

Reforming the SPLM

A requisite for peace and nation building

Paula Cristina Roque

Recommendations

1 The IGAD peace talks and the intra-party talks need to be aligned. An Assessment and Evaluation Commission should monitor the linked agreements.

2 The SPLM needs to operationalise its structures and empower them to serve their mandates; it also needs internal democratic restructuring.

3 The party needs to decide the basis upon which it will re-merge by addressing the ethnic/regional issue and incorporating it into the charter.

4 Representatives of the three SPLM factions need to jointly devise an agenda for reconciliation talks that has broader support from different constituencies.

5 A newly integrated NLC and the state liberation councils and congresses need to reach out to community leaders and civil society groups to help coordinate reconciliation initiatives.

Summary

Transforming the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is vital in achieving sustainable peace in South Sudan. The party reform process needs to go hand-in-hand with the peace process in order for a transitional arrangement to take root. Transforming the SPLM entails ensuring that politics become demilitarised; party structures reach the grassroots; and decision-making rules and leadership succession processes are established. The SPLM will need to neutralise the military legacy of being structured according to Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) seniority, demobilise private militias, and allow the SPLA to become a professional, depoliticised national army. The SPLM also needs to have a political programme and the organisational stability to take part in elections and in government; and have a civilian leadership that consults its members.

THE CONFLICT TRIGGERED BY the events of 15 December 2013 has revealed the fragilities of the state, the party and the leadership of South Sudan. At the genesis of the crisis was a breakdown of the political order, where the power and legitimacy of the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) started to crumble and the party began to disintegrate in the absence of internal structures and systems to moderate power grabs by leaders. As a result, politics within the party and by extension the government no longer embody consensus, organisation, effectiveness or legitimacy.

What began as a political conflict stemming from a governance crisis and failed nation-building exercise has rapidly morphed into an ethno-regionalist war that is destroying the social fabric of South Sudan. The SPLM's failure to act as a strong and effective ruling party that followed the transformation path it had laid out in the run-up to the 2005 transition, caused South Sudan's leadership to adopt important yet insufficient stopgap measures towards political accommodation and governance strategies.

The continued use of President Salva Kiir's 'big tent' approach provided some stability, but was not accompanied by the

A HISTORY OF THE SPLM
LEADERSHIP AND PARTY CRISES

1983

Creation of the SPLM

1991

Splintering and civil war

2004

Rumbek leadership crisis

2008

Convention leadership crisis

2010

Candidate nomination difficulties and dissention

2013

Leadership crisis and civil war

reform and empowerment of the ruling party. This resulted in a diluted political landscape defined by profiteering and power interests instead of a defined political programme, which could have tempered the negative aspects of unaccountable alliances.

Devising a broader peace strategy¹ is vitally important to resolving this conflict and will require careful sequencing, robust diplomacy and more international commitment and pressure to sustain the immediate transition. With a peace-building agenda potentially taking shape, the internal reform of the SPLM could become merely one element in the broader matrix of necessary reforms. The SPLM reform should instead be directly linked to the negotiations between President Kiir and Dr Riek Machar's SPLM-in-Opposition faction, so that one process can check the other and accountability is ensured.

Although the cohesion, unity and reform of a political party seems of secondary importance as conflict escalates, negotiations stall with the warring factions abandoning previously agreed positions, and the humanitarian crisis deepens, it should not be disregarded as a fundamental stabilisation step for South Sudan.

This brief argues that unless the internal reform of the SPLM is given prominence in any future initiative, 'state and peace-building' tasks devised under a transitional arrangement will struggle to take root. This internal reform will become the first line of defence against future political crises. While reforming the party alone will not address such pressing issues as security sector reform, national reconciliation, justice and accountability, attempting these without reforming the ruling party is a mistake.

The SPLM is currently the only nationally reaching force in South Sudan that can act as the main mediator in the

political change that will result from the transitional arrangements agreed in the Addis Ababa talks. While other national forces, namely civil society, religious organisations and opposition parties, find expression in only certain parts of the country, the SPLM will continue to dominate the political and governmental landscape for years to come. Reforming the state and setting out a path for government reform will thus be insufficient to achieve stability without inculcating a deeply transformative process of reform within the SPLM.

This brief will not address the fragilities of the state and governance mismanagement issues that contributed to this crisis, or the resolution needed to address them. It will instead focus on the role played by the ruling party in perpetuating this crisis and important entry points that, together with initiatives to address the different aspects of the conflict, will provide the most viable solution for peace and stability.

Linking party reform to the peace process

The approach being taken by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to simultaneously hold intra-party talks, facilitated by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front and the African National Congress, Ethiopia and South Africa's ruling parties respectively, while pushing towards restarting peace negotiations is an important one. However, defining how one process will inform and steer the other has yet to be established. An SPLM 'leadership review and self-assessment forum' was being prepared by a group of SPLM Political Bureau (PB) members of two of the three conflicting factions, yet this work seems to have stalled.

While these intra-party talks are expected to run concurrently to the peace negotiations, it is unclear what role they will play in determining the political

agenda for reform. If the party talks are placed inside a broadly undefined platform of 'contributing to political dialogue and national reconciliation', they will fail to receive the necessary commitment from the leadership or to institute a framework for the party reform needed to create the basis for a new political order. Addressing the leadership struggle through a power-sharing agreement and installing mechanisms to rebuild the state while dealing with governance problems may stop the main conflict and pave the way for peace. What it will not do is create the necessary conditions for future political crises to be internally mediated, and thereby avert future wars. This will need the input of a strong political party that has the internal capacity to hold its leaders to account and consult its diverse constituencies. Reforming the SPLM is key to ensuring that any political agreement stands and stabilises South Sudan in the wake of its highly divisive civil war.

In any war, reforming the governing party is a vital step to a peaceful transition. However, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, which prepared the political transition, made no mention of the need to internally reform SPLM party structures. The CPA ratified a one-party system in the North and South, and focused on restructuring and reforming the state structures without simultaneously preparing the political vehicle that would ensure those structures abide by their liberal rules. As a power-sharing agreement, the CPA entrenched power bases in Khartoum and Juba without reforming them. It attempted to install democratic rules without changing the internal party systems that would accept democratic procedure.

This is a mistake that cannot be repeated in the current mediations, as the focus must be geared towards addressing the internal dynamics of the SPLM and

formally linking internal party reform to the wider peace process. States are built, institutions reconstructed and developments initiated, but without the organisational structure of a strong political party to manage the contradictory and volatile processes of nation building, all other initiatives will remain fragile. A party that is accountable to its structures, operates in a transparent way and respects the allocation of authority within its ranks will be better positioned to build sustainable peace and will not easily circumvent democratic procedure and electoral politics.

Reforming the SPLM will mean altering the tenets of its *modus operandi*. This will not be an easy task, as leaders will need to have guarantees that their removal from power will still allow them and their communities influence and economic opportunities. The process will also need to provide assurances that the ethnic issue is not instrumentalised by one side to dominate others, and that politics will be defined in a national platform that elevates itself above these regionalised and ethnic considerations.

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Failure to transform and resulting fault lines

The SPLM has failed to transform itself because of four factors. The first factor is the structural challenges of operating with a revolutionary tradition of centralised authority and hierarchical command. With its legacy of a militarised movement, the leadership has had difficulty in adapting to other types of behaviour that are not confined by an adherence to rigid hierarchy and unbending loyalty, with any divergent opinions perceived as dissident and undisciplined. The 'behavioural DNA' of the liberation struggle is still very much

present – a legacy from the war period when the Politico-Military High Command controlled the political party, the military wing, the administrative organs and the judiciary. As an inherited practice it continues to rule the institutional functioning of the government and the party.

Second, the operational aspects of distinguishing between the state and the party, and the governance sequencing of who should lead who, have been blurred. Policy has been crafted at the government as opposed to the party level, and the driving force has been one of balancing the interests and representation of the various communities. Peacetime mobilisation has not followed a party line. Instead, it has seen the integration and political accommodation of potential spoilers and militia groups into an over-inflated megastructure that has threatened the future definition, vision and ideology of the SPLM. This further blurred the separation between the party and the state.

The third aspect deals with the lack of institutionalisation of the party, with

resolutions having only selectively been implemented. The structure exists, but the party organs meet only sporadically and certain individual and key interests eclipse the ability of these structures to operate independently.

Fourth, the party is still grappling with divisions among its elites, especially over the vision/ideology of the SPLM, which has become cemented into different camps with opposing ideas of how the party should be acting. In the post-Garang and post-independence eras, the need for a new vision was a fundamental requisite, but this was never defined.

Because of these four factors and, importantly, the inability to regulate authority within a structure that lacks organisation, the SPLM has continued to degenerate into an ethnic- and patronage-based movement that has been unable to define an effective and sustainable governance plan. However, several people within the SPLM already understood that the inherited practices and structural affectations of the liberation struggle were becoming dysfunctional in a post-independence state. Others within the party believed that in a post-independence setting it was sufficient for the SPLM to continue adapting to change and transforming in a manner that would allow it to strategically survive the challenges of state-building in an underdeveloped and highly heterogeneous nation without having to address deeper and more difficult issues. It adapted only to secure its hegemonic position. This is why addressing the political vehicle that rules South Sudan is vitally important to any future stabilisation strategy.

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Today the party is divided into three main fronts: President Kiir's faction, Machar's SPLM-in-Opposition faction, and the reformers' SPLM-in-Detention. Alone, none of these factions has the necessary traction or capacity to lead a reform process and govern the country, although the 'reformers' are by far the most balanced and nationally representative group that remains untainted by the war.

The mutual reliance vital to political survival is a fact that needs to be highlighted in any mediation, as zero-sum calculations will in this case mean the demise of the SPLM, a further implosion of the state, and a more difficult conflict to settle. The

President's camp includes key SPLM leaders such as Kuol Manyang, Daniel Awet and Michael Makwei; 'third-level' SPLM leadership members (Aleu Anyang Aleu and Telar Deng, among others); and former National Congress Party (NCP) members such as Riek Gai and Tor Deng Mawien. This faction is perceived as having a heavy Bahr el Ghazal and Dinka bias. The men surrounding the President are accused by other SPLM members of promoting this internal discord in an effort to divide and rule and maintain their own political relevance through proximity to the centre of power. They have created a level of distrust among former comrades that has resulted in many high-ranking SPLM and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) officials being sidelined within their own party.

Machar's SPLM-in-Opposition faction includes allies that defected with him in 1991 and, more importantly, other dissatisfied groups and individuals within the party and the military. Machar's quest for reform began as a political one, only

taking a military dimension in December, although several people within the SPLM claim that a rebellion was already being prepared at that time. Fighting alongside Machar are elements of the late Paulino Matiep's South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) militia, the Nuer 'White Army' community forces, and SPLA generals Peter Gadet (8th Division in Jonglei), James Koang Chuol (4th Division in Unity), Gabriel Tang-Giuye and others.

This group is also perceived as having a strong Greater Upper Nile and Nuer bias. In addition to the perceived ethno-regional bias, President Kiir and Machar's factions are both forming alliances with

political and military elements that stand outside the SPLM. These arrangements will complicate any future transitional arrangement, as the different groups will feel entitled to play important roles in governance and military arrangements. This will serve to further perpetuate the accommodation strategy that contributed to this political and governance crisis.

The third group (the 'Reformers', or the SPLM-in-Detention) is headed by several key SPLM leaders and spearheaded by dismissed Secretary General Pagan Amum. This group, most of whose members were detained, has an array of PB and National Liberation Council (NLC) heavyweights who all carry important credentials within the SPLM.² They are not part of the rebellion and can play a vital role given their multi-ethnic and multi-regional backgrounds, united under a common nationalist platform of reform. If it remains a cohesive and 'uncorruptable' unit, this group should take the lead in mediating between the other two SPLM factions on the route the party should take in a new peace agreement. It claims that the SPLM has lost its way and that internal reform is the only option to recalibrate what has become a failed nation- and state-building enterprise.

History of internal conflict – prelude to the current crisis

Internal crises are not new to the SPLM. The movement almost lost the war due to the 1991 splintering, it came close to fragmenting in 2004 as it prepared to rule the South and implement the CPA, in 2008 it faced another internal struggle, and it showed its fragilities as it approached the 2010 polls. All these were signs of a structurally fragile organisation that needed to be reformed from within, in order to curtail the destabilising effect of antagonism between different high-ranking officials translating into dysfunctional politics and manipulation of government offices.

However, with every crisis came an opportunity for reform.

The SPLM faced its first serious defections in 1991, led by Machar and Lam Akol, over grievances that John Garang's rule had become too authoritarian and personalised, and that the High Command had failed to establish an effective and democratic governance system. The Nasir faction built its political agenda on the call for secession, although it aligned itself with Khartoum for military and political support. After the 1991 split there was a re-evaluation of the liberation struggle and the movement, leading to Garang's SPLM holding its first national convention in 1994. The party vision was refined, a governance programme defined, and the party structures created. However, many important issues remained unaddressed.

The second crisis occurred in the run-up to the final stage of the CPA. The famous Rumbek crisis occurred in 2004 when Kiir clashed with Garang over claims that the movement was being mismanaged, that Garang ruled the SPLM as his personal fiefdom, and that there were no processes of inclusive decision-making and internal reflection. As a result, Kiir left with his troops to Yei where he was forming alliances with militia groups to oppose Garang militarily. It was Machar and a group of other SPLM officials, mainly Deng Alor and Paul Malong, who went to appease Kiir and bring him back to Rumbek to reconcile with Garang. Kiir apparently shared with Machar a list of 52 grievances, a list very similar to the Nasir declaration of 1991.

The parallels to the current crisis are interesting, with several major differences. Firstly, the potential party mediators that existed in 2004 were sidelined before the December 2013 crisis. Secondly, just before the 2004 crisis a new level of debate within the party was emerging, even though Garang wanted to control the pace of reform so that it was gradual and

slow. The 'SPLM strategic framework for war to peace transition' policy document emerged as a result, and recognised that the democratic transformation of Sudan first had to see the transformation of the SPLM itself. This 2004 document called for the reorganisation of SPLM structures; transforming the NLC into a Central Committee tasked with revising the party documents; the convening of a National Convention to elect rather than nominate the SPLM Chairperson and members of the NLC, who would then elect the PB, Deputy Chairpersons and other office holders; and the formulation of a post-conflict recovery and reconstruction strategy. It was this 2004 document that Rebecca Nyandeng, Garang's widow, quoted in her intervention at the 6 December 2013 press conference where several SPLM leaders publicly criticised President Kiir's chairmanship, blaming him for the poor governing record, lack of collective leadership and paralysis of the General Secretariat.

The third crisis came in 2008, as the party held its Second National Convention in preparation for the 2010 national elections during the CPA transition. The convention allowed for some reorganisation of the party's organs and a revitalisation of the roles of the youth and women's leagues, although it also exposed some of the its organisational deficiencies. The party was confronted with several difficult realities: that the leadership of the party was not prepared to manage all the congresses' elections, resulting in senior cadres losing their seats to new recruits and former NCP members; that delegates were not given the opportunity to debate and devise the SPLM's new strategy, or socio-economic and political policies for the government; and that the leadership was not prepared to be challenged.³ The Convention was paralysed for a week while the leadership decided who would be second-in-command in the party, an issue that threatened to split the SPLM

into different power centres where some tried to ethnicise and regionalise their positions,⁴ possibly because the second name would be regarded as President Kiir's successor. While there had been initial consensus to have only one deputy, the status quo was maintained with three deputy chairmen – Machar, Wani Igga and Malik Agar (later replaced by Daniel Awet). This marred subsequent political initiatives to reform the party, with difficult discussions being postponed or avoided. The three camps of the President, Machar and Amum were already defined in 2008. This was a factor very few chose to remember and address in the following years.

This latest crisis began to develop a year after independence. At an NLC meeting in March 2012 Amum proposed a road map for reform, yet this was ignored during the border war between Juba and Khartoum. At the time of the Heglig oil dispute, the SPLM was facing a difficult NLC meeting that was to set the stage for the Third National Convention, in preparation for the first post-independence elections in 2015. By engaging in a border war, the President recalibrated the need for national cohesion and patriotism in the face of external aggression, but this was short-lived and the issues within the party would resurface.

While a previous PB meeting had decided that reforms were needed in order to develop new strategic goals, reflect the political separation from the SPLM-North party and adapt to the post-independence political setting, the NLC meeting was a disappointment. No steps were taken to ensure that the reforms proposed in reports delivered by the Secretariat and members of the leadership were implemented. Had serious restructuring and debate occurred internally at this point, the crisis that unfolded could have been averted.

The subsequent developments in 2012 and 2013 have shown that there has

been a lack of adherence to party codes and procedures, that institutions and structures have no power to control individuals and allow for grievances to be addressed in existing forums, and that the rigid power structure is unwilling to reform. This unwillingness is masked by claims that stability is better served by

this was a clear violation of the party's constitution and could stem from the fact that the President had lost his ability to persuade the PB to act in his favour, with 14 out of 19 BP members supporting Machar's call for reform.⁵ From there events escalated and the political crisis took the form of armed confrontation.

The internal democratic restructuring of the party will have to be done on an advisory basis after consultations with party members have been concluded

maintaining the status quo (of wartime seniority) and not testing the willingness of powerful members to step aside and lose their privileges.

It is important to mention that by no means did this NLC meeting in early 2012 make tragedy inevitable for the party, as there were subsequent opportunities to resolve the internal divisions and recalibrate relationships among high-ranking officials. Many of those who today stand against the president stated at the time that the SPLM 'wanted back its chairman', who they felt had sidelined the party in favour of securing power within the Presidency and surrounding himself with the wrong kind of advisors. In July 2013 the entire cabinet was dismissed and new political allies, lacking party credentials, were given prominent positions. In November 2013, the President dismissed all the party structures and officials, except elements of the Secretariat, on the grounds that they had outlived their mandates. In a last bid to call for party reform and restore order within the party, the reformist group, which also had Machar's support, called a press conference on 6 December and highlighted the many problems and fault lines within the SPLM. Their objective was to call a PB meeting to determine the agenda for the NLC meeting. President Kiir bypassed the PB and convened the NLC meeting on 14 December. As explained in a report by the Sudd Institute,

Party reform strategy

Transforming the SPLM will entail attitudinal and structural shifts so that politics become demilitarised, party structures reach the grassroots level, and decision-making rules and leadership succession processes are established, while strategies and goals realign. In order to transform, the SPLM will need to 1) neutralise the military legacy of being structured according to SPLA seniority, it will have to disarm and demobilise the private militias of different leaders, and allow the SPLA to become an integrated and professional national army that has no political role; 2) draw up a defined programme and show sufficient organisational stability to take part in elections and in government; and 3) appoint a civilian leadership that consults its members on major policy decisions.⁶ In order to do this, several areas will need restructuring and reform: a leadership will need to be elected; collective leadership needs to exist at all levels of the organisation, with structures operating with scheduled consultative meetings; mandates will have to be respected; and accountability and reporting back to constituencies should become a normal function. The internal democratic restructuring of the party will have to be done on an advisory basis after consultations with party members have been concluded, so that structures within the party can be tested after a new

strategy has been devised. The focus could be on the creation of a standing committee or similar. Such a standing committee, consisting of all the conflicting groups in the SPLM, would have the authority to evaluate the governance of the party and how mechanisms are being used to resolve disputes, and refer recommendations for change to the PB. This committee would have to work closely with key international monitors, akin to the Evaluation and Assessment Commission (EAC) during the CPA transition, in order to have recourse against members being coerced or co-opted into deviating from the agreed plan.

Elections and candidate nomination

Elections of the SPLM leadership should be held at all levels and at regular intervals to ensure that leaders are not given power by 'arrangement' but are voted in, and therefore are conferred legitimacy by their constituencies. This element is vital in the restructuring of the SPLM and should factor into the revision of the party governing documents. Membership of any structure, committee and commission should be open to all party members. Access to power within the SPLM should not follow the old hierarchy of the military High Command and SPLA seniority, but rather through demonstrated ability to steer the party, policy platform and qualifications.

Ethno-regional balancing still factor heavily in leadership calculations, with each of the three deputy chairmen coming from the greater regions of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal. Nominations of members to the PB and NLC take both this ethnic/regional issue and the SPLA seniority into account, and all the cabinets formed in South Sudan thus far have been constituted on this representational basis. The party needs to come to terms with this reality and either decide to abandon these balancing acts for

nationalist policies or devise ways to address this divisive issue through rotational Chairmanship policies or other mechanisms.

As proposed in previous party strategy documents, the Chairman should be elected through an open and transparent process where different candidates are able to contest the position without fear of retaliation or disrupting ethnic alliances. As it stands, the Chairman is elected at the National Convention, as are the NLC members. Once elected, the NLC then has the authority to elect the Secretary General, although it is unclear if the NLC members then elect the relevant candidate or just endorse the nominations of the members of the PB. At other levels, the nomination of candidates will need to accommodate a broadly consultative state-level process (accounting for the grassroots decisions at the Boma, Payam and county levels) and feed into the national level.

Strengthening party structures and forums

Transforming the way the party manoeuvres itself would mean empowering structures to act within the confines of the party documents and rules. The regular holding of National Conventions every five years is a vital step in empowering the party structure and ensuring that mandates are renovated and policies recalibrated to address emerging concerns and challenges. The same needs to apply to the 19-member PB and the 275-member NLC which, as national bodies, need to play an executive role within the party. Part of the reform of structures would be ensuring that the lower SPLM structures, at the Boma, Payam, county and state levels, have functioning secretariats, liberation councils and congresses that are able to perform their duties. These are the frontline forums that deal with the different communities and are vital in mobilising support and members; they

are also the bodies that can connect the central party leadership to the grassroots and become the conduits between them. In a heterogeneous country such as South Sudan this is a crucial move.

Conclusion

Reforming the SPLM in the midst of a bitter power struggle will be very difficult, but this has to be attempted in order to avoid plunging the country further into an intractable conflict. The future of the party depends on the willingness of the three SPLM factions to work together and find common ground so that the many fault lines of this political crisis and the conflicting interests can be addressed. IGAD is well placed to play a mediation role in this regard, given its understanding of the different leaders and personalities involved.

The difficulty of implementing any agreement that arises after a breakdown in trust, communication and group cohesion is already great. Added to this is the fact that the parties to the conflict may not represent the main parties to the peace – as other SPLM groups and community leaders/civil society members should be included. In these circumstances the crafting of such a process becomes multifaceted and complex. Additionally, neither side can claim to completely control the groups that fight alongside them, self-interested militias form part of the mix, while southern politicians seem determined to perpetuate discord in the ruling party, and Khartoum and Kampala continue to play destabilising roles in the conflict. All of these factors only increase the difficulty of monitoring an agreement on the ground, disarming factions and promoting national reconciliation. This is why the SPLM reform process needs to become formally linked to the peace process between the two warring factions, providing the necessary checks to the transitional government but also

helping to re-establish trust in the party and the government among severely divided communities.

Furthermore, whatever the contours of the agreements reached in Addis Ababa, the difficulty of selling their terms and concessions to different constituencies will require a cohesive SPLM to bring divided communities on board. Each member of the PB and the NLC is a representative of his/her community and each will play the vitally important role of stabilising South Sudan in the post-conflict setting. Peace and stability cannot be built in a vacuum of political institutions. Without a resilient party to manage this process, South Sudan will continue down the path of a chaotically violent and fragile state where political interests will take on an ethnic character, and regions will become entrenched fiefdoms. While stabilising the country will entail highly complex mechanisms for peace building, state and governance reforms, and reconciliation processes, involving the SPLM in each of these will make it more accountable to its people and its leaders.

Notes

- 1 See John Prendergast's testimony before the US Congress, 27 February 2014, www.enoughproject.org (accessed 20 April 2014).
- 2 Deng Alor (Dinka from Abyei), Madam Rebecca Nyandeng (Garang's widow and a Dinka from Jonglei), Oyay Deng Ajak (Shilluk from Upper Nile), Majak D'Agoot (Dinka from Jonglei), John Luk (Nuer from Jonglei), Peter Adwok Nyaba (Shilluk), Gier Chuang (Dinka), Kosti Manibe (Zande from Western Equatoria), Cirino Hiteng (Lotuko from Eastern Equatoria), Luka Biong Deng (Dinka from Abyei), Madut Biar Yel (Dinka), and Chol Tong Mayay (Dinka from Lakes), among others.
- 3 John Gai Yoh, *The CPA: an embodiment of the New Sudan vision?*, in Francis Deng (ed.), *New Sudan in the making?*, Red Sea Press, 2009.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 *Africa Confidential*, *From power struggle to uprising*, 10 January 2014.
- 6 See Jeroen De Zeeuw, *From soldiers to politicians: transforming rebel movements after civil war*, Lynne Rienner, 2008.

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About the ISS

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