Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-Japanese Tensions

Asia Report N°258 | 24 July 2014
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Executive Summary

Enmity between China and Japan is hardening into a confrontation that appears increasingly difficult to untangle by diplomacy. Positions on the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku island group are wide apart, and politically viable options to bridge the gap remain elusive. New frictions have arisen. China’s announcement in November 2013 of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), overlapping that of Japan’s and covering the disputed islands, deepened Tokyo’s anxiety that Beijing desires both territory and to alter the regional order. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s provocative visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 triggered a bitter argument as to whether Japan has fully atoned for its Second World War aggression, a still vivid sore in the region. Amid heightened suspicion and militarisation of the East China Sea and its air space, the risks of miscalculation grow. Leadership in both countries needs to set a tone that prioritises diplomacy to calm the troubled waters: November’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit might provide such an opportunity.

A perception is gaining ground in Tokyo that the still new administration of President Xi Jinping is particularly assertive and that China seeks to revive its hegemonic “Middle Kingdom” status in the region. China perceives the Abe government as the “troublemaker” that stokes tensions in order to rearm Japan. Insensitive actions and strident rhetoric increasingly appear to be replacing diplomacy. Both sides progressively consider the other as a primary national security threat and are boosting their military capabilities and adjusting their defence postures accordingly.

Although not likely to attempt to wrest control of the islands fully from Japan any time soon, Beijing acts upon the belief that the balance of power is shifting in its favour and that a strength-driven approach can pressure Japan into accepting incremental changes over time. Tokyo, appearing to agree that China has long-term power advantages, seeks to tighten its U.S. alliance and unite regional countries around rules-based opposition to unilateral changes.

Presumably, neither desires an armed conflict, but they face heightened risk of an unplanned clash. The danger spans three theatres – the waters near the disputed islands; the high seas of the Western Pacific; and the airspace over the East China Sea – and involves law enforcement vessels, fishing boats, naval fleets and military aircraft. While it appears that patrol patterns around the islands have stabilised and risky behaviour there has eased since late 2013, military encounters in the other two theatres have become more frequent and dangerous.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has stepped up exercises in offshore waters in its quest for blue water capability, coming as a consequence into increasing contact with the Japan Self-Defence Forces (SDF). The sides have starkly different interpretations of their operational rights and limitations. Japan insists on rights to surveillance in international waters. China has demonstrated a willingness to take risks to keep foreign vessels and aircraft away from its fleets. Repeated close calls have resulted. Since China announced an ADIZ that overlaps with Japan’s, there has been a spike in the number of encounters by military aircraft, with both sides accusing the other of provocative behaviour.

Tokyo has been more active in pursuing crisis management and seeking out mitigation mechanisms but is concerned not to do so in a way that compromises its
sovereignty claims or legitimises China’s ADIZ. Beijing says that the current political environment is not conducive to engagement on this front. Even though awareness of the risk of unplanned clashes has been growing in both capitals, and both have accepted a multilateral Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), neither unofficial discussion nor the non-binding code has yet to reduce close calls.

The November 2014 APEC summit in Beijing may offer an opportunity for President Xi and Prime Minister Abe to meet and set the tone for negotiations on establishing and implementing means to manage the tension. Both sides would need to commit to handle the fragile relationship with extreme care and show restraint around the flashpoints, including the islands dispute and historical issues. Bilateral relations urgently require a sufficiently long period of calm to pursue discreet diplomatic initiatives.
Recommendations

To avoid unplanned clashes and prevent escalation in case of such an incident

To the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Japan:

1. Refrain from escalatory actions near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands; in particular:
   a) give clear instructions to the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) respectively to avoid collisions and conflict; and
   b) China should refrain from chasing Japanese fishing vessels and send no aircraft, including drones, into the airspace above or near the islands;

2. China should instruct the PLA navy and air force to refrain from risk-seeking and avoid collisions during patrol, exercise and surveillance activities on the high seas of the Western Pacific and in the air space above the East China Sea; and Japan, in the absence of a clear bilateral understanding on rules of military encounters, should instruct the Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to take extra caution to avoid collisions or conflict with the PLA.

3. Japan should continue to urge resumption of the multi-agency, high-level bilateral maritime affairs consultation process, and China should drop political conditions for resumption.

4. Prioritise implementation of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES); utilise active bilateral and multilateral track-2 and track-1.5 forums to clarify its application and operationalisation; and institute regular working-level dialogues (preferably closed-door) between defence ministries to review CUES implementation, so violations can be addressed bilaterally, away from media attention.

5. Operationalise the defence communications mechanism that has been agreed on but the implementation of which was interrupted by the islands dispute. China should remove political conditions for such actions.

6. Establish hotline communication channels between the JCG and the CCG and between the National Security Council (Japan) and the National Security Commission (China); ensure that these remain open at all times and that the persons/units responsible for them have authority to speedily reach decision-makers and frontline personnel in an emergency; and utilise these channels in case of an incident or near-collision to defuse an emergency before resorting to public criticism.

To third-party governments and non-governmental institutions, such as research organisations and think tanks with ties to both parties:

7. Host forums and symposiums that bring the parties together for discussions on crisis management and mitigation, including by;
   a) organising workshops on best practices to avoid incidents at sea; encouraging participation by both coast guards and militaries, especially commanders in charge of frontline operations; and
   b) utilising multilateral platforms such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium to push for and review implementation of CUES.
8. Organise multilateral naval exercises, involving both the PLA and the SDF, on CUES implementation.

To create an environment conducive to a bilateral meeting of the Chinese president and Japanese prime minister during the APEC summit in Beijing

To the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Japan:

9. Open up high-level political channels, with direct access to the leaders.

10. Take actions to lower the political temperature including by:

   a) China dialing down anti-Japan rhetoric to both domestic audiences and the international community, to allow room for diplomatic and unofficial engagement; and delinking the Second World War history from the islands dispute; and

   b) Japan giving assurance that Abe will not visit the Yasukuni Shrine again as prime minister; and Abe and other senior officials avoiding comments that appear to stray from the Murayama Statement or otherwise suggest revisionist views on the Second World War history.

   Beijing/Tokyo/Brussels, 24 July 2014
Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-Japanese Tensions

I. Introduction

Tensions between China and Japan have become routine since the Japanese government purchased three islands in the East China Sea that both (and Taiwan) claim sovereignty to from a private owner in September 2012. China, in challenge of Japan’s de facto control, responded by dispatching law enforcement vessels to patrol near the island group, called Diaoyu by China and Senkaku by Japan (hereafter Diaoyu/Senkaku).

A brief fence-mending opportunity appeared to have opened in spring 2013. In March, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Liu Yuan, believed close to Chinese President Xi, said it was important to warn the public that, “war is cruel and costly. When there are other solutions, it is not necessary to solve a problem with extreme and violent means”. Tensions with Japan, he said, “were due to a large extent to face”. In June, the deputy chief of the PLA general staff, Qi Jianguo, reaffirmed that China intended to leave maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas “to be solved by future generations with wiser methods”. Meanwhile, Japan detected “less intrusions by Chinese vessels” into waters around the disputed islands.

1 For previous Crisis Group reporting on China-Japan relations, see Asia Reports N°245, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks, 8 April 2013; and N°108, North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, 15 December 2005. For reporting on other maritime territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific, see Asia Reports N°223, Stirring up the South China Sea (I), 23 April 2012; and N°229, Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses, 24 July 2012. On other Chinese foreign policy issues, see Asia Report N°245, Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close, 9 December 2013.

2 The government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda purchased the islands to prevent Shintaro Ishihara, then Tokyo governor and a nationalist, from buying and building infrastructure on them. The Noda government informed Chinese officials of the plan and explained its rationale months ahead, but was said to have misjudged the Chinese reaction and mishandled timing of the purchase. See Crisis Group Report, Dangerous Waters, op. cit., pp. 7-9. The East China Sea extends to the east to the Ryukyu Islands; north to Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s main islands; northwest to Cheju Island off South Korea; and west to China.

3 This report gives the Chinese and Japanese names for the islands in alphabetical order. Taiwan calls the island group Diaoyutai.

4 “刘源上将：军人要和老百姓说清楚 打仗是很残酷的”, 中新网 [“General Liu Yuan: A soldier has to make it clear to the people that war is cruel”, china.com.cn], 13 March 2013.

5 “New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: Q&A”, Shangri-La Dialogue: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit, 2 June 2013. The South China Sea is bordered on the north east by the Taiwan Strait (connecting it to the East China Sea); on the east by Taiwan and the Philippines; on the south east and south by Borneo, the Gulf of Thailand’s southern limit, and the Malay Peninsula east coast; and on the west and north by the Asian mainland.

6 Crisis Group interview, Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2014.
Publicly, Tokyo continued to deny the existence of a territorial dispute with China, “because that would be tantamount to recognising China’s claim”.7 But the government in effect “took the signals positively” and secretly dispatched Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s special adviser, Shotaro Yachi, to Beijing in June. In high-level meetings, the sides reportedly “narrowed their gap”.8 According to a Chinese analyst, however, when Abe soon after criticised Beijing for “shutting all doors” on dialogue, “Chinese leaders became angry”, and momentum was dashed. The Japanese side blamed what it called China’s unreasonable demand: “China wants Japan to accept [the] dispute and Japan can’t accept it”.9

Soon new complexities emerged. In November, China announced an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and imposed strict rules on foreign aircraft entering the area. This drew strong protest from Tokyo and deepened fears in Japan that Beijing aimed to alter the regional order wholesale.10 The same month, Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which memorialises Japan’s more than two million war dead, including fourteen Class-A war criminals from the Second World War.11 The visit, together with controversial statements by Abe and his associates on war history, called into question Tokyo’s atonement for its past aggression and opened a new front with Beijing that erupted into mutually hostile global public relations campaigns.

This report, Crisis Group’s second on the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, focuses on the period since early spring 2013. Based primarily on interviews in Beijing, Washington and Tokyo with government officials, diplomats, security analysts and academics, it analyses events, actors and dynamics, domestic and bilateral, that complicate relations and impede diplomacy. It assesses risks that left unchecked could lead to armed conflict and offers recommendations for managing and reducing them. The report does not evaluate the legal merit of either Japan’s or China’s claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Taiwan’s claim to those islands is not a subject of the report.

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8 Crisis Group interview, Chinese strategist, Beijing, September 2013.
11 Antoni Slodkowski and Linda Sieg, “Japan’s Abe visits shrine for war dead, China, South Korea angered”, Reuters, 26 December 2013. Class-A war criminals were high-level government or military personnel who were found guilty of crimes against peace during the Tokyo Trials. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946) categorised the crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal as those against peace, conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity.
II. The Issues

A. The Islands

The sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is the most intractable problem in the relationship. Officially, Beijing demands that Japan admit they are in dispute; Tokyo insists “China has to stop intrusion into Japanese territorial waters”, meaning ceasing patrols within twelve nautical miles of the islands.12

China holds that Japan “admitting [to a] dispute” is the precondition to negotiations.13 Some analysts suggested that Beijing would be open to a bilateral summit, “if only Abe utters those few words”.14 Tokyo steadfastly refuses but has put forward alternatives. The Yoshihiko Noda administration, which bought the islands, was prepared to acknowledge “that there is some international problem” around Diaoyu/Senkaku.15 The Abe administration is ready to “recognise there is a diplomatic issue, because China also claims the islands”.16 China accepts neither formulation.

Some Japanese analysts and officials privately acknowledged that “saying there is no dispute over Senkaku may not be sustainable”, but pointed out a compromise would come with unacceptable perils, as it might validate China’s claim and weaken Japan’s.17 It could, they said, expose the Abe government to criticism that it bends under Chinese pressure and invite Beijing to apply more.18 Admitting a dispute could also have security ramifications, according to strategists, possibly calling into question Japan’s administration of the islands, and by extension, the commitment of the U.S. to defend them under their security treaty that applies to “the territories under the administration of Japan”.19

Unofficial efforts were made in late 2012-early 2013 to find a mutually acceptable formula. Some Chinese scholars reportedly proposed a joint document stating each side’s claim: “It could demonstrate the islands are disputed without Japan saying they are disputed”.20 It was unclear if the proposal had official Chinese backing, so received no Japanese response. An ex-senior Japanese diplomat has visited Beijing several times unsuccessfully seeking a formula “to save face for both sides”. The hunt for a viable diplomatic phrase tapered off in the second half of 2013, as it was no
longer seen as a sufficient remedy. “I’m not sure if agreed language can be a solution”, an official in Tokyo said. “Without a roadmap for the recovery of the relationship, mere language doesn’t mean anything”.21

China shows no sign of considering Japan’s request to withdraw patrol vessels. It sent maritime law enforcement ships into the territorial sea of Diaoyu/Senkaku 50 times in 2013, and in 2014 has plans to “strengthen China’s normalised maritime presence and continue consolidating achievements in safeguarding sovereignty” over disputed islands including the Diaoyu/Senkaku and those in the South China Sea.22 If Japan admits a dispute, Chinese analysts said, China would not cease patrolling, but it could negotiate on how to share administration.23 In essence, Beijing demands Tokyo accept a new status quo for the islands based on enhanced Chinese presence and weakened Japanese administration.

B. The History

China has consistently sought to link the Diaoyu/Senkaku matter with the Second World War history. It argues the islands were ceded to Japan as a result of the First Sino-Japanese War that ended in 1895 and should be returned to China under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (1943 and 1945), which stated Japan must return all territories seized through war. It accuses Japan of “brazenly negating the world’s victory against fascism” by refusing to do so.24 Japan states that it formally incorporated the islands in January 1895, after confirming that they were uninhabited and showed no trace they had been under Chinese control. Therefore, “Senkaku and the [Second World War] history are two separate issues”.25

In spring 2013, China began placing more emphasis on historical issues in communications between the foreign ministries, stating this was in response to Abe’s behaviour.26 A series of statements since the prime minister began his second term in December 2012, including refusal to label Japan’s actions in the Second World War as aggression, called into question whether his government would honour Japan’s apologies to Asian neighbours it invaded during that conflict.27 It took until

21 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, November 2012, Tokyo, January 2014.
23 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August 2013, January 2014.
25 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Beijing, September 2013. For Japan’s full legal position, see “MOFA: Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands”, foreign ministry, November 2012.
26 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Beijing, September 2013; email correspondence, March 2014.
27 In January 2013, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said the Abe government was considering replacing the landmark 1995 statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama with a more “future-oriented” statement for 2015, the 70th anniversary of the war’s end. Murayama had said, “Japan ... through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations”. All subsequent prime ministers repeated this, including Abe in his first term (2006-2007). “Abe eyes statement that would supersede 1995 government apology”, Asahi Shimbun, 5 January 2013. On 23 April 2013, asked about the Mu-
March 2014 for Abe to affirm the 1995 Murayama statement, in which then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama apologised for wartime aggression.28

The Yasukuni Shrine is at the centre of the history argument. Relations went into a deep freeze during the administration of Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), who visited the shrine repeatedly despite Chinese protests. Abe, who succeeded Koizumi, repaired ties partly by refraining from pilgrimages to Yasukuni.29 Yet, he reportedly regretted not visiting the shrine during his first term and often spoke of his desire to help Japan “escape the post-war regime” and shake off wartime guilt. Campaigning as head of the Liberal Democratic Party, he went to the site in October 2012 and said he wanted to return as prime minister.30

Throughout the second half of 2013, the shrine issue frustrated discreet efforts on both sides for de-escalation. China’s emphasis on historical issues became more pronounced “when there was a rumour that Abe would visit the shrine” on 15 August, the anniversary of the announcement of Japan’s Second World War surrender.31 He did not, but sent a ritual offering.32 There was a slight hope, a Chinese analyst said, that the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit that October would be an opportunity for the leaders to meet, but concern Abe might make his pilgrimage during Japan’s Autumn Festival tempered any optimism. Abe did not, but an aide told reporters he would make the trip by year’s end.33

On 26 December, Abe visited Yasukuni, pushing historical grievances to the forefront. Multiple Japanese sources with high-level government ties described the decision as “very personal” and against the advice of all advisers, except for a few conservative confidants.34 Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida reportedly explained the Murayama statement in an Upper House session, Abe said, “the definition of aggression has yet to be established in academia or in the international community. Things that happened between nations will look differently depending on which side you view them from”. On 8 May in the Upper House, he again avoided the word “aggression” but said, “Japan caused great damage and suffering to the people of many nations, particularly to those of Asian nations. I have the same perception as that of past Cabinets”. Kazuo Yamagishi, “INSIGHT: Abe stands firm on definition of ‘aggression’ amid international outcry”, Asahi Shimbun, 10 May 2013. On 15 August, breaking with tradition, he made no mention of Japan’s responsibility as an aggressor at the annual memorial ceremony for those killed in WWII. “INSIGHT: Abe shows true colors in war memorial speech”, Asahi Shimbun, 16 August 2013.

28 “PM Abe says his Cabinet upholds Murayama statement on Japan’s wartime aggression”, Mainichi, 4 March 2014.
32 Instead, two cabinet ministers and dozens of lawmakers made the trip. Beijing summoned the Japanese ambassador to protest. “Japan ministers in Yasukuni visit as PM Abe sends offering”, BBC, 15 August 2013. Japan said Beijing had raised the bar. “Before, China’s stance was that [the] prime minister, foreign minister, chief cabinet secretary and defence minister should not visit, but did not care if some small ministers and Diet members visited. Now China criticises Japan even when those lower-level people visit”. Crisis Group interview, Japanese analyst, January 2014; email correspondence, March 2014.
33 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, September 2013. “Aide: Abe may visit Yasukuni this year”, Kyodo, 20 October 2013.
34 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, January 2014. Abe’s right-wing confidants are said to include special adviser Seiichi Eto; Hakubun Shimomura, education minister; Yoshitaka Shindo, internal
potential diplomatic consequences to Abe, but his ministry was not consulted and
had less than two hours advance notice.35

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi lodged a “strong protest and severe condem-
nation” with Japanese Ambassador Kitera Masato, and Beijing unleashed an inter-
national anti-Japan public relations blitz.36 By mid-January 2014, more than 30
Chinese ambassadors had penned articles in local newspapers warning of the resur-
rection of Japanese militarism, and more than 40 envoys had given press briefings
and media interviews – a highly coordinated campaign that was “extremely rare” in
intensity and scale.37 China’s attempt at winning over public opinion and isolating
Japan internationally abated after the spring of 2014, likely due to its failure to gain
traction.38 However, Beijing has continued to remind the Chinese public of Japan’s
wartime atrocities.39

Japan saw both restraint and excess in China’s response. Analysts observed that,
unlike during previous bilateral altercations, there were neither mass anti-Japan
protests nor economic retaliation. Local officials and business delegations continued
to visit Japan, though there were isolated, possibly uncoordinated, cancellations of
invitations to Japanese guests.40 The scale and tone of the public relations campaign,
especially the accusations of revived militarism and subversion of the post-war order,
were seen as “overreaction”, deepening suspicion that Beijing prefers to tarnish Ja-

affairs and communication minister; and Isao Iijima, who was also instrumental in getting Koizumi
to visit Yasukuni.
35 Crisis Group interview, Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2014.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine”, press release, Chinese foreign ministry,
26 December 2013.
37 商西 [Shang Xi, “Chinese diplomats speak out in high frequency against Abe’s tribute to ghosts”], Jinghua Times,
12 January 2014.
38 Moscow reportedly rejected Beijing’s offer in February 2014 to recognise Russian sovereignty
over the Northern Territories, also claimed by Japan, in exchange for Russia’s support for China’s
claim to Diaoyu/Senkaku. “Moscov rejects Beijing’s offer to co-operate on separate territorial disputes in
with Tokyo”, Agence France-Presse, 7 February 2014. Germany, reportedly wanting “no
part of the East Asian propaganda war”, declined requests to include Holocaust memorial sites in
Xi’s official itinerary for his March 2014 visit. Beijing was said to have wanted “to impress the world
with the sharp contrast between post-Second World War Japan and Germany in facing their parallel
burdens of history”. Martin Sieff, “Merkel disappoints on Holocaust visits”, China Daily,
28 March 2014. Arguably South Korea, which has its own disputes with Japan on the Second World
War history, has been most receptive of China’s anti-Japan messaging. See Section III. A below.
39 On 27 February 2014, China’s legislature designated 3 September a national day for commemo-
rating the victory in the second Sino-Japanese War and 13 December as the national memorial day
for the Nanjing Massacre victims. “China ratifies national days on anti-Japanese war victory, Nan-
jing Massacre”, Xinhua, 27 February 2014. In June, China applied to UNESCO to include Nanjing
Massacre documentation and the “comfort women” issue in its “Memory of the World” program.
Since 3 July, China’s State Archives Administration has been publishing confessions of convicted
Japan war criminals. “China publicises confessions by Japanese war criminals”, Xinhua, 3 July
2014. China also launched a national memorial website for victims of the Nanjing Massacre and the
anti-Japanese war. “国家公祭网首页点击量百万 南京网民人数居前列”, Yangtze Evening Post, 8 July 2014. For more on Beijing’s campaign to isolate Japan, see Section III A below.
40 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, January 2014. For example, the north-eastern Chinese city Har-
bin cancelled invitations to the Japanese Consulate in Shenyang for the opening of an ice festival,
but “it did not appear to be part of a centrally coordinated tactic”. Crisis Group interview, diplomat,
Beijing, January 2014.
pan’s image rather than repair ties. “We tried to explain our stance to China, but China’s response has always been ‘Abe is bad; Abe is trying to change peaceful Japan and change post-war order’”, a diplomat said, and “at this stage, it’s not productive to talk with China”.41

The surge of historical enmity further drained political will for mending ties. Multiple diplomatic initiatives were set back. The Japanese foreign ministry reportedly had been working since October to pave the way for a China-Japan-South Korea summit. Abe’s shrine visit expunged all efforts and cast a “sense of weariness” among ministry bureaucrats.42 At the ministry’s invitation, China’s ambassador, Cheng Yonghua, had a closed-door meeting with Kishida on 20 December. According to a Chinese account, “the two of them agreed to take steps to cool down the situation”, beginning by trying to reduce negative media coverage, but Abe visiting Yasukuni “amounted to a slap in the face to the Chinese ambassador”.43 Ambassador Chen later said Abe “made the visit to the shrine at a time when both nations were working toward improving the strained bilateral relations”, but the visit “closed the door for dialogue”.44

Beijing’s reaction in turn alienated Japanese otherwise invested in better ties. A former diplomat and China specialist spoke of his colleagues’ weariness of being lectured by Chinese counterparts on history at the cost of constructive dialogues and lamented, “true friends of Japan are gone”. A retired Self-Defence Forces (SDF) officer who had been engaging Chinese counterparts on “confidence-building security measures” reported that “the first day was always filled with talk of history”, “which makes communications difficult”, and expressed concern that “it will be difficult to visit [China] because of Abe’s Yasukuni visit”.45

C. Security

The Abe government began a review of strategy and defence guidelines in September 2013, asserting that “the security environment around Japan has become all the more severe”.46 Beijing objected that the review “can make other Asian countries uncomfortable” and again accused Japan of “trying to subvert post-Second World War order”.47 On 17 December, the Japanese Cabinet adopted the country’s first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS) and updated the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), outlining the SDF’s structure and posture for ten years to 2024, and a Mid-term Defence Plan (MTDP), defining defence policy and capabilities to 2018. These cite concerns with China’s “rapidly advancing” military capabilities

41 Crisis Group interviews, Japanese officials, Tokyo, January 2014.
43 Crisis Group interview, Chinese scholar, Beijing, February 2014. According to the Japanese side, “[d]uring the 25-minute meeting, both sides reaffirmed the importance of Japan-China bilateral relationship and their basic positions of promoting Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on Common Strategic Interests(战略互惠关系), and also exchanged views on recent situations surrounding the bilateral relations”. Crisis Group email correspondence, 17 February 2014.
45 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, January 2014.
46 Crisis Group email correspondence, diplomat, March 2014. “Japan to draw up national security strategy: Abe”, Kyodo, 10 September 2014.
47 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2014.
“without sufficient transparency” and “actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions”.48 They warn that “grey-zone situations … that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests … tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations”.49

The documents outline steps to boost defence capabilities, especially in the south west, to safeguard and defend remote islands against attack.50 Japanese maritime security analyst explained that the SDF is shifting its priority from “preparing for attacks from North Korea and contingencies in the Taiwan Strait” to “an invasion by China of South Japan”, especially the Okinawa islands.51

The Chinese defence ministry accused Japan of “hyping up the ‘China Threat Theory’, playing up regional tensions, and making excuses for arms expansion in the disguise of maintaining its own security and regional peace”,52 China’s defence spending in fact eclipses Japan’s in size and growth. The official 2014 defence budget grew 12.2 per cent, to about $132 billion, continuing almost unbroken double-digit growth over two decades.53 Japan’s fiscal 2014 defence budget grew 2.2 per cent from the previous year to $47 billion; prior to 2013, there had been no growth for eleven years.54

The revision of Tokyo’s defence posture began not with the latest security review but in 2010. The 2004 NDPG focused on threats posed by international terrorism and North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs.55 A security analyst said, “China was considered peaceful then”.56 In 2006, Abe in his first term agreed with the then Chinese president, Hu Jintao, to “strive to build a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests”. Ties improved further as Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited in 2007 and Hu in 2008. During those years, though some in the foreign and defence ministries, as well as security analysts, had concerns

49 Ibid, p. 11 and pp. 1-2 respectively.
50 The SDF is to station more units in the south west and “maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units” in order to “respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimblly with an attack on offshore islands”. “National Defence Program Guidelines”, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
56 Crisis Group interview, security analyst and member of prime minister’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities, Tokyo, January 2014.
about China’s military build-up, Tokyo refrained from major security policy changes lest they disturb bilateral relations.57

2010 marked a turning point. China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy, and a boat-ramming incident involving a Chinese fisherman and the JCG near Diaoyu/Senkaku jolted bilateral relations.58 China’s responses to the collision were seen as coercive in Japan and came as “a total shock. The incident awakened Japanese minds and made radical changes to the defence program guidelines easy”.59 The 2010 NDPG mandated the SDF to enhance its defence posture in the south-western region and introduced the concept of “Dynamic Defence Force”.60 The concept emphasises constant intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, strengthened amphibious capabilities, a ballistic missile defence system and layered international cooperation in response to contingencies in the grey areas between war and peace.61 The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, however, did not focus on implementing the guidelines, as it was preoccupied with disaster relief following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

Even though the revival of the islands dispute in September 2012 focused attention again on potential threats from China, according to an official, “it was a diplomatic war [rather] than a security issue then”. Abe and his team, who “have a strong vision about Japan’s defence and security posture”, refocused the strategy toward “China as the most important factor”.62

Beijing reveals few details about its military budget or defence posture. The increased spending is said to favour capacity-building for the navy, air force and second artillery corps – the PLA’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles force – with the goal of developing the ability to project power at increasingly long ranges.63 The defence ministry’s 2013 white paper outlined a PLA plan to continue strengthening maritime capabilities and identified Japan as a potential adversary. Among China’s security challenges, it noted, “Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu islands”.64 According to the U.S. Defense Department, China’s military investment still primarily focuses on potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait but places growing emphasis on “potential contingencies in the South and East China Seas”.65 Multiple

59 Crisis Group interview, member of prime minister’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defence Capabilities, Tokyo, January 2014.
63 “中国所赠军费重点向装备倾斜海军二炮占大头”, 法制晚报 ["China’s increased military spending favours equipment, navy air force and second artillery account for the lion’s share", The Mirror], 5 March 2014.
Chinese analysts confirmed that “the PLA is seriously preparing” for a potential conflict with Japan, though they stressed that China would only respond to provocations.66

The sides’ adjustments to their defence postures have become codified and institutionalised and, as such, risk perpetuating strategic mistrust and posing increasing challenges to diplomacy. “The security factor has risen in importance in China-Japan relations”, lamented a veteran Japanese diplomat.67 The process has self-reinforcing potential, as hard-liners and militaries in both countries use the other’s capabilities to justify more resources and more assertive postures.

D. The ADIZ68

Japan views Beijing’s designation of an ADIZ over the East China Sea in November 2013 as another unilateral attempt to alter the regional status quo. The announcement, without prior consultation or explanation and at a time of bilateral tensions, appeared ominous to Tokyo and drew criticism from other regional countries, including Australia and South Korea.69 According to Japanese officials and defence analysts, “it is seen as another use of coercion”, designed to “create tensions in the East China Sea to put pressure on Japan to concede on the islands”.70 The foreign ministry noted that in the announcement, Beijing “seemingly describes the airspace over the Senkaku islands … as if it were a part of China’s ‘territorial airspace’. Japan cannot accept at all such description”.71 The move was also seen as an attempt to divide Japan and the U.S. by exploiting differences in their tolerance for tensions and seeking to expose Washington’s lack of full commitment to its ally.72

The rules Beijing set for its ADIZ also caused alarm. China requires all aircraft entering the zone to identify themselves by submitting flight plans, maintaining radio and transponder communications and marking nationalities, or “China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond”. The rules depart from common practice by making “no distinction between aircraft flying parallel with China’s coastline through the ADIZ and those flying toward China’s territorial airspace”.73 The strict requirements amount, Japanese analysts said, to asserting sover-

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66 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2013, May 2014.
67 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, January 2014.
68 See Appendix A for a map of the overlapping ADIZs of China, Japan and South Korea.
69 The area overlaps the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and includes the airspace above Diaoyu/Senkaku. The announcement drew immediate criticism and expression of concerns from Japan, the U.S., South Korea, Australia and Taiwan. Calum MacLeod, “China riles Japan, U.S. with air defense zone”, USA Today, 24 November 2013. South-East Asian countries were alarmed and anxious that Beijing would soon declare a similar zone over the South China Sea. Some privately expressed concerns to Washington and even directly to Beijing. Crisis Group interviews, U.S. scholar and Chinese official, March 2014.
70 Crisis Group interviews, January 2014.
72 Crisis Group interviews, diplomat, Beijing, December 2013; Japanese defence analysts, Tokyo, January 2014. For more on the U.S.-Japan alliance, see Section IV below.
eign jurisdiction over international airspace, as if “China wanted to treat the area as its territorial airspace”.74

Because of how it was created and the far-reaching rules it imposed, China’s ADIZ has been seen as offensive, not defensive, in nature. “China has a strong desire to control sea and air and wants to make [the] East China Sea and [the] South China Sea its sanctuary” by altering existing rules and norms for operation in international airspace and imposing its own, said a security analyst in Tokyo.75 The ultimate intention, some Japanese and U.S. analysts argued, was to operationalise an “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) strategy that would deny or impede the ability of U.S. and allied forces to operate near China during a crisis by making “U.S. power projection increasingly risky, and in some cases prohibitive”.76

Such a zone could acclimatise regional countries to increased PLA aerial activity, including patrols and responses to incoming foreign military aircraft. “If China operationalises the ADIZ in the East China Sea and dispatches fighters immediately to respond [to foreign aircraft], it will affect U.S. or Japanese activities”, a Japanese defence analyst said.77 Both Washington and Tokyo said they would not alter military behaviour in the area to accommodate the ADIZ rule, and to make a point, they flew into it without serving notice to Beijing.78

Some evidence suggests that the ADIZ was years in the making, principally to advance China’s strategic interests, and that the military used tensions with Japan to aid its rollout. The PLA, especially the air force, had been arguing that it was needed to protect coastal regions, where the country’s wealth is concentrated, because “aircraft are getting faster and faster, and time for early warning was getting shorter”.79 However, its proposal reportedly was repeatedly turned down by Hu Jintao, who was overseeing a rapprochement with Japan.80 “From the point of view of the PLA, especially the air force, the ADIZ was a must, but when China-Japan relations were good, there wasn’t the urgency”, a Chinese analyst said.81

The calculation changed under Xi Jinping, who by all accounts has been central to China’s responses to Japan after the island purchase and more receptive to a more muscular foreign policy.82 A main driver of the ADIZ appears to have been that the PLA was convinced, and then – contrary to what some Japanese analysts believe – persuaded the president it had acquired the capability to monitor and manage the

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74 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, January 2014.
75 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, January 2014.
77 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, January 2014.
79 Crisis Group interview, Chinese analyst, Beijing, February 2014.
81 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, February 2014.
zone after years of modernisation.83 “China had been testing and tweaking the plan. When we had the capability, we went ahead and did it”.84

The PLA also appeared to have taken advantage of tensions with Japan and a series of events. The Japanese SDF on 9 September 2013 scrambled an F-15 to monitor a suspected Chinese drone that entered the Japanese ADIZ. The same day the Chinese defence ministry appeared to confirm ownership of the drone. Responding to the sighting, it said the Chinese military had carried out “routine training in the East China Sea. We hope relevant countries do not make a fuss over nothing”.85 In October, the Japanese defence ministry reported that in the first half of fiscal 2013 the SDF scrambled fighters 149 times “to intercept Chinese aircraft, which marked an increase of 80 times compared to last year”. It also released a photo of “what was presumed to be an unmanned aerial vehicle of unidentified nationality”. The revelation was said to have “upset everyone” in Beijing, and the PLA air force “then applied for approval again for the ADIZ plan”.86

The PLA’s case was likely also helped when Japanese media reported in October that Japan’s defence ministry had drafted plans to shoot down foreign drones intruding into Japan’s air space if warnings to leave were ignored. The plans were said to be responses to a Chinese military drone that had flown in the direction of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.87 The Chinese defence ministry responded that this would be considered “an act of war” and vowed to “take resolute measures to strike back”.88 Also that month, it responded unusually harshly to Japanese surveillance of a PLA naval drill in the high seas of the Western Pacific, demanding that Tokyo “ensure similar incidents will not happen again” and warning that “China reserves the right to take additional measures [in response]”.89 With this series of events, according to several Chinese analysts, the “political environment was created” for the Chinese leader “to make up his mind about the ADIZ”.90

Although some Chinese analysts have suggested Beijing meant to use the ADIZ to boost its Diaoyu/Senkaku claim, there is no evidence it is enforcing its rules above the islands; Japanese aircraft continue to patrol unchallenged. However, it cannot be ruled out that China will eventually use the ADIZ to assert aerial control in the future.91 Beijing likely was motivated to seek parity with Japan, which has had an

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83 According to Japanese analysts, China is not yet able to constantly monitor its full ADIZ. “To sufficiently monitor the ADIZ, a country needs sophisticated land-based radar, surface ships, submarines, early warning aircraft and satellites, and they have to communicate well with each other. China has capability in each field but not enough, and they don’t communicate well”, said a Japanese security strategist. Crisis Group interviews, Washington, Tokyo, January 2014.
84 Crisis Group interview, Chinese analyst, Beijing, December 2014.
87 “Japan to shoot down foreign drones that invade its airspace”, Kyodo, 20 October 2013.
90 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, January, February 2014.
91 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, February 2014; Japanese security analysts, Tokyo, January 2014.
ADIZ since 1969, scrambles fighters to intercept Chinese planes that enter it and publishes statistics on scrambles.92 By establishing its own ADIZ and publishing records of enforcement, Beijing could demonstrate to its public stepped-up efforts to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.93 It could also seek to eliminate the public relations windfall Chinese analysts believe Tokyo reaps by announcing Chinese “intrusions” into Japan’s ADIZ.94

Beijing rejected the protest lodged with its embassy in Tokyo and pointed out that Japan’s ADIZ was set up decades ago and been expanded twice unilaterally.95 The strong international pushback, however, caught Beijing by surprise; Chinese analysts privately acknowledged the announcement could have been handled better, so that countries not considered “hostile”, like South Korea and Australia, would not have been unnecessarily alienated. Some attributed the inattention to fallout to the military’s near-monopoly over planning. “Once the leader approved the plan, the PLA rushed to roll it out. The foreign ministry did not participate, as this was considered a military project”.96

The ADIZ announcement set back a recent moderate recovery in bilateral relations. CitiGroup, in October 2013, led the first high-level Chinese business delegation to Japan since the island purchase. Official exchanges had quietly resumed at provincial and local levels, with a delegation visit from the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. Days before the announcement, nearly 200 Japanese executives visited Beijing and were received by Vice Premier Wang Yang, fuelling speculation, even in the Chinese media, that ties were defrosting.97

Around the same time, Chinese leaders appeared to signal readiness to blunt some of the edges of their foreign policy. In October, a high-profile Xi speech stressed that “peaceful development” is the “strategic choice” of the Communist Party, and “maintaining peace and stability in the periphery is an important objective”. He emphasised that “excellent external conditions” are necessary for China’s “reform, development, and stability”. Signifying its importance, the conference he addressed was attended by the full Standing Committee of the Politburo, organs of the Central Committee, State Counselors, the Central Leading Small Group responsible for foreign affairs, ambassadors to important countries, PLA leaders and executives of key state-owned enterprises.98 On the heels of a “charm offensive” by Xi and Premier Li Keqiang that month in South East Asia promoting regional economic integration

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93 Nicholas Szchenyi et al., op. cit.
94 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, December 2013, February 2014.
95 “China’s ADIZ will not cause tension: spokesman”, Xinhua, 29 November 2013. The U.S. established Japan’s ADIZ after the Second World War, then transferred management to Tokyo in 1969. Japan expanded it in 1972 to incorporate the Diaoyu/Senkaku, then in 2010 to cover all of Yonaguni Island, Japan’s westernmost inhabited point. Kimberly Hsu, op. cit., p. 3.
96 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, December 2013, January 2014.
and cooperation, the speech was seen as an effort to correct foreign policy missteps that had alarmed neighbours.99

Many Japanese who were predicting Beijing would ease tensions were shocked by the ADIZ. Xi’s speech was no longer seen by policymakers as an expression of sincere intent to improve relations with neighbours, a security analyst said, but rather as part of a tactical “mixture of aggressive and strong measures and soft conciliatory rhetoric” to confuse adversaries and conceal assertive intentions.100

E. The Perceptions: “Troublemaker” vs “Middle Kingdom”

Due to the combination of Abe’s visit to Yasukuni and Beijing’s ADIZ announcement, neither side is now willing to take signals of good-will – even by top leaders – at face value but rather tends to read them as rhetoric cloaking true intentions. Diplomacy is tainted by the overwhelming impression that it is insincere or lacks leadership support. “All effective communication channels with China are gone”, said a veteran Japanese diplomat, who described the situation as worse than before relations were normalised, when “there were influential Chinese visiting Japan”.101 With signals mistrusted and effective communications lacking, “both sides were responding to the media. Each is criticising the other to third countries in the media. It is very un-sound and only worsens the situation”.102

The mainstream narrative in China is that Abe’s real intention is not to improve bilateral relations but to stoke tensions so as to advance his agenda, which, analysts say, includes building up the military and loosening the restraints of the pacifist constitution, with the ultimate aim of converting Japan into a normal country. “When such a perception has been formed about Abe and his associates, we feel there is no use engaging them”. Abe’s calls for dialogue have been dismissed as “hypocritical”, and he has been dubbed “double-faced”. Chinese diplomats and officials have frequently labelled him, and Japan, “the troublemaker” of the region, and exhorted countries to unite to stop a militaristic revival.103

The perception is taking hold in Japan that China aims to alter not only the Diaoyu/Senkaku status quo but also the regional order. “There are elements in China that want to revive the Middle Kingdom ruling over the region and want to seek hegemony in the region”.104 The ADIZ is seen as an attempt to impose “new norms favourable to Beijing’s interpretation of international rules”. Japanese officials also cite China’s behaviour in the South China Sea maritime disputes as evidence of its defiance of a rules-based regional and wider international order.105

100 Crisis Group interviews, Japanese officials and analysts, Tokyo, January 2014.
101 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, January 2014. For more on the deterioration of communications, see Crisis Group Report, Dangerous Waters, op. cit., pp. 32-36.
102 Crisis Group interview, Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2014.
104 Crisis Group interview, Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2014.
105 Crisis Group interviews, Japanese officials and security analysts, Tokyo, January 2014.
III. The Strategies

A. China: “Safeguarding Rights and Maintaining Stability”

China’s consistent use of pressure can be seen as its attempt at “socialisation”, through which it “trains” Tokyo – for many years accustomed to a weaker neighbour – to be more conciliatory. Chinese analysts often attribute bilateral frictions to Japan’s refusal to accept the fact of China’s rise: “If it can adjust its role, we can be friends. If it keeps behaving strangely to maintain its superiority, it will be difficult.” As China grows powerful, it expects regional countries to accommodate its claims accordingly and applies pressure when this is not forthcoming.

The approach is strength-based and reflects Beijing’s outlook that the balance of power will continue shifting in its favour. Chinese analysts frequently state that maritime disputes will ultimately be determined by “a contest of comprehensive national power (综合国力)”, which roughly consists of military, diplomatic and economic elements. They insist that Beijing does not intend to use force proactively to settle disputes but predict that when its dominance in comprehensive strength becomes indisputable, use of force will no longer be necessary. One stated: “When China becomes powerful, the other countries’ attitudes will change”. Such a scenario presumes that, as China grows stronger and asserts itself accordingly, its rivals – including Tokyo and Washington – will gradually modify their calculations to accommodate Beijing.

Yet, for now, China has not acquired absolute regional dominance, especially as the U.S. and its allies maintain naval supremacy. Beijing faces the dilemma of flexing already significant power to advance its claims, while maintaining a stable periphery conducive to its further development. Xi articulated a policy to reconcile these two potentially contradictory aims in a speech to the Politburo on 30 July 2013. The country’s maritime policy, he said, should “plan as a whole the two overall situations of maintaining stability and safeguarding rights”. While balancing between conflicting objectives is by no means unique to China, Xi’s line indicates an adjustment in the priorities of the previous administration. “Under Hu Jintao maintaining stability was given the higher priority. Now both are equally important. The importance of safeguarding rights has increased, although it doesn’t mean that safeguarding rights trumps maintaining stability”.

A watershed event in China’s evolving policy toward maritime disputes took place in spring 2012. After a two-month standoff with the Philippines at the disputed Scarborough Shoal, Beijing established regular law enforcement patrols and excluded the Philippines from an area where neither had previously maintained a permanent presence. Chinese strategists hailed this as an example of advancing maritime claims without upsetting stability and balancing diplomacy with the need to “enhance the means and capability to safeguard peace, sovereignty and rights in accord-

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107 Speech by a Chinese scholar, conference, Beijing, June 2013.
109 “Building China into a maritime power”, china.org.cn, 30 August 2013.
110 Crisis Group interview, Chinese scholar, Beijing, February 2014.
ance with China’s economic prowess”. It was said to mark a new era in which Beijing began “proactively” defending its maritime rights and interests.

Discussions began in Chinese policy circles on how to replicate the “Scarborough Shoal Model”. Marking a “qualitative change” in maritime policy, explained a Chinese scholar, the model has four characteristics: use multiple means to safeguard rights, as diplomacy is no longer the main tool; skilfully use opportunities to turn the situation in China’s favour while stressing that it did not start the dispute; aim for complete or partial control of islands and shoals; stress the non-military nature of China’s actions to defend its rights and avoid solving the dispute with force.

Beijing sees its actions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku group as a successful application and further perfection of the Scarborough Shoal Model. Utilising Japan’s purchase of the islands, China demarcated territorial baselines around them; established regular law enforcement patrols in disputed waters; began broadcasting weather forecasts; and sent a law enforcement aircraft into the airspace. In each instance, Beijing deployed a tactic that can be termed “reactive assertiveness”: using an action by a rival claimant as justification to push back hard and change facts on the ground in its favour. As China modified the status quo incrementally, Japan and its ally the U.S. have found it difficult to respond meaningfully without provoking escalation. “China is using the combination of stating its peaceful intention and keeping up the potential for crisis very skilfully. It is very difficult for us to respond”, said a Japanese security strategist.

“Maintaining peace means no actions. Safeguarding rights means actively asserting rights that China claims. The two can be contradictory sometimes”, a Chinese analyst acknowledged. To seek balance, according to Xi in his July 2013 speech, “safeguarding maritime rights and interests should go hand in hand with the enhance-
ment of the country’s comprehensive national power”. That is to say, Beijing intends to pursue a dynamic balance and revise its goals in asserting maritime claims to match the growth of its strength. With its considerable and growing diplomatic, economic and military might, it gradually crafts new facts by skilfully deploying administrative and law enforcement resources but stopping short of directly involving the military — and bets on its opponents taking the risk-averse approach and so keeping tensions below the threshold of conflict.

Corresponding to the assessment that China’s comprehensive national power is not yet sufficient to gain full control of the Diaoyu/Senkaku group but that time is on its side, Chinese strategists in mid-2013 began to caution against “excess” in advancing a claim to the islands and advocate a strategy to preserve the gains already obtained. Although the “eventual solution to the Diaoyu Island problem includes expelling Japanese presence, establishing exclusive [Chinese] control, and stationing troops and developing the islands”, an analyst said, those goals should be realised in the long term and “should absolutely not be included in the near-to-medium term (five to ten years) strategic agenda”. Instead, he argued, China for now should focus on maintaining “overlapping control” and gradually obtaining acceptance by Japan, the U.S. and the international community of this reality, using diplomatic means to force Tokyo to admit the dispute and negotiate. Another analyst said Beijing intends not to push for further gains on the islands but to pressure Japan “to keep it nervous and wear it down”.

Beijing applies pressure diplomatically by denying Tokyo bilateral contact and “stepping up the international PR campaign”. The apparent goal is to isolate Japan and alienate it from its allies. Summit diplomacy has also been employed to win sympathy in other countries. Visiting Sochi in February, Xi stressed that China and Russia would jointly commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 2015 in order to “remember history and alert future generations”. In Berlin in March, he stated that the atrocities committed by Japan in China “are still fresh in our memory”.

Most efforts have been directed at wooing South Korea, which was also invaded and occupied by Japan and frequently spars with Tokyo over history. After President Park Geun-hye visited Beijing in June 2013, a joint statement expressed “special concerns” over regional instability caused by historical issues, an apparent reference to what both perceive as Japan’s unrepentant attitude toward its militaristic past. In January 2014, China opened a memorial hall to Korean national Ahn Jung-geun, who in 1909 assassinated Hirobumi Ito, four-time Japanese prime minister and the

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121 “Building China into a maritime power”, china.org.cn, 30 August 2013.
123 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, June 2014.
124 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, February 2014.
first resident governor of then Japanese-run Korea. In a visit to Seoul in July, Xi reminded his audience of Japanese aggression against both China and South Korea.¹²⁷

The military serves as backstop and deterrence. Vessels from all three fleets of the PLA navy have patrolled around the islands but stopped short of entering their territorial waters – the closest came to 30 nautical miles from the islands – as doing so would give Japan justification to dispatch warships, risking a military confrontation or even violent conflict.¹²⁸ The PLA navy in 2013 “regularised” drills in the Western Pacific, showcasing and enhancing its power projection.¹²⁹ Senior PLA officers often state that in the confrontation over the Diaoyu/Senkaku, China will “never fire the first shot, but will absolutely fire the second”.¹³⁰ Upon taking over as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi repeatedly admonished the PLA to build a force “capable of fighting wars and capable of winning wars”, which the PLA has codified as the key goal of its force building.¹³¹

B. Japan: “Collective Response”

Tokyo’s stance regarding the islands, according to Japanese officials, can be summarised as no escalation and no compromise. Japan does not desire a military showdown, though it may still enjoy naval superiority.¹³² “Today probably Japan can win over Senkaku, if there is a conflict”, but this would only result in an acceleration of China’s military build-up, said Shinichi Kitaoka, an adviser to Abe. “That will make our situation even more dangerous”.¹³³

Abe is seen as far less willing to accommodate Beijing than his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda. “He always refutes and responds strongly to Chinese pressure”, refused…

¹³⁰ “少将：如有人挑衅打第一枪 中国将予以有力回击”, 新华社, “Major General: If someone provokes with the first shot, China will strike back powerfully”, Xinhua, 4 March 2014. “尹卓：如果日本敢动武 中国绝不会客气”, 中国广播网, “Yin Zhuo: If Japan dares to use force, China will not hold back”, cnr.cn, 2 March 2014.
¹³¹ “习近平考察广州战区 称能打仗打胜仗是强军之要”, 新华社, “Xi Jinping inspects Guangzhou military region, says key of strengthening the army is to be able to fight wars and win wars”, Xinhua, 12 December 2012; “习近平：努力建设一支听党指挥能打胜仗作风优良的人民军队”, 人民日报, “Xi Jinping: Strive to build a people’s army that follows the Party’s command, is capable to winning wars and has fine work style”, The People’s Daily, 12 March 2013; “解放军总参谋部: 记住能打仗打胜仗是强军之要”, 人民日報, “PLA General Staff: Remember being able to fight wars and win wars is the key to a strong army”, The PLA Daily, 21 February 2013; “中央军委印发《关于提高军事训练实战化水平的意见》”, 人民日报, “Central Military Commission prints and issues ‘Suggestions on enhancing the live-combat capability through military training’”, The People’s Daily, 21 March 2014.
¹³² Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, January 2014.
The Abe government not only refuses to admit that the islands are in dispute, but has also sought to shore up its claim. A new office was established under the Cabinet Secretariat to improve “communications on Japan’s territorial stances, mainly about Senkaku, both to international and domestic audiences”. The government has likewise revised teaching manuals for junior and senior high schools to describe the islands as “integral parts of Japanese territory”. Resisting pressure essentially is Tokyo’s countermeasure to Beijing’s socialisation tactic. Japan also attempts to mould Chinese behaviour by rewarding moderation. “Prime Minister Abe’s basic stance is that there is no compromise under pressure”, a Japanese analyst said. “If China stops pressure, there will be room for compromise”.

The two most recent Japanese administrations, like their Chinese counterparts, are also said to differ in strategic mindset: “Noda was more diplomacy oriented and Abe is more security oriented”. The Abe government’s security agenda, including shoring up defences on Japan’s south-western flank and strengthening the SDF to defend and retake islands, enjoys wide domestic support despite the stress it places on relations with China. “Of course it’s not comfortable for China”, an official acknowledged, “but the change is not militaristic. We were too passive before”. But even proponents of stronger defence “know very well how fragile our budget is and that military development should not be enormous. Japan should not enter a race to militarily build-up with China”.

Knowing the limits and risks of contending with China one-on-one, Tokyo pursues a “collective response”, in which “the most important element is to partner with the U.S. and with South East Asia”, where anxiety about China’s assertive push to stake maritime claims also runs high. Tokyo aims to convince regional countries that Beijing’s behaviour in the East China Sea threatens to undermine international rules and norms, and seeks to rally them around a shared cause. During his keynote speech at the May 2014 Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore, Abe stated that “[r]ule of law should be the common language”, a concept he defined with three principles: making claims based on international law, not using force or coercion to advance claims, and settling disputes peacefully.

As part of his stated agenda of “advancing Japan’s diplomacy through a panoramic perspective of the world map”, Abe visited South East Asia in January 2013 for the first foreign trip of his second term; by November he had been to all ten members of

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134 Crisis Group interview, member of prime minister’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defence Capabilities, Tokyo, January 2014.

135 The “Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty” has launched a website (www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/ryodo/ryodo.html) promoting Japan’s territorial claims, intensified overseas messaging and convened a panel “to think about how to communicate in easy to understand language, instead of the dry and hard to understand legal language, to the outside world about territorial issues”. Crisis Group interview, Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2014. See the Office of Policy Planning’s “Initiative to Enhance Communications Regarding Territorial Integrity”, 22 November 2013. Crisis Group interview, Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2014.

136 “Isle disputes to make schoolbooks”, The Japan Times, 4 April 2014.

137 Crisis Group interview, Japanese analyst, Beijing, May 2014.


140 Crisis Group interviews, Japanese officials, Tokyo, January 2014. Shinzo Abe, keynote address, thirteenth IISS Asian Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 30 May 2014.
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).\footnote{141 Isabel Reynolds, “Abe’s Southeast Asia push adds to U.S. ties amid China rift”, Bloomberg, 26 February 2014. “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe”, press release, Japanese cabinet, 26 June 2013. “With visits to all 10 ASEAN nations, Abe’s China containment strategy complete”, Asahi Shimbun, 18 November 2013.} Tokyo has also stepped up assistance to South East Asian countries to build their maritime capacity and enhanced defence cooperation.\footnote{142 For more information, see “Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Nations – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)”, Japanese defence ministry.}

Japan’s support for the Philippines, another U.S. ally and focal point of Beijing’s pressure in maritime disputes, stands out. Manila has secured a deal to obtain ten coast guard patrol vessels from Japan through a $184-million loan. The two agreed in June 2013 to enhance cooperation on “the defence of remote islands ... the defence of territorial seas as well as protection of maritime interests”. Tokyo likewise expressed support of Manila’s request for international arbitration of its South China Sea dispute with Beijing, stating, “such an action contributes to the maintenance and enhancement of the international order in the region based on the rule of law”. In return, Manila says it welcomes a militarily stronger Japan to “serve as a balancing factor in the region”.\footnote{143 Delon Porcalla, “Coast Guard to get 10 more vessels with Japan loan”, The Philippine Star, 16 December 2013. “Japan vows to help Philippines amid China sea row”, The Manila Times, 27 June 2013. Statement, press secretary, foreign ministry, 31 March 2014. “Philippines says it would welcome stronger Japan”, Associated Press, 10 December 2012.}

Japan’s emphasis on rule of law is partly based on a calculation that time is not necessarily on its side – even with the U.S. as an ally – in a contest of strength: “[G]iven our uncertainty regarding the future balance of power between the United States and China, we have stressed the need for China to behave like a nation that respects universal values in its own conduct of foreign affairs”.\footnote{144 “Behind the New Abe Diplomacy: An Interview with Cabinet Advisor Yachi Shotaro (Part One)”, nippon.com, 8 August 2013.} A rules-based system, with the promise of reducing power imbalances by binding powerful and weak nations alike, resonates with South East Asian countries that would be disadvantaged in a regional order determined solely by strength. They are receptive in principle to upholding rule of law and opposing unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, endorsing, for example, the concept in joint statements by the U.S. president and Malaysian prime minister in April 2014 and ASEAN foreign ministers the following month.\footnote{145 “Joint Statement By President Obama And Prime Minister Najib Of Malaysia”, press release, White House, 27 April 2014. “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea”, press release, ASEAN, 10 May 2014.} In June, Singapore’s prime minister publicly supported “the primacy of the rule of law” to resolve territorial disputes peacefully.\footnote{146 Tarra Quismundo, “PH gets Singapore backing in sea dispute”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25 June 2014.}

Tokyo’s overture to South East Asia has been aided by China’s sudden announcement of its East China Sea ADIZ, which roused fear that Beijing would declare a similar zone above the South China Sea. Some privately voiced concerns to Beijing and sought assurance from Washington.\footnote{147 Crisis Group interviews, Chinese official and U.S. analyst, Beijing, March 2014.} Indonesia went so far as to publicly warn that a similar zone in the South China Sea would not be accepted.\footnote{148 Jack Greig, “The next South China Sea crisis: China vs. Indonesia?”, The National Interest, 23 May 2014. Indonesia plans to acquire and deploy jet fighters to the resource-rich Natuna waters off
Though anxious about its intentions, South-East Asian countries rely on China for economic development, and their defence capabilities are inadequate. They are in general reluctant to criticise or confront Beijing openly – with the exception of the Philippines and Vietnam, which are in active confrontation with China over maritime disputes. A joint statement after a Japan-ASEAN summit in Tokyo described the two sides as having “agreed to enhance cooperation in ensuring the freedom of overflight and civil aviation safety in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law”, but did not mention China’s ADIZ.  

IV. **The U.S.-Japan Alliance**

The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to both China’s and Japan’s strategic calculations.

A. **China’s Conflicting Goals**

China initially asserted that the U.S. “is not a party in the Diaoyu Islands dispute” and urged it to “not to take sides”.\(^{150}\) Beginning in late 2013 and possibly sensing disharmony in the alliance, Beijing stepped up efforts to persuade Washington that Japan is a liability. Chinese analysts noticed a nuanced difference between U.S. and Japanese positions on China’s ADIZ and asked if this signalled a softening of support for Tokyo.\(^{151}\) Beijing also sought to take advantage of Washington’s ire at Abe’s Yasukuni visit. “It serves the common interests of the Asia-Pacific region, which includes both the U.S. and China, to prevent Abe from leading Japan further down the wrong path”, the Chinese ambassador to Washington said. Defence Minister Chang Wanquan admonished the U.S. to “stay vigilant against Japan’s action and keep it within bounds and not to be permissive and supportive”.\(^{152}\)

Though they exhort the U.S. to bridle Abe’s ambition, Chinese analysts believe Tokyo has been carrying out Washington’s bidding. Some speculated that, while not wanting a conflict, Washington desires controlled tensions between Tokyo and Beijing to facilitate its pivot toward Asia and decelerate China’s rise. Those who hold this view, mainstream in China, see the U.S.-Japan alliance as a principal-agent relationship. They expressed surprise that Washington would “allow” Tokyo to reinterpret its constitution, largely drafted by the U.S. after the Second World War, and speculated that Japan secured permission by advancing Washington’s agenda to contain China. Seeing the alliance as transactional in nature, these analysts are tempted to believe Washington’s support for Tokyo could be bargained away if, for example, Beijing cooperated more on denuclearising North Korea.\(^{153}\)

This interpretation of the U.S.-Japan alliance contributes to conflicting strategic goals. Beijing appears to be pursuing a set of objectives – including eroding Japan’s control over the disputed islands, fending off U.S. strategic advancement in the region, driving a wedge between the allies and preventing Japan from growing its military – that may be mutually exclusive. Feeling pressure from China on the islands dispute, Japan has tightened its alliance with the U.S. and pursued moderate growth in defence capability. Were China actually to succeed in dividing the allies while maintaining pressure on Japan, Tokyo would arguably be compelled to enter an arms race with China.

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\(^{151}\) Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, December 2013, January 2014.

\(^{152}\) [Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.; Abe has become the ‘troublemaker’], op. cit. “Joint Press Conference with Secretary Hagel and Minister Chang in Beijing, China”, op. cit.

\(^{153}\) Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, December, January 2014.
B. Japan’s Deepening Insecurity

Partly due to China’s probing of its alliance with the U.S., Japan’s uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to defence of the Diaoyu/Senkaku group has grown. Although U.S. officials have repeatedly reaffirmed that the 1960 security treaty covers the islands, the U.S. does not take a position on the sovereignty issue. A Japanese official suggested that Washington’s refusal to do so “may have contributed to Chinese opportunism”.154

Tokyo, from the onset of the crisis, also wanted Washington to criticise China’s behaviour more forcefully as provocative. U.S. policymakers, however, sought to communicate commitment to its ally, so as to deter China from testing the alliance, while simultaneously avoiding the appearance of giving Tokyo a blank check to take risks.155 The gap between the allies surfaced in March 2014, when the two countries’ military officials met in Hawaii to review bilateral defence guidelines. The Japanese reportedly wanted to prioritise discussions on China and draft scenarios for responding to “grey zone” incidents, while U.S. officials preferred not to single out China in talks.156 Japanese analysts also took note that U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, departing from Abe’s position, did not demand that China revoke its ADIZ when he visited Beijing in December 2013, instead urging his hosts to “avoid enforcement actions that could lead to crisis”, a request seen in Tokyo as a retreat.157

Any sign of improved relations between the U.S. and China could raise fear of abandonment in Tokyo. “People in Tokyo are too sensitive and insecure about the U.S. They are allergic to any sign of positive development in U.S.-China relations”, said a Japanese analyst specialising on the alliance.158 In November 2013, U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice stated: “When it comes to China, we seek to operationalise a new model of major power relations”.159 It was the first time a high-level U.S. official publicly used that phrase, a signature foreign policy formulation of President Xi.160 It triggered concern in Tokyo that Washington had consented to a “Group of Two” arrangement, in which “China and the U.S. can have direct coordination without consultation with Japan”.161

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158 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, January 2014.
160 U.S. officials had previously avoided the formulation, instead speaking of “a new model of relations between an existing power and an emerging one” and “a new model of relations between the United States and China”. Tom Donilon, national security adviser, “The United States and the Asia Pacific in 2013”, remarks, Asia Society, 11 March 2013; “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping ... after Bilateral Meetings”, White House, 8 June 2013.
161 Crisis Group interview, Japanese security analyst, Tokyo, January 2014.
Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine complicated U.S. strategic interests in the region. These include keeping down Japan-China tensions; encouraging and facilitating a bigger Japanese role in regional and global security; and promoting cooperation between Japan and South Korea, two allies that anchor U.S. power projection in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. embassy in Tokyo released a statement that said Washington was “disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbours”. Some Japanese analysts expressed understanding of that disappointment and took it as a warning that “it is not worthwhile to shed American blood for an irresponsible ally”. Others took offense, saying Washington sent “the wrong message”, both angering the Japanese public and encouraging Beijing.

Overall, however, China’s apparent testing of the alliance has pushed Washington to give more assurance to its ally. U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo Caroline Kennedy called Japan “our most valued partner” and said “the U.S.-Japan relationship is not defined or dictated by China’s actions”. During an April 2014 visit to Tokyo, Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to state that Article 5 of the security treaty “covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands”. A joint statement following that visit said the U.S. and Japan “share strong concern over recent actions that have raised tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea, such as the uncoordinated declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea”. It added that the two countries “are strengthening and modernising our security alliance” in response to “the common security challenges our two countries face”.

The U.S. and Japan have begun taking steps to upgrade the alliance. In October 2013, their diplomatic and military chiefs met together for the first time in Tokyo and agreed to undertake a year-long initiative to rewrite their guidelines for bilateral defence cooperation, a process that had taken place only twice before in over half a

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162 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Chidorigafuchi, the Tokyo cemetery for Japan’s unidentified war dead, in October 2013. An unnamed U.S. official called it “the closest equivalent” to the Arlington National Cemetery for U.S. war dead. The gesture and Arlington reference were a rebuke to Abe, who had equated Yasukuni to Arlington in an earlier interview, and were seen as attempts to dissuade him from visiting Yasukuni. According to a Japanese analyst, however, the high-profile gesture “made Abe lose face” and hardened his resolve to visit the shrine. “Japan is Back: A Conversation With Shinzo Abe”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013; “Kerry, Hagel visit Chidorigafuchi to diminish Yasukuni”, Agence France-Presse-Jiji, 3 October 2013; Crisis Group interview, Washington, January 2014.
164 “When Caroline Kennedy was named ambassador [to Japan], there was a Kennedy fever in Japan. Now the fever is gone”, a Japanese analyst remarked about the embassy statement on Abe’s Yasukuni visit. Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, January 2014. A special adviser to Abe criticised the U.S. on YouTube, saying “it is our side that was disappointed”, with Washington’s attitude, and charging that past Republican administrations would not have responded in such a fashion. “Abe aide takes aim at U.S. over response to Yasukuni visit”, Kyodo, 18 January 2014.
century. As a result of their agreement, the U.S. has deployed two Global Hawk drones – its most advanced long-distance surveillance aircraft – to Japan. Other military assets to be sent to Japan include F-35 joint strike fighters, new ballistic missile radars and two naval destroyers equipped with missile defence systems.\(^{168}\) Said in part to “strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States” and “[elevate] the effectiveness … and deterrence” of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the Japanese Cabinet in July 2014 reinterpreted the country’s constitution and lifted its ban on collective self-defence, allowing the SDF to aid a foreign country “in a close relationship” with Japan.\(^{169}\) Washington strongly supports this move, as Japan’s self-imposed ban on exercising the right to collective self-defence “has for decades been seen as a major obstacle to expanded and more effective alliance cooperation”.\(^{170}\)


\(^{169}\) The right to collective self-defence is allowed under the following conditions: an armed attack “threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness”; there are no other means to repel the attack; and the use of force is limited to the “minimum extent necessary”. “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People”, press release, Japanese foreign ministry, 1 July 2014.

\(^{170}\) Adam P. Liff, “Watch this space: ‘collective self-defense,’ constitutional reinterpretation, and Japan’s security policy”, PacNet, Number 48, Pacific Forum CSIS, 26 June 2014.
V. The Theatres

For now, a premeditated military conflict initiated by either side appears unlikely, but risks of an accidental clash, spanning three main theatres, remain high.

A. Diaoyu/Senkaku Patrols

1. “Game of Chicken”

Chinese law enforcement vessels patrolled around the disputed islands 50 times in 2013, on average about once a week. The newly created China Coast Guard (CCG) sent patrol boats into the territorial waters for the first time on 26 July 2013. Typically, three or four such vessels circle the outer rim of the territorial sea. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrols the waters continuously. The two sides mostly maintain a safe distance but radio each other to assert sovereignty and demand that the other leave. “There is a tacit understanding to avoid any collision or conflict, but that’s not a result of discussions or negotiations”, a Chinese maritime strategist said.

The situation becomes more complicated and riskier when fishing boats enter. Both sides largely leave regular fishing boats alone, though the JCG uses “speakers, horns and other sound devices” to try to warn off Chinese fishermen who come into the territorial sea. When fishing boats carrying Japanese nationalist activists appeared in the disputed waters, however, Chinese patrols chased them, prompting the JCG to cut in between; at times the two sides were within ten metres of each other. On 23 April 2013, ten Chinese patrol boats chased ten Japanese fishing vessels, and in August, Chinese vessels tailed Japanese fishermen for more than 28 hours until the latter exited the area.

Both sides recognise that situations like these are highly risky, but accuse the other of behaving irresponsibly. “In violation of international navigation rules, Japan has used dangerous and prohibited manoeuvres such as cutting across [the paths of Chinese vessels] and pincer moves in close distances multiple times together with provocative actions such as illuminating [Chinese vessels] with bright lights”, according to the Chinese account. “We are doing a game of chicken, and it’s always the Japan side averting first. China never does it”, said a Japanese official.

Risky behaviour by law enforcement vessels largely ceased in the second half of 2013. Since October of that year, China has also reduced the frequency of patrols in the territorial sea of the disputed islands, instead increasing its law enforcement.
presence in the contiguous zone, twelve to 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline, potentially signalling a desire to lower risk of collision.\textsuperscript{177}

The change in behaviour coincided with the emergence of a domestic consensus to modify China’s principal objective from pushing for more gains to focusing on preserving those already made. Participants at a conference of leading Chinese analysts in September 2013 agreed that China had succeeded in ending Japan’s exclusive control of the islands and establishing regular Chinese patrols. They argued that the more urgent task had become “managing the risk of collision by the two countries’ law enforcement vessels”\textsuperscript{178}. Such thinking likely reflects a calculation that keeping the dispute out of the spotlight might desensitise global opinion and create de facto international acceptance of a new status quo in China’s favour, but a collision would undermine those goals.

2. Capability Race

If Beijing continues using its comprehensive national strength to calibrate the intensity with which it asserts maritime claims, it cannot be ruled out that it will eventually push for more control over the disputed islands and ultimately to exclude Japan. The “blowout style” expansion and upgrading of China’s maritime law enforcement capabilities, said to be justified by “a dire situation in safeguarding China’s maritime rights”, could be part of the preparation for such an eventuality.\textsuperscript{179}

Created in March 2013 by combining four maritime law enforcement agencies, the CCG has been configured as an armed police force (武警), or paramilitary. Its more than 16,000 personnel have been reclassified from public servants to active-duty service members, which means the CCG can arm them and their vessels, likely with “expelling weaponry such as small arms and large water cannons”.\textsuperscript{180} In 2014, in addition to an unknown number of decommissioned naval vessels, the CCG has twenty new vessels of 3,000-tonnes or above under construction, including two in the 10,000-tonne class. By 2015, it is likely to have more than 50 vessels of 1,000 tons or above. With this rapidly growing capability, the agency aims to do “all weather” patrols in “sensitive areas”, likely a reference to disputed waters in both the East and South China Seas.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{177} Taylor Fravel and Alastair Iain Johnson, “Chinese signalling in the East China Sea?”, The Washington Post, 12 April, 2014. See Appendix B for China’s law enforcement patrols around Diaoyu/Senkaku.

\textsuperscript{178} “中国周边环境变化与外交应对——第一期国研沙龙综述”, 国际问题研究, 中国国际问题研究所 [“Changes in China’s periphery and diplomatic responses – summary of the first ‘International Relations Research Symposium’”, China International Studies, China Institute of International Studies], 30 September 2013.


\textsuperscript{180} The CCG reportedly pushed to become a full military force but did not gain State Council approval. Crisis Group interviews, Chinese scholar and official, December 2013 and February 2014. “中国海警局编制确定超1.6万名”, 财新网 [“China Coast Guard configured, has more than 16k service members”, caixin.com], 9 July 2013.

The CCG is also rapidly ramping up its aerial law enforcement capability. Chinese maritime law enforcement commissioned its first plane in 2005 and had ten by mid-2013. The capability is expected to have “grown multifold” by 2015, including by addition of aircraft capable of flying at least 4,500 km and more advanced ship-borne aerial patrol equipment. “By 2020, aircraft of different types, different ranges and different applications will become an irreplaceable maritime law enforcement force.”182 Except for one entry by a Chinese plane in December 2013, the air space above the Diaoyu/Senkaku group is patrolled regularly only by the SDF. It cannot be ruled out, however, that China will begin to contend for aerial control over the islands. If Beijing does send patrol aircraft or “treat[s] the air space as its sovereign space and implements ADIZ rules, it will be a nightmare”, a Japanese security analyst said.183 Both sides would take enforcement measures, including interception and forced landing, potentially leading to a clash in the air where response times, unlike at sea, are measured in split seconds.

The JCG, likewise, has been building up its capability for the long-term defence of the islands. It received a budget of 183.4 billion Yen ($1.79 billion) for fiscal 2014, a 5.5 per cent increase, owing to a government consensus that improvement was needed due to the Chinese challenge. The JCG plans to create a special unit with 626 personnel to guard the islands. Ten large patrol vessels will be built, and two capable of carrying helicopters will be renovated by the end of fiscal 2015. Four of the new vessels are scheduled to enter service in 2014. To respond to “more urgent situations”, such as unusual numbers of Chinese vessels, the JCG also plans to build an additional six large and four medium-sized patrol boats and upgrade two existing vessels capable of carrying helicopters to back up the special unit.184

B. **PLA Exercises**

A more dangerous cause of potential clashes is the two sides’ starkly different views on rules of encounters and operations during military exercises. The PLA navy – quickening its development of far-sea capabilities – has expanded the frequency and range of its exercises in the Pacific Ocean, so it comes into more frequent contact with the SDF, which views Chinese naval exercises on the high seas as intelligence opportunities. The PLA navy is reportedly mandated to send each of its three fleets into the Western Pacific, beyond the first island chain, at least once a year.185 Actual exercises have been much more frequent: between October 2012 and October 2013, for example, monthly.186

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182 [“中国海监直升机深圳首飞”, Guangzhou Daily], 16 April 2005.
183 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, January 2014.
184 [“平成26年度海上保安庁関係予算決定概要”, press release, Japan Coast Guard, December 2014.
186 [“专家: 三大舰队齐赴西太演习 瓦解岛链封锁”, 81.cn], 30 October 2013.
Beijing considers its naval exercise areas, including those on the high seas or in a country’s exclusive economic zone, off-limits to vessels not involved. Thus in May 2014, for example, the China Maritime Safety Administration issued a notice on PLA exercises in the East China Sea that gave the coordinates of the designated area and stated that “all extraneous vessels are forbidden from entering”, and those that pass nearby “shall stay away from the exercise area or avoid passage during the exercises”.187

Japan, like the U.S., does not recognise such limitations. “The PLA has the freedom to conduct drills. The JSDF has the right to spy on the drills and conduct surveillance”, a former senior SDF officer said. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) explicitly regulates peacetime intelligence collection in only one circumstance: ships conducting innocent passage through a coastal state’s territorial sea may not commit “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coast state”. Chinese analysts acknowledge the “no-sail” notice has no basis in international law, so is not legally binding, but say, “it’s similar to a construction site where there are signs for people with no relevant business to stay away. If a brick falls and hurts someone who enters the area despite the warning, then the owner is not accountable”188.

Underlying conflicting interpretation of rules of engagement are capability asymmetry and corresponding tactical choices. Japan and the U.S. often argue that intelligence gathering was common between their navies and the Soviet Union’s during the Cold War and Russia’s now, and both the surveillance fleet and the party under surveillance have safety responsibilities. The U.S. and Japan signed agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent incidents at sea. They required surveillance ships to maintain a safe distance, prohibited both sides from interfering in the “formations” of the other or simulating attacks and required “aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party.”189

Although the PLA has been recorded conducting occasional surveillance over the U.S. navy, it is not yet equipped to do so regularly on Japanese or U.S. naval drills, “so we don’t want them to do that to us”, said a Chinese analyst.190 Remaining unpredictable and occasionally provocative helps the PLA bridge the capability gap and deter rivals seeking to gather intelligence.

Japan takes some heed: “During the Cold War, when the JSDF conducted surveillance against the Soviet navy, we kept a minimum 2,000 yards from Soviet ships. We now stay further away from Chinese ships, adding about 50 per cent of margin, so we stay about 3,000 yards away”.191 Still, friction between exercising Chinese fleets

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190 Crisis Group interview, Chinese maritime strategist, Beijing, December 2013. For example, on 26 October 2006, a Chinese Song submarine shadowed the USS Kitty Hawk and surfaced about five miles from it. The carrier battle group was conducting routine exercises near Okinawa. In October 2008, two Chinese submarines were detected on underwater surveillance of the USS George Washington off the South Korean coast. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone”, in Peter Dutton (ed.), Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Common (Newport, 2010), p. 32.
191 Crisis Group interview, former senior SDF officer, Tokyo, January 2014.
and spying navies has led to multiple hair-raising encounters, some predating recent tensions. In May 2013, during a China-Russia combined exercise, Chinese fighters came within 50 metres of a Japanese surveillance plane and 30 metres of a Japanese electronic intelligence plane. China accused Japan of “scouting and interfering with” the exercise and said, “Chinese war planes were scrambled to take necessary identification and preventative measures to ensure the safety of the warships and aircraft taking part in the drills”. Japan said its planes were conducting routine early warning and surveillance, without a specific target, and the Chinese fighters came out of their training area.

C. ADIZ Enforcement

There has been an alarming rise in close and dangerous encounters between Chinese and Japanese military aircraft over the East China Sea since November 2013. After the incident during the China-Russia combined exercise, the sides traded blame on more near misses, charging the other with provocative and dangerous behaviour. China, in May 2013, accused Japan of “long-time close-in tracking and monitoring for ten-odd times on ... Chinese aircraft which were on patrol missions”, and said planes came within about ten metres on the day China announced its ADIZ. In June 2014, Japan said Chinese fighters flew “abnormally close” to SDF reconnaissance planes “carrying out regular warning and surveillance”. China called the allegation “groundless”, and said Japanese fighters “flew very close to and followed the Chinese aircraft [on] routine patrol missions”.

Most of these incidents took place within the overlapping portion of the two countries’ ADIZs, where both assert the right to patrol, monitor and scramble against incoming foreign aircraft. For Japan, when unidentified foreign planes enter its ADIZ, the SDF scrambles fighters that monitor the incoming aircraft and can “issue warnings and force them to land” if they enter Japanese airspace. Scrambles against Chinese aircraft have steadily increased, from less than 50 in 2008 to over 400 in 2013, as China has “expanded its operational areas, and diversified its flight patterns”.

According to the Chinese defence ministry, “it is necessary for the Chinese military to dispatch fighters to identify the foreign military aircraft which enter the East China Sea ADIZ”. The PLA is said to “selectively intercept” unidentified incoming foreign aircraft “that are considered to pose a threat”. By December 2013, it had “established comprehensive monitoring and supervision” over the ADIZ, identified nearly 800 entries by foreign military aircraft and dispatched 87 reconnaissance,

192 See Appendix C for a list of such close encounters in recent years.
195 Richard C. Bush, op. cit., p. 68.
196 “China’s activities surrounding Japan’s airspace”, press release, Japanese defence ministry.
197 “DM spokesman: China has conclusive evidence on Japan’s jets’ risky actions”, op. cit. Crisis Group interview, Chinese analyst, Beijing, February 2014.
early-warning and fighter planes on 51 response missions. The overlapping activities without agreed rules of operations and in a period of heightened mutual suspicion are highly risky. “If China scrambles fighters [against Japanese aircraft], Japan will scramble fighters, and [this] could lead to a crash”, Japanese security analysts noted.198

VI. Risk Management

A. Barriers

Before the islands dispute, China and Japan had made progress on negotiations over management of future maritime crises. In mid-2012, they reached basic agreements on a defence communication mechanism, featuring a code of communications at sea, a hotline and regular policy dialogues between defence ministries. It was scheduled to be implemented by year’s end but was shelved after Japan’s islands purchase. The two had also held a first round of talks on a multi-agency communications mechanism for maritime law enforcement, militaries and foreign ministries in May 2012. These were likewise suspended after the purchase. Japan has since repeatedly asked China to resume both processes. Beijing has declined, saying “the [political] environment does not allow” such talks.199

The frosty environment is the biggest barrier to meaningful bilateral engagement on crisis management, especially formulation of a code of conduct around the islands. “Without Japan admitting that islands are disputed, what’s there to talk about?”, asked a Chinese strategist. Japan has its own reservations. “If we talk about crisis management with China near Senkaku, China could take it as Japan admitting the dispute and request that Japan reduce its patrol vessels. We can never do that”, a defence strategist said. Japan similarly worries that talks on rules of engagement in airspace could be viewed as recognising China’s ADIZ.200

Without clear operational instructions, China’s stress on both maintaining stability and safeguarding maritime rights could also amplify risk. With relations under duress, law enforcement and military personnel on the spot might well emphasise defence of national sovereignty rather than preserving diplomatic relations. Expounding on the balance between priorities, the head of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration stressed “resolutely safeguarding national maritime rights and interests”. When frontline agents act assertively, even provocatively, they are hailed as national heroes, as was the case with the trawler captain who rammed two JCG vessels and those involved in the near-collision with the USS Cowpens.201 Such events may serve as examples to emulate rather than as cautionary tales.

B. Opportunities

There is room to create communications channels and protocols without touching on sovereignty. The JCG and CCG radio each other at the scene via an international channel, but do so mostly to assert sovereignty and demand the other leave. More coordination is needed, such as better bilingual capability, complemented by sign language, to ensure clear communication of intent during an emergency.

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199 Crisis Group interviews, Japanese officials, Beijing, Tokyo, January 2014.
200 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, December 2013, Tokyo, January 2014.
201 “海洋局: 统筹维权维稳关系 坚决维护国家海洋权益”, 中国新闻网 [“SOA: Plan as a whole the relations between maintaining stability and safeguarding rights; resolutely safeguard national maritime rights and interests”, chinanews.com], 16 January 2014. “英雄船长回家 乡亲们铺‘金光大道’迎詹哥” [“Hero captain returns home, villagers pave ‘golden road’ to welcome brother Zhan”], bbs.tiexue.net, 27 September 2010. “‘考本斯’号专门监视中国军舰 美是恶人先告状”, 环球时报 [“Cowpens’ specialises on spying Chinese military vessels, the U.S. is the villain who sues his victim”], Global Times, 12 December 2013.
The JCG and CCG lack a headquarters-level direct channel, so emergency communications are likely to be delayed, as shown in January 2014, when on request from the Taiwanese rescue headquarters, the JCG saved a Chinese activist who had failed to land on a Diaoyu/Senkaku island. It informed the National Security Council, which coordinated a response and instructed the foreign ministry to contact its Chinese counterpart. The communications path in China is unknown, but eventually the JCG handed the activist over to a CCG vessel. In a tenser case, such a roundabout communications route might cause delay and confusion.

As consolidation of Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies proceeds and CCG configuration takes shape, “the JCG at least knows who its counterpart is”, and opportunity exists for the agencies to establish a channel that could be activated in an emergency. However, there is still organisational ambiguity on the Chinese side, as the CCG is under both the State Oceanic Administration and the public security ministry, with the latter said to provide operational guidance.

Crisis management outside territorial waters has more room to progress, as it does not have as many sovereignty implications, but political consideration pose a major challenge. Yoji Koda, ex-commander in chief of Japan’s navy, who has led a delegation of retired senior officers to Beijing for three years to engage the PLA, foreign and defence ministry officials and scholars on maritime crisis management, said, “I think the Chinese side is more serious about crisis management. I believe that some military researchers we met have started to convey the message to higher-ups”. A Japanese defence analyst agreed that some PLA officers had expressed willingness to establish a maritime communications mechanism, but added that the Chinese insist on “political confidence” as the precondition. “For China, such things are political activities, and there are political risks for PLA interlocutors”. The Chinese defence ministry in May reiterated that talks on prevention of incidents at sea “need a certain environment and atmosphere”.

Engagement in multilateral settings can blunt the political risks that inhibit participants in bilateral talks and has paid moderate dividends. At the April 2014 biennial meeting of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in the Chinese port city Qingdao, 25 nations, including Japan, the U.S. and China, adopted a non-binding Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), after Beijing ended years of objection. It creates a communications protocol between naval ships and aircraft and advises naval commanders to avoid dangerous actions such as shining lights on a ship’s bridge or an aircraft’s cockpit, or simulating attacks by aiming guns, missiles or fire-control radar at another country’s vessel. China’s desire for a result as host was said to have contributed to the agreement.

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203 Crisis Group interview, Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2014.
204 “China to restructure oceanic administration, enhance maritime law enforcement”, Xinhua, 10 March 2013.
205 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, January 2014. “国防部：中方掌握日军机危险行为确凿证据” [“DM spokesman: China has conclusive evidences on Japan’s jets’ risky actions”], op. cit.
CUES’ impact is still unclear. Soon after adoption, a Chinese naval officer suggested implementation would be subject to bilateral negotiations.\(^{207}\) It does not apply to coast guards or other non-military government vessels; nor has it prevented close encounters between PLA and SDF aircraft since its adoption. However, a Chinese naval training taskforce conducted a joint exercise with Indonesia in June, focusing on communications, formation change and other subjects in a simulated unplanned encounter, all according to CUES.\(^{208}\) At a minimum, CUES demonstrates China’s increased awareness of the danger of unwanted clashes, a subtle change in attitude toward crisis management that has been lauded: “There no longer is a mainstream view that CBMs [confidence-building measures] are only good as political leverage to extract concessions, or that there will be no incident as long as there is no political intention to create one.”\(^{209}\)

Efforts to engage on crisis management should continue. Particular focus should be placed on clarifying and reviewing CUES implementation and establishing a coast guard communications protocol and effective JCG-CCG headquarters-level links.

With Japan having set up its National Security Council in December 2013 and China its National Security Commission in January 2014, a hotline could offer effective crisis communications.\(^{210}\) Both have direct access to top leadership and authority to coordinate foreign affairs and security agencies. Although a hotline might appear premature to some – for example, those in China who believe that “there needs to be political trust” first – third-party-hosted symposiums and multilateral forums might plant the seed.\(^{211}\) Creativity would also be needed, as the agencies have quite different configurations. Japan’s is led by Shotaro Yachi, former vice foreign minister and long-time Abe adviser, China’s by President Xi. But creating an equivalent-level hotline is a challenge that should not stop efforts.

The APEC summit China is to host in November is another opportunity. Chinese analysts have indicated that Beijing is keen for a success and eager to avoid any display of tensions between Xi and Abe.\(^{212}\) Visits have picked up since spring and may indicate a mutual desire to mend ties, or at least stem deterioration.\(^{213}\) A Xi-Abe

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\(^{208}\) “Chinese and foreign navies carry out first CUES joint drill”, press release, Chinese defence ministry, 9 June 2014.

\(^{209}\) Crisis Group email correspondence, scholar at European think tank that has hosted maritime crisis management symposiums with officials, including Chinese and Japanese, April 2014.


\(^{211}\) Crisis Group interview, Chinese analyst, Beijing, February 2014.

\(^{212}\) Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, April 2014.

meeting during APEC that expresses, even in general terms, willingness to ease tensions, could create space for other officials, line agencies and non-official entities to act to repair ties. For this to happen, the two sides need to quarantine the island issue de facto and avoid making political capital over it.

China should refrain from escalating its presence in contested waters and airspace, which means not sending larger-than-usual fleets, not staying longer than usual in the territorial sea, not chasing Japanese fishing boats and not dispatching aircraft (including drones) near or into the airspace. If there is an incident, Japan should rely on diplomatic channels to communicate with China and at least initially refrain from going to the press. Most importantly, both should clearly instruct their maritime agencies to avoid a clash or any other conflict at all times.

The Abe government needs to put history issues to rest. Abe should not visit the Yasukuni Shrine again as prime minister and privately inform Beijing of this intent, as well as not make comments that could be seen as departing from the Murayama Statement. At the 15 August memorial ceremony, he should reinstitute the tradition of apologising for the wartime damage Japan inflicted upon Asian nations. He should also prevent conservative associates from making revisionist comments, and if they do, swiftly denounce the comments. China should refrain from using history to pressure Japan and arouse domestic nationalism. In the long term, it should define the terms of an apology it would accept, thus starting the process of removing history as a relations flashpoint and enabling lasting reconciliation.

Japan in June. Teddy Ng, “Japan can choose to be ally or threat, says China’s ex-foreign minister”, South China Morning Post, 5 June 2014.
VII. Conclusion

The islands dispute that ignited this prolonged confrontation remains deadlocked, with positions wide apart and no bridge in sight. Beijing demands that Japan accept a new status quo that acknowledges China’s claim and partial control of the island group. Tokyo insists on restoring its sole administration of the islands, as well as removal of Chinese patrols. New flashpoints have further strained ties. China’s declaration of an ADIZ above the East China Sea deepened Japanese suspicion. Abe’s Yasukuni visit and statements that appeared to retreat from Japan’s apology for war atrocities reopened an old wound and further constricted room for diplomacy.

With deepening mistrust and dwindling political will, both sides have increasingly turned to security measures. Japan is reorienting its defence and building capability to defend remote islands on its south-western flank. China continues double-digit annual military budget growth favouring the navy, air force and missiles, thus accelerating offshore power projection. All this institutionalises strategic antagonisms that tend to make threat perceptions self-fulfilling prophecies.

Although there is no sign either side plans a military offense, risk of unplanned clashes spans three theatres: the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands; high seas in the Western Pacific; and airspace of the East China Sea. Encounters between patrol boats near disputed islands appear to be controlled, but the situation becomes much more volatile when fishing boats enter the area. As the PLA increases its blue-water capabilities and expands activities in the Western Pacific, it comes into frequent contact with the SDF on patrol or reconnaissance missions. Due to the starkly different interpretations of rules of engagement and deep mutual suspicions, such encounters are a major source of friction and potential danger. With overlapping ADIZs, the East China Sea’s airspace has seen an alarming rise in close encounters between military aircraft.

Barriers to reaching clear rules of engagement are significant, but opportunities exist. China’s awareness of the danger of accidental clashes and desire to avoid them appears to be growing. Capitalising on this requires continued bilateral and third-party engagement on crisis management. It also requires détente between Beijing and Tokyo to make room for such engagement. The next APEC summit gives the two leaders a chance to meet and set the tone for the bilateral relationship to recover. They should seize it.

Beijing/ Tokyo/Brussels/, 24 July 2014
Appendix A: ADIZs of China, Japan and South Korea
On 8 December 2008, two Chinese law enforcement vessels entered the territorial waters of Diaoyu/Senkaku, marking the first Chinese patrol in the area on record. Between then and September 2012, Chinese patrol vessels entered the territorial sea in December 2008 (twice), August 2011 (twice), March 2012 (once) and July 2012 (four times). “中国公船等による尖閣諸島周辺の接続水域内入域及び領海侵入隻数（月別）” [“Number of Chinese public service vessels entering territorial waters and contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands (monthly)"], press release, Japan Coast Guard, updated 30 June 2014.
## Chinese patrol vessels entering the contiguous zone per month

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Vessels Entering Contiguous Zone</th>
<th>Per Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>104</td>
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<td></td>
<td>June</td>
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<td>October</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>January</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February</td>
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<td>April</td>
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<tr>
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<td>May</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Close Encounters between the PLA and SDF in Recent Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Chinese statement</th>
<th>Japanese statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>High seas within the East China Sea</td>
<td>Japan said PLA helicopters twice flew within 90 metres of SDF destroyers.</td>
<td>&quot;China conducts normal military exercises on the high seas in accordance with international laws and norms&quot;.</td>
<td>&quot;The Japanese were conducting necessary monitoring ... actions were not particularly dangerous, nor were they illegal&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>High seas within the East China Sea</td>
<td>Japan said PLA frigates twice locked fire-control radars onto a SDF helicopter and a destroyer.</td>
<td>&quot;Fire control radar was not used ... Japan has repeatedly spread false accusation[s]&quot;.</td>
<td>&quot;It could have put us in a very grave situation if things went wrong&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 November 2013</td>
<td>In China's newly announced ADIZ, which overlaps Japan's.</td>
<td>China said two SDF fighters tracked a patrolling PLA transport aircraft and flew within 10 metres of it.</td>
<td>&quot;Japanese military aircraft made dangerous close-in flight[s]&quot;.</td>
<td>&quot;China's claim is untrue as we always make sure to take strict safety measures&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 May 2014</td>
<td>Overlapping portion of China and Japan’s ADIZs.</td>
<td>Japan said Chinese fighters flew “abnormally close” to SDF reconnaissance aircraft.</td>
<td>&quot;Japan’s military airplanes ... [were] intruding into the airspace of China-Russia naval drill and making dangerous movements&quot;.</td>
<td>&quot;We perform ordinary surveillance operations ... incidents did not occur in the area where China and Russia were conducting exercises&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June 2014</td>
<td>Likely overlapping portion of China and Japan’s ADIZs.</td>
<td>China revealed footage of a pair of Japanese F-15 fighters closely tailing a Chinese Tu-154.</td>
<td>&quot;What Japanese pilots had done [was] dangerous and provocative&quot;.</td>
<td>&quot;Japan’s SDF aircraft [were] making scrambles appropriately in line with international rules&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June 2014</td>
<td>Overlapping portion of China and Japan’s ADIZs.</td>
<td>Japan said two Chinese fighters flew “dangerously close” to Japanese reconnaissance aircraft.</td>
<td>&quot;The Chinese pilots’ operations [were] professional and standard with restraint&quot;.</td>
<td>&quot;The SDF pilots felt endangered by the manner of flight the Chinese fighter made&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


[9] Ibid.


[14] “DM: China blames Japan for hyping up ‘close encounter’ of military aircraft”, press release, Chinese defence ministry, 12 June 2014. China said the incident took place within its ADIZ. Japan’s defence minister said he could not determine the location and timing of the incident from the video. However, the fact that Japan scrambled its fighters suggests that it took place in the overlapping portion of the ADIZs. “Press conference by Defense Minister Onodera”, press release, Japanese defence ministry, 13 June 2014.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.


[19] Ibid.


Appendix D: About the International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 125 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, and Dean of Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po), Ghassan Salamé. Mr Salamé also serves as the organisation’s Acting President from 1 July-31 August 2014.

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Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices or representation in 26 locations: Baghdad/Suleimaniya, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Dubai, Gaza City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Kabul, London, Mexico City, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Seoul, Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington DC. Crisis Group currently covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela.

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Appendix E: Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2011

As of 1 October 2013, Central Asia publications are listed under the Europe and Central Asia program.

North East Asia

China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea, Asia Report N°200, 27 January 2011 (also available in Chinese).

Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South, Asia Report N°208, 14 July 2011 (also available in Korean).

South Korea: The Shifting Sands of Security Policy, Asia Briefing N°130, 1 December 2011.

Stirring up the South China Sea (I), Asia Report N°223, 23 April 2012 (also available in Chinese).

Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses, Asia Report N°229, 24 July 2012 (also available in Chinese).


China’s Central Asia Problem, Asia Report N°244, 27 February 2013 (also available in Chinese).


Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close, Asia Report N°254, 9 December 2013 (also available in Chinese).

South Asia


Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate, Asia Briefing N°117, 23 February 2011.


Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°120, 7 April 2011 (also available in Nepali).


Pakistan: No End To Humanitarian Crises, Asia Report N°237, 9 October 2012.


Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition, Asia Report N°256, 12 May 2014.


Afghanistan’s Parties in Transition, Asia Briefing N°141, 26 June 2013.


Women and Conflict in Afghanistan, Asia Report N°249, 18 September 2013.


Aid and Conflict in Pakistan, Asia Report N°227, 27 June 2012.


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Pakistan: The Shifting Sands of Security Policy, Asia Briefing N°130, 1 December 2011.

Stirring up the South China Sea (I), Asia Report N°223, 23 April 2012 (also available in Chinese).

Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses, Asia Report N°229, 24 July 2012 (also available in Chinese).


China’s Central Asia Problem, Asia Report N°244, 27 February 2013 (also available in Chinese).


Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close, Asia Report N°254, 9 December 2013 (also available in Chinese).


Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition, Asia Report N°256, 12 May 2014.

Education Reform in Pakistan, Asia Report N°257, 23 June 2014.
South East Asia


Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape, Asia Briefing N°118, 7 March 2011 (also available in Chinese and Burmese).

The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°119, 24 March 2011.

Thailand: The Calm Before Another Storm?, Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 (also available in Chinese and Thai).

Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return from Indonesia, Asia Briefing N°122, 18 April 2011 (also available in Indonesian).


Indonesia: Gam vs Gam in the Aceh Elections, Asia Briefing N°123, 15 June 2011.

Indonesia: Debate over a New Intelligence Bill, Asia Briefing N°124, 12 July 2011.

The Philippines: A New Strategy for Peace in Mindanao?, Asia Briefing N°125, 3 August 2011.

Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in Papua, Asia Briefing N°126, 22 August 2011.

Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, Asia Briefing N°127, 22 September 2011 (also available in Burmese and Chinese).

Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon, Asia Briefing N°128, 4 October 2011.

Timor-Leste’s Veterans: An Unfinished Struggle?, Asia Briefing N°129, 18 November 2011.


Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict, Asia Report N°215, 6 December 2011 (also available in Chinese).

Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon, Asia Briefing N°132, 26 January 2012.

Indonesia: Cautious Calm in Ambon, Asia Briefing N°133, 15 February 2012.

Indonesia: The Deadly Cost of Poor Policing, Asia Report N°218, 16 February 2012 (also available in Indonesian).


Indonesia: Averting Election Violence in Aceh, Asia Briefing N°135, 29 February 2012.

Reform in Myanmar: One Year On, Asia Briefing N°136, 11 April 2012 (also available in Burmese and Chinese).


How Indonesian Extremists Regroup, Asia Report N°226, 16 July 2012 (also available in Indonesian).


Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua, Asia Report N°232, 8 August 2012 (also available in Indonesian).

Indonesia: Defying the State, Asia Briefing N°138, 30 August 2012.


Indonesia: Tensions Over Aceh’s Flag, Asia Briefing N°139, 7 May 2013.


A Tentative Peace in Myanmar’s Kachin Conflict, Asia Briefing N°140, 12 June 2013 (also available in Burmese and Chinese).


The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar, Asia Report N°251, 1 October 2013 (also available in Burmese and Chinese).

Not a Rubber Stamp: Myanmar’s Legislature in a Time of Transition, Asia Briefing N°142, 13 December 2013 (also available in Burmese and Chinese).

Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?, Asia Briefing N°143, 22 April 2014 (also available in Burmese).

Counting the Costs: Myanmar’s Problematic Census, Asia Briefing N°144, 15 May 2014 (also available in Burmese).
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