loan disbursed by Grameen Bank and other Micro Finance NGOs was around 43 billion taka (around 556 million USD) while the public sector agricultural credit was taka 17 billion only (around 220 million USD) (Zohir, 2005).
5.1 The political economy of Bangladesh today is perhaps not too far from what Paul Baran (1957) predicted half a century ago in his book *Political Economy of Growth*. A disarticulated, outward orientation of the economy geared towards the requirements of foreign capital and the markets proved critical for a peripheral economy like Bangladesh. It transformed the economic and social capital towards a lasting condition of dependency contributing to the state fragility. While some progress has been made like GDP growth, achievement of some MDGs, higher life expectancy and so on; but the full tale of Bangladesh is yet to be told. Located in the weakly regulated outpost of global economy, Bangladesh reflects the precarious and exploitative nature of international division of labour. David Lewis (2011) articulates the case in the first page of his book highlighting the life of a female RMG worker earning USD$ 1.50 a day in Bangladesh, "the garment work place brings her face to face with the contradiction and complexities of globalized economy: the factory may be Korean-owned, the fabric from Taiwan, the yarn from India, the packaging from China, yet the garments that she manufactures will each carry "made in Bangladesh" label." The proliferation of mercantile interest, monopolistic bourgeoisie dependent on foreign enterprise and capital often conniving with the state has created a political and social coalition of wealthy compradors, powerful monopolists, resulting in the leakage of potential economic surplus through endemic corruption and making Bangladesh a 'fragile state'.

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125 In an illuminating analysis of Baran’s book, Foster (2007) writes: ‘In the underdeveloped countries people are forced to use a large share of what would enable them to emerge from the present state of squalor and disease to maintain mercenaries whose function it is to provide cannon fodder for their imperialist overlords and to support regimes perpetuating this very state of squalor and disease.’
Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

1. Preamble

1.1 The seemingly universalized concept of ‘fragile states’ and the associated models of indexing them in some ascending order reflect our quest to quantify and measure states’ performances. Such measurement architectures are a natural extension of an increasingly performance oriented global society where metrics matters and ‘helps’ the policy makers to focus attention and resources. What we measure affects what we do. They also become an inseparable part of our vision of the world. Thus it is important that we measure it right (if at all) by investigating its underlying narrative, challenging its assumptions, indicators and benchmarks so that we can better our understandings, formulate right policies and direct efforts to things that really matters. This paper has been a part of that critical approach to better our understanding about the concept of state fragility that has become an indispensable lexicon in social science in recent times. This concluding chapter sums up the main arguments made in the paper suggesting that the current architecture of different fragility indexes needs to be reformed not scrapped. It also puts forward six points from a global perspective as the way forward, opening up the opportunity for further debates and discussion on the drivers of fragility in the context of Bangladesh.

2. Summing Up

2.1 The paper demonstrated the paradoxical nature of the ‘fragile state’ concept created by different fragility indexes and literature by exploring the role of international structures on state fragility in the context of Bangladesh. None of
these indexes take into account the global factors affecting state fragility. The international structures manifested by the institutions, norms, rules and regimes of the international system reflect the 'identities and interests' of the powerful actors (Collins, 2010). Indeed, there is little in global governance that is not driven or sustained by interest. In an era of globalization, it is hard to find any GI that is ‘disinterested, objective and technocratic'(Whitman, 2012). Be it the Realists’ contention that international institutions are ‘a reflection of power distribution based on great powers’ self-interest (Morgenthau, 2006, p.569), or the liberalists assertion that an integrated GIs can produce ‘cooperation’ -- the effect of international structures on state fragility remains inherently indivisible. The intangible and often un-quantified contributions of the international structures remain integral to the understanding of fragile state problematic.

2.2 By defining state fragility as ‘the extent to which states differs from their idealized image engender by global factors,’ this paper suggests that the structural and relational attributes of a state, privileged or constrained by the systemic forces of the international political, security and economic structures remains an important driver of state fragility (Chapter 2). Indeed, as the examination of the role of international security structure in the context of Bangladesh (Chapter 3) revels the Thucydean morality in fragile context where ‘the strong do what they have power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept ’ (Vasquez, 1996, p.10). Notwithstanding the domestic compulsions, Bangladesh’s transformation from an initial socialist-secularist orientation, discontinuing trade with Cuba, providing political space for the Islamists, struggling to revive the country’s ‘image’ following the events of 9/11 and living in the shadow of a notoriously fenced border with India are reflective of the Thucydean morality. It also signifies how the external influence and incentives can metamorphose into the domestic politics distorting the concept of national security into regime protection and consolidation of the regime’s domestic political power. Indeed the successive constitutional amendments, fast tracking of the anti terrorism legislation and amending it

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126 The Thucydean morality originates from the Melians dialogue. To remain neutral, the Melians, a colony of Sparta initially refused to join the Athenian empire like other islanders. However, when the Athenians had brought force to bear on them by lying waste their land, they had become open enemies of Athens. The dialogue between the representatives of Athenians and the Melians to negotiate took place when the later country was encircled by the former. See Vasquez (1996, p. 10).
twice etc arguably satisfied the powerful external actors and strengthened regime’s domestic political power.

2.3 The process of globalisation has also integrated Bangladesh’s peripheral economy and connected it to the global supply and demand for resources, products and services affecting the structural and relational aspects (Chapter 4). The increased interdependencies generated powerful international constraints and opportunities. The heightened sensitivity and lower resilience to global influences –- because of weak institutional capacity, high levels of poverty, corruption and inequality at home –- mutated and multiplied in unexpected or negative ways. Country’s economic orientation from import substitution to an export orientated strategy in the mid 80’s resulted in rapid growth of RMG sectors leveraging cheap labour and concessional quota system at the expense of neglecting economic diversifications and industrialization. This arguably trapped the economy into a dependency of foreign markets and demand. It also created a parasitic domestic polity whose entire fortune was linked with external dependency and changed the nature of social capital and relations. The restrictive and conditional market access, protectionist measures including the impending implementation of TRIPS by 2021 has created lasting dependency of Bangladesh’s economy.

3. The Way Forward

3.1 So, what is the way forward? To start with, we need to revisit the knowledge creation on fragile state problematique. The state centric fragile states indexes form an important part of that knowledge. The solution is not to scrap these indexes but to reform those taking into account the global factors. To be meaningful and objective, these indexes need to incorporate the global political economy, trade restrictions, tariff barriers, geopolitical interests etc and capture their effects by assigning appropriate quantitative values (positive or negative) in each dimension to arrive at the respecting ranking of the states. The current direction of the conflict/stability oriented indexes should shift from the ‘freedom from fear’ stream towards ‘freedom from want’ allowing the interest and ‘life welfare’ of the citizens of ‘fragile states’ to be the dominating considerations. This would require re-orientation and re-organizing of the indicators, benchmarks and criteria. Such a revised indexing of ‘state capabilities continuum’ would allow a more accurate and balanced picture, helping the policy makers and the social scientist alike to channel resources and taking actions to address deficiencies not only in the ‘fragile states’ but also in the
developed countries. In recent times, several such country specific indexes/assessments have emerged that uses political economy matrix: like UK’s Driver for Change Analysis, SIDA’s Power Analysis, and the Netherlands’ Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA). Such efforts, if expanded to include the global players and the associated political economy, would render a better and more accurate account and understanding of the concept of state fragility.

3.2 The current policy framework and reform agendas toward ‘fragile states’ by the international community also needs to be revised. First, there is a need to scale back international ambition particularly in the dimension of economic engineering. This would mean increasing market access, removing conditionality, trade and export barriers, relaxing/ removing TRIPS implementations etc for ‘fragile states’. According to one estimate, substantial trade liberalisation by developed countries can provide an additional cumulative income of US$1.5 trillion over a decade for the LDCs lifting an additional 300 million people out of poverty by 2015 (Wolfensohn, 2002). We live in a world where 24 percent of the population in the rich countries accounts for 75 percent of global GDP and the tariff barriers imposed by OECD countries on export alone costs the developing countries $100 billion each year, twice the amount of aid they receive (Willet, 2010, p.69). Thus removal of such restrictions, accepting the ‘diversity of cultures, regimes and market economies as a permanent reality’ (Gray, 1998) and allowing ‘fragile states’ to develop at own pace can have more effective and game changing effects to overcome state fragility.

3.3 Second, there is also a need to create an international capacity for independent economic risk assessment incorporating the global political economy metrics. This would allow assessing the liberalization measures (when agreed and implemented) by taking into account the indigenous growth potentials, labour market, investment climate, trade value and volume, social capital of the socio-political-economic environment of a ‘fragile state’. Integrating those with global political economy metrics -- to evaluate the risks of external economic stresses, and allow comprehensive assessments of the possible effects of economic liberalization. This can provide important insights for the policy makers about the time and pace of liberalization and how to maximize welfare of the people and minimise the risk of social exclusion, inequalities and retain adequate safety nets in fragile context (OECD, 2012).
3.4 **Third**, replacing the current exploitative nature of division of labour, a **selective and controlled global labour migration initiative** can be taken to transfer skills, remittance and knowledge back to the ‘fragile states’ to stimulate sustainable development.\(^{127}\) Currently, there are some schemes in selected developed countries (like German professional traineeships, Canadian highly skilled migration etc). However, they are often one way traffic and results in the drainage of skill and capital from ‘fragile states’. Most OECD countries have strict migration laws. Thus a positive change in the perceptions of migration in OECD countries could initiate this global migration initiative, facilitated by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) offering a low-cost, high-impact contribution to the development of ‘fragile sates’ (OECD, 2012).

3.5 **Fourth**, parallel to the migration initiative, a global **long term educational partnership** can be foraged facilitating higher education to meet the specific knowledge needs of ‘fragile states’ by the developing countries. This would allow a more lasting and sustainable positive changes. The focus for such educational partnership could be transferring practical knowledge and skills in areas such as public financial management, governance, local administration, developing leadership skills, attitudes and approaches allowing critical debates on new ideas and ideologies. Building practical skills and opening space for reflection/contestation of ideas can help in increases the ability to look forward and imagine alternative development choices for ‘fragile states’.

3.6 **Fifth**, a **complete re-orientation of security priorities** set by the global powers that currently emphasize more on ‘disciplinary actions’ in fragile context privileging the ‘freedom from fear’ stream is essential. As opposed to viewing the ‘fragile states’ as ‘hotbed of terrorism’, ‘spreading endemic diseases’, ‘migration and unending conflicts’ etc, the international community needs to approach the security issue with compassion and enlightened self interests. Corollary to this would be to enforce a globally agreed and binding international regulatory framework for the security services industry engaged in lucrative arms trade and other services in ‘fragile states’ (OECD, 2012). Developing and enforcing clear principles, criteria and risk assessment in the

\(^{127}\) According to one calculation, if a total of 2000 low-skilled workers were allowed to migrate from Haiti to the United States they could contribute around USD 380 million to Haiti over a 10-year period. This suggests that migration that reduces poverty does not necessarily have to involve mass movements (Clemens and Pritchett, 2008; Glennie and Gottfried, 2012). In Bangladesh context, most of the labours migrating to Middle East are unskilled and engaged in construction/farming activities.
form of legally binding framework for such trades could minimize harm. Although, the security situation in Bangladesh do not equate with many other African countries affected by civil war and rebel activities, such provisions are essential from a global perspectives. Similarly, targeting the demand side of drugs and other illicit goods at developed world would ultimately yield a better result in curbing the supply of such items from fragile and conflict affected countries.

3.7 **Sixth**, corollary to encouraging and assisting in domestic efforts and institution building, international community should remove the barriers to stolen asset recovery (StAR) initiatives. As a signatory of UN Convention against corruption (UNCAC), Bangladesh has been an active participant of the StAR initiative and its asset recovery initiative reportedly matches ‘global standard’ as claimed by the Central Bank Governor (BSS 2013). Some high profile recoveries of stolen/bribe money have been made in recent times (BSS, 2013). However, several international barriers remain to stolen asset recovery (The Economist, 2013; Stephenson et al, 2011) as the process of recovery primarily relies on bilateral treaties (involving developed countries) and their domestic legal framework (Stephenson, 2011). For Bangladesh, where corruption is one of the main issues affecting development, removing such international barriers enforcement could pay good dividend in recovering the plundered money. More so, the recent engagement and investment by the MNCs in oil and gas sector of Bangladesh (Lewis, 2011) suggests that endorsing Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI) could be beneficial to fight corruption in this sector. Thus technical assistance, encouragement by the global community can help Bangladesh in endorsing EITI.

4. **End Thoughts**

4.1 In a globalized world, states with relative weakness are like small fishing boats with rudimentary oars or rudders in the vast ocean with unpredictable currents from many directions and exposed to the push and pull of global factors. As these states engage and integrate with the global markets and institutes, it is essential that the developed and rich members of the international community need to do more to make their voyage safer. This

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128 The asset-recovery provisions in the UN’s Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) form a basic framework, but the process is still littered with obstacles: in a report in 2011, the World Bank and UN counted 29 hurdles. See Stephenson et al 2011 and The Economist, 2013.
requires enlightened self interest and getting serious on the part of powerful global actors to address the ever increasing socio-economic divergence between the rich and the poor of this world. The alliance of enlightened self interest and seriousness of the international community can only break down all the barriers and the systemic forces that stands between the aspirations and hopes of some 1.4 billion people living in so called ‘fragile sates’ and allow them to benefit from the global wealth and prosperity.
## Annex 2A: List of Indexes Measuring State Fragility/Stability/Weakness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser No</th>
<th>Name of the Index</th>
<th>Funded By/Origin</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Failed State Index</td>
<td>Fund for Peace</td>
<td>Conflict/stability</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Weak States in Developing World</td>
<td>Booking’s Institute</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>141 developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political Instability Task Force (PITF-)(formerly known as State Failure Task Force Report)</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency, USA</td>
<td>Conflict/stability</td>
<td>severe state collapse (not on the full spectrum of failed and weak states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency, (CIDA),</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>State Fragility Index</td>
<td>George Mason University</td>
<td>Conflict/stability</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA),</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>IDA recipient countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Index of African Governance</td>
<td>Mo Ibrahim Foundation</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>48 sub-Saharan African countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger</td>
<td>Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland</td>
<td>Conflict/stability</td>
<td>Global (163 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
<td>The Institute for Economics and Peace</td>
<td>Level of Peace</td>
<td>Global (158 countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Rotberg’s Index of Collapsed, failed, failing, weak states</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Conflict/stability</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sovereignty Index</td>
<td>Brookings, and Australian National University</td>
<td>Development (economic dimension)</td>
<td>Forthcoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence (FASE)</td>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>Stability/conflict</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS)</td>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>Stability/conflict</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Compilation.
## ANNEX 3A: CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENT IN BANGLADESH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 1971</td>
<td>Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 1971</td>
<td>Government in Exile formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16, 1971</td>
<td>Pakistani forces surrender marking the liberation from Pakistani occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10-12, 1972</td>
<td><em>Bangabandhu</em>, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Returns from prison in Pakistan. Promulgates interim constitution and is sworn in first as the President, then as Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4, 1972</td>
<td>The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh adopted establishing a Parliamentary democracy. Four principles of state are declared as: nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 22, 1974</td>
<td>Pakistan Recognizes Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 1974</td>
<td>Bangladesh admitted to the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Severe floods devastate much of the grain crop, leading to an estimated 28,000 deaths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1974</td>
<td>A national state of emergency is declared as political unrest grows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Feb 1975</td>
<td>Fourth amendment of the constitution abolishes parliamentary form of government. Presidential system established with a de-facto one-man rule under Sheikh Mujib. All political party banned except one: Bangladesh Krishok Sromik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasents, Workers and People's League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 1975</td>
<td>Sheikh Mujib assassinated in a ‘majors’ coup’ Khondoker Mushtaque Ahmed installed as president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-Nov 1975</td>
<td>Coup and counter coup follows. Mushtaque forced to resign. Supre Court Chief Justice becomes President and Chief Martial Law Administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1976</td>
<td>Army Chief of Staff Ziaur Rahman, becomes the Chief martial Law Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1977</td>
<td>Zia Becomes President. A martial law ordnance amends the principles of state ideology dropping socialism and secularism and substituting them with ‘economic and social justice’ and trust and faith in Almighty Allah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1979 Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) wins 270 out of 300 seats in the parliamentary election under martial law.

May 30, 1981 Zia assassinated, Sattar becomes Acting President, later elected as President


1983 Limited political activity is permitted. Ershad becomes president.

1986 Parliamentary and presidential elections. Ershad elected to a five year term. He lifts martial law and reinstates the constitution.

1987 State of emergency declared after opposition demonstrations and strikes.

1988 Islam becomes state religion. Floods cover up to three-quarters of the country. Tens of millions are made homeless.

1990 Ershad steps down following mass protests.

1991 Ershad convicted and jailed for corruption and illegal possession of weapons. Begum Khaleda Zia, widow of President Zia Rahman, becomes prime minister. Constitution is changed to render the position of president ceremonial. The prime minister now has primary executive power. Cyclonic tidal wave kills up to 138,000.

1991 Government announces amnesty for Shani Bahini rebels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

1996 Parliament dissolved. Opposition boycotts the national election. BNP elected to power. Opposition calls for continuous siege and indefinite hartal (strike) compelling BNP to pass 13th Amendment of the constitution with the provision of a neutral caretaker government for holding election

1996 Two sets of elections eventually see the Awami League win power, with Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, becoming prime minister.

1997 Ershad is released from prison. The opposition BNP begins campaign of strikes against the government.

1998 Fifteen former army officers sentenced to death for involvement in assassination of President Mujib in 1975.

2001 April Seven killed in bomb blast at a Bengali New Year concert in Dhaka. Sixteen Indian and three Bangladeshi soldiers killed in their worst border clashes.
2001 July  Hasina steps down, hands power to caretaker authority.
2001 October  Hasina loses at polls to Khaleda Zia's Nationalist Party and its three coalition partners.
2002 March  Government introduces law making acid attacks punishable by death amid public anger over escalating violence against women.
2002 July  Pakistani President Musharraf visits; expresses regret over excesses carried out by Pakistan during 1971 war of independence.
2002 December  Simultaneous bomb blasts in cinemas in a town north of Dhaka kill 17 and injure hundreds.
2004 May  Parliament amends constitution to reserve 45 seats for female MPs. Bomb attack on Muslim shrine in north eastern town of Sylhet kills two and injures UK high commissioner and 50 others.
2005 17 August  Around 350 small bombs go off in towns and cities nationwide. Two people are killed and more than 100 are injured. A banned Islamic group claims responsibility.
2005 November  Spate of bombings, blamed on Islamic militants, hits Chittagong and Gazipur.
2006 October  Violent protests over government's choice of a caretaker administration to take over when Premier Zia completes her term at the end of the month. President Ahmed steps in and assumes caretaker role for period leading to elections due in January 2007.
2007 January  A state of emergency is declared amid violence in the election run.
2007 March  Six Islamist militants convicted of countrywide bomb attacks in 2005 are hanged.
2007 August  Government imposes a curfew on Dhaka and five other cities amid violent clashes between police and students demanding an end to emergency rule.
2007 November  Cyclone Sidr kills thousands.
2008 August  Local elections take place, seen as a big step towards restoring democracy. Candidates backed by the Awami League party perform strongly.
2008 December  General elections: Awami League captures more than 250 of 300 seats in parliament. Sheikh Hasina is sworn in as prime minister in January.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009 February</td>
<td>Around 74 people, mainly army officers, are killed in a mutiny in Dhaka by border guards unhappy with pay and conditions. Police arrest some 700 guards. A further 1,000 guards are detained in May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 October</td>
<td>The government bans the local branch of the global Islamist organisation Hizbut Tahrir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 June</td>
<td>Constitutional change scraps provision for a neutral caretaker government to oversee elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 January</td>
<td>Army says it has foiled a coup planned by &quot;fanatical officers&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 May</td>
<td>Key figures from the main Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, charged with war crimes by a government tribunal investigating alleged collaboration with Pakistan during the 1971 independence struggle. Jaamat-e Islami supporters clash with police repeatedly in following months in protest at the trial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 January</td>
<td>War crimes tribunal sentences prominent Muslim cleric Abul Kalam Azad to death for crimes against humanity during the 1971 independence war. He was tried in absentia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 February</td>
<td>War crimes tribunal finds the assistant secretary general of the Islamist party guilty of crimes against humanity during the war for independence in 1971.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 April</td>
<td>Parliament elects Abdul Hamid as Bangladesh’s new president, following the death in March of Zillur Rahman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 May</td>
<td>European retailers promise to sign an accord to improve safety conditions in factories after a garment factory building collapsed in April, killing more than 1,100 people. Worker protests close hundreds of factories and extract a government pledge to raise the minimum wage and make it easier to form unions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 July</td>
<td>At least two people are killed as police clash with thousands of protesters after the conviction of Ghulam Azam, leader of the Jamaat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3B: Indicators to Measure Security Dimension in Different Fragility Indexes

| Source: Author’s Compilation from the mentioned Indexes. |
| Notes: |
| 1. FSI’s ‘Political and Security’ dimension score (8) reflects the average of all six indicators. |
| 2. Includes indicators that are primarily grouped under security dimension. However, several indicators overlaps (like regime type and regional effects are grouped separately in Marshall and Cole(2011) index) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex 67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh’s Score on Security: 6.55/10 (2nd quintile)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Country Indicator for Foreign Policy Index 2010 (Carment et al, 2010 p.90) | Conflict Intensity, (Uppsala University Data on Armed Conflict), Dependence on external military support (Fund for Peace Failed State Index), Human Rights in terms of Empowerment and Physical Integrity (CIRI Human rights index) Military Expenditure in percentage of GDP (WB, WDI), Political Stability (WB, Governance Matters) Refugees Produced (WB, WDI), Risk of Ethnic Rebellion (Gurr, 2003), Terrorism Incidents and Fatalities (US National Counter Terrorism Centre and Global Terrorism Database) |
| Bangladesh’s Score on ‘Security and Crime’: 6.31/10 (Within global mean) |

| Bangladesh’s Score on ‘Security’: Effectiveness: No fragility Legitimacy: Moderate |

| Fund for Peace Failed State Index 2013 | Internal Conflict, Small Arms Proliferation, Riots and Protests, Fatalities from Conflict, Military Coup, Rebel Activity, Militancy, Bombing and Political Prisoners (Content analysis using sophisticated search parameters and algorithms of CAST Software which are further triangulated using qualitative and quantitative inputs based on major events in the countries examined) FSI’s Political and security dimension also includes other indicators such as state legitimacy, factionalized elite, human rights and rule of law, public service and external intervention |
| Bangladesh’s score on ‘Security Apparatus’: 7.7/10 (Warning) Political and Security: 8/10 (average of 6 indicators) |
ANNEX 4A: MAJOR ECONOMIC DATA OF BANGLADESH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population, 1st January 2012 (in millions)</td>
<td>152.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (per sq/km of cultivable land, 2011)</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fertility Rate (per women, 2011)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Working Age Population (in terms of %, 2010)</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult (25 and older) Employment to Population Ratio (of %)</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth (15 – 24) unemployment to Population Ratio</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Poverty and Income**                                                   |            |
| National Head Count Index (% of Population, 2010)                        | 31.5       |
| Multidimensional Poverty Count (% of Population, 2011)                   | 58%        |
| Income GNI Per Capita (US$)                                              | 848        |

| **Macroeconomic**                                                        |            |
| GDP Growth Rate, (% 2012)                                                | 6.3        |
| CPI Inflation (base: FY96=100) 2012                                       | 10.6       |
| Foreign exchange reserves (million US$) in 2012                           | 10364      |
| Annual Development Programme (ADP) in terms % of GDP 2012                | 4.5        |
| Total Revenue as Percentage of GDP, 2012                                  | 12.9       |
| Overall Budget Deficit (including grants) in terms % of GDP 2013          | -4.1       |
| • Deficit Budget Financing from Foreign Sources                           | 0.8        |
| • Deficit Budget Financing from Domestic sources                         | 3.3        |
| Govt Domestic debt outstanding in terms of % of GDP 2012                  | 17.5       |
| Govt Foreign debt outstanding in terms of % of GDP 2012 (Excl. IMF)      | 19.7       |

| **Growth and Sectoral Share of GDP**                                      |            |
| Agriculture: Growth (Sectoral share) in % of GDP, 2012                    | 2.5 (19.3) |
| Industry: Growth (Sectoral share) in % of GDP, 2012                       | 9.5 (31.3) |
| Services: Growth (Sectoral share) in % of GDP, 2012                      | 6.1 (49.5) |

| **Export Sector**                                                        |            |
| Total Export in FY 2010-11 (in million US$)                             | 22,928     |
| • Of Which, Primary Commodity (Raw Jute, Frozen Foods, Agri)             | 5.7%       |
| • Of Which, Knitwear and Woven Garment                                   | 78.1%      |
| Export to EU and USA (in terms of % of Total Export, 2011)               | 74.4%      |

| **Import Sector**                                                        |            |
| Total Import in FY 2010-11 (In million US$)                             | 33,657     |
| • Of Which Food Grain                                                   | 5.7%       |
| • Of Which Crude Oil, POL, Chemicals, Fertilizers                       | 19.9%      |
| • Of which cotton, yarn, fiber, textile articles                        | 20.5%      |
| • Capital Machineries                                                   | 6.9%       |

## ANNEX 4B: INDICATORS TO MEASURE ECONOMIC DIMENSION IN DIFFERENT FRAGILITY INDEXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frailty Indexes and Bangladesh’s Score</th>
<th>Indicators/Clusters (Data source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh’s Score : 6.08/10 Security : 6.55/10 (3rd quintile)</td>
<td>Economic Growth and Size (both relative and total) External Debt - % of GDP, FDL, % of GDP, Foreign Aid - both in terms of % government expenditure and in total, Inequality, Inflation, (WB, WDI), Informal Economy - in terms of Black market and ratio of PPP to GDP (Heritage Foundation and WB WDI), Infrastructure - in terms of electricity supply and telephone main lines per capita (WB WDI), Internet uses, Investment climate, contract regulation (Heritage foundation), Level of participation in International Economic Organization (CIA world fact book), Paying Taxes (WB, Ease of doing business survey), Regulatory Quality (WB, Governance Matters), Remittance, Reserve holding, Trade Balance, Trade Openness, Unemployment, Women in the labour force (WB WDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Indicator for Foreign Policy Index 2010</strong> (Carment et al., 2010 p.90)</td>
<td>Economic Effectiveness: GDP per Capita (WB, WDI) The value for the most recent year (2009) is coded into a five-point fragility scale, based on cut-points derived from the threshold values for the State Fragility Index and GDP per capita in a baseline year (2004). Economic Legitimacy: Share of Export Trade in Manufactured Goods (UNDP, Structure of Trade, 2010, and WB, WDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh’s Score:5.76/10 (Within global mean)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Fragility Index and Matrix 2011</strong> (Marshall and Cole, 2011, p.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh’s Score on Economic: Effectiveness: High Fragility Legitimacy: No fragility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fund for Peace Failed State Index 2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh’s score:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Economic Dimension’: 7.55/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Average of ECO and UED only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Social and Economic’: 7.7/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(average of all 6 indicators)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Warning)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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