Towards a Holistic Approach in Peacekeeping
Promoting peace through training, research and policy development

The Training for Peace (TfP) Programme is an international training and research programme funded and established by the Norwegian Government since 1995. Its primary purpose is to contribute towards capacity building within the broader ambit of peace operations in Africa.

TfP is a joint programme between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra. The target groups are personnel within relevant ministries, such as Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the military, police, judicial, non-governmental organisations and media sectors.

Within its overall goal, TfP’s objective is broadly twofold:
• primarily, to establish a self-sustaining, multifunctional peace operation capacity in Africa.
• secondarily, to provide advice to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in formulating policies on issues pertinent to co-operative efforts between Africa and Norway regarding peace operations and reconciliation.

Both of these are implemented at the conceptual and the practical level through training, research and policy development activities.

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The holistic approach to managing conflict in post-conflict environments, as reflected in the contribution of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, ensures that peace and security activities are aligned with political, governance, democratisation and socio-economic development objectives to address the larger development agenda, and thus also the root causes of conflict. The holistic approach also involves a myriad of actors in the mission (military, police and civilians), and besides the peacekeeping operation, includes state and non-state actors, both local and international – such as non-governmental organisations and the humanitarian community. This requires a significant degree of coordination and integration of effort at the local, national, regional, continental and supranational levels. Both the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) have established a more systematic way of conducting peace operations, particularly in the context of conflicts within states – balancing the need for immediate response to crises with the provision of security, humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians with longer-term considerations for post-conflict peacebuilding and development.

Missions such as the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and increasingly robust mandates – as in the case of the Intervention Brigade of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) – allude to the operational shifts from peacekeeping towards peace enforcement, to address the contemporary challenges of responding to the complex nature, context and drivers of interstate conflict in the post-Brahimi era. It is 20 years since the Rwandan genocide, and the need to respond rapidly to conflict has never been more important. The UN uses mechanisms – such as the UN standby arrangements system (UNSAS) with member states – to deploy missions rapidly. The AU, through the African Standby Force, which aims to have a rapid deployment capability, has been building its capacity to respond to crisis on the continent in a timely manner. This has included establishing the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) in 2013, following the response to the situation in Mali.

The focus of this Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa Conflict Trends special issue is ‘Towards a Holistic Approach in Peacekeeping’. This issue provides a platform for reflection from academics, policymakers and practitioners in conceptualising key issues and debates on the holistic approach to peacekeeping, and in better understanding that conflict management can never be limited to just military or security responses, but must also address the political, governance, socio-economic and humanitarian dimensions of conflict. Drawing on emerging and evolving trends in the field, the articles highlight the opportunities and challenges experienced by both the UN and AU multidimensional peace operations in the implementation of a holistic approach to managing conflict in post-conflict environments. The aim is to provide information, guidance, experiences and lessons to the UN and AU policymakers and practitioners for the assessment, planning, implementation, management and evaluation of peace operations, as well as for improved coordination with other actors.

This issue of Conflict Trends promotes a multifaceted and multidisciplinary approach to international conflict management. It highlights that it is not constructive to employ overly rigid and one-dimensional approaches, as reflected in traditional military peacekeeping, since conflicts require more than a military solution only, and traditional military peacekeeping operations are not substitutes for political processes. This multifaceted and multidisciplinary approach to international conflict management is linked to the strategic goal of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) TfP Programme, to contribute towards ensuring an integrated approach to peace operations by addressing the lack of police and civilian capacity in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Ultimately, the aim is to ensure that peacekeeping is an effective conflict management mechanism and process on the continent.

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MODERN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: TOWARDS A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING CONFLICT

BY SEUN ABIOLA AND JOHN OTTE

Introduction

Modern peacekeeping has evolved from its early years as a tool used by the United Nations (UN) to monitor ceasefires and conduct truce supervision in interstate conflicts, into missions that are more involved in intrastate conflicts and which rebuild national structures and elements of civil society while maintaining the peace and conducting security sector reform (SSR). Indeed, the UN has worked towards a more systematic way of conducting peacekeeping operations, particularly in the context of conflicts within states – balancing the need for immediate response to crises with the provision of security, humanitarian assistance and protection to civilians with longer-term considerations for post-conflict peacebuilding and development.

Peacekeeping is part of the holistic approach to addressing conflict, along with conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The June 1992 Agenda for Peace – Report of the Secretary-General defines these concepts, and examines them as integrally related and major elements of a holistic

Above: Peacekeepers with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) provide security during Liberia’s presidential run-off election, in Monrovia (8 November 2011).
A peacekeeper from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Formed Police Unit speaks to residents while patrolling the streets of Gao, in northern Mali (May 2014).

approach to maintaining international peace and security. The spectrum of such peace and security activities was further codified in 2008, in the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (otherwise known as the Capstone Doctrine). Modern peacekeeping continues to develop within the framework of its own contribution to this holistic approach, which goes beyond a military or security response to address the root causes of conflict, and thus also the larger development agenda.

PEACEKEEPING IS PART OF THE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING CONFLICT, ALONG WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION, PEACEMAKING, PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEBUILDING

This article highlights the development of peacekeeping in the holistic approach to addressing conflicts within states. In particular, it provides an overview of the role of multidimensional peacekeeping in implementing comprehensive peaceful settlements, as well as facilitating post-conflict peacebuilding, prevention of relapse to armed conflict, and progress towards sustainable peace and development. Furthermore, it identifies key considerations for enhancing effectiveness to better plan, support and conduct such operations.

The UN Holistic Approach in the Agenda for Peace

The Agenda for Peace contains the foundation of peacekeeping that emerged in the first 45 years of the UN. It is a holistic approach to the maintenance of international peace and security in that it acknowledges the integrally related interventions of preventing conflicts, as well as preventing relapse and building sustainable peace through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategies. The 1990s experienced a dramatic increase in intrastate conflicts, characterised by multiple armed factions with differing political objectives and fractured lines of command. In the post-cold war era, the UN shift in focus from interstate to intrastate conflicts was accompanied by a consideration that ‘security’ extends beyond the security of nation states, to a people-centred concept of ‘human security’ that focuses primarily on protecting people while promoting peace and assuring sustainable continuous development. The Agenda for Peace reflects the emerging paradigm of ‘human security’, later popularised by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report,
which links various humanitarian, economic and social issues to alleviate human suffering and ensure security.

The report reflects thinking on the “new dimension of security” that the effort to build peace, stability and security should go beyond military threats, especially given the non-military sources of conflict. Over time, consensus has been reached that ‘security’ means more than the absence of conflict, and that sustainable peace will be achieved through a comprehensive approach to addressing, for example, issues relating to education, health, democracy, human rights, protection against environmental degradation, proliferation of deadly weapons, poverty alleviation and justice. As an integrally related and major element of the holistic approach, peacekeeping as a technique expands the prevention of conflict and peacemaking, as well as post-conflict peacebuilding, contributing to a comprehensive strategy for durable peace and security. In particular, peacekeeping missions support early peacebuilding, facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding, prevent relapse of armed conflict, and make progress towards sustainable peace and development.

Definitions of UN Peace and Security Activities

Conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress, and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.

Peacekeeping preserves the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and assists in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.

Peace enforcement involves application, with the authorisation of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force, in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels of conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

‘Robust’ peacekeeping versus peace enforcement: Although the line between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, there are important differences. Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or main parties to the conflict, whilst peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for member states under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, unless authorised by the Security Council.

Figure 1 depicts the UN’s perspective on the interconnection between the various peace and security activities.

Figure 1: Linkages and overlaps in peace and security issues.

The Role of Multidimensional Peacekeeping in the Holistic Approach

UN peacekeeping was not originally envisaged in the UN Charter as among the measures designed to preserve international peace and security, but emerged out of necessity during the cold war as an ad hoc improvisation. More than half a century after the establishment of the first UN field operation in 1948, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and separating forces in interstate conflict to a multidimensional model that incorporates a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and help lay the foundations for sustainable peace and legitimate governance within countries emerging from conflict. Over time, the theoretical boundary between peacekeeping and other UN activities seems to have become blurred as the functions of UN peacekeeping operations have expanded in three directions: peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. Experience has shown that these activities rarely occur in a linear way, but are mutually reinforcing, providing a holistic approach to addressing conflict.

An overlap between peacemaking and peacekeeping emerged when UN peacekeeping operations took on new tasks, such as supervising the implementation of peace accords and election processes. With the liberal peace paradigm dominating during the 1990s, peace was associated with democratisation and electoral participation was determined to be an integral human right; hence, peacekeeping exit strategies were based on elections. However, peacekeeping operations declared successful relapsed into conflict after the mission was withdrawn, which led to the development of a comprehensive list of conditions that need to be fulfilled before ending a peacekeeping mission, subsumed under the concept of peacebuilding. This list includes elections as only one component, in addition to SSR, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDR) of former combatants, and institution building. UN peacekeeping strategies adapted to provide an adequate
response to the people-centred security needs of intrastate conflicts, with a focus primarily linked to the objective of peacebuilding.

The UN has experienced mixed outcomes in addressing intrastate conflicts, with successful peacekeeping operations in countries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia and Tajikistan, and lessons learned from failures in Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. The majority of conflicts continue to take place within rather than between states, with 90% of conflicts between 2000 and 2009 occurring in countries that had previously experienced civil war.12 Practice has always preceded the conceptualisation of UN peacekeeping and, as an evolving concept, it has developed after repeated trial and error in the field.13

The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, was a comprehensive review of the whole concept of peacekeeping, and stressed the “pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, in both the long and short terms”, identifying peacebuilding as a key element of this approach. The creation of the UN peacebuilding architecture, including the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005, reflected the increase in awareness of the links between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles. The unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2086 in January 2013 recognised multidimensional peacekeeping as a tool for peacebuilding and longer-term development. Such operations have an important role to assist host countries in developing critical peacebuilding priorities and strategies, help to create an enabling environment for national and international actors to perform peacebuilding tasks, and implement early peacebuilding tasks themselves. This consideration for early peacebuilding tasks is reflected in the mandates and composition of operations, and such contribution to long-term peacebuilding objectives allows for the successful transition and withdrawal of the operations.

Over the last 20 years, UN multidimensional peacekeeping has become an important international peacebuilding instrument, usually playing a more prominent role at the early stages of a post-conflict peacebuilding effort, which can last decades.14 Ten of the current 16 UN peacekeeping operations are multidimensional in nature and have been mandated by the Security Council to perform a broad range of peacebuilding activities.15 Also, out of the 16 current missions, there are nine missions with Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandates.16 On 10 April 2014, the Security Council authorised the deployment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) (MINUSCA), which is mandated to protect civilians as its utmost priority and support transition processes. Military, police and civilian personnel work towards a common outcome, with an understanding of their roles and responsibilities in the complex mission and their contribution to a more holistic approach to dealing with conflict. The unique skills and resources contribute towards both alleviating the suffering of people affected by conflict, and assisting them in the reconstruction of their post-conflict societies.
Immediate Response to Crisis Versus Long-term Peacebuilding

The established principles and practices of peacekeeping – as articulated in the Capstone Doctrine – have had to respond flexibly to new demands to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers. Peacekeeping increasingly involves internal conflicts with armed groups who are only partially under the control of those who consent to a UN deployment, and developments regarding the use of force – such as the Force Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the mandate of MINUSMA in Mali – highlight the contemporary challenges of deploying where there is no “peace to keep”. Whilst it has been debated that UN peacekeeping doctrine should be adapted to reflect such challenges, it has also been argued that the strength of UN peacekeeping lies in its creative and spontaneous adaptation of general principles to a specific situation. Undertaking peacekeeping today in missions like the DRC, CAR, Mali and South Sudan highlight the continuous need to make peacekeeping operations more effective at addressing the increasingly complex nature and multivariate types of international security needs in the modern context.

It is evident that there are two main areas of concern for peacekeeping operations: the immediate requirements to respond to a crisis, and contributing towards long-term peacebuilding and development. It is an objective of operations to provide the host state and its citizens with a reasonable degree of security, which allows peacebuilding to be completed and long-term development to begin over time. A mission’s exit should be based on the “successful completion of its mandate, resulting in the establishment of a requisite political and security environment conducive to durable peace and/or a follow-on peacebuilding process”.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support’s (DFS) strategy provides guidance for peacekeepers on prioritising, sequencing and planning critical early peacebuilding tasks, and articulates that priority initiatives are those which advance the peace process or political objectives of a mission and ensure security and/or lay the foundation for longer-term institution-building.

UN peacekeepers deployed in an intrastate conflict area do not only maintain military security arrangements (such as ceasefires). Public security, such as the maintenance of law and order – the primary responsibility of the police component in the mission – also plays a significant role.
in the protection of civilians in a divided community or a failed state. From a human security perspective, post-conflict strategies must not only include a guarantee of security, but also provide humanitarian relief – building social capital, nurturing the reconciliation and coexistence of divided communities and restoring governance. Such technical assistance required by post-conflict countries (as reflected in the mandate) is mainly provided by non-military expertise, in the form of civilians.

Figure 2 shows the generic life cycle of a mission. Above the mid-line are operations performed by military, police and support forces, which help enable a safe and secure environment for all citizens in the mission area. The crisis–stabilisation timeline shows a crisis occurring that requires the deployment of an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping mission to implement the complex security, protection, humanitarian assistance and development mandate needed to address the conflict in a holistic manner. The figure then shows how the mission progresses, after emergency life-saving actions and the re-establishment of a relatively secure environment. This allows peacebuilding to become the dominant focus of the mission. It should be noted that there are overlaps in areas of activity, which implies that many activities can occur simultaneously, and indicates that peacebuilding – represented by activities which occur primarily in the stabilisation phase – has its foundations in the beginning of the mission. Tasks such as PoC and the re-establishment of the rule of law builds the basis for the respect of human rights. These are immediate priorities with long-term peacebuilding implications, which give the local population and host state the confidence that violence will not reoccur, allowing for the rebuilding of society and the start of reconciliation.

Unfortunately, there are high levels of relapse into violence, which is indicative of how post-conflict countries often continue to experience instability years after the end of the armed conflict, as reflected in South Sudan at the end of 2013. The causes of instability and relapse vary by context and may include external stresses such as the impact of cross-border conflict and international criminal networks, as well as internal factors such as political exclusion, real or perceived discrimination against social groups, severe corruption, high levels of youth unemployment, and unequal distribution of natural resource wealth. These internal and external conditions can be profoundly destabilising for countries that have weak institutions and are politically and socially fragmented. Hence, inclusivity (inclusive political settlements, achieved either through a peace agreement and subsequent processes, or because of inclusive behaviour by the party that prevailed in the conflict) and institutional capacity-building (to strengthen formal and professional institutions) are needed to build the foundation for lasting peace.

**Acronyms:**
- FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
- HCHR: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
- ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
- NGO: Non-governmental organisation
- UNDP: UN Development Programme
- UNESCO: UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNICEF: UN International Children’s Emergency Fund
- WHO: World Health Organization

Figure 2: Activities undertaken during the life cycle of a mission – from crisis to stabilisation.
informal institutions, including restoring core governance functions and equitable service delivery) have been identified as critical in preventing relapse into violent conflict, and in producing more resilient states and societies.29

Key Considerations for a Holistic Approach to Addressing Conflict in Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping designed to deal directly with the security needs of people must be aligned with the human security framework, which indicates that the focus of post-conflict strategies should not be limited only to effective peacekeeping narrowly defined, but should also include peacebuilding and sustainable development.26 Some key considerations for improving the practice of UN peacekeeping in such post-conflict strategies follow.

**Measuring success:** Criticism that the holistic approach to addressing conflict through peacekeeping is too all-encompassing – which would mean failure in the achievement of such ambitious goals – is equally applied to the implementation of the concept of ‘human security’. The millennium development goals passed in 2000 were one attempt to codify the scope of human security and make it measurable. The challenge of peacebuilding, from the inception of a UN peacekeeping mission, is to ensure coherence between and integration of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development to achieve an effective response to post-conflict situations, and these elements are addressed through integrated strategic assessment and planning processes from the outset.27

**Transition/exit strategy:** Peacekeeping is designed to be temporary, and the goal is to stabilise the situation and lay the groundwork for sustainable peace. Mission planning must, from the outset, include a transition/exit strategy, which may involve coordinating, planning and preparing the political groundwork for a successor mission, a systematic handover of responsibilities to local authorities and other partners, or a joint UN system effort to move from post-conflict priorities to a peacebuilding process.28

**National ownership:** National ownership of the peacebuilding agenda is crucial, and should be supported by all the actors in the mission. The ‘light footprint’ approach advocates that UN activities should be limited to those that are appropriate to local needs and context, and that international staff should be limited to the minimum required, with an effort to ensure local capacity-building, so that nationals can take over from the UN as soon as possible.23 National governments, the UN, and regional and subregional organisations are encouraged to continue to use existing civilian expertise, as well as to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian capacities for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition.

**UN ‘Delivering as One’:** The UN system should ‘Deliver as One’ at country level, with one leader, one programme, one budget and, where appropriate, one office.24 Clarity on roles and responsibilities of UN peacekeeping operations, UN country teams and other relevant actors – including entities of the UN peacebuilding architecture and the UN agencies, funds and programmes for the delivery of prioritised support to a country, consistent with specific peacebuilding needs and priorities as outlined by national authorities – is necessary to ensure effective integration of effort.25 There is also the need to make use of the advisory, advocacy and resource mobilisation roles of the PBC in peacebuilding activities; the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is the focal point in the UN system for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding; and the UNDP to strengthen the security and justice sectors.

**Coordination among the various actors:** The improvement of civil-military co-ordination within a peacekeeping operation facilitates positive interaction among the various components of the operation and is an important part of peacekeeping strategies that take into account humanitarian and development needs.

The improvement of civil-military co-ordination within a peacekeeping operation facilitates positive interaction among the various components of the operation and is an important part of peacekeeping strategies that take into account humanitarian and development needs.
Early Peacebuilding Critical Success/Risk Factors for Peacekeeping Operations:

- political will at national, regional and international levels;
- local knowledge through in-depth assessments;
- clear and achievable mandate supported with adequate financing;
- strong leadership;
- partnerships that reflect clear roles, comparative strengths and integrated approaches;
- national and local ownership;
- popular engagement in prioritisation;
- availability of appropriate skills and equipment; and
- rapid deployment capacity.

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Endnotes

7 Ibid., p. 19.
11 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
26 Uesugi, Yuji (2004) op. cit.
29 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
37 United Nations DPKO (2011) op. cit.
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES TO PEACEKEEPING IN MALI

BY KWESI ANING

Introduction

Multiple security dilemmas pose significant challenges for several West African states. Narcotics continue to threaten these states, to the extent that the whole continent is now perceived as ‘NarcoTrAfica’. While such an assertion may, on the surface, be perceived as excessive, developments in West Africa since 2005 paint a clear picture of the formidable attacks against the littoral states of the region, and an intrusion into – and, in some instances, the near capture of – the state. Narcotics infiltration into public and private spaces in Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Mali has been characterised as a troubling situation. This article discusses the emergence and deepening of ‘unholy alliances’ in the Sahel. Such alliances create enabling environments and convergence for multiple criminal enterprises that pose particular threats to states, of which Mali is a case in point. The article then examines the particular case of Mali’s near state capture by the convergence of criminalised transnational public-private interests, which eventually posed threats to the survival of the state. The resultant international responses to the collapse of Mali raises critical questions – such as, what threats are posed to peacekeepers when these threats emanate from criminal groups and not states? What operational difficulties are faced by peacekeepers in such circumstances and, finally, how do we understand and appreciate the nexus between transnational threats and the challenges posed to multinational multidimensional peace support operations?

Above: UN Police (UNPOL) conduct a police training on drug trafficking in Timbuktu, Mali (11 December 2013).
The Emergence of Unholy Alliances: Interface between Narcotics and Terrorism in the Sahel

There is an emerging intersection between drug trafficking and the expansion and variation in the activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). While AQIM’s modus operandi for funding its activities had been kidnappings – particularly of foreigners – and the protection of smuggling rackets in the Sahel, it has changed its operational tactics since 2009. First is the increasing expansion of its spheres of influence and activities to the more southern states of West Africa, and an increasing addition of new commodities of value – namely narcotics, petrol, migrants and cigarettes. Basically, anything that is tradable and has a monetary value will be sold. Equally new is the mode of transporting these goods – by air.

A critical question needing to be posed relates to the manner in which transnational organised groups are increasingly using aviation and maritime infrastructures, and the convergence of such multiple interests. This has been characterised as the “most significant development in the criminal exploitation of aircraft since 9/11”. This concern captures the growing incidences where criminal groups, who hire or own such aircraft, now exploit uncharted and disused landing strips, makeshift runways and airports in the larger Sahel region. Ironically, at most of these places, there is no active law enforcement presence or air traffic controllers. To illustrate, most of the aviation infrastructure comprises twin-engine turboprops, executive Gulfstream IIs and Boeing 727s. These aircraft bring into the Sahel what is assessed to be multi-ton loads of cocaine. To circumvent the limited controls that may be available, these flights have fraudulent pilot certificates, false registration documents and altered tail numbers, and some do not have airworthy certificates and log books. Due to poor air traffic control facilities in most West African countries, where planes carrying narcotics have been detected, such as in Sierra Leone, Mauritania and Mali, this has occurred purely by chance. The implication is that the number of aircraft involved in these illegal operations may be considerably higher.

If the involvement of aircraft carrying cocaine into West Africa – an already fragile and unstable region – is disturbing, then the involvement of AQIM operatives, who cross the region to purchase drugs, heightens the insecurity dilemmas of West Africa. In both Mali and Ghana, AQIM operatives have been arrested – initially on drug charges, but eventually with terrorism charges added. In Ghana, Oumar Issa, Harouna Toure and Idriss Abelrahman were charged with “plotting to transport cocaine across Africa with the intent to support al Qaeda, [and] its local affiliate AQIM and [the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] FARC”, and have been described as “an unholy alliance between South American narco-terrorists and Islamic extremists”. Sahelian states such as Burkina Faso, Mali,
A Gulfstream jet, grounded by authorities in July 2008 after it was suspected to have been involved in a plot to transport more than 600 kilograms of cocaine from Venezuela, is seen at the Guinea Bissau international airport.

Mauritania and Niger are subject to a number of factors that make them vulnerable to transnational threats.

The transnational threats posed by both the traffickers and armed or terrorist groups to states and peacekeepers are considerable, especially in fragile Mali. The most serious challenge to the survival of the Malian state is not only the influx of multiple trafficked goods, but also the links and relationships among these transnational organised criminal groups. It has become commonplace for organised criminal groups to provide safe passage and protection to traffickers, in exchange for a percentage of the total face value of the trafficked goods. Through the levying of taxes, terrorist or rebel groups gain substantial financial spin-offs, which enable them to continue with their activities. The scale of such spin-offs means that traffickers impact the public and private sectors, and any community institutions in which a culture of quick and easy acquisition of money occurs. Such financial outcomes have bought traffickers friends in high places, and there is evidence that national institutions have been penetrated at the highest level. Yet, another worrying development is that money obtained through trafficking activities co-exists and intermingles with licit money from legitimate businesses. According to James Cockayne, these developments have contributed to West Africa “... fast becoming a Silicon Valley of criminal and militant innovation ...” A resultant impact is that such developments are eventually leading to “a massive innovation in West African criminal markets and the fragmentation of state monopolies on violence”.

Although Mali has experienced the presence of both the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and Multidimensional Integrated United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) troops, there is still a noticeable upsurge in the use of its territory as transit points for trafficking. There is no doubt that the presence of peacekeepers from both AFISMA and MINUSMA has not been strong enough to counter this upsurge in trafficking. In fact, with the concentration of most peacekeepers and international actors in the Bamako area, where little actual trafficking takes place, it is not surprising that the presence of peacekeepers provides an almost ‘legitimising’ space for the continuation of such activities. With the presence of international peacekeepers in Mali, the presupposition is that their presence forestalls trafficking activities. This is far from the reality, as the northern part of Mali is virtually outside government control. This has occurred mainly due to an environment that permits the various criminal, terrorist and rebel groups and their local collaborators to exploit already-established networks. Such networks provide storage for goods, information on routes, identification of watering sources, presence of tourists and the activities of soldiers or security forces, as well as a warren of safe houses and, in some instances, the connivance of law enforcement agencies. These transnational criminal networks have developed into multiple interlocking pieces and reflect the Sahel region’s long history of trafficking activities, perpetrated chiefly by the Tuaregs, and that the roots of the current collaboration between traffickers and terrorist or rebel groups in fact span several years.

As a result of state fragility and the corresponding strength of the traffickers, clashes between traffickers and terrorist or rebel groups and the state and international interveners have essentially become the Sahel’s new war. Rather like legitimate businesses, the relationship between trafficking and criminal networks and the terrorist or rebel groups has been forged by multiple common interests, primarily to maximise profits with the minimum of risk and to obtain the financial means to carry out their attacks on governments. The net results of this strategic
A Tuareg man stands by a truck in a street in Timbuktu, Mali. The area has become a stronghold for an al-Qaeda franchise, and a hub for trafficking cocaine from South America by air, which is then smuggled into Europe.

calculation are twofold: first, criminal enterprises engage in more than one activity to maximise their profits – for example, smuggling routes used for one illegal commodity can often easily be used for others. Second, cooperation exists among and with others engaging in the underground economy, including the bartering of illicit commodities between criminal groups, leading to processes that magnify, amplify and intensify one another.

Increasingly, both traffickers and terrorist or rebel groups seek out weak entry points within state structures, and then exploit such institutional fragilities to their economic and political benefit. The Sahelian states possess many such vulnerabilities – which, in turn, allow traffickers to manipulate such opportunities for their own criminal gain. What the Sahel and Mali demonstrate is the dangerous and dark side of globalisation, where criminal networks have enough clout to challenge sovereign states.8

The Case of Mali

Mali’s geographic characteristics make it attractive for the criminal activities that threaten the security of its region and population, not least because of the porous nature of its borders. This has encouraged small arms trafficking (and other types of trafficking), internal armed conflicts, illegal immigration through the use of forged travel documents, Islamic radicalism, the emergence of armed non-state actors, transnational organised crime and the possible struggle for control over natural resources.

The wide expanse of land makes the bulk of the northern regions – including Timbuktu, Gao8 and Kidal – favourable for criminal and terrorist activities.9 Rebels, terrorists, bandits and criminal groups operate in northern Mali, including known terrorist organisations such as AQIM and the Salafists. AQIM, poses a significant threat to the country. Traffickers engage primarily in the trafficking of people, cocaine, heroin and small quantities of cannabis. Mali is often used as a transit point for these goods, which are chiefly destined for Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria.

One of the main terrorist strongholds in Mali is Kidal, which serves as a base and safe haven for supplies such as food, water and petrol. Kidal is a mountainous region with good water resources, essential for the survival of terrorist groups and criminal networks operating in the area. Kidal is also particularly important because all arms transiting Mali towards Algeria, Mauritania and other places in this region cross this area of the desert. Tigaharghar, Tadhakk, Boghassa and Esseli in north-eastern Mali are also favourable spots for terrorist activities. Tinedima is an active supply base in the Timbuktu region, as are Tedjereste and Bourem in the Gao region.11

Although AQIM is strong, in Mali it operates through small cells originating from Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, Algeria and Egypt. Meanwhile, in Burkina Faso, which shares its borders with Mali and Niger in the northernmost part of the country, the Tuareg ethnic groups that are
spread out across all three borders have begun to show signs of potentially causing trouble. Until recently, the Tuareg groups in Mali and Niger were known primarily for cattle-rustling and car theft, particularly of cross-country 4x4 vehicles, which are either sold in-country or across the borders. Although such activities have not yet reached alarming proportions, Burkinabe officials are aware of the possibility of such activities escalating, due to the fragility of the situation across the country’s northern borders and the tendency for Tuareg groups to commit crimes in Mali or Niger before hurrying into Burkina Faso to seek refuge with their ethnic brothers. Although few actual acts of kidnapping occur in Mali, the country has become a location for trading hostages seized in Niger, Algeria and Tunisia, overseen by major trafficking networks.12

Terrorist groups are known to be present in Mali, although they are not active in that country. Instead, the terrorists act as logisticians to facilitate the purchase of arms and the provision of intelligence to other terrorist groups. Terrorism is perceived as a threat to Mali and its neighbours, because the objective of the terrorists is to create an Islamic state by first weakening state structures, then winning support and finally taking over state structures. Consequently, northern Mali has become a refuge for transnational criminal groups that, as yet, do not have any permanent bases in the country.

More importantly, northern Mali is ideally situated for transnational criminal groups to recuperate, following engagements in Algeria and Mauritania. The relationship between traffickers, terrorists and the local population is extremely close in northern Mali. This is underpinned by several factors:

- intermarriage with local communities;
- close cultural and religious ties;
- skin colour; and
- the exploitation of traffickers’ superior purchasing power – they sometimes buy goods at twice the going market rate. This has distorted market forces, while gaining loyalty and support from local groups.

Furthermore, because of the sparse population and wide distances involved, as well as – more importantly – a limited government presence, terrorist groups not only bring financial inducement but also supply medication to these communities, thus becoming the providers of social welfare.

The use of violence and force is ‘respected’ in the regions of Timbuktu and Kidal in northern Mali and, as a result, terrorist acts are condoned. This traditional perception has contributed to the rise of criminal gangs and illegal activities. Historically, arms and weapons have long been exchanged between rebels from Mali and Niger. When a rebellion ends in one country, weapons are hired to the active rebellion in another for a fee. Although this region is sparsely populated, terrorists, traffickers and local communities are prepared to support one another on the basis of mutual reciprocation. Kidal is particularly targeted in this sense, since the local people provide intelligence and are known to cooperate with AQIM.

Terrorists and traffickers also exploit traditional Tuareg marriage rites to gain a foothold within local communities.
In Tuareg cultural practices, marriage provides an opportunity for ‘foreigners’ to be accepted as part of the community. Thus, terrorists and traffickers earn the right to protection. By bearing children with their new families, and providing goods and social services, stronger bonds are formed.

The exploitation of religious sentiments is also an important part of the strategic processes terrorists and rebels use to connect with local communities. AQIM and its supporters use the medium of preaching to convert would-be members to their cause. In Kidal, there are two recruitment systems in operation: through the spiritual mode, by which they win converts to their ‘type’ of Islamic religion, and through marriage with local people. This forms the domestic or local component of the terrorist groups, but there is also a transnational or international component, made up of terrorists from Algeria and Burkina Faso. At present, part of AQIM’s strategy is to occupy sparsely populated areas where the state has little influence. This makes northern Mali particularly attractive and vulnerable. Here, security forces are harassed and AQIM operates freely with the Tuaregs. As a result, AQIM aims to establish its presence in the region while simultaneously expanding its activities. The end result of the constant assault on the state reflects the group’s aim to threaten and occupy the Sahelian states.

Understanding the Nexus of – and Implications for – Transnational Threats and Peacekeeping

To what extent then do the dynamics of transnational threats challenge peacekeeping practices? There is no doubt that there is an increasing recognition that transnational threats must be recognised and responded to. This was the context within which the United Nations (UN) Security Council, in designing the mandate for the intervention force in Mali, “express[ed] its continued concern over the serious threats posed by transnational organised crime in the Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism.” Furthermore, it “strongly condemn[ed] the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions”.

Transnational threats create difficult conditions for peacekeeping operations because while peacekeeping is localised, the transnational dimensions of crime are regional – and, in some instances, global. Therefore, what needs to be recognised is that “transnational organised crime accelerates and leverages the state failures that contemporary peacekeeping operations are assembled to address most often. The other linkage is that transnational organised crime often operates within the territorial scope of these peacekeeping operations, threatening their security and hampering their goals.”

Having a localised mandate but functioning in an operational environment where the opposing forces are transnational in character raises difficulties, which impact on potential effectiveness. Part of these challenges arise from the fact that pre-deployment training of peacekeepers hardly takes into consideration these changing operational dynamics, in which one particular operational area serves both as the incubator and the vector for such transnational threats. In Africa, Mali provides a useful example of the actual manner in which the changing phases and drivers of transnational
threats have coalesced to threaten international security. For example, French intervention through Operation Serval, following UN Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012, sought to oust Islamic militants in the north of Mali, who had begun a push into the centre of Mali. This eventually affected southern Algeria.

But the apparent lacunae and operational challenges posed by a ‘localised’ mandate responding to a transnational threat has been recognised by the UN in terms of exploring options for inter-mission cooperation. For over a decade, West Africa has provided the operational context within which the UN has sought to “encourage greater coordination between peacekeeping missions”.16 In a Secretary-General’s report on 2 March 2005, several recommendations were presented on how to facilitate inter-mission cooperation. For example, it emphasised the Council’s role “…in adjusting mission mandates to allow cross-border operations”.17 In an example of how inter-mission cooperation has provided a framework for how a ‘localised’ mandate was insufficient to deal with transnational threats, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) were authorised by the Council to temporarily redeploy personnel among these three missions, to “deal with challenges which cannot be handled within the authorised personnel ceiling of a given mission”.18 In the aftermath of these decisions, several inter-mission cooperation mandates have been given by the Council. In continuation of these earlier discussions, recent efforts have focused on four main potential areas for inter-mission cooperation, based on the UN’s experience. The four main areas of cooperation could include, but are not limited to:

1. filling existing capacity/capability gaps in times of heightened tension or crisis;
2. providing temporary surge capacity at times of crisis or at mission start-up;
3. ensuring joint planning, implementation or coordination; and
4. achieving efficiency gains or savings through the sharing or pooling of logistical, military or other assets.19

And herein lies the possible potential for resolving the Malian crisis, if MINUSMA’s mandates and personnel ceilings are inadequate to deal with the challenges posed to Mali – and, by extension, the whole of West Africa – by these transnational threats. ▲

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Endnotes
The Shift to Stabilisation Operations: Considerations for African Peace Support Operations

By Yvonne Akpasom and Walter Lotze

Introduction

The African Union (AU) is increasingly undertaking stabilisation activities in the conduct of its peace support operations (PSOs), as reflected in the language of the various Peace and Security Council (PSC) communiqués and mandates. The AU’s interventions – such as those in Somalia, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) – have sought, among other aspects, to support the stabilisation of countries as they transition from conflict to peace. In so doing, they have also supported processes to ensure the reestablishment of political and legal stability. Underpinning this approach is a greater awareness at the political level of what is required, in addition to military-security efforts, to establish peace. In contexts such as those of Somalia, stabilisation has broadly included support by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in the stabilisation of areas recovered from Al-Shabaab1 and the extension of the authority of the federal government, as well as the facilitation of the capacity of local administrations to strengthen the delivery of basic services to communities. In this sense, the notion of stabilisation for AMISOM has been closely tied to the provision of immediate peace dividends and supporting the extension of governance.

Above: AMISOM troops speak to elders in the town of Burdubow. The town was liberated from Al-Shabaab militants on 9 March 2014 in a joint operation by AMISOM and the Somali National Army (March 2014).
With this said, one of the key challenges for the AU has been a general lack of clarity of the term ‘stabilisation’. Indeed, there as yet does not exist a universally agreed-upon understanding of this concept. This article takes stabilisation to mean, broadly, efforts to stabilise a particular operating environment through, among other aspects, neutralising elements that work contrary to this objective and, together with the host government and other bilateral/multilateral partners, supporting the extension of governance and administrative services.

The experiences of AMISOM in this regard are quite instructive, and warrant further reflection as they provide an opportunity for introspection on the requirements for more effective approaches to stabilisation, particularly important for any future AU work in reconceptualising and re-visioning the African Standby Force (ASF). Through the AMISOM experience, we can also see the gap between mandating on stabilisation activities and the need to ensure an enhancement of the capabilities and resources of missions to implement these mandates. This article hopes to serve as a catalyst for a discussion within the AU on improving its approach to stabilisation, borrowing primarily from the experiences of AMISOM.

**Stabilisation and the African Standby Force**

When the final touches were being put to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 2002, its drafters envisioned that the ASF would, *inter alia*, perform tasks related to:

1. observation and monitoring missions;
2. interventions in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, or at the request of a member state;
3. preventive deployment;
4. peacebuilding;
5. humanitarian assistance in conflict areas; and
6. any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Building on this understanding, when the ASF Policy Framework was adopted in 2003, six principle scenarios that would guide both the development and the deployment of the ASF were envisioned, including the deployment of the ASF: to provide military advice to an existing political mission; as an observer mission, co-deployed with an existing United Nations (UN) mission; as a standalone observer mission; as a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, or as a preventive deployment; for complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations featuring a low level of spoilers; and for intervention purposes in situations where the international community did not act promptly, such as genocide or other grave circumstances. As the ASF doctrine was being developed in 2006, the prevalent understanding of UN peacekeeping doctrine at the time was used to inform the tasks that ASF operations were most likely to perform on the ground. As such, significant attention was paid to conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, peacemaking and peacebuilding, with police

As part of the effort to improve the infrastructure in Somalia, AMISOM provided assistance in regrading the roads around Afgoye (10 November 2013).
and rule of law and humanitarian responses also receiving some attention.

As a whole, the concept of stabilisation operations and tasks did not feature explicitly or prominently in the initial conceptual development of the ASF. Accordingly, little by the way of guidance on stabilisation operations or tasks was provided for, and these operations by and large conformed to the deployment scenarios as described above. In the course of the further development of the ASF and the attainment of initial operating capability, the operating environments the AU found itself intervening in were becoming increasingly complex, involving the need to take on open and direct resistance from belligerent groups, whilst at the same time supporting tasks related to governance and nation-building.

One of the first instances in which an AU PSO was explicitly provided with a stabilisation mandate was in September 2011, when the UN Security Council, in Resolution 2010, welcomed the improvement of security in Mogadishu and requested that AMISOM work with the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia to develop a stabilisation plan for Mogadishu. The Security Council also noted the important role an effective police presence could play in the stabilisation of Mogadishu, and stressed the need to continue to develop an effective Somali police force. In this regard, the Security Council welcomed the desire of the AU to develop a police component within AMISOM to support these stabilisation efforts. Since 2011, AMISOM has been mandated to take on an increasingly active and important role in stabilisation efforts in Somalia.

Subsequently, other AU PSOs, such as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), have been provided with stabilisation mandates and tasks. In December 2012, the Security Council mandated AFISMA to support the Malian authorities in recovering areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups, before transitioning to stabilisation activities to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidating state authority through appropriate capacities. When the AU PSC reviewed the progress being attained by AFISMA in Mali in March 2013, the stabilisation nature and role of the mission was referenced no less than three separate times. Specifically, the Security Council welcomed the accelerated deployment of AFISMA and the ongoing stabilisation operations to facilitate the consolidation of the security gains made on the ground, and expressed its deep appreciation to all the forces engaged in the security and stabilisation operations. The Security Council also appealed to AU member states and partners to provide support to the mission to fulfil its mandate effectively. This was aimed particularly at assisting Mali to regain the territories still occupied, to ensure the security of the institutions and the people,
and to stabilise the security environment in the country.7 When AFISMA was rehatted into a UN peacekeeping mission on 1 July 2013, the stabilisation efforts that AFISMA had initiated became a core area of focus for the new UN operation. Indeed, the UN Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was mandated, among other things, to stabilise key population centres and support the reestablishment of state authority throughout the country, once the core areas in which AFISMA had been engaged since its deployment.8 Similar language has recently also been used by both the AU PSC and the UN Security Council in relation to the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA), providing the operation with a stabilisation role and responsibilities.9

FUNDAMENTALLY, A QUESTION THAT SHOULD ARISE FOR DECISION-MAKERS AND POLICYMAKERS ALIKE IS HOW TO ARTICULATE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES (WITH RESPECT TO STABILISATION) THAT HAVE A REASONABLE DEGREE OF SUCCEEDING

Whilst it is clear that AU operations are increasingly mandated to undertake stabilisation activities at the political level, this has yet to translate into clear and achievable objectives and strategies on the ground. Fundamentally, a question that should arise for decision-makers and policymakers alike is how to articulate intervention strategies (with respect to stabilisation) that have a reasonable degree of succeeding.

What Initial Lessons and Observations Can be Drawn from AMISOM’s Stabilisation Experiences?

AMISOM first deployed to Somalia in early 2007, and the mandate of the operation has evolved significantly over the past seven years. The addition of a stabilisation element to the mission’s mandate is, however, a relatively recent development, first applied to AMISOM operations, as mentioned above, in September 2011, when the UN Security Council emphasised the need for the development of a stabilisation plan for Mogadishu, and again in February 2012, when the Security Council made reference in three separate instances to the stabilisation role of AMISOM. First, the Security Council stressed the importance of stabilising the areas secured by AMISOM and the Somali security forces, and requested the AU to support the delivery of stabilisation plans developed by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Somali Transitional Federal Government.
Recruits in Mogadishu’s new fire department are given training by AMISOM. The fire department resumed activities in the capital after more than two decades of civil war in Somalia (15 January 2013).

Second, the Security Council again noted the important role of an effective police presence in support of the stabilisation of Mogadishu, and welcomed the desire of the AU to develop an operational police component for AMISOM. Third, the Security Council indicated that, in its future decision-making, it would take into account the degree to which the Somali security forces and AMISOM had consolidated security and stability throughout south-central Somalia, on the basis of clear military objectives integrated into a political strategy. By the end of that year, the AU PSC started to use the same language in relation to AMISOM operations, requesting the AU Commission to undertake a strategic review of AMISOM operations with a view to determining how best the mission could further contribute towards the stabilisation of Somalia and the successful implementation of the priorities set by the Somali government. By the end of 2012, the UN Security Council, while extending AMISOM’s mandate, also expanded the stabilisation component of AMISOM, requesting the mission to assist, within its capabilities, with the implementation of the Somali National Security and Stabilisation Plan. At the request of the AU, it also extended the logistical support package for AMISOM’s civilian component, underlining the importance of these civilians deploying swiftly to areas recently liberated from Al-Shabaab.

In early 2013, following a review of AMISOM operations, the AU PSC comprehensively revised AMISOM’s mandate for the first time since 2007. One of the key facets of the revised mandate was that AMISOM was tasked to facilitate and coordinate support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilisation and reconstruction of Somalia. This represented an important development, as although the concept of stabilisation, or specific stabilisation tasks, had featured in previous decisions of the AU PSC, this was the first time that the AU was providing a stabilisation mandate to a PSO – coming only a year after the UN Security Council had first introduced the notion that AMISOM could play a role in support of the stabilisation of Mogadishu. The concept of stabilisation as an integral part of AMISOM’s mandate, or the necessity to conduct stabilisation tasks, has featured both prominently and regularly in subsequent decisions of the AU PSC and the UN Security Council, and the mission has accordingly increasingly become involved in stabilisation activities in Somalia. Indeed, this expansion in the activities of the AMISOM mandate was in no small part attributed to the ability of the mission to attain relatively improved security conditions for the local population – which, in turn, provided the space within which longer-term reconstruction activities could take place.

To provide support to the stabilisation process in Somalia, AMISOM deployed a police component of 540 personnel to Mogadishu, with some individual police officers deployed to Belet Weyne and Baidoa in 2013, to support the development of the Somali Police Force and to promote the shift from military-security operations towards rule-of-law operations. To this end, two Formed Police Units were deployed to Mogadishu in 2013, and were intended to give prominence to public policing efforts and
to partner with the Somali Police Force in the conduct of routine patrols, cordon and search operations, roadblocks and other measures designed to instil public confidence and empower policing efforts in the Somali capital.

WHILST A LIMITED POLICE PRESENCE, AND AN EVEN SMALLER CIVILIAN COMPONENT, HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN MOGADISHU, THE MISSION IS STILL NOT ADEQUATELY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO STABILISATION PROCESSES ONCE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED

In addition, from 2012 onwards, AMISOM maintained a permanent civilian presence in Mogadishu, providing limited political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian liaison and public information capability, which was slowly increased in 2014. The mission also placed emphasis on the delivery of quick impact projects (QIPs) to populations in the areas recently secured from Al-Shabaab, designed to yield immediate peace dividends and bring tangible benefits to the affected populations. Further, AMISOM actively participates in the stabilisation working groups led by the Somali Federal Government, and provides the operational support it can to ensure that the federal government can work effectively in the newly secured areas.

Despite these efforts, however, AMISOM has faced – and continues to face – four significant constraints in its ability to undertake and support stabilisation activities in Somalia. These have important implications for AU operations going forward. First, AMISOM is not optimally configured to support the stabilisation process in Somalia. Since its establishment in 2007, it has been a primarily military-heavy operation. Whilst a limited police presence, and an even smaller civilian component, have been established in Mogadishu, the mission is still not adequately designed to provide support to stabilisation processes once military operations have been concluded. Increasing chances for success in the establishment of long-term stability necessitates actions that transcend military activities, and further requires integration of effort between the military, police and civilian components of the mission. There is also a requirement to put in place the necessary doctrine, policies, training and other guidance that will inform and support field personnel in implementing stabilisation activities in challenging environments like Somalia.

Builders construct a school in the Wadajir district of Mogadishu, as part of humanitarian efforts undertaken by AMISOM (October 2012).
Second and related to the above, within AMISOM’s military component, insufficient capabilities for effective support to stabilisation processes have been made available. At present, those sections of the military component that could be utilised in support of stabilisation efforts – such as civil-military coordination (CIMIC), engineering, medical, public information, and the training sections – remain relatively understaffed, as more attention has to date been placed on combat capabilities.

Third, AMISOM as a PSO has not been provided with sufficient resources, both human and financial, to undertake stabilisation activities in its areas of operation. With limited budgets and drawn-out administrative systems, both on the part of the AU and on the part of those partners supporting the mission, efforts designed to be delivered quickly on the ground often become drawn-out and costly exercises.

Finally, it should be noted that given the recent addition of stabilisation as a core aspect of the AMISOM mandate, and given the relative newness of the concept of stabilisation in AU PSOs, AMISOM stabilisation activities to date have taken place in a relative policy vacuum, operating without sufficient strategic guidance from the AU Commission on how it is to approach and prioritise its stabilisation mandate and activities.

Recommendations for Future Operations with Stabilisation Mandates

Drawing on the experiences to date, as discussed previously, three principle lessons can be extracted for future operations with stabilisation mandates.

1. Develop clear guidance on stabilisation operations

Over the course of the past three years, first stabilisation activities and then stabilisation mandates have become increasingly prominent in AU PSOs. However, to date, insufficient guidance in the form of doctrine or policies has been developed to guide missions in the interpretation and implementation of these mandates. To support more effective mandate implementation, the
AU should develop guidance on the development and implementation of stabilisation mandates and activities by PSOs. Such guidance should also be elaborated in real-time in the activities and operations of the mission. In addition, particular attention needs to be paid to ensure that mandates are clear and achievable, and that they take into consideration opportunities as well as constraints. Training of mission personnel is also a necessary investment in ensuring their preparation to undertake the broad array of tasks that stabilisation operations require.

2. Match mandates with capabilities

Linked to the previous point, where stabilisation mandates have been provided to operations, the appropriate resources should be provided to missions to implement these mandates, and the appropriate capabilities should be developed for the implementation of such mandates. Specifically, greater attention needs to be paid to the role of the civilian and police components with regard to stabilisation activities, and putting in place the requisite capabilities accordingly. Similarly, within the military component of a PSO, the requisite CIMIC, public information, engineering, medical and similar capabilities need to be deployed to ensure that the military can play an effective supporting role for stabilisation activities. Overall, political commitment in terms of providing the requisite financial, logistical, human resources and other material resources can be a determining factor in the attainment of more efficacious interventions.

3. Develop cohesive strategies

It should also be recognised that supporting stabilisation processes cannot be the responsibility of AU PSOs alone, and requires coordinated and harmonised engagement on the part of the AU Commission as a whole. Thus, the relevant divisions and departments within the Commission dealing with early warning, conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and development, human rights, governance, gender, development and related fields should be brought together to develop and implement a stabilisation plan jointly with missions in the field, to ensure that the support provided to stabilisation processes is both coherent and cohesive from an organisational point of view.

Conclusion

Whilst stabilisation missions are not entirely a new phenomenon, the inclusion of stabilisation tasks in AU operations appears to feature more prominently in the language of the various mandates and resolutions/communiqués with reference to AU operations, particularly AMISOM. Less attention has been paid, however, to how such political directives translate in practice in the day-to-day operations and activities of a particular mission – and, accordingly, what capacities and capabilities are required to increase the chances for success. As the AU begins a process of re-visioning the ASF, following recommendations to this effect by the AU Independent Panel of Experts’ assessment of the ASF,14 further conceptual work needs to be undertaken to throw light on what stabilisation means in the AU context, and how future operations should be configured accordingly.

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Endnotes

1 Al-Shabaab is an armed movement that has been in conflict with the Transitional Federal Government and the Federal Government of Somalia since 2006.
14 In January 2013, the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government requested an assessment of the progress made to date with the establishment of the ASF. To this end, the chairperson of the AU Commission appointed an independent panel of experts in July 2013 to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the ASF. The panel’s report was submitted in December 2013, and the report and its recommendations were subsequently endorsed at the 2014 Summit of Heads of State and Government.
The SADC Standby Force

The African Standby Force (ASF) is an operational arm of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their countries of origin. The regional standby forces (RSFs) that make up the ASF include: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF), The North African Regional Capability (NARC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force. Each regional standby capability or brigade that makes up the ASF should consist of the following: a regional brigade, standby roster, centre of excellence, civilian component, pledge units, brigade headquarters, planning element (PLANeLM), memorandum of understanding (MoU) and framework documents. As one of the regional standby forces that make up the ASF, the SADC Standby Force (SSF) was officially launched at the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka on 17 August 2007. The SSF is represented by a SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG). These compositions are being operationalised between 2010 and 2015. This time frame is in line with phases II and III of the ASF Roadmap. Phase II proposes the consolidation of the ASF tools and concept of operations, and the identification of capacities for deployment prior to 2010, whereas Phase III looks at validating the procedures of the ASF by 2009.

The SSF mandate is wide and covers:

- observation and monitoring missions;
- peace support operations (PSOs);
- interventions at the request of a member state to restore peace and security;
- preventative deployment (to stop the escalation of conflict, or to prevent conflict from spilling over into neighbouring states);
- peacebuilding in a post-conflict situation (including disarmament and demobilisation);
- humanitarian missions in aid of civilians (conflict or natural disaster related); and
- any other functions as may be authorised by the SADC Summit.

The SSF comprises three distinct components: military, police and civilian. The regional military, police and civilian staff on secondment from member states to SADC are on rotation in Gaborone, while the troops and personnel for the SSF are drawn from member states. In support of the ASF, the SADC Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) set up a technical team comprised of military planners to form the PLANeLM of the SSF. The SADC PLANeLM is an autonomous organisation that is not intended to be incorporated into the SSF structure during actual missions. It operates on a daily basis as a tool of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and receives its guidance from the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Committee of SADC Police Chiefs. The SSF mission scenarios are consistent with the African Union (AU) scenarios for deployment.
The SADC Standby Force Personnel Capacity

The SSF has made considerable progress towards its full operationalisation. In addition to the establishment of its PLANeLM, the SSF has further signed an MoU with its member states to establish a SADC BRIG, and to guide its operations and member states’ contributions. The SADC PLANeLM and SADC BRIG manage the SSF system and undertake the responsibility to monitor the preparation of the force within troop-contributing countries. The SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation approved the policy framework for the Civilian Component of the SSF in July 2012, and a roster for the secondment of civilian officers to the force’s PLANeLM in Botswana. The committee also approved a roster model for placement of civilians from member states at the PLANeLM, as well as the secondment of civilian personnel to the PLANeLM effective from 2013.

The SADC Standby Force Readiness is Determined by the Following Achieved Benchmarks

- framework documents;
- MoU with member states;
- PLANeLM;
- SADC BRIG headquarters;
- operational roadmap for the SADC BRIG;
- pledge unit;
- SSF logistics depot;
- SSF centre of excellence;
- The operationality of the SADC BRIG;
- SSF civilian component;
- SSF police component; and
- training of SSF personnel.

The Objectives of the SADC RPTC

- to promote regional cooperation in peace and security among SADC member states;
- to build capacity in conflict prevention and conflict management, including the peace support organ;
- to train peacekeeping practitioners and provide training, enabling all SADC member states to take part in peace support organs;
- to assist in planning for SADC peacekeeping exercises and operations;
- to develop and deliver peacekeeping training in line with the SADC, AU and United Nations (UN) standards; and
- to implement the objectives of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and the SADC development agenda related to peace and security.

SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre Training as a Tool for Readiness

The multidimensionality of peacekeeping requires the appropriate training of civilian, military and police personnel. One key pillar for the success of the ASF is the support from regional training centres of excellence. Training by the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) has been a relevant tool to address the initial challenges faced by the SSF. These challenges include the lack of a common training doctrine and the need for clarity in command and control issues, as well as in roles and mandate. Also, the need to have regular field training exercises, map exercises and command post exercises are part of the training requirements for troop-contributing countries that make up the SADC BRIG. The SADC RPTC has been very effective in providing the relevant training exercises required to improve the knowledge and effectiveness of the SSF personnel, and to address key challenges faced in peace support operations.

ASF Scenarios and Timeline for Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment Requirement from Mandate Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice to a political mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Standalone AU/regional observer mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peacebuilding)</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers</td>
<td>90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention; for example, in genocide situations, where the international community does not act promptly</td>
<td>14 days with robust military force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The SADC RPTC promotes civilian participation in peace operations through rostering, curriculum development, research and training, with support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and other partners. A number of civilian personnel, police and military officers have been trained by the SADC RPTC in Harare since its inception in 1995. The SADC RPTC also works towards improving female representation in all its training courses. From 2013 to date, the centre has trained about 76 women in peace support operation concepts.

### SADC RPTC Training Contributions to the Preparation of Peacekeeping Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management Module at the UN Staff Officers Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Liaison Officers Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Conflict Management Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management for the UN Commanders Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC-RPTC Peace Support Operations Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Course for the SADC Subregion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Preparedness – for the SSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Multinational Military Exercise, Codenamed GOLFINHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Civilian Mission Management Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre – Senior Mission Leadership Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC RPTC Civilian Foundation and Senior Police Officers Courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civilian Dimension of Peace Operations at the SADC RPTC Peace Support Operations Course for Battalion Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Operations Course for SADC Senior Police Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Middle Management and Leadership Course</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To fuse civilian peacekeeping approach to a more military orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To strengthen ties with the regional centre, with the broader aim of fusing the civilian peacekeeping approach with the more military orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To train participants in advanced conflict management skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop the pool of logisticians to offer support to peacekeeping missions from the SADC region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create a pool of civilian experts in PSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support the SADCBRIG in improving knowledge in PSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To contribute towards the establishment of a trained civilian component of the SSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To test the readiness of the SSF military, police and civilian components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of civilian officers in middle-management duties in Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To strengthen the senior leadership capacity within the SADC region, following the general guidelines set forth in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Senior Leaders Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To increase understanding on the civilian and multidimensional aspects of PSOs within the military-dominated training centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To increase awareness on the civilian dimension of peacekeeping among key military officers who will serve as battalion commanders in future peace operations in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To enhance understanding of the key concepts used in the practice of peacekeeping/peacebuilding and conflict management; the various negotiation and mediation approaches; and the centrality of these in the planning, analysis and conduct of peace operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To enhance understanding of the key concepts used in the practice of peacekeeping/peacebuilding and conflict management; the various negotiation and mediation approaches; and the centrality of these in the planning, analysis and conduct of peace operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentages of Training Participants (2013–2014)

- **Military**: 27%
- **Police**: 33%
- **Civilians**: 25%
- **Corrections/Prisons Officers**: 15%
ACCORD Support to the Development of the SSF

The Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa Programme at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) support to the AU on the ASF, since the inception of the ASF civilian dimension project in 2006, has been on staffing, training, rostering and recruitment. ACCORD has contributed to the development of AU ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Framework, the AU ASF Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan and, as a result, the SADC Standby Force Civilian Dimension Policy Framework. ACCORD also collaborates with key regional training centres of excellence, such as the SADC RPTC, on civilian and multidimensional training approaches, aimed at facilitating the development of the required civilian and multidimensional capacities and capabilities for current and future AU peace operations, utilising the ASF common training doctrine. ACCORD has contributed to the training and preparation of civilian personnel for map exercises, command post and field training exercises organised by the RSFs to test their capacities and capabilities. ACCORD’s engagements with the SADC RPTC have included training support in the form of (1) module descriptions on the development of curriculum for pre-deployment courses; and (2) training facilitation of modules on Negotiation and Mediation, Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC), Civilian Dimension of Peace Operations, and Protection of Civilians. Over the years, ACCORD has conducted a series of trainings with the SADC RPTC in support of building the pool of civilian, police and military expertise for the SSF in the region, as reflected in the following figures.

Olivia Victoria Davies is a Programme Officer in ACCORD’s Peacekeeping Unit.

Endnotes

6 Chellah, Christopher B.G. (2014) op. cit., p. 5.
8 All the training objectives are obtained from TfP ACCORD Annual Reports from 1997 to 2011.
9 All SADC RPTC training statistics are obtained from GIZ, as well as calculated from TfP ACCORD Annual Reports from 1997 to 2011.
The Impact of Peacekeeping Operations

As of 10 April 2014, there are 17 peace operations led by the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and 118,111 peacekeepers worldwide. The number of peacekeeping operations has increased over the years, in response to demands from countries in the aftermath of conflict for this kind of intervention. Peacekeepers contribute to maintaining peace, and by their very presence reduce the risk of further conflict by 55%. However, research into the political economy of peacekeeping sheds light not only on the benefits, but also the costs of peacekeeping. Whilst peacekeeping operations significantly improve the chances for peace, empirical studies highlight how such operations are an economic source of income and employment in economically weak post-conflict contexts, and show the perverse incentive and increased instability that results if such an economic source is reduced or removed. Peacekeeping missions also bring with them the risks of increased prostitution in response to demand from peacekeeping personnel, trafficking in women and girls, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of local populations, including minors. Whilst SEA by peacekeeping personnel is a reality, discussions around peacekeepers and sexual violence have disproportionately portrayed them as perpetrators rather than protectors, as SEA figures in the media eclipse successful peacekeeping initiatives.

Zainab Hawa Bangura is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

Zero-tolerance Policy on SEA

Learning from the lessons in past peacekeeping missions such as Haiti, Mozambique and Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN has made progress in addressing SEA, which is a conduct and discipline issue in peace operations. The UN Secretary-General has issued a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy and, in 2003, disseminated a bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) has also emphasised the need to build greater awareness of the responsibilities of UN peacekeepers. Furthermore, there is a policy of transparency in reporting on these issues, with access to statistics from UN DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) on allegations of SEA and other forms of misconduct.

Staff members of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) take part in the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) awareness training in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire (March 2005).
Figure 1: Trends for sexual exploitation and abuse allegations involving UN peacekeeping personnel.

Figure 2: Percentage of reported cases of SEA by uniformed civilian personnel and/or humanitarian workers that are acted upon out of the total number of referred cases.

UN Response to SEA through Conduct and Discipline

The UN has a three-pronged strategy to address SEA, which includes:

1. prevention of misconduct;
2. enforcement of UN standards of conduct; and
3. remedial action.
### Conduct and discipline/codes of conduct

#### Definitions:

- **Serious misconduct**: "Any act, omission or negligence, including criminal acts, that is a violation of mission standard operating procedures, directives, or any other applicable rules, regulations or administrative instructions that results in or likely to result in serious damage or injury to an individual or to the mission." Serious misconduct includes SEA (including human trafficking) and sexual harassment.

- **Gender-based violence (GBV)**: “… is violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts of physical, sexual and psychological violence such as rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, trafficking in women and forced prostitution, or other acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivation of liberty.”

### The Compilation of Guidance and Directives on Disciplinary Issues for All Categories of Personnel Serving in UN Peacekeeping and Other Field Missions:

- This directive provides instructions for dealing with serious misconduct by peacekeeping personnel, including sexual exploitation, sexual abuse and sexual harassment. The aim of the DPKO disciplinary directive is to encourage common standards of behaviour and comparable action when dealing with serious misconduct, across all categories of peacekeeping personnel.

### Training

- Troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries are responsible for providing mandatory pre-deployment training for military and police personnel.

- The UN DPKO and the UN Conduct and Discipline (C&D) Unit have demonstrated their efforts to curb SEA by ensuring the provision of pre-deployment training material to member states familiar with policies and regulations of the DPKO and who are in line with generating a basic level of gender awareness. The UN C&D Unit has also provided mandatory training on the prevention of SEA in UN missions. Training relative to the forms of serious misconduct (sexual exploitation, sexual abuse and sexual harassment) is touched upon in existing training material relating to codes of conduct.

- The DPKO revises training material with increasing content on gender-based violence – sexual exploitation, sexual abuse and sexual harassment. The emphasis is on ensuring that all peacekeeping personnel – whether military, police or civilian – participate in a basic level of gender-awareness training during pre-deployment and/or induction training.

### Awareness-raising

- The C&D Unit raises awareness by reaching out to host populations, including local government officials, relevant civil society organisations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

- Awareness-raising measures undertaken in field missions include poster campaigns, newsletters, brochures, websites and radio broadcasts.

### Preventative measures

- Prevention measures at field level include restriction of movement, curfews, requiring soldiers to wear uniforms outside barracks, designating off-limits areas, non-fraternisation policies, increased patrols around high-risk areas, and decentralisation of the C&D team personnel into locations with a potentially high risk of misconduct.

- The UN Inter-agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse has developed common guidelines on the implementation of the Secretary-General’s bulletin on *Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse* – a useful resource for managers and trainers.
Enforcement of UN standards of conduct

The UN ensures the enforcement of its standards of conduct through the implementation of the following:

- **Responsibility for investigations**: The Office of Internal Oversight Services, the independent investigative arm of the UN, is the sole body in the UN responsible for investigating all Category 1 allegations, which include all SEA-related violations.

- **Disciplinary action**: The Office of Human Resources Management in the Department of Management takes disciplinary measures for civilian personnel; if the serious misconduct involves military or police personnel, the UN may expatriate or ban them from further peacekeeping missions.

- **C&D Unit**: This unit is responsible for reporting misconduct, record keeping and data tracking, in line with the policy on transparency.

- **Criminal Accountability of UN Staff and Experts on Mission**: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 to address the extension of national jurisdiction by member states to cover criminal misconduct of UN officials or experts on mission.

- **Specific responsibilities of heads of mission for preventing and addressing GBV in a peacekeeping mission**: Heads of missions are responsible for taking appropriate action in cases of serious misconduct, assisting victims of SEA perpetrated by peacekeeping personnel, and promptly informing the focal point of SEA at headquarters.

Remedial action

The UN takes measures for remedial action by providing assistance and support for victims of SEA, as outlined in the following policy instruments:

- The Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Non-UN Personnel (2006), which is reinforced by the General Assembly Resolution on the UN Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel (2007). This resolution calls for the establishment of a sexual exploitation and abuse victim assistance mechanism (SEA/VAM) in every country in which the UN operates. The UN and NGOs have worked together through an interagency task force to formulate a joint approach to victim assistance. The SEA/VAMs provide medical, legal, psychosocial and immediate material care, as well as the facilitation of paternity and child support claims.

Endnotes


6 UN Conduct and Discipline Unit (n.d.) ’Statistics: Allegations for All Categories of Personnel Per Year (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse)’, Available at: <http://cdu.unlb.org/StatisticAllegationsbyCategoryofPersonnelSexualExploitationandAbus e/AllegationsforAllCategoriesofPersonnelPerYearSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx> [Accessed 27 May 2013].


ENHANCING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE: THE CASE FOR A SHIFT TO A JUST-IN-TIME RAPID RESPONSE MODEL?

BY CEDRIC DE CONING

Introduction
When political or social tensions result in violent conflict, the solution that is usually most prominently on the table is the rapid deployment of a peace support operation, as in the recent cases of the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. This is why the 2002 Protocol establishing the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) provided for the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin. When fully operational by end-2015, the rapid deployment capacity (RDC) of the ASF should be on standing readiness to deploy within 14 days, in response to mass atrocity crimes.

This target has, however, proven to be quite a challenge. In fact, there is no international or regional organisation that can deploy such a force within 14 days. There are only a handful of countries in the world that have the kind of standing readiness capacity to deploy at such speeds. If pursuing this kind of response time is unrealistic, is it not time to take stock and question whether this is the type of model in which we should continue to invest our efforts?

This article questions whether it is time for the ASF to shift from a standing readiness model to a just-in-time rapid response model. An overview is provided of the

Above: In 2013, more than 75 000 African peacekeepers served in African Union and United Nations peace operations.
The African Standby Force is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents. When fully operational by the end of 2015, the Force should be on standing readiness to deploy within 14 days.

progress made with the establishment of the ASF to date. Then, on the basis of an assessment of the actual African capabilities, as reflected in its deployments and operations, an argument for adjusting the ASF model to a more realistic and efficient just-in-time rapid response model is made.

The African Standby Force

The ASF is one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), alongside the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the Military Staff Committee, the Peace Fund and the AU’s PSC. The ASF is thus part of a holistic African approach to engaging in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The ASF is a continental standby capacity with a brigade-sized multidimensional (military, police and civilian) standby arrangement in each of the AU’s five regions: North, South, East, West and Central Africa. The policy framework envisaged six scenarios for ASF deployments, ranging in intensity and complexity from Scenario 1 to Scenario 6, with Scenario 5 providing for a complex peace operation and Scenario 6 providing for a rapid (14-day) peace enforcement response to mass atrocity crimes. Each regional standby arrangement should have an RDC with units that are pre-identified, prepared and verified, and then placed on standing readiness so that they are able to deploy within 14 days. The model also implies that the AU and its regions must have functioning headquarters, with matching continental and regional logistical bases that can plan and support such operations, including the strategic lift arrangements necessary to deploy the RDC within the 14-day time period.

The ASF Policy Framework was approved in 2003, and has been implemented in several phases or ‘roadmaps’. The initial target was set for 2010, but when that target was only partially met, a new target for full operational capability was set for 2015.

The African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC)

Over the last decade, in a parallel development to the establishment of the ASF, the AU has deployed several peace operations, including to Burundi (AMIB), Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM). Over time, frustration built up around the tension between the investment in an ASF capability that would only be ready in 2010 – later postponed to 2015 – and the need to deploy troops, police officers and civilians, as well as their equipment, to actual and ongoing operations. This tension came to a head in 2012, when the Government of Mali asked France to intervene in its crisis because the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were perceived not to be able to deploy their forces rapidly enough to deal decisively with the unfolding crisis in Mali.1

As a result of this frustration, a number of African countries decided to jointly create the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) in January 2013. The ACIRC was presented as an interim measure, aimed at addressing the rapid response deficit until such time as the ASF and its RDC reached full operational capability. The ACIRC is a voluntary arrangement, where those countries with the necessary capabilities make them available under the auspices of the AU. The distinguishing feature of the ACIRC is that it proposes a coalition-of-the-willing model that will be deployed by its contributors, initially at their own cost, under a lead-nation model. However, such a coalition will require AU approval for it to operate under AU auspices.

These factors – voluntary participation, coalition-of-the-willing, lead nation, self-funded – are all designed to make this mechanism more rapid. However, because the ACIRC model is voluntary, it will also fail to address the AU’s need to have a predictable rapid deployment capability. In practice, it means that countries will only be willing to deploy at their own cost when they have dire national interests at stake.2

2013 Assessment of the ASF

In the context of the Mali experience and the decision to establish the ACIRC, the January 2013 AU General Assembly asked for an assessment of the progress made
A peacekeeping brigade, part of the planned African Standby Force to be deployed on peace missions and crises on the continent, stand at attention as it was officially launched in front of regional heads of state at the end of a summit of the 14-member Southern African Development Community in Lusaka (17 August 2007).

to date with the establishment of the ASF. To meet this request, the chairperson of the Commission appointed an independent panel of experts in July 2013 to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the ASF. The panel submitted its report in December 2013, and in January 2014 the report and the recommendations of the panel were endorsed by both the ministers of Defence and Security and the AU Summit.

The panel found that despite progress towards operationalising the ASF, significant shortcomings, gaps and obstacles still remain. The panel was of the opinion that at the current pace and scope of effort, it is unlikely that the ASF will achieve full operational capability by the end of 2015. Therefore, the panel recommended that to achieve full operational capability by the end of 2015, a major effort will be needed over the following 18 to 24 months. The panel presented a plan of action that was aimed at addressing those key areas which, if left unaddressed, would make it impossible to achieve full operational capability.

The panel also recommended that the AU gives special attention to the financing of its peace support operations. The most significant constraint on AU peace operations, and its ability to respond rapidly to unfolding crises, is the inability of the AU member states to fund their own operations. The AU cannot make its own independent decisions regarding the mandate, scope, size and duration of its peace operations, as long as it is dependent on external partners to cover the cost of its peace operations. The panel thus strongly supported the emphasis the AU is currently placing on generating its own resources. At the same time, the panel recommended that the AU takes steps to reduce the cost of the ASF by right-sizing its concept, structures and policies, including the concept of mission support, in particular.

The panel also recommended that the AU considers undertaking a Brahimi-type high-level strategic review of the future of the ASF and African peace support operations. The ASF was designed on assumptions derived mainly from the UN’s multidimensional peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s. Since then, the AU has managed peace operations of its own in Burundi, the CAR, Darfur, Mali and Somalia. As a result of these operational experiences, the AU, the regions and the member states involved have started to develop their own body of knowledge on African-led peace operations. A significant gap has opened up between the consensual peacekeeping model the ASF is designed for, and the actual peace enforcement and stability operations the AU has been called on to undertake in Somalia, Mali and the CAR. The panel argued that the existing ASF Policy Framework should be reviewed against these experiences, and be aligned with the realities of the African peace operation experience. This will ensure that a new strategic vision for African peace operations and the ASF will be in place, which can inform the future of the ASF beyond 2015.

Impact of the ASF on New and Ongoing AU Peace Operations

The panel also noted that it is artificial to reflect on the standby capacity of the ASF, without also reflecting on the significant increase in actual African peace operations
capacity since the launch of the ASF project a decade ago. This increase is reflected in the number and scale of peace operations undertaken by the AU over this period, and the contributions from African troop-contributing countries to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. In total, approximately 40 000 uniformed and civilian personnel were mandated to serve in AU peace operations in 2013 (approximately 71 000, if the joint AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur is also taken into account). In addition, African contributions to UN peacekeeping operations have increased steadily during this period – from a little over 10 000 per annum in 2003, when the ASF project was launched, to approximately 35 000 per annum by 2013. This means that, in 2013, more than 75 000 African peacekeepers served in African and UN peace operations.

Since the establishment of the ASF, the AU has deployed missions of its own to Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, Mali and the CAR. Each of these missions involved political decision-making processes, planning, deployment, strategic and operational management and mission support. Several of these missions were also handed over and liquidated. Together, they represent a significant demonstration of capacity and experience. All these missions have been undertaken with support from the UN, European Union (EU) and bilateral partners, and they thus also reflect a growing body of experience with various forms of partnerships and collaborative action. In most of these missions, the ASF planning elements at the continental and regional levels have been involved in the planning and management of the missions, and the ASF regional centres of excellence have been involved in the training, preparation and evaluation of these missions.

Despite this record, some observers continue to criticise the ASF as ineffective, because its standing readiness model has not yet been utilised as envisaged. The panel argued that this distinction between the ASF – understood as the units, equipment and personnel pledged under the ASF – and the actual units and personnel deployed to AU peace operations, are artificial. The 75 000 African peacekeepers deployed in 2013 come from the same member states that have pledged contributions to the ASF, which demonstrates that these member states do have these capabilities and are able to deploy them when needed.

When it comes to rapid deployment, it should be noted that the AU, together with its troop-contributing countries and partners, have deployed forces into Somalia and the CAR far more rapidly over the last 24 months than the EU or the UN. It can therefore be argued that Africa’s actual deployed capacity is a stronger indicator of Africa’s real peace operation capability than the pledges reflected in the ASF. At the same time, we need to acknowledge that the

In 2012, the Government of Mali asked France to intervene in its crisis because the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States were perceived not to be able to deploy their forces rapidly enough to deal with the unfolding crisis in Mali.
AMISOM peacekeepers disembark from a plane at the Mogadishu airport to begin their mission in Somalia (1 July 2011).

ASF is not only going to generate value at some point in future; it is already significantly contributing to preparing the capabilities that are deployed to actual African and UN peace operations.

**The Case for a Just-in-time Rapid Response Model**

The logic behind the standby concept is that the ability to deploy a peace operation rapidly will be greatly enhanced if you preselect soldiers, police officers and civilian experts; prepare and train them; make sure they have the necessary equipment and support systems in place; and then place them on a standing readiness mode, waiting for a decision to deploy them. The standby model assumes that such a standing readiness capacity is a necessary precondition for rapid deployment, but acknowledges that it is not sufficient to ensure that a peace operation can be rapidly deployed when faced with a dire crisis. Two additional factors highlighted in the 2013 ASF assessment – the political decision-making process and the financing of peace operations – have already been mentioned.

The ASF and all other such standby arrangements suffer from two further interrelated vulnerabilities. The first is the political will of the contributing countries to participate in any given operation. Agreeing to participate in a standby arrangement is one thing, but agreeing to participate in a specific peace operation is a separate decision altogether. The second is the match between the context-specific needs of a specific mission at hand and the off-the-shelf generic design of the standby force. It is a combination of these two vulnerabilities that has undermined all international efforts to date to establish standby arrangements that can generate predictable rapid response mechanisms.

The UN Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)’ initiative, the EU Battle Group concept and the ASF share these same vulnerabilities. The SHIRBRIG initiative has already been abandoned, and it is unlikely that the EU Battle Group and the ASF’s standing readiness capacity will be used as envisaged. This is because each crisis is unique, and it is doubtful that a generic standby capacity can sufficiently match the needs – both in terms of the political coalition and the operational capabilities – posed by the specific challenge. Each crisis requires a context-specific solution, including the coming together of a unique set of countries that have a political interest in the resolution of the conflict, or have an interest in being part of that particular mission. Each crisis also requires a slightly different set of capacities, and the off-the-shelf generic standby brigade model does not meet such needs. This explains why the AU, EU and UN have not found a direct use for its standing readiness arrangements to date.

Rapid deployment can, of course, only happen if there are capabilities at national level that can be deployed. The basic assumption or logic of the standby model thus holds true at national level, but falls apart when it is applied at the multinational level. This is because at this level the decisive factor is not capabilities and readiness, but how those capabilities are coalesced in a political coalition that forges together political will, financial means, the capacity to plan, deploy and manage an operation and the national capabilities that can be deployed.
National interest is a subtle and often indirect driver in the consensual type of peace operations the UN and EU typically undertake, but it is still vitally important. In the AU context, where the operations undertaken to date have almost all been peace enforcement operations, with a stabilisation mandate that requires a higher degree of intensity, robustness and risk, the national interest of the major troop-contributing countries, in particular, has been of decisive importance. Both the missions in Somalia and the CAR have sustained heavy losses. A country with no interest in a given crisis is unlikely to agree to its capabilities being deployed in a high-intensity and high-risk operation, just because they agreed to be part of a regional standby arrangement.

What can be concluded from the ASF experience to date is that the general effort to establish the ASF has contributed significantly to the capacity of the AU, the regions and AU member states to plan, prepare, train and deploy military, police and civilian capacities to actual missions. However, the standing readiness dimension of the ASF concept – that is, the idea of specific pre-identified military and police units being prepared, verified and then placed on standing readiness, so that they can be deployed rapidly when called upon to do so – has not, and is unlikely to be used as assumed in the design of the ASF.

This leads to the recommendation that we should adjust the post-2015 ASF concept to one that is aimed at generating a just-in-time capacity, rather than a standing readiness capacity. A just-in-time model will focus on developing common standards and procedures, including through joint training and exercises. It should also have a special focus on developing AU, regional and national planning, command, mission management and mission support capabilities.

A COUNTRY WITH NO INTEREST IN A GIVEN CRISIS IS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO ITS CAPABILITIES BEING DEPLOYED IN A HIGH-INTENSITY AND HIGH-RISK OPERATION, JUST BECAUSE THEY AGREED TO BE PART OF A REGIONAL STANDBY ARRANGEMENT

There may be a place for the ACIRC lead-nation model, especially in dire emergencies when rapid response is critical, but the just-in-time ASF model proposed here foresees situations where the AU, in close cooperation with the regions, plays the lead role in putting together, planning, deploying and commanding its own peace operations.

This proposal does not imply that we abandon the ASF – only that we move away from the standing readiness model and, in its place, develop a just-in-time model. At the national level, many AU member states should, and

The African Union and its troop-contributing countries have demonstrated their capacity for successful rapid deployment in Somalia and the Central African Republic.
The one exception is the civilian dimension of the ASF. Nations have military and police capacities that they can make available for AU peace operations, but they do not deploy civilian experts in the same way. Civilian experts are hired by the AU in their individual capacities. This is why it is necessary for the AU, in cooperation with the regions and member states, to continue to identify, train and roster civilian experts in political affairs, human rights, public information, humanitarian liaison and all the other specialities identified in the ASF Civilian Policy Framework.9

It is now time, based on our experience with the ASF and actual AU operations over the past decade, to take stock and acknowledge that the standing readiness aspect of the ASF concept is not going to generate the kind of predictable rapid response the AU member states desired when they agreed to establish the ASF. Instead, we should shift our focus to a just-in-time model based on three elements:

1. the modalities necessary to put together context-specific coalitions consisting of the AU, regions, member states and partners;
2. the ability of member states to contribute military, police and civilian capabilities; and
3. the ability of the AU and regions to plan, deploy, manage and support peace operations.

We also have to invest much more in prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, so as to limit the cases where rapid responses may be necessary.

Mali may have been a reminder that we will not always succeed in deploying rapidly, but Somalia and the CAR have also shown us that the AU, together with its member states and partners, can deploy troops at remarkable speed. The reasons why we were able to deploy much faster in the latter cases has less to do with predesigned standing readiness arrangements and more to do with the kind of political will the AU was able to generate, and the context-specific coalitions the AU, interested member states and partners were able to put together. This is why a just-in-time standby arrangement is likely to be the more realistic and cost-effective option for the future of the ASF.

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Endnotes

3 The author was a member of the panel of experts, but writes here in his own capacity.
4 For deployment figures, see: <http://bit.ly/1ok6B63> and <http://bit.ly/1g02Wrz> [both accessed 8 May 2014].
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICING IN PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES

BY GUSTAVO DE CARVALHO

The role of police continues to evolve, with an increasing demand for specialized capacities... Support for national police development is often central to hand over security tasks to national authorities.¹

Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The idea of holistic approaches to peace operations has been at the core of the development of police components and approaches in the past 20 years. Peace operations have evolved from being primarily a military enterprise – which was traditionally concerned with separating opposition forces and monitoring ceasefire agreements – to becoming a complex mix of different dimensions that support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and the creation of foundations for long-term peacebuilding.²

Police components increasingly started undertaking a wider variety of tasks in response to a shift in peace operations mandates, which focus on supporting rule of law and human rights approaches as an essential means of achieving sustainable peace. In particular, peace operations engaged in a wide range of police reform efforts, including a role in the strengthening and reform of security sector institutions, capacity development, and applying new approaches in the process of professionalising national policing efforts.

Above: Women in the Abu Shouk Camp for internally displaced persons in North Darfur attend English classes conducted by volunteer teachers and facilitated by the police component of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Sudan (18 February 2014).
This article provides an overview of developments on the role of police components, as part of the wider evolution of peace support operations, particularly in relation to its peacebuilding dimensions. The article presents how the evolving role of police in international peace operations has been affected by the increasing understanding that peacekeepers should play early peacebuilding roles. Finally, it presents views on current policy processes that are being developed, to increase the relevance and efficiency of police components in peace operations.

The Quantitative and Qualitative Evolving Role of Police in Peace Operations

The United Nations (UN) can date the use of police in peace operations to the early stages of operations deployment. Whilst former UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie already suggested the use of police components in 1948, the first deployment of police peacekeepers can be dated to 1960, when a small police contingent was deployed in the UN Mission in the Congo (ONUC). During the initial period, police contingents were deployed in some missions, but with a very limited scope and mandate to operate. Until the 1990s, police components focused mostly on tasks related to monitoring, observing and reporting, in line with the types of mandates approved by the UN Security Council.

There was a realisation that the priority should move beyond keeping the peace and halting violence, to ensuring that issues of gross human rights violations and weak state authority were addressed.

With several failed experiences in the 1990s, peace operations showed that the great ambitions brought by the end of the cold war were not matched by great strategies, great competence or great success, as presented by William Durch. During that decade, more police components were deployed in countries like Namibia, El Salvador and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with limited accomplishments. As part of a wider reconfiguring of peace operations, important changes occurred. There was a realisation that the priority should move beyond keeping the peace and halting violence, to ensuring that issues of gross human rights violations and weak state authority were addressed. As such, it has required that peacekeepers – usually the first group on the ground – take these issues into account.

Since 1999, all major UN missions have had police components in their mandates, and police components have become the fastest-growing component of UN peace operations. In 1990, 69 police officers were deployed in UN peace operations. In 1994, this number increased to 1677 UN police deployed in peacekeeping operations. By 2013, this number had substantially increased, to 1936. The increased numbers show not only the need for more police officers, but also the increased use of police functions that require a larger number of officers, such as formed police units (FPUs).

The growing importance of police components in peace operations is not only relevant to the UN. The African Union (AU) has increasingly engaged in the deployment of police components in its peace operations. For example, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has deployed around 515 police officers, divided between
The qualitative growth highlighted the increasing engagement of police peacekeepers in early peacebuilding tasks. Such tasks, which aim to contribute to wider long-term strategies that support the development of local structures which can enable the sustainability of peace processes, have thus become central in the role of police in peace operations. As a result, as the UN looked for clarity on its peacebuilding roles, police components became clearly engaged in supporting missions’ roles in paving the way for longer-term sustainable peace.

In 2011, the UN developed some guiding documents to assist peacekeepers from different components in their understanding of the main roles performed in broader peacebuilding efforts. Among those, the UN Secretary-General listed the following roles as the key peacebuilding roles performed by peacekeepers, including police:13

- “Peacekeepers articulate strategic priorities by supporting consensus among national counterparts and the broader international community;
- Peacekeepers enable peacebuilding by others, by providing a security umbrella, monitoring commitments by parties to the conflict, expanding and preserving political space, facilitating assistance efforts, delivering administrative and logistical enabling support, and coordinating or directly managing various resource streams; and
- Peacekeeping operations directly implement certain peacebuilding tasks, including measures for short-term stability and laying the foundations for long-term capacity development in collaboration with partners.”

**THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) HAS INCREASINGLY ENGAGED IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF POLICE COMPONENTS IN ITS PEACE OPERATIONS**

Beyond a quantitative increase, new qualitative ways of implementing police components in multidimensional mandates have been attempted, particularly through the emphasis on rule of law and human rights, as previously mentioned. As the focus of the police components moved away from monitoring and reporting roles only, they increasingly focused on supporting the development, building and restructuring of local police. In particular, police components of peace operations became increasingly involved in the development of activities that aimed to support the creation of sustainable national police capabilities. Police components have also, on a few occasions – such as in Timor Leste and Kosovo – been given the executive mandate to play interim policing roles, by protecting law and order and facilitating the launch of new domestic police.12

FPUs and individual police officers (IPOs). AMISOM was the first AU mission to deploy FPUs – a sign of the AU’s evolving thinking on the importance of the role played by police components in its peace operations. In AMISOM, police components play a key role in supporting the increased ownership of local security sector actors, through training, mentoring and advising the Somali Police Force (SPFi) in different categories of police work.11

A 140-member formed police unit serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) arrives in Mogadishu to support the Somali Police Force in maintaining law and order in the capital (7 August 2012).
As a result of an increasing role in supporting wider peacebuilding processes, police components became key actors in supporting “transformational activities”\(^\text{14}\). This enabled police in peace operations to conduct a wide range of tasks aimed at increasing the sustainability of processes and empowering local actors. An increased emphasis on mentoring, training, reform, restructuring and the rebuilding of post-conflict police services was then seen.\(^\text{15}\)

**Police Components: Specific Roles and Functions**

The previously mentioned changes in mandates and operational environment led to a broadening of the complexity of tasks and functions played by police components in peace operations. The UN Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, from 1 February 2014, conceptualises two core functions played by UN Police, namely operational support for law enforcement; and support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of host state police.\(^\text{16}\)

A key development in the police components in peace operations has been in relation to the creation of more specialised functions, and the differentiation between armed and unarmed components. The table below provides an overview of the different specialised functions, and their roles in relation to the implementation of wider peace operations mandates.

**Key specialised functions of police components\(^\text{17}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formed police units (FPUs)</td>
<td>FPUs are constituted by 140 armed police officers, who can be independently deployed without the additional support and assistance of other components. The units provide support in ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel and material, as well as providing support in crowd control.(^\text{18}) The first FPU was deployed in Kosovo in 1999. FPUs often play a critical role in supporting host-state police to perform their functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual police officers (IPOs)</td>
<td>IPOs are unarmed officers (unless when performing executive mandates), deployed with the aim of providing advisory, reform and capacity-building functions, or even to become members of observer missions. IPOs provide specialised tasks and functions, including investigations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Police components perform their functions through a wide range of tasks and activities. These are presented broadly in the table below.

### Key tasks of police components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to host-state police and other law enforcement agencies</td>
<td>Critical role in developing institutions. Particular role in training and advising by police components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim law enforcement</td>
<td>Where local capacities are insufficient, the peace operation might conduct direct police and law enforcement actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of mission personnel and material</td>
<td>International police play a critical role in protecting the mission's personnel and facilities, in support of domestic law enforcement agencies. This is conducted by the FPUs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1995 and 2013, according to Durch, the most common tasks conducted by police components in UN operations were to advise national (or other non-UN) police, to provide basic training and to mentor local police. The frequency of implementation of such tasks highlighted the important transformational role played by police components, particularly in supporting the development of capacities of local and national police elements. The UN Police policy provides definitions on the types of activities aimed at building capacities of national police components, and are presented below, as compiled by Marina Caparini.

### Instruments for Capacity-building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Areas in which Capacity-building can Provide Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provision of material support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring, advising and mentoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of organizational infrastructure and management systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of governance, accountability and integrity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Officers of the South Sudan National Police Service completed an eight-week training course in Livestock Patrol Tactics conducted by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan’s (UNMISS) police contingent. The course aims to curb the damaging effects of cattle raiding on South Sudan’s local communities.

By providing a key element of developing the capacities of national actors, focusing on national ownership, police components have increasingly engaged in supporting wider rule-of-law processes at a national level. This has led to the development of processes globally to develop further guidance on how national police components can be better supported. The following section provides an overview of the current process that is being developed, and some of its opportunities for strengthening the role of police components in peace operations.

The Strategic Guidance Framework

“The demand for an overarching strategic framework is based on the realization that UN police peacekeeping differs fundamentally from domestic policing. The difference derives from the context of deployment; that is, a post-conflict situation and a fragile environment often characterized by widespread human rights violations, in which authority, power and rules for social interaction are fluid.”

Whilst the role of police in peace operations has evolved, both qualitatively and quantitatively, police components have faced a great challenge in meeting these new requirements. While missions’ mandates expanded, police officers were increasingly expected to offer advice and mentoring to local actors, and to play a key role in strengthening the quality of domestic police forces. This had a critical impact on the development of specialised and professional functions of police components, as it has a critical component in the design and recruitment of police officers. Also, it has directly impacted the recruitment challenges faced by organisations, as police officers would often fail to meet minimum selection standards.

As a result, in 2008, the UN initiated a review of the role of police in its missions, offering advice to the system on how to strengthen the quality of police components in peace missions. More recently, the UN, through its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Police Division, began the development of a Strategic Guidance
Framework (SGF) for International Police Peacekeeping. The SGF, as an overarching global policy framework, aims at developing further guidance on the role of international policing in peace operations, particularly by developing clarity on roles and tools to ensure more relevant responses by police components in peace operations.

The new policy presents an opportunity to further define core functions of police peacekeeping – not only for the UN, but also for police components that are deployed by regional and subregional organisations. The AU, for instance, has developed several mechanisms to support peace efforts on the continent, with a particular focus on the development of police components in its peace support operations. As such, active participation of the AU in the SGF could provide opportunities for further interaction between different international organisations, as well as to share and learn lessons of different types of deployments and environments.

The SGF also provides the opportunity to focus on particular guidance materials and capacity development initiatives in the various areas related to policing. This process had its first guiding document issued on 1 February 2014, through the approval of a new policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Missions. This presents an opportunity for increased predictability and guidance to police officers on the ground, who are expected to respond to increasingly complex contexts. Subsequent guiding materials are being issued during the course of 2014 and 2015.

In 2014, for instance, four core functional areas of the SGF are being discussed in different meetings across the globe. These meetings, on key strategic gaps that need to be addressed by police components, will focus on aspects of command and control, administration, operations, and police capacity-building and development. Each of these areas are critical elements that need to be addressed in the process of strengthening the capacity of police components on the ground, and providing a strong opportunity for different peace operations to fulfil their mandates.

**Conclusion**

This article highlights how police components in peace operations are increasingly engaged in peacebuilding actions, particularly in relation to strengthening of rule of law. It also identifies the ongoing changes in current policy and guidance processes, particularly through the SGF. The SGF is a wide process that can potentially provide opportunities for police actors to improve their presence on the ground and increase their ability to respond to complex challenges and environments. As such, processes such as the SGF can provide not only clarity on how police officers...
A female Somali police officer participates in a training exercise at General Kahiye Police Academy in Mogadishu. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is currently training 100 Somali police officers in a programme aimed at equipping the Somali Police Force with the necessary skills to effectively arrest suspects, stop vehicles at checkpoints, and cordon off areas (16 June 2014).

can be better capacitated in transferring and supporting the transformation of local and national institutions, but also relevant assistance in increasing the capacity of countries to own their peacebuilding processes.

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Endnotes


15 Ibid.


21 Caparini, Marina (2014) op. cit.

22 UN DPKO/DFS (2014) op. cit.


24 UN DPKO/DFS (2014) op. cit.
Introduction

Africa continues to experience a number of humanitarian emergencies that are linked to conflicts. These are anticipated to increase, due to worsening climate change-connected natural disasters. For instance, the conflict in northern Mali was linked to droughts in the Sahel, where more than half the population fled from the drought to live in northern Mali, which was faced with its own food crisis and poor harvests – and which, in turn, resulted in further food shortages and generated a humanitarian crisis. In response, humanitarian action is being taken by actors including the United Nations (UN) humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); international agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Migration Organisation (IMO); and international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

At the same time, the African Union (AU) is involved in a range of actions aimed at managing conflicts such as the one in Mali, including through the deployment of military forces.

Above: There are very few African countries that have specialised military units and equipment that can be used for disaster response. The military assets that are most sought-after are helicopters and transport aircraft, and in some cases ships, to transport humanitarian goods, equipment and personnel.
peace support operations (PSOs) such as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Questions that are now being asked are: what are the connections between African PSOs and humanitarian action? Can African PSOs be expected to play a bigger role, particularly in large-scale emergencies, where the capacity of humanitarian organisations may be overwhelmed? And, if so, what are the policies, guidance and procedures for regulating and coordinating the relationships between the African PSOs and these humanitarian actors?

The Role of the African Union

Within the AU Commission’s Department of Political Affairs, the Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division is responsible for humanitarian issues. This division undertakes assessment missions and provides advice to the chairperson of the AU Commission (AUC) and to the Assembly on what the AU can do to support humanitarian action. The main role of the AU is to ensure that the political environment enables humanitarian action; for instance, by negotiating and ensuring access for humanitarian agencies to populations in need. The importance of this role is reflected in the way humanitarian agencies have sought to have an ongoing exchange with the AU on humanitarian issues. For example, there are now more than 20 humanitarian agencies that have a presence at the AUC in Addis Ababa. In several cases, the AU has made contributions aimed at further enabling the work of humanitarian actors, such as donating US$100 000 to the UNHCR for its programmes in the Central African Republic (CAR).

In every humanitarian emergency on the continent where there is also a political conflict, the AU will be engaged, in close cooperation with the relevant regional economic community (REC), in trying to manage the conflict. In some cases, this may also include a PSO – for instance, in CAR, the AU has deployed the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) since December 2013. MISCA has provided protection for humanitarian aid workers when requested to do so, and has also provided escorts for humanitarian conveys on request. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also operates in a situation where there are large humanitarian needs. AMISOM has, for instance, provided medical care and distributed clean water to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other populations in need, and it provides security to
humanitarian actors on request. In other AU missions, such as AFISMA (now the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)\textsuperscript{5}) and the joint AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID), armed escorts have also been frequently requested.

The most important role any PSO plays is, of course, to contribute to a safe and secure environment within which other civilian actors, including humanitarian actors, can operate. In situations of ongoing conflict, such as in CAR, South Sudan and Somalia, this may mean securing key facilities such as sea ports and airports, as well as securing areas where humanitarian stockpiles are kept or where international humanitarian aid workers live and work.\textsuperscript{6} As well as providing overall security, these missions also typically have a protection of civilians mandate, which results in them taking special care to protect communities at risk, such as refugees and IDPs.

In addition to these ongoing operations, the AU is also planning future operations and preparing future capabilities. Articles 6, 13 and 15 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Protocol of the AU deals with the African Standby Force (ASF)\textsuperscript{7} and, among others, it provides for situations where the ASF can be used to support humanitarian action.\textsuperscript{6} With the anticipated increase of natural disasters and emergency situations due to climate change, the AU decided to “examine the modalities of establishing an African humanitarian mechanism to provide a rapid response, in a coordinated, harmonized and efficient way, to serious humanitarian situations which could occur in Africa and in other parts of the world”.\textsuperscript{8} In this context, the AUC is also considering the role the ASF could play in support of humanitarian action following large-scale natural disasters, and has begun to work on what it calls the Humanitarian and Natural Disaster Support programme.

At a regional level, in 2012 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established the ECOWAS Emergency Response Team, which is expected to work with the ECOWAS Standby Brigade. However, in spite of the efforts to respond to crises in the region, this initiative and other regional humanitarian institutions in Africa remain largely dependent on foreign donors.\textsuperscript{9}

There are very few African countries that have specialised military units and equipment which can be used for disaster response. Internationally, the military assets that are most sought-after for supporting natural disasters are helicopters and transport aircraft, and in some cases ships, and these are all used to transport...
An African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) soldier conducts a security check on a woman at a distribution centre in Afgoye, Somalia. AMISOM forces provided support to humanitarian workers as they distributed food to internally displaced people (4 August 2013).

humanitarian goods, equipment and personnel. Engineering equipment that can be used to clear and fix roads, or that can be used to clear rubble following floods or earthquakes, is also very useful. Other needs include providing clean portable water and electricity. The AU, RECs and regional mechanisms would need to map the resources and capacities available on the continent, and then train the personnel. There are probably few people with experience in planning and managing military missions dedicated to supporting humanitarian action, so special effort may be needed to train planners and commanders for these kinds of operations.

The AU is thus actively supporting humanitarian action through political accompaniment, donations to humanitarian agencies, and providing general and specific security to humanitarian actors where it has a presence on the ground, as well as by developing a programme to provide support to humanitarian actors in the context of large-scale humanitarian disasters.

Civil-Military Coordination

The UN definition of humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) is “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals”. UN-CMCoord serves as a broad humanitarian framework that directs political and military actors on how best to support efforts aimed at providing humanitarian services in emergency regions. The UN has developed specific guidelines for how military assets – such as planes, ships and vehicles – should, and should not, be used in both natural disasters and complex emergencies. In short, to protect the independence and impartiality of humanitarian actors, the guidelines for humanitarian services are only to make use of military or PSO assets as an option of last resort; in other words, when there is no civilian alternative, and when there is

UN-CMCOORD SERVES AS A BROAD HUMANITARIAN FRAMEWORK THAT DIRECTS POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTORS ON HOW BEST TO SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN SERVICES IN EMERGENCY REGIONS
urgency to act. In the same vein, the guidelines for military actors are only to provide direct assistance to populations in need as an option of last resort; that is, when there is no humanitarian agency able to provide the assistance, and if there is urgency to act. These guidelines serve to guide both humanitarian and military actors to respect and protect each other’s specific roles and mandates. In addition to these generic policies and guidelines, the UN, in consultation with its partners in the field, usually also issues country-specific guidelines, including for countries where the AU has PSOs, such as in Somalia.

THERE ARE TYPICALLY TWO TYPES OF REQUESTS FROM THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY: FOR SECURITY, OFTEN IN THE FORM OF AN ARMED ESCORT; OR FOR THE USE OF MILITARY ASSETS

The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) will typically deploy a UN-CMCCoord officer in humanitarian emergencies where there is also a PSO deployed, to help the humanitarian agencies coordinate their actions with the PSO, and especially its military component. Similarly, it is now standard practice for the AU to deploy at least one official in its PSOs responsible for humanitarian liaison. This person will ensure that the senior leadership of the PSO receives advice on the humanitarian situation and what it can do to support the humanitarian actors, as well as advise on what the PSO should avoid doing to protect the independence and impartiality of the humanitarian agencies. This person also acts as a focal point for liaison between the PSO and the humanitarian community.

As most requests for support from the humanitarian community to a PSO are directed at the military components – especially the battalions that are deployed in the field, often in the same areas where the humanitarian agencies are operating – the military has now adopted the practice of creating Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) units. These units and the CIMIC officers that work in them serve as liaison officers between the military unit and the humanitarian agencies in the field. There are typically two types of requests from the humanitarian community: for security, often in the form of an armed escort; or for the use of military assets. Armed escorts, like all military support to humanitarian action, should only be provided as a last resort, if no other options are possible. There are also many ways in which security can be provided to escorts, some of which are more indirect than others. CIMIC officers need to be trained as escorts, and in other related roles, so that they can advise their commanders and the humanitarian

agencies requesting escorts of alternatives available to them. If a decision is taken to provide an escort, the unit providing the escort needs to be trained in the standard operating procedures for providing an armed escort for a humanitarian convoy, and especially how the civilians in such a convoy should be protected if the convoy comes under attack.

The other type of request humanitarian agencies often make to PSOs is for the use of military assets. The most frequent request is for transport – for example, for the PSOs to transport humanitarian goods and personnel in its planes, ships or vehicles. At other times, the PSOs may have specialised equipment – such as forklifts for large containers, recovery equipment or engineering equipment – that the humanitarian agency wishes to make use of, often for a given time-limited task.

The UN humanitarian guidelines make a distinction between direct support, indirect support and infrastructure support. Direct support should not be provided, except in life-saving emergencies and as an option of last resort. Indirect support and infrastructure support can be provided, on request, as long as it will not endanger aid workers or beneficiaries, and will not affect the humanitarian independence of the agency concerned.14 To ensure that humanitarian requests for support are considered and acted upon, if deemed appropriate, the PSOs and humanitarian agencies should establish a coordination mechanism that is clear and transparent for all concerned. The humanitarian actors should know whom they can contact to make requests, and how those requests will be considered. Both the humanitarian agencies and the PSO personnel need to be familiar with the generic policies of the UN and the AU on civil military coordination. If there is no country-specific guidance, then it may be a good idea to cooperate on jointly developing such a guidance document.

DIRECT SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE PROVIDED, EXCEPT IN LIFE-SAVING EMERGENCIES AND AS AN OPTION OF LAST RESORT

UN OCHA provides training for its UN-CMCoord officers, and it would be good practice for the AU to ensure that its humanitarian liaison officers and CIMIC officers participate in these courses. Similarly, most of the regional peacekeeping training centres of excellence that are part of the ASF network conduct CIMIC courses,
and it would be good for UN-CMCoord officers and other humanitarian officers responsible for coordination to participate in these ASF courses, so that they can become familiar with each other’s cultures, mandates and policies. Country-specific training – for example, in CAR, Darfur or Somalia, where the specific people who are likely to work together for the coming months are trained together – is another effective way of ensuring that the relevant people have a common understanding of the applicable policies and guidelines, and also serve as a good team-building and confidence-building tool.

Conclusion

Due to climate change, it is anticipated that the number and scope of natural disasters will increase. There is thus a need to plan and prepare communities, nations, regional organisations and AU capacities to identify, prepare, mitigate and respond appropriately to natural disasters, as well as the complex emergencies and conflicts that are often closely linked with these climatic conditions. In this context, the AU has embarked on a new programme to identify and prepare the support that the ASF can potentially provide to humanitarian actors in future humanitarian crises. Such preparation will entail the development of appropriate policies and guidelines, as well as the physical training and preparation of PSOs’ military, police and civilian personnel.

In the meantime, several African PSOs are deployed in countries such as CAR, Somalia and Sudan, where they are already operating alongside humanitarian actors and already providing escorts and other forms of support to these humanitarian agencies.

The AU has embarked on a new programme to identify and prepare the support that the ASF can potentially provide to humanitarian actors in future humanitarian crises

To date, the UN guidelines for humanitarian civil-military coordination, both generic and country-specific, has helped to guide both the PSOs and the humanitarian agencies to manage these ongoing relationships. In addition, UN OCHA has deployed UN-CMCoord officers to manage these relations, and the AU PSOs have deployed humanitarian liaison officers as well as CIMIC officers in the military units to ensure that the humanitarian agencies have clearly identified focal points with whom they can interact.

Despite the good progress to date, the AU should consider how it can further improve its ability to manage civil-military coordination in future missions. Currently, the AU does not have a civil-military coordination policy or directive that can guide its future missions. Once such a policy has been developed, it should also facilitate the adoption of country-specific guidelines, and it should support the selection, appointment and training of personnel responsible for civil-military coordination.

In particular, the AU should consider what kind of support the ASF can potentially provide to large-scale humanitarian disasters in future, and how such an ASF humanitarian support mission would be mandated, planned, staffed, managed and supported. If the AU decides to develop such a capacity, then countries with appropriate expertise would need to be identified, and such units would need to be trained together with the AU and REC planning capacities, so that they develop the knowledge and experience needed to ensure rapid deployment when called upon to provide support in the next big crisis.

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Endnotes

1 Sunday Babatunde is acknowledged and thanked for his input and assistance in developing this article.
8 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 29.
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