



DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
STRANDGADE 56 • 1401 COPENHAGEN K • DENMARK
TEL +45 32 69 87 87 • diis@diis.dk • www.diis.dk

**CAN NEPAD SUCCEED WITHOUT
PRIOR POLITICAL REFORM?**

Ian Taylor

DIIS Working Paper no 2005/23

© Copenhagen 2005

Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS

Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark

Ph: +45 32 69 87 87

Fax: +45 32 69 87 00

E-mails: diis@diis.dk

Web: www.diis.dk

Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler

Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi as

ISBN: 87-7605-112-9

Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included)

DIIS publications can be downloaded

free of charge from www.diis.dk

Ian Taylor, Dr., Lecturer at University of St. Andrews, Department for International Relations

CONTENTS

Nepad Elites and their Democratic Qualifications	4
The African Peer Review Mechanism.....	10
The Great Retreat	13
Concluding Remarks	19
Bibliography.....	23

Can NEPAD Succeed without prior Political Reform?

Ian Taylor

The New Partnership for Africa's Development or Nepad has been enthusiastically pushed by a select number of countries in Africa, as well as by the G-8, as a means to stimulate what has been termed the "African Renaissance" (see www.uneca.org/nepad/nepad.pdf). Nepad was launched in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001; it arose from the mandate granted to five African heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) by the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) to work out a development program to spearhead Africa's renewal.

Nepad has succeeded in placing the question of Africa's development onto the international table and has managed to obtain a fairly high profile and awareness. In doing this, Nepad has claimed to be a political and economic program aimed at promoting democracy, stability, good governance, human rights, and economic development on the continent. Nepad has been essentially sold as a bargain: African countries will set up and police standards of good government across the continent – whilst respecting human rights and advancing democracy – in return for increased aid flows, private investment and a lowering of obstacles to trade by the West. An extra inflow of \$64 billion from the developed world has been touted as the "reward" for following approved policies on governance and economics.

In essence, Nepad is a project that places at the heart of the continent's renewal Africa's presidents. Indeed, Paragraph 1 of Nepad opens with the statement that 'This New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development'. Paragraph 6 follows with the assertion that 'What is required... is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort and poverty eradication'.

Bearing in mind that many countries have been independent for over forty years, and perhaps seeking to pre-empt the question as to why is it only now that the elites seemingly recognize

that they have duties to their constituents, Paragraph 42 declares that 'there is today a new set of circumstances' which make Nepad and responsible leadership possible. This new set of circumstances is stated in Paragraph 44 where it is claimed that 'the numbers of democratically elected leaders are on the increase. Through their actions, [such elites] have declared that the hopes of Africa's peoples for a better life can no longer rest on the magnanimity of others'. And Paragraph 45 makes the assertion that 'backed by the African Union (AU), which has shown a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from the norm' Africa's leaders have turned the corner.

A great deal of expectations have been raised about the possibilities opened up by Nepad, particularly with regard to the promise to develop a credible peer review process to advance democracy and good government in Africa.¹ Much of this, I would argue, is unrealistic – the logic and modus operandi of neo-patrimonial rule and the dominance and nature of extractive economies in Africa – and their relationships with the international system – means that Nepad's strictures on good governance and democracy cannot be implemented without eroding the very nature of the post-colonial African state and undermining the positions of incumbent elites – an unlikely possibility. Such realities, I argue, have already derailed Nepad's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the cornerstone of the whole project in many observers' eyes and the key ingredient of Nepad as it was sold to ostensible partners.

What is argued is that Nepad (and studies endorsing its credibility) ignore the reality that power in African politics must be understood as the utilization of patronage and clientelism and operates within neo-patrimonial modes of governance, which is the antithesis of Nepad's own vision for Africa. Indeed, in spite of the façade of the modern state, which is taken as Nepad's starting point, power in most African polities progresses informally, between patron and client along lines of political reciprocity, is intensely personalized and is not exercised on behalf of the general public good. 'The state itself remains the major vortex of political conflict precisely because it presides over the allocation off strategic resources and opportunities for profit making' (Othman, 1989: 114).

The irony is that the type of solutions advanced by Nepad would deprive rulers of the means to maintain their patronage networks. In short, to have an Africa based on the enunciated

¹ I am aware of the contentious meanings associated with the terms "democracy" and "good governance". Thus I restrict my definitions to those provided by African themselves i.e. in the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* of 2000 and the *Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government*, also 2000.

principles of Nepad would actually erode the material base upon which the neo-patrimonial state is predicated. And yet Nepad seems to advance the idea that the very same African elites who benefit from the neo-patrimonial state will now commit a form of class suicide. The possibility seems improbable. As Chabal and Daloz (1999: 15) point out:

If political domination becomes embodied in the recognised juridical universe of the bureaucratic state [as Nepad's strictures on good governance demands] political elites would no longer have to justify their prominence through the fulfilment of their patrimonial duties. What this would mean however is that they would have to accept both the supremacy of institutions over individuals and the temporary nature of their political eminence.

With very few exceptions (Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa) the majority of heads of state involved in Nepad are quintessentially heads of neo-patrimonial regimes and certainly do not regard their rule as 'temporary' nor that institutional law should constrain their preeminence. In other words, most African presidents behave in ways that are the exact opposite of what Nepad says regarding good governance. What this means is that the commitment shown to the APRM by state elites so far needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. After all, the countries that have so far signed on are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Of these, only two would probably pass Nepad's own strictures on clean government and democracy (Mauritius and South Africa), whilst perhaps four others (Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Rwanda) might be – as this is written – given the benefit of the doubt regarding efforts towards moving forward to universal standards of governance and democracy. Others are highly dubious, not least one of the most recent signatories, Angola: 'Oil producer Angola is the latest inclusion. Analysts say it will be interesting to see the evaluators report on Angola, where international agencies say as much as \$4 billion in oil revenues – equivalent to 10 percent of GDP – has been lost to graft over the past five years. They have also set their eyes on Nigeria, where corruption has eroded billions of dollars in oil earnings' (*Reuters* (Kigali) March 11, 2004).

Certainly, it will be most interesting to see how the regime in Angola plans to be evaluated on its governance standards, bearing in mind it is essentially a military dictatorship where the elites are methodically looting the public coffers to the tune of billions of dollars and where patronage, cronyism and corruption are systemic (Hodges, 2001). After all, this is a country where:

Lack of transparency remains the norm for all key financial accounts, such as those used for oil revenues and diamond revenues and those of the National Bank of Angola and the national treasury. Parliament faithfully votes each year to approve a budget in which a substantial portion of the monies received by the Angolan state simply does not appear. The official budget is thus a document which bears no relationship to reality, and in any case it is just not implemented for the most part (Messiant, 2001: 292).

It might be advanced that Dos Santos' apparent commitment to the governance agenda of Nepad, like the Angolan budget, bears no relationship to reality and cannot, unless Dos Santos is prepared to voluntarily unravel the whole state apparatus in Angola (if this is possible) be taken particularly seriously. Certainly, his behaviour whilst the president of Angola make him and his regime somewhat curious signatories to the APRM and raises interesting questions not only about Angola, but also about other signatories. As Frederik van Zyl Slabbert put it, 'Angola is a plundered and failing state. If Angola says it buys into Nepad, what does it mean? It means nothing' (quoted in *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg) December 28, 2003). Indeed, it is about time that analyses of Nepad move beyond the rhetoric and investigate the reality of the current situation on the continent. By looking at the credentials of some selected Nepad signatories, I plan to briefly set the scene for more substantive criticism of the APRM.

NEPAD ELITES AND THEIR DEMOCRATIC QUALIFICATIONS

Next to Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, has been instrumental in advancing Nepad's claims to promote democracy and good government in Africa. Yet, Obasanjo, an ex-military ruler of Nigeria (1976-1979) is president of the country in Africa which has become synonymous with corruption and malgovernance – the “open sore of the continent” as Nigeria's Nobel Prize winning author put it (Soyinka, 1996). This is a country where “government's business is no man's business” and where there is a well-understood dictum that there is ‘nothing seriously wrong with stealing state funds, especially if they [are] used to benefit not only the individual but also members of his community. Those who [have] the opportunity to be in government [are] expected to use the power and resources at their disposal to advance private and communal needs’ (Osaghae, 1998: 21). Clientelism and patronage are absolutely central to the whole political economy of the country (Barnes, 1986; Reno, 1993; Aluko, 2002).

According to Paragraph 71 of Nepad, 'African leaders have learnt from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development'. Many observers would remark that such qualities are absent in Nigeria, even under the internationally-celebrated rule of Obasanjo. Worryingly, whilst Paragraph 79 states that 'Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy [and] fair, open, free and democratic elections periodically organized to enable the populace choose their leaders freely', a key Nepad initiator is in power in highly dubious circumstances. After all, the whole election process which saw Obasanjo assume power, was characterized by confusion and fraud, which has been covered in depth by the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which sent a large-scale delegation to observe the elections. 'Among those who witnessed electoral abnormalities in person was President Carter, who saw a stack of ballots neatly placed in one ballot box in precise numerical order. Several other delegates observed instances of ballot box stuffing, including visiting polling sites where [independent election] officials or party agents illegally printed multiple ballots with their own thumbs. In at least nine states, particularly in the South-South zone, NDI/Carter Center delegates observed voter turnouts that were significantly lower than the official tally. In some states, delegates estimated that less than 10 percent of registered voters cast ballots, but official turnout rates for those same states exceeded 85 percent' (Carter Center, 1999: 28-29).

Meanwhile, 'many individual polling sites recorded that all 500 registered voters had cast ballots when the NDI/Carter Center delegation and other observers saw fewer than 100 people there during the day. Another significant development that the delegation reported was the altering of results. In many instances, NDI/Carter Center observers recorded low numbers of accredited voters at polling stations, sometimes less than 10 percent of those registered. During the counting and/or the collation process later in the day, however, they found that these same polling stations reported considerably higher numbers, sometimes even 100 percent of the registered voters of the process in the areas where they occurred' (ibid.)

Similarly, Obasanjo's "re-election" in April 2003 was marked by vote rigging and irregularities, which election monitoring groups refused to endorse. In Obasanjo's home state the president allegedly gained 1,360,170 votes (resulting in a North Korean-style endorsement rate of 99.92% of the votes cast) whilst his opponent received only 680 (*Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), April 23, 2003). European monitors said in an interim report that the election was 'marred by serious irregularities throughout the country and fraud in at least 11 (of Nigeria's 36) states', whilst American monitors said they had 'observed incidences of obvious premeditated electoral manipulation' (ibid.). In response, Obasanjo appealed to an "African

way of voting”, asserting that ‘Certain communities in this country [i.e. Nigeria] make up their minds to act as one in political matters...they probably don’t have that kind of culture in most European countries’ (*Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), April 23, 2003).

Intriguingly, it is very difficult to see how Obasanjo, one of the key initiators and promoters of Nepad, fits with its strictures relating to good governance and economic probity and management. Certainly, how Obasanjo fulfils Paragraph 88, which states that Nepad members will ‘enhanc[e] the quality of economic and public financial management as well as corporate governance’, is difficult to observe regarding current practice under Obasanjo’s administration. After all, a journalist, Nnamdi Onyeuma, was arrested in June 2001 – on the direct orders of Obasanjo – for alleging that Obasanjo receives \$1 million in allowances for each trip he undertakes overseas and that the president had, by May 30, 2001, made \$58 million in allowances in two years. The decision by Obasanjo to spend \$13 million on a Nigerian satellite and \$600 million on the 2003 All-Africa games continues the trend: a demonstration of Obasanjo as a Big Man, a man of substance and modernity, even whilst the country falls apart.² It should be noted – almost as an aside – that more than 10,000 people have been killed in communal clashes since Obasanjo became president in 1999. Meanwhile, in November 2004 the Nepad stalwart was forced to admit that his farm alone brought in \$250,000 a month to the Obasanjo accounts – whilst the majority of the population lives on less than \$1 a day (*BBC News Online*, November 24, 2004).

In fact, it was recently revealed that about 80 per cent of Nigeria’s oil and natural gas revenues accrues to just one per cent of the country’s population. This means that Nigeria has the second lowest per capita oil export earnings in the world, put at \$212 per person in 2004. The 2004 per capita earning compares to the \$589 per person earned in 1980 – a decline of more than 50 per cent. The same report, based on Transparency International information, estimated that over 100,000 barrels of oil per day are stolen by well-connected insiders, which works out to be worth approximately \$1460 million a year – and ‘there are indications that illegal bunkering activities will continue without a firm response from [Obasanjo’s] government’. At the same time, Obasanjo’s 2004 budget is based on an assumption of \$23 per

² As part of the All-Africa Games, Obasanjo ordered the construction of a new 60,000-seater stadium in Abuja (even though Nigeria already has at least eight international-sized grounds across the country – in 1999 Nigeria hosted the FIFA World Youth Championships). The new stadium cost at least US\$347 million, about the same amount that the state budgeted for recurrent spending on education in 2001 and twice the amount of the country’s health budget in 2003.

barrel for Nigerian oil, \$11 per barrel below experts' oil price forecast for Nigeria for 2004 (Nigeria's crude prices have actually averaged about \$40 per barrel in 2004). It is anyone's guess where the surplus finances from oil sales go – certainly not into government coffers (*Vanguard* (Lagos) October 26, 2004).

In the light of the nature of Nigerian politics and the condition of the Nigerian state (Joseph, 1987; Ikpe, 2000; Maier, 2000; Nwankwo, 2002; Rotberg, 2004), Abuja cannot at this time be taken seriously as a vehicle to move the continent beyond malgovernance. In addition, given the highly questionable way by which Obasanjo assumed power, the democratic credentials of one of the leading Nepad promoters should also be treated with caution. Furthermore, there is minimal buy-in vis-à-vis Nepad within Nigeria itself, even within the government: 'There appears to be no high-ranking, middle-level or articulate support staff or bureaucracy to support [Nepad] work. The situation creates doubt as to whether Nepad will outlive the present [Obasanjo] government' (*Business Day* (Johannesburg) October 23, 2002).

Unfortunately, other polities and their leaders within Nepad are equally prominent examples of neo-patrimonial systems of patronage, corruption and profligacy, as well as authoritarianism and undemocratic practices. For instance, Paul Biya of Cameroon, who sits on Nepad's Heads of State Implementing Committee has 'presided over one of Africa's most corrupt governments' and has been negotiating with opposition leaders as he 'needs safety from potential prosecution for human rights abuses and the corruption of his administration' (*Africa Confidential*, vol. 43, no. 17, 2002). In fact, in 1998, 1999 and 2001 Cameroon was classed as the most corrupt country in the world by Transparency International and Cameroon has been regularly cited as *the* textbook case for an African neo-patrimonial state (Van de Walle, 1994; Mehler, 1998). Indeed, Biya's credentials are the antithesis of what Nepad is supposedly all about, with him being described as 'a predator, not a provider. His CPDM party endures the popular acronym "Chop People Dem Moni" in pidgin, loosely paraphrased, "They eat our money like it's their own"' (Takougang and Krieger, 1998: 9). With regard to democracy and good governance, Biya 'was a reluctant participant in the democratization project...[but] he has been able to manipulate it and ensure his continued monopolization of power', whilst Biya 'has utilized corruption to co-opt opposition leaders and other competitive elites in an effort to retain...power' (Mbaku and Takougang, 2004: 23, 21).

In October 2004 Biya was "re-elected" with 70.9 percent of the vote, with observers from the Commonwealth voicing concern that 'many people who wished to vote were not on the Voters' Register, so were denied the right to vote' (*Inter-Press Service* (Johannesburg), October 27, 2004). One Cameroonian commentator noted that with Biya's "re-election", 'the economic

crisis will worsen. Political predation will continue. The powerful will benefit from the uncontrolled deregulation of the productive sectors and commercial networks, and the little people will try to manage to survive. Led by an absentee captain...our country will continue its descent into hell once that October 11 [the election] charade is legitimized' (ibid).

Similarly, Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, one of central Africa's representatives on Nepad's HSIC, is almost an exemplar par excellence of what Nepad is trying to move away from – *un dictateur criminel*, according to Mayima-Mbemba (2001:1). The former Marxist dictator of Brazzaville from 1979-1992, Sassou-Nguesso returned to power (and control of the country's rich oil reserves) when he seized the government by military force from President Pascal Lissouba in the 1997 civil war. Sassou-Nguesso had previously lost to Lissouba when he was forced to hold elections (Sassou-Nguesso won only 5 percent of the votes). After building a private army in northern Congo, Sassou-Nguesso forcibly retook the presidency during a conflict that claimed at least 10,000 people dead.

Later, Sassou-Nguesso scored an unbelievable 89.41 percent victory in the 2001 presidential poll, on a 'dubious electoral register' (*Africa Confidential*, vol. 43, no. 6, 2002). The elected President later remarked, 'the way the elections were held was exemplary. I wish all African countries behaved the same way we did!' (Sassou-Nguesso, 2002: 152). Sassou-Nguesso's army was, according to reports, 'responsible for extrajudicial killings, as well as summary executions, rapes, beatings, physical abuse of detainees and the civilian population, arbitrary arrest and detention, looting, and solicitation of bribes' (United States Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, quoted in *IRIN* (Nairobi), March 6, 2002). Meanwhile, 'Congo's primary commodities... provided incentives for civil war, but later helped the victor consolidate a new neo-patrimonial regime' (Englebert and Ron, no date: 4). Currently, Sassou-Nguesso, the head of the Republic of Congo's police and other ministers and military figures in the regime, are the subject of a case under investigation in France as the result of a suit filed in 2001 regarding the fate of more than 350 Congolese exiles who went "missing" at the end of Congo's civil war in 1999.

Another Nepad stalwart and member of the HSIC is Omar Bongo, president of Gabon, who has been dictator of that country since 1967, a state described by *Africa Confidential* as 'one of Africa's worst managed and most corrupt oil economies', where 'Gabonese have lost interest in the perennially rigged elections. Turnout at the legislative polls [in 2001] was under 20 per cent and may be lower still in the local polls' (*Africa Confidential*, vol. 43, no. 25, 2002). Bongo has had the country's constitution amended 16 times since in power – all to his own benefit and in 2003 it was announced that the government had made changes to the constitution in

order to allow Bongo to run for office as many times as he wished. A senior opposition politician, Pierre Mamboundou, criticized the amendments saying that they had been made to ensure that Bongo held onto power for life and appealed for help from the outside world (*Daily Telegraph* (London), July 17, 2003). There has been no evidence that any other African president has expressed concern to Bongo over such a move.

Furthermore, investigations continue in the United States to establish how Bongo came to deposit over \$180 million in three private Citibank accounts in New York. First raised in Senate hearings in November 1999, it is now the subject of a law suit against Bongo in the Federal Court, whilst 'Bongo's lawyers are trying to establish diplomatic immunity for him as a serving head of a state' (*Africa Confidential*, vol. 42, no. 16, 2001). Meanwhile, with a GNP per head of \$4,000, Gabon's peoples should be amongst Africa's wealthiest, yet most people live in poverty and in 1999 investigators were trying to chase a "missing" \$350 million from government coffers (*Africa Confidential*, vol. 40, no. 22, 1999). The recent Elf corruption case in France, 'probably the biggest political and corporate sleaze scandal to hit a Western democracy since World War II', revealed that annual cash bribes totalling about \$16.7 million were made to Bongo (*Vanguard* (Lagos) November 18, 2003).

In 1971 president Bongo issued a *laisser-passer* (no. 318/71) to known mercenary Bob Denard, who on the evening of September 18th assassinated opposition leader Germain M'ba and his wife in their car while they were returning home from the movies. In 1990 president Bongo had his long-time critic Joseph Rendjambé murdered in his hotel room (Yates, 1996: 122-123). Meanwhile, an Amnesty International has long alleged that torture and human rights violations are common in Gabon under Bongo (Barnes, 1992: 62).

The fact that such characters sit on the HSIC of Nepad is both a major cause for concern (one would imagine) and perhaps a reflection of the nature of the recovery plan. After all, 'all are invited to be part of Nepad. And all will be embraced by Nepad' (Amoako, 2002). Problematically, 'the initial concept of Nepad was that it was not going to be something any old dictator could join to get the benefits, but a more narrow type of reformist club, this has now gradually shifted to become more inclusive' (*Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), November 20, 2002). However, such generous inclusivity somewhat undermines the argument that Nepad will be different from the old Lagos Plan of Action or all the other previous declarations. It also undermines the claim that 'the fact of the matter is that the Heads of State who initiated Nepad process...were predominantly elected by their populations' (Kanbur, 2003).

THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

Noting all of the above, most focus on Nepad has been aimed in particular at the section on Political Governance and Peer Review. As a Scandinavian ambassador commented, 'It was this that captured our imagination and made Nepad that much easier to sell' (*Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg) November 8, 2002). This was because it appeared to suggest a qualitatively different approach to Africa's problems than previous plans and declarations. The HSIC in Abuja in March 2002 approved the Draft Report on Good Governance and Democracy and the African Peer Review Mechanism (see UNECA, 2002) and Nepad's promoters have forcefully argued that the APRM is a positive and demonstrable effort to encourage African states' commitment to "good governance" (Akinrinade, 2002: 3). It was in this context that Nepad staked its claim to being a different document from previous African declarations. Here, perhaps for the first time, was a promise to self-police African leaders: 'the most significant initiative ever advocated for moving the African continent from crisis to renewal', as one commentary claimed (Hope, 2002: 397). The very idea behind the peer review mechanism was to connect to the rest of the world on the basis of honesty and mutual respect with a recognition of the universality of democracy, human rights and good government.

According to Nepad's promoters, there will be four stages through which the APRM will proceed. Stage one will see studies commenced to measure the progress that various African countries have made so far towards democracy and good governance (ill-defined, it should be noted). During this first phase, participating states will devise a "Program of Action", coordinated by the UNECA. This will seek to respond to the levels of political representation, institutional effectiveness and accountability, and economic management and corporate governance in each country. According to Nepad, once such studies are complete, the UNECA will publish an "Africa Governance Report" and will call together an "African Development Forum" on the theme of "Progress towards Good Governance in Africa". Critics have already noted that this seems to be yet another series of conference meetings and declarations (*Mmegi* (Gaborone) February 12, 2004).

Stage two of the APRM will see an Eminent Persons Review Team visit the country under review to carry out "consultations" with the state administration and its leaders as well as with political parties and legislators. Representatives of civil society are said to be included, although who is to be included and who excluded has not been decided or enunciated publicly. The APRM Panel of Eminent Persons comprises the following: Adebayo Adedeji representing West Africa; Bethuel Kiplagat for East Africa, Graça Machel, Southern Africa,

Dorothy Njeuma, Central Africa; Marie-Angelique Savané, West Africa, and Chris Stals, Southern Africa. The credentials of these Eminent Persons will be discussed below.

Stage three will see the Review Team finalizing its report on the basis of its discussions in stage two and the findings of the studies undertaken during stage one. The material and findings of the Review Team's report will be evaluated against the pointers contained in the UNECA's Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. As part of this, the African Union will review the level of democracy and assess political governance through several of its own institutional divisions. Unfortunately, many of the divisions that would naturally be best placed to review governance practices, such as the Conference on Stability, Security, Development, and Cooperation in Africa, are not actually operational, nor likely to be in the near future. Be that as it may, the report will be considered with the government under evaluation and revisions made. Yet this is highly problematic as at this point all non-state actors are excluded and only the government concerned will be involved in revising the report. In other words, state elites will be given the opportunity, free of civil society oversight, to revise and amend the report as they see fit. The only limits placed on their activities will, presumably, be those placed by the Eminent Persons. This follows a by now well-worn path pursued by Nepad: limited, if not minimal, engagement with civil society. After all, 'until April 2002, no trade union, civil society, church, women's, youth, political-party, parliamentary, or other potentially democratic or progressive forces in Africa were formally consulted by the politicians or technocrats involved in constructing Nepad' (Bond, 2003: 9).

Finally, stage four will witness the revised and final review report, which will be known as a Nepad Country Report. This will be given in to the Nepad HSIC and upon its adoption by the HSIC the APRM is complete. The country reviewed will then be left to implement the advice put forward by the Eminent Persons. Again, non-state actors and civil society is not included in this end process and in fact, the reports will not be made public unless the heads of state agree. Furthermore, due to the voluntary nature of the whole process, states do not actually have to implement the APRM panel's advice. Thus if state elites go back on the recommendations of the Review Team there are no mechanisms or teeth to do anything about this and even civil society is excluded from being involved. According to Nepad's position, 'the participating states should first do everything practicable to engage it in constructive dialogue, offering in the process technical and other appropriate assistance. If dialogue proves unavailing, the participating Heads of State and Government may wish to put the government on notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date' (Nepad Secretariat, 2002: 11). But these 'appropriate measures' continue to be indeterminate

and obscure and have led to a degree of cynicism over the whole APRM process. Indeed, 'these vague measures neither penalize a country for an unfavorable review nor provide it with incentives to undertake the recommendations of the review or take steps to avoid an unfavorable review' (Bekoe, 2003: 5). Yet, 'this mechanism will fail in its task if reviews happen only periodically and rigorous criteria – and the consequences for deviant governments – are not spelled out. It seems that African heads of state will be left to judge their own performance. The proposed peer review shows that Nepad leaders do not yet recognize accountable governance as a relationship between governments and citizens' (*Zimbabwe Independent* (Harare), May 24, 2002).

If a country does comply with the Review Team's recommendations, then it will, according to Nepad process, be eventually given a grade: 'Nepad Compliant', 'Aspiring to Nepad Compliance, but in need of assistance', 'Wilfully non-compliant', and 'Post-conflict countries requiring special reconciliation and reconstruction' (*Business Day* (Johannesburg), November 4, 2002). According to the logic within Nepad, this is then supposed to facilitate increased aid and foreign investment into the country, depending on the grade achieved. However, as the whole process is voluntary from the start, 'The toughest aspect of peer review – awarding "pass" or "fail" marks – is...neatly dodged, because only those countries likely to make the grade will volunteer to undergo the APR[M]' (De Waal, 2002: 472).

Before discussing the APRM in more detail and the way it has backtracked from initial commitments, it should be noted that no budget has actually been set for the APRM. Indeed, the proposed plan at the moment calls for the APRM to gather its resources primarily from those states that have volunteered to participate in the review process – countries have to pay at least \$100,000 to take part. Whilst the APRM (commendably) emphasizes the need to keep foreign financial assistance low, in order to avoid charges that it is not African-owned, the financing scheme raises deep concerns that the APRM will end up underfunded and devoid of any real political independence. Firstly, states with no real commitment to Nepad principles can cite the lack of funds as an excuse to duck out of the review process. In addition, 'resources from African states can also be used to bias the peer review. A participating state may refuse to contribute its levy, as a means of protesting an unfavorable review – holding the APRM hostage' (Bekoe, 2003: 6). Certainly, given the historical failure of African states to meet their financial commitments to previous African initiatives, such as paying their dues for membership of first the Organization of African Unity and now, the African Union, serious questions need to be asked vis-à-vis the financing of the APRM and the implications that this has. After all, when the OAU wound down, to be replaced by the AU, the outgoing OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim indicated that only four countries had paid their dues

on time. This improved somewhat by the time of the transformation into the AU: of the 53 OAU members, 16 had settled their dues. This still meant however that the AU inherited multi-million dollar debt. And as it stands, the African Union recently reported arrears of nearly \$39.9 million out of an operating budget of \$43 million. 'Moreover, since the funding of the APRM will come from participating countries only and not all the 54 states in Africa, the levy will be disproportionately borne' (Bekoe, 2003: 6).

THE GREAT RETREAT

As it was originally conceived (and certainly how it was sold to partners in the G-8) the peer review mechanism pledged to offer a disciplinary device to secure compliance with agreed values and norms in Africa. This was cast as a way to improve the legitimacy of African states in their dealings with outside actors and bolster the possibility of improving governance in Africa as a means to secure greater political and economic stability to reverse Africa's marginalization. The very concept of peer review was portrayed as the examination and appraisal of the functioning of a state by other states (peers), by mandated institutions, or by a combination of these (Economic Commission for Africa, 2002: 2). The end objective was cast as assisting the reviewed state's progress in its adoption of approved best practices and to *ensure* it fulfilled agreed-upon principles and values. The APRM itself drew upon experience in the West, where an acceptance of regular and at times intrusive peer reviews have been established for a period of time, particularly with the facilitation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). But whereas the OECD review process is mainly economic, Nepal's APRM at first promised political reviews and evaluations of governance issues, including democracy.

Indeed, initially the review mechanism was sold as having muscle to rein in malefactors. Such a review process, Nepal promoters originally insisted, had to include measures to ensure compliance. This was because, according to Obasanjo 'African leaders could no longer remain silent about the shortcomings or abuses of other African leaders' (quoted in *Africa Recovery*, vol. 15, no. 4, December 2001: 10). Indeed, Mbeki 'repeatedly stressed the importance of establishing a credible and effective African Peer Review Mechanism to help decide which countries benefit, and to what extent, from membership of Nepal. Peer review is vital to his vision for Africa' (*Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg) May 10, 2002). This meant, Mbeki claimed, that the Nepal peer review process should support 'certain standards of behaviour, which are agreed, which are clear, *which are capable of enforcement* [emphasis added]' (*South African Press Agency* (Cape Town), February 12, 2002). In addition, Mbeki had asserted that 'African

leaders should set up parameters for good governance to guide their activities at both the political and economic levels. In this regard, it decided that, at its next meeting, it will consider and adopt an appropriate peer review mechanism and a code of conduct' (Nepad Secretariat, 2001). Mbeki had also previously asserted that 'the New Partnership is unique in African history in that African leaders have pledged to co-operate and be accountable to one another...leaders must account to their counterparts at summits and interact with their development partners in industrialised countries'. African leaders should, according to Mbeki, ensure that 'measures for good governance are put in place through which our governments are accountable to their peoples [and] that best practices are agreed upon and put in place for economic and political governance' (Mbeki, 2002b).

However, the whole question over what peer review implied quickly embroiled Nepad in controversy and led to a somewhat ignominious retreat to a vague and voluntary process with no measures to ensure compliance. Prior to a meeting in Abuja in 2002 – to decide on what form peer review should take – Mbeki suddenly declared (unilaterally it might be added) that the APRM would not review the political governance of African countries (Taylor, 2002a). Mbeki announced that political governance review was the jurisdiction of the AU and thus Nepad would simply focus on economic performance. Mbeki further claimed that Nepad was simply the African Union's "socio-economic program", and asserted that 'there was never ever any suggestion that we have a Nepad peer review process that would conduct the work of the Commission on Human Rights' (quoted in *Business Day* (Johannesburg) November 5, 2002). This contradicted what the promoters of Nepad had been saying the previous twelve months or so and prompted a letter from the then chairman of the G-8 (Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien), requesting Mbeki to explain what had happened to the governance side of the APRM, which had been a key factor in garnering G-8 support for Nepad. Mbeki's reply, circulated among diplomatic circles in South Africa, was reported by local press to have been a "technocratic" obfuscation of the position of political peer review within Nepad (*Star* (Johannesburg) November 20, 2002). One G-8 diplomat in South Africa was quoted as saying of Mbeki's explanatory letter that 'It [was] one of the worst letters I have ever seen...very technocratic, and some of the explanations [were] absurd' (quoted in *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), November 19, 2002). Mbeki retorted that critics who disapproved of the back-pedaling regarding the APRM were racists who were 'self-appointed champions of democracy and human rights in Africa' and who were infused with 'contemptuous prejudice' for Africans by daring to suggest that 'Africa's political leaders cannot be trusted to promote and entrench democracy and human rights' (Mbeki, 2002d).

Governance review was eventually retained as a watered-down voluntary process, as has been detailed above. What this practically means is that the effectiveness of the peer review process is now reliant on the influence of peer pressure and public scrutiny. Both of these are hamstrung. Firstly, as one of the Eminent Persons of the APRM has asserted, 'the spirit of the review is not to chastise...the aim is to help the country to change', quoted by *Reuters* (Kigali) March 11, 2004. But then the APRM has absolutely no mechanisms if the elites of a given country turn down such offers of help. Secondly, bearing in mind the oppressive nature of many African leaders and given that states volunteering to take part in the review process can not only revise the final report as they see fit but can also apparently chose not to even make it public, it is very difficult to see how civic scrutiny will play a meaningful role in the whole process.

The "retreat" to a purely voluntary review might be seen as a belated realization by Nepad's promoters that an intrusive review process would never be bought by the bulk of Africa's leaders. In fact, as one African diplomat (of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Co-operation, Mauritius, interviewed in October 2003) pointed out, Mbeki quickly realized that if a credible peer review process had been endorsed, then Pretoria would have rapidly been elevated (by the donor countries) to being the de facto policeman of good governance in Africa, a duty that Mbeki – as the debacle surrounding his policies towards Mugabe has shown – is not willing to perform. In addition pan-African elite solidarity and the historic reluctance of criticizing fellow presidents on the continent meant that any review mechanism that might seek to enforce best practices and/or judge others' performances, was bound to falter. Furthermore, the volte-face threw into focus the over-selling of Nepad by its promoters and the too easy acceptance by the G-8 of the initial plan – note the comment by one Western diplomat in Pretoria that 'Perhaps we were naïve, but we were very taken by Mbeki going where very few other leaders – and certainly no Africans has dared. It was this that captured our imagination' (quoted in *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg) November 8, 2002). But, the type of intrusive peer review system initially sold by Mbeki in the run up to the launch of Nepad was ahead of even the sophisticated and long-standing OECD and the European Union has not even tried to introduce such a mechanism. As a result, looking at the current situation in Africa, a political peer review system of the type originally sold by Mbeki would only have called attention to wholesale malgovernance and corruption on the continent, thus immediately sabotaging Mbeki's rhetoric that the "African Renaissance" was already underway. Yet, at the same time, a process with no sanctions or counter-measures against those countries that fail to pass muster means that the review mechanism will have no teeth. The newness of Nepad or its alleged break from the past is thus limited, to say the least.

Certainly, the suspicion now is that the evaluation panel will restrict itself to rubber-stamping governance reports of countries that were confident of positive evaluations by the panel in the first place. However, surely 'the major indicators of a reliable peer review mechanism should include an evaluation of the type of APRM panel members (are they truth-tellers or biased?)' (Bekoe, 2003: 5). As noted above, the Eminent Persons panel (appointed in May 2003) is made up of six initial members. All of these panelists are intimately linked to the elite classes of Africa and brings into question any notion of real independence and objectivity. Certainly it makes a nonsense, I would say, of Marie-Angelique Savané's assertion that 'We are controversial people back at home and we cannot be manipulated' (quoted by *Reuters* (Kigali) March 11, 2004). The six are: Graça Machel (Mozambique), the wife of Nelson Mandela; Adebayo Adedeji (Nigeria) ex-head of the UN Economic Commission for Africa and ex-minister in one of Nigeria's military-run, coup-generated governments; Marie-Angelique Savané (Senegal), former head of the UN Population Fund's Africa Bureau; Bethuel Kiplagat (Kenya), ex-ambassador under Daniel arap Moi; Dorothy Njeuma, ex-minister of education in Cameroon; Chris Stals (South Africa), ex-head of the South African Reserve Bank.³ Cynics have noted that this line-up will no doubt satisfy those elites in Africa who were quick to assert that 'Nepad should not be used as a political tool to demand human rights, democracy and other unnecessary conditions' (Namibian Agriculture Minister Helmut Angula, quoted in *The Namibian* (Windhoek), April 15, 2003). Indeed, the whole Eminent Persons panel is devoid of credibility. Take for instance one member, Dorothy Njeuma. In September 2004 during the Cameroonian election, Njeuma told a campaign rally that, 'with Biya, there is progress, stability and development...if we want more development, we have to show him our support'. She also stated that the people should vote for Biya, 'on behalf of their sons', because if they do not support Biya, 'their sons may not have the opportunity to be where they are' (*Post* (Buea) September 29, 2004). Njeuma, it should be noted, is a member of the political bureau of Biya's governing party. And yet, the Eminent Persons panel is supposed to be independent, free-thinking and willing to critique recalcitrant governments. How does this square with one of its members actively campaigning for a politician who is routinely held up by observers as being one of the worst examples of a corrupt, neo-patrimonial Big Man?

³ What is interesting here of course is the fact that before being recruited onto the well-paid and high-profile Eminent Persons committee, Adedeji was a prominent critic of the NEPAD, denouncing it for ignoring his own Lagos Plan of Action and AAF-SAP. In fact, according to Adedeji, the NEPAD was fundamentally flawed because it sought to make Africa 'march towards its future hand-in-hand with its colonial mono-cultural, low productivity and excessively dependent and open economy' [sic] (Adedeji, 2002: 6).

Certainly, from the perspective of the international community, for the reviews to be considered credible, they should not diverge too much from what international opinion knows and thinks about a country already. But this is a key point: what added value will the APRM process provide to potential investors, which is not already offered by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Standard and Poors credit ratings, Human Rights Watch Africa's reports, Amnesty International's overviews, indeed general knowledge garnered from the media and first-hand experiences? The key answer seems to be that the APRM is "Africa-owned". But this may not be so much of a plus point. After all, any repetition of the Zimbabwe debacle or the situation in Rwanda where African monitors gave the presidential elections of 2003 an unrealistically favorable endorsement of the polls, in contrast with the negative opinions of Western observers, will instantly undermine the APRM's worth:

If the reviews are not credible then it will depend on what alternative, consistent and transparent monitoring process is applied by the partner countries. To the extent that the developed countries end up paying lip service to superficial or cosmetic reviews, they will simply be helping to entrench an ineffectual political ritual. Therefore the G-8 and other developed democracies... have to try to make sure that the "reviews" do not simply create a smokescreen behind which corrupt but influential African governments continue with their old habits, confirming the worst fears expressed by the international NGO movement (Schlemmer, 2002:13).

After all, 'The G-8 supporters of Nepad insist that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is the jewel in Nepad's crown and have clearly predicated the amount and quality of their financial support on it. Nepad's political difficulties in Western circles have not been helped by how the prognosis of the APRM has become entangled with the controversies over Zimbabwe' (Graham, 2002: 3).

Whilst defenders of the retreat from the original premise of Nepad argue that volunteering for a review will put pressure on those that do not, this is somewhat unconvincing. The argument has been advanced that an obligatory peer review process under the rubric of Nepad would have undermined the supposedly binding nature of the provisions of the African Union regarding political governance. Yet, as any historian of the AU's predecessor – the Organization of African Unity – will tell you, adhering to "good" political governance was largely neglected by that organization, sacrificed to the pan-African principle of "non-interference" in domestic affairs and, effectively, elite solidarity (Van Walraven, 1999). Why the promoters of Nepad now claim that the AU will be qualitatively different from the OAU

when the very same African elites are in power and when the nature of the African state remains largely unaltered is unclear. After all, as Adeleke notes, any renewal project for the continent ‘cannot be meaningful if it is spearheaded and guided by the current African political leadership, those directly responsible for undermining the very foundation upon which a viable pan-African tradition could have been built’ (Adeleke, 1998: 533).

Perhaps the main motive for the volte-face is linked to the fear that Nepad would actually result in a split in Africa. If it was to be implemented as a compulsory and credible review process then one would see emerging various clusters of “winners and losers” within the continent. The main political (and perhaps, economic) beneficiaries would almost certainly be the economically stronger African territories and/or the few leaders on the continent perceived as being serious (i.e. pro-reform liberalizers with an “approved” record on human rights and democracy) by the West. Deviants from this norm and those states with tainted leaders i.e. “non-acceptable” to the West, would be set aside – unless of course their value as guardians of resources warranted a tactical “blind eye”. Yet such a scenario would strike at the heart of one of the very few things the African Union actually stands for: pan-African unity amongst its elites. Increased polarization between these elites is not what Nepad was supposed to be about, even if the logical outcome of its governance agenda would have certainly led to such a milieu. Indeed, the APRM reflects an undeniable contradiction within the whole recovery plan: on the one hand it must be as inclusive as possible, in order to obtain pan-African “buy-in” whilst on the other hand it has to be as exclusive as possible in order to obtain credibility with the West. Furthermore, the APRM as it was initially sold, created what Van der Westhuizen (2003: 389) called the “dual dilemma” of Nepad:

First, a mechanism to provide a “seal of approval” is required to assure wary foreign investors, but such a mechanism is vulnerable to being perceived by critics as an extension of “Western imperialism”...The second...is the difficulty of relating to sovereignty and non-interference, which prohibits fellow African states from interfering in one another’s domestic affairs.

A retreat from such a problematic scenario was thus perhaps inevitable.

Whilst obviously “good governance” is but one part of any coherent program to tackle Africa’s situation, the way in which Nepad has seemingly got bogged down (by controversy over the backtracking regarding peer review) is noteworthy. Equally noteworthy is the de facto retreat by Mbeki over his call, linked to the APRM, that the G-8 hold African leaders to their expressed promises. After all, Mbeki claimed that ‘I’ve been saying to the leadership of the

developed world that they need to respond positively...to challenge us, to say “this is what you say but we want to see practical action from you consistent with what you are saying” (quoted in Mbeki, 2002a: 204). Yet, when Commonwealth leaders discussed Zimbabwe and demanded that Mbeki and other African leaders demonstrate ‘practical action...consistent with what [they had been] saying’ regarding democracy and human rights, Mbeki labeled them racists who were merely ‘inspired by notions of White supremacy’ and who felt uneasy at their ‘repugnant position imposed by inferior Blacks’ (Mbeki, 2002c).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The key problem facing the continent is the ability or otherwise of governance and development initiatives such as Nepad to successfully operate in the context of neo-patrimonialism and Big Men politics. As Chabal (2002) notes, any cool evaluation of the political situation on the continent undermines the potency of the renewal project as a means towards better governance. I have already remarked that “rewarding” leaders with extra resources for *not* undermining human rights and not preventing democracy is flawed. This is because in my mind good governance should not be dealt with as a tradable commodity or some sort of bargaining chip with the outside world. Surely, African leaders should be encouraging the practice of good governance irrespective of the stance of the industrialized states? And besides, ‘good governance is something African leaders owe first and foremost to their own people’, rather than, as Nepad promoters have framed it, ‘a condition of their relationship with the continent’s creditors’ (*Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), September 22, 2002). As Seepe rather bitingly put it:

Nepad’s subtext is: “We African leaders, having failed to consolidate democracy, to ensure sound economic management, and to bring about people-centered development in our countries, come before you chaps in the G-8 to enlist your support. If you give us money, we promise to honor the commitments we made to our people. We need to be rewarded for what we should have been doing in the first place” (quoted in *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), July 12, 2002).

A Zambian writer goes further and states that:

The Africans [promoting Nepad] are asking the rich countries to bribe them to practice democratic governance and to pursue policies of economic and political stability...There is no reason whatsoever for the people of Africa to be proud that

their leaders are now offering to sell their “good governance” commitment for a few billion dollars... Why should our leaders be paid to do the right thing? Don't they have a conscience of their own to simply know that it is wrong for them to tolerate corruption and general bad governance, with or without developmental aid from the rich? Why can't they simply be [good leaders] even when it does not involve any money? (Chisala, no date).

Obviously, Africa's regeneration is not simply a question of advancing “good leadership” or “good government”; the structural impediments to African trade are equally important, and we must avoid a voluntarist approach to Africa's development nor neglect the nature of its relationship with the international system. But, it can be said that without the construction of transparent and accountable government, Nepad's ambitious economic plans, whatever their own manifest weaknesses and the wider structural impediments of the global economy (see Bond, 2002; Taylor and Nel, 2002) are profoundly compromised. Indeed, the failure to act thus far in any meaningful way regarding governance and human rights as situations have presented themselves indicates that Nepad will have a rather muted impact. After all, the leaders of Nepad did not need to wait for the APRM to be fully functional before talking out about misrule in places such as Zimbabwe or Swaziland (Taylor, 2002a), or Malawi or the Sudan. Whilst one is fully aware of the historical legacies that mean that pan-African elite solidarity reigns, the question that needs to be asked is, for how long will this solidarity trump all else? And can it ever be used to justify inaction and nod-and-wink postures towards malevolent dictators? As Robert Rotberg notes:

African leaders are expected to demonstrate that they are “fully aware of the responsibilities and obligations to their peoples, and are genuinely prepared to engage and relate to the rest of the world on the basis of integrity and world respect”. This is a tall order. Neither Presidents Mbeki nor Obasanjo have employed peer pressure to halt the growing trend toward dictatorship in today's Africa. Neither leader has publicly condemned electoral theft in Zimbabwe or attempts to breach the constitutions of Malawi, Namibia, or Zambia. Neither they nor many of their contemporaries have criticized denials of media freedom in neighboring countries, corruption, misappropriation or squandering of foreign assistance funds, or said much about the leadership causes of the famine now engulfing 13 million people in southern Africa (quoted in *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), June 19, 2002).

The key problem is that there is a 'growing need in this globalizing world to have a strong and credible Africa-wide voice, a voice that draws its legitimacy and authority from being rooted in democratic principles. There are two directions in which this voice needs to speak – internally, to African nations, and externally, to the court of world opinion. Internally, there is a need to show the way, and to persuade and if necessary to sanction, African nations who stray from democracy and basic human rights, and this can best be done by other African nations, through an organization that is founded on these principles' (Kanbur, 2003). However, Nepad is unlikely to match the heady expectations that greeted its launch and the APRM certainly will not. This is because to do so involves trying to enlist the support of elites who are expected to undermine their own positions and the positions of their clients and as the Rwandan journalist Shyaka Kanuwa notes, this 'brings us to the question, or rather the dilemma: how can rulers who are themselves clearly the problem be part of the solution?...These men are not troubled by niceties such as respect for human rights, concern for their populations' material welfare or consensual decision-making. Most preside over decaying military or police states. They benefit from a hybrid of African patronage and farcical parliamentary, judicial and other institutional procedures that contrive invariably to act in the big man's interests' (quoted in *Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg) July 12, 2002).

In addition, to do so would call into question the manner by which Africa interacts with the global economy (Bond, 2002). It is naïve to expect elites, whose very modus operandi is based on privatized patronage (in Western eyes, malgovernance) and the prohibition and erosion of democracy, to begin implementing and operating by the rubric of "good governance". To do so would not only damage their own holds on power but reduce their ability to maintain lucrative linkages with the external world. That is why this author has little confidence that the commitments to democracy and good government by members of the HSIC such as Obasanjo, Bongo, Biya or Sassou-Nguesso goes beyond anything more than rhetoric, nor that the involvement of the likes of Adedeji or Njeuma on the Eminent Persons panel amounts to anything. When questioned about this contradiction between rhetoric and reality, the chairman of Nepad's steering committee, Wiseman Nkuhlu, was apparently 'not bothered by the criticism' as he had 'a simple answer for the critics'. This answer was that 'all leaders' involved in Nepad 'were democratically elected. So they represented ruling parties from their own countries' (quoted in Mkhondo, 2004: 19). I would beg to differ.

This skepticism regarding the democratic credentials of a good number of Nepad's signatories is shared by others, including the policy-making community. Stephen Morrison, a former United States State Department adviser and currently director of the African program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has commented:

No one is going to stand up and say Nepad is a bad thing. But people are talking about it less and less because they don't believe it will amount to much. The US administration agrees in principle with Nepad's goals. But the inaction over Zimbabwe's persistent breaches of human rights, the inclusion of some very strange people on the Nepad steering committee and Mbeki's statement that political criteria are not part of the peer review system give rise to skepticism. The interest level in Nepad wanes as its credibility drops (*Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), November 8, 2002).

Thus it remains that in Africa, 'a very small elite (whether civilian or military)...generally favors self-preservation over policies and political structures truly designed to benefit the disempowered majorities of most African countries. In case after case, ruling elites continue to impede the process of sharing political and economic power more broadly' (Schraeder, 1994: 85). And as Ottaway's study on the emergence of a group of "Africa's New Leaders" demonstrates, there are a lot of false dawns and premature speculations about the motives and anticipated behavior of elites on the continent (Ottaway, 1999).

This implies that any monitoring of governance standards and the improvement in democratic standards on the continent cannot remain elite-driven as is inherent in the APRM process nor, from the perspective of the donor community, dependent upon the whims of the elites within government. Nor can they be detached from a critical restructuring of Africa's global economic linkages and world trade policies. Currently, one of the main positive things about Nepad is that it is an African initiative and that it has generated a certain level of debate within Africa with regard to the continent's development impasse. These facets of the project are worth building on. However, whilst Nepad remains so dependent upon the Big Men to advance good governance through the APRM, something which goes against the very logic of neo-patrimonial rule, then its project to promote the continent's regeneration in the new millennium, will likely remain stillborn.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adedeji, A. (2002) 'Keynote Address: From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither Africa?', paper prepared for presentation at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April.
- Adeleke, T. (1998) 'Black Americans and Africa: A Critique of the Pan-African and Identity Paradigms', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 31, no.3.
- Akinrinade, S. (2002) 'Nepad: The New Partnership for Africa's Development', *Bulletin of the Conflict, Security and Development Group*, no. 15.
- Aluko, M. (2002) 'The Institutionalisation of Corruption and Its Impact on Political Culture in Nigeria', *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3.
- Amoako, K.Y. (2002) 'Moving Nepad from Concept to Implementation' opening statement by the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa to the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 19 October.
- Barnes, S. (1986) *Patrons and Power: Creating a Political Community in Metropolitan Lagos* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Barnes, J. (1992) *Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy* Boulder: Westview.
- Bekoe, D. (2003) 'Creating a Reliable African Peer Review Mechanism', *Chimera*, vol. 1, issue 4.
- Bond, P. (ed.) (2002) *Fanon's Warning. A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development* Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Bond, P. (2003) 'South Africa and Global Apartheid: Is the Reform Strategy Working?', paper presented to the Transnational Seminar, University of Illinois/Champaign-Urbana, 14 November 2003.
- Carter Center (1999) *Observing the 1998-99 Nigeria Elections: Final Report* Atlanta: Carter Center.
- Chabal, P. (2002) 'The Quest for Good Governance and Development in Africa: Is Nepad the Answer?', *International Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 3.
- Chabal, P. and J-P. Daloz (1999) *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* Oxford: James Currey.
- Chisala, C. (2002) 'In Exchange For Morals: Nepad Joke', www.zambia.co.zm/capitalism/Nepadarticle.htm
- De Waal, A. (2002) 'What's New in the "New Partnership for Africa's Development"', *International Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 3.
- Englebort, P. and J. Ron (no date) 'Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville's Ambivalent Resource Curse', unpublished paper.

- Graham, Y. (2002) 'Nepad's Slippery Milestones', *African Trade Agenda*, no. 5, December.
- Hodges, T. (2001) *Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism* Oxford: James Currey.
- Hope, K. (2002) 'From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development', *African Affairs*, vol. 101.
- Ikpe, U. (2000) 'Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria', *African Journal of Political Science*, vol. 5, no. 1.
- Joseph, R. (1987) *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Kanbur, R. (2001) 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad): An Initial Commentary', www.people.cornell.edu/pages/skl45
- Maier, K. (2000) *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis* London: Penguin.
- Mayima-Mbemba, C. (2001) 'La Logique des Puissants ou la Condition "Humaine" Reservee aux "Sous-Hommes"', mimeograph, (Strasbourg).
- Mbaku, J. and Takougang, J. (2004) 'General Introduction: Biya and the Promise of a Better Society' in Mbaku, J. and Takougang, J. (eds.) *The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya* Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Mbeki, T. (2002a) *Africa – Define Yourself* Cape Town: Tafelberg.
- Mbeki, T. (2002b) 'Sceptics will Not Stop the Re-building of Africa', *ANC Today*, vol. 2, no. 38, 20-26 September.
- Mbeki, T. (2002c) 'Letter from the President: Zimbabwe: "Two Blacks and One White"', *ANC Today*, vol. 2, no. 10, 8-14 March.
- Mbeki, T. (2002d) 'Critics Ill-Informed About Nepad Peer Review', *ANC Today*, vol. 2, no. 45, November 8-14.
- Mehler, A. (1998) 'Cameroon and the Politics of Patronage' in David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin (eds.) *History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Since 1960* London: Longman.
- Mkhondo, R. (2004) 'Nkulu Unpacks Nepad', *Leadership*, December/January.
- Nepad Secretariat (2001) *New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) (2001)* www.dfa.gov.za/events/Nepad.pdf
- Nepad Secretariat (2002) *Nepad Action Plans* Midrand: Nepad Secretariat.
- Nwankwo, A. (2002) *Nigeria: The Stolen Billions* Enugu: Fourth Dimension.
- Osaghae, E. (1998) *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence* London: Hurst and Company.
- Othman, S. (1989) 'Nigeria: Power for Profit: Class, Corporatism and Factionalism in the Military' in Cruise O'Brien, Dunn and Rathbone (eds.).
- Ottaway, M. (1999) *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Reno, W. (1993) 'Old Brigades, Money Bags, New Breeds, and the Ironies of Reform in Nigeria', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1.

- Rotberg, R. (2000) 'Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 5.
- Rotberg, R. (ed.) (2004) *Crafting the New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Sassou-Nguesso, D. (2002) 'Overwhelming Majority Means Overwhelming Responsibility', *African Geopolitics*, no. 6, Spring.
- Schraeder, P. (1994) 'Elites as Facilitators or Impediments to Political Development? Some Lessons from the "Third Wave" of Democratisation in Africa', *Journal of Developing Areas*, vol. 29, no. 1.
- Schlemmer, L. (2002) 'Getting Real about Democracy in Africa: Nepad and the Challenge of Good Governance', paper presented at an international colloquium on Cultures, Religions and Conflicts, Mzaar, Lebanon, September 18-21.
- Soyinka, W. (1996) *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Takougang, J. and Krieger, M. (1998) *African State and Society in the 1990s: Cameroon's Political Crossroads* Boulder: Westview.
- Taylor, I. (2002a) 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development and the Zimbabwe Elections: Implications and Prospects for the Future', *African Affairs*, vol. 101, issue 404.
- Taylor, I. and Nel, P. (2002) "'New Africa", Globalization and the Confines of Elite Reformism: "Getting the Rhetoric Right", Getting the Strategy Wrong', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 1.
- Van de Walle, N. (1994) 'Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa, with an Illustration from Cameroon' in J. Widner (ed.) *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Africa* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Van der Westhuizen, J. (2003) 'How (Not) to Sell Big Ideas: Argument, Identity and Nepad', *International Journal*, Summer.
- Van Walraven, K. (1999) *Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa, 1963-1993* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Yates, D. (1996) *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil, Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon* Trenton: Africa World Press.