



„Partner Desejado“ –

Reflections on Brazilian Multilateral Choices in Global Security

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Summary

This essay takes a look from a German perspective at Brazil's growing stature as a global player and its multilateral choices with respect to global security. Traditional and new challenges to Brazilian security reaffirm its security policy supporting systems of cooperative security and confidence building measures, and getting actively involved in a multitude of international, political and economic fora. Brazil has strategic objectives and policy goals that match well with those of its preferred partners. But Brazil itself has also become a "Partner Desejado" on a global scale due to its strategic objectives, its enormous and ambitious investment programmes and its growing global stature.

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Analysis

1. World Outside Brazil

Big nations tend to focus on internal challenges. Yet, in globalization there is a world outside – a world that may have a dramatic impact on a nation's security and prosperity. In particular the past years have unveiled black swans, i.e. serious challenges to security and prosperity which nobody had thought of and prepared for in advance. Almost every other month a new crisis has erupted. North Korea and Iran haven't gone away. The evolving security situation in Iraq may need military intervention again. Rising tensions with China and Russia have drawn global attention.

Obviously, conflicts and military interventions have been on the rise, as a report by the Australia-based Institute for Economics and Peace¹ has identified. *“Over the (past) seven years, global peace was negatively affected by a number of international events including major outbreaks of violence in the Middle East; a deterioration of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan; civil wars in Libya and Syria; the escalation of the drug war in Central America; continued deteriorations in peace in Somalia, DRC and Rwanda; and violent demonstrations associated with the economic downturn in a number of European countries.”*²

From a German perspective, crises and conflicts have drawn closer to home. The environment in which Germany pursues foreign policy has evolved. Important examples are climate change and cyber security. Just as Brazil, Germany is more inter-connected on a global scale than ever before. In fact, globalization is generating new connections between continents. These include growing flows of energy, goods and services as well as greater access to each other's markets, resources, and talent, new opportunities afforded by education, technology, infrastructure and investment, and, not least, challenges such as crime, violence, human trafficking and drugs.

South American criminal cartels have crossed the Atlantic using West Africa as a logistical base. Governments such as Guinea-Bissau have become organized criminal enterprises facilitating illicit transatlantic flows. The nexus of drugs, guns and terror has been growing. Drug trade, flows of arms and money, human trafficking, piracy, political instability, and terrorist infiltration are in many cases interacting, fuelled by the growing engagement in the region of both traditional and new players while existing governance or enforcement mechanisms are not working effectively. This dynamism creates vulnerabilities that may well lead to the disruption of critical functions of society, the economy and security, requiring comprehensive multinational efforts to promote security and prosperity across the globe. Governments need to develop ways and means to protect their society's critical infrastructure, the networks that sustain them, and the connections those networks bring with other societies.

Particular attention needs to be given to the global common four domains – maritime, air, outer space, and cyberspace. The “global commons” bind together domains that are indispensable for the free flow of goods, people, resources, and information that are the backbone of a globalized world. Players that are able to influ-

¹ Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2014, Sydney, June 2014, pg. 1, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20REPORT.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014).

² Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2014, Sydney, June 2014, pg. 1, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20REPORT.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014).



ence the quality and the direction of these flows exert strategic influence. Consequently, in the 21st century, access to the global commons has become of particular importance to the security and prosperity of nations. As nations have a substantial interest in assuring unrestricted access to manoeuvrability within and use of the global commons, this will lead to the development of anti-access and area denial strategies.

These challenges have to be dealt with in a situation of dynamic strategic change. In the past especially, U.S. primacy on the high seas has guaranteed commercial maritime stability for decades, and has, therefore, been taken for granted, even as globalization has depended on it. Yet given a reduction in U.S. military spending, we may be entering a phase of history in which several nations might share dominance of the high seas. Similar situations have developed in the other global commons and beyond. This has had not only financial and economic effects, but has also narrowed former military gaps between the United States and some of its competitors / potential adversaries. While Washington's defence spending has started to shrink – though it is still at a comfortable level – it has risen in Russia, China, and in the Middle East and Asia.

Among the key strategic developments of the past years, two stand out:

Firstly, the U.S. strategic shift to Asia-Pacific. This 'shift' has become the most important strategic development since the Cold War. The 'shift' is a realization that the nexus of global strategy and commerce has moved from the North Atlantic to the Western Pacific. According to the McKinsey Global Institute, the last decade showed *"the fastest rate of change in global economic balance in history"*³. *"The shift in economic balance toward the East and South is happening with unprecedented speed and scale. We are quite simply witnessing the biggest economic transformation the world has ever seen as the populations of cities in emerging markets expand and enjoy rising incomes"*⁴ – with Sao Paulo, by the way, being one of the most prosperous megacities.

Given Europe's growing economic dependence on East Asia and the growing shaky security situation in the region, its interests are massively engaged. The same is true, to varying degrees, of Europe's relationship with South Asia; here the India-Pakistan conflict, a looming "post-American" Afghanistan in 2014, and uncertainty concerning Iran and the Persian Gulf have a direct security impact on the European Union.

With the envisaged significant cuts in the U.S. budget, the 'shift' implicitly is a move away from Europe. This has become a common perception in European capitals. Already in the near future we may see over-stretched and under-resourced U.S. forces leaving much unfinished business to their European partners – in Southeast Europe, North Africa, in the Greater Middle East and beyond. The consequent realignment will profoundly reshape the European Union politically and economically, with major implications for NATO and other elements of the transatlantic partnership.

Secondly, the Ukrainian crisis. As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, former NATO Secretary General stated recently: *"We thought we had established a European order since the breakdown of the Berlin Wall and the lifting of the 'iron curtain'"*⁵. But the truth is: 25 years on from the end of the Cold War, from the collapse of a black and white

³ Richard Dobbs et al.: "Urban World and the rising of the consuming class", McKinsey Global Institute June 2013, preface, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_world_cities_and_the_rise_of_the_consuming_class (access: 23 July 2014).

⁴ Richard Dobbs et al.: „Urban World and the rising of in the consuming class“, McKinsey Global Institute June 2013, pg. 17, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_world_cities_and_the_rise_of_the_consuming_class (access: 23 July 2014).

⁵ SDA, „Overhauling transatlantic security thinking“, Report of the Security & Defence Agenda's annual conference co-organised by Security & Defence Agenda, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Atlantic Council and the Konrad-



order that had persisted for decades, the world has found neither a new European nor a new world order. For a long time it appeared to political leaders throughout the world that the “rule of law” had succeeded over the “rule of power particularly in the highly integrated European Union environment and its neighbourhood. Now, the violent developments in the Ukraine – including the “annexation” of the Crimea and Sevastopol – point in the opposite direction. Vladimir Putin observed in his speech of 18 March 2014 to the deputies of the State Duma the “rule of power” to be a key element of the emerging New World Order. In fact, there are developments happening all over the world that might be interpreted in that very way.

This is clearly neither in the Brazilian nor German interest. As the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has been highlighting recently: Germany, as the largest country in the heart of Europe, cannot ignore what’s going on in the world. The life of its citizens depends on a peaceful and free world that – most importantly – is based on rules. Germany is more interconnected with the world than any other country: its economic prosperity depends on world peace. Germans clearly benefit from world order and the “rule of law”. Consequently it needs to contribute to shaping rules where these have to be developed respectively and adjusted, and ensuring that these are being maintained.

Among the lessons learned by the European Union and NATO in recent crisis management is the urgent requirement to improve their capabilities for crisis management (soft and hard) and defence. Instability and performance deficits of governments create misery and often encourage people to turn to terrorism. As recent large-scale military intervention has had unintended negative consequences, in future the European Union and NATO will need to be more cautious over its use of force. Clearly, there is greater need than ever for soft power – from humanitarian aid to assistance in state and nation building. At the same time, both need to further develop their hard power capabilities. In particular the European Union needs options to contribute more effectively to international security while not being over-reliant on the United States. It needs capabilities to deploy limited military force to trouble spots, especially in Africa. These capabilities will need to deal with a growing variety of threats in future, including cyber warfare and the use of technology such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

The vision of NATO is to turn the organisation into a strategic security hub that can project power, guarantee defence and promote resiliency across the conflict spectrum, preferably in partnership with other nations or institutions such as the UN, EU and OSCE. To that end, it strives to reach out and work with those engaged in stabilisation and reconstruction across the civilian human security community in support of efforts to prevent or react to humanitarian crises. Interested partner nations and organisations will have to define their respective roles, interests and capabilities within such a collaborative framework.

2. Global Level of Ambition

Brazil's rise over the past few decades is remarkable – an enormous success story with a quarter century of democracy and political stability and excellent economic performance. In the past decade the nation's poverty rate has been cut by half. Millions of poor people came into jobs with the appropriate, positive effect on the internal market. Rich resource endowments ensure that Brazil will stay one of the world's leading exporters of

Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Brussels 2014, pg. 7,
<http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Contentnavigation/Library/Libraryoverview/tabid/1299/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3>



commodities for years to come. It has enjoyed remarkable economic growth over the past two decades, particularly from 2010-2012. The years 2013 and 2014, however, have been disappointing.

Brazil is a peaceful country. It supports systems of cooperative security and confidence building measures and is actively involved in a multitude of international, political and economic fora. *“It runs its international affairs, among other things, adopting the constitutional principles of non-intervention, defence of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. This pacifist trait is part of the national identity....”*⁶ To this end Brazil strives for international cooperation on defence issues with a focus on Brazil’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Unlike its BRICS partners and competitors, Brazil enjoys a much better security situation. Brazil has no perceived threats that require military capabilities. Brazil is geopolitically satisfied. It has no major boundary disputes with its ten neighbouring countries. Argentina is no longer an issue after a decade’s long rivalry. This comfortable security situation places Brazil in a unique position internationally. While military spending in China, Russia, and India increased by 170 %, 79 % and 66 % respectively over the past decade, Brazil could afford just a 22 % increase over the same period of time.

Not having any enemies does not mean that there are no Brazilian security concerns at all. Key challenges for Brazilian security – the world’s leading exporter of agricultural products – constitute issues such as global warming, drug trafficking and protectionism. Traditional security tasks focus on the Amazon region and the coastal strip of Santos and Rio de Janeiro up to Vitória, where the Brazilian oil reserves are located. Particular threats come from Colombia and other neighbours as they become further involved in the drug trade. As the drug trade has leapfrogged from South America towards Africa, the area for Brazil to engage in has greatly expanded.

Brazilians tend to believe that they are immune to terrorism and that they would be at the bottom of any list of potential targets. That was exactly the Brazilian attitude towards cyber threats before the U.S. interest in listening to Brazil was detected. The 2012 visit of the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Venezuela, which is not too far from Brazilian critical infrastructure, has been an eye-opener for the political and military leadership of Brazil, as it revealed how close terrorism has already come.

Consequently, the strategic ambitions of Brazil have been focused on South America and the South Atlantic Ocean, including the West African coast. Structurally Brazil has supported missions of the United Nations. In addition, an increasingly external energy policy plays an important role – pronounced already in Latin America.

As the 7th largest economy in the world⁷, Brazil wants recognition as a major world power. Brazil has the ambition to play an important role in international security. The National Strategy of Defence and National Strategy of Development leave no doubt about it.⁸ A permanent seat at the UN Security Council would reflect this ambition. The implementation of this claim is the leitmotif of Brazilian foreign and security policy.

[695/Overhauling-transatlantic-security-thinking.aspx](#) (access: 23 July 2014).

⁶ Ministry of Defence, National Strategy of Defence (NSD), Brasilia 2008, pg. 8, http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf (access: 23 July 2014).

⁷ The World Bank states for Brazil a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US\$ 2.253 trillion in 2012, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview> (access 22 August 2014).

⁸ NSD pg. 8.



Brazil has used its soft power well to extend its global relations and develop sustainable political influence.⁹ It has become a dynamic force in global politics. It has taken a leadership role in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other international organisations. Increasingly, however, it finds its ability to exercise influence constrained by limitations in its ability to deal with international asymmetries in hard power.¹⁰ A well-balanced mix of soft and hard power capabilities has proven indispensable for Brazilian global aspirations.

For a long time the civilian Brazilian presidents tended to minimize the role of the Armed Forces for the country, and consequently made deep cuts in the defence budget. This process was reversed after 2003, with Brazil aiming to establish a deterrent through strategically and tactically mobile and ready forces with capabilities for monitoring and control of its territory, airspace and territorial waters. The investments were increased again, particularly after the approval of the National Defence Strategy in 2008.

Significantly increased funding has already led to a remarkable improvement in the capability profile of the Brazilian armed forces. The current Defence Equipment and Articulation Plan seeks to diminish a long shortage of investments in defence. Today, Brazil is undertaking serious efforts to modernise and develop its military as well as its defence industrial base. This trend is likely to continue, but there is still a long way to go. A particular advantage of the drive for military modernisation in Brazil is the institutional deepening that it has encouraged. The defence ministry now makes periodic reports to the congress. Its concern for technology puts the military in more frequent dialogue with the executive branch and the university system. It also strengthens ties with the private sector.

Three important documents guide Brazilian national defence:

- **National Defence Policy**

The *National Defence Policy* (NDP), as the main planning document for the Brazil's defence, provides goals and guidelines for the preparation and use of national training, the involvement of the military and civilian sectors in all spheres of power. In the National Defence objectives since 2005, the tasks, objectives and regional priorities have been clearly defined: South America and the South Atlantic.

- **National Defence Strategy**

The *National Defence Strategy*¹¹ defines how to do what was laid out in the NDP. It is the main legal guide to the understanding of the concepts that base the Brazilian defence structure. The version that was approved in 2008 is still valid and

- specifies the requirements for equipment and modernization of the armed forces to include reorganization and reorientation of the armed forces, restructuring of the national defence industry with the aim of ensuring the operational autonomy of the armed forces, improved (personnel) forces, in order to better meet relevant challenges and threats to security.
- emphasizes the need of inter-operability, as well as the effectiveness of joint approaches, operations, planning and logistics.

⁹ Dr Joseph S. Tulchin, MARCH 12, 2014, Brazil aims for closer military ties with United States, <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/article/1394601910389396000> (access: 23 July 2014).

¹⁰ Harold Trinkunas, „Brazil's rise seeking influence on Global Governance“, Brookings, Washington 2014, pg. 26, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/04/24%20brazils%20rise%20trinkunas/trinkunas%20brazils%20rise.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014).

¹¹ NSD.



- stresses for the Brazilian army a role in securing the Amazon region
- underlines the international role of Brazil in international operations such as the UN mission in Haiti
- identifies three specific areas of *strategic importance* i.e. cyber space, space, and nuclear energy / drives

A new version was sent to Congress in July 2012, but this reformulation is still in the approval process.¹²

- **National Defence White Paper**

The *National Defence White Paper* of 2012¹³ is the first White Paper of the Brazilian government. It analyses the strategic context of the twenty-first century, looking at medium and long term prospects. It provides editorial context to the new strategy and policy as it increases transparency about the Brazilian defence system to include the enhanced role of cooperation, particularly in South America. All three documents are as of today¹⁴ still in the congressional approval process, but their key contents have been applied in the decision making of the administration since their staffing in 2012.

3. Leadership through Partnerships

Brazil has strategic objectives and policy goals that match well with those of its preferred partners. But also Brazil itself has become a “Partner Desejado” on a global scale because of its strategic objectives, its investment programmes and last but not least, its new global stature.

The importance of the U.S. shift to Asia has been highlighted before. Europe has been caught by surprise. Brazil could find itself soon in a similar position to Europe. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington in late November 2013: “*The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over....*”¹⁵ This may also mean less U.S. lead engagement in Latin America and thus more crisis management and security engagement falling on the shoulders of South American nations.

In the emerging new world order, Brazil must do its homework nationally, in the South American and South Atlantic neighbourhood. In addition, it has a growing number of global responsibilities. Prosperity and security of future generations will depend crucially on the fact that key tasks will be completed successfully, including the involvement of the ascending countries such as Brazil, China and India in a future oriented, cooperative world order and the development in South America in the direction of good governance.

¹² The Chamber of Deputies has approved the Draft Legislative Decree 818/13, which contains the texts of the National Defence Policy (NDP), the National Defence Strategy (END) and the White Paper National Defence (LBDN). The text, already approved by the Senate, continues its course to be sanctioned. Defence Market Intelligence. Brazil; National defense strategy confirmed. Tuesday, 17 September 2013, http://dmilt.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7983:brazil-national-defense-strategy-confirmed-&catid=35:latin-america&Itemid=58 (access: 23 July 2014).

¹³ Janie Hulse, „Brazilian Military’s White Paper to Guide Future Defense Priorities“, Dialogo, 17 June 2011, http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/06/17/aa-brazil-white-paper (access: 23 July 2014).

¹⁴ July 2014.

¹⁵ Zachary Keck, “The US Renounces the Monroe Doctrine?” November 21, 2013, in: The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-us-renounces-the-monroe-doctrine/> (access: 23 July 2014).



At present Chile, Colombia and Peru are Brazil's preferred partners on the South American continent. The United States is not particularly loved, but is frequently looked to. The European Union – including Germany – are appreciated partners in business and the defence industry. Of course, the other BRICS states are natural partners for Brazil, just as Brazil is an attractive partner for them.

With view to security and prosperity in its neighbourhood, Brazil seeks to promote multilateral governance in the region. Good cooperation with its neighbours and other states is an indispensable foundation. Brazil has been investing particularly in international co-operation aimed at creating a common South Atlantic identity that allows it to actively pursue its own interests within the region. Brazil has diversified its bilateral defence co-operation with countries along the western coast of Africa. Most of these programmes involve training of military staff, collaboration on continental shelf surveys, but also in a growing number of cases the provision of defence equipment and increased exports of Brazilian-made weaponry.

At the same time, Brasilia works to boost multilateral organisations: for instance, it is helping to revive the somewhat fading South Atlantic Peace and Co-operation Zone (ZOPACAS – Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul). The strategic partnership with Venezuela is part of a new, growing self-understanding of Brazil. Particularly close relations have been maintained with the Portuguese speaking countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP)). In this way, Brazil seeks to emphasise the need to create a zone of peace and prosperity, while also stressing that the primary responsibility for the area lies with the countries bordering the South Atlantic.

Brazilian aspirations and security challenges have increasingly informed the structure of key military partnerships and exercises during the past years – joint exercises such as the India-Brazil-South Africa-Maritime (IBSAMAR) activities off the South African coast, as well as initiatives that include South American partners. Further examples are Brazil's participation in the naval exercise ATLASUR with forces from South Africa, Argentina and Uruguay, and in the annual UNITAS multilateral naval exercise with forces from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, as well as the U.S. and the UK. Some of these exercises simulate attacks targeting Brazilian offshore oil platforms in the South Atlantic.

The slight rapprochement with the U.S. under the government of President Dilma Rousseff has been damaged by the Snowden revelations that have disclosed the remarkable interest U.S. intelligence takes in Brazil. Additionally, the United States has so far failed to provide credibly to Brazil, that it respects the country as a strategic partner. In fact, Brazil assesses the quality of strategic partnerships with key global players through their willingness to share sensitive equipment, technology and respective intellectual properties with Brazil.

Nevertheless, the United States is Brazil's prime partner. The US-Brazil Defence Cooperation Dialogue has identified six priority areas for partnership in 2012: science innovation and technology transfer, logistics, communications, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, cooperation in support of African nations, and cyber security. The U.S. is watching the Brazilian market closely and has engaged in long-term commitments. The technology of the sporting events comes from the USA. And also in the field of technology transfer, the U.S. has engaged in numerous MOUs addressing technology transfer and export support in order to get into a better position with respect to major Brazilian investment projects.

Brazil also maintains intense political relations with the other BRICS such as Russia, India, China, and South Africa and some European states, including France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany. Between Brazil-



ian and Russian government officials there has been a series of meetings. These include the meeting of President Dilma Rousseff with Russian Prime Minister Medvedev, but also meetings of the foreign ministers of both countries in June 2013. As a result Brazil has considered buying a number of Russian weapon systems in exchange for exports to the Russian consumer market.

China has also been seeking to close ranks with Brazil. There has been Chinese pilot training for the aircraft carrier crews. A task force of three Chinese warships has been deployed to Brazil in October 2013 for manoeuvres with the Brazilian navy, and port visits in Argentina and Chile. France and Brazil have developed a "privileged partnership" in defence cooperation that is supposed to lift the Brazilian defence industry into international competitiveness.

The Brazilian-German relations have a particular broad foundation – politically, economically, culturally and socially. Brazil is the only German strategic partner in Latin America. An Action Plan of this strategic partnership to further expand the cooperation in bilateral and multilateral area was negotiated between the then Brazilian President Lula and Chancellor Merkel. Brazil sees the strategic partnership with Germany as an opportunity to develop and sustain its ambition as a global player. From this perspective close cooperation in armaments, economic, technological and security-related ventures offers the potential, to improve the Brazilian performance in the region and beyond. Consequently, in November 2013 Brazil and Germany took a leading initiative in the debate on global internet governance and introduced a UN resolution calling for an end to excessive electronic surveillance, data collection and other gross invasions of privacy.

While Brazil actively seeks engagement within the United Nations context, it has remained sceptical to this point with regard to NATO's interest to build a relationship. In fact, NATO's role in the South Atlantic has been clearly questioned by the Brazilian government. Brazil's Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota stated in a recent speech at the UN Security Council, that: *"We are still concerned that NATO may be seeking to establish partnerships outside of its defensive zone, far beyond the North Atlantic, including in regions of peace, democracy, and social inclusion that do not accept the existence within that space of weapons of mass destruction"*.¹⁶ But in fact, NATO is among the viable multilateral choices of Brazil. As NATO keeps permanently adapting to an altering security environment,¹⁷ this also an option for Brazil to leave its imprint on NATO.

4. Shape the Future

Based on desk research, broad observations and discussions in Brazil, further by matching *global challenges* with Brazilian ambitions, matching European *lessons learned* and Brazilian aspirations and last but not least looking at the scope and quality of existing partnerships, this essay suggests a MOSAIC of choices for Brazil in developing its stature as a global security player – MOSAIC standing for M - Maritime, O - (regional and global) Order, S - South America, A - Africa, I - Industry and C - Cyber.

¹⁶ Speech by Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota at the UN Security Council on 6 August 2013. Translation by Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, "Brazil's Maritime Strategy in the South Atlantic: The Nexus Between Security and Resources", Johannesburg, November 2013, pg.6; <http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/11438-1442-5-30.pdf>

¹⁷ Harold Trinkunas, „Brazil's rise seeking influence on Global Governance“, Brookings, Washington 2014, pg. 26, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/04/24%20brazils%20rise%20trinkunas/trinkunas%20brazils%20rise.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014).



- **Maritime** – *Brazil should develop its maritime options vis-à-vis its neighbours, but also with view to new partners such as the European Union and NATO*

As the South Atlantic region is confronted with the same global threats as the rest of the world, Latin America, Europe and NATO should strive together for common comprehensive capabilities to meet the challenges ahead. The enduring prosperity of the world's industrialised democracies as well as the steady rise of new economic powers, such as Brazil, owes much to the fact that the world's maritime domain has been, by and large, secure and safe. Consequently, crises involving the *maritime domain* have the potential to involve major disruptions to the movement of cargo within the global supply chain. Freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, energy flows, protection of marine resources and environmental safety are of significant importance with regard to security and prosperity of nations worldwide. Maritime security issues are among the most pressing questions on the agenda of international foreign and security policy and require political foresight as well as cooperation to resolve.

The South Atlantic Ocean has always been of strategic importance to Brazil. Along the South Atlantic seaboard Brazil possesses the longest coastline. The security of its coastline, its maritime resources, and its sea lines of communication have been of critical importance for Brazil's economic and political development. In addition to the existing resource wealth in Brazil, further gas and oil reserves have been recently discovered in the deep layers of the continental shelf. Brazil has filed a proposal with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) authorities to expand its national waters based on a redefinition of its continental shelf. It has been investing significantly in scientific research programmes that not only allow it to chart its continental shelf with greater precision, but also to map maritime resources. It maintains teams of researchers on its Atlantic islands, thereby boosting Brazil's presence in and claim to this part of the South Atlantic. This way Brazil has been demarcating its space within the South Atlantic as a means of guaranteeing exclusive access to the new maritime resources.

With Brazil's new prioritization of the South Atlantic, the strategic value of Antarctica has also increased¹⁸ – Antarctica as

- the intersection area between the South Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,
- a site of deepening competition over natural resources,
- an opportunity to enhance cooperation with other South American states,
- part of a broader foreign policy strategy to better integrate Brazil within and beyond its region.

Consequently, Brazil is now seeking to strengthen its naval capabilities and defence industry in order to improve its defensive capabilities against potential state and non-state violence. But Brazil cannot do it alone.

In the past, threats to maritime trade have been related to situations such as search and rescue, water pollution, maritime law enforcement and coastal protection. In the recent past asymmetric threats have been added, with sea banditry or robbery, terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking and piracy as the most common

¹⁸ Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, „Rising powers and Antarctica: Brazil's changing interests“, The Polar Journal, 2014, pg. 14, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2014.913910> (access: 23 July 2014). Regarding threats in the maritime domain see also: Dr. Peter Roell, "The Importance of Intelligence in the Maritime Domain", in: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), September 2014, ETH Zurich, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=183322>.



situations. Additionally, disputes over maritime resources, climate-induced change and cyber security issues have introduced instability in the maritime domain. While command of the sea by naval superiority in the past used to provide global reach, freedom of movement and secure access, the same command is in modern terms not realistic without an unhindered access to the air, outer space and cyber space domains. Protecting this access has become a cooperative, multilateral venture. Consequently Brazil needs partners – in the region and beyond. And Brazil also needs procedural as well as technological inter-operability with those partners. This needs to be planned for, trained for and exercised.

Brazil has begun modernising and expanding its naval capacity with special attention to maritime power in the South Atlantic. Priority has been placed on enhancing surveillance and patrolling capacity as part of the country's deterrent power. This strategy has entailed a significant increase in arms acquisition and development, including not only the purchase of vessels but also co-operation with France on the development of a nuclear-propulsion attack submarine. Domestically, this modernisation project has been accompanied by 'Blue Amazon', a campaign aimed at mobilising popular support for the idea that Brazil has both vital resources and new security responsibilities in the South Atlantic. All of these activities ask for a cooperative, multilateral Maritime Domain Awareness capability that would

- support a common understanding of what is going on in the Maritime Domain,
- would ease the path towards common recommendations of what should be done,
- would provide for orchestrating common multinational action of civil and military instruments in the Maritime Domain in case common action is required.

A particular point is that U.S. primacy on the high seas has guaranteed commercial maritime stability for decades, and has, therefore, been taken for granted, even as globalization has depended on it. Yet given a reduction in U.S. military spending, we may be entering a phase of history in which several nations might share dominance of the high seas, rather than just one as in the recent past. Brazil's growing attention to the South Atlantic represents an opportunity to assume a leadership role nationally, regionally and beyond. Given Brazilian leadership, why shouldn't the European Union and NATO become welcome partners?

- **Order - Brazil should develop and sustain its role in shaping regional and global order**

Today, the well-being of nations is tied to developments around the globe. The trend towards a more chaotic world is not going to change anytime soon. A world order with Brazil as a global player in a driving position requires multilateral Brazilian engagement. In fact today, Brazil leads peacekeeping troops in Haiti. It has sponsored a web of new regional institutions. It has large-scale economic interests in Africa, having turned, in several countries, into a key investor and donor of both development and humanitarian aid. The BRICS and the G20, both of which Brazil is a member, have turned into fixtures in the international landscape. Brazil has turned into the world's 7th largest economy.

Brazil's international responsibilities are far greater today than they were at any other time in history. In the global security environment it is not major crises that shape the picture. Rather unnoticed arises, step by step, a new world order, while erosion in stability keeps spreading and deepening. The competition for power and influence in this changing world order is taking place in multiple dimensions - in economics & finance, commodities & energy, security & society. Decision-makers in politics and administration must make far-reaching decisions under time pressure and high uncertainty in the future. They need clear objectives and orientation



with respect to future development options. Anticipatory and interdepartmental political action is becoming increasingly important under these circumstances, and, at the same time, also more demanding.

Brazil has the potential to shape within the emerging world order, particularly the Atlantic Community¹⁹ by:

- boosting traditional, unconventional and renewable energy production, facilitating energy access, and building a bridge to a low-carbon future;
- opening trade and investment;
- ensuring that people share the benefits of economic growth and opportunity through improved innovation, education, training and mobility;
- reducing poverty and inequality as a central economic goal, facilitated by inclusive economic growth;
- contributing to more effective international aid and development efforts;
- enhancing cooperation in principles of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- advancing cultures of lawfulness and effective democratic governance;
- promoting human security.

To this end, Brazil could facilitate greater cooperation on global issues formulating and implementing shared approaches to strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of international rules-based governance mechanisms to include the maritime, air, space and cyber space.

- **South America - Brazil should implement its leadership potential in South America**

At his inaugural ceremony in 2003 former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stated that Brazil aims at contributing to a *“South America that is politically stable, prosperous and united, based on democratic ideas and on social justice. (...) We will also take care of the social, cultural and scientific-technological dimensions in the process of integration. We will encourage joint ventures and stimulate a dynamic intellectual and artistic interchange among South American countries.”*²⁰ This very statement has become the conceptual core of Brazilian policy towards South America, which has been further specified in the 2008 National Defence Strategy: *“This integration (of South America) not only will contribute to the defence of Brazil, but it will also allow the country to promote regional military cooperation and the integration of the defence industrial bases. It will dissipate the spectrum of possible conflict situations in the region.”*²¹

During the past decade, Brazil has worked steadily to limit potential and actual challengers to rise within South America. It has invested significantly to establish itself as the major power in South America. Argentina's decline and Mexico's focus on North America have made this path easier.²² Brazil's principal vehicle has been regional integration and multilateral diplomacy. To this end it has used a cooperative approach and has built new regional institutions. Yet, Brazil's historical reluctance to pool sovereignty with other states through inter-

¹⁹ CTR, new Atlantic Community – Declaration of the Atlantic Basin Initiative. The Atlantic Basin Initiative is spearheaded by CTR Distinguished Fellow and former President of the Government of Spain Jose Maria Aznar and CTR Executive Director Dan Hamilton, <http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/events/2012/Atlantic%20Basin%20Initiative/EPG%20Call%20to%20Action.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014).

²⁰ Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, Bureau of Diplomatic Planning, Brazilian Foreign Policy Handbook, Brasília 2008, Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at his Inaugural Ceremony, National Congress - Brasília, January 1, 2003, pg. 44.

²¹ NSD, pg. 17.

²² Harold Trinkunas, „Brazil's rise seeking influence on Global Governance“, Brookings, Washington 2014, pg. 1, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/04/24%20brazils%20rise%20trinkunas/trinkunas%20brazils%20rise.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014).



national regimes is reflected in the characteristics of the South American multilateral institutions it created. All have limited budgets, personnel, and inconsistent leadership.

The experiences of the European Union with its neighbourhood policy and NATO with its partnership programmes could provide in a closer partnership a wealth of lessons learned and proven instruments to reinforce the effectiveness of Brazilian multilateralism. In particular, crisis management, humanitarian aid and disaster relief could be especially well suited areas to begin with.

In the summer of 2013 Julio Bueno, Secretary of Economic Development, Energy, Industry and Services for the State of Rio de Janeiro pointed out to your author the tremendous Brazilian interest towards building sustainable skills in crisis management. As he stated, *“Rio is not prepared for crisis management good enough”*. This has also been an issue when visiting the Centro de Comando e Integrado Controle (CICC), the operations centre of the city of Rio de Janeiro that serves not only for local and regional contingencies, but if needed also for national contingencies. In crisis management and emergency management of the state, this is the place where integrated operations of police, traffic police, fire service, civil protection, traffic control, regulatory services, etc. are run. A centre of such enormous potential could well develop a function as a crisis management hub for regional contingencies in South America. The European Union could become a sponsor in developing adequate capabilities and skills. At the same time, this would be a perfect preparation for common crisis management engagement in Africa.

- **Africa** - Brazil should increase its international cooperation and also increase building institutions for policy dialogue involving governmental representatives, research institutions, business directors, and NGOs

An increasing co-operation among the countries of the South and regional integration has become an important element towards the emergence of Brazil as a global power. Today, as the lack of legitimacy of global governance mechanisms is obvious, Brazil has been contributing to reform decision-making mechanisms via its commitment to multilateralism striving to alter existing hegemonic structures.

Building institutions is a sine qua non condition for transparency, accountability and sustainability. Consequently Brazil should involve its own research centres and NGOs, but also partners from African and Latin American countries. Again, cooperation with the European Union could improve the effectiveness of any initiatives undertaken. With respect to the role of Brazilian industry such as Odebrecht in Angola and Vale in Mozambique, it would also be important to encourage Brazilian businesses to develop a code of ethics in their partnerships with African countries. Additionally, it would be beneficial to promote national and international research as a means for developing a knowledge base, and defining common criteria with regard to development effectiveness. In this case South Africa could be a preferred partner.

- **Industry** - Brazil should shift its focus from protecting local industries to strengthening their competitiveness in global markets

Brazil has become a particularly attractive place for investment. In 2012 it ranked third in foreign direct investments behind China and the United States.²³ With regards to its exports, Brazil aims globally at all

²³ IP, “Brasilien von A-Z“, IP July/August 2013, pg. 11.



addressable markets and has supported this approach with a number of strategic partnerships. However, Brazil has been experiencing recently the cooling of important markets such as China reinforced by still largely poor competitiveness of Brazilian industry.

Brazilian governments of the past decade have – with a strong social and development-oriented focus – decided to protect local companies and stimulate economic growth mainly by exports of agricultural products and raw materials. Having successfully lifted millions out of extreme poverty, Brazil now has to find ways for accelerating growth in order to deliver on the promise of what a middle-class life really means.²⁴ Deepening ties with the global economy could provide a promising venue to that end. This would require strengthening the competitiveness of local industries in global markets.

Also with respect to its geopolitical ambitions, Brazil has aimed to achieve a high degree of independence in their own defence technologies. However, the national defence industry and military modernisation is today deeply imbedded in complex global value chains.²⁵ Brazil's creation of a modern military depends upon participation in the global value chain. But, increasing participation necessarily means leveraging the country's strict course towards autonomy.

This is quite a challenge and may require advice and cooperation with strategic partners such as Germany. In the recent past this has been hampered by a very demanding Brazilian offset policy and particularly by the difficulties for foreign partners to enter the Brazilian market. Up to now Brazil has shown *Italian* symptoms. One first builds difficulties to overcome these afterwards. Bureaucracy is stifling. Laws are full of requirements. Detailed labour laws and regulations don't allow for flexibility. Creation of enterprises takes twice as long as in other countries, is twice as expensive and ultimately results in a number of harmful consequences, such as unreliable supply chains, bottlenecks and inefficiencies.

An excellent example how to promote Brazilian industry to become a successful global competitor is Embraer, one of the largest aircraft manufacturers in the world. Only a few Brazilian companies have been that successful in international markets. Embraer is fully embedded in the global value chain. The company offers also a wide range of military capabilities, including a light fighter-bomber, skills for airborne counter-insurgency and Airborne Early Warning. With the UK, France and Greece, three NATO countries have Brazilian aircraft for their own training purposes, airlift and airborne early warning in the inventory. A particular seller in the foreseeable future is the KC 390 as the new tactical airlifter and tanker aircraft.

Embraer was created in 1969 as a state-owned company. In 1994 Embraer was privatized. Since then, it has gone head- to-head with global competitors for international contracts – and has thrived as a result. Today the company has offices, subsidiaries, and joint ventures around the world. The Brazilian government ensured the early growth of Embraer by providing production contracts and imposing import tariffs. It also took concerted steps to develop specialized talent and to create R&D infrastructure for continuous innovation. The imperative to become more connected is not solely a question of trade and finance.

Brazil also needs to tap into advanced skills, knowledge, technology, talent, and best practices from around the world. A greater focus on education and vocational training will be crucial to Brazil's competitiveness and

²⁴ Heinz-Peter Elstrodt, James Manyika, Jaana Remes, Patricia Ellen, César Martins, „Connecting Brazil to the world: A path to inclusive growth“, McKinsey Global Institute, Shanghai, May 2014 pg. 71.

²⁵ Patrice Franco, "The Defense Acquisition Trilemma: The case of Brazil", INSS Strategic Forum, January 2014, pg. 13.
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=177142> (access: 23 July 2013).



its ability to build more sophisticated industries. Brazil needs a skilled and productive workforce that can continuously deliver products that keep pace with a fast-changing marketplace and incorporate the latest generations of technology. The private sector can play a role in expanding training programs as the German KMW has proven with its Brazilian engagement; it can also partner with local education providers to design curricula targeted to the workforce skills that are in demand. A greater emphasis on developing human capital would have the double benefit of making Brazil's industries more competitive while also creating better career pathways and widening economic opportunity for all Brazilians. Here especially, partnerships with European countries can be very beneficial to Brazil, as there has developed a culture of supporting European industrial engagement abroad with educational and training programmes of very capable governmental and private institutions.

- **Cyber - Brazil should understand the cyber domain as an urgent action item**

Among the global commons, cyber holds a *force multiplying* position. This makes the issue of cyber strategically important to the prosperity and security of Brazil. The "Cyber" domain has become one of the key "power sources" of global prosperity and security. The well-being of modern, sustainable states and societies is inextricably linked with the secure and uninterrupted access to the virtual world. However, in politics, administration and the economy of many countries, the dimension of "cyber" is still dramatically underestimated. In terms of comprehensive security standards it is clear that a State security provision in the context of "cyber" starting with the protection of the personal rights of individuals up to the sustainable prevention of threats to critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is required. In addition to areas in the economy such as the financial sector, and in key industries and energy supply, it includes for example, police, military and society. A failure in providing viable protection could threaten the very existence of governments and societies.

When I wanted to discuss cyber security issues during my last visit to Brazil in July 2013, I didn't find much interest. A few weeks later this had changed completely. President Dilma Rousseff was not at all amused, when she learned²⁶ that her personal communications were intercepted by America's National Security Agency (NSA). She cancelled a long planned state visit to Washington. The visit would have been the first by a Brazilian president in two decades. In the meantime Dilma Rousseff has gained much recognition from international experts for her leading role – in close cooperation with Germany and other countries – in establishing global cyber governance, which is able to guarantee neutrality and privacy.

Her interest in internet governance is more than justified, as Brazil is rapidly becoming a digital nation.²⁷ Its online population has quadrupled over the past decade, and today almost 50 % of Brazilians have regular Internet access. Roughly a third of the population has been using Facebook. But Brazil is not highly connected to those international data flows, which underpin the cross-border exchange of goods, services, capital, and people. Its international data traffic per inhabitant is only 5 % of what flows through Germany. Yet the intensity of domestic use shows that Brazil has the potential to play a bigger role in the digital economy. This is highlighted by the new role of Brazil as a big player in the Information and Communications Technology sector

²⁶ Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, „Spy target Dilma Rousseff takes a lead in global internet reform“, in: Geopolitical Information Service, <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/article/1404967186400449700> (access: 23 July 2014).

²⁷ James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, Susan Lund, Olivia Nottebohm, David Poulter, Sebastian Jauch, Sree Ramaswamy, „Global flows in a digital age: How trade, finance, people, and data connect the world economy“, McKinsey Global Institute, Shanghai, April 2014, pg. 1-9.



(ICT) with a market volume of more than U.S. \$ 230 billion. In the Southern Hemisphere Brazil has become number one. It takes 4th place in the global ranking of ICT markets.

In today's digital world, there is a need for orientation supported by clear rules and instruments. Germany sees international cyber policy as a cross-cutting task and aims to:

- ensure responsible use of the Internet's freedom-generating potential,
- curb cyber threats,
- expand the economic opportunities the Internet offers, and
- enlarge the scope for diplomacy and international communication.²⁸

The cyber domain has become a rapidly growing network that needs regulations and standards, as well as institutions that can agree on and implement accepted rules. At this point in time, international rules seem a distant prospect, but the process has to start. Consequently, Germany and Brazil have tabled a resolution on the protection of privacy in the UN General Assembly. In November 2013 Brazil and Germany formally presented a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly calling for all countries to extend internationally guaranteed rights to privacy in the Internet and other electronic communications. The resolution also calls for independent oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of states in regard to their surveillance operations.

There is plenty of activity in the cyber domain – private and business, criminal and governmental activity. Besides the known offensive players involved, such as the U.S., Russia, China and Israel, almost all countries of the world have become aware of the possibilities that offensive use of cyber operations offers. In between it has become common knowledge that even with low risks and costs, it is possible to achieve significant strategic gains, to include

- access to critical infrastructure,
- strategic industrial espionage, economic sabotage and manipulation of financial markets,
- agitation by manipulation of data,
- erosion of competitors by combined espionage and sabotage,
- extension / redevelopment of military and electronic warfare.

From the military point of view, the linking of military and civilian networks is a particular risk, given the effects of instabilities and failures of common cyber infrastructure on the readiness of the armed forces. On the other hand, military forces must not only meet cyber threats, but also take advantage of related emerging opportunities. In the armed forces, "cyber" needs to be trained for and designed in both offensive and defensive operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Also the police, the judiciary, and the business sector need to be set up accordingly in the course of their respective tasks, e.g. in the field of cyber forensics. Of note, banks are already far advanced in this regard. Against this background, cooperative ventures are getting increasingly important in the cyber domain.

Obviously, Brazil should have a considerable interest in promoting awareness, skills and governance commensurate with the opportunities and challenges the cyber domain presents. New partnerships have evolved and may impact also on other global governance structures, including the partnerships with Germany and the

²⁸ http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/GlobaleFragen/Cyber-Aussenpolitik/KS_Cyber-Aussenpolitik.html



European Union. Cyber issues have already become part of the bilateral Brazil-EU-agenda.²⁹ A new policy dialogue has been established in 2014 inspired by Brazil's impressive performance with regard to internet governance. The NetMundial conference dedicated to internet governance in April 2014 in Sao Paulo has generated remarkable international attention. As the EU and Brazil are trying to shape the cyber debate, this strategic partnership could gain prominence in the coming years.

This is a good time for Brazil to shape the future.

Remarks: Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author.

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²⁹ Thomas Renard, „The rise of cyber-diplomacy: the EU, its strategic partners“, ESP Working Paper 7, June 2014, Madrid 2014, pg. 23, <http://www.fride.org/publication/1202/the-rise-of-cyber-diplomacy-the-eu-its-strategic-partners-and-cyber-security> (access: 23 July 2014).



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