

Brazil's involvement in peacekeeping operations: the new defence-security-foreign policy nexus

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■ Executive summary

This report addresses Brazilian involvement in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as a challenging learning process in the context of post-cold war UN-led interventions. The Brazilian Ministry of Defence has tried to design a “Brazilian way” of performing in PKOs that has been tested by Brazil’s command of the UN Support Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004 and of the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC in 2013, and by its participation in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon since 2010. The report discusses the international and domestic impacts of this experience. Brazil’s military interface with UN headquarters has notably increased, as has the perception of the country’s armed forces as an operative part of its presence in global security arenas. Also, the lessons learned in the pacification of Haiti have spilled over into the domestic security realm, with the Peace and Pacification Units currently in place in a number of *favelas* in Rio benefitting from methods first experimented with in Port-au-Prince. Although the armed forces are keen to continue their involvement in PKOs, the country has decreased its contributions to UN peacekeeping. Current figures are partly explained by the withdrawal of MINUSTAH, but they also reflect domestic economic and political difficulties.

Introduction

In the last decade Brazil has applied a foreign policy-defence formula designed to enhance the country’s performance in peace and security initiatives as part of a long-term strategy for the country’s involvement in world affairs. Increasingly, the Ministry of Defence (MD) has followed in the footsteps of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA – commonly known as Itamaraty) to expand Brazil’s regional/global geopolitical impact. The combination of traditional diplomatic expertise and new military capabilities has led to an expanded presence in international defence matters based on three pillars: active participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), a significant portfolio of bilateral cooperation agreements and a growing presence in the global military equipment market.

Brazilian involvement in PKOs – the main subject of this report – has become a challenging learning process in the context of post-cold war UN-led interventions.² Brazil has evolved from being a selective troop contributor to an ambitious innovator in terms of its political approach and

stabilisation methods. This process started in 2004 when Brazil accepted the military command of the United Nations Support Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH), followed by growing commitments to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) and, most recently, the responsibilities assumed by a Brazilian officer in the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). While each mission presents specific incentives and difficulties, in Brasília all are perceived as an opportunity to improve operational-logistical knowledge and the handling of groundbreaking methods of engagement in UN-led interventions.

The defence-foreign policy link

Although coming from very diverse bureaucratic-historical backgrounds, in recent years the Brazilian MFA and MD have built up strong links based on complementary interests and expertise. Military and diplomatic officials believe that the essence of this partnership lies in a mutual perception of the need to combine long-term strategic aims

¹ We gratefully acknowledge the work of research assistant Vitor Sion during the preparation of this report.

² The findings of this report are based on interviews with MFA and MD officials, academics, and NGO professionals, in addition to a review of media and specialised literature on Brazil’s participation in PKOs.

with operational capabilities. This association has been cultivated by the presence of defence ministers particularly concerned with world affairs, notably Nelson Jobim (2007-11) and Celso Amorim (2011 to the present). From a conceptual standpoint, Brazilian defence policy in recent years has been driven by a “grand strategy” based on the idea that an independent foreign policy ought to be supplemented with a robust defence policy (Amorim, 2012: 15).

Involvement in foreign affairs presents the Brazilian Armed Forces with an opportunity to reinforce their traditional values, particularly their commitment to peace, which is part of the Brazilian constitution. Aside from the importance of participating in UN-led PKOs, they have expanded ties with Brazil’s South American neighbours and supported membership of BRICS,³ IBSA⁴ and the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries). These forums became fertile grounds to explore comparative advantages and improve the image of the Brazilian military both abroad and at home. This engagement has also served as a motivation, among others, for the armed forces to update the normative premises of the country’s National Defence Policy (Brazil, 2005).

In this context the MFA and the MD have appointed attachés in their counterparts to facilitate inter-departmental communications. In 2012 this collaboration was institutionalised with the creation of the Division for General Coordination of Defence Affairs at Itamaraty. Deepening synergies have also come through training courses offered by the Diplomatic Academy to military attachés assigned to Brazilian embassies. Furthermore, proper procedures for interaction between the MD and the UN have been slowly built up and have become essential to Brazil’s involvement in the creation and functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.⁵

The peacekeeping push

Brazil’s involvement in PKOs can be divided into three phases:⁶ (1) 1957-67, with participation in six missions (Gaza, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iran, the Dominican Republic, Cyprus, and the border between India and Pakistan); (2) 1989-2004, with engagement in second-generation PKOs in Angola, Mozambique and El Salvador; and (3) since 2004, when the country increased its involvement in UN missions, particularly MINUSTAH.

While for the Brazilian military participation in PKOs until the 1990s had been largely symbolic, for Brazilian diplomats the commitment to multilateral initiatives and the

country’s repeated presence in discussions on international intervention at the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member had become an essential part of Brazilian foreign policy.⁷ Once the MD perceived the importance of PKOs, Brazil gradually augmented its position as a contributor to UN-led PKOs. The country now participates in nine of the 17 UN-led PKOs, with 1,764 troops: 97% of this participation takes place in Haiti and Lebanon (Santos & Almeida Cravo, 2014).

According to the Brazilian military, engagement in peace operations always has an underlying political motivation. In particular, “adventurous” involvements in which withdrawal strategies may turn into deadlock situations are avoided. From a domestic perspective, it has been crucial to maintain equilibrium between the fundamentals of the National Defence Policy and the rules of engagement followed by UN-led PKOs. From a global political standpoint, it is argued that there has been a nexus between increased participation in PKOs and Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the UNSC (Paixão, 2008: 64). At the ground level this presence is said to be based on “favourable” elements, such as linguistic-cultural affinities and similarities of climate linking Brazil and the target country, as well as Brazil’s familiarity with issues such as social exclusion, structural poverty and public violence. The adoption of a selective approach to peacekeeping is designed to maintain focus while avoiding an overstretching of the country’s economic and human resources. Brazil has also sought to maintain an equilibrium with the UN on the costs of maintaining its troops in the various peacekeeping missions.

The MD has tried to design a “Brazilian way” of participating in PKOs. The need to be able to rely on a suitable toolkit, based on the country’s own worldview and differing from the doctrines and operational framework formulated by others – particularly NATO – led to the establishment of a dedicated training centre, the Centre for Preparation and Evaluation for Peacekeeping Missions of the Brazilian Army, in 2001.⁸ This initiative introduced an institutional framework for preparing Brazilian troops to participate in PKOs. This process involves internalising the UN rules of engagement, adapted according to the principles of the National Defence Doctrine and enhanced by local interpretations of peace and conflict scenarios.

Brazil’s command of MINUSTAH became the country’s first opportunity to test and improve the methods and contents of this training process.⁹ It also became a fertile learning process regarding the sensitivity of missions undertaken in

³ Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa.

⁴ India-Brazil-South Africa.

⁵ In May 2014 General Paul Cruz, who previously had been chief of the MINUSTAH military command and vice chief of staff of the army, became the director of strategic partnerships at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

⁶ This chronology updates the classification presented by Fontoura (2005).

⁷ Brazil has been a non-permanent UNSC member ten times between 1946 and 2011.

⁸ In 2007 the training centre was renamed the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Centre.

⁹ The training process takes six months and includes simulation exercises in low-income areas of Brazil. Besides military instructors, the courses also involve the collaboration of organisations like Viva Rio, in view of the latter’s expertise in conflict mediation in violent urban contexts.

terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which implies strict observation of the UN rules of engagement (UNDPKO, 2008). The protection of the civil population had to be balanced with the political aims and humanitarian concerns of the mission, and the orders given by the force commander to his subordinates had to ensure that the methods used would protect the human rights of the affected civilian population. The central issues in this context were: (1) the limits of the use of force in urban contexts; (2) the use of the military in crowd-control activities; and (3) the methods employed to neutralise the presence of violent gangs. According to military instructors at the training centre, “accountability always has to go hand in hand with efficacy”.¹⁰

While the acknowledgement of the challenges mentioned above reflect an effort to achieve autonomy and innovation, other points reveal problems not yet overcome in the Brazilian peacekeeping experience. The first is the question of human resources (Hamann, 2012). Compared to other Latin American countries, Brazil is well behind Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay in the participation of women and civilian personnel in UN missions.

The second is the economic effects of Brazil’s participation in PKOs. The country’s contributions to UN PKOs must face the same uncertainties as all external commitments, which are currently affected by domestic budgetary cuts. Since the beginning of the Dilma Rousseff administration the MD and Itamaraty budgets have suffered cutbacks of 24% and 15%, respectively, curtailing the president’s diplomatic agenda and affecting opportunities for expanding the country’s involvement in multilateral initiatives.

The MINUSTAH decade

The MINUSTAH mandate has been renewed 11 times since April 2004, with adjustments made in light of the gradual changes in Haiti’s security and political situation. Recently, the improved state of the general conditions in the country since the adoption of UNSC resolutions 1908, 1927 and 1944 (2010) led to a decision to reduce the number of troops, followed by a decision to start the gradual withdrawal of the mission (UNSC, 2012). Yet the course of action to be pursued beyond a simple quantitative cutback has become a matter of discussion involving UN headquarters, MINUSTAH’s civilian and military commands, the principal donors, and the Haitian authorities. At the UN the idea is to initiate an assisted transition similar to those experienced in Sierra Leone and Liberia (see ICG, 2012). One of the main points addressed when redesigning the MINUSTAH structure has been the need to frame its responsibilities exclusively in terms of Chapter VI. This change can only take place with the replacement of the blue helmets based in various parts of the island by a Haitian National Police (PNH) force capable of responding to the security needs of the local population.

Haiti’s case has become emblematic for the UN experience of multidimensional post-conflict reconstruction. Even before the 2010 earthquake the military part of MINUSTAH had assumed various duties that involved stabilising local public order, reforming local police forces, disarming local gangs, protecting human rights, enforcing the rule of law and improving local infrastructure.

Beyond teamwork with the UN representative and the mission’s civilian departments, the Brazilian military command in Haiti has taken on three key responsibilities during the last decade: (1) the management of all UN military and police personnel in Haiti; (2) control by Brazilian troops in the areas of Cité Soleil, Bel Air and Delmas in Port-au-Prince and, post-2010, of the homeless camps in Port-au-Prince and its periphery; and (3) coordinated action with the Brazilian diplomatic team in Port-au-Prince. The nexus between these responsibilities has spilled over in various ways. Besides an expanded presence at UN PKO headquarters, they have stimulated a stronger link between the MD and MFA in Brasília, and the strengthening of ties with South American militaries forming part of MINUSTAH.

The Brazilian military and the country’s diplomats agree on their perception of the Haitian reality. Haiti is not considered a “failed state”, and despite the acknowledgement of its many needs and vulnerabilities, they also believe that local political culture and institutions still function, although not very well. Accordingly, and despite ten years of MINUSTAH’s presence, the Haitian political system is viewed as functioning adequately, based on the concentration of power in the hands of the president and prime minister, in association with political groups and local elites. However, this centralised framework coexists with outbursts of gang violence in a context of extreme poverty.

For the Brazilian military, an overall appreciation of MINUSTAH inevitably leads to a divide between the periods before and after the earthquake. During 2004-10 the challenges focused on deterring and dismantling local gangs, sustaining a stabilised environment that would allow for the recovery of the rule of law, and gradually improving economic and social conditions. After January 2010 MINUSTAH had to simultaneously deal with a severe humanitarian crisis and the chaotic presence of external actors perceived to be governed by the prejudices and misconceptions of their respective governments and organisations. In both phases the aim of the Brazilian Armed Forces was to forge an appropriate method to approach the Haitian reality without moving away from UN rules of engagement.

During the first years of the MINUSTAH, the focus had been on the cautious but decisive use of Chapter VII, balanced with efforts to establish a stable environment for the local population (Rocha, 2009). In this context the conception and

¹⁰ Author interviews with training centre staff.

implementation of the strong-point approach in slum areas became the most powerful resource. This was combined with a range of efforts to create a positive image for the armed forces among the Haitian population (through activities such as road paving, health-care, cultural and sports activities). To avoid an image of external military intervention, the Brazilian troops opened direct lines of communication with the local population to ensure that “the friendly hand acted in connection with the strong arm”.¹¹ This tactic has been perceived by the Brazilian military as being different from those of other countries, which tend to make a distinction between the forces in charge of law and order and those concerned with winning the hearts and minds of local society. It is also said that this approach has always been shared with other South American troops in Haiti.

Following the earthquake, the impact of a severe humanitarian crisis accompanied by perilous social conditions posed new challenges for the Brazilian military. At first, a cohabitation pact had to be established with the arrival of numerous U.S. troops: UN contingents were made responsible for local security while U.S. forces were in charge of the distribution of humanitarian aid. Refugee camps spread all over Port-au-Prince and adjacent areas were not addressed as refugee camps resulting from forced migration processes. The Brazilian military viewed these camps as a provisional substitute for the neighbourhoods that had been destroyed by the earthquake. Therefore, although surrounded by rubble, the people in these camps preserved the notions of community and belonging, which were a valuable asset in terms of their commitment to reconstruction. In this view of the situation, in the months following the earthquake women were targeted as the central focal point to distribute the assistance coming from the international community.

An unprecedented consequence of Haiti’s devastating reality for Brazil has been the start of both legal and illegal migration from Haiti to Brazil. This has become a problematic issue for the Brazilian authorities, resulting in a range of different reactions on the part of local governments that are unprepared for this unexpected consequence of the country’s responsibilities as part of MINUSTAH. For the first time Brazil is facing the difficulties generated by the complex link between military occupation and asymmetrical economic relations that are normally experienced by great powers and ex-colonial powers.

The Haiti-Rio experiment

All the UNSC resolutions on MINUSTAH underline the urgency of assisting the Haitian government to reform its justice and security institutions. The challenges of professionalising the PNH have constituted the core issue of the reconfiguration of the local security system from the time

of the previous UN missions in 1995 and 2000. Achievements have always lagged behind expectations in the face of the difficulties of reducing violence in a country where the political and economic elites have been lax in their control of armed groups. Such groups have been viewed as legitimate actors in an environment where the rich protect themselves with private security while the poor are forced to coexist with a range of armed gangs.

In January 2004, when the Aristide government fell, the PNH nearly collapsed. After an initial period of chaos and dismantling, its organisation slowly started to rebuild under MINUSTAH supervision, although it had suffered from a chronic lack of trust and the means to function properly. Some recruits were ex-members of local military forces with no support from local elites and political leaders. In 2006-07 the PNH and MINUSTAH launched a “search and arrest” operation against gangs in Cité Soleil. This was the first initiative to eliminate them, coinciding with the initial stages of the Preval government, which was publicly committed not to negotiate with gangs (Cockayne, 2009).

The operation’s success allowed the PNH – by then fully supported by the military and political planning staff of MINUSTAH – to impose its presence in Cité Soleil and monopolise the use of violence in the area. This was due in large measure to an inclusive strategy of reinforcing the local police with UN military units, which was supported by the political elites, community organisations and the slum population. The management of such a complex blend of actors demanded an efficient intelligence system and the coordination of all the various police agencies (community, border, private) and the judicial and penal systems. In tactical terms the success of this operation was assured by the “strong-point” approach (“*ponto-forte*”) of the Brazilian military in Bel Air, Cité Soleil and Cité Militaire.

The learning process undergone by the Brazilian Armed Forces in the pacification of Haiti has been replicated in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro. The peace and pacification units now in place in a number of areas in Rio benefit from methods first experimented with on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, i.e. they use the doctrines enforced in Haiti by the Brazilian military. Troops do not fight and then leave, but attack and occupy the strong points in a particular area. It is not considered enough to attack organised crime, but also to occupy open areas – i.e. those in which the state has been unable to fulfil the minimum needs of the local population.¹² This method of occupation and pacification has been employed in Rio since 2004 with the participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces and is considered a benchmark tactic for the re-establishment of public safety in the *favelas* (Zaluar & Barcellos, 2014). An interesting statistic reveals the Port-au-Prince-Rio connection: by the end of 2010 approximately 60% of the troops deployed in the Maré *favela* had formed part of Brazil’s MINUSTAH contingent.

¹¹ In 2009 this strategy reached a peak of 20 strong points in the slum areas in and around Port-au-Prince.

¹² Statement by Luciano Pereira, Brazilian army captain who served in MINUSTAH in 2005-06 [Lemle, 2010].

Projects carried out by the Brazilian non-governmental organisation (NGO) Viva Rio have provided important support for Brazil's military presence in Haiti. Most of these initiatives prioritise the engagement of local youth and their reinsertion into their communities with the aim of avoiding their subordination to a failed penal system. Viva Rio has been an active participant in the pacification process of Rio's *favelas* in the last decade and its expertise in peace accords in violent urban communities has been acknowledged as a valuable asset that has worked simultaneously in Brazil and Haiti. Beside the continuous participation of Viva Rio in training courses for the Brazilian troops sent to Haiti, the organisation has deepened its collaboration with MINUSTAH in Cité Soleil and Bel Air by providing information about and access to clashing local leaders. One of the effects of this two-track agenda has been the involvement of Rio de Janeiro's police in the training of PNH members, carried out in terms of the legal framework of a cooperation agreement signed between the two forces.¹³

Preparations to address the Haitian situation have involved simulation exercises in dense urban environments where local communities are exposed to "community violence reduction" methods. A special toolkit has been designed to deal with gang violence in poor neighbourhoods that takes into account the fact that social conditions are the result of continuous economic marginalisation. According to General Santos Cruz: "In Haiti the problem with violence is that one cannot relax; the risk that gangs may re-group must be avoided, and this is a permanent job to be done until the Haitian Police can replace UN troops" (Agência Brasil, 2007). While this system of replacement was considered a considerable achievement in the period 2006-09, after the earthquake it confronted an intimidating set of new challenges. Together with the loss of local police members and the physical destruction of the Haitian prison system, a new generation of gangs emerged with a more fragmented territorial presence and new violent practices. This reality has posed unprecedented difficulties for the present MINUSTAH withdrawal process.

New horizons in the Middle East

The decision to participate in UNFIL opened another important international horizon for the Brazilian Armed Forces. Whereas for the MFA, engagement in the Middle East represented a step forward in Brazil's status as an emerging power with significant international responsibilities, it has also been perceived as an opportunity to promote the participation of the country's naval forces in UN operations.

At present, the mission in Lebanon is one of the UN's largest, comprising 10,208 troops from 38 different countries. UNIFIL was created in 1978 by UNSC Resolution

425 to monitor Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in a peaceful and stable environment, while assisting the local government to restore its authority in the area. The naval component of the mission, the Maritime Task-Force (MTF), was established in 2006 to enhance this mission mandate by carrying out coastal surveillance and impeding the smuggling of arms and military equipment into Lebanon.

In 2010 Brazil was invited to join this force, and although reluctant at first, it now perceives this as a way of expanding its presence in a particularly sensitive area. The country's responsibilities in the mission increased in 2011 when it replaced Italy as commander of the MTF, which is a multinational force comprising nine vessels tasked with patrolling a 220-kilometre coastal strip.¹⁴ The fact that this was the first time that a non-NATO member had assumed command of the MTF represented a significant step in the international status of the Brazilian navy.

Brazil has not yet confirmed that a contingent of approximately 350 men is to join UNIFIL in the first quarter of 2015 (Saleh, 2014). This would be the first time that Brazil has sent troops (as opposed to the naval contingent) to the Middle East since the 1950s, when it joined the UN peace-keeping mission in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. Growing pressure from the UN to increase Brazil's participation resulted from the withdrawal of Spain and France from UNFIL. Brazilian participation would involve the rapid deployment of the 19th Motorised Battalion, a well-trained unit with many experienced veterans from other missions in Haiti, East Timor and Angola.

A step higher in the DRC

Brazil's participation in the UN mission in the DRC represents a unique experience for Brazil. The appointment of a Brazilian officer as the military commander of MONUSCO in 2013 came as a result of a personal invitation to General Santo Cruz and was not the result of diplomatic negotiations between Itamaraty and the UN secretary general, as in the cases of the country's participation in MINUSTAH and UNIFIL. Yet for the MD the responsibilities assumed in MONUSCO by a Brazilian officer became a new source of pride and international projection. The appointment has also been perceived as part of a positive sequence in which the country engages in more complex missions involving the use of force, intervention procedures and innovative technological backup (MONUSCO is the first UN mission to make daily use of drones to reinforce Chapter VII operations).

At present, MONUSCO is the UN's PKO operating with the largest budget (\$1.5 billion) and comprises 22,000 members: 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 members of uniformed police

¹³ This agreement was signed by Haiti and the state of Rio de Janeiro in May 2013.

¹⁴ The multinational force involves ships from Brazil (1), Germany (2), Greece (1), Bangladesh (2), Indonesia (1), Italy (1) and Turkey (1).

units. Enforced since 2010, the MONUSCO mandate was partly reshaped in 2013, with the aim of introducing more effective stabilisation efforts in the eastern part of the country. The main purpose of the recently created intervention brigades is to neutralise armed groups that threaten state authority and the civilian population (Silva & Martins, 2014). The challenges MONUSCO faces include the country's severe political and social vulnerabilities and a tense network of antagonistic alliances between the local armed groups and their counterparts in DRC's neighbours (Uganda, Rwanda and Angola). Linkages between rebel groups (such as M23, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the National-Allied Army for the Liberation of Uganda) and the intense arms trafficking and mineral smuggling – particularly gold – have constantly jeopardised UN attempts to promote peace talks leading to sustainable post-conflict reconstruction.

General Santos Cruz insists that offensive military action, based on the principle of proportion, should be pursued to ensure the elimination of violent groups. This has been the idea behind the introduction by the UNSC-UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the intervention brigades, which in fact implies an expansion of the principles underlying Chapter VII operations. According to an interview with General Santos Cruz, "Political solutions can only be introduced once battles are won". This is the way to re-establish some kind of order, guarantee conditions to protect civilian populations "and to allow a more peaceful life for women, children, and men not involved in combat".

The media have explored the connection between Santos Cruz's presence in the DRC and his previous experience as military commander in Haiti (2006-09), when he played a decisive role in the dismantling of the armed gangs in Port-au-Prince. The coincidence of Brazil's military presence in MINUSTAH and a Brazilian representative at UN headquarters helped to establish this linkage.¹⁵ Yet as Santos Cruz has noted, the difference between the realities of the two countries should not be ignored: "Haiti is a country of eight million people and the Congo of 71 million, besides the diversity and complexity of the groups disputing power in the case of the DRC." He has highlighted two other contrasts: firstly, the context of violence in Haiti is urban not rural, as in the DRC, and, secondly, although most of its people are poverty-stricken, the DRC is a rich country thanks to its mineral resources, which could allow its economy to be rebuilt on a sustainable basis if and when the state manages to extend its authority over the whole country.

Although far from accomplishing its objectives, and quite differently from the MINUSTAH experience, the UN has already started talking about MONUSCO's possible withdrawal (UNSC, 2014). This has led the UN to define parameters to gradually withdraw its military presence.

Conclusion

The new links between Brazil's defence and foreign policy have become a positive factor to open the way for the country's expanded presence in global security affairs. Yet it is still not clear what the long-term consequence of these links will be. While Brazilian foreign policy is clearly not undergoing a process of militarisation, it does entail new challenges in terms of the debate on the domestic impact of Brazil's growing involvement in world security. A final quick glance at the international and domestic dimensions of this process will help to clarify these challenges.

International dimension

There is a correlation between closer relations with the military and the increasing caution in Brazilian diplomatic positions when approaching questions of conflict, the definition of a threat and the pertinent use of force. Brazilian foreign policy has emphasised the question of the legitimacy of the use of force in international interventions, as well as the humanitarian impact of military action and the importance of solutions that seek a balance among peace, solidarity, sovereignty and sustainable development. And although this may seem paradoxical, the expanded presence of the armed forces in foreign policy decision-making has reinforced Brazil's rejection of securitised solutions to international crises.

One of Brazil's main concern has been the promotion of capacity-building and the strengthening of national institutions instead of coercive responses to address local political turmoil. Brazilian diplomacy also insists on the need to enhance mediation and peaceful solutions in order to avoid intervention and/or militarised approaches to crises. These concerns explain Brazil's attempt together with Turkey in 2010 to find a diplomatic formula acceptable to the UNSC to deal with the Iranian nuclear programme. This also applies to the Brazilian minister of defence's most recent offer to the UN secretary general to conduct a UN-led mediation to de-escalate the crisis in Syria.

Brazil has been a regular non-permanent member of the UNSC, but claims the right to a permanent seat if and when the council is reformed. This presence at the UN has contributed to the country's expanded participation in PKOs. Yet this should not be taken as a simplistic assumption, nor as evidence that this sort of engagement is the result of pragmatic calculations – even more so when perceptions in Brasília have become quite realistic regarding a renewed multilateral architecture. Neither the MFA nor the MD has any illusions regarding possible UNSC reform in the short or medium term. At present global political developments are seen as unconnected to an institutional process of redistributing power. Nevertheless, the loss of momentum regarding UNSC reform has in no way diminished Brazil's involvement in PKOs.

¹⁵ Ambassador Edward Mullet of Brazil, who was the UN representative at MINUSTAH and worked with General Santos Cruz in 2006-07, is the current director of DPKO and has been directly involved in the reconfiguration of the MONUSCO mandate.

Different from other emerging powers, e.g. India, until recently Brazil's military had little interaction with multilateral bureaucracy. Yet once it developed the motivation and confidence to assume high-level responsibilities on the ground, its interaction with UN headquarters expanded notably, together with a perception of the country's presence in the various UN forums as an essential part of Brazil's presence in global security arenas.

Domestic dimension

Domestically, a growing acknowledgment of the Brazilian military's international presence has opened space for its participation in internal public security activities. In Brazil, the questioning of the legal grounds for the military force employed by MINUSTAH in the absence of an armed conflict in Haiti has come and gone. At first, Brazil's armed forces were uncertain about participating in missions focused on combatting crime and the preservation of public order, which comprised one of the MINUSTAH tasks. Most importantly for the Brazilian military, currently such activities are valued as a source of international recognition, representing an institutional asset to the armed forces and a boost to individual careers.

In this context, the last ten years have been an important learning process, one in which the army has improved its doctrines and operating methods in the use of ground troops in actions usually assigned to the police. The military mission in Haiti and operations in the *favelas* of Rio to combat crime and drug trafficking have mutually reinforced each other. The initial difficulties involved in operations to improve public security in urban environments have been surmounted, in part facilitated by the judicial safeguards determined by Brazilian legislation.

In fact, the Brazilian Armed Forces have become increasingly used for public security tasks, which from a legal standpoint and according to the Federal Constitution (art. 144) are considered a responsibility of the Federal Police. In recent years the army has been mobilised to keep order in the streets of major Brazilian cities: during the strikes of state police forces (especially in Bahia in 2012); to guarantee elections and prevent public disorder during elections (2002); to back up police operations against drug trafficking; and to maintain order during major international events (such as Rio+20, the Youth World Reunion and the FIFA World Cup). This increased presence has been severely criticised by human rights NGOs concerned about the possibility of the military being used against demonstrations, such as those that have spread throughout Brazil since mid-2013.

Wrapping up

The Brazilian military's international and domestic involvement will gain growing importance in the country's public discussions, particularly in terms of the current (August 2014) electoral debate. There follows a summary of the central political issues at stake when addressing the new links between defence and foreign policy.

- The Brazilian military is displaying ambitions that go beyond the fulfilment of a straightforward operational role in foreign policy. Political aspirations on the part of the military are perceived when a "defence foreign policy" is mentioned as a possibility in the near future. The question will be how to harmonise such expectations with the external and internal commitments and constraints tying Brazil's role exclusively to soft power attributes.
- Brazil's armed forces have made their intentions clear to continue their involvement in PKOs. Yet Brazil has decreased its troop contributions to UN PKOs. Whereas the current low figures for troop numbers are partly explained by the MINUSTAH withdrawal process, they also reflect domestic economic and political circumstances, hence it will not be easy to maintain Brazil's prominent role in peacekeeping. In this context the prospect of new deployments, such as sending troops to UNIFIL, have opened up new expectations for the Brazilian military.
- Although institutional links between the MD and MFA have expanded, they have also inevitably suffered the consequences of a decline in the focus on foreign affairs during the Dilma Rousseff administration (2012 to the present). Beyond differences in style and drive in comparison to the proactivism of President Lula's diplomacy, the current government has imposed dramatic budget cuts that affect bilateral and multilateral commitments.
- Yet there is still a job to be completed in Haiti. The countries responsible for MINUSTAH's withdrawal will face many challenges regarding long-term human rights protection, housing for the people living in camps, effective public security, maintaining the rule of law and sustainable economic reconstruction. The very question of pulling out its forces throws up unresolved dilemmas for the UN (e.g. the challenge of Haiti's previous hosting of UN missions and the problems that these missions left behind them). A major issue is how to deal with intervention fatigue and avoid going back to square one. Dealing with this issue is a major concern of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which is currently chaired by Brazil.
- A major consequence of the UN withdrawal from Haiti has already surfaced: the expansion of private security companies. This tendency started in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake and, ironically, both UN agencies and foreign governments have become major clients of such enterprises, while banks, NGOs, schools and private business also rely on the protection offered by private security firms. This prospect has created a private/public security divide, undermining the transfer of the monopoly on the use of violence from external forces to local authorities in Haiti. Because of this, compliance with the UNSC-prescribed transition process cannot be fully achieved.

- One of the MD's main concerns has been to balance the process of pulling out with the ability to provide long-term solutions for Haiti. It has agreed to offer cooperation in the field of military engineering, yet this is controversial, since it represents an indirect pathway for the rebuilding of the Haitian Armed Forces.
- The departure of MINUSTAH troops is the first UN withdrawal to be led by the Brazilian military. In a way, the challenges ahead resemble those faced by the armed forces when they pulled out of the *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro. Assuring long-term stabilisation when basic public goods such as health, education and housing are still not available makes the resurgence of violence more likely.
- As has been widely exposed in the MINUSTAH ten-year evaluation, a large percentage of resources promised by aid donors never reached Haiti. Can a comparison be drawn between the impact of the unfulfilled promises of development aid pledged to the Haitian people and the negligence of local government authorities toward large Brazilian urban complexes?
- This argument leads to one last question that forms the background of this report: the central difference between defence and security. Abroad and at home, the Brazilian Armed Forces may be a central resource to deal with and contain eruptions of violence, but they cannot address the broader factors that cause insecurity.

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