



# Horizon 2014: sub-Saharan Africa

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In 2014, sub-Saharan Africa will remain high on the EU's agenda. While some countries will continue to face the consequences of crises that escalated in the course of the past twelve months, in other countries several upcoming elections have the potential to revive frozen tensions or exacerbate existing ones.

**South Sudan:** 2013 culminated in an outbreak of violence between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice-President Riek Bachar. President Kiir was unwilling to compromise with his former strategic ally despite attempts by Ethiopia, as chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to mediate. An agreement was finally signed on the cessation of hostilities on 23 *January* in Addis Ababa after 3 weeks of negotiations. If not rapidly implemented, sanctions are likely to be adopted by the international community as there is a risk that tensions may be exacerbated by clan-based rivalries. The conflict has already displaced more than 500,000 people and the UN estimates that there have been more than 10,000 casualties. The deteriorating and still unpredictable situation dominates EUSR Rondos' agenda.

**Somalia:** The Federal Government in power for the past eighteen months is facing international donor fatigue after the successive international conferences in London and Brussels. Concrete steps towards holding democratic elections in 2016 will be necessary to secure the donors' support. The election of a former Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government as the President of Puntland

on 8 *January* might help in that regard. On the maritime front, this year the EU will be chairing the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (piracy attacks have been reduced by 95% over the past few years) while the mandate for the EU Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, due to expire on 12 *December*, will have to be reviewed. EUCAP Nestor is likely to see its mandate renewed in July with a more limited geographical scope.

**Central African Republic:** After the forced resignation of President Djotodia on 10 *January*, the country's *Conseil national de transition* (CNT) elected Catherine Samba Panza as new transition President on 20 *January*. She has been mandated to lead the country until the next presidential elections, set to take place in *February 2015* at the latest. To bring stability to the country and allow for the elections to be held, the African Union is currently deploying the peacekeeping mission *Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine* (MISCA), which could be replaced by a UN peacekeeping mission in the course of the year. To flank the French operation Sangaris and the deployment of MISCA, the EU is planning a CSDP military operation to secure Bangui, the country's capital, and the surrounding area. The operation is planned to be headed by France as its framework nation, to be about 500-strong, and to have its operational headquarters in Larissa, Greece.

**Guinea-Bissau:** On 16 *March*, Guinea-Bissau is scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary

elections to restore constitutional order following the April 2012 military coup. The elections in Guinea-Bissau, which is currently governed by interim President Nhamadjo, were originally set to take place in November 2013 but had to be postponed – officially due to a lack of funding which meant that the polls could not be organised efficiently. While the elections will be a step in the right direction, it remains unclear whether they can fundamentally improve the situation in the country, which is characterised by acute power struggles within its political and military elites.

**South Africa:** *April-July* will be marked by general and presidential elections. Even if incumbent President Jacob Zuma is likely to be re-elected, an unknown factor is the share of votes the ANC might get. These elections will mark the 20th anniversary of the end of apartheid and the first ANC election without Mandela. The voting behaviour of the 'born free' generation, i.e. young South Africans who were born after the apartheid era, will be decisive. One of the first international engagements of the (re-)elected President is likely to be the EU-South Africa Summit, planned to take place in Europe this summer.

**Mauritania:** Presidential elections will be held in *July*. However, most opposition parties have already announced that they will boycott the polls if current President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz runs for re-election. They accuse the president of having rigged the last elections in 2009, which led many opposition forces to refuse to participate in the parliamentary polls in November and December 2013 and to organise protest marches in several cities. Criticism of President Aziz may thus increase further in the event that he runs for re-election and wins the forthcoming poll.

**Mozambique:** Renamo, the former opposition party which resumed its guerrilla campaign last autumn, is set to continue to launch ambushes against government forces, leading rural Mozambicans to flee their homes in the central regions. Despite this destabilising factor, the *October* general and presidential elections will represent a milestone by confirming the emergence of a new opposition party, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), who splintered from Renamo in 2009. The ruling party Frelimo, however, is unlikely to lose if it selects a credible new candidate (as President Guebuza, in power for two successive mandates, cannot run again). In parallel, Mozambique is set to start enjoying an upturn in natural resources extraction which could propel growth to 10% in the years to come.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo:** Between *October and November*, the DRC will hold local elections, the first ones in the country's history. The polls will be an important test of whether the peace established following the defeat of the M23 rebellion in November 2013 is sustainable. However, there is cause for concern that the run-up to the elections will be a tense and difficult time. Several other armed groups remain active in various parts of the country, and M23 rebels have recently been rumoured to be regrouping in neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda. The mandates of the two CSDP military and police training missions in the country (EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo) will end on *30 September*, but the EU is discussing how to continue supporting security sector reform in a different framework.

**Mali:** The situation in Mali has calmed down since the parliamentary elections held in late 2013. It is not yet clear, however, whether 2014 will see the long-awaited start of official negotiations between the Malian government and groups in the North with a view to finding a long-term settlement for the conflict in northern Mali. The start of the negotiations, originally set for November 2013, is blocked by the inability of Bamako and three rebel groups to find a preliminary agreement on the disputed future administrative status of northern Mali and on disarmament. In the meantime, the EU is planning a civilian CSDP mission (EUCAP Mali) to support Malian gendarmerie and police forces. The mission will complement the existing CSDP operation EUTM Mali, which trains the local military.

**Nigeria:** The next presidential elections are only scheduled for 2015, but the preceding year will be a crucial one. Incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan has come under strong criticism, including within his own political party. Despite that, Jonathan has not ruled out running for re-election in 2015, which could lead to increased political infighting as the vote gets closer. While there is little risk that this political battle will turn violent, it could nevertheless affect the country's stability and weaken its effectiveness in the fight against terrorism in northern Nigeria and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

**African Union:** The 4th EU-Africa Summit will take place in Brussels on *2/3 April*.

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