ANTI-SEMITISM IN ROMANIA:
HISTORICAL LEGACIES,
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

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The present article offers a brief survey of the modes of manifestation of anti-Semitism in Romania, from the time of the establishment of the state in the 19th century and until present day. While aware of the inherent limitations of attempting to carry out such an endeavour in the space of a short article, we believe that adopting such a broad historical perspective allows for observing patterns of continuity and change that could help explain some of the peculiarities of the Romanian varieties of anti-Semitism, as well as draw attention to the importance of a phenomenon that was central (albeit to varying degrees in different historical periods) to Romania’s modern history, and that is still visible in the country today. In doing so, the author aims both to provide a survey of the existing literature on the subject for the English-speaking audience, as well as to point out some of the gaps in the literature which call for further research on the subject. Finally, while the article will be limited to the case-study of Romania, some of the patterns of prejudice explored in its pages display clear parallels with the situation in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, while others point to context-specific particularities that render the Romanian case distinct from other countries in the region.

I. ANTI-SEMITISM IN ROMANIA BEFORE WORLD WAR I

Anti-Semitism was part of Romanian history ever since the establishment of the state. Discussing the roots of the virtual anti-Semitic consensus in interwar Romania, the authors of the ‘Final Report’ of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania state explicitly that “the anti-Semitism that manifested itself in Romania between the two world wars grew directly from seeds sewn at the major turning points of the country’s
development starting in the mid-nineteenth century. As a modern phenomenon replacing previous religious anti-Judaism, anti-Semitism appeared at this time throughout Europe, and Romania was no exception. Its development needs to be placed in the context of a significant migration of Jews to the Romanian principalities after the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), which opened up opportunities for trade in the territories that were to become the Old Kingdom of Romania. If the results of the 1825 census in the principalities of Moldova and Wallachia indicate that only very small Jewish communities were present in these territories (10,000 in Wallachia, mostly Sephardim, and 12,000 in Moldova, mostly Ashkenazi), the total number of Jews living in the United Principalities in 1859 amounted to 135,000. However, the very same Treaty of Adrianople that opened up economic opportunities in Romania also entailed a Russian occupation of the principalities that lasted until 1834, and, importantly, the introduction of a quasi-constitutional legislation imposed by the Russian governor, General Pavel Kisselev, usually referred to as the Organic Statutes. In addition to many other discriminatory regulations against the Jews, Article 94 of Chapter III of the Statutes introduced an element of utmost importance for further developments related to Jewish emancipation: the Jew’s legal identification as a ‘foreigner’. The notion of foreigner was further associated with the idea of “vagrant, thus easing the possibility of the Jews’ expulsion”. Consequently, as Carol Iancu points out, anti-Jewish measures in Romania during this period appear to be of Russian origin, inspired by the retrograde tsarist legislation.

As elsewhere in Europe, the Revolution of 1848 marked a moment of hope for the Jewish community in Romania. Article 21 of the Proclamation of Islaz, a programme adopted on 9 June 1848 by the Romanian revolutionaries referred to the “emancipation of Israelites and political rights for any compatriots of a different confession”. A similar demand was made in Article 27 of the programme of the Moldovan revolutionaries, Aims of the National Party in Moldova, which however, in light of the higher number of Jews in Moldova, advocated a gradual and not immediate emancipation. Although the defeat of the revolution in the Romanian principalities meant that none of these provisions came to be implemented, one of the former 1848 revolutionaries, Alexandru Ioan Cuza, eventually became the first prince of the United Principalities in 1859, and during his reign (1859-1866) the Jews in Romania enjoyed full civil rights. Following the deposition of Cuza as a result of a palace coup and his replacement with a foreign prince, Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (eventually crowned as King Carol I of Romania), this brief and partial emancipation of the Jews in Romania was reversed. Article 7 of the first Constitution of
Romania, issued in 1866, stipulated that “only foreigners of Christian rites may become Romanians.”\textsuperscript{12} This provision reflected the ambiguous position of the Romanian ruling elite towards the Jews – on the one hand, as a predominantly urban, commercial and entrepreneurial group, their contribution to the modernisation of the Romanian economy was welcomed; on the other, they were perceived as a foreign group in direct competition with the emerging ethnic Romanian middle class, in the latter’s attempt to safeguard and advance its own position. As such, as Andrew Janos points out, the Constitution of 1866 reflected this tension: while providing “legal protection to Jewish capital and urban property [...] it denied Jews the rights of citizenship, and hence access to bureaucratic positions, ownership of rural property, and the exercise of political rights. By this formula Jews could participate in developing the modern, urban economy without posing the threat of competition to landowners, bureaucrats, and professional politicians.”\textsuperscript{13} In its practical consequences, this document served as the justification for a number of abusive measures directed against the Jewish population by the Romanian state (including expulsions, allegedly legitimised by the Jews’ ‘foreign’ and ‘vagabond’ character), which continued uninterruptedly and in the face of European protest until 1878.\textsuperscript{14}

If prejudice against the Jews, coupled with legal discrimination of the Jewish minority, was widespread in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Romania, it was a turning point in the country’s history – the achievement of independence – that was to mark the beginning of anti-Semitism per se, paralleling similar developments in other countries in Europe at the time, albeit in a very different context. While a commonplace in studies of anti-Semitism views it as a reaction to Jewish emancipation, in Romania the opposite was the case – anti-Semitism emerged in the context of the failed emancipation of Romanian Jews, accompanying the official discriminatory policy of the state.\textsuperscript{15} Following Romania’s participation in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 on the side of Russia and its proclamation of independence, at the Congress of Berlin the recognition of the country’s independence was conditioned on two grounds (Articles 44 and 45 of the Congress): the acceptance of the territorial changes proposed by the Great Powers in accordance with the interests of the Russian Empire, and the guarantee of the implementation of the principle of equality of rights, civil and political, in Romania. The latter condition entailed the alignment of Romania to the policy of states in Western and Central Europe with regards to Jewish emancipation, granting them full citizenship rights, and was the result of extensive lobbying work by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, under the leadership of Adolphe Crémieux, as well as of other Jewish organisations in Germany and Great Britain.\textsuperscript{16} In spite of the pressure of the Great Powers
and the postponement of the recognition of Romania’s independence, the proposed incorporation of Article 44 in the Romanian Constitution did not take place. Instead, through a subterfuge devised by interpreting the existing legislation, the Romanian parliament, in accordance with King Carol I, “found an excellent pretext for not resolving Jewish emancipation. Since the Jews were all foreigners, in order to enjoy all rights, including political ones, they had to be naturalised as Romanians.”

This was to be carried out through a revision of the aforementioned Article 7 of the Constitution of 1866 that would extend naturalisation to Jews as well. Furthermore, with the exception of the Jewish veterans of the war of 1877, who were emancipated en masse, naturalisation was to be granted on an individual basis, following an extremely complicated procedure.

It was in the context of the debates surrounding Jewish emancipation that anti-Semitism became an integral part of public discourse in Romania, increasing in virulence as well as in the variety of arguments employed. International pressures on behalf of the Jews were seen as interference in the internal affairs of an independent state, and notions of a conspiracy appeared for the first time in the newspapers of the country. Paralleling similar arguments put forth in Austria-Hungary, Germany or France, or even directly importing them from the foreign press, Romanian anti-Semites increasingly conceptualised the Jewish minority as a national and not a religious one, and developed pseudo-scientific interpretations meant to ‘demonstrate’ its detrimental effect on the economy, society and politics. The entire panoply of anti-Semitic stereotypes and ‘theories’, complete with accusations of separatism, economic imperialism, and international conspiracy, was employed by some of the most prestigious political and cultural personalities in the country: Mihail Kogălniceanu, Vasile Alecsandri, Bogdan-Petriceicu Hașdeu, Ion Heliade Rădulescu, Mihai Eminescu, Vasile Conta, Nicolae Iorga, and Alexandru C. Cuza, to name only a few.

The latter two scholars and politicians had a particular impact on the development of anti-Semitism in the interwar period as well: while in 1910 they co-founded the National Democratic Party, the first Romanian political party with an explicitly anti-Semitic platform, the two parted ways after World War I, with Iorga becoming increasingly moderate and opposed to the new anti-Semitic student organisations and A.C. Cuza maintaining his radical anti-Semitic stance and acting as a ‘mentor’ to the young generation of interwar anti-Semites.

If the rise of anti-Semitism in Romania at the end of the 19th century paralleled similar developments in Central and Eastern Europe, its specificity lies with the legal discrimination that severely affected the Jewish minority in Romania until World War I. The number of anti-Semitic laws and
decrees passed by the Romanian governments during this period (1879-1913) was over two hundred. These affected various domains of public life, from the military (aimed at preventing Jews from acquiring citizenship rights through military service) to education, liberal professions such as medicine or law, and traditional occupations for the Jewish community in Romania, such as trade and handicrafts. As a result, by 1913 Jews in Romania could no longer be: officers, clerks or students of military schools, gendarmes, physicians, veterinary doctors, midwives, chemists, pharmacists, nurses, attorneys, tobacco or alcohol sellers, itinerant traders, stockbrokers, or members of the journalists’ union.

The legal exclusion of Jews from Romanian public life was coupled with a policy of expulsions. Until 1881, expulsions were still being ordered under the pretext of vagrancy (motivated, as mentioned earlier, by the association of Jews with ‘foreigners’ and ‘vagrants’). The situation changed with a law promulgated on 18 April 1881, which “provided for the expulsion by decree of the Council of Ministers of foreigners who might disturb the peace or threaten national safety (Article 1)”.

This law was used by the Romanian government as an instrument for eliminating reputed Jewish scholars or journalists who were critical of the country’s intolerant policies. The primary outcome of the unfortunate combination of legal discrimination and widespread anti-Semitic discourse during this period was mass emigration: “between 1899 and 1912 the number of Jews in Romania declined from 266,652 to 239,967, or from 4.5% to 3.3% of the state’s population.” Summing up, as Ezra Mendelsohn pointed out, “prewar Romania had a well-deserved reputation for being, along with Russia, the most anti-Semitic country in Europe.”

At the same time, the manifestations of anti-Semitism in Romania before World War I were however different in one significant respect from those in Russia, where the pogroms that occurred throughout the southwestern provinces of the empire in 1881-1882 and again in 1905-1907, as well as in Kishinev in 1903, took the form of mass movements. No organised violence of this type took place in Romania during this period, and the only exception, the incidents of anti-Jewish violence that ensued during the Peasant Revolt of 1907, have to be seen in the context of an uprising that was essentially motivated by economic considerations and where the violence targeted ethnic Romanian boyars and leaseholders as well as Jewish, Bulgarian and Greek ones. Although there were certain anti-Semitic overtones to the conservative populist propaganda in Moldova before the rebellion, studies of the revolt clearly show that it only became murderous when it spread to Wallachia, and that the violence was much more pronounced there than in Moldova. This aspect downplays the importance of anti-Semitic motives: at the
turn of the century, Jews represented 10.5% of the population of Moldova and only 1.8% of the population of Wallachia; moreover, the latter were predominantly urban and mostly concentrated in the capital of Bucharest, where no violent incidents occurred. As such, it is difficult to agree with statements that refer to a “tradition of violent popular anti-Semitism” in the Old Kingdom of Romania. This situation would change significantly after the war.

II. VIOLENCE AND EXCLUSION – THE RADICALISATION OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN INTERWAR ROMANIA

In spite of their exclusion from Romanian citizenship, Jews were drafted into the military when Romania entered World War I in 1916. However, the full emancipation of the Jews in Romania was first introduced during the German occupation of the country, as a provision of the Treaty of Bucharest (7 May 1918), which amounted to a capitulation of Romania to the Central Powers. Never ratified by King Ferdinand I and his government-in-exile, who had retreated to the unoccupied north-eastern part of the country, the treaty was subsequently invalidated when the king and the politicians loyal to him regained control of the capital. In light of the disastrous effects of the wartime German occupation on the Romanian economy and society, this short-lived Jewish emancipation was consequently interpreted by anti-Semites as ‘proof’ of the Jews’ treason and collaboration with the enemy. Nevertheless, in spite of the reluctance of the Romanian state to emancipate its Jewish population, the issue became once again an international one at the Paris Peace Conference, where Romania, like other new or significantly enlarged states in Central and Eastern Europe, was forced to sign a Minority Treaty guaranteeing protection of the country’s national minorities in exchange for the recognition of its incorporation of new territories. The intensity of Romania’s reluctance to do so can be inferred from the fact that two Prime Ministers (Ion I.C. Brătianu and Arthur Văitoianu) resigned rather than sign the treaty, which was eventually ratified by Constantin Coandă. Moreover, four more years would pass before Jewish emancipation would make its way into the Constitution of 1923, making Romania the last country in Europe to emancipate its Jewish population.

Greater Romania was a much more ethnically heterogeneous state than its prewar predecessor: while both its population and its territory doubled, the proportion of national minorities among the population increased fourfold. If ethnic Romanians had made up 92.1% of the population in 1899, their proportion of the population dropped to 71.9% in the interwar period, and the Jewish minority was no longer the most numerous one, as it had been before the war, but the second largest, after the Hungarians. Moreover, of the 756,930 Jews (4.2% of the
population) recorded in the 1930 census, those living on the territory of the Old Kingdom of Romania represented a mere 30% (roughly 240,000), while 70% of them lived in the newly acquired provinces. To the already existing difference between the small, Sephardic, acculturated Jewish community in Wallachia and the much larger Ashkenazi community in Moldova, Bukovina brought into the picture a Jewish population that “had long been emancipated and enjoyed full equality”, Bessarabia a community that had been exposed to the discrimination and pogroms in Imperial Russia and was as a result compact and politically conscious (with both socialism and Zionism well represented), and Transylvania Jews that “were culturally and linguistically assimilated with the Magyars [and] regarded themselves as Magyars of the Jewish faith”. Socioeconomic and linguistic patterns added further differences to the ones pertaining to group identity, resulting in a “situation [that] was probably more complex here than anywhere else in Eastern Europe”, encompassing “at least five distinct Jewries”. However, this diversity was missed on the interwar anti-Semites, who in their radical and increasingly ideological anti-Semitism constructed a representation of the ‘Jew’ as arch-enemy that brought together divergent and even mutually exclusive features (e.g. communist and capitalist, religious and atheist) pertaining to different communities.

Whereas before World War I anti-Semitism in Romania can be described as primarily political and elite-driven, mostly manifest in anti-Semitic public statements and in the legal discrimination that led to the exclusion of Jews from various areas of public life, the period after the war brought to the fore incidents of organised anti-Semitic violence and the emergence of new radical movements committed from the outset to the complete exclusion or even elimination of the Jews from Romanian society. The new, violent form of anti-Semitism that became characteristic for the interwar period and contributed to the radicalisation that would later show its devastating consequences in the Holocaust first became manifest in Romanian universities. In this respect, the case of Romania was no different from the situation in almost all Central and East European countries (with the notable exception of Czechoslovakia). It was the intensity of the violence and the virulence of the anti-Semitic discourse employed, as well as the establishment of a virtual anti-Semitic consensus among young intellectuals in the 1930s, that render the Romanian case study distinct and perhaps comparable only to that of interwar Germany.

Even before Jews were accepted as citizens with full rights in interwar Romania, Jewish students were already excluded from all student societies following a resolution passed at the first student congress held after the war, on 4-6 September 1920.
proponent of this exclusion was Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the future founder and leader of the ‘Legion of the Archangel Michael’, Romania’s interwar fascist movement. He would acquire notoriety in the 1920s as an instigator and leader of pogroms carried out against Jewish communities in his native city of Iaşi and elsewhere, starting from attacks on Jewish students from Bessarabia whom he accused of being communists, through public burnings of left-wing newspapers, devastations of their headquarters and assaults on their Jewish editors, and culminating with an attack with revolvers against the Jewish neighbourhood of Târgu-Cucului in Iaşi.

The violence against Jewish students spread to all university centres in the winter of 1922 as the Romanian students demanded the introduction of *numerus clausus* laws, and the day of 10 December became a symbol of student anti-Semitism, celebrated every year by the nationalists making up the proudly self-entitled ‘generation of 1922’. These nationalist students of the early 1920s would later constitute the backbone of the legionary movement and of all other anti-Semitic organisations in interwar Romania.

In addition to the legacy of anti-Semitism in the country, one of the reasons why the anti-Semitic violence was initially most intense in universities has to do with the “unprecedented expansion in educational facilities [that] increased the number of students to a record level”.

In its attempts to homogenise the newly acquired territories, the interwar Romanian state embarked on an aggressive project of cultural nationalisation that accompanied Bucharest’s centralising drive. In this context, one needs to take into consideration that Jews were the ethnic minority that was best represented in Romanian universities, making up 16.4% of the total number of university students during the period from 1921 to 1933. In some faculties, like pharmacy or medicine, they constituted about 30-40% of the student body – it was not a coincidence that the agitations started precisely in these departments. Another contributing factor to the animosity of Romanian students towards their Jewish colleagues was the difficult material conditions they were facing, especially in the case of students coming from a rural environment. According to a contemporary Jewish observer, “the number of places in dormitories was limited, rents were high, and government scholarships few. Jewish students, however, came from urban areas, lived at home with their parents, and even if they were not rich, appeared as such in comparison to Rumanian students. Any anti-Semitic propaganda thus fell on fertile ground.”

Having started in universities, the new form of anti-Semitism manifest after the war would not be limited to that environment. In anticipation of the voting of the new Constitution, which formally provided for Jewish emancipation, a new organisation founded on 4 March 1923, the League of
National Christian Defence (Liga Apărării Național-Creștine – LANC), became the first political organisation in the interwar period with an exclusively anti-Semitic platform.\(^45\) Led by A.C. Cuza and with Codreanu in charge of the organisation of the youth section at the national level, the League brought together briefly the two main representatives of the old and the young generations of Romanian anti-Semites. Although the two found common ground in their virulent anti-Semitism, they would soon part ways due to their diverging views regarding the principles of organisation of the anti-Semitic movement. Cuza, a representative of the pre-war generation of anti-Semites, wanted a reversal of Jewish emancipation and a return to the pre-war state of affairs, and consequently envisaged LANC as a traditional political party, activating within the boundaries of the democratic (if not exactly liberal) system. Codreanu, inspired by the rise of fascism in Italy, rejected parliamentary democracy altogether and wanted to organise LANC as a disciplined movement functioning according to the principle of direct action, and based on unconditional obedience to the leader.\(^46\)

The eventual break between the two led to Codreanu’s establishment of the ‘Legion of the Archangel Michael’ on 24 June 1927. The movement had an initial slow start at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, due in part to the popularity enjoyed at this time by the National Peasant Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc – PNȚ), possibly the most democratic political party in interwar Romania and the only one that attempted to “involve representatives of the ethnic minorities in the political decision making process”.\(^47\) This translated into a short respite for the Jewish community in Romania, which during the PNȚ government benefitted from some degree of protection against anti-Semitic attacks. This period came to an end with the economic crisis of the 1930s, overlapping with a political crisis caused by the compromise of the PNȚ by corruption scandals and by the destabilising effects of the return to the throne of King Carol II. As a result, throughout the 1930s, the legionary movement and other anti-Semitic organisations (in 1935 LANC merged with the National-Agrarian Party, led by another Romanian anti-Semite, the Transylvanian poet Octavian Goga, to form the National Christian Party – Partidul Național-Creștin, PNC) witnessed a steady growth in popularity.

In 1934, a law was passed that enforced the employment of Romanian personnel in a proportion of 80% (corresponding to the percentage of ethnic Romanians in the population) in “economic, industrial, commercial and civil enterprises of all types”.\(^48\) Although not quite the *numerus clausus* demanded by the anti-Semites, this law undoubtedly represented a first step towards it and an anticipation of the harsher legislation to come. In a general political climate that gradually shifted towards the right, it was however the legionary movement
that made interwar Romanian anti-Semitism into the ideological, abstract counterpart of the Nazi projection of the ‘Jew’ as arch-enemy much more than any previous or contemporary anti-Semitic political organisations in the country. Marking a complete break with pre-war anti-Semitism, the legionary movement put forth a composite anti-Semitic discourse making up an image of ultimate evil, displacing all the economic, social and cultural problems confronting Romania (and Europe) into one comprehensive enemy image. While the scope of this article is too limited to elaborate on the diverse associations that made the representation of the ‘Jew’ into the ideological articulation of an arch-enemy of an equally imaginary ‘Romanian’, an issue with which I have dealt extensively elsewhere, a brief summary of these associations provides a clear idea of its comprehensiveness. In legionary discourse, the Jews were made responsible for Marxism, communism, democracy, liberalism, individualism, corruption, poverty, alcoholism, social inequality, cultural backwardness, immorality, atheism, rationalism, cosmopolitanism, pacifism, militarism, and even ecological issues. In its comprehensiveness and radicalism, including what Aristotle Kallis identifies as an ‘eliminationist drive’, as well as in its centrality within the structure of Romanian fascism, legionary anti-Semitism closely resembled the Nazi one, despite being based on cultural and religious arguments rather than racial ones.

Just as during the period before World War I, anti-Semitism in Romania acquired considerable ‘prestige’ due to the association of some of the country’s most prominent young intellectuals with the legionary movement. More so than in any other country in Europe, the Romanian intellectuals’ allegiance to the native variant of fascism was by no means limited to a few isolated cases, but was rather a mass phenomenon – as Marta Petreu argued in a recent study, by the end of the 1930s the list of young intellectuals who were not legionary sympathisers or members was far shorter than that of those who were. The self-proclaimed members of the ‘new generation’ of Romanian intellectuals were in turn extremely influential in shaping public opinion and eventually establishing a virtual anti-Semitic consensus in Romania. Their support of the legionary movement also conferred it a degree of sophistication that its own initial propagandists had most certainly lacked and thus contributed decisively to its popularity. As a result, the Legion eventually became the third largest fascist movement in Europe and the only one that came to power without direct support from Germany or Italy.

However, it was not the legionary movement that was the first to introduce anti-Semitic legislation in interwar Romania, but rather its political competitor, the National-Christian Party, invited to form the
government in December 1937 by King Carol II in a last minute attempt to contain the growth of the Legion and the threat it posed to his throne. The government led by Octavian Goga and A.C. Cuza decreed the following anti-Semitic measures: the suspension of newspapers owned by Jews; the annulment of the free circulation railway passes of Jewish journalists; the annulment of all licences to sell alcohol for Jews in rural areas; the appointment of Romanian commissars to all foreign enterprises; and the eventual ‘Romanianisation’ of all enterprises who employed ‘foreigners’. All of these culminated in a decree law for the revision of the citizenship of all Jews settled in Romania after World War I, in direct violation of Article 7 of the 1923 Constitution, which had established the full emancipation of the Jews in Romania. As a consequence, by 1939 no less that 395,000 Jews (more than half of the total number of Jews in the country) lost their citizenship. While some of these provisions were reversed following the removal of the Cuza-Goga government and the establishment of the royal dictatorship of King Carol II in February 1938 (which also entailed an extensive repression of the legionary movement, including the execution of Codreanu and most of the legionary leadership), extensive legal discrimination against the Jews in Romania continued until his abdication and the establishment of the National-Legionary State in September 1940. In fact, just one month before the demise of the royal dictatorship of Carol II, in August 1940, the first racial legislation in Romania was passed by the cabinet of Ion Gigurtu, replicating the Nazi Nuremberg laws.

III. THE HOLOCAUST IN ROMANIA

During its short time in power, the legionary movement demonstrated the extremism and aggressiveness of its anti-Semitism, not only by passing new legislation with an anti-Semitic character, but by the countless abuses committed against the Jewish population. Raids of legionary police on Jewish houses became an everyday occurrence, torture was taken up as a method of extortion, and the legionaries showed their racketeering skills and their greed through the barrel of a gun. “Confiscations of property, forced sales of property at derisory prices, sequestrations, beatings, maltreatments, and medieval punishments such as the pillar of infamy” eventually culminated in the savage pogrom that took place in Bucharest during the legionary rebellion of January 1941, when a total of 125 Jews were killed and thousands of others beaten, tortured and raped throughout the country.

The legionary pogrom in Bucharest represented a tragic prelude to the Romanian Holocaust, in which between “280,000 and 380,000 Romanian and Ukrainian Jews were murdered or died [...] in Romania and the territories under its control”. As Raul
Hilberg noted, “no country, besides Germany, was involved in massacres of Jews on such a scale.” Furthermore, the systematic deportation and killing of Jews was carried out by the Romanian army mostly independently of the Nazi Einsatzgruppe D, with the responsibility for the murder of the Jews in Romania falling “squarely on the Antonescu-led Romanian state”. While the legionary movement played only a minor role in the Holocaust, having been outlawed following the failed coup of January 1941, its leaders either imprisoned or fled to Germany to escape Antonescu’s repression, it is beyond doubt that their anti-Semitic propaganda and street violence during the interwar period was pivotal in desensitising the general population towards the plight of Romanian Jews and making possible the gradual escalation of discriminatory measures into murderous policies.

The mass murder of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews perpetrated by the Antonescu regime is probably the best documented aspect of the history of the Jewish community in Romania. In what follows, this paper will provide a brief summary of the most significant developments in the history of the Holocaust in Romania, while directing the reader interested in more detailed presentations to the vast literature on the subject.

The already existing anti-Semitic legislation was maintained and extended by Marshal Ion Antonescu’s dictatorship after the legionary movement was removed from power following its failed coup; a National Centre for Romanianisation, responsible for the expropriation and ‘nationalisation’ of Jewish property was established on 3 May 1941. However, a marked distinction was already visible in the policy of expropriating Jewish property, between the Jews living within the boundaries of the Old Kingdom of Romania (but including also the southern part of Transylvania that had remained within Romania after the Second Vienna Award of 1940, when Northern Transylvania was transferred to Hungary) and those living in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, the regions that Romania had lost to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940. The policies applied to the latter were always harsher and more extensive than for the former, and this feature would be maintained throughout the war, pervading all aspects of the Holocaust in Romania. As such, commercial and industrial property was confiscated from the Jews in Bessarabia and Bukovina but not from those in the Regat (the Romanian name for the pre-World War I Kingdom of Romania); the former were forced to wear the Star of David whereas the latter were not; ghettos were established in Bessarabia and Bukovina, but not in the Regat; and, perhaps most importantly, while the Jews in the Regat were subject to forced labour (either at their place of domicile, mostly in the case of urban Jews or skilled workers, or in labour camps and battalions), with few exceptions (such as the
well-known case of the Jews of Dorohoi, in southern Bukovina) they were not subject to the deportations to Transnistria, the area between the river Dniester and the Bug where the majority of the victims of the Holocaust perpetrated by the Romanian state perished.

This aspect seems to lend credence to the interpretation of Antonescu’s policies against the Jewish minority as being prompted by his pervasive anti-communism, as well as by his frequent associations of Jews with communism. The Marshal’s frequent statements claiming that Jews were acting as agents of the Soviet Union, his view of the persecutions of the Jews in Bessarabia and Bukovina as retaliations for their support of the Soviet Union in 1940 and their alleged attacks against the retreating Romanian army, as well as his blaming of ‘Jewish commissars’ for the fanaticism of Red Army soldiers and consequently for the massive losses of the Romanian army following its attack on the Soviet Union, seem to indicate that this was one of Antonescu’s justifications for his treatment of what he called ‘eastern Jews’. And while there is general agreement among scholars that Antonescu was much more fervently anti-communist than he was anti-Semitic, there can also be no doubt of his anti-Semitism.

An exclusionary nationalism was among one of Antonescu’s defining characteristics, and one of its unfortunate consequences for the national minorities in Romania was the plan for the ethnic purification of the country that his government devised, and to which Jews, but also other minorities (Roma and Ukrainians), were to fall victim. At the same time, it was precisely Antonescu’s fervent nationalism that led him to flout the demands of Nazi Germany at crucial moments in the history of the alliance between the two countries: from the setting up of the Central Jewish Office in December 1941 according to patterns which allowed for some Jewish intervention and angered the SS commander responsible for Jewish issues in Bucharest, Hauptsturmführer Gustav Richter, to the much more fateful decision to refuse the deportation of Romanian Jews to Poland in the summer of 1942 and even allow emigration to Palestine. It was an odd combination of one of the peculiarities of Romanian anti-Semitism, i.e. the Romanian state’s paternalistic attitude towards what it had defined since the 19th century as ‘its own’ Jews, and of Antonescu’s strong nationalist feelings which made him perceive German pressures as an affront to Romania’s sovereignty, that led to the Marshal’s refusal to participate in the Final Solution, and even to grant safe passage to Hungarian Jews fleeing the deportations from Northern Transylvania. Paradoxically, the same resistance to foreign intervention which had prevented Jewish emancipation in 1878 and had prompted such reluctance to finally agree to it in 1919 was to ensure the survival of more than half of Romania’s Jewish community during the Holocaust, leading
William Oldson to use the unlikely term of ‘providential anti-Semitism’ to describe this paradox.\footnote{71} As a result, approximately 428,000 Jews survived the Holocaust in Romania, the overwhelming majority of them from the Regat and Southern Transylvania, “only slightly less than had been recorded within the same borders before the war, and more than half of Greater Rumania’s total Jewish population”\footnote{72}.

The other half of the Jewish minority in Romania perished at the hands of the Antonescu regime, as a result of actions that were by and large carried out independently of Nazi Germany. The massacres of Jews began immediately after the joint German-Romanian attack on the Soviet Union and the first round-ups (of Jews and communists) were ordered under the pretext of security considerations, to prevent enemy action behind the lines of the advancing Romanian and German armies.\footnote{73} In an exception to the typical pattern of repression against the Jews identified above, the first victims of Antonescu’s wartime dictatorship were the Jews of Iași. While the exact numbers of the victims of what came to be known as the Iași pogrom are disputed, at least 4,000 Jews were shot in the city between 26 and 30 June 1941 by German and Romanian troops (with the involvement of the Romanian Secret Service, the SSI), and 2,713 died during a murderous deportation by train, due to the appalling conditions of transport.\footnote{74}

Mass killings of Jews were perpetrated by the advancing Romanian and German armies in Bessarabia and Bukovina. Estimates indicate that at least 4,000 Jews were murdered in Bukovina (both by army units and by Romanian and Ukrainian civilians) and 12,000 in Bessarabia, half of which were shot by the Romanian army and not by Einsatzgruppe D.\footnote{75} In Odessa, in reprisals ordered by Antonescu for the blowing up of the Romanian military command of the city, in which 61 Romanians and Germans had been killed, approximately 20,000 Jews were shot and their corpses burned.\footnote{76} The mass killings of Jews by the Romanian army were often carried out arbitrarily, without a clear plan, and were consequently often criticised for this by the much more systematic commanders of the Einsatzgruppe D, who also pointed out the extreme cruelty and sadistic nature of the executions carried out by the Romanians.\footnote{77}

While in the cases mentioned above the intention to murder the Jews was clearly discernible, during the deportations of Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina it was the sheer criminal incompetence, the unpreparedness and the extreme callousness of the Romanian military towards the Jews that was to a large extent responsible for the staggering death rate. This was highest in the region of Transnistria, an area between the rivers Dniester and Bug which came under Romanian occupation following an agreement with the German command signed at Tiraspol on 19 August 1941.\footnote{78} The majority of the Jews deported from Bessarabia, Bukovina and
Odessa, as well as a significant number of Roma, were sent to this region, which however was only envisaged as a temporary location, as Antonescu intended to eventually deport all Jews across the Bug, outside Romanian territory. The death toll in this province was the highest of all territories that came under Romanian occupation during the war, representing almost half of the total number of deportees. The Jews were deported on foot, and those who could not keep up with the forced marches (mostly the sick, the elderly and the children) were shot on the spot by Romanian and Ukrainian guards. The complete absence of any concrete logistical plans concerning the deportations, the “herding of Jews into makeshift camps without adequate food or health care”, the lack of winter clothing, the overcrowding of the camps, and a typhus epidemic led to the death of between 105,000 and 120,000 deported Jews due to starvation or disease. The Jews that the Romanian authorities tried to send across the Bug, into German-occupied territory, were shot by the German army. In the absence of food or medicines, the Romanian authorities eventually ordered mass executions of Jews in an attempt to contain the spread of disease. In the areas with a significant German minority, approximately 28,000 Jews were shot by the Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz. Finally, in addition to the executions carried out by army or paramilitary units, many Jews were attacked, robbed and killed by the local population. The total number of victims in Transnistria was between 220,000 and 260,000 Jews, as well as approximately 20,000 Roma.

In the summer of 1942, Antonescu reverted his policy of deportations to Transnistria, just as Nazi Germany began asking for the deportation of the Jews in the Regat and Southern Transylvania as part of the Final Solution. This volte-face which allowed the survival of half of Romania’s Jewish community was partly prompted by the protests raised at this time by some prominent Romanian intellectuals and leaders of the democratic parties, by religious leaders from both the Catholic and the Orthodox churches, by Helen of Romania, the Queen Mother, as well as by Traian Popovici, the mayor of Cernăuți, whose memorandum described in detail the conditions of the Jewish deportees in Transnistria. In addition, some foresight on Antonescu’s part about the fate of the war, concerns about the negative image of Romania among the Western powers, and some degree of opportunism, all juxtaposed to the Marshal’s aforementioned nationalism prompting his opposition to what he saw as a German dictate and interference in the internal affairs of Romania, led to his refusal to submit to the German demands. In spite of German protests, not only were any further deportations of Jews suspended, and repatriations from Transnistria initiated, but emigration to Palestine was allowed – against the payment of sums varying from 200,000 to 500,000 lei (350-875 $) per person.
extremely cynical plan considering the circumstances constituted a precedent for what will become during the communist period in Romania a veritable ‘trade’ between Romania and Israel. Furthermore, the same desire for gain led the Romanian authorities to allow Hungarian Jews safe passage through Romania in 1944, when the Nazis implemented the Final Solution in Hungary. On 23 August 1944, as a result of the rapid advance of the Red Army towards Romania’s border, Marshal Antonescu was deposed by a coup led by King Michael of Romania, and replaced by General Constantin Sănătescu as the leader of a national government. The new government realigned Romania with the Allies and declared war on Germany. The wartime dictatorship responsible for the Holocaust in Romania came to an end.

IV. A PROFITABLE TRADE – THE JEWISH MINORITY IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA

Although the group that carried out the coup leading to the overthrow of Antonescu’s dictatorship contained only few social democrats and communists, already in October 1944 Romania was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence and as a result a communist regime was gradually but firmly installed in the country. This was to prove rather difficult initially, considering the striking lack of support for the Communist Party in interwar Romania, due to a large extent to its membership in the Comintern and resulting advocacy for the break-up of Greater Romania and the joining of the provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the adoption of what was perceived as an ‘anti-national’ line led to a situation where ethnic Romanians represented a minority in the party and ethnic minorities in Romania made up a majority of its members. In turn, this led to the perpetuation of an image of the Communist Party as led by ‘foreigners’, primarily Hungarians and Jews, and of its regime as imposed by a foreign power, the Soviet Union. Such a perception was reinforced by the ubiquitous association of Jews with communism that was characteristic of interwar Romanian anti-Semitism, which, as we saw earlier, constituted a veritable consensus in the country.

As a result, in spite of the official ban on anti-Semitism in Romania after 23 August 1944, and of the perception of Jews as victims of fascism, reinforced by the trials of certain members of the Antonescu regime, including the Marshal himself, for war crimes, anti-Semitism in Romania continued into the post-war period, albeit in a very different form from the pre-war one. At the trials of the Romanian generals who had committed war crimes, their role in the attack on the Soviet Union was emphasised rather than their responsibility for the Holocaust, and the plight of the Jews was often subsumed under the generic one of Soviet citizens. As such, as Raphael Vago argues, just like other countries
in Central and Eastern Europe, “Romanian society did not face its past” and “anti-Semitism reared its ugly head soon after the war, or in fact never lost its appeal”. This aspect became visible during the famine which affected Romania, and particularly the eastern region of Moldova, in 1946, when anti-Semitic accusations about the alleged responsibility of Jewish speculators – reminiscent of interwar anti-Semitism – were widespread. Moreover, the far more common blaming of Jews for the instauration of the communist regime in Romania, supported by a partial emphasis on some prominent figures of the regime, such as Ana Pauker or Alexandru Nicolschi, the Deputy Director and later chief of the Securitate who became notorious for his abuses even outside Romania, represented a significant example of continuity with pre-war anti-Semitism. Such accusations glossed over considerable evidence indicating this was not the case, even after the purges and subsequent ‘Romanianisation’ of the regime that followed in the wake of Stalin’s anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in spite of these setbacks, there is no doubt that the situation of the surviving Jews in Romania improved considerably after 23 August 1944, and that initially there was considerable enthusiasm for the new regime among the Jewish population. In 1946, following the return of the surviving deportees from other countries, the number of Jews in Romania was 420,000, the largest of all countries in the communist bloc except for the Soviet Union. Despite the persistence of anti-Semitism, there were no violent outbursts against the Jewish population in Romania in 1945-1946 as in Hungary, Poland or Slovakia. Moreover, in spite of its shortcomings, the communist regime in Romania did create some favourable conditions for Jewish intellectuals, certainly more so than had ever existed during the interwar period; as a result, as Hary Kuller (himself a representative of this group) argues, the Jewish intelligentsia in Romania thrived under communism, regardless of the numerous frustrations and privations, some shared with the majority population, others specific to the Jewish minority.

At the same time, the efforts at the mass integration of Jews into the new regime, with the help of the Jewish Democratic Committee (Comitetul Democratic Evreiesc, CDE), an organization established in June 1945 with precisely this purpose, largely failed. As a result, the initial enthusiasm of the Jewish minority for the new regime in Romania gradually faded against the backdrop of generalised poverty, aggravated by the currency reform of 1947, which had devastating effects on the private sector of the economy, as well as following the failure of the Romanian state to return Jewish property confiscated during the war. The primary consequence was a pronounced desire to emigrate to the newly established State of Israel, and the story of the Jewish minority in
communist Romania would subsequently be one combining mass emigration with growing (if we accept that it had ever subsided) anti-Semitism and marginalisation, including within the ranks of the Romanian Communist Party. Furthermore, while the post-war Romanian state initially followed the line of Moscow with regards to Jewish emigration (albeit presenting some striking differences from the situation in other Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe), later on it adopted a cynical policy whereby it viewed the Jewish population in Romania as a valuable commodity to be ‘traded’ to Israel in exchange for either goods or foreign currency, a policy that was to some extent reminiscent of Ion Antonescu’s approach to repatriation and emigration between 1942 and 1944.

Until 1948, the Romanian state posed no obstacles to emigration, partly reflecting the Soviet approach to the establishment of Israel as a potential bulwark against the British influence in the Middle East. However, as Israel turned to the United States soon after its establishment, Stalin’s view underwent a complete reversal and Zionism was condemned “as a nationalist, reactionary political movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie” and as a tool of Western imperialism at the same time. Romania immediately followed suit, and while the persecution of Zionists never reached the murderous features it had in the Soviet Union and in other satellite states, the country nevertheless resolutely shut the doors to Jewish emigration in 1948, when other Soviet satellites were still allowing it. Just as the CDE stepped up its attempt to control all Jewish institutions, the constant harassment of Wilhelm Filderman, the leader of the Union of Native Jews in the interwar period and during the war, and Chief Rabbi Alexandru Șafran, both of which had made significant efforts to ensure the survival of the Jewish community in Romania during Antonescu’s regime, eventually led both of them to emigrate. The communist-backed Moses Rosen became the Chief Rabbi of Romania and was tasked with presenting the situation of Jews in Romania in very positive colours abroad, thus playing a similar role to that of Patriarch Justinian Marina in the Romanian Orthodox Church, the largest religious denomination. At the same time, yet another interwar anti-Semitic trope was resurrected by the communist regime: the association of Jews with international capitalism, indicating, as Raphael Vago notes, “more continuity than a break with the pre-war era”.

As a result, by 1949 the CDE was the only remaining legal Jewish organisation in Romania, as the activities of all the other national and international Jewish organisations were officially banned. The CDE was itself disbanded in 1953, in the wake of the ‘Doctors’ Plot’ and the Slansky trial, echoing the anti-Semitic purges in the Soviet Union.

A combination of international pressure from Israel, of the efforts of some of the prominent Jewish members of the state
apparatus (particularly Ana Pauker), and of the tireless activity of Zionist organisations in Romania (despite their official ban) eventually led to the resumption of emigration, translating into the first wave of mass migration from communist Romania to Israel, between 1950 and 1952, when approximately 110,000 Jews left the country. In spite of the very large number of Jews that left Romania, the demand for emigration was actually considerably higher – no less than 220,000 Jews submitted applications for emigration in the first two weeks in spring 1950, when emigration became possible following a two-year ban, and the percentage of the population demanding visas in the larger cities reached up to 80 and even 90%. Already in the course of this first wave of emigration, the Romanian state received both currency and oil-drilling equipment from Israel in exchange for issuing exit visas for Jews in Romania, anticipating the much more explicit ‘trade’ of later years.

It is not a coincidence that the moment when the Romanian state banned Jewish emigration coincided with the fall of Ana Pauker, who was removed from power in the first major purge of the Romanian Communist Party, under charges that emphasised her alleged Jewish nationalism and support for Zionism. This shows on the one hand the significance of her efforts to allow emigration of Jews from Romania to Israel, while marking also the beginning of a shift in the Romanian communist regime that saw the gradual replacement of representatives of national minorities with ethnic Romanians in the leadership of the party. While this did not constitute an anti-Semitic purge of the type witnessed at this time in the Soviet Union (the two other prominent members of the party who were purged, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu, were not Jewish), it did signal the beginnings of a gradual turn towards an ideological orientation that came to be known during the time in power of Nicolae Ceaușescu (1965-1989) as ‘national communism’.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory in 1958, Romania’s policy would move ever further away from Moscow, and the pursuit of an independent policy had its effects on the course of Jewish emigration as well. Following a strict ban on emigration between 1952 and 1958 (coupled with arrests, imprisonments and torture of Zionists in Romania), despite considerable protests from the United States, the communist regime led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej decided to resume it, probably in an attempt to improve its relations with the West, seen at this time as an important trading partner. Moreover, the first item of trade were the Jews themselves – emigration was allowed in exchange for much-needed foreign currency; Henry Jacober, a Jewish businessman based in London, paid the Romanian Securitate cash for exit visas for Jews and non-Jews alike, with rates varying between 4,000 and 6,000 $
for each person. As a result, from 1958 – when emigration was resumed – to 1965, when Dej died and was replaced by Ceaușescu as Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, “107,540 Romanian Jews emigrated to Israel”. During this time, in addition to the issuing of exit visas in exchange for cash, a barter of Jews (and non-Jews) for agricultural equipment and livestock was also under way, allegedly prompted by Nikita Khrushchev’s advice to Dej to avoid direct cash exchanges, as these would damage Romania’s reputation if proven abroad. The extent of the operation was described by General Ion Mihai Pacepa, the famous defector from communist Romania, as follows: “by the end of 1964, the Ministry of the Interior had become the largest meat producer in Romania. It owned chicken farms, turkey farms, and pig farms producing tens of thousands of animals a year, several cattle farms, and other farms with some 100,000 head of sheep – all with automated slaughterhouses, refrigerated storehouses, and packing plants. [...] All of these farms and food processing plants were paid for by Henry Jacober, in exchange for exit visas for Romanian Jews.”

After taking power, following initial outrage at what he perceived as a potential damage to Romania’s international prestige, Ceaușescu soon resumed the trade, reverting however back “from the ‘ancient age of barter’ to ‘modern foreign trade’” and asking for “cold dollars”. Furthermore, his instructions were that the amount of cash to be paid for each Jew was to be made dependent “on age, education, profession, and family status”; consequently, the sums varied between 2,000 and 50,000 $ per person, reaching up to 250,000 $ in certain cases. An emigration that had slowed down in 1965-1968 soon picked up pace again, stabilizing according to the figures provided by Radu Ioanid at an average annual rate of 1,997 Jews between 1969 and 1989, amounting to a total of 40,577 Jews who emigrated to Israel during this period. The same type of exchange was extended in the 1970s to include the German minority in the country, after West Germany discovered the trade with Israel, so that Ceaușescu could state by the middle of that decade that “oil, Jews, and Germans are our best export commodities.” By the time of the general census of the population carried out in 1992, there were 8,955 Jews left in Romania, out of the approximately 420,000 that had survived the Holocaust. And while Ioanid cites an anonymous high-ranking Israeli official who remarked that “the agreements with Romania worked to the satisfaction of both sides”, he also notes that others consider it tantamount to “buying slaves”; there is certainly some truth to both these views.

In addition to the sheer greed that prompted Ceaușescu’s callous sale of the Jews and Germans in Romania, and to his seeking of favour with the United States and the West in general, another motivating factor was
according to Dennis Deletant his fervent nationalism that saw the emigration of ethnic minorities as facilitating “the process of creating a homogeneous Romania based on the majority Romanian element”. According to Dennis Deletant his fervent nationalism that saw the emigration of ethnic minorities as facilitating “the process of creating a homogeneous Romania based on the majority Romanian element”. Accompanying the national communism of the Ceauşescu regime was a gradual rehabilitation of Marshal Ion Antonescu, increasingly presented as a ‘patriot’ and a “tragic figure”. At the same time, in the attempt to re-fashion a patriotic national history, during Ceauşescu’s time in power there was almost complete silence on the deportation and the murder of the Jews in Romania during the war. As can be expected under these circumstances, there was a marked increase in the intensity of anti-Semitism during the Ceauşescu regime, and one that established a direct continuity with post-communist Romania.

In the party press, as well as in the pages of numerous publications issued by Ceauşescu’s ‘court poets’ (among which was Corneliu Vadim Tudor, who would become better known in post-communist Romania as the leader of the far right Greater Romania Party – Partidul România Mare, PRM), anti-Semitic statements became increasingly frequent and ever more extreme. The publication of the complete works of Mihai Eminescu – the ‘national poet’ – in 1980, including his anti-Semitic articles characteristic of late 19th century Romanian anti-Semitism, prompted the protest of Rabbi Moses Rosen, as the texts were not accompanied by any explanatory note regarding their anti-Semitism. In the same year, “the Bucharest cultural weekly Săptămâna [The Week] published a strikingly anti-Semitic editorial, entitled ‘Ideals’, written (but not signed) by Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Exemplifying the protochronism that was typical of nationalist ideology during Ceauşescu’s regime, the editorial stated that “a nation can only build itself through the people of its localities who have been born here for hundreds and thousands of years” and coupled the positive representation of these ‘authentic’ Romanians with an outright rejection of “visitors eager for gain … clad in foul-smelling tartans, Herods foreign to the interests of this nation who … make people dizzy with their speculator [gheşefiar] patriotism. We have no need for lazy prophets, for Judases who lack the dimension of Romanian self-sacrifice in their blood.”

Such statements were reminiscent of the anti-Semitic ultra-nationalism of the interwar legionary movement, and, as Michael Shafir points out, this type of discourse had never been employed officially in Romania since the end of World War II. The scandal around the editorial and the ensuing Western protests led to subsequent retractions of some of these statements by the editorial board of the newspaper, as well as to Ceauşescu’s first explicit condemnation of anti-Semitism, in a speech given in April 1981, and a reiteration of this position in January 1982. However, his condemnation
represented little more than a declarative stance meant to placate the West, with no real consequences that would counteract the growing anti-Semitism in the country. Acts of vandalism against Jewish cemeteries and synagogues multiplied, going unpunished as the regime was unconcerned with abuses carried out against religious communities. Furthermore, the religious persecution that affected all denominations in Romania also targeted Judaism: rabbis were frequently harassed, arrested and subjected to abuses by the Securitate, and even instructions for the revision of prayer books were issued, a measure that, as Vladimir Tismăneanu notes, had never previously been adopted in the past, not even in the notoriously anti-Semitic interwar Romania.\(^{135}\)

**V. A CASE OF ANTI-SEMITISM WITHOUT JEWS: ‘RADICAL CONTINUITY’ AND ‘RADICAL RETURN’ IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA**

The political evolution of post-communist Romania amply demonstrates the importance of the country’s history for understanding its present situation, and nowhere is this aspect more visible than in the persistence of anti-Semitic attitudes in a country where, as shown above, the Jewish minority amounted to no more than 0.03% of the total population in 1992. The collapse of a hated regime entailed a substantial reconsideration of the past, translating into a resurgence of nationalism, partly due to the valorisation of the interwar period as a ‘golden age’ of Romanian history (brutally interrupted by the instauration of communism) and partly by the continuation into the post-communist period of the nationalist line of Ceauşescu. This dichotomy prompted the excellent distinction that Michael Shafir – one of the most prolific analysts of the radical right in contemporary Romania – made between organisations of ‘radical return’ and ‘radical continuity’ respectively.\(^{136}\) At the same time, although the two positions share a strong nationalist outlook, the distinctions between them account for the different manifestations of exclusionary nationalism – and implicitly also anti-Semitism – in contemporary Romania. Of these, the two positions that Shafir has identified as ‘selective negationism’ and ‘comparative trivialisation’ are perhaps the most characteristic features of post-communist Romanian anti-Semitism (although they are by no means specific to Romania, but are instead encountered in various forms in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe).\(^{137}\)

Paradoxically perhaps, the prevailing anti-communism in Romania after 1989 did not preclude the continuation of many of the ideological features of the Ceauşescu regime into the post-communist period, nor indeed of many of the former collaborators, affiliated intellectuals and second-rank bureaucrats of the regime, who re-invented themselves as anti-communist ‘democratic’ politicians. In
the absence of an organised dissidence similar to the ones in Poland or Czechoslovakia, these were the politicians that took centre stage after the collapse of communism, bringing with them the legacy of anti-Semitic nationalism that had been characteristic of Romania under Ceauşescu. Furthermore, in their attempt to redefine themselves as anti-communist, politicians of this ilk frequently emphasised their nationalism. As such, it should come as no surprise that a cult of Marshal Antonescu that had already begun in incipient and veiled form during the years of Ceauşescu’s dictatorship was to erupt into Romanian public space after its collapse.

Already in 1990, two organisations bearing the name of the wartime leader of Romania, ‘The Pro-Marshal Antonescu League’ and the ‘Marshal Antonescu League’ were established, both aiming at the juridical rehabilitation of Antonescu, which they formally demanded in 1992. While the former organisation was set up by war veterans, the latter was established following the veterans’ refusal to cooperate with two persons they perceived as tainted by their collaboration with the communist regime: Iosif Constantin Drăgan – a Romanian exile who was a former member of the interwar legionary movement as well as a collaborator of the Securitate from the early 1950s – and the aforementioned Corneliu Vadim Tudor, one of Ceauşescu’s ‘court poets’. In addition to demanding a posthumous appeal of Antonescu’s trial with the purpose of annulling the sentences passed at his post-war trial, the ‘Marshal Antonescu League’ also announced that it will be pressing charges against King Michael of Romania (as shown above, one of the leading actors in the coup that led to Antonescu’s overthrow and his subsequent trial for war crimes and treason), for “the arrest, judgment, sentence to death and assassination of Marshal Ion Antonescu, as well as for subjecting Romania to the domination of totalitarian Soviet bolshevism”. This odd accusation had little to do with historical reality, however, and much more to do with contemporary politics. Simply put, the issue of Antonescu’s rehabilitation was used as a political weapon, in a triple sense: as an ideological tool directed against ethnic minorities in Romania (particularly Jews, Hungarians and Roma), a feature which was a direct continuation of Ceauşescu’s approach to the matter; as a means to divert public attention from the outstanding issues of government corruption, as well as from the communist past of many of its members; and, finally but perhaps most importantly, as a means to undermine the credibility of King Michael of Romania, who, while not having any political aspirations of his own, made clear his opposition to the ruling coalition of 1992-1996 (including the two most significant formations of ‘radical continuity’, the Greater Romania Party – Partidul România Mare, PRM – and the Romanian National Unity Party – Partidul Unităţii Naţionale a Românilor, PUNR –
alongside one of the ‘successor parties’ of the Romanian Communist Party, the Party of Social Democracy of Romania, Partidul Democrației Sociale din România, PDSR) and his support for the opposition, consisting mainly of the two historical democratic parties in Romania, the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party.  

At the same time, the push for the rehabilitation of Antonescu was also multifaceted, and Michael Shafir distinguishes at least three types of groups associated with it. The first two consist on the one hand of a large segment of the population, uninformed of Antonescu’s wartime crimes and the Holocaust in Romania, and driven primarily by nationalism and anti-communism (a 1995 survey showed that 62% of Romanians had a “good opinion” of Antonescu, and, although the number has significantly declined since, opinion polls carried out in 2012 show that he is still “predominantly viewed as a positive figure in the country’s history”); and on the other by the war veterans who had not personally witnessed the genocide perpetrated by Antonescu’s regime and the victims of the communist regime, prompted by genuine belief in the Marshal’s innocence. These two largely uninformed categories were manipulated by a third one, acting as the driving force behind the rehabilitation (or, in the case of PDSR, allowing this process in the attempt to appease its extremist coalition partners, PRM and PUNR), whose approach to the matter, as shown above, was primarily political and utilitarian. While the attempts at juridical rehabilitation were unsuccessful, numerous commemorative ceremonies honouring Antonescu took place in post-communist Romania, sometimes attended by representatives of the government or prominent officers in the Romanian Army, including two occasions (in 1991 and again in 1999) when the Romanian Senate honoured him with a moment of silence. In addition, by 2004 “between six and eight statues had been erected in memory of the marshal, 25 streets and squares had been renamed after him, and in Iaşi even the ‘Heroes’ Cemetery’ carried the dictator’s name”. An artistic film directed by Sergiu Nicolaescu (the most prominent director associated with the series of historical epic films produced during the Ceauşescu regime that glorified Romania’s past), as well as two documentaries claiming ‘historical objectivity’ also put forth a positive image of Antonescu. Finally, in the course of his two bids for the Presidency of Romania, in 1996 and 2000, Corneliu Vadim Tudor likened himself to the Marshal and promised to be “a second Antonescu”.  

The attempts at the posthumous rehabilitation of Ion Antonescu, associated primarily with the organisations of ‘radical continuity’ (i.e. having both ideological and personal links with the national-communism of Ceauşescu’s regime), are unfortunately not the only manifestations of anti-Semitism in post-communist Romania, despite being perhaps the most visible ones. Alongside the
parties of ‘radical continuity’, which initially achieved significant electoral success, culminating in Tudor’s entering the second round in the presidential elections of 2000 and receiving 33.17% of the vote, a plethora of movements, parties and foundations emerged in the 1990s that rejected the communist legacy altogether and looked instead for a model to the interwar legionary movement. Frequently opposed to the parties of ‘radical continuity’, these were the organisations that Shafir groups together under the term ‘radical return’ and which, despite remaining on the fringes of Romanian politics to date, are nevertheless striking due to the radicalism of the discourse they adopt, reminiscent of interwar fascism, and their explicit glorification of legionary leaders, such as Codreanu, Ion Moţa or Vasile Marin.

The most visible examples of this orientation in the 1990s were the Movement for Romania (Mişcarea Pentru România – MPR, whose very name recalled the colloquial designation of the interwar legionary movement, often simply referred to as Mişcarea, ‘the movement’) and the Party of National Right (Partidul Dreapta Naţională – PDN). Their political programmes and organisational structures (in small cells of three to fifteen members recalling the legionary ‘nests’ in the case of the MPR, setting up a paramilitary organisation known as the Civic Guards in the case of PDN) recalled the legionary movement, whose legacy was explicitly acknowledged by both organisations. While both organisations disappeared by the end of the 1990s, due to internal dissensions among its members and scandals involving their leaderships, another political party established in 1993 as Partidul Pentru Patrie (For the Patria Party) changed its name in 2011 to Partidul Totul Pentru Țară (All for the Country Party), which was the exact denomination of the political organisation of the legionary movement in the interwar period. Finally, another radical right organisation, Noua Dreaptă (New Right), whose name is derived from that of the homonymous publication issued by PDN in the 1990s, was established in 2000 as yet another group that adopts the legionary legacy and that is quite visible both in the public space and in the online media.

The proliferation of radical right organisations and parties in post-communist Romania needs to be understood in the context of the reluctance of the successive governments after 1989 to tackle the issue and take decisive measures against the dissemination of material with a fascist or anti-Semitic character. The few and hesitant steps taken in this direction have almost always been prompted by international protests or as part of the conditionality packages for accession into the EU and NATO. During his term in office (1996-2000), President Emil Constantinescu was the first to acknowledge Romanian responsibility for the genocide perpetrated against the Jews, albeit qualifying his statement by insisting on
the fact that Romania had also refused to take part in the Final Solution. On 13 March 2002, the government led by Prime Minister Adrian Năstase issued Ordinance 31/2002, the first item of legislation in post-communist Romania that outlawed organizations of “fascist, racist and xenophobic character” that promote ideas “on ethnic, racist or religious grounds”. Statues of Antonescu were taken down, streets bearing his name were renamed, and, to respond to the PRM block of the Ordinance in Parliament and the party’s denial that genocide had indeed taken place in Romania, an international commission led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Elie Wiesel was appointed to study the Holocaust in Romania. Although the findings of the commission were unequivocal, it took four years for the decree that banned anti-Semitic propaganda to become law. Moreover, in spite of the existence of this legislation, to date no person or extremist organisation has been condemned under this law. On 9 October 2013 (the Holocaust Memorial Day in Romania), the leader of the National Liberal Party, Crin Antonescu (no connection with the wartime dictator) announced that he put forth a new legislative proposal that would modify the 2006 law to explicitly include a ban against actions, organisations and symbols with a legionary character. To date, the law has not been promulgated.

In turn, this reluctance of the Romanian state authorities to deal with cases of Holocaust denial or legionary propaganda has to be understood against the background of a public opinion that, as recent polls show, is still swayed by anti-Semitic, racist and xenophobic stereotypes, although the incipient Holocaust education in Romania has led to some notable decrease in anti-Semitic attitudes. Results however indicate that this decrease was accompanied by an intensification of anti-Roma discourse (reminiscent of interwar anti-Semitism in its virulence and pervasiveness), and there is general agreement among authors writing on the topic that the Roma minority has replaced the ‘Jew’ to become the new significant ‘Other’ that is the target of most hate speech in contemporary Romania. At the same time, despite the gradual decline in popularity of right-wing formations, several intellectuals (such as Gheorghe Buzatu, Paul Goma or Ion Coja – although the last one can be better described using the terminology of the Final Report on the Holocaust in Romania as an “integral negationist”) have become notorious for their publications which put forth a ‘selective Holocaust denial’ (not denying the Holocaust as such, but the Romanian involvement in it, and insisting that it was perpetrated only by the Nazis) or attempt its ‘comparative trivialisation’ through a ‘competitive martyrdom’ that juxtaposes it to the Gulag. In fact, as mentioned above, and similar to the situation in many Central and Eastern European countries – where the acceptance of the notion that Jews are responsible for communism is, as Shafir
notes, “nearly axiomatic”\textsuperscript{162} – these are the two main lines of argumentation characteristic of post-communist anti-Semitism in Romania.

They are not, however, the only ones, and Michael Shafir identifies six types of anti-Semitism in post-communist Romania, many of which are quite likely to be encountered elsewhere as well: 1) “self-exculpatory nostalgic anti-Semitism”, professed by the former members of the legionary movement and the organisations belonging to the category of ‘radical return’; 2) “self-propelling anti-Semitism”, corresponding to the parties and personalities of ‘radical continuity’, for which anti-Semitic prejudice is instrumental in their quest for political power; 3) “neo-populist mercantile anti-Semitism”, where this form of prejudice is used as a “merchandise to promote personal and/or party interests”, without being central to the ideology or belief system of the respective person or organisation, a feature which distinguishes this category from the previous one;\textsuperscript{163} 4) “utilitarian anti-Semitism”, encompassing “the occasional exploitation of anti-Semitic prejudice for the needs of the hour by politicians who, by and large, are probably not anti-Semitic”; 5) “reactive anti-Semitism”, encompassing the public figures who engage in ‘competitive martyrdom’ between the Holocaust and the Gulag; 6) “vengeance anti-Semitism”, denoting “the simplest and at the same time most ancient form of anti-Semitism: simple hatred of the Jews for whatever they do or refrain from doing”, of which the aforementioned Ion Coja is perhaps the most notorious contemporary example.\textsuperscript{164} Allowing for significant overlaps and crossovers among the aforementioned categories, and noting that the first one, of apologists of the legionary movement, fits firmly within the last, albeit representing a particular case, Shafir’s typology appears justified, and the examples he provides demonstrate that all these different forms of anti-Semitism are indeed present in post-communist Romania. What this shows, in spite of the recent relative decline in anti-Semitic attitudes registered among the population by opinion polls, is that anti-Semitism is unfortunately still present in contemporary Romania, despite the fact that the Jewish community in the country is now minute.

\section*{VI. CONCLUSION}

According to the latest census, conducted in 2011, only 3271 persons (out of a total population of 20,121,641 people, or 0.016% of the population) identified themselves as Jewish by ethnicity and 3292 persons declared themselves of the Mosaic faith.\textsuperscript{165} In practice, this means that a majority of the people who still hold anti-Semitic prejudices in contemporary Romania are not very likely to ever encounter a real Jewish person. For those inclined to see some connection between anti-Semitism and the presence of a real Jewish community in a territory, this aspect represents decisive proof that the former can
thrive in the absence of actual Jews, based as it is on an imaginary representation of ‘the Jew’ that is nevertheless all too real in its consequences. The persistence of anti-Semitic attitudes considering the extremely small size of the Jewish minority in contemporary Romania thus shows that anti-Semitism, rather than being based on any objective characteristics of the Jewish community, is much more of a projection corresponding to the fears and fantasies of the anti-Semites themselves.\(^{166}\) As I have argued elsewhere,\(^{167}\) simply put, it says a lot more about the Romanians than it does about the Jews.

At the same time, a comprehensive survey of anti-Semitism in Romania from the 19\(^{th}\) century until the present day, despite the shortcomings associated with attempting such an endeavour within the scope of a short article, does emphasise some of the patterns of continuity that emerge with regards to its evolution, beyond the relatively obvious links with the interwar period or Ceauşescu’s national communism. It appears thus that a relatively small number of anti-Semitic intellectuals were often able in the course of the country’s history to mobilise an indifferent or apathetic public opinion towards adopting a discriminatory or even exclusionary stance, albeit with different likelihoods of success that were typically more dependent on the crises affecting the country than on any demographic or socio-economic patterns corresponding to the Jewish minority. It also becomes apparent, particularly in Romania’s recent history, that pre-existing prejudice can often be exacerbated by a considerable dose of opportunism, and that not all anti-Semites are necessarily ideological, or that their ideological stances may change as a function of perceived political opportunity structures – leading even someone like Corneliu Vadim Tudor, with a long personal history of anti-Semitism, to suddenly declare himself philo-Semitic for political gain.\(^{168}\) Finally, at different times in Romania’s history, from the Congress of Berlin through the Paris Peace Conference and to the process of accession to EU and NATO structures, international conditionality has acted as the driving force prompting the improvement of the legislation relevant to the Jewish minority in the country. However, while such international pressures were undoubtedly positive and beneficial not only for the Jews in the country, but also for Romania’s record of human and minority rights in general, it is also clear that they were frequently only half-heartedly and reluctantly accepted by Romanian politicians, and that the existing legal framework guaranteeing the rights of the Jewish minority (and other minority groups) in the country represents a necessary but not a sufficient step towards ensuring their effective protection from discrimination and prejudice.
Endnotes

1 This is an expanded and revised version of a previous paper published in German: Raul Cârstocea, ‘Historisches Erbe und Gegenwart des rumänischen Antisemitismus’, Europäische Rundschau, 42(2) (2014), 83-106.
4 Neagu Djuvara, Între Orient şi Occident. Țările române la începutul epocii moderne (Between Orient and Occident. The Romanian Principalities at the Beginning of the Modern Era), (București 1995), 179. Wallachia and Moldova were the two principalities that would unite in 1859 to form the Kingdom of Romania. The denomination ‘Moldova’ included at this time both the omonymous present-day region of Romania and the contemporary Republic of Moldova, as up until the modern period the two were part of the same territorial entity.
5 Carol Iancu, Jews in Romania 1866-1918: From Exclusion to Emancipation (New York 1996), 77.
7 Dinu Bălan, Naţional, naţionalism, xenofobie şi antisemitism în societatea românească modernă (1831-1866) (National, Nationalism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism in Modern Romanian Society) (Iaşi 2006), 411.
8 Iancu, Jews in Romania, 25.
10 Bălan, Naţional, naţionalism, xenofobie şi antisemitism, 416.
11 Iancu, Jews in Romania, 35. The union of the principalities, opposed by all Great Powers except for France at the Congress of Paris, was eventually accomplished through a political subterfuge, i.e. the double election of Alexandru Ioan Cuza as prince in both Moldova and Wallachia, leading to a personal union which was formalised in 1862, when the country became known as Romania. See Robert W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians from Roman Times to the Completion of Unity, (NP 1963), 243-268.
12 ‘Constituţiune’ (Constitution), Monitorul Oficial (The Official Monitor – the official press organ of the Romanian state), 1 June 1866.
15 For the cases of Germany, Austria and Hungary see e.g. Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction; Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (Cambridge MA, 1988); Raphael Patai, The Jews of Hungary: History, Culture, Psychology, (Detroit 1996). For a comparison between the situation in Hungary and the one in Romania, see Raul Cârstocea, ‘Uneasy Twins? The Entangled Histories of Jewish Emancipation and Anti-Semitism in Romania and Hungary, 1866-1913’, Slovo 21 (2009), 64-85.
17 Iancu, Jews in Romania, 95.
18 See Constantin Iordachi, ‘The Unyielding Boundaries of Citizenship: The Emancipation of ‘Non-Citizens in Romania, 1866-1918’, European Review of History 8 (2001), 157-186 (170). Even if all conditions had been met, each individual case of naturalisation had to be approved by Parliament with a two-thirds majority of the vote. Article 8, Royal Decree Law no. 2186/1879, Monitorul Oficial, 25 October 1879. As a result, in 1913, besides the 883 veterans of the war of 1877, the total number of naturalisations after the Berlin Congress was 529 persons. Carol Iancu, Emanciparea evreilor din România (1913-1919) (The Emancipation of the Jews in Romania), Bucureşti 1998, 51.
19 See Leon Volovici, Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s. (Oxford 1991), 6-20; Armin Heinen, Legiunea ‘Arhangelul Mihai’: o contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional (The ‘Legion of the Archangel Michael’: A Contribution to the Problem of International Fascism), (Bucureşti 2006), 70-90;


28 Leonida Colescu, *Analiza rezultatelor recensământului general al populaţiei României din 1899* (The Analysis of the Results of the 1899 General Census of the Population of Romania). (Bucureşti 1944), 85.


31 For the Jews in Greater Romania, as the enlarged interwar state is typically referred to, this was a particularly salient issue, since all the Jews living in the newly acquired territories already enjoyed full civil and political rights. See Hausleitner, ‘Antisemitism in Romania’, 204-205.


34 *Ibid.* This also meant that the Jews’ proportion of the population in the new provinces was much higher than the national average – 7.2% in Bessarabia or even 10.9% in Bukovina, a figure that is closer to the demographic pattern in interwar Poland. Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe*, 179.


41 For an excellent account of this project, involving extensive reform of the education system, and its effects on student anti-Semitism, see Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation-Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930*, Ithaca 1995.


45 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, 271-272.

46 As mentioned earlier, Codreanu’s activity was marked from the very beginning by violent actions. These escalated in the course of the 1920s, when he assassinated the Iaşi police prefect, Constantin Manciu, in retaliation for his persecution of the nationalist students. His acquittal by a nationalist jury brought him national popularity. See Ibid, 280-287; Cărstocea, The Role of Anti-Semitism, 51-58; CNSAS, Fund P, File 11784 (18), 174.

47 Hausleitner, ‘Antisemitism in Romania’, 207.

48 ‘Lege pentru utilizarea personalului românesc în întreprinderi’ (Law for the Use of Romanian Personnel in Enterprises), Monitorul Oficial, 16 July 1934.

49 See Cărstocea, The Role of Anti-Semitism.

50 Ibid, 152-188.


53 See Volovici, Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism; Zigu Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties, Boulder 1999. By the late 1930s, the exceptions to this pattern, i.e. non-Jewish intellectuals who remained at least neutral to the ‘Jewish issue’, were very few indeed, notable among them the case of Eugen Ionescu.

54 Stanley Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, Madison 1995, 275-277; Heinen, Legiunea ‘Arhanghelul Mihail’, 357. Heinen actually shows that if one considers it proportionally to the population and before taking power, its membership (1.5% of the population in 1937) was higher than that of both the NSDAP (1.3% in January 1933) and the Italian PNF (0.7% in December 1921).

55 In the 1937 general elections, the political representative of the legionary movement, the ‘All for the Country’ party, came third, obtaining 15.58% of the vote; the anti-Semitic National-Christian Party led by A.C. Cuza and Octavian Goga came fourth, with 9.15%. Ioan Scurtu et al., eds., Ideologie şi formaţii de dreapta în România, Vol. IV (1934-1938) (Right-wing Ideology and Movements in Romania), Bucureşti 2003, 376.

56 Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (The National Central Historical Archives, henceforth ANIC), Fond Ministerul Propagandei Naţionale (henceforth Fund MPN), File 27/1937, 40-47.

57 Decree Law Nr. 169 / 1938, Monitorul Oficial, 22 January 1938.


59 Decree Law Nr. 2650 / 1940, Monitorul Oficial, 9 August 1940.


62 Ibid, 381.

63 Cited in Ibid, 382.

64 Ibid.


67 See Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 106-229.

68 Ibid, 128, 141.

Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 121, 205-229.

William Oldson, A Providential Anti-Semitism, especially 1-11. One of the survivors of the Holocaust in Romania that Oldson quotes in his study formulated his explanation in the following terms: “We were their Jews. If any one was going to kill us, it would be them. And they didn’t choose to.” Ibid, 11.


Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 130.

Ibid, pp. 130-137. While the number of victims who died on the ‘death trains’ was established with accuracy, the figures for the Jews who were murdered in the city vary greatly: from the minimum of 4,000 identified by German diplomats in Bucharest (cited by Deletant) to a number between 8,000 and 12,000 mentioned by Radu Ioanid, ‘The Antonescu Era’, in Braham (ed.), The Tragedy of Romanian Jewry, 144, and finally to “more than 14,000” in Ancel, Preludiul la asasinat, 11.


The number of Jews killed in Odessa is also subject to debate, and the figure of 20,000 represents a minimum. See Alexander Dallin, Odessa, 1941-1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory under Foreign Rule, Iaşi, Oxford and Portland 1998, 74.


The territory had never been part of Romania, and of a total population of approximately 2.5 millions, ethnic Romanians made up a mere 10% (290,000), a similar number with that of the Jews (300,000), with the majority of inhabitants being Ukrainians and Russians. Another significant minority for the history of the region during World War II was the German one (125,000). Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 167.


With very few exceptions (such as that of Nicolae Melinescu, the senior officer at the Bogdanovka camp, who refused to follow the order to exterminate the 48,000 Jews at the camp), these orders were carried out by the Romanian army, with the help of local Ukrainian police forces. According to Dennis Deletant, “the record of bestiality shown by the Romanian authorities at Bogdanovka, Domanovka and Akmechet [the largest camps in Transnistria] ranks alongside the most horrific acts of mass butchery carried out during the war. This was a solely Romanian affair. The part played by the Germans was largely that of spectators.” Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 180-182 (182).

Ibid, 183.

Ibid, 171.

Ibid, 162-165, 205-212.


Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 242-245.

Veiga, Istoria ‘Gărzii de Fier’, 222. This led to a situation whereby the Communist Party was banned since 1924, forced to operate as an underground organization and one that was subject to intense surveillance by the Siguranţa, the interwar secret police. As a result, in 1940 the Romanian Communist Party counted no more than 4,210 members, a number which dropped to about 1,000 as a result of the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union, and of Northern Transylvania by Hungary. See Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-1965, London 1999, 1-33, especially 22-23.

Ibid, 7-10.

Hausleitner, ‘Anti-Semitism in Romania’, 211.


In spite of these accusations, Jewish organisations distributed food to the affected population, both Jewish and Romanian. Hausleitner, ‘Anti-Semitism in Romania’, 212.

See Comisia Prezidenţială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România (Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, Raport Final (Final Report), Bucureşti 2006, 530, 551. The report, known
also as ‘The Tismaneanu Report’ (as historian Vladimir Tismaneanu was President of the Commission), notes that the percentage of Jews in the state apparatus, including the Securitate, only reached up to 5.5%.


94 Vago, ‘The Unexpected Cosmopolitans’, 494.

95 Hary Kuller, ‘Inteligenta evreiască în anii comunistului local. Considerații preliminare și studiu de caz’ (The Jewish Intelligentsia in the Years of Local Communism. Preliminary Considerations and Case Study), in Liviu Rotman et al. (eds.), Noi perspective în istoriografia evreilor din România (New Perspectives in the Historiography of Jews in Romania), București 2010, 168-192.

96 Vago, ‘The Unexpected Cosmopolitans’, 492.


100 Levy, Ana Pauker, 163.


102 Comisia Prezidențială, Raport Final, 554-555.

103 Vago, ‘The Unexpected Cosmopolitans’, 494.


107 Levy, Ana Pauker, 173.


110 Ibid, 163-182.

111 Vago, ‘The Unexpected Cosmopolitans’, 503; Hausleitner, ‘Anti-Semitism in Romania’, 215-218. Mentioning the cases of many Jews who occupied very important party positions even under Ceaușescu, Mariana Hausleitner states that “one cannot speak unequivocally of a removal of Jewish functionaries even if at this time many young Romanians, including Ceaușescu, rapidly ascended the rungs of the party apparatus” (218).

112 Comisia Prezidențială, Raport Final, 558-562.

113 Ioanid, The Ransom of the Jews, 75-77.


115 Ioanid, The Ransom of the Jews, 93.

116 Ibid, 84.


118 Ioanid, The Ransom of the Jews, 95.

119 Pacepa, Red Horizons, 75.

120 Ioanid, The Ransom of the Jews, 94, 146.

121 Ibid, 141-147.

122 Pacepa, Red Horizons, 73.

123 Institutul Național de Statistică (The National Institute of Statistics), ‘Populația după etnie la recensământele din perioada 1930-2002, pe județe’ (The Population According to Ethnicity During the Period 1930-2002, by County), 2. At: <http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t1.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2014). Of the total population recorded in the 1992 census, of 22,810,035 persons, Jews thus represented 0.03%. However, since no data is available for the period 1990-1992, when there were no more restrictions to Jewish emigration, it is difficult to estimate how many Jews left Romania in the first years after the collapse of communism.

124 Ioanid, The Ransom of the Jews, 165-166.


Comisia Prezidenţială, Raport Final, 563.

Ibid.


Compare the statement above with the view of the Romanian nation put forth by the interwar leader of Romania’s fascist movement, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: “All the other nations around us have come out of somewhere and settled on the land they live in. [...] Only one nation did not come from anywhere. That nation is us. We were born in the dawn of time on this land, together with the oaks and the firs.” Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Pentru legionari (For My Legionaries), Sibiu 1936, 92-93.


Comisia Prezidenţială, Raport Final, 564-566.


Shafir, ‘Reabilitarea postcomunistă a mareşalului Antonescu’, 409-411.


Cited in Ibid, 410.


Shafir, ‘Reabilitarea postcomunistă a mareşalului Antonescu’, 405-409.


Despite the fact that the party ran in the 2012 local elections using the interwar legionary symbols and colour, the Bucharest Court has rejected in June 2013 the request of the Prosecutor’s Office to ban the party. Andrei Muraru, ‘De ce trebuie scos legionarismul în afara legii’ (Why ‘legionarism’ must be outlawed), Observer Cultural 695, 18 October 2013. At: http://www.observatorcultural.ro/De-ce-trebuie-scos-legionarismul-in-afara-legii*articleID_29299-articles_details.html> (Accessed: 2 April 2014).


Ibid, 197.


Muraru, ‘De ce trebuie scos legionarismul în afara legii’.

Horațiu Pepine, ‘Interdicție explicită pentru cultul mișcării legionare’ (Explicit Interdiction for the Cult of the Legionary Movement), Deutsche Welle Romania, 9 October 2013. At: <http://www.dw.de/interdic%C5%A3ie-explicit%C4%83-pentru-cultul-mi%C5%9Fc%C4%83rii-legendare/a-17147448> (Accessed: 2 April 2014).


Shafir, ‘Rotten Apples, Bitter Pears’, 171.

One example of this category is that of George (Gigi) Becali and his New Generation Party (Partidul Noua Generație – PNG); the party has included at various times notorious anti-Semites within its ranks, and Becali has made occasional use of slogans borrowed from the legionary movement, as well as uttering frequent positive references to it and its religiosity. Neither the party nor Becali himself could however be considered to belong to the category of ‘radical return’, and his anti-Semitism is just as inconsistent as the remainder of his ideological orientation, subject to change as a function of the prevailing political environment. Ibid, 159-164.


Given the small size of the Jewish community in Romania, Corneliu Vadim Tudor turned his attention to conspiracy theories involving “international plots […] led by the ‘Jewish Mafia’, repeatedly denounced for attempts to take over Romania (and indeed the world) through devious financial scheming”. Cinpoeș, Nationalism and Identity. 119. Ion Coja provided a yet more fantastic conspiracy scenario in which 450,000 Jews had allegedly secretly received Romanian citizenship after 1990, as part of a secret plan to establish a new Palestine, which he refers to as ‘Project Israel in Romania’. These allegations represent nothing but an absurd adaptation to contemporary realities of a conspiracy theory that the legionary movement was putting forth during the interwar period. Shafir, ‘Rotten Apples, Bitter Pears’, 176-178.


In November 2003, Tudor surprised the Romanian media with the following volte-face: “Time has come to repair a great injustice done to me, which, in the past few years, has been sustained and spread by Ion Iliescu himself: I am not anti-Semitic, I am philo-Semitic. The criticism I occasionally addressed to some Jews were polemics and literary
lampoons – which I now regret – and nothing more.” Cited in Cinpoes, *Nationalism and Identity*, 150. He later followed up on this statement with more gestures meant to demonstrate his ‘philo-Semitism’.
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