



DIIS REPORT

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Community Policing in Sierra Leone –  
Local Policing Partnership Boards

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## Abbreviations

APPC	Area Policing Partnership Committees
ASJP	Access to Security and Justice Programme
CCSSP	Commonwealth Community Safety Project
CDF	Civil Defence Force
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CRD	Community Relations Department
CRO	Community Relations Officer
CSD	Corporate Services Department
CSV	Community Safety Volunteer
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc.
EMB	Executive Management Board
FSU	Family Support Unit
IGP	Inspector-General of Police
JSDP	Justice Sector Development Programme
JSRS-IP	Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Implementation Plan
LCU	Local Command Unit
LPPB	Local Policing Partnership Board
LUC	Local Unit Commander
NEC	National Electoral Commission
PRO	Public Relations Officer
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
OSD	Operational Support Division
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
TCG	Tasking and Coordination Group
UN	United Nations
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
ZPPB	Zonal Policing Partnership Board

## Executive summary

1. This report was produced in 2012-2013 in support of the Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP) in Sierra Leone, funded by the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID) and implemented by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI). Its findings have been used to inform the program's activities as they relate to the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) community policing model, which is built up around the Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPBs). From this point of departure, the report serves two purposes. First, it is a source of how the SLP has applied its community policing in Sierra Leone, and specifically how LPPBs operate across the country. Second, the report provides insight into the approach taken by the ASJP in support of the SLP community policing model. (For this reason, recommendations as they were formulated in 2013 have not been deleted from the report).
2. As soon as the war in Sierra Leone officially came to an end (2002), the process of establishing LPPBs in Local Command Units (LCU) (police divisions) across Sierra Leone began. They were instituted to ensure stakeholder participation in the process of policing, signifying a perceived need within the police and among international partners to rebuild relations with local communities. They are expected to investigate and resolve conflict between members of the community, and increase the level of interaction between the police and the local communities. What this has meant in practice is under scrutiny in this report.
3. The report analyses how community policing is organized in 17 of Sierra Leone's 33 LCUs by looking at the role and responsibilities of LPPBs in:
  - a. Establishing linkages between local communities and the SLP;
  - b. Enforcing local security; and
  - c. Setting priorities of the SLP.

Conclusions are based upon on-site observations and comprehensive interviews of police officers and LPPB members.

4. The report reveals a number of reasons why the LPPBs are an important element of the SLP's policing model, but also where there is room for improvement. LPPBs:

- a. *Democratize security.* First of all, they include the citizenry in defining and acting on local security concerns to a degree that was not the case before or during Sierra Leone's conflict between 1991 and 2002. Second, they have engendered a shift of focus from police collaboration with "local authorities" to collaboration with "communities." This means that policing at the local level is not restricted to collaboration between the SLP and traditional leaders (paramount and lesser chiefs), but involves a cross-section of society, including, among others, women's representatives, bike riders, teachers, small traders, businesspeople, and farmers.
- b. *Are a nationally and locally-driven initiative.* While LPPBs incorporate international best practices, they were first and foremost initiated and supported by the SLP. Voluntary in nature, they function without much (if any) outside financial support, and have proven to be sustainable, because SLP and community members alike consider them important for local safety and security. In a resource scarce environment such as Sierra Leone, the fact that they function on a voluntary basis and on a limited resource base is an important point to highlight.
- c. *Support a police force that is logistically challenged,* provide information and report crimes to the police, mediate minor disputes within the communities and between the community and the police. While there are problems related to untrained civilians playing this role, it is also evident that the SLP does not have the necessary capacity or access in order to police many rural as well as urban areas.
- d. *While members are interest-driven, LPPBs are not political* (at least not openly). Without exception, LPPBs in the various LCUs that this report's research team visited noted that members who were openly politically active were excluded from LPPB membership. Many LPPB members, particularly those members who represent the business community, will argue that they seek LPPB involvement to secure the area in which they live and work, and thus their commercial interests. This is to say that precisely because of the scarcity of resources that characterizes Sierra Leone, it should be expected that civilians to some degree seek LPPB membership to further their own interests.

While there is no doubt that the LPPBs have an important policing function, they continue to face a number of challenges. For one thing, it is not possible to say precisely how many and which types of cases the LPPBs intervene in and mediate, because the LPPBs do not keep records (either locally or nationally). This leads to the first recommendation of the report:



- a) *Community Relations Department (CRD)*: The SLP needs to clarify the roles and responsibilities of their Community Relations Officers (CROs) and the CRD as a whole at the LCU level. In addition, a formal reporting channel needs to be established between the LPPBs and the police. Currently, the 2011 LPPB Constitution does not specify which SLP department LPPB members report to. As a consequence, this report's research team encountered a varied picture in the LCUs with respect to police-LPPB relations. In the Congo Cross LCU, for instance, the CRD was established as part of the first community policing pilot immediately after the war in 2002 and is considered the first point of contact to the LPPB Chairman. Similarly, a strong CRO was at the time of the fieldwork for this report in place in Kissy LCU. In Waterloo LCU, the SLP Media Relations Officer has the role of CRO added to his portfolio without clear direction on what this responsibility entails. In some LCUs located up-country, we were told that CROs had recently been appointed and were currently undergoing training. In others, CROs did not exist. Increased clarity and consistency about the role of CROs in all Sierra Leone's LCUs would provide LPPBs with a clearly identified point of contact and ensure that one officer/department is tasked to engage with the LPPBs and record activities. This will also ensure that a degree of institutional memory with respect to community policing is ensured at the level of the LCU. *There is a need to develop clear job descriptions for the Community Relations Officer, as they are the focal point of day-to-day community policing operations and activities.*
- b) *The 2011 LPPB Constitution*: The LPPB Constitution is the single most important source of written guidance available to the LPPBs. It provides an overview of the formal membership of the LPPB, including "functions of board officials" and a list of the LPPB's primary tasks. However, LPPBs would benefit from clarifying and aligning the LPPB Constitution with realities on the ground. This means adjusting, for instance, the LPPB Constitution's list of board officials by adding youth and women's representatives; clarifying how LPPBs may input at the national level; and outlining the geographical representation of LPPBs as well as their structure and status outside the LCU headquarter town and below the LPPB executive. (In the LCUs of Kenema, Tankoro and Kabala, for example, all current executive members were elected from within the main area of the town). More importantly, what the LPPB Constitution does not provide is a step-by-step explanation of and guidance on how to carry out the many tasks expected of the LPPB. *Both the CRD and the Corporate Services Department of the SLP should analyze and propose clarifications of the LPPB Constitution and also develop a "LPPB Handbook" to guide both SLP and LPPB members.*

- c) *Civil and criminal cases:* Without exception, LPPB members noted that serious cases such as wounding (with intent), theft and sexual abuse are referred directly by the LPPB to the SLP. However, a grey area exists, in particular with respect to domestic violence. LPPBs, like a number of other actors, such as chiefs and even the police, perform conflict resolution informally. For instance, most LPPB members deal with “fraudulent conversion”, “common assault”, and “matters between husband and wife.” Precisely what these cases entail, whether violence and theft are involved and so forth that would make them criminal and thus police matters, means that discussion/debate and even training for LPPB members and constituents on what constitutes criminal and civil cases is vital. *LPPB members need more clarity on what constitutes criminal and civil cases. Discussion, debate and training on what informal resolution entails, and how and in what cases it should be carried out is also recommended.*
- d) *Training for sustainability:* On the basis of conversations with LPPB members, numerous ideas for trainings could be considered, which would involve CRD, Local Unit Commanders (LUCs) and LPPB members together. The critical need for more training in SLP-LPPB strategic planning, interrogation techniques, report writing and communication skills was mentioned often by LPPB members and the police in interviews. (While some LPPB members have these skills, others do not.) Equally important, thought must be given to how to generate income to sustain and develop the LPPBs, possibly through small-scale farming/business projects. *It is recommended that ASJP and SLP sit down and agree on a training strategy around community policing and LPPB sustainability at regional and/or LCU levels.*

## I. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Guided by Sierra Leone Police's (SLP) community-orientated concept of Local Needs Policing and led by volunteers, Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPBs) have been established across Sierra Leone over the past decade. While Local Needs Policing is the ethos of the entire police force, LPPBs and their continued development are the responsibility of the Community Relations Department (CRD).

The primary role of LPPBs is to ensure provision of security and safety at the community level, that is, the towns, villages and neighborhoods across Sierra Leone's rural and urban areas. They were established to enable local communities to have a say and be involved in finding solutions to local problems relating to safety and security. They function as a *de facto* interface between the SLP and the local community, enabling the resolution of minor offenses. They are set up to facilitate and ensure that criminal offenses such as murder and cases of rape are reported to the police. Finally, they provide information to the police on "hotspots", thereby influencing where local police patrols are deployed.

Anecdotal knowledge on and localized studies of how LPPBs operate as providers and enablers of safety and security are available (Albrecht 2010, 2012; Baker 2005, 2008; Denney 2011; Horn *et al* 2011). That the LPPBs contribute to local stability is unquestionable; some of the findings of this work will be presented below. At the same time, however, suspicion is often raised about the neutrality of the partnership boards. A number of practitioners who partake in designing and implementing policing programs have questioned whether sufficient accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure that the LPPBs are not exploited by the police or used by its members to pursue private interests.

It has been argued, for instance, that the LPPBs are mechanisms for intelligence gathering for the police, which is partly the case. Indeed, the SLP sees the LPPBs as integral to their ambition of being intelligence-led (rather than reactive). The suspicion – and critique – is also partly valid because the LPPBs are not interest-free security actors at the local level. In fact, it may even be argued that it is because of the

<sup>1</sup> Special thanks to the SLP and LPPB members interviewed for this report, and especially Elizabeth Turay and Thomas Lahai. Thanks to Iben Villumsen at the Danish Institute for International Studies for comments and analytical input on earlier drafts of this report. Thank you to DAI for allowing us to publish the report and to Susan Michael for her substantial support towards its finalization.

private interests of individual citizens that LPPBs are functioning in the first place. As with any governance institution, the LPPBs have not been established in isolation from the political, social and historical context in which they operate. Indeed, they are shaped by it, and part and parcel of it (Albrecht 2012). This often means that the primary allegiance of the LPPBs outside the main District headquarter towns is with traditional leaders rather than the police (Albrecht 2013). In addition, personal incentives – accessing political power, generating an income, securing a business – are often primary motivational factors that lead to citizens becoming involved in the work of the LPPBs.

Any development program that aims to work with Sierra Leone’s LPPBs should develop its activities from this point of departure rather than assume that “complete neutrality” is even a possibility. It is not. How and by whom security and justice are provided is not a purely technical matter, but has political implications that relate to how resources and power are distributed. This is particularly the case in Sierra Leone.

While a general understanding of how partnership boards operate is available, there is a dearth of *concrete* and *systematic* analysis of how LPPBs in Sierra Leone’s 33 Local Command Units (LCU) operate.<sup>2</sup> According to the head of the SLP’s CRD, the home of the LPPBs, this is a general issue within the police organization as a whole. On this background, this report explores the following five areas of research in 17 of Sierra Leone’s 33 LCUs:

1. How are the LPPBs organized?
2. What is the social profile of key members in the LPPBs (focusing specifically on how or whether private interests interfere with the public nature of the LPPBs)?
3. How are the LPPBs financed and operated and what are the options for making the LPPBs sustainable in the future (outside the SLP budget)?
4. How are incidents reported to/by the LPPBs and what are the reporting channels of the LPPBs (from when an incident that warrants police involvement occurs to when and how it is reported to the SLP and beyond)?
5. What kinds of cases do the individual LPPBs take up?

In a collaborative effort between ASJP and the SLP – CRD and Corporate Services Department (CSD) specifically – the aim of this research has been to gain in-depth

<sup>2</sup> The Local Command Unit (LCU) is the formal designation of the police division in Sierra Leone.

insight on these five key areas. In turn, this information has subsequently been used to develop ASJP’s programming to engage and reform the LPPBs.

The report is divided into two sections. The first section outlines the general history of police reform in Sierra Leone from the late 1990s and onwards. The second section presents findings from the field research carried out by the ASJP and SLP (CSD) during the second half of 2012 and early 2013.

## 1.1 Methodology

The research is qualitative in approach. Together with the CRD and CSD, LCUs were selected according to the following parameters:

1. Regional differences/representation.
2. Tribal identity.
3. Political affiliation.
4. Rural and urban areas.

On the basis of these parameters, field visits were conducted across the country’s four Regions and in the Western Area. The following 17 LCUs were visited:

Bo East LCU	Kabala LCU	Adonkia LCU (x2)*
Bo West LCU	Mongo LCU	Congo Cross LCU (x2)*
Makeni LCU	Moyamba LCU	Kissy LCU
Kailahun LCU	Tankoro LCU	Eastern LCU
Daru LCU	Motema LCU	Lunsar LCU
Kenema LCU (x2)*	Waterloo LCU (x2)*	

*\*These LCUs were visited twice.*

Special attention has been paid to female participation in the LPPBs, both with respect to LPPB membership, the cases that LPPBs deal with, and the degree to which women members represent women’s interests.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> ASJP is of the impression that there is renewed interest in gender mainstreaming and training within the SLP relating to equality, anti-discriminatory practices and harassment, etc. Because they are “police mandated” bodies, support to the LPPBs should take these general developments within the SLP into account. In connection to this, ASJP takes note of and works within the parameters of the SLP Self-Assessment Survey on Gender Responsiveness conducted in May-October 2011 and the plan for gender training that is currently being drafted in the SLP’s training department.

Being qualitative in approach means that data has been gathered primarily through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with the SLP, and members and users of the LPPBs. Focus group discussions were primarily carried out with partnership board members themselves.

Users of the LPPBs were accessed through LPPB members and by analyzing cases that have been recorded at the LCU level. This means that the end-users, i.e., those who are ultimately to benefit from the activities of LPPBs, were not accessed independently from the police hierarchy. The main complication in this approach is that LPPB members will likely point to cases that they consider themselves to have been successful in resolving. This was remedied, if not fully resolved, in three ways:

- The selection of interviewees through conversations with LPPB members was, where possible and available, cross-checked with police records of cases that have been resolved by the LPPB.
- An explicit request was made to speak to both parties to a criminal act in which one or more LPPB members were involved.
- By recognizing the political context in which LPPB members operate, it was also recognized as a point of departure that private interests play a significant role in executing the role of partnership board member.

## **2. History of Police Reform**

### **2.1 The Context**

Sierra Leone's justice sector reform process began in the late 1990s and has moved through phases of stabilization, peacebuilding and long-term development for close to 15 years. This section discusses these three reform phases, focusing on police reform in general and Local Needs Policing, community policing and LPPBs in particular.

The Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) began implementation in the midst of war during the late 1990s and continued until 2005. It included community policing, initially only in Freetown. In parallel to the CCSSP with its exclusive focus on the police, the Law Reform Programme worked on the state-sanctioned court system. From the outset, a separation was established at the level of policy and programming between access to legal mechanisms (judiciary) and provision of security (policing).

This lack of coordination between programs in support of establishing the justice sector was addressed with the initiation of the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) in 2005. While a Primary Justice Sector Coordinator was now appointed, it was still Freetown-based providers that continued to receive the most attention and funding. Moyamba district was the notable exception as the only pilot located outside Freetown and the Western Area.

The third phase of internationally supported justice sector reform is the ASJP, the design of which began in 2010 (ASJP is currently under implementation, scheduled to end in late 2015). As the third cycle of reform, it was designed to split its efforts between district level and central government institutions, with a heavy emphasis on the former. While its two predecessors – CCSSP and JSDP – to a greater or lesser extent assumed a trickle-down effect from Freetown to local communities in the provinces, ASJP has a permanent presence in four districts outside Freetown, including Western Rural (Waterloo LCU), Kenema (Kenema LCU), Koinadugu (Kabala LCU and Mongo LCUs) and Moyamba (Moyamba LCUs). In 2014, this number expanded to an additional four districts.

## **2.2 Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), 1999-2005 – The State-Centered Approach**

The initial years of police reform in Sierra Leone took place during the latter stages of Sierra Leone's brutal conflict that began in 1991 and ended in 2002. Police reform was primarily supported by the CCSSP, which was funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). How re-organization of justice and security in Sierra Leone was envisioned and pursued cannot be analyzed separately from how investments were channeled by the CCSSP into equipment, infrastructure, logistics and human capacity to rebuild the SLP.

The CCSSP constituted the heyday of police reform in Sierra Leone. From 2000 to mid-2005, investments of approximately £27 million were made with the sole purpose of establishing a state-centered police organization that could enforce internal security and replace the chaos of war and military coups with the rule of law. Central to the CCSSP was the purchase of new vehicles, uniforms and radios procured by the UK, which became an essential component of the post-war state-building effort (Albrecht 2010:33).

Programmatically, what took precedence was enabling the SLP to establish law and order through “visible policing,” which implied getting the police back out on the streets, in marketplaces, and on the roads (Albrecht 2012:168; Scheye 2013).

Given the extent to which the Sierra Leone state had failed in the late 1990s, indeed, war was still going on during this period, police advisers believed that they were working from a clean slate. It was also assumed that if the state did not fill the “power vacuum” created by war, criminal groups and warring factions would (Jackson and Albrecht 2011:52-53). Adrian Horn, who managed the CCSSP from 1999 to 2003, believed that “a complete re-structuring of the police service in Sierra Leone” was necessary (Horn quoted in Albrecht and Jackson 2009:32). “I had the luxury of free thinking”, Horn recalls, “my previous involvement in developing change were usually constrained by systems and procedures, which only allowed tinkering and not ‘blue sky’ thinking. This was different” (Notes, Adrian Horn, 2008).

Apart from the work of the CCSSP, Keith Biddle, a retired UK police officer, was appointed by Sierra Leone's President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, to become Inspector-General of Police (IGP) in 1999 (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:33). This was a remarkable move. Not since W. G. Syer headed the police force during the final years of colonial rule and handed over command to L. W. Leigh in 1963, had a non-



Sierra Leonean been the executive head of the SLP (Krogstad 2012:131-136). As it were, 40 years later in 2003, a UK police officer would again hand over executive powers over the police to a Sierra Leonean.

Generally speaking, the initial phase of police reform was characterized by the notion that building a strong police force from the center (Freetown) and out (provinces) would automatically allow the police to monopolize the provision of security. This was in a very clear-cut way state-building by police reform.

### *2.2.1 The Police Charter and “A Force for Good”*

Before the CCSSP and Biddle’s appointment as IGP, Horn and Biddle had come to Sierra Leone in 1997 to initiate project appraisal activities (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:29). Together, they wrote the new policing charter that was delivered to and signed off by Kabbah. A draft of the charter was subsequently circulated amongst senior SLP officers and then refined. “That police charter was presented to Kabbah by Adrian and myself”, and made publicly available in August 1998. The new slogan of the SLP became “A Force for Good”. “Kabbah took up this and I christened the police in charge as a ‘force for good’ and he used that. That was the basis that we then gave to everybody and said: ‘That is the type of police force you’ve got to create.’” (Biddle quoted in Albrecht 2012:172)

### *2.2.2 Local Needs Policing*

In line with the re-birth of the SLP as a “force for good”, its new doctrine was conceptualized as Local Needs Policing (LNP). Related to notions of community policing, it was defined as: “Policing that meets the expectations and needs of the local community and reflects national standards and objectives” (Adrian Horn quoted in Albrecht and Jackson 2009:32). While what was meant by “community” was not clearly defined – an issue that will come under scrutiny later in this report – LNP became the basis of future police developments across the entire force.

### *2.2.3 Policing During Open Conflict and in its Immediate Aftermath*

The first years of police reform began during open conflict. Therefore, before 2002, reform efforts took place predominantly in Freetown and emphasized strategic issues, in part because of a genuine need to do so and in part because it was not possible to move safely outside the capital. In particular, emphasis was placed on building capacity

among the senior personnel levels of the SLP, including training at the Police College in Bramshill, UK. The emphasis on Freetown at the time was also precipitated by the severity of the security situation in the capital, particularly the high number of internally-displaced people occupying any large building available, including former railway train sheds and derelict factory buildings in the east end of Freetown.

After the war ended, it became possible to move SLP operations outside Freetown and move from a theoretical, strategic approach to a more practical one. It was during this period that deployment across the country began, which would not have been possible without the UK's massive investment in a vehicle fleet and nationwide communication systems (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:86-97; CCSSP 2000, December 2000).

By 2004, one assessment noted, "the SLP has improved its responsiveness and its visibility. A major factor in achieving this situation has been the communications, vehicles and infrastructure support provided through the C SSP (sic)" (C SSP 2004).

### **2.3 Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), 2005-2012 – The Holistic Approach**

In 2005, the CCSSP was taken over by another program cycle with different priorities. IGP Biddle left his post (and Sierra Leone) in 2003, and a Sierra Leonean, Brima Acha Kamara, was appointed to replace him (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:91-92). The Justice Sector Development Program (JSDP) that replaced the CCSSP reflected a turn to what was referred to in international policy discourse as a more "holistic" approach to reforms.

Rather than targeting one organization within, such as the SLP, and addressing its effectiveness as an enforcing agency, the justice and security sector was to be worked upon as a whole. As such, the JSDP constituted a fundamental break with previous efforts, in the sense that traditional leaders as well as bureaucratic oversight were now factored into reforms. While initiating community policing, the CCSSP had not directly engaged local actors in the process to any significant degree. The reformers delineated a clear dividing line between what they considered state and non-state, with the latter being more or less irrelevant to the reforms that they supported.

The holistic approach of the JSDP meant that the primary focus was now spread across the justice (and security) system, something that the CCSSP in its very design

had worked against with its exclusive focus on the SLP (Albrecht 2010:69). As noted above, investments of approximately £27 million had been made in the police force of 9,500 officers under the CCSSP. In the next phase, approximately £25 million was to be distributed among the actors considered to make up the justice and security sector as a whole, encompassing the judiciary, prison, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and so forth. Only £3-4 million was to be spent on the police (Albrecht 2010:69-70).

With the demise of the CCSSP and the onset of the JSDP, the SLP had lost Biddle as a clearly identifiable and decisive international leader and the SLP continued to be financially dependent on contributions from international donors. As one key adviser to the JSDP noted, this was somewhat of a double blow to the SLP: “Withdrawal of international funding inevitably leads to short-term paralysis and degradation of service with a real danger of attrition to the *status quo ante*” (Howlett-Bolton 2008:8).

Under the holistic approach, priority reform areas were expanded beyond any one organization. Areas to be reformed included out-of-date and inaccessible laws and procedures such as the indexing of customary law, prison overcrowding, delays in courts, absence of juvenile justice provision and the lack of support mechanisms to meet the “needs of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized to access justice and the lack of connection between community needs and police operations” (Bredemear *et al* 2007:9-10).

The focus on the SLP as an institution was eclipsed by DFID’s emerging reluctance to support programming considered too oriented towards security and “the state” rather than “the people.” DFID’s reorientation was towards the broader justice sector, the judiciary in particular. JSDP thus marked DFID’s return to its perceived “core business”: Bettering conditions for the poor (Bredemear *et al* 2007:9-10). This shift was supported consistently by the JSDP in both Freetown and Moyamba District, which became the pilot district outside the Western Area in which concentrated reform efforts took place.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The Moyamba District was chosen as the district outside Freetown in which the JSDP would “pilot” its holistic approach. Practically, it was chosen because it had a number of statutory justice institutions, including a prison, four police stations and five police posts, encompassing 14 chiefdoms and a population of 260,000 people. The District was also chosen because of its easy accessibility to Freetown. The original JSDP program document suggested that the JSDP would branch off into other Districts. This, however, did not occur, which in all probability was due to the overwhelming JSDP intent to encompass the justice and security field in its entirety. By 2009, a review referred to Moyamba in the context of JSDP as “a district test-bed for new projects and ideas” (Biesheuvel *et al* 2009). The general focus of the JSDP in Moyamba has been on community access to courts and, more generally, institutions such as Partnership Boards. A so-called “circuit court”, holding sessions across Moyamba, was established in an attempt to overcome the inaccessibility of many parts of the district (Bredemear *et al* 2007).

JSDP placed a heavy emphasis on what can best be described as governance-related activities, i.e., the organization and inter-linking of state and community-based institutions. This was the practical recognition of the link between development, quality of governance and security which gained prominence in international development agencies up through the 2000s.

A Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan for 2008-2010 (JSRSIP), launched in February 2008, was regarded by the donor community in particular as an important contribution to Freetown-based reform efforts across the justice sector. A donor-supported and Government of Sierra Leone-led Justice Sector Coordination Office was established in July 2007 (and continues to have a central role in coordinating the justice sector in 2013-2014). It is located next to the Attorney General and Solicitor General's offices within the Ministry of Justice and played a pivotal role in producing JSRSIP, and particularly JSRSIPII. Moreover, it has had a central role in establishing an inter-linked and coordinated justice sector (Bredemear and Lewis 2008; Biesheuvel *et al* 2009).

Finally, JSDP began implementation outside the Western Area in a way that was hardly possible under the CCSSP, given the context of war in which its implementation had begun. JSDP also engaged local level actors, such as traditional leaders, to a much greater degree than was ever the case during the life of the CCSSP (this had more to do with program design than what was possible at the time). This is indicated by an important training initiative undertaken by the JSDP in 2009 with respect to the LPPBs, when Chairmen, Secretary-Generals and women's representatives of the LPPBs as well as CRD officers and LUCs from across the country were given several weeks of training at the Police Training School in Hastings, outside Freetown.

## **2.4 Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP), 2012-2016 – The Service Delivery Approach**

The end of JSDP became evident during 2010 when DFID in Sierra Leone proposed a new intervention, initially referred to as Improved Access to Security and Justice (IAJSP), later renamed Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP). ASJP began implementation in 2012, and is scheduled to run until 2015. As such, the third phase of reforms is under way, as implementation began in earnest during 2013. Unlike CCSSP and JSDP, the focus of ASJP is predominantly in the districts outside Freetown, and thus takes the local level into greater account. In brief, this

has meant striking the balance between the needs and demands for improved justice and security by individuals and their communities by means of an accountable service delivery approach.

## **2.5 Community Policing in Sierra Leone**

### *2.5.1 Policing by Consensus*

Brima Acha Kamara, who replaced Biddle as IGP in 2003, described the police's scope to enforce order in the late 1990s as "policing by consensus": "There were other forces, warring factions, RUF [Revolutionary United Front] combatants, CDF [Civil Defence Force], competition about who should really be in charge of internal security. We were not able to flex our muscle, and we were ultimately doing *policing by consensus*" (Interview, Brima Acha Kamara, 2009; italics added). Kamara was describing policing in the immediate aftermath of war. In his assertion, however, also lay the rationale for policing in the years to come, and inadvertently the basis of the role that the LPPBs would play in peacetime.

### *2.5.2 Popular Inclusion*

Under Biddle's and Kamara's leadership as IGPs, LPPBs were established in each LCU from 2002-2003 onwards. They were instituted to ensure stakeholder participation in the process of policing, signifying a clearly perceived need within the police to rebuild relations with local communities. It is a role that they have performed to this day.

In the words of the 2010-11 Strategic Plan of the SLP, LPPBs are "an initiative to engage communities to fight crime and the fear of crime in cooperation with the police... The LPPB forms part of the community policing strategy aimed at involving non-police stakeholders in security and crime prevention" (SLP 2009:ii). LPPBs are thus seen across the country as a bridge between the police and communities. In this regard, they are expected to "investigate and resolve conflict between members of the community", and "increase the level of interaction between the police and the local communities" (LPPB Constitution 2011:3). This point is reiterated in the 2012-14 Strategic Plan of the SLP: While much has been done, there is "increasing need for the involvement of citizens in policing through LPPBs" (SLP 2011:10). Unpacking what "the involvement of citizens" implies is put under scrutiny later in this report. Suffice it to note here, however, involvement of citizens can have different meanings, including:

1. *Involving* the citizenry in providing their own security;
2. *Influencing* local deployments of police officers; and
3. *Informing* the police of crimes and general community developments that require police involvement.

### 2.5.3 *Inclusion by Necessity*

While the SLP commonly use a language of inclusion to explain the rationale of the LPPBs, this language was also a pragmatic response to the understanding that the “numerical strength of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) in coverage is smaller compared to the fast growing population for the entire nation” (i.e., a continuance of “policing by consensus”). This statement is taken from the *Proposed Guidelines and Codes of Conduct for Operations of the Local Policing Partnership Boards of Sierra Leone* (SLP 2005). This set of guidelines – a precursor to the 2011 LPPB Constitution – was never formalized at the executive level of the SLP. However, these guidelines express the common perception that LPPBs could compensate for the lack of resources within the SLP.

As a “community based structure” and a “non-partisan, inter-religious, social integration and development group”, the LPPBs were established to “create a peaceful and healthy police/community co-existence at all levels, with the ultimate goal to fight and reduce crime to an appreciable level and contribute to the socio-economic and political development of Sierra Leone” (SLP 2005).

Mustapha Kambeh was involved in developing the LPPB concept when he was posted at police headquarters in Freetown in the mid-2000s. He recognized their importance and worked hard to set them up in the seven chiefdoms that Motema LCU in Eastern Kono cover. LPPBs, he said, are:

“Critical in assisting the police to curb and mediate in conflicts within the areas of the police division. The Partnership Board members know that they have the role because they’re part and parcel of the community and they are listened to, and will understand the situation very well. So that is helping us, the SLP, police our area. So what the LPPBs are now doing is helping us to do early warning, they are an early response mechanism to conflict, given the economic situation in the country. The resources are inadequate if you allow conflict to erupt and grow within your areas of responsibility. The sooner we observe that conflict is about to erupt, we are able to move quickly to curb

it in a timely way; the LPPB assists us in resource use” (Mustapha Kambeh quoted in Albrecht 2012:185-186).

In December 2012, the LUC in Mongo LCU – a particularly challenging area in terms of roads and communication infrastructure – noted that prior to the establishment of LPPBs, policing had been “difficult” (interview, 2012). Paramount Chiefs would interfere in crimes such as murder and unlawful possession of weapons that were beyond their mandate. The research team of this report was not able to verify the correlation between the establishment of LPPBs, and the role of traditional leaders in enforcing local security. However, it was evident that LPPBs do provide necessary support to an overstretched police force.

#### 2.5.4 Evidence of Their Effectiveness?

The general focus of the JSDP in Moyamba was on community access to courts and, more generally, police institutions such as LPPBs which interface with the population. In 2009-2010, the only two LCUs where the LPPBs existed in all chiefdoms were in Motema (western Kono) and Kailahun (LCU-wide). However, the JSDP revived the LPPBs in Moyamba LCU; at the chiefdom level they amounted to what appeared to the external observer as a “House Watch” scheme, which is part of community policing and the overall LPPB organization. A decrease in some crimes, including larceny (by 63%, 297/109) and housebreaking (by 67%, 22/7) was reported in 2006 compared to 2005 (JSDP OPR, April 2007).

Supposedly, an assessment notes, the “pilot neighborhood watch scheme set up by the youths is working well and is helping in the reduction of crime” (JSDP OPR, April 2007). It should be kept in mind that the involvement of youth groups in providing security is not new in Sierra Leone, and is never done in isolation from local authorities (as such, they are not vigilante groups *per se*). This has been a common method to ensure community security in places where the SLP has not been present. Given the limited reach of the police in Sierra Leone’s rural areas, and the fact that the police are often overwhelmed in densely populated areas of Freetown, a degree of vigilantism has always characterized local enforcement of security.

This report now turns to a detailed presentation of data on the LPPBs collected during fieldwork performed in the second half of 2012 and early 2013. Insight is provided on how LPPBs operate across Sierra Leone’s LCUs, including how they

are organized, the cases they pursue, what they have meant to how local security is provided, and the ability of the SLP to manage/guide their activities and further development.



### 3. Local Policing Partnership Boards

LPPBs have been engaged in all three cycles of security and justice programming (CCSSP, JSDP and now ASJP) for the past 15 years. However, establishment of community policing in the country has been characterized by remarkably limited formal national policies and guidelines, not to mention legislation.

As noted above, a set of guidelines was produced and circulated informally in 2005 (i.e., neither agreed to nor ratified by the police leadership). In 2011, *The Sierra Leone Police Local Policing Partnership Board Constitution* was adopted by the SLP's Executive Management Board (EMB), and has since provided the most important piece of written guidance for the organization and management of LPPBs.

However, even if formal written guidance has been limited – and non-existent until 2011 – LPPBs have been established across practically all of Sierra Leone's LCUs, mostly in urban settings, but also in rural areas. They have come to play an important role in providing local security, raising community concerns and liaising with the police on behalf of community members. This relative success does not stem from their formal status in legislation or from (international) funding, but from their organization around already existing local structures of authority. This is one of the report's main arguments: The LPPBs have the potential to change how security is provided at the local level in Sierra Leone by building on and *transforming* already existing structures of authority.

As such, LPPBs have to a degree supported the democratization of how local security is provided. Today, Chiefs, who have often acted as unilateral authority figures in the past, are not in a position to simply bypass the opinion and voice of LPPB members who come from a range of backgrounds. Thus, while Chiefs are involved in the selection/election of LPPB members, and we return to this point below, they do not fully dictate LPPB operations. As such, LPPBs have the potential to effect a positive reconfiguration of local power structures. Women's representatives, bike riders, teachers, small traders, businesspeople, farmers, and others now have the chance to play a central role in defining local security needs and provision.

The remainder of this report discusses how Sierra Leone's LPPBs work. It concludes by presenting a number of the activities that were suggested to the

ASJP in support of their work with the SLP to strengthen community policing in Sierra Leone.

### **3.1 Lack of Clarity on the Exact Role of the LPPBs**

#### *3.1.1 Recordkeeping*

The number and type of cases that LPPBs deal with are unclear. Recordkeeping by both the SLP and LPPBs is limited and inconsistent in headquarters of the LCUs, both in the Western Area and in the provinces. A notable exception in this regard was the Kissy LCU, because its Community Relations Officer, a university graduate, compiled simple but good data on the day-to-day work of the CRD, which he managed. In most other police posts visited by the team outside Freetown, records were commonly non-existent.

The primary reason for the lack of good LPPB recordkeeping is not that the SLP does not have a consistent and regular recording system for the cases that they deal with. The SLP consistently keeps a hand-written record of cases reported to all LCU headquarters and most police stations and posts. The lack of a LPPB records has likely more to do with the nature of cases LPPBs engage in. Because these cases are often considered minor (an issue we return to below), they are dealt with informally and orally.<sup>5</sup> In most of the headquarters of LCUs visited by the research team, several cases and minutes of LPPB board meetings – ordinary and emergency – are kept on file (in hard copy). However, cases, minutes and documents for other activities of the CRD were not kept separately from those relating to the LPPB, and therefore an overview of the full scale of LPPB activities could not be provided.

The lack of records makes it difficult to isolate and get a full picture of the role played by LPPBs at the local level. When ASJP's district offices in the Western Rural Moyamba, Koinadugu and Kenema LCUs are up and running, an important role in each office will be to collect evidence of which cases are dealt with by which actors at what time over an extended period.

<sup>5</sup> Indeed, as Chirayath, Sage and Woolcock (2005:2) note, “the vast majority of human behavior is shaped and influenced by informal and customary normative frameworks. Even in societies with the most developed legal systems, only about 5% of legal disputes (that is, situations that have been understood as ‘legal’) end up in court.”

### 3.1.2 *Hybrid Provision of Security*

In addition, in the matter of record-keeping, it is not always evident whether LPPB members act in the capacity of being part of the LPPB or in the capacity of being community members of a certain status. This is because how security is provided and enforced locally in Sierra Leone is constituted by a hybrid order of numerous actors, including the police, quasi-vigilante groups, traditional leaders, secret societies, bike rider unions and others (indeed, the LPPBs are constituted by representatives from these and other groups).

Following from this, the division of labor between LPPB members and traditional leaders, for instance, is not evident, since the types of cases that both deal with – “minor disputes” – are not easily distinguishable from one another in practice. In the longer-term and as the LPPBs develop further, tracking the types of cases that LPPBs and chiefs deal with in each of ASJP’s district offices (Western Rural, Moyamba, Koinadugu and Kenema) would benefit the evidence-base of and help direct the implementation of ASJP. The picture that is likely to emerge is that there is an overlap of cases dealt with by traditional leaders and LPPB Chairmen.

The key role of traditional leaders more generally and elders in particular is undeniable in Sierra Leone. In a recent survey conducted by Fanthorpe and Gaima (2012) of public attitudes towards local justice and security providers, one of the questions asked was which institution – chiefs, Local Courts or the SLP – local residents prefer to deal with cases. Respondents, the report notes, expressed a preference for chiefs’ justice because it is “decisive, quick and relatively cheap” (Fanthorpe and Gaima 2012:19).

At the LCU headquarter level the research team did not encounter LPPBs where the Chairman or any other member of the executive was a Paramount Chief. (Several section and town chiefs do serve on the LPPB executive board). Paramount Chiefs or their representatives do serve as LPPB advisers.

However, with respect to selection, election or at times appointment of the LPPB executive, the chiefs are always involved, and often in direct ways. We return to this point in greater detail later, but emphasize it here to make the obvious point that LPPBs do not act in isolation from the broader context in which they operate – not in Freetown and not in the provinces. A broad range actors and institutions, including but not limited to chiefs, secret societies, bike

riders unions, trade unions, and others all have a stake in how local (hybrid) security is organized.

The important contribution of the LPPBs in this network of actors is that they constitute a new way of structuring interaction with the police. By extension, they have the potential to democratize how security is accessed by the general population, because they expand the number and type of actors that are given a voice in raising security concerns – both to the SLP and relevant community actors represented within the LPPB.

In general, the LPPBs consider themselves to be performing on much more of a voluntary basis than tribal heads, chiefs and other traditional leaders. In Waterloo, for instance, the LPPB Chairman compared his approach to traditional leaders in the following way: “With the tribal heads you definitely lose money, you have to ‘shake their hand’, tell them why you are there, upon your explanation, they ask you to pay. With the LPPB you can come with a complaint, either against the police or another person. I introduce myself, I show my ID Card, say that we are here to settle minor disputes. I ask for your consent. We are not coercing. I ask if I can mediate; most times I can go ahead. Then, I can give reasonable mediation. Others will say: ‘No, take me to the police’. I’ll take them to the police, let them make a report, leave them there” (interview, 2012).

### **3.2 Communities, Local Authorities and the Social Profile of LPPB Members**

Findings from this report’s fieldwork suggest that LPPBs are part of and could further consolidate a process of social transformation. Findings also suggest that this is a long-term process that reaches far beyond – but nevertheless should be supported by – ASJP. A distinction exists between what the concept of “community” encompasses in rural and urban areas. Reflecting discussions with LPPB members, a general rule is that in rural areas – outside the headquarter towns of LCUs and districts – “community” is equated with local authorities such as headmen and section and paramount chiefs. In urban or densely populated areas, however, the establishment of LPPBs has expanded the range of actors involved in defining and responding to local security needs. In short, “community” does not equate to local authorities in urban areas to the same extent as it does in rural areas.

### 3.2.1 *Rural Sierra Leone → Communities = Local Authorities*

When involvement of the community is mentioned by police officers, “community” has, particularly in areas outside District headquarter towns and LCU headquarter towns, tended to mean local authorities, i.e., chiefs, officially referred to as headmen, section and paramount chiefs. In other words, LPPB involvement of the community has not meant involvement of the general population (with the notable exceptions of several chiefdoms in Mongo LCU).

The equation “community = local authorities” is compounded by the fact that the LPPB is not necessarily tribally or socially representative of the locality in which it operates, because local authorities commonly are considered “sons of the soil”. The equation has also been compounded by traditionally close working relations between the police and local authorities in rural areas. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that the police will be hampered in operating in areas where they do not entertain close ties with traditional leaders.

A common scenario at the town/village level is that the LPPB representative, if he (or she) exists, is one of the authorities of the town (or represents a town authority) and at the same time acts as a police proxy. The LPPB member can only operate if he or she is formally accepted by the Paramount Chief. When someone is committing a crime, the LPPB member will be supported by the young men of the village/town in making an “arrest”. These youth groups are the physical force of community provision of security.

### 3.2.2 *Urban Sierra Leone → Communities ≠ Local Authorities*

In District headquarter towns and most of the LCU headquarter towns that the research team visited, the LPPBs seemed to have led to a shift in thinking about what the concept of community entails in the context of security and safety. This is an important point to explore in greater detail, because it provides insight into the potential transformative effect of the LPPBs. It also demonstrates how LPPBs may provide checks and balances on traditional leaders and the police alike (even if neither the police nor the traditional leaders can be fully differentiated from the LPPB).

As is the case in most rural areas of the country, more often than not communities equate “communities” and “local authorities.” The chiefs are still considered important stakeholders. As one LPPB member in Bo West LCU noted: “All Paramount Chiefs

are members [of the LPPB serving] as advisers. They are major stakeholders, because they have traditional control over their people. However, they are not members of the executive” (interview, 2012). Indeed, it was noted, “some people may listen to them more. Even this election [on 17 November 2012], when the parties are campaigning, they need to inform the Paramount Chief, because he or she is in charge of the Chiefdom, directly representing the head of state here” (interview, 2012).

However, as was noted in one group discussion with the LPPB in Tankoro LCU: “Before, the police would work with the chiefs, *and not work with the communities*” (interview, 2012) (A similar sentiment was relayed to the research team at Dogoloya Police Post in Mongo LCU). In short, it was explained, the community is no longer equated with chiefs, but is represented by a broader range of actors – and the presence of LPPBs supports this development.

While Paramount Chiefs are involved in the operation of LPPBs, the LPPBs constitute a general shift on two fronts. The first shift is reflected in the broad range of actors that constitutes the LPPB executive, including teachers, petty traders, business people, and others. The second shift has to do with the general change in perception of the police, and “an understanding of how the police work. Before, people would run away and hide when the police showed up, but with the sensitization that the LPPBs have undertaken this has changed” (interview, 2012). LPPBs will not alone lead to a more inclusive community concept that in turn democratizes the provision of security. However, it can support the process by expanding the number and broaden the backgrounds of people who are engaged in defining what security means at the local level.

### **3.3 Policy/Legal Basis of the LPPBs**

#### *3.3.1 Existing legislation (SLP and Chiefdom Police)*

The SLP was established in 1964 with the passing of the “Law Relating to the Organisation, Discipline, Power and Duties of the Police.” This Act established the Police Council, chaired by the Minister of Internal Affairs (now chaired by the Vice President as per the 1991 Constitution). This piece of legislation continues to define the role of the SLP as “the detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of Law and Order, the protection of life and property, and the due enforcement of all Laws and Regulations with which they are directly charged” (The SLP Act, Act No 4 of 1964).

A separate legal entity than the SLP, the Chieftdom Police appears in numerous pieces of legislation.<sup>6</sup> Its primary role is to deliver summons for cases in local courts, enforce by-laws and assist with the collection of chieftdom revenue. The 1960 Chieftdom Police Act established the Chieftdom Police (Cap 284, Laws of Sierra Leone of 1960). According to this Act, the Chieftdom Police is employed by the Chieftdom Councils upon the recommendation of District Watch Committees, which comprise the District Commissioner, the Superior Police Officer commanding the police district and one representative from each Chieftdom in the district, as appointed by the District's Chieftdom Committee (sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Chieftdom Police Act).

### 3.3.2 LPPBs and Legislation

The role of the LPPBs is not defined in law; indeed, no police legislation has been developed since they were established in 2002-2003. Instead, they have until now been developed and implemented at the operational level, and have become one of the critical ways of implementing and consolidating LNP.

LPPBs are still evolving as a concept and as a set of practices, and therefore continue to be characterized by a number of ambiguities (more on this below). Following from this, it is essential that the LPPBs are not formalized through legislation prematurely, but are given time to develop further and to be tested in practice.

However, this does not mean that LPPBs should be left out of discussions of reforms to current legislation regarding policing in Sierra Leone. This could be done quite simply by inserting a clause in future legislation obliging the SLP to consult with

<sup>6</sup> The Chieftdom Police were previously the enforcement arm of the District Councilors and Paramount Chiefs as "Court Messengers." Around 1956, as the British began to prepare Sierra Leone for independence, the SLP moved into the Protectorate (beyond the Western Area). The Commissioner at the time was asked by the Colonial Secretary to absorb the Court Messengers. He considered it but eventually refused on almost the same grounds as used by the leaders of police reform in the early 2000s. In short, the financial and management implications of doing so would have been too great. IGP Keith Biddle, noted about the Chieftain Police in 2009: "I had enough on my plate without taking on the personnel problems that would emanate from such an amalgamation and suggested to Peter [Penfold, British High Commissioner in the late 1990s] that the CP [Chieftain Police] be left to wither on the vine, with the SLP through LNP and LPPB filling the space. An issue that exercised my mind was the manner in which the PCs [Paramount Chief] and DOs [District Officers] managed the CP. Many were enforcing questionable practices and collecting "local taxes" – extortion money – for the chiefs and DOs. In some chieftainships, they were used to drag recalcitrant girls to the Bondo Bush for FGM [Female Genital Mutilation]. Many of the PCs and DOs really opposed the suggestion [of incorporating the CP into reform efforts], as they were apprehensive that things might turn difficult for them and that they would lose their power base" (Email communication, Keith Biddle, 2009) (Albrecht 2010:9).

and be advised by community representatives. (Community here is understood in the broad sense of the term). As a few LPPB members would rightly point out, giving the LPPBs even minimal attention in future legislation – and involving them in the ongoing reform process as a whole – would emphasize the central role of community policing in Sierra Leone’s security provision infrastructure. This may be done by giving the 2011 LPPB Constitution the status – and thereby flexibility – of being secondary legislation.

The importance of this point is not theoretical. In meetings in 2012 between ASJP staff and the newly-appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, Joseph Bandabla Dauda, it was noted by the Minister that reform of police legislation is on the agenda during his term. In other words, consideration of how LPPBs may be acknowledged for their role regarding policing – and without putting the LPPBs into a legislative straitjacket – will be important in the future.<sup>7</sup> This is not least the case because new legislation may not be developed for the next several decades. (As noted above, current police legislation was developed in the 1960s).

At the moment, the most important direction for establishing and organizing LPPBs is found in *The Sierra Leone Police Local Policing Partnership Board Constitution*, which was developed with support from international partners, including JSDP and United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). It was accepted by the Executive Management Board of the SLP in 2011, and has been distributed to all LCUs/LUCs across Sierra Leone’s 33 police LCUs. Long under way, the 2011 LPPB Constitution has proved a vital reference document for LPPB members and police officers alike. Rather than focusing on legislative reform that is politically sensitive and time-consuming, continued work on the LPPB Constitution, and refining and clarifying the guidance that it contains, should be the priority of CRD and Corporate Services Department (with support from ASJP).

### **3.4 Community Relations Department (CRD)**

Reestablishment of the CRD in Police headquarters occurred in July 2009 where it was subsumed under the Community Affairs Directorate together with the Media

<sup>7</sup> The legislative process in general and with respect to the police in particular is cumbersome and politically sensitive, due to the role played by the Police Council (chaired by the country’s Vice-President). Indeed, there may be discomfort within the Office of the President regarding redefining clearly the roles and limitations of the police in present-day Sierra Leone. Delays are to be expected in passing the legislation, both in finding space on the parliamentary agenda and obtaining executive sign-off. All of this to say that while community policing is important, there are more vital political debates around management and accountability that will take precedence.



and Public Relations Department. The CRD is led by one Chief Superintendent who has eight staff working under her. Each LCU is meant to have a CRD with three officers; however, as will be discussed in more detail below, this number can vary from none to six.

The CRD was established centrally as part of reform efforts under the CCSSP in the early 2000s, but was relatively quickly devolved to the LCUs. The CRD's resurrection came after the "EMB saw that community relations are important," one CRD officer noted, to ensure that policing was not by mere "firefighting" (interview, 2013). "We went back to our roots, back to the drawing board; they [the EMB] thought they could do better" (interview, 2013).

The CRD's current mandate is to:

1. Support the formation of LPPBs in all LCUs;
2. Direct public sensitization with respect to fighting crime and the fear of crime;
3. Organize consultative meetings with LPPBs and find solutions to issues relating to public safety;
4. Organize school visits; and
5. Inform the public about the activities of the SLP (in collaboration with the Media and Public Relations Department).

In the coming years, it will be the role of the CRD at police headquarters in collaboration with the LCUs to further systematize precisely when and how LPPBs are to be involved in policing their communities. In particular, attention must be given to the *nature* of the cases that LPPBs *are* and *should* be involved in. Until this is done systematically by the SLP, the full scale of how LPPBs operate day-to-day will not be fully understood, and therefore clear direction cannot be provided from headquarters. The ability to do so centrally will support the further development of community policing across Sierra Leone, and will in turn allow headquarters to learn from community policing practices across the country's LCUs.

A 2011 report evaluating transition priorities in the move from JSDP to ASJP noted that (re)establishment of a department dedicated to community policing in headquarters "risks limiting community policing approaches to one silo rather than enabling the police to understand this as the overall philosophy for policing" (Glentworth *et al* 2011). Caution is important and necessary. However, a qualified voice on community policing by a dedicated CRD has been identified as necessary to ensure that community policing is being discussed at the national level (i.e., by the EMB).

Furthermore, community policing is a key aspect of general policing in Sierra Leone, which is certainly evident at LCU level. All the LUCs the research team spoke with noted that they would have a difficult time policing within their areas of responsibility without entertaining strong ties with the LPPB Chairmen and the broader community. However, the research team did observe that the LUCs can become too involved in community matters, rather than allowing a qualified CRD to engage with the LPPBs.

The problem in this regard is that in a number of LCUs, insufficient priority and human resources are given to CRDs, whose function at the LCU level is not clearly articulated. Indeed, as the Director of CRD noted, in a number of LCUs, the CRD does not have dedicated office space in police headquarters. It was recommended that where there is space, a “Court Barrie” should be constructed in connection with the CRD where LPPB meetings could be held. Holding meetings in a Court Barrie would make LPPB meetings a public affair, as was the original intention with the LPPB. (Constructing a Court Barrie would be relatively inexpensive).

Also, as was noted by CRD headquarters staff, it is “frustrating when you come across the LUCs that do not know the importance of community policing. They will appoint officers that are no good, the ‘dormant’ ones, to the CRD [at LCU level]” (interview, 2012). It was evident in our research that the best functioning CRDs were located in the Freetown area, with four to six officers employed in the Kissy, Eastern and Congo Cross LCUs. In Western Rural, the CRD was one officer (the media officers had community relations attached to his portfolio).

In other places such as Kabala, no CRD existed. It should be noted, however, that the lack of a functioning CRD does not mean that LUCs across the country do not understand the need to liaise and communicate with members of the public. “You cannot operate in a vacuum and isolation,” the LUC of Eastern LCU in Freetown noted (interview, 2012). However, ensuring a structured approach to community relations requires a dedicated department at the LCU level, which may ensure a degree of institutional memory, expert knowledge on what community policing entails and daily interaction with and outreach to the community. It is no doubt a positive that the LUCs generally find it necessary to liaise with community members, but they cannot dedicate the necessary time to build and sustain community relations by themselves. Needless to say, in order to support the institutionalization of community relations at LCU level, building a CRD is crucial.

It should be the responsibility of headquarters, notably the Corporate Services Department, to support the development of strong CRDs at the LCU level. This would not only establish the CRD as the home of community policing in the LCUs, but would also ensure that there is some institutional memory in the event that a new LUC is appointed to a LCU.

Apart from developing job descriptions for CROs under the level of the Director in police headquarters (they currently do not exist), CRDs across the country may be further consolidated through the consistent provision of training and development of written material on how to carry out community policing. For instance, the CRD could develop and issue a handbook that sets out guidelines on how community policing is to be carried out in the particular context of Sierra Leone, and precisely what types of cases the LPPBs can and cannot engage in.

The LPPB Constitution combined with a handbook may not ensure full coherence across the country, but in any case this should not be the aim of international support. Different local contexts require different approaches. However, more clarity on the role of the CRD and the LPPBs will lead to greater inclusion of community policing across the entire organization.

### **3.5 Structure, Formation and Social Profile of the LPPBs – the Constitution and Beyond**

As an initial disclaimer, it is worth noting that while the LPPB Constitution provides vital guidance on the role and organization of LPPB, its language needs cleaning up. As this report progresses a number of ambiguities of the LPPB Constitution become evident.

#### *3.5.1 The LPPB Structure Outlined in the 2011 Constitution*

At its full capacity, the LPPB consists of 26 individuals occupying 21 different categories of positions. The LPPB Constitution refers to 12 categories of “board officials”, eight of which constitute the “Executive Board”. However, it is not entirely clear from how the LPPB Constitution is structured who is “executive” and who is a “board official.” For instance, while “Auditors” should be “appointed from outside the Board by the Chairman upon consultations with the Board/LUC”, they are listed under “Board Officials” (and are often considered executive members by LPPB members) (LPPB Constitution 2011:15). However, given their role as an

external accountability mechanism, Auditors might be board officials, but cannot at the same time be constitutive members of the Executive Board.

In general, it should be clarified in the LPPB Constitution who among the board officials are “executive members.” Doing so will align language both *within* the Constitution, and in *accordance with* the empirical reality of how (most) board officials refer to their position in the overall structure. In the LPPB Constitution, the Chairman is tasked to “be the head of the Executive Board,” but the positions comprised by the Executive Board are not clearly outlined in the Constitution. In this context it is also worth noting that since LPPBs are run by volunteers, requiring a treasurer, a financial secretary and three auditors may not adequately reflect an appropriate LPPB structure.

Related to this, the SLP should be clearer about the status of non-executive members of the LPPB. This is particularly important since the SLP is involved in issuing IDs to executive members of the LPPB, thus creating lines of divisions within the LPPB. Finally, while the LPPB Constitution outlines the tasks that each board official is expected to undertake, it might be worth giving some consideration to what the role of the remainder of the LPPB members should be. The positions of the board as outlined in 2011 LPPB Constitution are:

*Executive members (board officials)*

1. Chairman (board official/executive member), the head of the Executive Board with the responsibility to direct the affairs of the board;
2. Vice Chairman (board official/executive member);
3. Secretary-General (board official/executive member) keeps documentation of all LPPB activities and records the proceedings of all meetings;
4. Assistant Secretary-General (board official/executive member);
5. Organizing/Social Secretary (board official/executive member) organizes all domestic and public social activities on behalf of the board;
6. Financial Secretary (board official/executive member) records all monies and donations received on behalf of the board;
7. Treasurer (board official/executive member); and
8. Public Relations Officer (board official/executive member).

*Other Board members*

9. Youth Representative;
10. Women’s Representative;
11. Two Traditional Chiefs – Advisers (board officials);

12. Two Religious Leaders – Advisers (board officials);
13. One Legal Counsel Representative – Adviser;
14. Zonal Policing Partnership Chairman;
15. Three Auditors;
16. Local Unit Commander – Chief Adviser (board official);
17. Regional/LCU Commander – Operational Support Division (OSD);
18. The Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG) – Supports, Operations, Information, CID and CRD;
19. Civil Society Organization Representative;
20. Traditional Society Representative (male and female); and
21. Whip.

### 3.5.2 *The LPPB Structure in the Field*

#### 3.5.2.1 Who is the Executive?

In general, the number of positions of the executive should be kept small and manageable enough for the SLP to oversee. This is particularly the case since it is the SLP that hands out ID Cards to executive members. For this reason, individual Executive Boards of LPPBs should refrain from issuing their own ID Cards to members who are not part of the executive. LPPB members did bring this up as an option during interviews with the research team, for instance in Tankoro LCU, where one member noted how “the executive should be able to recommend other members [to become part of the executive]” (interview, 2012). However, as long as authority of the LPPBs remains dependent on police recognition, it should be up to the police to decide – and control and manage – how many members can have executive status within each LCU.

Following from this, it is crucial to outline which members are part of the executive and which ones are not and that whatever arrangement is agreed upon is communicated clearly across Sierra Leone’s LCUs. For instance, Area Policing Partnership Committee (APPC) Chairmen in urban and densely populated areas are *de facto* executive members in Freetown, Bo and Kenema, but are not considered to be so in the LPPB Constitution. Among the LPPBs that the research team met, the eight executive member listed in the LPPB Constitution were standard, including the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General, Organizing/Social Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer and Public Relations Officer.

The roles of the Financial Secretary and the Treasurer are limited, at least for now, since LPPBs work on a voluntary basis and operate in a resource scarce environment. However, given that activities may be put in place to support the sustainability of LPPBs in Sierra Leone, financial management may to some degree become a more central feature of the Partnership Boards in the future.

### 3.5.2.2 Zonal Policing Partnership Boards/Area Policing Partnership Committees

The Constitution notes that the LPPB should ensure that “the Local Zonal Policing Partnership Boards” sustain good working relations between the community member and stakeholders and the police policies” (LPPB Constitution 2011:6). However, it is not clear how these “Local Zonal Policing Partnership Boards” – also referred to simply as “Zonal Policing Partnership Committees” (LPPB Constitution 2011:7) – are organized and with what membership. This leads to some confusion on the ground. Zonal Chairmen play an important role locally, particularly in densely populated urban areas such as Freetown, Bo and Kenema. Therefore, they are often considered part of the executive group of LPPB members, but do not receive ID cards, which the CRD in Freetown has made clear are only for the Executive Board.

Who the executive members are is left for interpretation and at times leads to misunderstandings that are difficult to deal with for the LPPB Chairman. In Eastern LCU, the LPPB Chairman noted: “If myself and others get an ID, how would you feel [if you did not get one]? Is there a way to include them? According to the LPPB Constitution, all the Chairmen [of the zones] are automatically members of the board, but they did not get the ID Card” (interview, 2012). Clarifying the LPPB Constitution would be helpful in this regard.

In discussions with the police and LPPB members, ZPPBs were also referred to as Area Policing Partnership Committees (APPCs), both in the Western Area and in the provinces. Referred to in one interview as “another layer in the LPPB” (interview, 2012), APPCs in Motema, Lunsar, Kabala and Mongo LCUs are structured around the Chiefdom. Members are drawn from each section of the Chiefdom, and commonly selected by the Chiefly hierarchy and less commonly by election.

### 3.5.2.3 Women's Leaders

In the various LCUs visited by the research team, the common number of executive members mentioned was 12 (there were exceptions, such as Bo, whose LPPB members told us that the executive had eight members). In other words, there is a discrepancy between the board officials (executive positions) listed in the LPPB Constitution, and the structure that the research team met on the ground.

Without exception, a women's leader was considered part of the inner circle of the LPPB by those members interviewed by the research team. In many cases, women assumed leading positions within the LPPB. In Daru LCU, for instance, both the Vice Chairman and the Secretary-General were women.

The role of the women's leader is not reflected in the LPPB Constitution, even though it is generally accepted that women play a unique role in matters of local security, notably with respect to women and children involved in domestic violence cases. Among those interviewed, there was general consensus that women "are dominated in the community" as one LPPB member in Kabala put it, and that violence against women and children is common (interview, 2012).

Being part of semi-formalized structure such as the LPPB was considered beneficial in terms of being in a position to intervene, as noted by the Vice Chairlady in Kabala LCU: "Some people beat their wives, some people beat their children. When such things happen we intervene. When somebody beats his or her child, we will come in and advise. We don't have the right to get involved if they don't accept our involvement. However, we can advise them that there may be trouble, and that we can call the police – the LPPB gives us the opportunity to involve the police" (interview, 2012). Broadly speaking, women were considered better equipped than their male counterparts to deal with issues relating to domestic violence. "Feeding, taking care of their children, not supporting the women – we call the man to say that he should take on his responsibility," one LPPB member noted in Tankoro LCU (interview, 2012).

Commonly, with respect to domestic violence, "if the beating is severe, we come into it, and if it's above us, we refer to the FSU [Family Support Unit]. However, in most cases we try to handle the issue" (interview, 2012). In sum, women deal with types of violence that are widespread in Sierra Leone, and as LPPB members, they are able to represent the voice and interests of women in a way that men often are not able to. Another female LPPB member in Daru, who worked as a social worker

and referred to herself as an activist, noted how her key interest in being a LPPB member was to bring justice to women and children, whom she considered to be the most vulnerable and deprived members of her community.

Finally, matters relating to Sande (or Bondo), the women's secret society that initiates girls into adulthood, can only be dealt with by women who have themselves been initiated. Female circumcision (often referred to as Female Genital Mutilation), which is considered part of Sande initiation practices, can only begin to be addressed if those who carry out initiation are incorporated into structures such as those of the LPPBs.

In the context of the LPPBs, this means providing targeted support to those women who are already members of the LPPB in order to raise their profile. In one LPPB meeting attended by the research team, only one woman was in attendance among 25-30 men. While she noted that women are better at handling "sensitive domestic matters," she also pointed out that women are not able to engage in LPPB meetings due to the money involved in travelling.

#### 3.5.2.4 Youth Representatives

Just as women's leaders are considered part of the inner circle of the LPPB, i.e., the executive, so too are representatives of the youth. The "youth" label is precarious and highly political in Sierra Leone. It identifies someone who is considered socio-economically disadvantaged and someone who has not yet established a family whom he or she takes care of (King 2007, 2012). In other words, emphasis is not on chronological age – a man in his mid-40s may very well be considered a youth – but on whether social and economic adulthood has been achieved. Youth also connotes physical strength or what was referred to in numerous conversations during our research as being "able-bodied." Because Sierra Leone experiences high unemployment and poor education among the general population, a large proportion of the population is considered part of the youth demographic.

A good example of the central role of youth in local security is found in Tankoro LCU, which covers the eastern half of Kono District. Tankoro LCU with its headquarter in Koidu town is one of Sierra Leone's main kimberlite mining sites (OCTEA Ltd, formerly Koidu Holdings) and one of the areas in which youth from across the country seek employment as seasonal and day workers (many of which are considered ex-combatants). Therefore, "outsiders" or "strangers" are numerous in Kono, a common social category in Sierra Leone denominating someone who



was not born in the area in which he or she resides and works. This category of the citizenry should be represented on the LPPB, particularly in mining areas.

We do not go into detail on Sierra Leone's diamond industry or the conditions of miners in the country's mining areas in this report. Suffice to note here that Kono has been – and continues to be – one of the most volatile areas of the country. The reason for this is to a large degree the considerable numbers of youth-as-strangers working in the District. The shootings in December 2012 following a strike outside the OCTEA Ltd premises and involving OSD officers are an indication of this.

When the research team visited Tankoro LCU one week before the OCTEA shootings, the LUC at the time explained that when he had arrived in post a few months earlier, he had identified all youth groups in and around Koidu town. Clearly, meetings between the LUC and youth groups in Koidu did not prevent violence from breaking out a few months later (the LUC had started in his post in October 2012). However, this does not detract from the need to collaborate with and involve the youth in policing activities as was the intention of the Tankoro LUC. This is acknowledged in Freetown. "We don't want to be reactive," the Director of Community Relation based in Freetown noted when referring to the Koidu incident, "if only we had used our men and women to gather more info; the LPPBs are living with the people, and the police need to engage the LPPB to address the issue" (interview, 2012).

Generally speaking, while the youth are considered a security threat that needs to be contained, they are also a key partner in providing security. In Kailahun LCU, for instance, a murder was committed in 2010, and the perpetrator, trying to escape to Guinea, was arrested by the youths. On another occasion, larceny was on the rise in one area of Kailahun town. An emergency LPPB meeting was held with stakeholders, and it was agreed that night patrols of youth groups should be organized, which led to a considerable reduction in crime rates. In other areas, such as Motema, Yengema and Bumpeh in Motema LCU, task forces have been established to assist the police. Similarly, the LPPB Chairman of Tankoro LCU noted that a task force had been established there, consisting of youth who are organized on voluntary basis.

In general, in Sierra Leone's rural areas, groups of young men constitute the physical force of community provision of security in isolated towns and villages as well as in urban areas. They could be referred to as vigilantes, but they do not act in isolation from local authorities (chiefs and elders). In rural areas, groups of young men are

often selected according to allegiance to the local chiefs. In urban areas, notably in the Western Area, they are formally tied to the LPPB and referred to as Community Safety Volunteers (CSVs).

In sum, a youth representative should be written into the LPPB Constitution as an executive member. Special note should be taken of the fact that youths are not a homogenous group, but consist of numerous factions with different interests.

#### 3.5.2.5 Community Safety Volunteers (CSVs)

Due to Freetown's size and continued growth, and the density of the population and consequent crime rates across the Western Area, the role of youth in providing security has been structured to a degree that is not the case in the provinces. While similar to task forces in the provinces, CSVs have been distributed across all police zones in the Western Area (partly orchestrated from police headquarters). They work directly with the SLP's Operations Department and under the leadership of the executive of the LPPB, support night patrols of the police, and sensitize the communities on CSV roles and functions.

The CSVs are not elected; they are selected from the community by executive members of the LPPB and other local authorities. In 2010, the LPPB Chairman in the Eastern LCU noted that "these people are like police, but they are not police" (Horn *et al* 2011:35), meaning that they enforce security in support of the police as part of the community in which they live – *not* as part of the police. In 2010, they were referred to by one police officer as a "civil defense force," a term used to describe local militias that emerged during the war in the 1990s to defend localities in rural areas of the country where the government was unable to do so (and thus referencing a time when the state was unable to provide these services) (Horn *et al* 2010:35).

The CSVs are "a group," the LPPB Chairman in Waterloo explained, "helping the police to combat crime; young men and women, working with the police 24/7 finding criminals, making reports to the police. We have arrested people who committed murder in Freetown, and handed them over to the police. They have helped greatly to reduce crime rates from where they [i.e., the crime rates] were" (interview, 2013). The Chairman in Congo Cross supported this statement: CSVs "monitor activities at night, and when there is any crime, they have the police hotline. Either they call me at night or they call the police directly" (interview, 2013). The Chairman and the executive of the LPPB are often individuals of some status (businesspeople,

teachers, etc.), and therefore a certain age. Working alongside CSVs provides the LPPBs – and by extension the SLP – with physical backup.

In the past, CSVs were paid an allowance/stipend of Le 2.000 per day (unlike LPPB members, who work on a voluntary basis). When police headquarters withdrew this funding, the CSV program stopped functioning as regularly as it had until then. Through funding from ASJP, police headquarters resumed these payments during the November/December 2012 election period. In Waterloo LCU, for instance, 150 CSVs were active during the election period, and in Kissy and Eastern LCUs more than 200 CSVs operated during the same period.

In general, CSVs are unemployed youth, and are therefore motivated by the stipend they receive. The authority that comes with being aligned with the police and enforcing some level of security is also an important factor, as is the possibility of being recruited into the police following good service as a CSV. Without funding, CSVs made it clear that they would stop their activities.

In Eastern LCU, CSVs were represented on the Executive Board of the LPPBs, but they have not been written into the LPPB Constitution. Because they are not a permanent body attached to the LPPBs due to lack of funding, it may not be worthwhile giving them a role on the Executive Board at this time. However, the formation of CSVs should be mentioned as a possibility in the LPPB Constitution, under which conditions they should be formed and how. The notion of a task force should be avoided as it has an unfortunate political undertone: Youth groups attached to political parties to provide security are often referred to as task forces.

When CSVs operate, it is important that they are clearly identifiable, especially since they are not a permanent institution. In early 2010, the LUC in Eastern LCU noted: “Sometimes people say they are CSVs when they are armed robbers; so it is important that they can show that they are indeed part of us” (Horn *et al* 2011:37). Already in 2010, in Eastern LCU, CSVs were provided with “white t-shirts with the crest, just like SLP uniforms” (Horn *et al* 2011:36). This was also the case during the election period in November-December 2012.

### 3.5.2.6 Bike Riders Union

While women’s leaders and youth representatives are listed as members of the LPPB in the Constitution, the Sierra Leone Commercial Bike Riders Union is not.

However, during research team discussions with the SLP and LPPB, they were often referred to as central members of the LPPB (if not as part of the executive). At other times, such as in Kabala LCU in Koinadugu district the LUC noted that if “it’s an issue that relates to bike riders we invite those stakeholders [to LPPB meetings]” (interview, 2012). LPPB members have assisted a number of times in cases involving bike riders, which often occur with respect to unlicensed motorbikes.

The Bike Riders Union estimates that there are around 189,000 riders – known as Okada riders – operating across the country.<sup>8</sup> In Koinadugu district alone, the Bike Riders Union has 2,800 registered members, consisting of former criminals and unemployed youth. (In Kono district, many Okada riders are referred to as ex-combatants). According to the leadership of the Bike Riders Union, the rising numbers of bike riders has reduced rates of theft. In Koinadugu district, the Union was organized around a district executive, park executives and chiefdom executives. At the District level, they had a Chairman, Vice Chairman, Public Relations Officer (PRO), Accident Officer, Secretary-General, and so forth.

To avoid involvement of the police or traditional leaders (paramount and lesser chiefs), the Union has established their own task force referred to as “Police and Chief Justice” (interview, 2012). This body handles matters like outstanding debt, lent bikes that are not returned in time, theft of bike parts and abusive language among Union members. According to the executive in the Bike Riders Union in Koinadugu district, the Police and Chief Justice task force handles six cases per day in Kabala town alone. The significance of the LPPB to the bike riders only relates to cases that involve individuals outside the circle of Union members.

Given the strong organization of bike riders across Sierra Leone, and given that bike riders are often involved in incidents, a bike rider representative should be appointed to sit on the general LPPB, if not on the Executive Board.

### **3.6 Motivation to Engage in the LPPB: Altruism, Business and Politics**

LPPB members are motivated by a number of factors. First, and important, is the sense, as communicated by one Bo-based member to “to give something to my

<sup>8</sup> Note that the number of Okada riders mentioned here is unverified, and extremely high, given that the population of Sierra Leone is estimated to be 6 million people. However, it is a fact that working as a bike rider is a common way of making a living as a young man in Sierra Leone.

country as a Sierra Leonean” (interview, 2012). In Kailahun LCU, which covers the entire district, the LUC noted that the LPPB works because of “the dedication of a few members” (interview, 2012). Similarly, there was also a generalized – rather than personalized – concern expressed by those interviewed about the consequences of high levels of crime. As the LUC of Bo West noted, “if there is insecurity, your business cannot prosper. We have to look at the security aspect” (interview, 2012). Similarly, in Bo East, a LPPB member noted that “everybody has their own priorities; there is nothing to derive from the LPPB. We are just satisfied with the fact that we can come in to help our people to maintain security and peace” (interview, 2012). In sum, it should be assumed that one reason why LPPB members engage in community policing is the altruistic belief that he or she is doing something positive for the community in which he or she lives.

Following from this, LPPB members who have the means to do so supply fuel and transportation to the police; they have also helped building police posts and paint police stations. (In Kenema, the LPPB started, but did not finish, the construction of a police hospital.) The Chairman of the LPPB in Bo noted that: “Number one: We are not policemen. We are only supporting the police to be able to police properly. We force them. We pressure them” (interview, 2012). The LPPB provides support, including logistical support, to the police, while at the same time seeking to hold the SLP to account for its actions.

While LPPB members serve their country, there are at the same time concrete benefits from being a member. The Chairman of Kissy LCU noted in 2011 without hesitation that he had wanted to become the Chairman to secure his business, and that his close relationship with the LUC – and logistical support provided by the Chairman to the LUC – had paid a dividend (Horn et al 2011:38). In Kenema and Bo LCUs, both Chairmen are Lebanese-Sierra Leonean shop owners who are able to consolidate their positions with respect to both the police and the communities in which they live. In Waterloo LCU, the Chairman of the LPPB explained that without security, his business would run at a loss, “but if there is security and stability in a country, then investors will come, and I will have more contracts. Therefore, my personal interests and those of the LPPB are the same” (interview, 2012).

While personal interest was thus openly presented as a legitimate motivation to become a LPPB member, political activity is not. The only LCU in which we met an openly dysfunctional LPPB was in Makeni, where the Secretary-General was also the Chairman of the ruling party, the All People’s Congress (APC). (Makeni is the

stronghold of the APC). In general, the Makeni LPPB had been heavily politicized, and therefore appeared to have lost a legitimate role in local order-making. By contrast, in other LCUs, politically active members were removed from their positions. This is not to say that LPPB members in other areas are not politically active, but it is nonetheless recognized that the connection between politics and security is problematic.

### **3.7 Geographical Representation**

Working with the LPPBs requires working with an explicit distinction between rural and urban areas of Sierra Leone. LPPBs in densely and scarcely populated areas are up against different challenges in terms of distances and the availability of transport and communication (in Mongo LCU large areas are not covered by the telephone network).

The 2011 LPPB Constitution does not clearly spell out how to ensure geographical representation on LPPB boards, including on the Executive Board, and the different challenges of establishing and running LPPBs within and outside Sierra Leone's urban areas. At a minimum, some thought should be given to how this might be done, and written into the LPPB Constitution to ensure a degree of geographical representation across the country. This inclusion of geographical representation might support the continued democratization of security provision in Sierra Leone. Together with the CRD and other relevant departments in police headquarters, a structure of how to ensure appropriate geographical representation should be agreed and disseminated to the relevant stakeholders.

#### **3.7.1 Freetown and Western Area**

One of the key weaknesses of the LPPB structure is its organisation and geographical representation outside Freetown (Western Area) and other densely populated areas of Sierra Leone such as Bo, Kenema and Koidu. More than anything else, this is related to the logistical challenges in getting to headquarter towns from the far reaches of a district. Where people live in close geographic proximity to one another, it is relatively easy – and cheap – for LPPB members to attend meetings in police headquarters on a regular basis. Indeed, in Eastern LCU, the LUC has meetings with the LPPB Chairman on a daily basis.

In the LCUs visited by the research team in the Western Area, including Kissy, Congo Cross, Eastern and Waterloo, the structure of the LPPB is relatively straightforward

and streamlined. The CRO in Kissy explained to the research team that the LPPB consists of three bodies, including:

1. The Executive Board;
2. Area Policing Partnership Committees (APPCs); and
3. Community Safety Volunteers (CSVs).

The Executive Board of the LCU was referred to as the “main membership” in Kissy by LPPB members (interview, 2013), and each police zone constitutes an APPC which has its own Chairman and set of CSVs that in turn answers to the Executive Board. APPC Chairmen – referred to as Zonal Policing Partnership Chairmen in the 2011 LPPB Constitution – are part of the general membership of the LPPB. In a densely populated area such as Eastern LCU, APPC Chairmen are considered *de facto* executive members.

### 3.7.2 Provinces

#### 3.7.2.1 Concentration around Urban Centers

In the provinces, a less homogeneous LPPB organizational structure emerges. Kenema, the third-largest town in Sierra Leone, constitutes one of the country’s six municipalities with an elected city council headed by a mayor. It is divided into 29 police zones; we were told by Kenema LCU’s CRO that so far, 22 APPCs had been established. Outside Kenema town, in the 12 chiefdoms of the district, however, the LPPB only functions in three, including Nongowa (Kenema town), Simbaru and Small Bo. The research team was told there is no representation from the chiefdoms on the Executive Board.

A similar picture was evident in discussions with the LUC in Kabala LCU. While it was recognized that the LPPB provided vital support to the police – “the police are not everywhere at all times” (interview, 2012) – APPCs had not been established in the six chiefdoms covered by the LCU. In Makeni LCU, the LPPB had been politicized and was dysfunctional: No meetings or elections had been held for the past several years.

In places like Kenema, Kabala and Makeni where the LPPB only operates in urban centers or has ceased to function, collaboration between the police and local communities still takes place in the rural areas. However, the nature of collaboration

reflects pre-war practices where working with the community means working with the local authorities, i.e., paramount and lesser chiefs, as discussed earlier in the report.

In Binkolo (a police post in Makeni LCU), for instance, the Post Commander noted that a LPPB had recently been established. However, the Paramount Chief was the Chairman and the Speaker the Vice Chairman. In Fadugu (a police station in Kabala LCU), the officer-in-charge had knowledge of LPPBs, but noted that a board had not been established within his area of responsibility. Community policing was practiced in Fadugu, however, and good working relations existed with the Chiefs. In other places such as Kamabai (a police post in Makeni LCU), the Post Commander did not know what an LPPB was, but noted, as is common, that relations between the police and the community, meaning the chiefs, were good. A similar picture emerged in Kodembaia (police station), a mining town of approximately 3,000 people, in Kabala LCU. None of the police station's six personnel in Kodembaia knew what an LPPB was.

### 3.7.2.2 Different Models of Rural LPPBs

The examples above represent the general picture of LPPBs in rural Sierra Leone (and outside the Western Area). However, exceptions exist in a number of the LCUs visited by the team, including those of Tankoro, Mongo, Kailahun and Motema. I will briefly present findings from each of these LCUs in the following sections. Each of them provides insight into how infrastructural and logistical obstacles might be overcome under resource scarce circumstances.

#### 3.7.2.2.1 Tankoro LCU

Tankoro LCU in Kono district covers nine chiefdoms and borders Guinea. While APPCs have not been established outside Koidu town, chiefdom coordinators – one per chiefdom – have been appointed. The coordinators reside in Koidu town, and have the primary task of coordinating between the Executive Board of the LCU (mostly from Koidu town) and the chiefdom they represent. Communication is by cell phone. On the research team's visit to Njagbwema Fiamma (where a police post is located), it was confirmed that the chiefdom coordinators set up by the Executive Board played an important role in connecting Njagbwema Fiamma and the LPPB/SLP in Koidu.

While not ideal compared to having APPCs in each chiefdom, the establishment of chiefdom coordinators indicates that the Executive Board has had somewhat improved lines of communication with peripheral areas of the LCU.



### 3.7.2.2.2 *Mongo LCU*

Mongo LCU in Koinadugu district covers five chiefdoms. It is a vast LCU that shares a porous border with Guinea, has challenging road infrastructure and a limited telephone network (the only line of communication of LCU headquarters of Mongo is a police radio connected to the LCU in Kabala town). Despite or perhaps because of the challenging environment of the LCU, combined with a limited number of police officers (84), a variety of organizational structures have been set up across the LCU's chiefdoms to connect the police and the population. As a common reflection across urban and rural areas, but for different reasons, the LUC noted that "the police cannot cover the entire area effectively without the help of the partnership board" (interview, 2012). APPCs had been established, if not by the LUC then with his active and on-going support across the four chiefdoms visited by the research team (including Bendugu, the headquarter town of the LCU).

Covering two Chiefdoms, Dembelia Sikunia and Folasaba, a functioning APPC was established on 1 May 2012, with representation from across the Chiefdoms (34 ordinary members and 11 executive members). Women were considered to play a key role, being "quick to understand issues" and "faster to get information/intelligence than the men", as the Chairman put it (interview, 2012). APPC members had made their own blue t-shirts, with "Police Partnership Board – Mongo LCU – Folasaba Demblia (sic) Chiefdom" printed on the front.

At each LPPB meeting, money was collected for the transport of members to meetings. It would be worthwhile drawing this particular APPC into trainings/discussions with other LPPBs/APPC about their skills and not least motivation (at subsequent trainings held by the SLP in Koinadugu for LPPB members, Mongo LCU LPPB members were involved).

The team encountered a similarly structured APPC in the neighboring Chiefdoms, with a more or less strong involvement of the Chiefs, particularly with respect to selecting candidates for the APPC executive. Due to the infrastructural challenges of Mongo LCU, members of the LPPB executive are drawn in large part from Mongo Chiefdom. The LCU (based in Bendugu, Mongo Chiefdom) plays an important role in liaising with APPCs and obtaining information from the population, in particular from the border areas.

### 3.7.2.2.3 *Kailahun and Motema LCUs*

In both Kailahun (bordering Guinea and Liberia) and Motema (bordering Guinea), LUCs have been in place that put strong emphasis on the importance of setting up LPPBs. For this reason, members of the LPPB executive were drawn from each chiefdom. As in Mongo, these LCUs provide insight into the great importance of a motivated and engaged LUC. Despite the fact that Motema LCU experienced a disengaged LUC in 2010-2011, the institutional structures had been established, and was easily reconstituted by the LUC who arrived in post in 2012. At the same time, as the Chairman of Kailahun noted: “The problem with finance – fair representation – and then to call somebody from Koindu, he has to pay transport. Some cannot afford to come, and when they come, they expect per diem. At least they expect to have lunch. One time I had to pay their transport from my own pocket, but I cannot offer that every time. When they come, and they know they are not getting anything, they find it difficult to come” (interview, 2012). The issue about transport and complimentary meals were commonly raised concerns.

In sum, as the question of how to ensure geographical representation on the Executive Boards of the LPPBs is being considered, reference should be made to the different solutions that LPPB members across the country have found in the resource-scarce environments that they live in.

## **3.8 Election of LPPB Members and the Role of Chiefs**

It is generally accepted that the Executive Board of the LPPB is formed through election as outlined in the 2011 LPPB Constitution. (In Motema LCU in 2009, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was called in to oversee LPPB elections, thereby emphasizing the level of formality of election to the Executive Board). However, because these positions are not clearly outlined in the LPPB Constitution, it is often still unclear which positions are in fact up for election.

In addition, the LPPB Constitution provides only limited guidance on how APPCs should be formed. At the moment, therefore, APPC/Zonal members are at times appointed by the chiefly hierarchy in the provinces and by community authorities in the Western Area (also referred to as local chiefs or tribal heads). At times, chiefs and community authorities appoint the candidates from whom the APPCs are elected (as is the case with respect to the LPPB executives). This is often presented as a

community decision, why it is important to keep in mind that community and local authorities are commonly closely aligned in Sierra Leone (though not exclusively, as discussed earlier in this report).

The LPPB Constitution speaks of the LUC's role in establishing the Electoral College for the election of executive LPPB members. It notes that five delegates are to be chosen by "zonal members" (LPPB Constitution 2011:16). What this means is that without exception, the community, led by the paramount and lesser chiefs, is left to choose the candidates who can run for election to the Executive Board (LPPB Constitution 2011:16). In the case of Kailahun district, for instance, functioning LPPB structures have been established across the LCU's five chiefdoms. However, this number varies. In Motema LCU, Paramount Chiefs and elders were asked by the LUC to appoint 10 people from each chiefdom to be members of the Electoral College.

According to the LUC and the Chairman of the Executive Board in Kailahun, APPCs have been established in all chiefdoms of the LCU, which covers the entire district. (This was confirmed in the case of Koindu police station that the research team visited.) In March 2012, a message was sent through the Paramount Chiefs to the Section Chiefs to put appropriate candidates forward for elections. In turn, five delegates from each Chiefdom came to Kailahun to take part in the election of the Executive Board. (Most of the LPPBs in the 17 LCUs visited by the team had elected new executives during 2012). An election process similar to the ones in Kailahun and Motema had been followed in Daru LCU.

### **3.9 The Activities and Roles of LPPBs – Conflict Resolution, Strategic Planning, Sensitization**

LPPBs, broadly speaking, undertake three types of activities:

1. In the Western Area and urban areas across the country in particular, they support the SLP in day-to-day policing, bringing alleged criminals to the police and conducting informal conflict resolution;
2. They engage in strategic planning and advise on the deployment of police officers; and
3. They support preventive measures to avoid situations from escalating and spiraling into violence.

### 3.9.1 How LPPBs Deal with Everyday Cases

#### 3.9.1.1 Minor and Sensitive, Civil and Criminal Cases

*“First and foremost, you need to ensure that the individual you are talking to trusts you. That’s the first step, you are not taking sides, you are not there as a policeman.”* (LPPB member, Bo West LCU, emphasis added).

Generally speaking, LPPB members distinguish between cases that are considered minor or trivial and cases that are sensitive and considered “above” the LPPB. Murder, severe beatings, rape (referred to as “blood crimes” in some communities), substantial theft and sexual abuse of children are commonly referred to the police. By extension, most LPPB members who were interviewed for this report made an explicit distinction between civil and criminal cases. As one LPPB member in the newly established Bo West LCU noted, the “partnership board does not investigate or charge to court; if they can, they mediate and do informal resolution” (interview, 2012).

Like a number of other actors, such as chiefs and the CRD of the police, the LPPBs carry out informal conflict resolution. In Kabala, informal resolution was explained by one LPPB member as a situation “where people are dealing with minor crimes, minor cases – they come to us, we examine, we talk to the two parties” (interview, 2012). In Waterloo LCU, the LPPB Chairman said that informal resolution involved “matters that you settle out of court, out of the police, but [that are] more or less recognized by the police. If you lock a person up in prison, there is every possibility that he will become a hardened criminal. If there is a way to settle this matter; tell him: ‘This thing is not good for you, you are healthy, able-bodied’ – tell him to find a job” (interview, 2012).

Most LPPB members would deal with what they referred to as “fraudulent conversion”, and “common assault”, but also cases of domestic violence. Not surprisingly, the picture varied in this regard, depending on whether an incident of domestic violence occurred in an urban or a rural area.

#### 3.9.1.2 A Grey Area between Minor and Sensitive Cases

It was evident during interviews with LPPB members that a grey area exists with respect to cases that the LPPB takes on, particularly with respect to domestic violence. As such, *there is no doubt that cases involving violence and theft were dealt*

*with by the LPPB through informal resolution.* This is important to emphasize, because it shows that LPPBs deal with cases that they should refer directly to the SLP. As one female LPPB member in Daru noted: “If a girl is raped, that one is not compromised. Flogging of a child, I will just say stop it. Bruises and wounds, I will report. Where there is no wound, I don’t” (interview, 2012). In other words, there is work to be done to understand better how LPPBs can play a positive role in dealing with cases of domestic violence. This is an indication that more training should be provided to ensure that LPPB members and police officers alike are able to distinguish between civil and criminal cases.

### **3.9.2 Resolving Matters between the Public and the Police – Gradually Changing the Image of the Police**

The role of the LPPB in mediation between the police and the public is vital; the research team was presented with a number of cases in which the LPPB has played this role. In Kailahun LCU/district, for instance, the police were accused of mishandling a civilian, and the situation was getting out of hand. LPPB members went on the radio to talk about the issue, called the parties involved and arbitrated. The LPPB Chairman led the process of arbitration as a respected elder as well as in his capacity as LPPB Chairman. A compromise was found. Similarly, members of the Bike Riders Union in Bo town noted that the LPPB “serve as middlemen between the community and the police, playing an active role when problems occur with the police, customs, etc. They go in between to make sure that peace and tranquility prevails” (interview, 2012).

#### **LPPB Oversight Committee in Kabala**

In Kabala LCU, the Executive Board has established what they refer to as an “Oversight Committee.” It keeps a check on the police, how suspects are treated in retention, how they are fed, and so forth. More generally, the Oversight Committee plays an important role in holding police officers to account for their actions in the public sphere. The rationale is, the LPPB Chairman in Kabala noted, that “whenever a police officer is doing something wrong in public, it will reflect on the entire police force and it will affect the perception of civilians of the police in the community. If it is a minor issue done by the officer, he will be advised to stop and not to repeat it. If it is a bigger crime, he will be reported at the police station” (interview, 2012).

The LPPB has the potential, if it continues to be seen as community-driven, to support an ongoing change of the police's image.<sup>9</sup> As noted by the LPPB in Bo West LCU: "It's a gradual process; we are actually not at the end of the road, it's a gradual process – to change perceptions takes a long time" (interview, 2012). Previously, as the Operations Officer in Daru noted: "The civilians saw the police as enemies – some police officers were hostile to the population, because of the power vested in the police. The community was not collaborating with the police because we thought we should isolate ourselves from them. *The police thought they could do anything. People did not know their rights*" (interview, 2012). The LPPB Chairman in Waterloo LCU said that the image of a deeply corrupt and unresponsive police force has stuck, even when the police, from his point of view, have sought to change how they do policing. (He believed, as a perception rather than a quantitative fact, that around 15% of police officers accepted/demanded bribes from the general public) (interview, 2012).

The LPPBs have encouraged a degree of transparency/openness and not least accountability within the police, because while they do not pay allegiance to the police, they are able to some degree to hold them accountable for their actions.

### 3.9.3 Strategic Planning and Preventive Measures

At a national LPPB conference held on 4-5 October 2012 in Freetown, it was noted that greater effort should be made on the part of the SLP to involve LPPB members in strategic planning. While the point was important, the research team did come across numerous examples of police deployments taking place on the advice of the LPPB. For instance, if crime levels rise in an area, an LPPB meeting involving the LUC as Chief Adviser will be summoned to discuss how best to deal with the matter. In Daru, the Operations Officer told us: "Even in certain operations we involve them, such as in cases of arrests of unlicensed Okada riders. We call them [LPPB members] before we do this – probably they will come up with suggestions, and we reach something that will be comfortable for both parties" (interview, 2012).

Finally, the LPPB are instrumental in taking preventive measures when a situation has the potential to get out of control and turn violent. This is done primarily by calling an emergency meeting among the implicated parties, and ensuring that

<sup>9</sup> This is obviously conditional on developments within and actions of other arms of the police, including operations, the armed wing of the police, and criminal investigation.

### **LPPB and Informal Conflict Resolution in Kenema**

The Chairman of the Bike Riders Union in Kenema LCU had lent a motorbike to a rider. The rider decided to drive through the Hamaddiya Muslim Secondary School compound and by accident hit a female student. One teacher and a few students witnessed the accident, apprehended the rider and beat him up. The rider managed to escape and sought refuge in the house of one of his friends. The group of students that had beaten him began to stone the house in which he was hiding. They demanded that the rider should leave the house of his friend, but he refused. The students then forced their way into the house and one of the students stabbed and killed the rider.

Immediately after the incident, the bike riders threatened to burn down the Hamaddiya Muslim Secondary School and kill any student seen in the street. A meeting was called by the Resident Minister (Eastern Province), involving the family of the deceased, the bike riders, the principal of Hamaddiya Muslim Secondary School and LPPB members. The matter was discussed, and it was agreed that all parties should refrain from using violence. The LPPB members were actively involved in monitoring developments after the event and provided the SLP with information on the bike riders' plans. After a week had passed, LPPB members, members of the Bike Riders Union and the principal of the Hamadiyya Muslim Secondary School successfully undertook a joint sensitization tour around Kenema, in which students were called upon to return to school after a week with no classes.

everyone has the correct information, including what the police are doing to resolve a given matter. For instance, when a bike rider was accidentally killed by a police officer in Western Rural, bike riders assumed that the police would not deal with the matter, which led to tensions and threats of violence against the police. The LPPB played an important role in informing the bike riders about how the police officer was being disciplined.

## **3.10 LPPBs in Support of Police Activities**

### *3.10.1 Non-Threatening Force Multipliers*

One of the key functions of the LPPBs is to be a “non-threatening force multiplier.” In Bo West LCU, LPPB members saw themselves as actively supporting crowd control by intervening as community members. At times, the police themselves are considered a threat to stability and can contribute to the escalation of a situation.

One LPPB member commented to the research team that the “police should not be seen as an enemy. Some will see the LPPB as closer to the SLP – others see them as part of the community. *They are not a second or third force; they are the same as the community*” (interview, 2012). It is in this capacity, as “part of the people”, and because the “police are overstretched” that LPPB members use their mediation skills to settle matters and support the police (interview, 2012).

It is this in-between role of LPPB members that should be maintained, where LPPB members are considered part of the community while in a position to liaise with the police when necessary.

### 3.10.2 Information-gathering and Sharing

Before the war in the 1990s, the public was afraid to pass on information directly to the police: Doing so could mean that they would be taken into custody. Given the history of police-community relations in Sierra Leone, the SLP is still feared today to a degree. A Bo West LPPB member noted that “it is easier to pass on information to the LPPBs, who will then pass it on the police” (interview, 2012). Indeed, the LUC for Bo West noted: “With a growing population, we rely on the board to give us information, and the boards have been very instrumental in this regard” (interview, 2012).

In a review of the training of LPPBs and SLP that the JSDP conducted in 2009, one participant noted: “We provide information and the police act on the information.” It is, as another participant commented, “intelligence and community-led policing” that was developed and encouraged in previous cycles of police reform. “The board makes it easier,” the LUC of Eastern LCU in Freetown noted in 2010, “a murder has been committed, we call the board and tell them that ‘we want you to go and find the person for us’. Before the reform, we were not having the board, and it was difficult to police. The difference is that now, when we want information, we contact the [LPPB] Chairman, he will then call the zonal heads. They will discuss and come back to us” (Horn et al 2011:37). This comment is in line with the SLP 2010-2011 Strategic Plan, which notes that: “Civilian partners have and continue to provide sensitive information permitting the institution to respond to local issues and concerns” (SLP 2009:ii).

The LPPBs are also significant in terms of gaining access to areas where community members actively resist police involvement. “This Sierra Leone business, this family



business, means that they will save their sons. Initially, when I came here,” the LUC of Eastern LCU told us, “a serious theft occurred – the chiefs saw it, and the CSVs arrested the criminals. They held them, called the police, but when we came they were no longer there. I sent my intelligence people out there, but we could not do anything. If it had been an outsider to their own community, they would have reported the case to us, but since it was done by their own community, they dealt with it within themselves” (interview, 2012). A number of cases like this were recorded by the research team, including cases where the SLP was not able to resolve the matter without involvement of the LPPB.

### **3.11 The LPPBs and Future Sustainability**

One LPPB member in Bo East noted: “When you are talking about sustainability, there must be some kind of training, micro-financing, farming so that sustainability can occur” (interview, 2012). The biggest constraint to LPPB members, and something that is a cause of widespread complaints, is that they have no budget, and therefore receive no money for their efforts, not even for transportation to attend LPPB meetings.

For LPPB meetings to take place there is currently a reliance on the commitment of police officers and community representatives, including private donations to underwrite the cost of transport for members. In Motema LCU, Kono District, this meant that a disproportionate amount of time during meetings concerned fundraising for the LPPB. For instance, in 2008-2009, an agricultural committee was set up in Motema LCU, which suggested establishing a Casava<sup>10</sup> farm that could generate an income for LPPB members (with strong support and input by the LUC at the time). In Bo, the LPPB Chairman suggested that an “entertainment center” could be set up to support the running of the LPPB. It is initiatives and suggestions such as these that need to be further developed so that an income can be generated for the LPPBs. Over-reliance on temporary donor funding should be avoided, because it will create a short-term need for financial input, and possibly jeopardize the voluntary nature of the LPPBs rather than a long-term solution. Future training should at a minimum include elements on how to integrate components to enable LPPBs to pay for transport of their members to and from meetings.

<sup>10</sup> Casava is a commonly eaten vegetable across Sierra Leone.

The LPPB has also supported fund-raising for the SLP. In Kabala LCU, a fund-raising committee was established, first, to raise funds within the executive through individual contributions for meetings, refreshments, phone bills and transportation. In addition, the fund-raising committee has also written project proposals. At the time of the research team's visit, it had written two proposals that had been sent to Sierra Leone's President Koroma, one to support the construction of a three-bedroom house for the LUC, and another to pay for repair of LCU headquarters.

## 4. Conclusion

For the past fifteen years, Local Needs Policing has been the ethos of the SLP. As a variety of community policing, one of its practical expressions has been the LPPBs. After a decade of war and a virtually total breakdown of local safety and security, the LPPBs were above all introduced to reestablish relations between the central government and local communities. At the same time, they were also introduced to engage citizens in local security delivery and to support an understaffed and logistically challenged police force. The research team of this report found that while LPPBs still face a variety of challenges, they have in many places across the country supported stronger relations between the police and the local population and by extension led to better and more locally sensitive provision of security.

In its comprehensive review of half of Sierra Leone's LCUs, the research team of this report observed a number of existing LPPB issues that should be observed and addressed when working with LPPBs in order to solidify their achievements and build stronger institutional structures.

First, and as a point of departure for understanding the role and function of the LPPBs in the first place, there is a lack of recordkeeping by LPPBs and by the SLP about LPPB involvement in police cases. This contributes to the general lack of clarity of precisely what LPPB board members do and how they contribute to security provision at the local level. This report provides insight in this regard, but data collection in the long-term by the SLP, LPPBs or an NGO would ensure a more systematic understanding of how LPPBs operate. Part of the reason for the dearth of records is that LPPB members are often involved in cases of conflict and crime on an informal basis: Oral reports by board members are often the only "official" reports they make. Suffice it to note here that whatever recording system is put in place must respect the need to keep this recordkeeping on a practical and usable level that LPPB members will use readily.

An additional reason why there is limited clarity on which cases are dealt with by LPPB members is reflected in the nature of security delivery in Sierra Leone. Paramount and lesser chiefs, quasi-vigilante groups as well as secret societies play a central role in enforcing order and security at the local level. LPPB membership is comprised of members from all of these groups. Paramount chiefs are formally involved in LPPBs in an advisory capacity. They are a fact of political life in Sierra

Leone's 149 chiefdoms that cannot be ignored. As such, they will inevitably have a say in what security means in their chiefdoms and how it should be delivered. Moreover, quasi-vigilante groups of young men may now play an important role in making order within the LPPB framework as Community Safety Volunteers. However, it is a security function that young men have long had in rural and urban settings, often under the guidance of the local leadership (the elite). On the one hand, herein lays one of the key strengths of the LPPBs, and one of the reasons why they are relatively efficient in many of the areas where they do function: They have been built up around already existing structures of authority at the local level. On the other hand, it makes it difficult to ascertain whether young men would have played a central role in local order-making, regardless of whether LPPBs had been established or not. What is certain is that LPPBs have supported the (re) formalization of relations between the police (the state) and local communities (the population).

A second related issue that should be taken into account is that there is a difference between the interplay of local authorities and community in rural and urban areas. Involvement of the community in security provision in rural areas tends to mean involvement of paramount and lesser chiefs. In short, there is often a complete overlap between the chiefly and LPPB hierarchy. This means that LPPB members in these communities act both as representatives of local authorities and act as police proxies. In turn, this does not (necessarily) lead to a broadening of who is in a position to define what security provision is and how security needs should be addressed. The concept of community is central to this discussion. While it has been equated with paramount and lesser chiefs in rural areas, in urban or densely populated areas the establishment of LPPBs has expanded the range of actors involved in defining and responding to local security. Thus, the notion of community has for example come to encompass teachers, youth and women's leaders, among others. As such, Sierra Leone's LPPBs have, particularly in urban settlements, supported the democratization of security in Sierra Leone. They have expanded the number of people that are consulted on communal security, and have established links between the police and community in the broad sense of the term that previously did not exist.

Third, because LPPBs are still evolving as a concept and as a set of practices, it should be considered carefully how and under what conditions they are formalized in legislation. At the moment, as this report suggests, they continue to be characterized by a number of ambiguities and it is essential that the LPPBs are not formalized

through legislation prematurely. LPPBs should be given the time to develop further and to be tested in practice. This does not mean that LPPBs should be left out of discussions of reforms to current legislation regarding policing in Sierra Leone. This could be done quite simply by inserting a clause in future legislation obliging the SLP to consult with and be advised by community representatives.

Fourth, the voluntary nature of LPPB membership is one of the cornerstones of the LPPBs, which is particularly pertinent in a resource scarce environment such as Sierra Leone. The fact that the LPPBs function without stable funding speaks to the fact that their contribution to security and order-making is considered meaningful while not necessarily apolitical or interest free. Equally important, the voluntary status of LPPBs is central to maintaining the status of these boards as connected to, but not a formal component of the police. The flipside to the limited funds available to LPPBs is that members sometimes pay for their own transport to attend meetings, and that meetings in turn often are devoted to lengthy discussions about funding. There is a possibility that if this issue is not addressed in a comprehensive manner, board members may become discouraged from engaging in LPPB activities.

Finally, whatever activities the police and LPPB leadership might pursue in the future to strengthen LPPBs, their “in-between” status should not be altered. LPPBs help an overstretched police force resolve cases and promote peace in communities. LPPBs have the potential to liaise between the police and the people; as such, they act as a non-threatening, mediation-oriented police force multiplier. LPPBs should continue to be seen as part of the community while in a position to liaise with the police when necessary. It is fundamental to the original vision of LPPBs and central to the concept and practice of community policing in Sierra Leone to maintain this role.

## 5. Summary of Suggested Programming Activities

The following list of suggested programming activities was presented in the original report to ASJP in early 2013 to inform their community policing strategy together with the SLP. It is reproduced here as a record of what was suggested, and may be used in future research for comparison with respect to what was subsequently done and achieved:

1. LPPBs are based on a voluntary principle. Support to develop the LPPBs and community policing more broadly should maintain this principle until such a time when LPPBs might be able to raise their own funds or when the Government of Sierra Leone begins to provide regular support.
2. Support should be given in a way that puts the SLP in the lead so as to both give the right “face” of support, but also to ensure that LPPBs are the SLP’s method of reaching out to and engaging communities across the country.
3. However and whatever support is given, the “in-between” status of LPPB members should be maintained. They are part of the community while at the same time in a position to liaise with the police as and when necessary.
4. Together with the CRD, the ASJP should initiate a process of clarifying the LPPB Constitution. The Constitution is a vital instrument for the SLP and LPPBs alike and offers greater clarity on what each entity’s role should be. In its current form, however, it contains a number of ambiguities that suggest, among others, the following questions:
  - Who exactly are the members of the Executive Board?
  - How can geographical representation be constitutionally ensured?
  - How can women’s positions in the LPPB, including on the Executive Board, be strengthened?
5. To ensure that community policing – and Local Needs Policing – are discussed across the SLP, reformulation of the LPPB Constitution should involve a cross-section of police departments, including but not limited to Corporate Services, Operations and Criminal Investigation. Local Needs Policing is not for the CRD to deal with in isolation: It expresses and involves the ethos of the SLP as a whole, including the OSD.
6. Support the CRD in developing job descriptions for all CROs in order to clarify their role, both in police headquarters, but especially at LCU level. Job descriptions should be developed in collaboration with currently serving CROs

- and LUCs, and ensure that the CRD at LCU level becomes the institutional memory of community engagement, around LCU level community policing.
7. Because of the central role of the LUC in establishing LPPBs and APPCs, all activities considered with respect to community policing *must* involve the management level of the SLP.
  8. The LPPB Constitution describes what is expected of LPPB members, but does not give guidance on how carry out its tasks. It would be useful if a *LPPB Handbook* were to be developed which would constitute the basis for training. Any material of this nature should be developed in collaboration with both LPPB members and LUCs across the country. Areas that the *LPPB Handbook* could cover are:
    - Mechanisms to hold the police to account for their actions;
    - Informal conflict resolution;
    - Dos and don'ts of interviewing;
    - Report writing;
    - The difference between civil and criminal cases, emphasizing domestic violence;
    - LPPB elections; and
    - The role of LPPBs in national elections.
  9. On the basis of a revised LPPB Constitution and the *LPPB Handbook*, a training strategy should be developed in collaboration with the SLP and rolled out to the districts in which ASJP operates, and to the greatest degree possible involve neighboring LCUs. *Trainings must include discussions on how to make LPPB structures financially sustainable.*
  10. Ensure that ASJP's field offices build relations with LPPBs in the LCUs where they work, and monitor LPPB activities.
  11. Support the LPPBs in developing further as a police accountability mechanism.
  12. Develop a simple monitoring framework that can be used to collect data on *which* types of cases LPPB members deal with; *how* LPPBs deal with those cases; and *what* the follow-up has been.
  13. Ensure that geographical representation on the Executive Board is promoted. In the process of finding the most appropriate structure, the different models that are already being used in the LCUs of Mongo, Kailahun and Motema, for instance, should be drawn upon. In the medium-term, develop and agree to a structure in rural and urban areas.
  14. In the context of the LPPBs, provide targeted support to those women who are already members of the LPPB in order to raise their profile, and encourage general recruitment of women into the LPPB.

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