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Welcome from Editor

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume VIII, Issue 5 (October 2014) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States).

Now in its eighth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has almost 4,500 regular subscribers and many more occasional readers and visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by external referees while its Research Notes and other content are subject to internal editorial review.

In this issue, you can find Daniel Koehler's overview of more than 50 years of right-wing extremism in the German Federal Republic, based on a new database. Two articles deal with media and (counter-)terrorism while the opening article by Assaf Moghadam and his colleagues looks at terrorist organisations' use of violence other than terrorism. A Research Note by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn from the Netherlands questions some of the assumptions made about 'foreign fighters' returning to Europe. The Op-Ed by Philipp Holtmann focuses on the IS-Caliphate and what could be done about it. As usual, old and new publications are featured in the review and bibliographic sections.

This issue was prepared in the European offices of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) while the last issue of 2014 will be prepared by the co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism, Prof. James Forest, on the other side of the Atlantic.

Sincerely,

Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid

Editor-in-Chief
I. Articles

Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent:
Labeling and Analyzing Contemporary Terrorist Actors
by Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger, and Polina Beliakova

Abstract
Terrorist groups are commonly understood to be groups that carry out acts of terrorism, and their actions viewed as terrorist campaigns. Yet, recent events are a reminder that the activities of even the most violent terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State extend beyond the use of terrorist tactics. These actors usually employ classic guerrilla tactics as well, and their overall strategy combines both violent and political means. Furthermore, these acts of political violence do not merely constitute isolated campaigns of terrorism, but are usually part of a broader conflict such as an insurgency or civil war. The purpose of the present article is twofold. The first is to offer some empirical evidence in support of our claim that most major contemporary terrorist groups also employ other, non-terrorist, modes of warfare, notably guerrilla tactics. In the second part, we offer our reflections of these findings for theory and policy. Our main recommendation is for governments to adopt an approach that separates the official labeling of these groups from the analysis of their origins, conduct, and threat potential. While official policy statements might continue to label actors involved in terrorism as terrorist groups, we argue that the policy analysis informing these governments’ pronouncements and decisions should adopt greater nuance by regarding most of these actors as insurgent groups. Such an approach can help policy analysts adopt and employ a broader array of intellectual tools to understand the complex nature of the threat posed by these groups, and arrive at more adequate, comprehensive, and longer-term solutions to the problems they pose.

Keywords: terrorism; terrorist groups; guerrilla; insurgency; counterinsurgency.

Introduction
When does an organization merit the name “terrorist group”? The answer might seem obvious at first: terrorist groups are groups that carry out acts of terrorism. What, however, if that group specializes in forms of political violence other than terrorism and uses terrorism only sporadically? This question has implications beyond theory and seems to apply to an ever growing number of terrorist groups. In the summer of 2014 in the Middle East alone, at least three prominent groups commonly classified as terrorist organizations have been engaged in significant combat operations that posed challenges to their enemies far exceeding the capabilities traditionally ascribed to these types of actors. The Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, or ISIS) has been able to extend its stronghold in Iraq and create an imposing presence over large swaths of territory in both Syria and Iraq, while threatening other neighboring countries such as Jordan. The Lebanese Hizballah, dubbed by some analysts as “among the most skilled light infantry on the planet,” [1] continues to amass significant battlefield experience through its ongoing involvement in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the incumbent Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. Finally, in the Gaza Strip, the militant Islamist group Hamas, which since 2006 is the elected governing party in that territory, has posed formidable challenges to Israeli military forces and civilians using a combination of insurgent tactics. These trends have applied to other geographic areas and even to the movement perhaps most widely acknowledged as a “terrorist group.” As a recent article by jihadism scholar J.M. Berger argued, even Al
Qaeda, broadly defined, conducts terrorism only “on the side.” Its primary focus at present is to fight wars and insurgencies.[2]

The above mentioned trends beg a series of questions. To earn the “terrorist” label, do groups have to rely exclusively on terrorist tactics? Might they use a variety of tactics as long as terrorism is the dominant form of violence? What if a group uses terrorism only rarely, when compared to other forms of political violence? Does the “terrorist” label then continue to have merit? If so, when and how should that label be employed? If not, what terms and concepts may be used that more accurately portray the nature of these groups’ activities?

The aim of this article is twofold. The first is to provide empirical evidence—based on data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database of the University of Maryland (GTD)—showing that nearly all terrorist groups listed in the GTD database use classic acts of terrorism only part of the time. According to the GTD, between 2002 and 2012 only a single outfit—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—limited its attacks to civilian targets, rendering that group a “terrorist group” in the strictest sense of the word. [3] All other groups aimed their attacks not only at civilians but also at government, police, and military targets—a modus operandi generally associated with guerrilla tactics.[4]

Our second aim is to then reflect on the merits of using the term “terrorist group.” Our finding that acts of terrorism constitute only a portion of these groups’ overall activities suggests that the common usage of the term “terrorist groups” to describe these actors is, technically speaking, only partially accurate. Such imprecise labeling could even lead to counterproductive policy choices if, by fixating on only one activity in these actors’ repertoire, counterterrorism scholars and practitioners de-emphasize or ignore other critical activities of these groups.

While other labels, especially the concept of “insurgent group,” offer a technically more accurate description of these groups’ activities, this article stops short of calling for the abandonment of the term terrorist groups, for three reasons. First, the authors accept the notion that, once a militant group decides to engage in indiscriminate violence against civilians for political ends, it crosses a certain moral threshold that sets it apart from other groups.[5] Secondly, “naming and shaming” such groups for their brutal and indiscriminate acts of violence can serve the important goal of undermining their ability to obtain popular support. Third, the use of the terrorism moniker to describe these groups can abet the curtailing of financial and material support they receive, and therefore help undermine their capacity to inflict harm.

That said, we believe that concepts drawn from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and from the study of civil wars, can make significant contributions to the scholarly analysis of terrorism and the groups that utilize this tactic.[6] Closer correspondence and cross-fertilization between terrorism studies, the study of insurgency and counter-insurgency, as well as the literature on civil wars can offer a more lucid and dispassionate conceptualization of these groups; of the full range of their activities; and of the broader context in which they tend to operate. Such an approach, in turn, can improve policies to address the threat posed by these violent non-state actors.

The remainder of this article begins with a review of the existing literature on the relationship between terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. We then provide some empirical analysis in support of our claim that the label of “terrorist group” lacks technical accuracy. Next, we discuss the potential harm to policy-making that can result from using the terrorism label as the sole frame of reference to understand the nature of these groups. We conclude that despite the technical inaccuracy of the “terrorist group” label, governments should continue to use the term in their policy pronouncements due to the moral and legal implications that have become associated with this label. At the same time, as far as the policy analysis...
informing these pronouncements is concerned, we argue that it is imperative that policy analysts adopt a more nuanced approach in framing this problem set. Adopting concepts and practices from insurgency and counterinsurgency theory—including the term insurgent group as the framework of analysis—serves this goal. Such an approach can help policy analysts adopt and employ a broader array of intellectual tools to understand the complex nature of the threat posed by such groups, and arrive at more adequate, comprehensive, and longer-term solutions to this problem.

**The Connectivity between Terrorism, Guerrilla, and Insurgency**

The extant scholarship on the definition of terrorism suggests that terrorism is a phenomenon that is distinct from other types of political violence. The distinguishing features include such elements as the targeting of unarmed civilians, the use of extra-normal violence, the desire by the terrorists to instill fear in the target population, or the intent to influence a broader audience beyond the immediate victims of the terrorist attack. [7] Problematically, however, none of these attributions appear to be sufficient for the production of a consistent and clear definition of terrorist groups.

In order to approximate a more precise label, it is necessary first to acknowledge that on the ground, terrorism is usually entrenched in the broader context of violent political conflict. Consequently, a contextualized framework for understanding terrorism is likely to provide a more comprehensive theoretical perspective of the issue and could contribute to more effective policy design.

In particular, discussing the interrelationship between terrorism and insurgency can provide a more detailed picture of actors who utilize different forms of political violence, including terrorism. Common definitions of insurgency describe it as a struggle between a non-ruling group and a ruling government or authority, where the former uses a combination of political and military means to challenge governmental power and legitimacy, while striving to obtain or maintain control over a particular area.[8] Terrorism is usually mentioned as one of the tactics of insurgency, together with propaganda, demonstrations, political mobilization of constituencies, subversion, insurrection, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.[9]

As far as definitions of the actor (terrorist groups/organizations vs. insurgents), as opposed to the action (terrorism vs. insurgency), are concerned, attempts to draw distinctions are generally made on the basis of the following features: Insurgents are usually described as using mixed violent/nonviolent methods; seeking high levels of popular support; enjoying a broader supply of manpower and often a richer resource base; and being capable of controlling territory, among other characteristics. Terrorist groups, in contrast, are said to function in a conspiratorial fashion. They tend to be smaller in size and to employ uncompromising violence. Conventional wisdom holds that the secret nature and small size of terrorist organizations generally prevents them from holding territory, while their focus on extreme violence prevents them from enjoying much popular support.[10] Bruce Hoffman, a leading authority in the field, thus states that terrorists “do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat, are constrained both numerically and logistically from undertaking concerted mass political mobilization efforts, and exercise no direct control or governance over a populace at either the local or the national level.”[11]

Complicating this discussion is the fact that there is no consensus as to which of the various features that characterize either insurgent or terrorist groups prevails. Consequently, a group can simultaneously be categorized as a terrorist group based, for example, on the scale of violence it uses, and as an insurgent group based, for instance, on its ability to capture and hold territory.
Furthermore, some scholars argue that the qualitative differences between terrorist and insurgent actors may be due to uneven access to resources, as opposed to differences by design. Daniel Byman thus argues that the majority of the groups that do not hold territory and lack popular support, yet use terrorism as a tactic, can still be considered proto-insurgencies. These groups, Byman believes, are simply unable to attain the other features of insurgency due to numerical inferiority or lack of resources. Along similar lines, Steven Metz states that “pure” terrorist movements are those that are simply incapable of exploiting the complete strategy of insurgency, so they have to resort to terrorism as a tactic in order to attract attention and galvanize potential supporters.

We may infer from the analysis above that the quest for a comprehensive, thorough, and accurate label for groups utilizing terrorism—one that appreciates its multidimensional nature—requires considerations of the complex realities on the ground. A look at the Al Qaeda network exemplifies this complexity because Al Qaeda—the entity probably most widely regarded as a “terrorist group”—increasingly employs a variety of tactics, terrorist or otherwise. In a widely circulated essay published in February 2014 in Foreign Policy, jihadism scholar J.M. Berger argued that the present Al Qaeda movement conducts activities that go beyond acts of terrorism. The current Al Qaeda movement, Berger argued, is more akin to a “wide-ranging fighting movement” involved in numerous insurgencies. To that end, it raises funds while mobilizing local, regional, and foreign fighters in a variety of theaters. To be sure, the movement continues to carry out horrific acts of terrorism, but that effort is “secondary in al-Qa`ida’s portfolio.” Although terrorism made Al Qaeda what it is today, and continues to matter, “it is no longer the main line of business”.

Berger’s point is well taken. From Africa across the Middle East and all the way to South Asia, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are busy fighting local regimes. Without a doubt, their self-described jihad features classic terrorist activities—acts of extra-normal violence against civilians or noncombatants in the service of political ends, designed to create fear and thereby influence a broader audience.

“Terrorist groups,” however, regularly carry out guerrilla operations as well. Guerrilla attacks typically emphasize extended campaigns of assassination, sabotage, and hit-and-run attacks carried out by small and highly mobile paramilitary units. Like the tactics of terrorism, guerrilla warfare is described in the literature as a “weapon of the weak” designed to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will. Yet where terrorism is in essence an act of psychological warfare used in the hope of turning the targeted population against its own government, guerrilla operations primarily target their enemy’s capabilities. Functioning as “small armies,” potent guerrilla forces are large and strong enough to seize and hold territory. Moreover, guerrilla tactics differ from terrorist tactics in terms of its main targets. While the prime targets of guerrilla fighters are the enemy’s armed forces, police, or support units, as well as general government and economic targets, the targets of terrorist groups are usually understood to be civilians and, at most, noncombatants. As Alex Schmid notes in his magisterial Handbook of Terrorism Research, “in the dominant understanding among experts, the victims [of terrorism] are predominantly not members of an armed force.”

Whereas terrorist groups have traditionally been considered as distinct from guerrilla organizations, many contemporary militant groups apply both terrorist and guerrilla tactics. As Robert Scales and Douglas Ollivant argue, a growing array of Islamist “terrorists” have turned into “skilled soldiers” who increasingly use a blend of traditional terrorist tactics and modern war-fighting techniques. Contemporary militants continue to use terrorist tactics to intimidate potential supporters and enemies alike, but their modus operandi has evolved into skills that can pose considerable challenges to states and their populations. They now “maneuver in reasonably disciplined formations... and employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages.” They rely on ambushes, roadside bombings, sniper fire, and other tactics that in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan have imposed considerable challenges and losses to U.S. forces. Groups such as the Islamic State,
Hizballah, and Hamas are able to handle second generation weapons such as Russian RPG-29 and possibly wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and build sophisticated underground tunnel systems.[20]

The above trends, which are highlighted by knowledgeable observers, indicate that in recent years a growing number of actors traditionally labeled “terrorist groups” are increasingly relying on a combination of tactics that fall squarely within the predominant understanding of both terrorism and guerrilla tactics.[21] In fact, these groups employ both tactics concurrently, sometimes on the same day.[22] The inescapable conclusion is that for a growing number of such militant groups, the terrorist and guerrilla labels apply equally well; these groups are terrorist and guerrilla actors at one and the same time.

**The Targets of “Terrorist” Groups: An Empirical Analysis**

In order to examine the extent to which the combined use of terrorist and guerrilla tactics applies to a broader array of contemporary “terrorist groups,” the authors conducted an empirical analysis. To that end, we examined one criterion by which to measure the growing crossover of terrorism and guerrilla tactics, namely the choice of targets. Specifically, our analysis examined the targeting choices of groups defined as “terrorist groups” by the Global Terrorism Database of START at the University of Maryland, one of the most extensive and widely employed databases available for the subject under consideration here. The authors examined all groups in the period between 2002 and 2012 that carried out at least six attacks—the minimum required to render the statistical analysis meaningful.[23] 2012 is the last year for which GTD data were available at the time of this writing, and we examined a period of more than ten years because a shorter period would have significantly lowered the number of groups that would have reached the set minimum of 6 attacks. Furthermore, focusing on this time period allows for the analysis of contemporary militant actors, thereby rendering our study more policy relevant. These scope parameters left us with 119 groups to analyze. For each group, we recorded the total number of attacks during that period and examined the distribution of target types, with a focus on attacks against civilians, general and diplomatic government targets, military targets, and attacks against the police.[24] We expected a sizeable portion of the targets of these organizations to be military, government, or police targets—a finding that would lend credence to our hypothesis that terrorist groups use a variety of tactics.

As the following analysis shows, the data strongly suggest that groups labeled terrorist indeed use a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, due to conceptual inconclusiveness on the one hand, and limitations inherent in the data on the other hand, our empirical analysis is of suggestive nature only. The first problem is conceptual: attacks against government and police targets can be plausibly regarded as either terrorist or guerrilla attacks. The second problem relates to issues inherent in the coding of GTD data. Problematically, the GTD’s definition of military targets includes attacks against both combatant and non-combatant military targets, with no possibility of ascertaining whether the military target was struck in a combatant or non-combatant context. Theoretically, therefore, if all military targets hit by a particular organization would be non-combatant targets, our assumption would lack empirical support. In our opinion, however, it is unreasonable to believe that all attacks against military targets carried out by the organizations included in this analysis were attacks against military forces in non-combatant situations. Most importantly, our aim in this article is relatively modest: to cast reasonable doubt on the claim that terrorist groups carry out terrorist attacks only. Hence, we believe that the empirical analysis provides qualified support for this article’s claim that terrorism is only a portion—and often a small portion—of these groups’ overall activities. [25]

The analysis first focused on data for the universe of groups active in that decade. For these 119 groups,
the average percentage of attacks against civilians is 32% (with a median of 28.6%). As Chart 1 shows, on average civilians are the favored target for these groups, but such attacks account for no more than a third of all attacks. A total of 16% of the attacks were aimed at military targets, 15.3% against government targets, and 13.4% against police targets. When combined, those targets generally considered typical for guerrilla operations—such as military, government, and police targets—are targeted in 44.7% of the cases—a significantly higher figure than that for civilians, the classic target of terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>32.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>15.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (General)</td>
<td>15.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>13.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart # 1: Average Distribution by Target type, All (Source: GTD)*

The analysis then focused on the ten most active jihadist groups of that period.[26] As the empirical analysis indicates, these groups do not appear to rely exclusively on terrorism either, and frequently appear to rely predominantly on guerrilla tactics. Still, the majority (6 out of 10) target civilians more than any other category, although only Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) does so in more than half of its attacks. Three of these jihadist groups target military targets more than any other, including civilian targets. For example, 45% of AQAP's attacks were aimed at military targets. The GSPC and AQIM also targeted military targets more than any other targets (33.7% and 32.3%, respectively). On average, these ten groups target civilians 30.2% of the time, military targets 21.5%, government targets 13.3%, and police targets 19.2% of the time. The median for these attacks shows a similar tendency. The median for attacks against civilian targets is 28%, for military 18.1%, for government 12.5% and for police targets 20%. Once again, the empirical evidence gathered for the period under review suggests that while civilian targets are the highest on average, non-civilian targets still comprise in total the most attacks with a combined average of 54.4% of the attacks.

While these figures seem to provide empirical support for Berger's hypotheses vis-à-vis Al Qaeda and its cohorts, the authors of the present article expanded the inquiry to non-jihadist groups as well. Of the 10 most active non-jihadist groups in the examined period [27], the authors surprisingly found that they targeted civilians more often, on average, than jihadist groups. Two of the groups, the LRA and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, do so in more than 50% of their attacks (83.6% and 56.7%, respectively). Two of these groups targeted military targets more than any other targets (New People's Army with 24.6% and the PKK with 33.1%) and one group favored police targets more than any other target (ETA, with 19.6%).
On average, the combined attacks of all groups in this category targeted civilians 38%, military targets 14.2%, government targets 9.8%, and police targets 13.6% of the time.[28] As the data show, non-jihadist movements actually target civilians more than all the other targets combined, with 38% targeting civilians compared to a combined average of 37.7% of all the other targets studied. Nevertheless, it is clear that even in this case, civilians are still targeted less than 50% of the time and that these groups employ terrorist and guerrilla tactics almost evenly.

In conclusion, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that if terrorist attacks are defined as attacks against civilian targets only, the common labeling of these groups as “terrorist groups” is, strictly speaking, only partially accurate. If that is the case, however, what explains the prominence and perseverance of a label that refers to only a portion of a given group’s activity?

The widespread use of the “terrorist group” label is likely due to a combination of psychological and instrumental factors. Psychologically, the use of this label provides a certain degree of emotional satisfaction to societies targeted by terrorism. Terrorism evokes repugnance and fear, thereby stoking an unequivocal rejection of terrorism’s means and agents alike.[29] Populations have been trained to reject compromise with terrorists, and want to believe that terrorists are unique in their “evilness;” therefore deserving a category of
their own. This explains not only why governments and societies targeted by political violence cling to the terrorism label, but also why they often fail to view “terrorism” as part of a broader violent conflict.

Instrumentally, a strong case can be made that “naming and shaming” groups that rely on the most brutal acts of violence can serve a number of goals designed to weaken these actors. Such labels can assist efforts of building an international coalition designed to oppose these groups through legal, political, economic, or militarily efforts. Moreover, repeated emphasis of the most unacceptably violent behavior of such groups can arguably serve the goal of curtailing public support for these groups among their potential constituents. For the purpose of policy pronouncements, therefore, the terrorism label has certain advantages. Despite this value, we argue that policy analysis—including those that directly affect policy formulation and strategic messaging—must adopt a more complex view that better accounts for the evolving nature of terrorist groups and their complex interaction with other tactics and modes of warfare, as well as their interaction with broader conflicts such as insurgency and civil wars.

“Insurgent Groups”: The Least Inaccurate Framework for Analysis

The trends emerging out of our data analysis confirm not only our own intuition, but also that of a growing number of other scholars that have begun to appreciate that terrorism is not a sui generis phenomenon. Scholars of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars increasingly recognize not only that terrorism is a tactic frequently used in conjunction with other tactics, but that these violent tactics are employed as part of a broader spectrum of political activities. Boaz Ganor and Eitan Azani, for example, have developed useful models of “hybrid terrorist organizations” that describe the fact that groups such as Lebanese Hizballah or Hamas engage in terrorism and politics concurrently.[30] Cognizant of the challenges in differentiating between terrorist, insurgent, and rebel groups, scholars in the broader field of conflict studies have adopted alternative terms such as “violent non-state actors” or “armed groups.”[31]

We argue that an existing concept, that of the insurgent group, is most useful in describing the predominant contextual realities of terrorism.[32] The concept accounts for the generally observable interplay between violent and nonviolent (i.e., political) means of struggle; for these groups’ reliance on either single or multiple tactics; and for the fact that terrorism most often emerges in the context of a broader armed conflict such as civil wars.

The U.S. Army/ U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual offers a definition of insurgency that synthesizes the dominant view among insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN) theorists. It describes insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”[33] Subversion and armed conflict—the interplay of political and violent means—are the two main ways in which insurgents seek to attain their goals. The concept of insurgency can help overcome the conceptual difficulties regarding the proper labeling of many contemporary militant groups because theorists of insurgency have long argued that insurgents typically rely on several modes of warfare at once. Although theoretically these modes of warfare do not have to include acts of terrorism–insurgents can rely, for example, on a combination of conventional and guerrilla tactics–they almost always do. Ariel Merari, for instance, observed that “whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.”[34]

Viewing terrorist groups as insurgent groups should not be seen as an attempt to play down the fact that these groups frequently commit acts of indiscriminate violence. Yet it does help place these acts in a broader context of a more complex reality. Based on this understanding, even the most violent groups using the most
despicable tactics are likely to spend some or most of their time and energy doing something other than killing civilians—fighting regular troops and government forces and subverting their enemies by means of propaganda and other political means.

Of course, as the late terrorism scholar Paul Wilkinson noted, “it is possible to engage in acts of terrorism without mounting a full-scale insurgency.”[35] Self-standing campaigns of terrorism detached from broader conflicts, however, are becoming increasingly rare, and have always been the exception. According to Wilkinson, historically, acts of terrorism have been used as “part of a wider repertoire of struggle.”[36] Recent research on the interplay between terrorism and civil wars—the dominant type of warfare since World War II—confirms the ongoing relevance of Wilkinson’s assessment. According to data assembled and analyzed by Michael Findley and Joseph K. Young, most incidents of terrorism “take place in the geographic regions where civil war is occurring and during the ongoing war.”[37]

**Implications for Theory and Policy**

Analyzing the militant actors described above as insurgents while continuing to publicly refer to them as “terrorist groups” will allow governments to enjoy the benefits associated with the use of the terror label while significantly reducing the possible costs of this approach by avoiding some of the blind spots and pitfalls that often accompany the use of the terrorism moniker.

Considering violent, politically motivated groups that commit acts of terrorism within a broader framework of insurgency provides a more comprehensive perspective for the analysis of the goals, the means, and the context of the violent political struggle waged by these groups, with important implications for countering these actors.

Employing the “insurgency” lens, analysts can gain a better appreciation of the goals that the group is trying to attain by carrying out terrorist attacks, but also of the broader political objectives pursued by the group using alternate means. This approach will place terror attacks within the broader strategic framework of insurgency and can help avoid confusion between means (use of uncompromised violence to cause high level of destruction and human casualties) and ends (e.g., challenging governmental authority). In other words, the adoption of “insurgent groups” as an analytical framework can improve a government’s ability to recognize that these groups use terrorism as a means to actively try to engage governments in a competition aimed at the redistribution of power.[38]

Adopting the concept of insurgency also sharpens the analysis of the means of struggle in an additional way: It provides an opportunity to analyze the insurgent group in its early developmental stage, and to trace the process by which it adopts particular violent tactics of struggle, including terrorism. Moreover, considering terrorism as one of several possible tactics that insurgent groups can adopt can help governments to reach conclusions regarding the conditions that lead militant groups to choose certain tactics over others.

In terms of context, counterinsurgency studies can shed some light on the influence of political, economic and social conditions on the emergence and development of politically motivated groups that adopt insurgency as a strategy, and terrorism as a tactic to reach their goals. Specifically, embracing the “insurgent group” concept emphasizes that governments and violent, politically motivated non-state actors are engaged in dynamic relationships in the course of which governmental actions influence the patterns of the opponent’s political behavior—including his selection of tactics.[39]

Finally, considering the use of terrorism in the context of insurgency provides a clearer picture by considering...
the role of other relevant actors that may have an influence on the conflict dynamics, including the local civilian population, armed gangs, oligarchs, clerics, and educational institutions, among others.[40]

Policy Implications

Adopting the framework of “insurgent groups” can shift the analytical focus away from an enemy-centric approach and towards a condition-centric approach. Such a shift is likely to have a tangible impact on policy making by expanding the scope of policy efforts; changing policymakers’ assessments of threats and opportunities; and granting more flexibility to governments in following a course of action. These three aspects will be discussed in turn.

On the issue of policy interest, as Metz has argued, American strategic culture has traditionally adopted an enemy-centric orientation. This approach implies that the conflict is caused by malicious challengers, and can be resolved by destroying the adversary’s military capabilities and eroding his will to fight. This focus, Metz believes, has substantially complicated all policy aspects regarding counterinsurgency. In particular, the enemy-centric approach has limited the U.S. security community’s ability to gauge the threat in a systematic way and to go beyond the perception that the conflict is induced by “evil people.”[41] and not by a broader set of conditions. That view implies that the physical defeat of the enemy is a main goal of operations, while political, social, and cultural aspects of insurgency are placed lower on the list of priorities.

In this respect, considering terrorism within the contextual framework of insurgency can help foresee complications and foster the formulation of governmental strategies in accordance with the complex nature of violent challengers. In particular, seeing terror as a tactic used as part of a broader insurgency requires resources to be allocated to population-centric activities aimed at separating the civilian population from the insurgent group and its infrastructure. This approach will aid the goal of undermining the recruitment networks and reducing the likelihood of new terrorist and other violent attacks.[42]

By conceiving of its opponents as insurgent groups, governments can also widen the scope of their policy efforts. Besides aiming at the tactical defeat of the adversary using military means, the insurgency framework highlights the necessity of simultaneously focusing on reestablishing governmental credibility and gaining popular support in problematic areas. In this regard, addressing the social grievances upon which the insurgents’ political agenda is based should move to the top of the policy agenda.[43] In other words, a strong case can be made that counterterrorism efforts should be subordinated to classical COIN concerns of winning the hearts and minds of the local civilians, while marginalizing the violent elements.

As far as the discussion of threats and opportunities is concerned, we argue that considering the rival as an insurgent group can uncover certain threats and opportunities that governments focusing primarily on combating terrorism might otherwise overlook. While terrorism is primarily perceived as a security threat, the threats posed by insurgencies are usually assessed more broadly. Well-organized and sustained insurgencies are considered to pose not only tactical security challenges, but broader strategic challenges such as attempts to undermine governmental legitimacy, power, and authority. Adopting the insurgency framework of analysis will lead policy analysts to better assess the potential strategic challenges posed by these groups, and therefore place certain groups—for example, those seeking to establish an alternative authority in particular areas—more prominently in governmental threat assessments.

Even in cases when the establishment of an actual alternative authority is not a major concern of the insurgents, popular support and mobilization may have significant ramifications for the government’s legitimacy and ability to enforce security.[44] By ignoring this strategic aspect of competition, governments
risk finding themselves waging an exhausting struggle to address more urgent, immediate threats, while losing focus on the political developments of their adversaries. At worst, the insurgents may not only control certain territories, but also gain broader public support for their cause in the local and international arena, and successfully delegitimize governmental counterterrorism efforts.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the evolution of Palestinian militant groups into politico-military actors highlight the costs of governmental neglect of the non-kinetic aspects of these groups' activities. Thus, while Israel's focus on battling urgent security threats in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the subsequent years resulted in a number of tactically successful military engagements, Israel failed to properly trace and manage the political deployment of Palestinian insurgent groups.[45]

In terms of opportunities, regarding an opponent as an insurgent group may broaden the range of governmental means of political influence over the challenger and his support base. Such strategies may include the delegitimization of the opponent's political cause (as opposed to the mere neutralization of the tactical military threat he poses); undermining the channels of legal and financial support to the insurgent; disruption of the enemy's educational networks; or the prevention of insurgent alliance formation with third parties. Alternatively, regarding the other side as an insurgency also provides opportunities for negotiating with moderate members of the group, including applying reassurance strategies for those who are willing to cooperate, and dealing with the provision of goods and services to the local population.[46] In addition, viewing the nature of the terrorist threat through the perspective of “insurgent groups” may help to foresee the possible impact of governmental actions on the nature of politically motivated violence adopted by insurgent groups—and thereby may help to avoid possible counterproductive policies from being enacted. Conceptualizing these groups as terrorist groups, in contrast, is likely to limit the perception of threats and opportunities to “hard security” domains.

Lastly, the increasingly complex nature of the adversary requires a more comprehensive and tailored policy toolkit on the part of governments. Viewing the terrorist threat as one emanating from “terrorist groups” can limit governmental actions to law-enforcement and military efforts. Adopting the “insurgent group” concept for the purpose of analysis, in contrast, broadens governments' flexibility in dealing with these challenges. [47] Such policies can be better used to address broader, but arguably no less important challenges, such as cutting popular support for these groups, reducing calls for revenge among the constituencies, decreasing the salience of the insurgents' political agenda, and ultimately hampering these groups' recruitment and fundraising capabilities.[48] Conceiving of these groups as insurgencies, in other words, can prevent governments from playing into these groups' hands by responding to their attempts of provocation with an overreaction that will ultimately backfire on the government.[49] In addition, conceiving of the enemy as an “insurgent group” will allow governments to apply carefully adjusted strategies to each type of primary and secondary conflict actor in order to reach a long-term sustainable solution.

It is also important to note that seeing terrorism as an insurgency-related phenomenon will require governments to adjust their counterterrorism policies to better handle the cultural peculiarities of insurgencies. For instance, the analysis of religious, ethnic and cultural underpinnings of insurgency may be crucial for formulating efficient policy options vis-à-vis global insurgencies in order to prevent terror attacks by applying deterrence, assurance or de-legitimization strategies.

**Conclusion**

In sum, the official use by governments of the “terrorist group” label to describe groups adopting terrorism as a tactic continues to be an important element in the struggle against terrorism. It can help delegitimize...
the use of terrorist violence; reduce public support; and undercut financial and material support for terrorist entities.

At the same time, the use of this label must not obscure a far more nuanced reality that acknowledges a number of important caveats: First, terrorist groups use, almost without exception, terrorism in conjunction with other tactics, notably guerrilla warfare. Second, terrorist groups are becoming more sophisticated political actors, with some attempting to provide basic services to the population in an attempt to win over hearts and minds. Third, terrorism is rarely a self-standing phenomenon. Instead, most terrorism occurs in the context of broader armed conflict, typically an insurgency and/or a civil war.

We argue that governments should strive to preserve the benefits of applying the terrorism label while avoiding the label's potential entrapments. Perhaps the most dangerous potential pitfall is for governments to fall victim to their own rhetoric. At worst, such a rhetorical entrapment can lead governments to focus on policies designed to address only the specific threat of terrorism posed by these groups. As the above discussion has shown, however, the dangers emanating from these actors are far more variegated. A government policy that not only labels, but whose policy analysts also examine these actors through the narrow lens of “terrorist groups” loses sight of the overall challenges posed by these groups, thereby failing to enact the most adequate policy responses.

For that reason, we argue for an approach that separates the way in which these militant actors are referred to in official statements from the way in which they are examined by specialists and analysts—including those directly informing the government. Official policy statements, we believe, should continue to label actors involved in terrorism as terrorist groups. At the same time, policy analysis informing the government’s policy pronouncements and decisions should adopt greater nuance when examining and conceptualizing these militant groups. We believe that in most cases, these groups are best understood as insurgent groups, and hence propose this label for analytical purposes as the most nuanced framework.

The analytical employment of the “insurgent group” concept can contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding of the power distribution challenge that insurgent groups pose to governments by using terror. In addition, the suggested label can be useful in explaining the adoption of both violent (including terrorism) and nonviolent means of political struggle, based on the present political, economic and social conditions on the ground. Furthermore, utilization of the label “insurgent groups” allows for a more comprehensive perspective on the dynamic relations between politically motivated violent actors that use terrorism as a tactic, governments, and other relevant actors. Finally, in terms of policy, the use of the suggested framework will provide a broader perspective of the insurgents’ political development, a better grasp of its network of contacts and supporters, and it may also grant considerable flexibility to policy decision-making.

Theoretically, our conclusions also call for closer intellectual interactions between the terrorism and insurgency studies fields, as well as the study of civil wars. Closer correspondence between these related fields can help shed more light onto the political aspects of the campaigns in which terrorism occurs. There are already a number of promising examples of fruitful interdisciplinary efforts, such as the increasing prominence of “conflict studies” as a field that combines scholarship from the civil wars, social movement, insurgency, terrorism, and other related sub-disciplines; research centers dedicated to international security issues that offer fellowships to conflict scholars from a range of disciplines; or journals such as Studies in Conflict and Terrorism or Terrorism and Political Violence that encourage submissions from terrorism, insurgency, and civil war scholars alike. These efforts are commendable, but disciplinary insularity is still the prevailing norm. Future steps towards intellectual plurality could include government research grants that encourage cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of international conflicts, or international conferences
devoted to the examination of contemporary political violence from multiple disciplinary angles.

Viewing terrorism as a phenomenon closely related to insurgencies and civil wars will allow analysts to pool the insights and best practices from academic fields that have thus far been treated separately. The study of terrorism, insurgency, and civil wars do not only suffer from a disconnect as far as the analysis of their causes are concerned; analyses of how these different phenomena might end are similarly compartmentalized.

Insights from the study of the termination of civil wars and insurgencies, for example, are likely to inform future studies of the decline and demise of groups heavily reliant on terrorism, and vice versa.

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**Notes**


[3] According to the GTD, UNITA carried out six attacks in that period, all against civilian targets.


[5] Boaz Ganor, interview with the authors, Herzliya, Israel, 12 February 2014.


[22] On 31 December 2012, for example, Al Qaeda in Iraq carried out 16 attacks. Of these, three were directed against government targets, five against police forces, seven against civilians and private property, and one against military forces.

[23] The GTD database distinguishes between a large number of target types, but five of these were of particular significance to this project: civilians, diplomatic, government, military, and police targets. We chose a minimum of six attacks because if a group listed in the GTD database attacked each one of the target types included in the database, setting six attacks as the minimum would ensure that at least one target type was targeted more than the others. A lower cut off point would render the statistical analysis less meaningful.

[24] As stated earlier, the GTD provides information about many other target types. However, these are of less importance to this project. Additionally, we eventually excluded one of the target types—attacks on (diplomatic) government targets—from our charts and the final analysis as this type of target was rarely struck when compared to the other target types; not used by most groups; the category lacked sufficient weight for the empirical analysis.

[25] By using data that was collected, coded and reported by others, we have no control over the quality, validity and reliability of the data. Nonetheless, we find the data reported by the GTD to be valid and reliable enough for the purposes of this analysis.

[26] The most active of the ten groups were the Taliban, with 2,431 attacks between 2002 and 2012. The least active was Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, with 90 attacks. The
other eight groups in that category, in descending order of activity, are Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Boko Haram, al-Shabab, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

[27] In descending order of activity, as measured by numbers of attacks, this category includes the following groups: Communist Party of India (CPI), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), New People’s Army in the Philippines, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Hamas, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA). It is important to mention that for all groups examined in this study, we did not confine the attacks to domestic ones, but considered all attacks, both domestic and international.

[28] The corresponding medians are 36 for civilians, 13.3 for military, 10.9 for government and 14.9 for police.


[31] We believe that the terms “violent non-state actors” (VNSA) or “armed groups,” despite some benefits, are no panacea to the problem of labeling these militant group because they fail to account for terrorism’s key characteristic as a form of political violence. Strictly speaking VNSAs or armed groups could be criminal organizations guided purely by greed, with little connection to actors driven by political motives.

[32] We are not the first authors to do so. For similar arguments, see for example Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency;” David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency;” and Khalil, “Know your enemy: On the Futility of Distinguishing between Terrorists and Insurgents.”


[34] Merari, Ariel. "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency." For a similar view, see also D. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency.”


[37] Findley and Young, “Terrorism and Civil War,” 286.

[38] See O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare; D. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency.”


News and Entertainment Media: Government’s Big Helpers in the Selling of Counterterrorism

by Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Brigitte L. Nacos

Abstract
This article explores how mass media depict overt responses to terrorism, such as military actions, and covert acts, such as the torturing of captured terrorists or suspected terrorists in the context of American politics and policymaking. Contrary to most studies of media and terrorism, this paper examines both entertainment and news media's depiction of counterterrorism and how this might affect public and elite perception of the government's responses to the threat of terrorism.

Keywords: media, propaganda, counter-terrorism, United States

Introduction
Mid-March 2014. A digital clock is counting down. Days, hours, minutes, seconds. 48:07: 45:09. Appropriate advertising for the return of the counterterrorism thriller series “24” and Jack Bauer, whose life as super-agent of a U.S. Counter Terror Unit was dramatized in 24-hour real time countdowns during each of its eight post-9/11 seasons. A few short trailers of the renamed new series (“24: Live Another Day”), available on the Fox.com site, depict horror scenes in burning London streets and Bauer, pistol in hand, trying “to thwart an unthinkable terrorist attack in London that could change the world forever.”[1] If you want to be sure not to miss the new counterterrorism drama, you are invited to click the “Remind Me to Watch” button and provide contact information. The Fox Channel promises to alert you so that you don't miss the opening episode or subsequent shows. Eight weeks before Jack Bauer will return to the television screen, the search term “24: Live Another Day” produces more than 44 million results on Google.

While Hollywood embraced all along the notion that extraordinary events, including heinous crimes and terrorism call for extraordinary responses, this manifested itself in the dramatic proliferation of brutality and torture in prime-time network television following the 9/11 attacks.[2] Moreover, before 9/11 the bad guys were the ones displaying brutality, after 9/11 the good guys tortured for the common good in the so-called war against terrorism. FOX's “24” went particularly far in its frequent torture scenes. Typically, there was a ticking time bomb or some other kind of imminent attack and a captured suspect who knew of the plot. By torturing the villain, Bauer and his team would extract information that would be crucial in preventing another man-made catastrophe.

The action thriller Zero Dark Thirty about the daring raid by SEAL Team Six that killed Osama bin Laden in his hide-away in Pakistan was among the many Hollywood productions that contributed to the idea that torture works. Starting with the torture of a major Al Qaeda figure, there was up front the implication that information gained during that torture was instrumental in finding and neutralizing bin Laden. Among those who immediately protested against what they considered a non-factual association between information gained through torture and the capture of bin Laden were Senate Intelligence Committee chair Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat, and Senator John McCain, a Republican. When such controversies arise, movie-makers tend to defend themselves with the argument that Hollywood narratives are not real and that audiences know the difference between reality and fiction; but in her eloquent critique of “entertainment violence” (in motion pictures/TV shows/computer games) and “media violence” (especially in TV news)
Sissela Bok (1998, 37) rejected that argument. “A killing in a movie is watched by real people on whom it may have real effects.”[3] Similarly, one could argue that Jack Bauer and his brethren in their all-out fight against terrorists are watched by real people on whom it may have real effects.

The Propaganda Model and Hollywood

There is good reason to open our article with references to entertainment media and first discuss how Hollywood fiction has portrayed the fight against terrorism and terrorists before moving on to news media. After all, screen heroes like Bauer, their successful ways of “tuning up” terrorists, and the fictitious ticking-time-bomb scenario have influenced America’s post-9/11 debate about homeland security and in particular about the treatment of captured terrorists or suspected terrorists—perhaps more than news reports (Downing 2007; Kamin 2007; Nacos 2011). Commenting on a tidal wave of motion pictures “so viciously nihilistic that the only point seems to be to force you to suspend moral judgments altogether,” David Edelstein (2006) coined the term “torture porn” and recognized the possible impact of these sorts of movies in post-9/11 America. “Fear supplants empathy and makes us all potential torturers, doesn’t it?” he wrote. “A large segment of the population evidently has no problem with this. Our righteousness is buoyed by propaganda like the TV series *24*, which devoted an entire season to justifying torture in the name of an imminent threat: a nuclear missile en route to a major city. Who do you want defending America? Kiefer Sutherland [Jack Bauer] or terrorist-employed civil-liberties lawyers?”

With few exceptions (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2007) media and communication researchers tend to focus either on the news or on entertainment, not both in one and the same research project and topic. Yet, both observation and research findings suggest that film and television fiction are as potent as news media in affecting audiences’ understanding and views of public affairs. Nearly a century ago, based on his observations, Walter Lippmann (1997 [1922]: 61) hypothesized that links exist between film images and movie-goers perception of reality, when he wrote,

> *The shadowy idea becomes vivid; your hazy notion, let us say of the Ku Klux Klan, thanks to Mr. Griffiths, takes vivid shape when you see The Birth of a Nation. Historically, it may be the wrong shape, morally it may be a pernicious shape, but it is a shape, and I doubt whether anyone who has seen the film and does not know more about the Ku Klux Klan than Mr. Griffiths, will ever hear the name again without seeing those white horsemen.*

Similarly, the Intelligence Science Board, a group of expert advisers to the U.S. intelligence community, noted in its extensive 2006 report on interrogation, “Prime time television is not just entertainment. It is ‘adult education.’ We should not be surprised when the public (and many otherwise law-abiding lawyers) applaud when an actor threatens the ‘hostile *du jour*’ with pain or mayhem, unless he or she answers a few pointed questions before the end of the episode.”[4]

Research confirms such observations. Michael Delli Carpini and Bruce Williams (1994: 793) found that participants in focus groups referred slightly more often to fictitious TV shows than news programs in political discourse about the environment. They concluded that “understanding the full impact of television on political conversations and on the public opinions formed during them requires expanding the definition of politically relevant television to include both fictional and nonfictional programming” because “when subjects draw on media in their conversations, they make few distinctions between fictional and nonfictional television.” Robert Entman and Andrew Rojecki (2000, 208) concluded, “Although we have distinguished between news, entertainment, and advertising, there is little reason to believe that such distinctions significantly shape people’s responses. The overall patterns of images and information establish the mental
associations, the schemas, used to process the social world. The most relevant differentiation is not between
genres but between different patterns of communicated information and prototypes they construct.”

The blurred lines between entertainment and news in audience perceptions exist as well with respect to
counterterrorism. Based on their research of post-9/11 television news and Hollywood entertainment like
the American “24” and the British “Spooks” TV dramas Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin (2007, 148)
reckoned that “it is not surprising that when our audiences talk about news and actual events in the War on
Terror, they lapse into dialogue about movies and TV drama.”

The majority of Americans are not aware or do not want to admit that entertainment programs affect their
understanding of public affairs, including terrorism and counterterrorism. A few months after 9/11, when
pollsters asked survey respondents whether they “learn something about terrorist attacks or the war on
terrorism from late night TV shows such as David Letterman and Jay Leno,” 17% answered “regularly” or
“sometimes,” 23% “hardly ever,” and 63% “never.” Among 18- to 34-year olds the result was different in
that 24% told pollsters that they learned regularly or sometimes from late night comedian shows about
terrorism and counterterrorism, whereas 22% said hardly ever and 53% never.[5] Rejecting the conservative
argument that Hollywood is “a den of leftist shills” Michael Parenti (2010, x) characterizes the films and
TV productions of what he calls “make-believe media” as providing “political entertainment [that] makes
political propagation all the more insidious” (Parenti, 1992, 3). Concentrated corporate ownership and the
influence of Pentagon, CIA, NASA, and other government agencies on war movies in particular ensure
according to Matthew Alford (2010a, 4) that “Hollywood generates considerable sympathy for the status quo
and, indeed, frequently glorifies US institutions and their use of political violence.”

What Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010) and others (e.g., Frank 2010; Westwell 2010) concluded after analyzing
post-9/11 TV dramas and films is in part compatible with Alford's (2010b) model that is borrowed from
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky's (2002) propaganda theory designed for analyzing and explaining
mainstream news media in the United States. After examining post-9/11 motion pictures Alford concluded
that the propaganda model “is equally applicable to mainstream US cinema” and that, thanks to Hollywood
entertainment "a cultural framework was laid for the war against terrorism that fitted neatly with the broader
objectives and narratives of the US government” (2010b, 88).

That was reflected, for example, in America's public debate about torture. The public bought to one degree or
the other into the fiction that torture could be used for a good end, namely the extraction of information to
prevent terrorism; merely a minority rejected torture categorically. Indeed, the public's pro-torture sentiment
was highest after bin Laden's death (2011) and after the 2013 release of Zero Dark Thirty (see Table 1).

Even more important was that Jack Bauer was a hit with top decision-makers. John Yoo, for example, the
lead-author of the Justice Department's infamous “torture memos” wrote in defense of his role in the Bush
administration's war on terrorism, “What if, as the popular Fox television program 24 recently portrayed, a
high-level terrorist leader is caught who knows a nuclear weapon in an American city. Should it be illegal for
the President to use harsh interrogation short of torture to elicit this information”(Yoo 2006, 172)? His and
the administration's answer, as reflected in the “torture memos” was in favor of torture, not “short of torture”
although they called it “enhanced interrogation techniques.”

Or take U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Scalia. In a 2007 panel discussion on terrorism and the law in
Ottawa, a Canadian judge said, “Thankfully, security agencies in all our countries do not subscribe to the
He saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Are you going to convict Jack Bauer? Say that criminal law is against

Table 1: Torturing Terrorists and the Public

Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Often Justified</th>
<th>Sometimes Justified</th>
<th>Rarely Justified</th>
<th>Never Justified</th>
<th>DK/Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>PEW</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>AP/NORC**</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.

*When the question was asked more than once per year by Pew, we present a yearly average (for 2005, 2007 and 2009);

**AP/NORC question's wording: “How do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists to obtain information about terrorism activities? Can that often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified? “

Indexing, Propaganda Model, and Counterterrorism News

Although we devoted the opening section of this article to entertainment media, we certainly do not discount the importance of the news media as important source for public affairs information. Just as the news media, in spite of terrorists’ use of the Internet, continue to be central to the terrorist publicity calculus (Nacos 2007), governments in democracies depend on the news media for enlisting public support for their counterterrorism policies. Because of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of press and expression, the American press has been characterized as an extra force or branch in the governmental system of checks and balances between the administrative, legislative, and judicial branches. Indeed, the American Society of News Editors (formerly the American Society of Newspaper Editors), the professional organizations that pioneered codified journalism ethics, declares in its “Statement of Principles” that “freedom of the press belongs to the people” and, most important, that “the American press was made free not just to inform or just to serve as a forum for debate but also to bring an independent scrutiny to bear on the forces of power in the society, including the conduct of official power at all levels of government.”[7]

Contrary to those ideals which are shared by other journalistic organizations, the mainstream media do not always exercise their declared freedom and independence when reporting on public affairs. Recognizing this, W. Lance Bennett’s (1990) “indexing” approach speaks to the media’s tendency to make news decisions based on their assessments of the power dynamics inside government, especially, as these dynamics can be discerned at the major news beats in the administration (the White House, Departments of Defense and State) and in Congress. Decisive here is that the levels of agreement or disagreement among Washington’s
most influential officials will be reflected in the news. While the “indexing” theory recognizes the influence of government insiders to frame the news, shape mass-mediated policy debates, and ultimately policies themselves, it does not go as far as the propaganda or hegemony model. The latter explains the American news media as an instrument of the power elite, among them the upper crust in politics, business, and the military. In C. Wright Mills' (2000 [1956], 215) view, the media are important instruments of power in the hands of the powerful with some in the media either part of those elites or in prominent roles among their hired hands. In their initial explanation of the “propaganda model” Herman and Chomsky (2002, xi) write that “among their other functions, the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them.” While the indexing theory is more nuanced than the propaganda model and the two schools of thought emphasize their differences, both recognize decision-makers’ influence on the media agenda in major foreign policy matters and especially during foreign policy crises.

Media scholars tend to distinguish between news of foreign/international politics and policies on the one hand and domestic politics and policies on the other. In the age of globalization the once distinct domestic-international demarcation has become increasingly blurred in a multitude of areas, including trade, environment, health, and financial markets (Deese 1994; Huntington 1997). This convergence of the domestic and international spheres has been particularly compelling with respect to transnational terrorism and counterterrorism—even before the beginning of rapid globalization processes in the 1990s. Thus, whether we consider the wave of anti-American terrorism incidents in the 1980s or the catastrophic attacks of 9/11, the actions by transnational terrorist groups and American reactions to those had dramatic effects on U.S. domestic politics and policies as well as on international relations and foreign policy. For this reason, the propaganda and indexing models or a synthesis of both seem suited to examine counterterrorism reporting, to what extent this news takes its lead from government insiders, and how this is reflected in public opinion data.

Counterterrorism: Limited Military Deployments

In the face of an international crisis that involves the United States and challenges the president, Americans tend to rally around the flag and their president in what seem nearly automatic reflexes of patriotic passions. But scholars (Mueller 1985; Brody and Shapiro 1989; Hugick and Gallup 1991) found that not all such crises trigger “rallies-'round-the-flag.” Even quite similar incidents, for example the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo by North Korea and the 1975 seizure of the SS Mayaguez by the Khmer Rouge resulted in different reactions by the American public. While President Lyndon Johnson’s approval dropped after the Mayaguez incident, President Gerald Ford’s public approval increased. After studying such discrepancies Richard Brody and Catherine Shapiro (1989; Brody 1991) explained that rallies occur when the news reflects that “opinion leaders,” such as administration officials and members of Congress, support the president or refrain from voicing criticism. However, when the news reflects disagreement on the part of “opinion leaders,” the public will not rally. To be sure, leading media voices qualify as opinion leaders as well and thus contribute to news content that determines public reactions in this respect.

The rally phenomenon is most likely in the face of a major national security crisis, such as the events of 9/11, wars, and limited military deployment. Scholars suggest a range of minimum approval increases in the first post-incident surveys to qualify as rallies with percentages between 3% and 5% (Edwards 1983; Hugick and Gallup 1991). Moreover, robust rallies require further approval gains in the second poll after the particular event. In the following, we examine three cases in which Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama deployed the U.S. military for quick strikes abroad against transnational terrorists and terrorist sponsors in the name of counterterrorism:
The 1986 Bombing of Libya: Immediately after taking office in January 1981 and with an implicit reference to the just resolved 444-day Iranian Hostage Crisis, President Reagan warned, “Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.”[8]

In the following years, as terrorist attacks against Americans increased, especially in the Middle East, there was no “swift and effective retribution.” By the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration was eager to respond. While the Lebanese Hezbollah was involved in a wave of bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings, Washington did not target its sponsor, Iran, but rather the not quite as strong Libya and its ruler Muammar Qaddafi. Indeed, Qaddafi was according to President Reagan and his administration’s propaganda what Osama bin Laden became in the wake of the 9/11 attacks for President George W. Bush, the world’s number one evil-doer. The opportunity to finally do something arose in April 1986, when a bomb exploded in a disco in Berlin, Germany, killing two U.S. servicemen. Claiming that Libyan agents were involved in the bombing, the Reagan administration had now “a smoking gun” against Libya. Expecting retaliatory strikes, American media organizations beefed up their presence in the Libyan capital Tripoli and were ideally situated to report live when the bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi began on April 14th. More importantly, media opinion was strongly in favor of the bombings although the victims were predominantly Libyan civilians. As the New York Times editorialized one day after the raids, “Even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attack on Libya…” Another Times editorial noted that with the bombing America sent the message, “The tiger bites.”[9] News organizations reported also extensively about the overwhelming congressional support for President Reagan’s decision. Not surprisingly, Ronald Reagan’s general public approval increased from a solid 62% before the bombing to 67% thereafter while 70% or more Americans approved the bombing raids (Table 2).
Table 2: Presidential Approval and Military Counterterrorism – Three US Presidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reagan</th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bombing of Libyan Targets</td>
<td>Missiles Strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan</td>
<td>Commando Raid that Killed Bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>General Incident Specific</td>
<td>1998 General Incident Specific</td>
<td>2011 General Incident Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>% change</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/11-14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

April 14/15 – Announcement of Air strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>Incident Specific</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>Incident Specific</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>Incident Specific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/17-18</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>8/11-13</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>5/2-3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/24-28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8/17</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>5/5-8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/30-1/5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>8/19-21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5/20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/15-19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the absence of oppositional voices among influential officials inside and outside the administration, the Congress, and within the media, the president's agenda was reflected in the news and a public very supportive of Ronald Reagan.

1998 Missile Strikes Against Targets in Afghanistan and Sudan: Two weeks after terrorists drove car bombs into U.S. embassy compounds in Kenya and Tanzania causing hundreds of deaths, the U.S. military targeted Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and what was described as a “chemical weapons related facility” in Sudan with 79 Tomahawk missiles. The counterterrorism strikes were launched three days after President Clinton had publicly admitted an affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Opinion leaders, especially the president’s adversaries in Congress, claimed that Clinton had ordered the strikes in order to draw attention away from his sex scandal. Not only were those political attacks covered by the news media, reporters, too, expressed skepticism about the president’s motives. Characteristic for the media’s stance was an exchange during a press conference at the Pentagon. Secretary of Defense William Cohen was asked by one reporter whether he was familiar with the Wag the Dog movie in which an American president cooks up an imaginary war for the purpose of deflecting interest away from his sexual encounter with a teenage girl. “Some Americans are going to say this [the missile strikes] bears a striking resemblance to Wag the Dog,” one reporter said. “How do you respond?” Cohen replied that “the only motivation driving this action today was our absolute obligation to protect the American people from terrorist activities.”

Along the lines of Brody and Shapiro's findings, the mass-mediated disagreement among opinion leaders was reflected in the news and not lost on the public. As Table 2 shows, President Clinton's general approval decreased slightly whereas his decision to strike back at terrorists and their supporters had solid public support.

Hunting Down Osama bin Laden: On 1 May 2011, shortly before midnight, it was already May 2 in Pakistan, President Obama stunned the nation and the world with the following televised announcement: “Good evening. Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.” As the New York Times reported the next day, The President “drew praise from unlikely quarters on Monday for pursuing a risky and clandestine mission to kill Osama bin Laden, a successful operation that interrupted the withering Republican criticism about his foreign policy, world view and his grasp of the office. Former Vice President Dick Cheney declared, “The administration clearly deserves credit for the success of the operation.” New York's former mayor, Rudolph W. Giuliani, said, “I admire the courage of the president.”

A huge majority of the American public, 85%, expressed approval for President Obama's handling of the raid on bin Laden's secret compound and his general approval for his performance as president jumped 10 percentage points from 47% before the Al Qaeda leader's death to 57% thereafter (see Table 2). This was reason enough for Republican media figures and opinion-makers to wonder whether these approvals would translate in support for Obama in the 2012 presidential election. Before long, these circles made and repeated the claim that President George W. Bush deserved credit for the undoing of bin Laden. Their point was that the intelligence community would not have found the hideaway in Pakistan without exposing captured terrorists to “enhanced interrogation techniques.” As Lanny Davis, a Fox News contributor told Bill O'Reilly, “I wrote today that we have to give credit to George Bush and those that used these techniques for getting information that directly or indirectly led to the death of Usama bin Laden. I don't think there's any way to deny that.” It was telling that President Obama's general approval dropped 3 percentage points in the
second post-raid poll. Two weeks after bin Laden's demise Fox News commissioned a survey that asked respondents, "Do you think President Obama has been personally taking too much credit for the killing of bin Laden, the right amount of credit, or not enough credit?" A majority of Americans (53%) thought that Obama had taken the right amount of credit, 31% said he had taken too much and 12% too little credit with 4% not voicing an opinion.

The commando mission against bin Laden became more of an issue during the 2012 presidential campaign. Just before the first anniversary of the raid to get bin Laden and before Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney won officially the Republican Party's nomination, the Obama campaign aired an ad that strongly implied that the presumptive GOP candidate would not have given green light for the operation, using Romney’s own words against him. Romney fired back with the claim that “the decision to go after bin Laden was a clear one and that ‘even Jimmy Carter would’ have made the call.”[14] In the end, it is impossible to figure out whether and to what degree the media's reporting on the bin Laden coup may have factored into President Obama's reelection.

Mass-Mediated Counterterrorism in the Post-9/11 Years

Nothing reinforces people's fear of terrorist strikes more than heavily covered threat warnings issued by government officials on the one hand and by known terrorists on the other, in the wake of major attacks. The months and years after 9/11 were a case in point. Besides around the clock coverage in television, radio, and the print media that highlighted the horrors of the attacks and the likelihood of more terrorism, there were many reports of threat warnings issued by administration officials and Al Qaeda leaders. Appearing before a Joint Session of Congress eight days after 9/11 President George W. Bush spoke about the threat against America. “Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack,” he said. He told the nation, “I know many citizens have fears tonight and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.” Pointing to the enormity of what had “just passed,” the president said that it was “natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear” before promising that “this country will define our times, not be defined by them.”[15]

In the same speech, Bush announced the appointment of Tom Ridge to head up the Office of Homeland Security. First as head of that office and later as Secretary of the newly created Department of Homeland Security the former Governor of Pennsylvania became a key figure in what he himself characterized as “the politics of terrorism” but what was more precisely a politics of counterterrorism.[16] In this role, he and his staff disagreed repeatedly with other administration officials’ eagerness to issue public terror alerts indicating that attacks were likely or even imminent. Central in such discussions was a color-coded terrorism alert system with five levels that Ridge introduced in early 2002 to the public. While confusing to the public, it was exploited by certain administration officials a useful prop in a threat manipulation scheme.

Before Memorial Day 2003, for example, Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft held press conferences on the same day. In response to questions about threats and security, Ridge told reporters that there was no reason to heighten the alert level. A few hours later, Ashcroft warned publically of an imminent, major attack on the United States by Al Qaeda. President Bush was not pleased with Ridge's assessment; in their next regular meeting in the Oval office he told the Secretary of Homeland Security that he wanted a united front (Ridge 2009, 228). Obviously, besides President Bush some of Tom Ridge's colleagues understood the usefulness of threat alerts in America's “war against terrorism.”

When it comes to analyzing intelligence, reasonable people can differ about the meaning of often sketchy information and the credibility of sources. In discussing threat assessments on the part of those who fight
terrorism, Albert Bandura took note of the likelihood that such judgments can be influenced by the desire to justify counterterrorism policies. As Bandura (2004, 129) put it:

Lethal countermeasures are readily justified in response to grave threats that inflict extensive human pain or that endanger the very survival of the society. However, the criterion of “grave threat,” although fine in principle, is shifty in specific circumstances. Like most human judgments, gauging the gravity of threats involves some subjectivity... Assessment of gravity prescribes the choice of options, but choice of violent options often shapes evaluation of gravity itself.

Not surprisingly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a strong advocate of raising the threat level at any opportunity. Inside the Pentagon, Rumsfeld made no bones about his motives. In his so-called “snowflakes” memos to his staff the Secretary “wrote of the need to ‘keep elevating the threat’...and develop ‘bumper sticker statements’ to rally public support for an increasingly unpopular war” (Wright 2007, 1).

As Brigitte Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Robert Shapiro (2011) documented, the news media was something like a supporting cast in the selling of the administration's formal terrorism threat alerts and the more frequent informal threat warnings. True to the media’s tendency to highlight disconcerting news, the three leading TV-networks ABC, CBS, and NBC broadcast all 23 announcements of increases in the national, regional, or local terrorism alert levels and all of them were reported as lead stories at the top of newscasts. But the three networks reported decreases in threat levels much less prominently, airing only 13% of such announcement as lead stories and 87% further down in their broadcasts. When the Bush administration raised the nationwide terrorism alert, the networks devoted an average of 5 minutes and 20 seconds to such reports; when the terror alerts were lowered, the average news segment lasted only 1 minute and 34 seconds. The difference was even more pronounced for regional or local alerts: the average airtime for raised threat levels in these cases was 2 minutes and 56 seconds versus only 20 seconds for segments reporting on the lowering the official alert level. When the three networks aired reports about threat advisories that did not involve changes in the color-code scheme, the average length of these stories was still fully 2 minutes and 20 seconds. In addition, the frequent threats from bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders received prominent and extensive coverage as well. John Mueller (2006, 26) warned that “the harm of terrorism mostly arises from the fear and from the often hasty, ill-considered, and overwrought reaction (or overreaction) it characteristically, and often calculatedly [emphasis added], inspires in its victims.” The media bought into the administration's threat scheme and became the government's helpers in keeping the American public’s fear of more terrorism alive (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011, chapter 2). As David L. Altheide (2007) noted, “Notwithstanding the long relationship in the United States between fear and crime, the role of the mass media in promoting fear has become more pronounced since the United States ‘discovered’ international terrorism on 11 September 2001.”

Nisbet and Shanahan (2004) found in the post-9/11 period that people who paid “high level” attention to television news about national affairs and the war on terrorism were far more convinced that another terrorist attack would occur within the next 12 months than were “low level” and “moderate level” news consumers. Based on their experiments and survey analyses, Jennifer Merolla and Elizabeth Zechmeister (2009) demonstrated how perceptions of threat trigger authoritarian attitudes, lead to intolerance toward disliked groups, increase social distrust, curtail support of civil liberties, increase the likelihood of support for leaders dealing with the threat at hand, and affect opinions towards foreign policies. This is precisely what happened in the post-9/11 years, when the drum-beat of threat alerts and warnings by the administration and compliance by most opinion leaders inside and outside the media gave President Bush and his aides card blanche for their extreme counterterrorism policies from the USA PATRIOT Act’s curbing of civil liberties to the invasion of Iraq and human rights violations in the treatment of terrorists or suspected terrorists.
For the months and years immediately following 9/11, both the indexing and the propaganda model explain the mainstream media’s pertinent reporting. Indeed, during that period “officials in Washington—especially President Bush and members of his administration—were able to set the media agenda when that was their intention” (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011, 183). When administration officials held news briefings, gave interviews, delivered speeches, and found plenty of other occasions to go public, TV-networks and other media provided them with ample opportunity to sell their agenda.

When, on the other hand, the White House and other administration officials did not make strong efforts to promote certain counterterrorism measures, the news reflected this low level engagement and offered other sources access, albeit without the prominence and frequency granted to top-Washingtonians. A systematic study of post-9/11 news about terrorist threat alerts and warnings, civil liberty policies, the selling of the Iraq War, terrorism prevention in the homeland, and preparedness for terrorist strikes showed the following (see Table 3): The president and high administration officials were crafty in using the media to publicize the terrorist threat and the need to invade Iraq in order to prevent terrorist attacks. In both cases, the TV networks “indexed” the news mostly within the narrow range of Washington opinion leaders as far as domestic sources were concerned. The administration was least active with respect to prevention of terrorism at home and preparedness for other terrorist emergencies. As a result, there was only a moderate amount of news about these important but rather complex and not particularly dramatic policy areas. Finally, the administration’s public engagement in issues arising from civil liberty restrictions in the name of security was less intensive compared to the hype surrounding the build-up to the Iraq War and the overblown messages about terrorist threat warnings but more rigorous compared to the modest selling and reporting of prevention and preparedness (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011, ch. 7).

Table 3: News Messages by Domestic Sources in TV-Networks’ Post-9/11 Terrorism Coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Threat %</th>
<th>Civil Liberties %</th>
<th>Build-Up Iraq %</th>
<th>Prevention %</th>
<th>Preparedness %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President/Administration</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Congress</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/State Officials</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Domestic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/Public Opinion</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, Shapiro, Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and the Public. University Press of Chicago.—% = percentage of total sources (Note: because foreign sources are not included in the table, the listed sources do not add up to 100% in all cases).

Ever since 9/11, presidents, high administration officials, and the intelligence community left no doubt that the terrorist threat remained. Yet, they did not launch campaigns to urge the public to make sensible preparedness arrangements and seek information about their communities’ emergency preparations. The news rooms of leading media organizations were not interested either. Thus, in the three years from Jan. 1, 2010 to December 31, 2013, The Washington Post published 98 stories and The New York Times 84 about or mentioning both terrorism and preparedness; during the same period, the CBS Evening News aired 6,
CNN’s “The Situation Room” 10 such segments. An analysis of those stories revealed that only a fraction of them were exclusively about the state of preparedness in the U.S. or some particular measures to prepare emergency responders and/or the general public for terrorist strikes. Yet another example that the news media, not all the time but to a large extent, follow the government’s agenda: what is high on that agenda will be reported prominently, what is low will not be reported much or at all. As a result, a solid majority of Americans consider their communities’ terrorism preparedness “inadequate” or are “unsure.”[17]

Conclusion

After they examined some of the Bush administration’s most drastic post-9/11 measures taken in the name of counterterrorism, Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2007, 137) concluded that “the administration assumed it could bend mass perception of reality even against massive evidence to the contrary, with only occasional challenges from the press and dissident sources.” Indeed, the mass-mediated politics of counterterrorism policy was a case of news “indexed to power” (Ibid, 174) that also met the propaganda model's criteria of a power elite using the media to manufacture consent (Herman and Chomsky 2002). Eventually, major news organizations regained their footing, in the cases of The Washington Post and The New York Times admitting their failures. But neither a mea culpa nor the return to professional journalists’ self-proclaimed ethics codes could turn back the time clock and undo the damage inflicted abroad and at home. Instead, the immediate post-9/11 era demonstrated that in crisis times the press must bark like a watchdog and not cozy up to the power elite like a lapdog.

Similarly, Hollywood’s post-9/11 entertainment productions—not all but many of the most popular ones—spread the message that extraordinary threats require extraordinary responses. In this respect, films and television shows fit perfectly into Washington’s counterterrorism propaganda built around the permanent and at times allegedly imminent threat of more terrorist attacks inside American borders.

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Brigitte L. Nacos is a journalist, author, and adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, New York. Among her more recent books are ‘Terrorism and Counterterrorism’ (Pearson) and ‘Mass-Mediated Terrorism’ (Rowman & Littlefield).

References


Association Press.


Notes


[3] Bok, 37. Howard Gordon, the lead writer of “24,” insisted, however, that people are able to differentiate between a television show and reality.


[17] According to a 2011 poll commissioned by the Mailman School at Columbia University and conducted by the Marist Institute for Public Opinion. In early 2014, this was the last available poll about terrorism preparedness.
Making ‘Noise’ Online: 
An Analysis of the Say No to Terror Online Campaign

by Anne Aly, Dana Weimann-Saks, and Gabriel Weimann

Abstract

A consideration of terrorism as communication necessarily draws attention to the development of counter narratives as a strategy for interrupting the process by which individuals become radicalised towards violent extremism. As the Internet has become a critical medium for psychological warfare by terrorists, some attempts have been made to challenge terroristic narratives through online social marketing and public information campaigns that offer alternative narratives to the terrorists’ online audiences. ‘Say No to Terror’ is one such campaign. This article reports on a study that examined the master narratives in the ‘Say No to Terror’ online campaign and applied concepts of ‘noise’ and persuasion in order to assess whether the key elements of the ‘Say No to Terror’ campaign align with the application of “noise” as a counter strategy against terrorists’ appeal on the Internet. The study found that while the master narratives of ‘Say No to Terror’ align with suggestions based on empirical research for the development of effective counter campaigns, the campaign does not meet the essential criteria for effective noise.

Keywords: Narrative, counter-narrative, countering extremism, strategic communication

Introduction

Terrorism has often been described as a form of communication by weak actors using violence as an instrument of last resort for communicating their cause. While psychologists argue violence communicates internal conflict in the perpetrator [1] some scholars of terrorism studies argue that terrorism cannot be viewed as a matter of individual psychology. Rather, the use of violence by terrorist actors is a strategic choice to communicate, through violence, that problems exist.[2] Terrorists use violence as a communication strategy to provoke effects that are not necessarily directly connected to the victim population. The effectiveness of violence lies not in the violence itself (the capacity for destruction) but in propaganda generated through the act and through the various communication protocols adopted by terrorist groups to influence and coerce target audiences. Among those communication protocols, terroristic narratives that use the Internet to reach large and disparate audiences have attracted considerable attention. The role of Internet disseminated propaganda in the process of radicalisation has been questioned in prominent cases where it has been established that terrorist or extremist actors have been, at least in part, influenced by their online activities. Despite recognition that the Internet plays a role in the radicalisation process, there is still little evidence available to assess the assumption of causality between exposure to terroristic narratives on the Internet and radicalisation to violent extremism. A study by the RAND Corporation tested five assumptions in the literature with regard to Internet radicalisation and found that empirical evidence existed to support the assumption that the Internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised and serves as a space for individuals to find support for their ideas among like-minded individuals. The study also found that assumptions that the Internet accelerates the process of radicalisation and promotes self-radicalisation without physical contact were not supported.[3]

The body of work that examines terrorist activity online approaches the problem by examining both terroristic content (including the ways in which terror content appears online) and the ways in which the terroristic narrative appeals to certain groups of users. Though the first has been given far more consideration
in the literature, there is an emerging interest in understanding why and how terrorist narratives are so seductive to particular targets. Aly argues for an approach to understanding the appeal of Jihadi-Salafist terroristic narratives that recognises the role of the audience as active players in the process of message transfer, influence and indoctrination. She offers a model for understanding the appeal of the online narrative that takes into account how needs that are shaped by social roles are gratified by the attributes, content and the context of different media platforms.[4]

Weimann and von Knop posit that the social situation of diaspora communities that may be socially alienated, disenfranchised and in search of social bonding, creates a condition of emotional need that is served by the terroristic narrative. They identify several stages of engagement with terroristic narratives online: the searching phase; the seduction phase; the captivation phase; the persuasion phase and the operation phase. Understanding the process of engagement and radicalization allows for an identification of phases where the user is still vulnerable to ideas or messages that challenge those embedded in the terroristic narrative. Such counter messages can act as “noise” that interferes with or disrupts the process of radicalization.[5]

How Noise Works

In communication theory, noise is that which distorts the signal on its way from transmitter to recipient. Noise interferes with the communication process as it keeps the message from being understood and prevents it from achieving its desired effect. The concept of noise was first introduced in communication theory in the 1940’s by Shannon and Weaver.[6] They were mostly concerned with mechanical noise, such as the distortion of a voice on the telephone or interference with a television signal producing “snow” on the TV screen. In the succeeding decades, other kinds of noise have been recognized as potentially important problems for communication:[7]

- Physical Noise is any external or environmental stimulus that distracts us from receiving the intended message sent by a communicator.
- Semantic noise occurs because of the ambiguities inherent in all languages and other sign systems.
- Cultural noise occurs when the culture or subculture of the audience is so different from that of the sender that the message is understood in a way that the sender might not have anticipated.
- Psychological noise results from preconceived notions we bring to the communication process, such as racial stereotypes, reputations, biases, and assumptions.

While the concept of noise was first perceived as relevant only to interference with the transmission of a message, it later became recognized as a crucial element in the communication process, potentially affecting each stage of the process. The concept of noise in communication theory and research has often been treated as a negative element, damaging the communication process. In fact, most empirical uses of the concept were directed at reducing or minimizing noises to improve the flow of communication. However, today noise is breaking away from the status of undesirable phenomenon bestowed upon it by traditional communications theory. No longer merely an undesirable element to be eradicated so as to retain the purity of the original signal, noise can be regarded as a more complex and even desired element. When it comes to the terrorist (or any other illegal, harming, and dangerous communication), one may question the instrumentality of creating noise that may reduce the communicator’s efficiency and success. Creating and using semantic, psychological, cultural, and physical noises may describe a rich variety of counter measures and organize
them in a strategic framework. Thus, noise could become a key conceptual and theoretical foundation in the strategy of countering terrorism online.

**Noise in Counterterrorism Communication**

In their article “Applying the Notion of Noise to Countering Online-Terrorism”, Weimann and von Knop suggested applying various “noises” in counterterrorism campaigns.[8] Later, Weimann developed a strategic communication plan for the disruption of terrorist communication, based on the use of Mechanical/Technological Noises and Psychological/Social Noises.[9]

Applying Mechanical/Technological Noises refers to the technological disruption of the flow of communication. The mechanical/technological tactics include a rich variety of interventions from the damaging of websites and the defacing and redirecting of users to the spreading of viruses and worms, blocking access, hacking, and total destruction. These deviant measures can be adopted and used against online terror and to minimize their reach and impact. In the most severe cases, hacking the websites may be the most extreme measure, though not always the most efficient one in the long run. Such disruptive counter-attacks on terrorist online platforms are not new: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed that the U.S. government has been hacking al-Qaeda websites in an effort to sabotage the terrorist group’s activities.[10] Such attacks have had very limited effects since the terrorists easily manage to re-establish their online platforms and re-emerge in cyberspace. A more sophisticated “mechanical noise” is the optional use of Trojan Horses, viruses, and worms against terrorists. The common distinction among the three is that a Trojan horse is a program that does something malicious when run by an unsuspecting user; a worm is something that replicates; and a virus is a worm that replicates by attaching itself to other programs.

Applying Psychological/Social Noises involves various psychological and social operations and counter propaganda. Different terms relate to Psychological/Social Noise: Information Warfare, Information Operation (IO), and the current doctrine of Military Information Support Operations (MISO). In 2010 the US Army dropped the Vietnam-era name “psychological operations” for its branch in charge of trying to change minds behind enemy lines, acknowledging the term can sound ominous. The Defense Department picked a more neutral name “Military Information Support Operations,” or MISO. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

As a communication medium and vehicle of influence, the Internet is a powerful tool for psychological campaigns. In many ways, terrorists launch their online campaigns in the same way legitimate political campaigns use the Internet. Both attempt to attract users, to seduce them by engaging them in a sensory experience, trying to manipulate their needs, suggesting the fulfilment of a goal, and inspiring and guiding the users to make a choice by providing a higher-level motivation. Campaigning via the interactive Internet often provides social bonding and replicates feelings of personal contact. These elements, frequent also in terrorist websites, can be used in counter campaigns too. However, before such campaigns are launched, the agencies involved should know the psychographic profiles of those susceptible to recruitment, and secondly, the messages that most likely affect them. They also need to understand how these individuals are influenced: what channels are meaningful to them, whom they listen to, the effect of peer networks, and how to reach them most effectively.
Counter Narratives, Noise and Persuasion

The reasons why an individual becomes radicalized are not yet fully understood. The fact that an individual embraces the terrorists’ narrative does not necessarily mean he/she will join Jihad against the West and/or actually engage in any terrorist activity. Yet progress in counterterrorism appears to be related to both establishing a credible narrative and damaging the terrorist narrative. The role of narratives is relatively new to the examination and analysis of terrorism. Studies that have been undertaken have contributed to understanding how terrorist narratives are used strategically by violent extremists to establish and influence target audiences. Based on this knowledge, other studies apply understandings of the terrorist narrative to the construction of counter narratives that challenge the messages embedded in terrorist texts. Casebeer and Russell, for example, suggest that the most effective way to counter terrorism is by developing a ‘better story’ to replace “their” narrative. For this purpose, in Britain, a special communication unit, the Research, Information and Communication Unit (RICU) was set up in Whitehall in 2007. Its task was specifically to “use messaging to disrupt the al-Qaeda narrative”.[11] In the US, a Presidential Task Force report also argues for “rewriting the narrative”.[12]

The construction of a counter narrative to violent jihad should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to combat radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups. The counter narrative differs from a counter information campaign in that, more than simply maligning the enemy or challenging its message, it offers an alternative vision to which one opts in; a storyline that gives meaning to the actions it is requesting of the subscriber. This narrative, then, must discredit that of the jihadists—most importantly de-legitimizing the violence they promote—while at the same time making a compelling case for forms of non-violent activism and civic participation. In the United States much of the Internet-based campaigning that has appeared in opposition to the jihadi narrative has been negative, formulated by groups and organisations with an anti-Islamic agenda. The same can be said of the Australian context where anti-Islamic groups such as the Australian Defence League have established a web presence that is as problematic as those of the jihadists.

In her Op-Ed article on “Future Terrorists,” Jane Harman argued that “we need to employ the best tools we know of to counter radicalizing messages and to build bridges to the vulnerable. (...) Narratives can inspire people to do terrible things, or to push back against those extremist voices.”[13] To run such a strategy, a political Internet campaign against terrorism must use tactics which have proven to be successful and which can be applied to the counterterrorism arena. Finding such effective tactics was at the heart of discussions at the Riyadh Conference on the “Use of the Internet to Counter the Appeal of Extremist Violence.” Co-hosted by the United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the Naif Arab University for Security Sciences in Riyadh in partnership with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (January 2011),[14] the conference brought together around 150 policy-makers, experts, and practitioners from the public sector, international organizations, industries, academia, and the media. The conference focused on identifying good practices in using the Internet to undermine the appeal of terrorism, expose its lack of legitimacy and its negative impact, and undermine the credibility of its messengers. Key themes included the importance of identifying the target audience, crafting effective messages, identifying credible messengers, and using appropriate media to reach vulnerable communities.

There is an important source for counter-terrorist narratives: learning from those who have decided to leave terrorist organizations. As suggested by Jacobson, in order to determine what kind of counter-narrative might be effective among those seemingly hardened individuals already in terrorist organizations or those well along the path to radicalization, it is useful to study people who have voluntarily walked away from these paths.[15] Determining the reasons for such a change in perspective could help crafting messages designed to
pull people away from terrorist organizations.

**Say No to Terror**

*Say No to Terror* is a comprehensive communication campaign comprising a website, media and social media presence. The campaign uses a variety of mechanisms including short videos and posters for communicating a counter narrative to selected elements of the terroristic narrative. The website is entirely in Arabic and hosts information content (Mission Statement/ About Us) as well as videos, forums, posters and links to social media platforms (Facebook and Twitter). Users who register on the website can post comments about the videos as well as other material.

*Say No to Terror* is specifically aimed at a Muslim Arabic audience; this is underscored by the campaign's slogan “Terrorism. I am Muslim: I am against it” and its language of delivery. According to the website, “Terrorism is a criminal act targeting innocent people, and it deserves to be fought by all means and to have its claims and its devastating effects on our society disclosed.”

The “About Us” section of the full website describes the website creators as believers in the justice of true Islam and defenders of the greatness of Islam. Their mission is to:

“No expose the claims of terrorist agitators and unveil their crimes, to encourage all those who have a conscience to reject their criminal acts and destructive ideas and to fight them in order to protect our society from their wrongs and their destructive impact on all levels.”

Attempts to identify the source of the website have not yielded any significant insights- a domain search reveals that the domain is shielded behind a Washington based anonymity protection service. The website is hosted in Montenegro in what may be an attempt by the creators to circumvent attitudes of mistrust of American-sponsored communication in the Arab world. However, a close analysis of the website content suggests that affiliations lie with or are at least sympathetic to Saudi Arabia. The campaign videos are also posted on YouTube and repeatedly aired as public service announcements on the Pan-Arab Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) and Al-Arabiya channels, both Saudi-owned. Posts that refer to specific religious tenets or situations (such as the Syrian conflict) are consistent with Saudi Arabia’s stated position on such matters. These posts give precedence to the Saudi Arabian monarchy, “The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”, as the legitimate authority in Islam and emphasise the monarchy’s efforts to counter terrorism. In order to provide context and information about the website, a comprehensive translation and analysis of the website content was undertaken.

The methodology involved an initial translation of the website content and videos from Arabic to English. The translation was undertaken by one of the authors (Aly) and a bilingual research assistant. Aly’s translations of the videos applied to both the visual elements (characters, setting, use of symbols) and the textual elements (spoken and written). This was followed by a qualitative content analysis of the written and visual texts to explore the content, structure and function of the messages embedded in the texts. The analysis was constructed around a grounded theory model, based on the one first developed by Glasser and Strauss.[16] This model involved an initial reading of the data to code for as many categories as possible. These categories originated in concepts borrowed from content analysis of terroristic narratives available in the literature (for example: *jihad*, *martyrs*, *caliphate*) as well as the researcher’s own knowledge of the cultural and linguistic setting and the significance of particular concepts within this setting (for example: *zakat*, *takfir*, *sectarianism*). The initial open coding of the data [17] highlighted themes in the videos and posts for further analysis. The salient themes from the analysis of the videos and posters were then collated and integrated.
The final stage of the coding process produced four thematic categories or master narratives used in *Say No to Terror* to construct narratives about terrorism, its place in Arab society and its consequences. The master narratives, their attributes and the themes that comprise them are summarised in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Master narrative</th>
<th>Descriptive content</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism is a dangerous threat</td>
<td>Terrorism destroys individuals and families. Those who join terrorist groups are misled and the terrorist lifestyle is damaging.</td>
<td>Jihad, Extremism, Sectarianism, Consequences of Terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists are the enemy</td>
<td>Terrorists are the real oppressors and attempt to brainwash children and youth. Muslims are suffering at the hands of terrorist criminals who kill other Muslims.</td>
<td>Takfir, Extremism, Manipulation and lies, “Enemies of Islam”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermining terrorist leaders</td>
<td>Terrorists are liars and manipulators who use Islam to serve a personal agenda.</td>
<td>Takfir, Extremism, Jihad, Manipulation and lies, Enemies of Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim obligation</td>
<td>All Muslims have a duty to be vigilant against terrorist manipulators and to protect themselves and their families from the scourge of terrorism. Muslims have a duty to ensure that they are not inadvertently supporting terrorism. Those who support terrorism are also terrorists.</td>
<td>Extremism, jihad, Consequences of terrorism, Vigilance against terrorism, Manipulation and lies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there would also be value in a quantitative analysis of aspects that may serve as indicators of the campaigns reach and/or effectiveness, a quantitative analysis was considered beyond the scope of this particular study. Rather, the task undertaken in this case was to identify the master narratives of the texts and the persuasive elements embedded in these narratives: the purpose being to evaluate whether and how the master narrative of *Say no to Terror* forms a counter-narrative to the al-Qaeda master narrative. Finally, the master narrative and related messages of *Say No to Terror* were analysed through the framework of noise proposed by Weimann and Von Knopp. It describes five elements of a successful noise strategy: credibility; terminology; traditions; partners; and act local, think global. As the website is constantly updated, the analysis included all 15 videos available for viewing on the website at the time of writing and a selection of website content during the period February thru August 2013.

**Videos**

The analysis of the 15 videos on the *Say No to Terror* website highlighted the following themes that appeal to either logic and reason (systematic persuasion) or habit and emotion (heuristic persuasion):

1. Consequences of joining terrorism;
2. Manipulation and lies;
3. The “enemies of Islam”;
4. Vigilance against terrorism.

Importantly, these themes are constructed around familiar concepts in traditional Arab/Muslim culture. The videos use Quranic verses and popular hadiths to accompany images and rely on Arab/Muslim traditions that value family and the collective good over individualism. In this respect, the videos present a narrative that mirrors elements of the terroristic narrative that construct the call to armed jihad as an altruistic obligation for all Muslims for the sake of the greater good.[18]

A salient theme in the website videos is that of exposing the agenda and manipulative techniques used by terrorist organisations. Several videos depict terrorist organisations as criminal and warn viewers against being manipulated by the terrorist narrative, while others use the testimony of former terrorists to expose “the enemies of Islam”. “The Misguided Terrorist” is presented as based on real events as a young man narrates an account of his arrest for terrorist activities. “The Enemy Within” picks up similar themes exposing terrorists for killing Muslims, while other videos such as “The Scream”, “I am Innocent of Your Crimes” and “No Life Flourishes where there is Terrorism” all draw on images of innocence juxtaposed against images of terrorism. These three videos use visuals of children and/or childhood symbols to draw attention to the injurious effects of terrorism. “The Road of no Return” is more explicitly focussed on sectarian violence, suggesting that the video is targeted at an Iraqi audience. The video exposes sectarianism as a vulnerability that extremists exploit: “Sectarianism makes you enter the prison of extremism, and so you become a prey for agitators seeking to achieve their political goals. It is not through sectarian extremism that you defend your religion, but you defend your religion through protecting it from sectarian extremism.”

Drawing on Arab/Muslim social constructs of collective good, several videos urge viewers to be vigilant about terrorism and its influence. These include the video titled “An eye that watches is better than an eye that cries”, which warns viewers that “The Internet is a way to communicate and a gateway to knowledge. But the terrorists also see it as a window /path to our children, to brainwash their young minds and to convince them of their criminal principles. Our duty is to protect our children from danger and deception, not only in the schools and on the roads, but also within the sanctity of our homes. Terrorists are determined to mislead our children.”

“The Clowns” also calls for vigilance but targets public support for terrorism by encouraging viewers to speak out against terrorism. Two videos titled “Zakat” and “Good Charity/ Bad Charity” attempt to raise public awareness of terrorist financing operations posing as valid charities. Both videos call on viewers to take personal responsibility for ensuring that charitable donations and zakat (Muslim obligatory charity) do not end up funding terrorist activities.

**Posts**

While the website videos tend to avoid reinterpretation of religious concepts that challenge the Jihadi-Salafi ideology, the posts and other website content take a more direct approach either through the images posted or by means of links to articles and opinion pieces that challenge the Jihadi-Salafi construction of key Islamic concepts. An analysis of the website posts during the period of examination reveals four themes:

1. Extremism (mainly in a context marked by sectarianism)
2. Takfir (accusing other Muslims of apostasy)
3. Jihad
4. Terrorism

For each of these themes, the website posts present an alternative construction and a world view that counters that found in terroristic master narratives.

Sectarianism: The danger of sectarianism is regularly highlighted in the website with sectarian divisions a common theme. Sectarian strife such as in Iraq presents the ideal context for extremism to flourish and provides fertile ground for terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda to establish in a region /country.

Extremism: Extremism is described as the first step towards terrorism. Website posts aim to discredit extremists and their motives stating that extremists (specifically the Taliban and al-Qaeda) use jihad to justify killing innocent Muslims and non-Muslims. Specific posts denounce the hypocrisy of extremist Islamic scholars expressing cynicism of Sheikhs who issue fatwas about the obligation of jihad in Iraq and elsewhere and stating that their motives are financial gain among other things. A good example is the cartoon posted by the website administrators depicting a cleric telling his son “I will send you to the US to study and get a high-ranking job “ and then telling another young man “I will send you for Jihad in Syria so that God willing you get into heaven” (posted 23 July 2013).

Other posts denounce the misleading discourse of incitement to violent jihad by preachers of extremism and the influence mechanisms they use. Islamic extremists are the enemies of Islam (they hold the image of Islam as hostage) and they feed Islamophobia. The reference to Islamophobia is particularly interesting and suggests an attempt to re-construct an understanding of Islamophobia that turns a lens onto extremism.

An image posted on the website on 5 July 2013 shows terrorists holding Islam (represented by the image of a man dressed in traditional Arabic clothing) hostage. The cartoon bears the title Islamic extremists are the real enemies of Islam and is accompanied by the text “No one feeds Islamophobia with as much destruction and strength as do these Islamic extremists. They are the real Islamophobes.” The post links to an article published in the Opinion pages of Al Hayat news website that describes Islamophobia not as an attack on the teachings of Islam, but an attack on Muslims living in the West designed to limit their ability to actively engage with and contribute to the societies in which they live. As such, Islamophobia is most potently perpetrated by Islamist extremists who provide Western Islamophobes with justifications for their hostility towards Muslims. [19]

Takfir (accusing other Muslims of apostasy) is challenged through website posts, not through religious reconstruction or debate on the concept but by criticising its use to serve certain political agendas—namely those of Salafi groups. In the context of the Arab Spring, website posts makes some comment criticising authors supportive of political Islam movements who resort to takfir and who propagate al-Qaeda’s ideology.

Terrorism and Jihad: A consistent message in the website posts is the denunciation of terrorism as a manipulation of religious doctrine. Terrorists are constructed (both visually and discursively) as menacing figures who kill innocents, kidnap civilians and send the Ummah’s youth to perdition. The poster titled Youth in the hands of preachers of extremism is accompanied by the text: “Who are these people who are misleading youth? They are a category of people who mix, in their methods and rhetoric, between old means of agitation and new ones. Sometimes they try to hide behind religious or ideological slogans and sometimes behind popular claims or appeals or slogans, in order to justify terrorism and call for more of it and incite young people to practise it. It has become clear that the misleading discourse of incitement uses a set of means and mechanisms” (Posted 29 April 2013).
Master Narratives of ‘Say No to Terror’ and the al-Qaeda Master Narrative

Halverson et al introduced the concept of ‘master narratives’ that are employed by violent Islamist extremists in their ideological discourse. Unlike narratives, master narratives transcend localised differences, are deeply embedded in culture and, importantly, are constantly re-interpreted according to the historical context. According to Halverson et al, the violent extremist Islamist narrative commonly draws on sacred texts and Islamic history. One example is the Pharaoh master narrative which violent jihadists use to propagate their own struggles against regimes and to reinforce divine sovereignty. Similarly, the Battle of Badr, the first major battle between the Muslims and Quraysh, the most powerful tribe in Mecca, provides a powerful metaphor for contemporary conflicts reinterpreted as modern jihad.

A report by the Open Source Centre identified the following elements of the al-Qaeda master narrative:

- **War on Islam:** There is a war going on against Islam, and the West is a major enemy.
- **Agents of the West:** Muslim rulers are agents of the West.
- **The Nakba:** The establishment of Israel is a humiliation and an injustice that Muslims must rectify.
- **Violent Jihad:** Muslims have a duty to wage violent jihad in order to achieve justice.
- **Blood of the Martyrs:** Self-sacrifice is the route to victory.
- **Restoring the Caliphate:** Ending injustice and suffering requires restoring Islamic rule according to al-Qaeda’s version of Islamic law.[20]

Collectively, these six master narratives construct a salient argument that defines the problem, the solution and the required course of action. They employ both systemic and heuristic persuasion techniques appealing to emotion by constructing the problem as a gross humiliation and injustice to the Muslim world and to logic by drawing on historical evidence. Importantly, they also divert existing attitudes around issues such as the establishment of Israel into contemporary directions that call for action. This process known as “canalization”[21] which involves the channelling of existing motives, needs and values to new directions. According to Wallack, a communication campaign that calls for a change in behavior congruent with existing attitudes—or canalization—is more likely to succeed.[22]

The al-Qaeda master narratives “emphasize themes of shared humiliation, injustice, faithful duty, and the promise of re-establishing a golden age. Further, they draw on a robust set of historical evidence — from the earliest days of Islam to today’s hot zones — applicable to diverse audiences and geographies, giving al-Qaeda communicators the flexibility they need to use these master narratives across varied strategic and communications fronts. Historical depth and geographic breadth makes these stories enduring, dramatic, and highly resilient.”[23]

Collectively, the four master narratives of Say No to Terror form a coherent argument for resisting terrorism tailored to an Arabic audience. These narratives emphasise themes of familial and national loyalty and social well-being, drawing heavily on cultural dimensions of the Arabic collective society.

As a counter marketing campaign, Say No to Terror employs mechanisms that communicate incentives and benefits for resisting terrorism that appeal to the cultural values of the target audience. These mechanisms are important for assessing how the campaign operates as a counter marketing strategy. Even more important is that master narratives in the campaign, like the violent Islamist narrative, are deeply embedded in Islamic cultural history and they challenges elements of the al-Qaeda master narrative by offering alternative
constructions and understandings of contemporary affairs.

The master narratives of *Say No to Terror* comprise elements derived from sacred texts. Quranic verses that directly or indirectly challenge violent extremist interpretations of key Islamic doctrines such as *jihad* and *takfir* are used to expose and undermine the political agenda of violent extremists. In doing so, this narrative reconstructs terrorists—not the West—as the most threatening enemy of Islam and attempts to manipulate the intersubjective world view of Muslims that positions the West as a force that is actively engaging in an ongoing war to undermine Islam. While the master narratives of al-Qaeda impose on Muslims a religiously sanctioned moral obligation to wage violent jihad, the master narratives of *Say No to Terror* impose a religiously sanctioned moral obligation to protect themselves and their communities from extremism and terrorism. While the master narratives of al-Qaeda construct Muslim rulers as agents of the West and call for a restoration of justice through the imposition of Islamic rule, the master narratives of *Say No to Terror* emphasise the ordained authority of “The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”.

In constructing a counter narrative that primarily aims at challenging the validity of terrorism, the justification of violent jihad and the authority of terrorist leaders *Say No to Terror* presents a counter campaign that aligns with Jacobsen’s suggestions for the construction of an effective counter narrative. Drawing on lessons learned from cases of former terrorists, Jacobson suggested several motives for counter-narrative:

1. **Undermine terrorist leadership:** From the various terrorist dropout cases, it seems clear that a general lack of respect for a group's leadership has often been a factor in dropping out of terrorist group or path. Thus, undermining terrorist and extremist leadership, should constitute one part of the tactic. Crafting messages that significantly detract from leaders’ authority and credibility is vital.

2. **Highlight civilian/Muslim suffering, hypocrisy of the Islamist narrative:** An effective counter-narrative should also demonstrate civilian and Muslim victimization by extremism and terrorism. Disillusionment with the terrorists’ strategy and actions has been found to play a major reason people have left such groups.

3. **Portray terrorists as criminals:** Many terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, are increasingly involved in a variety of criminal activities. These include a wide array of criminal activity, ranging from cigarette smuggling to selling counterfeit products, from identity thefts to production and selling of drugs. According to the [American] Drug Enforcement Administration, 19 of 43 U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist organizations are definitively linked to the global drug trade, and up to 60 percent of terrorist organizations are suspected of having some ties with the illegal narcotics trade. Painting terrorists as common criminals may help demonstrate the impurity of their motives, ideology and supposed religious conviction.

4. **Focus on life as a terrorist:** The reality of life for a terrorist has often driven people out of them. Through studying the personal stories of terrorist dropouts, it can be discerned that the individual operatives’ perceived lack of respect from leaders was influential in their decision to break from the radical group. If people are joining because the terrorist lifestyle seems glamorous or because they believe they are fulfilling some larger purpose, demonstrating the reality will help to dispel these myths. This may involve the use of former members that can describe their unsatisfying lives as members of a terrorist organization, emphasizing that it simply does not live up to the hype.[24]

Jacobsen’s model for developing counter narratives also comes with an important caveat: “Another critical element of devising a successful counter-narrative strategy is recognising that governments are not always the
most effective messengers for presenting the counter-narrative… There are many cases, however, where other actors may make more effective and credible messengers.”[25]

**Say No to Terror as Noise**

Analyses of the *Say No to Terror* master narratives or its persuasive elements do not necessarily yield any insights as to the effectiveness of the campaign as an online counter-terrorist narrative. An analysis of 281 YouTube comments in response to the campaign videos by Al-Rawi found that 60% were negative, characterised by anger, mistrust and threats against the campaign sponsors. While this finding cannot be considered indicative of the overall response to the campaign given that those most likely to comment are those who feel either strongly negative or strongly positive, it does provide some indication as to the kinds of responses the campaign elicits. According to Al-Rawi’s analysis, the negative response to the videos is largely driven by suspicion about the authenticity and motives of the sponsors. Al Rawi also suggests that the campaign may have motivated a wave of counter efforts on YouTube. Inspired by the campaign’s catchphrase, videos entitled or tagged “Jihad, I’m Muslim: I’m with it” and “Occupation, I’m a Muslim; I’m against it” now vastly exceed the number of *Say No to Terror* videos on YouTube.[26]

Weimann and Von Knop argue that an effective communication strategy should combine both hard and soft power elements. In terms of noise, mechanical noise such as hacking incorporates elements of a hard power approach while social and psychological noise are characteristic of a soft approach. Weimann and von Knop suggest five elements of a successful noise strategy: credibility; terminology; traditions; partners; act local, think global.[27]

Credibility of the source is a decisive factor for ensuring the persuasiveness of any communication. Terroristic narratives derive their authority from the master narrative that draws on sacred texts. Religious authority in Islam is, however, flexible and contentious, allowing for counter narratives to similarly draw on sacred texts to establish credibility—particularly on the Internet.

The fragmentation and decentralisation of religious authority in Islam has been noted by Eickleman and Piscatori. They argue that “the ulama no longer have, if they ever did, a monopoly on sacred authority. Rather, Sufi Shaykhs, engineers, professors of education, medical doctors, army and militia leaders, and others compete to speak for Islam.”[28] The Internet has both intensified and delegitimised traditional structures of religious authority creating a virtual marketplace of religious ideas and interpretations where epistemic authority in Islam is highly dependent on the perception and acceptance of authority by the social network.

[29] Weimann makes this point in relation to the issuing of jihadist fatwas [religious edicts] on the Internet:

> “The authors of jihadist fatwas come from diverse backgrounds. Some are scholars, some are religious authoritative figures, and others are political leaders of radical movements who are not seen in the wider Islamic world as having authority to provide fatwas, but are accepted as authorities by their followers.”[30]

Several authors have observed that the Internet has challenged traditional structures of religious authority by creating a competitive market where individuals can access religious texts, assemble their own religious guides and accept the religious authority of online experts. As such, the construction of religious authority is as central to the terroristic narrative as it is to any attempts to counter this narrative.

In marketing, the practice of masking sponsors of a message in order to garner public support for a cause is referred to as astroturfing. Political astroturfing is often used to influence public opinion on issues that serve a particular political agenda by lending credibility to the source of the message.[32] Religious credibility in the *Say No to Terror* campaign should be established through the master narrative that draws on similar sacred text elements to the terroristic narrative but that also relies on damaging the credibility of the
terroristic narrative. As Weimann and Von Knop propose, an effective counter strategy involves undermining the terrorists’ credibility while simultaneously introducing an alternative credible source.[33]

Terminology plays a significant role in the effective application of noise. A consistent theme of Say No to Terror is the undermining of terrorists’ use of Islamic concepts like takfir. Interestingly, the campaign does not challenge the theological interpretations of key terminology, takfir and jihad, by replacing the terms with nonviolent interpretations. However, it criticises the use of the terms to serve the terrorists’ violent agenda and exposing their manipulative uses. Specific posts for example openly denounce the hypocrisy of scholars and express cynicism towards sheikhs who issue fatwas about the obligation of violent jihad, ascribing their motives to financial gain.

Traditions form the basis of the violent extremist Islamic master narrative. Thus, a key element of a viable counter narrative campaign should also draw on solutions from within Islamic cultural and religious traditions, symbols and values. Effectively, the strategy of utilising existing cultural traditions, attitudes and shared values constitutes canalization. Say No to Terror does not impose unfamiliar knowledge or social constructs. Instead it canalizes existing attitudes towards the West and socially embedded understandings of religious and moral obligations to new directions that motivate desired changes in behaviour—most notably those associated with identification of the enemy as violent extremists, renewed confidence in the traditional authority of the Saudi Arabian monarchy and increased vigilance such as taking responsibility for ensuring that charitable donations do not fund terrorist activities.

Partners from within the target communities should be actively involved in online counter campaigns to ensure legitimacy and appeal to the target audiences. As mentioned, the source of Say No to Terror remains unidentified and anecdotal evidence suggests that there is some suspicion among Arab communities that the actual source and motive for the campaign originates in the United States. Though this suggestion requires validation, it is important to ensure that the legitimacy of the campaign is not undermined by such allegations and that, even if proven correct, the perceived affiliation with regional partners does not become perceived as an example of Western attempts to influence Arab affairs.

Co-opting additional agents of change in ways that promote the concept of “act local, think global” is a necessary measure for long-term success. Supporting actors include education institutions, social welfare groups and non-government organisations. There is no evidence to suggest that Say No to Terror has transferred from the virtual to the real world through any form of local activism. However, should the campaign continue to expand, there are opportunities for schools and universities both within the Arab world and beyond to utilise Say No to Terror as an education resource and a platform for engaging discussion.

**Conclusion**

The Say No to Terror website and web-based resources represent a novel attempt at disrupting online radicalisation by applying elements of social marketing to attitudinal and behavioural change objectives. From the perspective of noise, the campaign offers an opportunity to explore how noise strategies may be delivered through online counter narratives. A textual analysis of Say No to Terror offers some insights into how the elements that comprise a successful noise strategy may be applied in an online counter narrative campaign: credibility, terminology, traditions, partners; and act local, think global.

The master narrative of Say No to Terror reconstructs several key concepts that are central to the al-Qaeda master narrative in ways that challenge and undermine the Jihadi-Salafist narrative but that are also deeply embedded in Islamic cultural tradition. Theoretically, the salient themes in Say No to Terror comprise what
should be an effective counter narrative: undermining the terrorist leadership (and reinforcing tradition Islamic leadership models); highlighting the hypocrisy of the Jihadi-Salafist narrative; portraying terrorists as criminals (and highlighting that support for terrorist activity, whether witting or unwitting, is also criminal); and focussing on the negative lifestyle of terrorists. However, the obscurity surrounding the origins and motives for Say No to Terror detracts from an essential element of successful noise–credibility. Credibility remains critical to ensuring the effectiveness of any communication, yet it is becoming increasingly challenging in the context of new media technologies that have had a transformative impact on how religious authority is established. One of the most significant challenges to an effective counter narrative is that traditional structures of religious authority in Islam are increasingly undermined and delegitimized by the Internet. Religious authority therefore becomes a matter of individual agency as individuals are able to assemble their own religious guides accepting those that conform to a certain world view and rejecting those that do not.

Whether or not Say No to Terror is an effective communication strategy can only be determined through a long-term, measured assessment of the target audience responses (attitudinal and behavioural) to the campaign’s embedded narratives. A consideration of the audience, their everyday lives and the contexts within which users engage with Internet-based content, has often been lacking in analyses of terroristic narratives. It should be a primary consideration in the development of effective counter communication strategies.

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Notes


[18] Aly, The Terrorists Audience; Aly, Winning the ‘War of Hearts and Minds’


[27] Weimann and von Knop, Applying the notion of noise.


German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective. A First Quantitative Overview of the ‘Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right-Wing Extremism)’ – DTG\textsuperscript{wxe} Project.

by Daniel Koehler

Abstract

This article presents a first quantitative overview of the findings of a private research project, which is running since 2011. The project aims at establishing a comprehensive database of German right-wing terrorist actors (groups, individuals) since the Second World War. It assembles data on incidents in order to gather as much information as possible about respective tactics, strategies, target groups, biographical backgrounds, connections and ideological legitimizations. As a first report and analysis, this article provides a quantitative analysis of right-wing terrorism in Germany, based on data relating to average group size, main target groups, length of existence and main tactics.

Keywords: right-wing terrorism; Germany; database; quantitative analysis

Introduction

Due to the discovery of the German right-wing terrorist group “National Socialist Underground (NSU)” in 2011, which allegedly assassinated at least 10 persons and committed two bombings over a period of almost 14 years undetected, right-wing terrorism has been brought back to nation-wide attention. In comparison to the 77 casualties caused in the same year by the lone wolf Anders Behring Breivik, and compared to Jihadist, national separatist or anarchist terrorism, the activities by the extreme right in Germany have been of a lesser order of magnitude. Only a very small number of academic studies have been focusing exclusively on the nature, tactics and structures of right-wing terrorism in Germany in the last decades. A few edited volumes have collected chapters on specific right-wing terrorist groups from different countries, but without looking at it in a comprehensive way and in any depth. We therefore possess few insights into the possibly distinctive characteristic of terrorism from the extreme right.

In order to establish a comprehensive database for terrorism research in Germany, to begin with in the German right-wing context, a unique private research project was started in 2011 by the author. Over the course of three years, the project collected as much information as possible on terrorist activities by right-wing extreme groups in Germany since the Second World War and merged it in one coherent data base. While still ongoing and constantly being updated, the material gathered so far allows the making a first quantitative overview regarding some basic structures of German right-wing extremist & terrorist groups. As a purely quantitative survey, this article will not focus on specific terrorist groups, incidents or strategic concepts. Rather it concentrates on some basic structures such as the typical group size, targeted groups, methods, lifespan, and communication strategies. In addition some insights into the historical development over the last 50 years will be provided, answering questions such as whether or not right-wing terrorist groups got smaller and more flexible over time (based on the “leaderless resistance” concept), whether the target groups or methods changed, or whether certain waves or phases of right-wing terrorist activities can be identified.
State of the Art

Within international research on terrorism, right-wing extremist terrorism has so far only received minor attention, compared, for instance, to Jihadi terrorism. Although some major publications in the last decades focused specifically on this topic [1], they only scratch the surface of the issue—usually with chapters introducing various right-wing terrorist groups or incidents—without an underlying general typology or concept. Most academic publications dealing with the extreme right either focus on parties and political processes such as elections and campaigns [2] or on various subcultural aspects of different right-wing groups which are not part of the more traditional contemporary political spectrum [3]. The formulation of a theory and typology of right-wing terrorism has been attempted by Ehud Sprinzak [4]. His theory of “Split Delegitimization” — differentiating between revolutionary, reactionary/reactive, vigilante, racist, millenarian, and youth counterculture right-wing terrorism — has, however, not found a wide resonance within academia due to a certain lack of empiric groundwork. Sprinzak suggested that for right-wing terrorist groups, the conflict with government would be “secondary” in comparison to “private wars against hostile ethnic communities” [5]. This does, however, not hold true for many right-wing groups and lone wolf actors (e.g. militias in the US, Breivik in Norway) who perceive democratic and multicultural governments as their main enemies. As Sprinzak’s typology was recognized as being “too simplistic” [6] to be applied to empirical analysis, his model remained relatively inconsequential.

Within international research publications, works on German right-wing terrorism are few; only a handful of academic studies can be identified [7]. From an academic perspective, most publications have been of a rather journalistic nature and lack scientific rigour [8]. On the academic level, only a handful of publications can be found [9]; they vary greatly both in terms of scope and quality. Partially due to lack of empirical data, some scholars have formulated theories that are surprising, for example, that right-wing terrorists prior to the NSU series of murders, never directly attempted to kill individuals from their target group and are therefore claiming that there is a rise of a ‘new generation’ of right-wing terrorists [10]. In short, with regard to forms and aspects of right-wing terrorism, the field is highly under-researched and under-represented within international and German academic studies of terrorism and political violence. Although some scholars have attempted to establish theoretical foundations for a study of right-wing terrorism, the sheer lack of comprehensive and detailed empirical data about right-wing terrorist actors, structures and tactics has essentially prevented the development of systematic analysis regarding this type of terrorism.

To improve this situation, the DTG\textsuperscript{wxs} began building a knowledge base for the in-depth study of German right-wing terrorism in order to detect potential differences and commonalities with other forms of terrorism.

Methods, Sources, and the Database Project

The main goal of the initial DTG\textsuperscript{wxs} project was to describe the development of ideologies, strategies, tactics, group structures and networks of German right-wing terrorism from a historical perspective. For the first time in research on German right-wing extremism, an attempt has been made to establish a database for right-wing terrorism that includes as much information as possible on the actors (groups and individuals), incidents, target groups, tactics, ideology, networks, lifespan, communication, effects of government measures, success of the terrorist groups, victims and other relevant data. As a notoriously inaccessible field for research, all available sources have been included: media reports, police investigation files, court documents, academic literature, autobiographies of former right-wing terrorists, verdicts, interviews with former terrorists, investigators and lawyers, intelligence reports (Verfassungsschutzberichte – reports form
the agency for the protection of the Constitution), government reports as well as internal documents of right-wing groups (e.g. strategy papers, books, training manuals). After an initial overview, the data was coded and analysed quantitatively and qualitatively, gathering as much information as possible for each identified actor or incident.

The DTGrwx consists of two main parts: incidents and actors. While the part on incidents includes acknowledged acts of violence committed by right-wing extremists (e.g. killings, arson and attacks with explosives, kidnappings and hostage takings) not all have a terrorist background; sometimes incidents attributed to right-wing extremists have a rather personal criminal background and can therefore not be included in an analysis about right-wing terrorism. In addition, many incidents, actors or purposes are simply unknown. Sometimes a right-wing motive has only been suspected by authorities. In our database, the part on actors only includes identified actors (groups and individuals) from the extreme right, who planned, prepared or executed coercive acts of violence for purposes identified in the revised Academic Consensus Definition of terrorism (2011), developed by Schmid [11]. Naturally there is a large difference between these two parts in terms of numbers and proportions. This article solely relies on the identified actors, while the database on incidents has to be analysed in a different way.

Although the analysis is still ongoing and the database is constantly updated, it has already become the largest accumulation of information on right-wing terrorism in Germany. Currently the DTGrwx consists of:

- 84 right-wing terrorist actors (groups and individuals) that could be identified since 1963, using the combined definition of Schmid (2011) and Wagner (2013).
- 123 right-wing terrorist attacks using explosives of some kind since 1971
- 2,173 right-wing arson attacks since 1971
- 229 homicides with a right-wing extremist background since 1971
- 12 kidnappings
- 56 cases of blackmailing
- 174 armed robberies

Of course not every arson attack, kidnapping, blackmailing or robbery can be related to right-wing terrorism, which is why every incident has to be qualitatively analysed and embedded within the database of identified actors. Sometimes one right-wing group for example commits an armed robbery to finance another group’s terrorist activities, which was then counted as militant periphery (support structures, recruitment pool, radicalizing milieu). As the scope of the DTGrwx also aims to cover the militants’ peripheral attacks (e.g. averted by police) that failed and plots that have been prepared but not carried out have been included as well.

**Definitions**

To gather information on right-wing terrorist actors and incidents in a database requires definitions adequately balanced to recognize the relevant phenomenon and to distinguish it from irrelevant data. As the German legal definitions both of right-wing extremism and terrorism was deemed far too narrow for this project, a combination of two main academic definitions have been applied to identify right-wing terrorist actors, groups and incidents. In addition, the project aimed to include the militant periphery of right-wing
terrorist actors as well. Regarding the definition of ‘terrorism’, which is in itself almost a sub-discipline of terrorism studies, Schmid’s revised academic consensus definition from 2011 was used:

“Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties” [12].

Right-wing extremism or radicalism is not less controversial as a concept. In an analysis of different studies of right-wing extremism, Mudde [13] arrived at twenty-six different ways to define the concept, which contained fifty-eight different criteria. In a similar examination of thirteen studies, Druwe [14] found ‘only’ thirty-seven different, partially-intersecting, meanings. In German research at least two definitions are widely used: the ‘consensus group’s and Heitmeyer’s definitions. As a collection of essential characteristics of right-wing extremism the ‘consensus group’ of social scientists defined right-wing extremism as an opinion based on inequality, the affinity to dictatorships, chauvinism, belittlement of National Socialism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and Social Darwinism [15]. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, on the other hand, abstained from a collection of essential characteristics but identified as the core of right-wing extremism a combination of an ideology, which is based on inequality, and a basic acceptance of violence [16]. While Heitmeyer’s definition is far too broad to identify right-wing terrorism the consensus group’s definition with its focus on certain ideological characteristics (e.g. anti-Semitism) remains too narrow; it excludes certain right-wing groups or actors (e.g. Anders Behring Breivik, who would not be counted as a right-wing extremist under the consensus group definition due to his lack of anti-Semitism). Therefore this article and the research project applied the definition elaborated by Bernd Wagner [17] for the data collection:

“Right-Wing Radicalism is a term for a social reality referring to a family of ideologies, which create organizations, movements, mentalities, fashion, groups and scenes, united by the characteristic constraining of the individual’s freedom as ‘zoon politicon’ and of groups on the account of biological and/or ethnic-cultural reasons and criteria. In addition, these elements suspend freedom and dignity, as well as personal rights, in spirit and action, and introduce non-democratic forms of government. Right-Wing Radicalism aspires to create and maintain an order establishing prerogatives for biological and cultural chosen ones thought of as an ethnos, folk or race and to develop a distinctive culture of life, which is thought to be superior and to be established accordingly through morality and legal status, as well as force, ensuring the submission to this order of every participant.” [18].

In short the term right-wing extremism covers a broad range of ideologies that essentially see violence as a legitimate tool to combat a political and ethnic ‘enemy’ (including individuals with different culture, religion, nationality or sexual orientation) seen as a threat to the own race or nation. Both are entangled in an active state of war over future existence.

Main Findings

For a first analytical overview resulting from the DTG project, the following categories will be highlighted in a comparative and quantitative perspective: group size, tactics (main methods), target groups, and lifespan.

Group Size

Regarding the typical group size of German right-wing terrorist actors an important research question is,
whether theoretical concepts such as “leaderless resistance” from 1983 [19] have effectively altered tactical formations in practice or whether merely an evolution of tactics (in terms of group sizes) can be found. For this analysis, five types of sizes have been used to cluster the right-wing terrorist actors: large associations with more than 100 members, large groups with 10 to 40 members, small groups with four to nine members, small cells with two to three members, and lone actors. To determine the size of a certain right-wing terrorist actor is sometimes challenging if not impossible due to several factors:

- In 12 cases no information about the group size was available.
- In five cases only differing estimations about the group size (e.g. 40-100, “a minimum of six”) were available. In these cases the lowest proven number was used.
- Almost all actors had no official membership status and thus a high degree of fluctuation over time. Members also had different functions, which makes it difficult to link some persons to a terrorist plot. Regarding time, the group size at the time of arrest, detection or disbandment was used. In some cases during investigation, trial and verdict the initial group was divided into categories by the authorities, which also complicates the analysis (e.g.: a group of ten was arrested for planning a bomb attack, six persons were charged, four persons convicted of explosives-related crimes, and two on weapons-related charges). In these cases, the number of identified individuals connected to the initial terrorist activity (including execution, planning, support) was counted.
- In some lone actor cases, there is still a debate going on whether or not other persons were involved. For example, the deadliest terrorist attack after the Second World War in Germany is the bombing of the Oktoberfest in Munich in 1980, causing 13 casualties and 211 wounded. It was perpetrated by an extreme right activist: Gundolf Köhler. Although he was a member of a large right-wing extremist organization (the “Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann”) courts and several investigations still claim that he acted alone, despite the fact that some contrary evidence has surfaced over the years. In this case, the DTG™ follows current official police or court statements, meaning that the Oktoberfest bombing is counted as a lone actor perpetrated incident in the database.

Excluding from analysis all the actors about whom we do not yet have good information, it emerges that there were, in total 72 actors between 1963 and 2014. They came from:

- 6 large associations with more than 100 members
- 10 large groups with 10 to 40 members
- 26 small groups with 4–9 members
- 13 small cells with 2–3 members
- 15 lone actors

With 54.2% of perpetrators being part of small groups and small cells, this is by far the most common type of size of right-wing terrorist actors in the DTG™. Lone actors alone count for 20.8% of right-wing terrorist actors.

Small group sizes as a visible part of German extreme right terrorism can be dated back to 1963. At that time, a group of eight German right-wing extremists tried to attack infrastructure (power plants) in South Tyrol (Austria). In 1965, a group of three planned to assassinate the Federal Prosecutor General and execute a bomb attack against the German Office for the Prosecution of War Criminals in Ludwigsburg. However, to
the general public small scale right-wing terrorism became visible only in 1973 with the “Gruppe Neumann” (six members) and in 1978 with the “Wehrwolfgruppe Stubbemann” (three members). In fact most of the more or less widely known and lethal terrorist groups have developed small group or cell structures (e.g., “Gruppe Ludwig” [two members, killing 14 person in 9 attack between 1977 and 1984], “Deutsche Aktionsgruppen” [four members, killing two persons in nine attacks in 1980], “Hepp-Kexel Gruppe” [six members, perpetrating four attacks], and “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund” [three members, killing 10 persons]). Based on the timeframe segmented into roughly four decades (1963-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2014) and the distribution of small units (for small groups and cells) and lone actors, the following observations can be made:

- 1963-1979: eight small groups and cells, two lone actors
- 1980-1989: ten small groups and cells, five lone actors
- 1990-1999: four small groups and cells, two lone actors
- 2000-2014: 16 small groups and cells, six lone actors

Although this shows a clear increase of small units and lone actors since 2000, it has to be mentioned that most actors with unknown size are located in the early decades of the DTGrwx. Broken down into percentage (including small groups, cells and lone actors) of all known right-wing terrorist actors per decade the numbers are as follows:

- 1968-1980: 40%
- 1980-1990: 78.9%
- 1990-2000: 40%
- 2000-2014: 88%

Therefore, it can be argued that after a first zenith of small scale right-wing terrorism between 1980 and 1989, a clear orientation to small unit tactics by the extreme right terrorist milieu is observable since 2000.

**Tactics**

Tactics used by right-wing terrorist actors include methods of coercive violence, typically explosive and arson attacks, targeted assassinations, hostage takings and kidnappings. Again some qualifications are necessary. In a number of cases, no concrete tactics could be detected or was made public. In these cases, investigators or courts spoke of “severe crimes planned against the security of the state”, “militant plans” against politicians and civilians or simply used the term “terrorist plans”. Naturally, due to a lack of coherent definitions, standards and legal frameworks these cases occurred more often in the early decades of the DTGrwx. Moreover, groups that have been mostly active in supportive operations for other terrorist actors have not been included here. However, when a right-wing actor executed, prepared and planned an attack, using one of the above-mentioned methods, the actor was included. In many cases, actors used a mix of terrorist methods either simultaneously or in sequences. Each method executed or planed was counted. Thus the percentages below do not refer to absolute size of attacks in the real world but rather show a distribution of tactics in regard to preference by actors in theory and practice. They exclude actors committing acts of support or without a known tactic.
This table shows that in the early decades within the DTG, a broad range of tactics was used by these actors, including hostage taking and kidnappings - tactics almost completely vanishing after 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, right-wing terrorist actors relied on three tactics: explosive attacks (mostly), as well as arson attacks and targeted assassinations. It would appear that a wave of explosive attacks between 1990 and 2000 was followed by another differentiation of tactics since 2000. Two special cases have been excluded but are worth mentioning:

- Between 1977 and 1978 the “Wehrsportgruppe Rohwer/Werwolf” attacked Allied and German military installations, patrols and barracks in at least four cases.
- In 2014 a young right-wing extremist was discovered in Munich with an arsenal of weapons, extensive combat gear, and explosives. While police attempted to enter his apartment he tried to detonate several bombs and killed himself.

A special reference is also necessary regarding the wave of right-wing arson attacks on asylum seeker homes in the early 1990s after the German reunification (1,499 incidents between 1991 and 1994). These attacks are part of the incidents database but could in most cases not been tied to a specific actor or to a specific strategy. Although it is proven that in some instances right-wing groups publically called for, and advertised, arson attacks against asylum facilities it is unclear whether these attacks can be included in an analysis of right-wing terrorism. This phenomenon will be treated differently and needs in depth qualitative analysis. It is very close to Sprinzak’s category of “youth counterculture terrorism” [20].

**Target Groups**

When it comes to targets of right-wing terrorism, again, a number of cases have to be excluded because no specific information was available or because actors attacked more than one target group. In addition, this categorization aligns with the target typology typically used by right-wing terrorist actors themselves. In many cases, the only evidence comes from statements or documents of the perpetrators outlining, for example, planned attacks against “foreigners” – a highly controversial term in the German context – without necessarily being more specific. This makes it difficult to analyze subcategories, such as right-wing terrorist violence against Muslims. Even most police and court documents do not differentiate the ethnic background of the target groups, but usually use terms like “immigrants” or “persons with an immigration background” are used. Due to this, the category “foreigners” as a target group mainly refers – in the eyes of the perpetrators – to individuals with non-German or ‘non-Aryan’ ethnical background. Right-wing terrorists very rarely seem to focus on a specific group of ‘foreigners’ or delineate what the category means exactly (e.g. Muslims born in Germany, mixed families).

The numbers reproduced below represent proportions of specific target groups. Subsuming any representative of the government or state structure, the ‘Government’ category includes targets such as police officers, judges, politicians, military personnel (German or other), as well as state prosecutors. ‘Infrastructure’ includes mainly buildings such as party offices (e.g. from the Social Democratic Party), court houses, police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Targeted Assassination</th>
<th>Explosive Attacks</th>
<th>Arson Attacks</th>
<th>Hostage Taking, Kidnapping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1979</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>0%*</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2014</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
stations, schools, but also railways, power supply networks, restaurants and other installations. To the extent that individuals or groups identified by the extreme right as “the Left” (communists, anti-fascists, social democrats not being part of the government) have been targeted, they were subsumed under the category “The Left”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>The Left</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1979</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2014</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Surprising is the fact that the government always has been a major target of right-wing terrorists, which is contrary to the theory of Sprinzak [21]. In addition it could be expected before the German reunification that the presence of Allied and Russian Forces in Germany would, in theory, provide a basis for right-wing terrorist propaganda. After the reunification, a perceived weakness of especially East German authorities might have triggered attacks on government targets. After 2000 right-wing terrorists again chose different target groups, with a major focus on Jewish communities and persons.

Three special cases have been excluded and are worth mentioning in detail:

- The “Gruppe Ludwig” killed 14 persons in nine attacks between 1977 and 1984, mainly targeting discotheques, prostitutes, and catholic priests. The group's agenda was to stop moral decay within the Christian-’Aryan’ culture and society.

- Gundolf Köhler, the perpetrator of the Oktoberfest bombing, killed 13 persons and wounded 211, making it most severe terrorist attack in post Second World War Germany. Köhler planted the bomb at the main entry of the Oktoberfest, which allegedly detonated earlier than expected, killing Köhler. This is the only known right-wing terrorist act that targeted persons indiscriminately. It was obviously designed to inflict mass casualties.

- In 1981 a group of five right-wing extremists founded the “Kommando Omega”. They targeted dropouts (‘traitors’), judges and lawyers with explosives and assassinations.

**Length of Group Activity (Lifespan)**

To show the average length of a group's active existence among Germany’s right-wing terrorist groups is more problematic. For one reason, it is simply impossible to determine when a group of individuals or lone actors have decided to form a terrorist cell or started preparing for an attack especially since this kind of activity is typically executed clandestinely. Although some court documents and media reports state facts like “have been preparing since…” or “formed a terrorist group in 2001 the latest”, it is completely unclear which criteria have been used to define or recognize the starting point of a terrorist group or act. In addition, media reports, investigation files, court verdicts and other sources might all use different criteria and have different perspectives on when a group was formed or an act prepared. Thus this overview of average time of activity before detection by authorities, arrest, and/or disbandment should be used with caution and as a rough indication only.

Excluding two cases without confirmed information about the actor's lifespan, the vast majority of right-wing terrorist actors is active no longer than one year (73.2%) before either being detected and arrested by the authorities or before disbandment (sometimes to avoid arrest). It would, however, appear, that if an actor
‘survives’ more than one year, chances of long-term activity rapidly increase with 13.4% being active between one and five years and 13.4% more than five years. With 14 years of activity the “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU)” was the most successful German right-wing terrorist actor in terms of lifespan.

Communication

Probably one of the most surprising characteristics of right-wing terrorism is the form of communication chosen by right-wing terrorist actors in combination with their attacks. Although terrorism, due to the propagandistic and psychological effects, can always be regarded as form of communication in itself, some scholars have focused on media attention as a central goal of terrorists to gain a podium for their political or religious agenda [22]. Many (if not most) terrorist actors therefore use some form of public claim statement after attacks to connect their group, ideology, brand or statement with the incident. In case of German right-wing terrorism, however, only a small minority of perpetrators claimed in public credit for the attack (including to leave a note, statement, or other form of ideological identification at the crime scene). As a result of the absence of public claims of responsibility for their attacks, public and academia in Germany discuss whether right-wing attacks should be counted as ‘terrorism’. While in theory the psychological effect (terrorizing the target group) can be achieved without specific claim statements (e.g., a bombing of a synagogue might be self-explanatory), the propagandistic effect of unclaimed attacks is much weaker, if present at all.

For this survey, only those right-wing terrorist actors who actually tried to execute attacks (including failed ones) were used. This accounts for 42.9% of all actors in the DTGrwx. Of those, only 19.4% made some form of public claims (e.g., letters, statements at the crime scene, media communiqués – almost one fifth of the attackers) to identify themselves as perpetrators and to spread their political or ideological agenda. As a special case the “Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU)” did produce a video statement claiming the attacks. However, they sent them to different media stations, politicians, and civil society groups only after the group was detected in 2011. In general, public statements of right-wing terrorist actors only very rarely contain concrete political claims or programs. In most cases swastikas or similar symbols were left at the crime scene or the victims and target groups were scorned through the statements.

Conclusion

With this brief quantitative overview, the first step to a more comprehensive analysis of right-wing terrorism in Germany becomes possible. Taking key elements of known right-wing terrorist actors (size, tactics, target groups, lifespan, communication), this article allows to characterize right-wing terrorism in Germany for the first time empirically so that common traits as well as differences with other types of terrorism can be found. Most striking at this point appears to be the lack of typical forms of communication (e.g., communiqués, claim statements) after perpetrating attacks. This holds true for the majority of right-wing terrorist actors in Germany. This is an aspect worth looking into in future studies, showing how exactly (if at all) the propagandistic effect of right-wing terrorist acts is achieved and how the actors themselves think about this strategy (or lack thereof). In addition, knowing more about the targets of right-wing terrorists, what tactics they typically use and how long they usually survive, allows us to identify the atypical cases and subject them to in-depth analysis (e.g., the ‘Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund’, the ‘Gruppe Ludwig’, the ‘Kommando Omega’). In addition the DTG\textsuperscript{rwx} has aggregated a large amount of data regarding biographical backgrounds, reaction and effectiveness of police actions. The database also focuses on ideological explanations as well as strategic and tactical concepts. This will allow for a series of multiple, qualitative and quantitative studies,
focusing on German right-wing terrorism in the future.

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Notes


[12] ibid. p. 86


[18] ibid. p. 3


II. Research Note

The Foreign Fighters’ Threat: What History Can (not) Tell Us
by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn

Abstract

Methodological questions around the determination how many of the foreign fighters going to Syria are likely to engage in terrorism upon their return are discussed. Two approaches are used in this Research Note to assess the threat posed by Western foreign fighters in the past. These serve to answer two questions: how many of the former foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity (approach 1) and how many of jihadist-inspired terrorists were former foreign fighters (approach 2)? The research is based on three studies (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia) and the data are presented in an Appendix. A typology of foreign fighters is presented in the text itself.

Keywords: foreign fighters, Syria, Irak, jihad

Introduction

The New York-based Soufan Group, an international consulting firm, estimated in June 2014 that 12,000 fighters from 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria of which 2,500 originate from Western countries. [1] European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, in September 2014 spoke of no less than 3,000 Europeans who have gone to Syria or Iraq to fight.[2] However, most foreign fighters come from the Middle East and North Africa.

Table 1: Foreign Fighters in Syria from selected countries (as of September 2014) [3]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of foreign fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,200 – 2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This development has been unprecedented in both its scope and speed. Rallying cries to defend the ummah – the Islamic community – have been heard before, with thousands of fighters flocking to Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s and Somalia, Iraq and Yemen in the last decade. Yet Syria has attracted more foreign fighters within a shorter time span.

The ongoing increase in the number of Western foreign fighters going into Syria raises security concerns. Many of these individuals are joining radical jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and lately, the Islamic
State (IS, also known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL).[4] Authorities are worried that these fighters will returned radicalized, battle-hardened and determined to launch terrorist attacks in Western countries. Given the high number of fighters, if only a small percentage of those who return would become involved in terrorist activity, it would lead to a handful (if not dozens) of serious terrorist plots in the period ahead.

The recent change in tactics taken by IS, including the beheadings of Western journalists, shows that the organisation understands psychological warfare. These beheadings are full of symbolism (e.g. the Guantanamo Bay-like jumpsuits, Westerners publicly defying their own governments) and they reach very large audiences around the world via social media. It appears to be a text-book example of what Brian Jenkins observed in 1974: ‘Terrorists want a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead.’[5] Jenkins revised this statement in 2006, saying that ‘[m]any of today’s terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.’[6] As such, IS has not shied away from mass atrocities either, as exemplified in the killing of prisoners of war.[7]

Given the current situation in Iraq and Syria, there is increased pressure on Western leaders to take forceful measures against foreign fighters. Some suggest stripping foreign fighters of their nationality, imprisoning them upon return or forbidding them to return at all.[8] Such suggestions, in turn, have invited fierce criticism. Richard Barrett, former MI6’s Counter-Terrorism chief, noting the debate about presuming British foreign fighters are guilty of involvement in terrorism unless they can prove otherwise, responded that ‘(t)his fundamental tenet of British justice should not be changed even in a minor way for this unproven threat – and it is an unproven threat at the moment’.[9] However, an attack on a Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014 by a former foreign fighter linked to IS and the statement of David Cameron that IS-linked militants had already attempted six attacks in Europe by September 2014 serve as indicators of the gravity of this threat.[10]

The aim of this Research Note (which is based on the author’s Master’s thesis) is to provide an assessment of the threat posed by foreign fighters in previous conflicts and relate this to the current threat posed by foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. It must be immediately acknowledged that this is only of limited value when looking at the current situation in Syria and Iraq. Context and dynamics of each conflict are distinct. Nevertheless, when trying to understand current developments, it is helpful to look at similar events in the past. The outcome of this research can certainly not be extrapolated to the current situation in Syria and Iraq but can help to identify certain parameters that are likely to influence outcomes.

Methodology

Two approaches are used in this Research Note to assess the threat posed by Western foreign fighters in the past. These attempt to answer the following two questions: how many of the former foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity (approach 1) and how many of jihadist-inspired terrorists were former foreign fighters (approach 2)? Three case studies were conducted focusing on foreign fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia. In the results section, problems associated with the quantitative outcomes of such studies will be explained. Regarding the first approach, this Research Note explores the pathways of Western foreign fighters, resulting in a typology based on their post-conflict behaviour.

The second approach looks at the role of former foreign fighters in terrorist plots. It tries to complement the existing works on foreign fighters, especially the works of Thomas Hegghammer, David Malet, Petter Nesser and Aaron Zelin who have studied this issue.[11] Hegghammer’s research is most directly related to this research question as he also explored how many foreign fighters became involved in terrorist activity in the West. In this Research Note, a different definition and methodology is used to offer another perspective on
the threat posed by former foreign fighters in the past.

Before proceeding to the results, a number of elements of the research question must be defined: ‘to what extent have Western Muslim foreign fighters been directly involved in jihadist-inspired plots and attacks in Europe between 1979 and April 2013?’. The first element, Western foreign fighters, is defined in accordance to the definition used by David Malet as ‘non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts’. In the qualitative part of this study – the three historical case studies – foreign fighters from Europe, the United States and Canada are included. In the second approach that investigates the presence of former foreign fighters in terrorist plots, the plots were limited to Europe. This made it possible to use the list of plots and attacks compiled by Petter Nesser.

Jihadist-inspired terrorism will be defined in accordance with the definition proposed by Edwin Bakker as ‘the product of a combination of Islamist ideology and the idea of the jihad (...) in furtherance of the goals of Islam’. Direct involvement in jihadist-inspired plots and attacks excludes passive support such as the financing or mere facilitation of terrorist attacks. The focus is on those who pulled the trigger or detonated the bombs—in other words, those who posed the highest security risk.

Finally, the time span of 1979 – April 2013 needs further explanation. The year 1979 marks the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, signalling the beginning of one of the largest and best documented mobilisations of foreign fighters in history. It was in many respects the beginning of (Western) Muslim foreign fighting we are still confronted with today. Therefore, this conflict will serve as one of the three historical case studies in part I of this Research Note. The second approach relating to the ‘foreign fighter: terrorist ratio’ covers the period 1994 – April 2013, relying on the database compiled by Nesser.

The Two Approaches: Choices and Challenges

The second approach attempts to quantify the presence of Western Muslim foreign fighters in terrorist activity in the West. This has been done carefully by Thomas Hegghammer; he concluded that 1 out of 4 terrorists was a (former) foreign fighter. His research is extremely valuable as it is one of the rare attempts to collect empirical data on foreign fighters in the past. This Research Note, however, uses a somewhat different method of measuring this threat as will be outlined below.

One of the main problems with existing research on foreign fighters is the lack of conceptual clarity: what exactly is a foreign fighter? When do we call someone a foreign fighter and when do we call him a terrorist? Foreign fighting is just one form of militant Islamist action, which can take many forms and shapes. However, Muslim foreign fighting is often described by pundits and scholars as directly related to (jihadist-inspired) terrorism. This runs the risk of overlooking some of the complexities and differences between these two concepts. This conflation of foreign fighting and jihadist-inspired terrorism has been criticised by, amongst others, Barak Mendelsohn. In his article ‘Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends’ he remarks that ‘[u]sually the discussion of the significance of the foreign fighter problem also suffers from a tendency to bracket all foreign volunteers together’. He continues by saying that a foreign fighter is someone ‘fighting in a local conflict that is not his own country’s war’ while a foreign trained fighter is ‘a local who goes to another area, receives training only, and comes back to carry out attacks elsewhere, normally in his own country’.

The distinction applied by Mendelsohn can be difficult to maintain, especially with regard to the ‘AfPak-region’, where (former) Al Qaeda training camps such as Khaldan, al-Farooq or Derunta transformed from sustaining the insurgency against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s to real ‘terrorist training camps’ once Al Qaeda was established. Despite these difficulties, it is useful to put ‘foreign activity’ cases into one of the
two categories. Individuals who merely go to terrorist training camps but do not partake in civil conflicts are categorised as ‘foreign trainees’.

A second choice made in this Research Note that differs from previous research is the inclusion of a definition of the term ‘Western’. This Research Note tries to provide an answer to the question to what extent former Western foreign fighters are involved in terrorist activity. To answer this, it is important to distinguish Western fighters from non-Western foreign fighters. The scenario of an Algerian or Moroccan foreign fighter who eventually decides to travel to a Western country to be involved in a terrorist attack is different from that of a British, Dutch or French Muslim leaving to fight and then coming back to launch an attack.

The criteria that are used in this Research Note are as follows: a) being a citizen of a Western country by birth, b) having moved to a Western country before the age of fifteen, or c) having lived for at least ten years in a Western country prior to any terrorist activity. It must be immediately acknowledged that one can disagree with these criteria and that the empirical data for making such distinctions are uneven and often poor.[18] However, it is important to distinguish between the threat coming from ‘within’ and the so-called ‘imported’ threat. This is a first (and far from perfect) attempt to do so.

Thus, with these two modifications to existing methodologies – a distinction between fighting and training and the criteria qualifying ‘Western’ – a new database was built. This database consists of the ‘Category 1’ incidents included in Petter Nesser’s database: incidents where ‘the existence of hard evidence that a terrorist attack was planned, prepared, or launched; that an attack struck a specific target or that a target or a type of target had been identified by terrorists; and finally, that clearly identifiable jihadis were behind the planning and the attacks.’[19] The result is a new database consisting of 26 plots with 123 individuals involved.[20] This is admittedly a small database but it is hoped that it can serve as a representative sample of all (major) jihadist plots in Europe due to the inclusion of all ‘Category 1’ incidents.

**The Results**

As explained in the previous section, the first approach consisted of three historical case studies because there is a significant gap in empirical data, a gap which impedes us from quantifying the overall presence of terrorists in the foreign fighter population. There is no clear picture of how many individuals became foreign fighters in the first place. William Rosenau and Sara Daly observe that probably hundreds, if not thousands of American Muslims fought in conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s but that subject has not been properly studied. [21] This gap in knowledge is reflected in the estimates given by authors, ranging from hundreds to thousands. One scholar who tried to address this lack of understanding is investigative journalist John M. Berger. In his book *Jihad Joe: Americans who go to war in the name of Islam* he estimated that at least 1,400 Americans participated in some form of jihad over the last thirty years. [22] For the European situation, it is again Hegghammer who provides some useful estimates of the size of the foreign fighter movements. Regarding the European foreign fighters in the 1990s, Hegghammer provides a conservative estimate of around two hundred individuals.[23] This estimate is based upon different reports that have completely different ranges. One report claims that several hundred Europeans fought while another one puts the number at 2,000 fighters. The total estimate of Western foreign fighters in the years 1990 to 2011 was estimated to amount to 945, according to Hegghammer a very conservative estimate. He used this number to calculate the proportion of foreign fighters involved in terrorist activity in the West. The author found 107 such cases, arriving at the conclusion that there is a ‘one-in-nine-radicalization rate that would make foreign fighter experience one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in domestic operations that we know’.
However, there are some reasons to question this. The most important one has been indicated by the author himself as he adds that this must be seen as a maximum rate.[25] This qualification is often overlooked by media, government agencies and scholars, who make this rate seem more ‘cast in stone’ than the author had probably intended.[26] As this is a conservative estimate, it is based upon continuous rounding down of the subtotals of foreign fighters. The low bar of inclusion for foreign fighters – including foreign trainees and not excluding non-Western foreign fighters – leads to a higher number of foreign fighters, which in turn also raises the radicalization rate. Since it has been estimated that, for instance, between 1,500 and 4,000 Britons have received training in terrorist camps[27], it is difficult to accept the number of 945 as a workable amount of all Europeans who have been trained or who have fought abroad.[28]

Unfortunately, there are not enough open-source based data with more reliable estimates of the total amount of foreign fighters. It can only be speculated that it must be multitudes of the current estimate used. Given this obvious limitation, how then can we get a better understanding of the involvement of foreign fighters in terrorist attacks compared to the overall number of foreign fighters? For this Research Note we looked at three cases, namely Afghanistan (1980s), Bosnia (1990s) and Somalia (2000s). The sample could have admittedly been larger if Chechnya, Iraq or Yemen had also been included. The result is a typology of foreign fighters’ post-conflict behaviour. There is no denying that it simplifies the complicated picture of foreign fighters. Nevertheless it provides a framework to structure analysis and to identify knowledge gaps in current research.

Results from Three Case Studies

In this Research Note, there is not enough space to discuss the complete results of these historical case studies. For that readers can turn to a recent ICCT-paper co-authored with Edwin Bakker.[29] One result discussed here is that foreign fighters, based on their post-conflict behaviour, can be divided in five types:

Table 2: Typology of Returned Foreign Fighters

(i) the martyr: a foreign fighter who joins a conflict and is killed on the battlefield. The martyr will pose no further risk to the country of origin unless the martyrdom itself is used as recruiting tool.

(ii) the veteran: an experienced fighter who continues fighting in other theatres of conflict. The veteran sees jihad as a way of life. While the veteran is a risk to people in conflict zones, he is no risk to the country of origin in the West.

(iii) the recruiter: the recruiter is usually a former foreign fighter who returned home to recruit others to fight, often quite successfully because of his “street credibility”. However, it must be noted that the role of the recruiter has possibly somewhat changed in recent years.[30] Generally speaking, recruiters are not directly involved in terrorist activity but are frequently seen as spiritual guides to future terrorists. They are an indirect risk by constantly ‘feeding’ the local jihadist community.

(iv) the reintegrated fighter: he is the one-time foreign fighter. After the conflict or his role in it has ended, the reintegrated fighter will return and resume his pre-departure life or will at least not be involved in terrorist activity.[31] Some of these fighters might have been driven by a genuine desire to help the oppressed or might have been motivated by the search for adventure, often without profound
knowledge of religion. This fighter might return home disillusioned because the conflict was not what he expected it to be. These fighters are usually no risk to the country of origin. It should be noted the fighter could also integrate in the country he fought in, as happened with some of the Bosnia veterans.

(v) the terrorist: when he comes into contact with terrorist networks in conflict zones, he becomes convinced that it is not only a priority to fight for the oppressed abroad, but also to target the country of origin. This type of foreign fighter – not infrequently converts to Islam–undergo the most fundamental shift in identity and norms and pose a direct threat to the country of origin.

Now that a typology of foreign fighters has been established, the question arises if it is possible to provide estimates of the proportions of these types. A first observation is that our knowledge of the different categories is uneven. Three of these five categories are better understood: the martyr, the terrorist and the recruiter. Cases of martyrdom are often reported by the foreign fighter movements themselves in online martyrdom notices. The terrorist is directly linked to an attack and can therefore be expected to gain high exposure. The recruiter is often under surveillance by intelligence authorities.[32] Much less is known about the veteran and the reintegrated fighter.

Despite the difficulty to give rough estimates about the number of foreign fighters, the anecdotal evidence that formed the basis of the three case studies suggest that the total number of martyrs, terrorists and recruiters comes nowhere close to the total number of foreign fighters. Simply put, thousands of Western Muslim fighters have fought abroad while only a few dozen of them became involved in terrorist activity at home. One tentative finding is that the ‘hard-liners’ are often not the ones who return but rather the ones who continue to fight somewhere else. They exhibit no motivation whatsoever to return because they have taken, as they say, the path of jihad. Another observation that was evident in all three case studies was the major influence of ‘recruiters’: foreign fighters who returned to recruit others. Many of the Afghanistan veterans who relocated to European cities like London were pivotal in subsequent foreign fighter mobilisations.[33]

Finally, it must be said that these categories are not fixed, unchanging nor the only options. Sometimes they might even overlap. However, they are useful for a better understanding of the different types of threats posed. Different types, in turn, ask for different approaches to counter it. Thus, they should be seen as lenses and not as a rigid depiction of an ‘empirical reality’.

Second Approach: Involvement of Foreign Fighters in 26 Terrorist Plots in Europe

As part of the second approach, a new list was compiled, consisting of 26 plots with a total of 123 individuals involved (see Appendix I). Of these 123 individuals in the database, just over half (68 or 55.3%) could be categorized as Western.[34] Employing the definition used by Hegghammer that includes both foreign fighters (those who fight in conflict zone) but also foreign ‘trainees’ (those who train at a terrorist training camp), we find 33 cases of a foreign trip plus two cases of individuals who tried to join a militant group but failed to do so and returned home.

This means that 33 out of 123 (26.8%) of all the individuals can be categorised as Western foreign fighters according to the common definition.[35] In other words, more than a quarter of terrorists involved in the most important terrorist plots in the West can be categorised as Westerners who went abroad either for terrorist training or fighting. However, if we look at the distribution between fighting and training, we see that 11 of them (33.3%) were foreign fighters who joined an insurgency in a conflict zone while 22 (66.7%) were foreign fighters who went to a training camp. These individuals almost exclusively went to training
camps run by Al Qaeda, mainly in Pakistan or Afghanistan, or are confirmed to have met with high-ranking Al Qaeda figures while abroad. Thus, according to the definition of foreign fighting used in this research project, only 11 out of 123 (8.9%) individuals can be categorised as Western foreign fighters. This would rather point to a rate of 1 out of 11.

There are some other ways of looking at this data that could be useful. In 13 of the 26 plots (50%), there was at least one individual who went abroad to either fight or train. In 5 of those 13 cases (38.5%) of individuals who went abroad, the motivation was because at least one individual joined an insurgency while in the other 8 cases (61.5%) it was because at least one individual went to a training camp. Therefore, 5 of the 26 plots (19.2%) had at least one individual involved who can be defined as a Western foreign fighter. 8 of the 26 plots (30.8%) had a link to a Western individual who went to a terrorist training camp.[36]

**The Lethal Plots**

A final calculation will look at the relation between lethal plots and foreign fighting or training. Of the plots in this database, 10 resulted in injuries or fatalities other than the perpetrators themselves.[37]. Of the 61 individuals involved, seven were Western foreign fighters or trainees (11.5%). This percentage is considerably lower than the 26.8% of Western foreign fighters and trainees in all the plots (33 out of 123).

Contrary to what is often argued, this could suggest that Western foreign fighters (and trainees) do not make more lethal operatives than non-foreign fighters. However, among these plots is an example reminding us of the danger of a link to foreign training: two of the four London Bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, trained in Pakistan prior to the attacks. While this plot clearly had a foreign link, both of these men cannot be categorized as foreign fighters but should rather be seen as foreign trainees. If we distinguish between foreign fighters and foreign trainees in all these ten plots, we see that all of these seven individuals went to training camps and none of them actually participated in traditional insurgencies. Therefore, not a single case of ‘foreign fighting’ as defined here has been involved in the most lethal attacks in Europe since 1994.

It must be noted that these findings should not be seen as the result of statistically significant data. This approach calculated the ratio of former foreign fighters involved only in the most serious jihadist-inspired terrorist plots and attacks in Europe since 1994. Further criticism on this database could address its limited scope (only Europe, only 26 plots), its reliance on newspaper articles and secondary literature (which might have led to wrong categorisations), and its working definition of ‘Western.’ That is why the presented rates should certainly not be interpreted as the ‘true’ rates, countering findings from previous works. It is, however, an attempt to further build on previous works and critically examine some assumptions that inform our current view on the issue.

**Conclusion**

The two approaches used in this Research Note show that the extent to which Western foreign fighters have been directly involved in terrorist activity in Europe in the past is rather limited. Again, it cannot be said often enough that this highly depends on the definitions used. In this Research Note, we summarized findings from three past instances of foreign fighting. The main conclusion from these three case studies is that there is no archetype of the foreign fighter. Rather, based on post-conflict behaviour, they can be divided into five categories: the martyr, the veteran, the recruiter, the reintegrated fighter and the terrorist. These are very simple categories and they do not say much about the motivation of individual foreign fighters nor can
they be used to predict who will end up in which category. Further research is necessary to try to understand
why and how out of a large group of foreign fighters, some become terrorists while others peacefully
reintegrate. A difficult question is to what extent this is caused by internal factors (motivation of the
foreign fighter, religiosity, social alienation and so on) and what is caused by external factors (recruitment,
radicalization, pressure, and obstructing factors that hinder reintegration). To answer that, however, is
beyond the scope of this Research Note.

What this Research Note hopefully did show is that the presence of Western foreign fighters in the most
serious jihadist attacks and plots in Europe since 1994 has been limited and is much lower than is often feared. When there is a foreign link, it is, in most cases, a link to a terrorist training camp rather than to actual foreign fighting pur sang: defensive jihads in Afghanistan or Bosnia where a civil conflict was already ravaging the country before the influx of foreign fighters (which often made it worse). In European lethal plots, this presence was even lower, which makes the assumption that foreign fighters have proved to be more lethal operatives than those who did not fight questionable. However, to build this database (see Appendix), much information on the included perpetrators was taken from open sources, such as newspaper articles (which are not very reliable). Thus, in order to be able to make any substantial claims on this issue, more in-depth research is needed. Again, a phase of refining the definitions, methodologies (a larger and more reliable database) and sources is needed to make any authoritative claims, especially when talking about proportions of foreign fighters subsequently involved in terrorist activity at home. However, this Research Notes has pointed at some avenues for further research and has hopefully raised awareness that careful reconsideration of the assumptions that currently form the basis of our understanding of foreign fighters is necessary.

Finally, a number of observations with regard to the current situation in Syria and Iraq need to be made.
As explained in the introduction, extrapolating the research outcomes to the current situation cannot be justified. The sole possibility is to assess the current situation in order to identify issues that require further research. The following observations should thus be carefully approached. The initial phase of the conflict in Syria appeared to share many characteristics with the cases that in this research have been labelled classical examples of foreign fighting: Afghanistan and Bosnia (more than Somalia). As Brian Jenkins explained in a testimony in November 2013, ‘(s)ome of the jihadists are determined to fight, but others seem to be little more than jihadi tourists who stay out of harm’s way while taking photos of themselves and boasting to their friends back home on social media.’[38] This clearly echoes stories about past conflicts in which foreign fighters were sometimes called ‘Gucci soldiers’ or only turned up for the fight during their summer breaks, like in Afghanistan.[39] Until recently, these fighters in Syria were viewed as a greater problem than other former foreign fighters because of the proximity to the West and their volume [40], not because there was some kind of assumed ‘qualitative’ difference between those fighters and their historical counterparts. Jenkins continues by saying that ‘Syria’s jihadist groups may not be looking for a fight with Western countries, which are also opposed to Assad. This attitude could change if the West or Western-backed rebels move against the jihadis during a post-Assad civil war.’[41]

Unfortunately, his prediction seems to describe what has happened in the summer of 2014. While Western
governments initially supported the rebels and have not backed down from arming them, much has changed.
[42] This culminated in US-led air strikes (backed by Arab nations) on IS-fighters in September 2014.[43]
This transformed the Islamic rebel groups into direct enemies of Western (and Arab) governments. On
September 13, 2014, spokesman for the White House Josh Earnest declared that ’[t]he United States is at war
with ISIL in the same way that we are at war with al-Qaeda.’[44]

The rhetoric used by rebel groups has also dramatically changed. Jabhat al-Nusra, which has mainly focused
on Syria and rejected mergers with IS in the past, has now allegedly joined forces with the latter and
threatened the West to ‘pay the highest price’ for its actions.[45] Clearly, the terms of engagement on both sides have changed. This does not bode well for the future.

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## Appendix I - the Database [46]

### Legend:

- **Black**: individuals who did not fulfill the criteria of 'Western' or could not be categorized as foreign fighters or trainees.
- **Green**: individuals who fulfilled the criteria of 'Western' and could be categorized as foreign fighters or trainees.
- **Blue**: activity of this Western individual can be categorized as training.
- **Red**: activity of this Western individual can be categorized as fighting.
- **Orange**: failed attempt by a Western individual to train/fight.

### Table

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| 2      | GIA group 1995 France | 0/17
| 3      | Lyon railway bomb 1995 France | 0/14
| 4      | South Paris bomb 1996 France | 0/12
| 5      | Paris train bombing 1996 France | 0/29
| 6      | Lille marketplace 1996 France | 0/12
| 7      | Lille G7 bomb 1996 France | 0/12
| 8      | Abou Doha Network operating from Khaldan camp Afghanistan | 0/12
| 9      | Strasbourg Plot 1996 France | 0/12
| 10     | Abu Doha Network operating from Khaldan camp Afghanistan | 0/12
| 11     | Baghdad network 1996 France | 0/12
| 12     | Shoe Bomber 1996 UK | 0/12
| 13     | Jewish targets in Germany 1996 Germany | 0/12
| 14     | Heathrow plot 2003 UK | 0/12
| 15     | 68
| 16     | ISSN 2334-3745
| 17     | October 2014

### Individuals

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<td>26</td>
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Notes


[13] Only focusing on Europe would have yielded too few results, given the fact that most foreign fighters in, for instance Afghanistan, came from the United States.


[17] B. Mendelsohn. 'Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends', op. cit., p.193. The distinction can also be found in the earlier mentioned work of Marc Sageman: Understanding Terror Networks (2004), who excludes 'Muslims fighting for the “liberation” of Kashmir or Chechnya, for these seem to be straightforward jihads, like the former Afghan or Bosnian jihads as defined by Azzam' from his ‘global Salafi mujahedin' population. Sageman is right to point at a difference between terrorists and ‘traditional' mujahideen. There is a clear difference in the target selection, the legitimacy and the modus operandi of both groups.
[18] Terms like 'Western', 'Westernised' and 'Western values' should normally be applied with due caution. Some even argue that there is no such thing as specific 'Western' as in 'Western values'. However, debates about the assimilation and integration of immigrants are not part of this research. The aim here is to understand the risk coming from Western foreign fighters, where 'Western' serves to point to 'those coming from within' rather than a threat coming from those who adhere to so-called 'Western values'. The criteria are therefore aimed at delineating what can be called 'within' and should not be regarded as pretending to say anything about the relative merit of cultural values, assimilation and other issues relating to (im)migrants or cultures.


[20] Although almost all the ‘Category 1’ plots of Nesser were included, I chose to exclude two plots and include one extra. The first excluded plot is the arrest of two French-Algerians by the French police in January 2004 that were claimed to plan to use ricin. These individuals are reported to be relatives of Menad Benchelalli of the Chechen Network but their identities have not been revealed. Another excluded plot is the arrest of five persons in Rovigo, Italy, because the police found bombs during a regular raid looking for illegal immigrants. Maps of NATO bases and central London were found, but no real plot was discovered. One plot that I chose to include was the arrest of Kamel Bourgass in the United Kingdom, who possessed poison recipes and bomb-making instructions. During a police raid, Bourgass killed one police officer. Although Nesser has some doubts about the plot, calling it a Category 2 plot while saying it is difficult to assess the 'realities of this particular case', the plot is included in the databases of both Bakker and Egerton. Because Bourgass was responsible for the killing of a police officer, I chose to include the plot, although the fatality is not counted.


[26] The author of this Research Note also first failed to stress that this was a maximum rate. Other examples are the United Kingdom Counter – Terrorism Home Affairs Committee, which stated that Hegghammer found “that on average, one in nine foreign fighters returned home to take part in a domestic terror plot”–The United Kingdom – Parliament, Counter-Terrorism Home Affairs Committee, Foreign Fighters, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaaff/231/23105.htm, May 9, 2014.

[27] This might, in turn, be a case of overestimating the numbers of UK residents who trained in terrorist camps.


[30] Prior to 9/11, these individuals enjoyed relative freedom but after these attacks their activities are more closely monitored and constrained.

[31] This is a group where psychological problems such as PTSD could occur. While these fighters form no security risk in the sense of involvement in terrorist plots and attacks, 'reintegrated' fighters could certainly pose a risk to themselves and their direct surroundings.


[34] Using the criteria as mentioned in the previous section and the definition of Western countries as the 28 EU member states, Western European states that are not member of the EU, the United States, Canada and Australia.
[35] Note that the 33 only related to Western cases.

[36] In the original research, two corrections were applied. Two plots disproportionately influenced the results: The Madrid Bombings and the Chechen Network. The Madrid Bombings accounted for almost a quarter of all individuals in the database (27 out of 133) of which none had fought or trained abroad. The Chechen Network, in turn, accounted for more than half of the entire number of Western foreign fighters in the database (6 out of 11). Thus, calculating without these two plots results in a number of 27 out of 90 (30%) having either trained or fought abroad, of which 22 went to training camps and only 5 (5.6%) can be categorised as Western foreign fighters. Applying these two exceptions results in a ratio of 1 out of 17.

[37] It should be noted that 10 out of 26 is not a reflection of the overall rate of jihadist plots that are successfully executed and result in casualties. Because the database only contained plots until 2007, I included five post-2007 plots that resulted in deaths or injuries. On the other hand, this does mean that the database contains at least the most dangerous/lethal plots that can be seen as the ones with the highest security risk. A second remark that should be made is that one of the perpetrators of plot 11 – Kamel Bourgass – killed a police officer when his house was being raided. That is, however, not counted as a fatal plot because this was no terrorist attack (or even premeditated murder) but lethal violence upon being arrested.


[41] Idem.


[46] Readers can request a list of sources by sending an e-mail to: <jeaninederoyvz@gmail.com>.
Fernando Reinares: ¡Matadlos!/ Quién estuvo detrás del 11-M y por qué se atentó en España [“Kill Them! Who was Behind 3/11 and Why Spain was Targeted.”]


Reviewed by Ely Karmon

Fernando Reinares, the prominent terrorism researcher at the Madrid Elcano Royal Institute, recently published the book, in Spanish, “Kill Them! Who was Behind 3/11 and Why Spain was Targeted”. It elucidates the circumstances of the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, the most lethal jihadist attack in Europe in terms of fatalities and injuries.

Against the background of the growing threat from the current participation of thousands of Western and Muslim foreign fighters on behalf of al Qaeda-type insurgents in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, as well as their involvement in the insurgencies in Libya, Somalia, Nigeria or the Sahel, Reinares’ book is an important tool to understand and prepare for this immediate threat of homegrown Islamist extremism in the West and its ties to such foreign conflicts. The author describes in detail the rise of jihadist networks in Spain, in the larger context of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He provides a clear and concise historical background about the major organizations involved in the jihadist activity in Spain and Western Europe like al-Qaeda, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) or the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI) in Milan.

His dissection of the jihadist network responsible for the March 11 attacks follows the pattern of a criminal police investigation relating individuals to professional and terrorist contacts, movements across Europe, Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond, based on a huge amount of juridical and police documents, personal interviews, journalistic and academic sources. This information is extremely important for understanding the complexity of the terrorist network and its mechanism, although it is at times difficult to digest for a more hasty reader.

The book raises several important operational issues connected to the activities of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups: the importance of the reconquest of al-Andalus (Spanish territory under Muslim rule during the Middle Ages) in the strategy of northern African jihadist groups; the role of Tablighi Jamaat movement in the recruitment of young Muslims to terrorist organizations; the radicalization of Muslim criminals in prisons and their contacts with the local criminal scene.

Ten years after the tragic events of March 2004, Reinares convincingly demonstrates that the al-Qaeda Central command and not a loose ad-hoc local Islamist group was behind the Madrid attack, thereby challenging the “leaderless jihad” paradigm. According to the author, the decision to attack Spain was made not in direct response to the Iraq War, but instead was taken already in December 2001 by the Moroccan Amer Azizi, an important member of al-Qaeda’s Spanish Abu Dahdah cell which was dismantled after the 9/11 attacks. The Madrid bombing network began its formation in March 2002, more than one year before the start of the Iraq war. Azizi, who took refuge in Pakistan and became a senior figure in al-Qaeda’s military command, had a central role in the building of the Spanish jihadist network and the planning of the attack.

However, to conclude that the decision to attack Spain was mainly the result of Azizi’s desire for vengeance
after the arrests and trials of Abu Dahdah's cell members while the operation used the Western intervention in Iraq as a favorable pretext is a bit farfetched. It underestimates al-Qaeda's strategic thinking at the time that it had to challenge UK, Spain and Italy's roles in supporting the U.S.-led fighting in Iraq, which viewed Spain as the weakest link in the Western military coalition.

Reinares stresses the difficulties and constraints of law enforcement approaches in challenging the threat of the jihadist terrorism in the juridical framework of a democratic state. Proof for this is the survival of part of the Abu Dahdah's network after the arrest of those notoriously involved in the 9/11 plot in the U.S. and their participation in the 3/11 plot in Madrid. The recent terrorist attack at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, by the French jihadist Mehdi Nemmouche, an ISIS terrorist who was one of the captors and torturers of Western hostages in Syria and reportedly planned a major terror attack in Paris, is proof of the need to improve the juridical framework and the operational tools to challenge the threat so well analyzed by Professor Reinares.

*About the Reviewer: Dr. Ely Karmon is a Senior Research Scholar at The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel.*
Morten Storm with Paul Cruickshank & Tim Lister, Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda and the CIA


Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

In the 1949 book “The God That Failed: A Confession,”[1] prominent ex-communist intellectuals recounted their disillusionment with and abandonment of communism. What also made that book noteworthy was its running concept of “Kronstadt” as the defining moment in which these ex-communists decided not merely to leave the Communist Party, but to actively oppose it as newly fledged anti-communists.

“Agent Storm: My Life Inside Al Qaeda and the CIA” is Morten Storm’s authoritative account of how he was radicalized as a young Danish convert to Islam into ultimately becoming a trusted member of al Qaeda’s inner circles in Yemen and elsewhere and how his subsequent disillusionment with its genocidal ideology and violent tactics led to his own “Kronstadt” moment, in which he decided to become a double agent on behalf of the Danish, British and American intelligence services against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and his brethren in Europe.

Although there are other examples of European Muslim extremists who lost faith with jihadi Islam and al Qaeda and its affiliates and became prominent critics of radical Islam, Mr. Storm’s is the most recent case. Moreover, while the others were at the margins of al Qaeda’s operations, Mr. Storm represents the most high-level Western intelligence penetration of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)–considered al Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliate–as well as other al Qaeda affiliates, such as the Somali al Shabaab. His assistance to American intelligence, according to his account, helped lead to the targeted killing in late September 2011 of Anwar al-Awlaki, one of al Qaeda’s top spiritual and operational leaders in Yemen. Al-Awlaki had inspired many Western jihadi terrorists, such as Major Nidal Hassan (the November 2009 Fort Hood murderer), Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the unsuccessful 2009 Christmas Day airliner underwear bomber, who had been trained in Yemen), and the Tsarnaev brothers (who conducted the Boston Marathon bombings in mid-April 2013).

The book is filled with dramatic accounts of Mr. Storm’s involvement in numerous Western intelligence penetrations of al Qaeda and its affiliates, whether in Yemen or Somalia, as well as with its extremist adherents in Europe, especially in Denmark, Sweden, and Britain. Written by Mr. Storm and his two collaborators, Paul Cruickshank, a top CNN investigative journalist on al Qaeda, and Tim Lister, who has worked for CNN and the BBC in the Middle East, the book reads like a first-rate spy thriller, but it is in fact a stunning and true inside account of the workings, personalities and mindsets of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda, its worldwide operations, and extremist Islamist constituencies.

In one of the book’s most dramatic segments, in September 2009 Mr. Storm was asked by al-Awlaki, his longtime “mentor” (whom he had befriended while living in Yemen in 2006)–who had a history of procuring prostitutes while earlier living in America and at the time in Yemen was married to two wives, one older and the second much younger–“to find him a wife in the West.” (pp. 195-196) Mr. Storm, who had divorced his first Muslim wife and was living in England with his second, found in a radical Muslim Facebook forum a suitable potential bride for al-Awlaki: a beautiful, blonde 32-year old Muslim convert from Croatia named Aminah, who was willing to travel to Yemen to meet and marry the already married al-Awlaki, whom she had greatly idolized. At this point, no one in Mr. Storm’s family knew about his double-agent status.
What neither Aminah (real name Irena Horak) nor al-Awlaki knew was that this “matchmaking” was being orchestrated and financed by the British and American intelligence services who had planted tracking devices in her suitcase and an electronic Arabic pocket dictionary that they hoped would lead them to al-Awlaki’s whereabouts in Yemen’s lawless tribal areas. The details of how Mr. Storm arranged for Aminah’s travel to meet al-Awlaki, how American intelligence eventually located al-Awlaki’s whereabouts (this time via a different courier in a later meeting arranged by Mr. Storm) to kill him, and her ultimate fate in Yemen (she was unaware of Mr. Storm’s involvement in setting the trap for al-Awlaki) are riveting. These accounts are backed up by extensive evidence in the form of travel and financial documents and videos Mr. Storm provided to his co-authors, including the actual video of al-Awlaki proposing marriage to his prospective Croatian bride.

Aside from bringing readers close to the workings of high-stake intelligence operations, Mr. Storm’s book is important for other reasons. It is a first-rate account of how a troubled young Danish Christian, with a history of petty criminality, incarceration and drug use was drawn to convert to Islam and was radicalized into its most extremist jihadi circles in Denmark and Britain. It illustrates how recruiters in such jihadi circles in Europe identify and send their promising convert adherents to “study” at jihadi religious schools such as the extremist Dammaj Institute in Yemen, where, upon their return to their countries of origin, they are expected to further radicalize others into pro-al Qaeda violent extremism and martyrdom terrorist operations.

In what is the book’s most telling and hopeful segment, Mr. Storm discusses his “Kronstadt” moment in early 2007, when he rejected radical Islam’s “justifications made for the murder and maiming of civilians,” (p. 118) and the steps he took to contact PET, the Danish intelligence service, to offer his services to counter and betray his former comrades in European jihadi circles and al Qaeda around the world because, as he writes, “I knew the murderous worldview of al Qaeda, and I wanted to play a part in stopping them.” (p. 122)

While today Mr. Storm is relieved to have given up jihadism (as well as Islam) and is proud of his previous work in support of Western intelligence in fighting al Qaeda and its sympathizers, these undercover activities took a toll on him and his family. He currently resides in undisclosed whereabouts in England under the protection of British authorities (or others in the private sector operating on their behalf) because of constant death threats against him by his former jihadi comrades.

The drama of “Agent Storm” will no doubt attract Hollywood’s attention (it’s already an hour-long CNN documentary), but bright lights aside, the book is an indispensable guide to how the West can counter the appeal of violent jihadism and its al Qaeda terrorist groupings. Today, when so many young Western Muslims are flocking to Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of genocidal insurgents such as the al Nusra Front and ISIS/Islamic State, this book’s insights could not be more important.

[This is a revised version of the author’s review that was published in The Washington Times on September 16, 2014. Reprinted by permission].

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

Note

“Counterterrorism Bookshelf”:
17 Books on Terrorism & Counter-terrorism Related Subjects
by Joshua Sinai

Continuing the series of columns that focus on books published by major publishers on terrorism and counterterrorism-related subjects, this column focuses on such books published by Springer and its associated imprints. Springer, noted for its extensive scientific and engineering publications, is also a major publisher of books that draw on computational social science and other social science-related approaches to analyzing terrorism and counterterrorism in a systematic manner. Please note that most of these books were recently published, with some of them published over the past several years but deserving renewed interest.

Note: Future columns will review books by publishers such as Stanford University Press, the University of Chicago Press, as well as other noted publishers.


The contributors to this edited volume discuss the incorporation and management of new information and communication technologies (ICT) in countering terrorism and organized crime by law enforcement agencies. The book is divided into three sections. The first section’s chapters discuss the Odyssey Project, an effort to develop a prototype Pan-European ballistics and crime information intelligence network for law enforcement agencies. The second section’s chapters examine new technologies, such as data management techniques, that have applications in criminal investigations, 3D recognition techniques for forensics and counterterrorism applications, simulation technologies for crisis management, and simulation games for countering violent extremism. The chapters in the final section focus on information sharing in countering human trafficking, applying profiling and trend analysis in countering cybercrime, and training methodologies to train law enforcement agencies on these new technologies.


The contributors to this edited volume apply computational social science methodologies and technologies, such as data mining and social network analysis visualization tools, to examine new trends in how terrorist groups organize (e.g. hierarchically or non-hierarchically), their motivations, areas of operations, and warfare patterns. They also cover topics such as “anticipating terrorist safe havens from instability induced conflict, and the use of gaming and simulation techniques to demonstrate how ethno-political conflicts play out.


An application of the mechanisms of the law of state responsibility and the due diligence principle to enable state counterterrorism agencies to legally fight non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. To achieve this objective, the author begins by discussing how terrorism can be defined under international law, the duty of states to protect their citizens against terrorist-type crimes, and whether the requirements of national security
can override human rights in countering terrorism. The author concludes that “In rendering judgment on these matters, there are grey areas and fine lines, negotiations to be had and horse-trading to be done.” (p. 216).


The contributors to this edited volume examine the challenges to international and domestic law presented by the concept of Jihadism, which represents for its adherents a religiously sanctioned war to “propagate or defend” the Muslim faith against their apostate adversaries. Divided into three parts, the book’s chapters discuss the meaning of Jihad in the Islamic tradition, Islamic and Western interpretations of international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians, Western European legal responses to Islamic militancy, and whether Western counterterrorism policies are effective at addressing the challenges posed by Jihadist terrorist violence.


A comparative and highly detailed examination of the role of human rights in legislating the counterterrorism campaigns by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. To examine these issues, the book begins with a discussion of the nature of terrorism and how it is defined, particularly from a human rights-based approach, and how international conventions define terrorism. The author then proceeds to discuss the legal components in the counter-terrorism campaigns conducted by these Commonwealth countries and how they relate to international law and human rights compliance, e.g. in terms of criminalizing acts of terrorism, following the rules of criminal procedure in investigating acts of terrorism, arrests and detentions, designating individuals and groups as terrorist entities, measures to control the trans-border movement of terrorists, and regulating the interplay between free speech, media reporting, and alleged incitement to terrorism. All these issues are summed up in the volume’s concluding chapter.

An examination of the interplay between the requirement for security, the employment of technology, and the need to balance security and civil rights in monitoring and countering the online manifestation of terrorism. Following a general discussion about the need to balance security and civil rights and the legal predicaments faced by Western governments in monitoring extremist activities online, the author discusses how these issues play out in the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia. A separate chapter discusses Israel's legal framework in countering terrorism online. A final chapter discusses technology issues involved in monitoring extremist activities online, including uncovering encryption efforts by terrorist groups. The author concludes that new legal regulations, particularly “in relation to wiretapping and monitoring,” are required to counter extremist activities on the Internet because they differ from tracking analog communications. (p. 155)


The contributors to this highly comprehensive volume examine new trends in the spectrum of terrorist warfare, such as urban terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, biological terrorism, environmental terrorism, and terrorists’ targeting of the aviation, maritime, and rail transport sectors. Also covered are case studies of major terrorist attacks, such as the 1983 Beirut bombings, the 1995 Tokyo subway attack, the June 1996 attacks against the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 9/11, the July 2005 London transport bombings, and the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. The concluding chapter discusses the implications of these new terrorist warfare trends on the need for a new understanding of counter-terrorism responses against such threats.


This textbook is a comprehensive and systematic overview of the law enforcement components of counterterrorism through the examination of how such campaigns have been conducted by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Germany, and the United States. The concluding chapters discuss best practices drawn from these countries’ counterterrorism campaigns, as well as “lessons to be learned” for future campaigns, particularly in terms of “the need to invest more time and resources in proper intelligence gathering” and the creation of what the authors term “the Intelligence File,” which is the file that is employed to investigate terrorist suspects and incidents that needs to be effectively shared among all those involved in such investigations while safeguarding a suspect’s civil liberties.


This is a highly comprehensive handbook on the spectrum of violence, ranging from youth violence and
guns, organized crime and violence, to political violence such as civil wars, pogroms, and terrorism. Written by prominent experts, the handbook's chapters cover topics such as the different types of groups that engage in violence, the processes of learning and socialization in violent individuals, the evolutionary and social biological approaches to studying the perpetrators of violence, the nature of the different types of victims of violence by individuals and groups, the different types of ideologies and justifications that are used to legitimize the resort to violence, the processes of escalation and de-escalation in the intensification of violence, and the theoretical and methodological issues involved in researching violence.


The contributors to this edited volume examine the issues involved in applying international legal instruments to assist victims of terrorist attacks. Following a discussion of the nature of contemporary terrorism, how terrorism is defined (including the difficulties in formulating a legal definition of terrorism), and defining the primary and secondary victims of terrorism, the discussion shifts to defining “restorative justice,” which is intended to provide restitution to its victims. The remaining chapters discuss issues such as the needs of the victims of terrorism, including the provision of psycho-social assistance, providing such victims with access to the justice system, and compensation and reparation for victims of terrorism, which is different from what is provided to victims of “ordinary” crimes.


A conceptually innovative approach to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism through the application of evidence-based methodologies, drawn from the discipline of criminology. The volume's sections discuss topics such as data sources for evaluating terrorist warfare (such as developing terrorism event databases, employing trajectory analysis to examine the evolution of terrorism over time, using spatial analysis techniques to analyze terrorists’ areas of operation), generating evidence-based information on effectiveness in counterterrorism (such as through the activities of fusion centers, airport screening techniques, and using a complexity method for assessing counterterrorism policies) to evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies in terms of their ability to curtail terrorist financing and balancing “toughness vs. fairness.” The concluding chapter presents a framework for a research infrastructure for evaluating counterterrorism effectiveness.


Using Israel as its primary case study, this is a very comprehensive and detailed examination of the applicability of international law to a government’s perceived need to conduct targeted killings of its terrorist adversaries. The volume's conceptual framework (which takes up most of the book) discusses topics such as how to define “targeted killings”, the moral legitimacy and effectiveness of targeted killings, and the relationship between human rights, international humanitarian law, and other relevant international laws to the practice of targeted killings. The conceptual framework is then applied to Israel's engagement in targeted killings of its terrorist adversaries. The author concludes that “if the human rights standards were applied
properly [i.e., to Israel’s policy of targeted killings], many killings which would be legal according to the Israeli Supreme Court would be illegal according [to human rights] standards.” (p. 540) In this reviewer’s opinion, however, perhaps a more nuanced interpretation may be warranted because the terrorists own violation of human rights by their deliberate targeting of innocent civilians and the difficulty of arresting them when they exploit their safe havens by hiding within their protective communities might make targeted assassinations the only viable option for states facing such threats.


An examination of the dilemmas facing police forces, which are traditionally trained to counter crime, on their added missions to counter terrorism within their often culturally diverse communities. The book’s chapters discuss issues such as the nature of the evolving terrorist threat; new approaches to counter-terrorism policing represented by the three models of community intelligence, “belonging” and social cohesion, lessons learned from United Kingdom community policing; the altered policy and legal environments facing democratic policing strategies; the components required in community policing, such as the need to understand the needs of culturally and religiously diverse communities; and the organizational and training components of counter-terrorism community policing. The concluding chapter presents a social cohesion approach to counter-terrorism policing.


A systematic examination of the increasingly pervasive phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism by focusing on six crucial dimensions: definition, incidence and evolution (including a chronology of lone wolf terrorism in 15 countries), motivations and ideologies, influences and radicalization (including personal circumstances, social backgrounds, sociocultural and political influences), modus operandi (in terms of planning, targeting and types of weapons used), and counterterrorism responses (such as those that are legalistic, repressive, and conciliatory). Although one may argue that certain attacks that are generally attributed to lone wolf terrorists (such as Major Nidal Hassan’s November 2009 massacre at Fort Hood, Texas) are, in fact, linked, however loosely, to more organized groups, the author’s account is highly authoritative and a valuable overview of the academic literature on this subject.


Originally published as a special issue of the *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, the contributors to this volume examine the major components of terrorism risk: the relationship between civil liberties and the requirement to reduce terrorism risks, the probability of terrorist incidence, the impact of catastrophic terrorist incidents on the insurance markets that cover such risks, the problems associated with insuring the victims and physical destruction of those affected by the 9/11 attacks, and the governmental policy responses involved in mitigating terrorism risk.

The contributors to this volume examine the numerous issues involved in the impact of the European states’ counterterrorism campaigns on those societies’ legal and political institutions, including maintenance of civil liberties. The volume’s chapters cover topics such as the German police’s perspective on the terrorist threat environment and counterstrategies to mitigate it, terrorists’ exploitation of the Internet and the use of international laws to counter it, the roles of the United Nations and the European Union in countering terrorism, how victims of terrorism need to be treated, the utilization of criminal laws to counter terrorism, and the impact of counterterrorism campaigns in limiting civil liberties and human rights.


The contributors to this volume examine the evolving role of policing in countering terrorism and homeland security by focusing on such practices and trends in the cases of Israel and the United States. Beginning with a discussion of trends in international terrorism, including the use of databases to generate incident trends, the volume’s chapters cover topics such as the role of the police in counterterrorism and its impact on societies, and future trends and associated requirements in policing terrorism.

*About the Reviewer:* Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.
IV. Bibliographies

Bibliography: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Part 1)
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism–BSPT-JT-2014-5]

Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To keep up with the rapidly changing political events, more recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to expand the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Israel, Palestine, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism, peace process

NB: All websites were last visited on 5.9.2014.–See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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**Note**
Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after getting consent by the author(s).

**About the compiler:** Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her *doctoral thesis* dealt with Internet usage of Islamist terrorists and insurgents. Currently she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information (ZPID). She also serves as Editorial Assistant for 'Perspectives on Terrorism'.
Bibliography: Domestic State (or Regime) Terrorism and Repression

Compiled and selected by Eric Price


NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an asterix [*] only have a clickable table of contents/only more information.

Keywords: State Terrorism, Repression

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**Resources on the Internet**


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**ISSN 2334-3745** 125 October 2014
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About the Compiler: Eric Price is a Professional Information Specialist who worked for many years as a librarian with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Upon retirement, he joined the Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism.
The IS-Caliphate: What Should Be Done to Prevent it from Spinning out of Control?

by Philipp Holtmann

Last year in an Op-Ed in Perspectives on Terrorism (Vol. 7, No. 3, 2013) I suggested three possible future scenarios for the Syrian civil war. The worst scenario depicted the emergence of a “Jihadi Super-region from the Euphrates to the Nile and all along the North African Coast and an Extremely Hot Cold War in the Middle East.” The announcement of a Caliphate by the Islamic State connecting large parts of Syria and Iraq and the enthusiasm with which it was received by many fellow jihadists in the Muslim world has opened the doors for this worst case. IS envisions a Jihadi empire whose ambitions are ultimately global: not only Middle Eastern borders, but all other states and ideologies, are to be crushed in its vision. The West and the rest of the world cannot stand idly by and watch events unfold in the hope that the Islamic State will implode under the weight of its own contradictions.

At the moment the IS-caliphate is like a large honey-pot for global Jihadists: thousands of them from all five continents have, according to IS, been heeding the call of the new caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In the case of the Islamic State, a policy of containment rather than one of arming often dubious allies and providing them with air support might turn out to be the best option. If IS is allowed to spread beyond parts of Syria and Iraq, the task of degrading and defeating it will become very costly indeed.

What we have seen so far is that IS has mastered “Blitzkrieg” tactics. Proof for this is the extremely quick rise of IS since 2013. Portraying itself as the saviour of Sunnis from the Syrian and Iraqi regimes and capitalising on the civil war in Syria, IS has catapulted itself to the position of the leading insurgent organisation in the region, despite numbering not more than 20,000 to 30,000 fighters according to one recent US intelligence estimate. Online IS has shown itself to be at least as savvy as on the ground; it has mastered the art of psychological warfare through social media, e.g. under the Twitter-hashtag “AllEyesOnISIS” and the “One Billion Muslim Campaign to Support IS”.

IS has sidelined al-Qaeda by being more extreme and more global. It is, as one TV commentator put it: “the son of al-Qaeda on testosterone.” The promise to bring back the glory of the Islamic empire has ignited an ideological wildfire that may continue burning, even if a lucky strike by the “Coalition of the Willing” knocks out IS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Such a hit – as proven by previous killings of top jihadist leaders—might create a black hole that could be filled by an even more extreme person. Other jihadist factions, among them the Syrian “Islamic Front” and the al-Qaeda allied “al-Nusra Front,” might be joining or might be waiting in order to portray themselves as “moderates” in IS’ place. Moreover, as a martyr, al-Baghdadi might enjoy a second life among followers who venerate him and his ideas after his death, turning him into a post-mortem leader with a greater than life charisma. Al-Baghdadi apparently sees himself as a messianic preparer. Some Muslim traditions (ahadith) have it that the establishment of a caliphate in the Levant will be ushering in the return of the Mahdi—according to Islamic prophesy the rightly guided redeemer of Islam, who will return together with Jesus near the end of times. The Mahdi’s task is to rid the world of evil, establish Islam on earth (the last caliphate) and prepare for Judgment Day.

Today, the reach of the Islamic State already goes beyond the Euphrates valley. IS exerts a considerable level of ideological-strategic guidance (“virtual leadership”) over its followers via the Internet. For example, Algerian terrorists calling themselves “Soldiers of the Caliphate”—former members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb—pledged allegiance to IS and claimed to act on orders of “our leader Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” when they gruesomely murdered their French hostage Hervé Gourdel. Shortly before, on 21 September 2014, IS-spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, had called upon IS cells worldwide to attack Westerners. IS has extended its strategy from fighting the near enemy (the Shiite dominated Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian regimes) to fighting both the near and the far enemies: the “West” and all member states of the “Coalition of the Willing”. IS volunteers, inspired by ultra-takfiri [calling enemies apostates] and violent apocalyptic fantasies, are likely to bring their struggle to Europe, possibly trying to recruit susceptible members of Muslim diasporas for their cause.

IS commits unspeakable war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against women; it engages in genocidal policies against religious and ethnic minorities. Yet we have to remember that IS is not the only actor in the Syrian-Iraqi civil war landscape, committing gross human rights violations and mass atrocities using similar tactics (collective punishment, mass executions, beheadings, torture). The world’s reaction to these crimes has been lukewarm and divided so far. Until recently, the U.S. and some other NATO states have been involved in arms and money transfers by Gulf States to Syrian opposition forces, which contain hardcore jihadist factions, some of them connected to IS. Turkey and some other states in the neighbourhood have even covertly supported IS forerunner “Islamic State in Iraq and the Greater Syria” (ISIS) by buying cheap oil from it and from other jihadist factions which took control of oil fields. Some European oil companies, with the knowledge of European governments and with an eye on Russian energy supply bottlenecks in the coming winter, have also been buying oil through stooges at dumping prices.

A comprehensive strategy for combating IS requires several elements. The oil fields, IS main source of revenue, must be recaptured, and, until then, international companies should be prohibited to buy their crude oil through middlemen. The Assad regime’s indifferent slaughter of its own citizens and the Iraqi regime’s discrimination of Sunnis have facilitated the large-scale mobilisation and integration of Jihadi fighters into IS-ranks, and both regimes (Assad’s and al-Baghdadi’s) must be held accountable. A coalition that exerts effective political pressure should include not only pro-Western states, but also allies of both Syria and Iraq. A decisive defense plan to safeguard religious and ethnic minorities against IS attacks is urgently needed. Regional actors, such as the Kurdish Peshmerga, should be strengthened without infuriating Turkey, who is afraid of Kurdish separatist aspirations. And finally, a critical task of the West is to communicate with Muslim opinion leaders. 120 Muslim scholars have recently signed an open letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, refuting his theological claims point-by-point. We must remember that hundreds of millions of Muslims do not share IS’s ideology. They should be encouraged and enabled to stand up against Jihadi extremists and challenge the so-called “Islamic State”. Only through a multi-dimensional counterterrorism strategy – beyond bombing and supplying weapons – will the international community prevent the IS nightmare from spinning out of control.

About the author: Dr. Philipp Holtmann is a Research Associate of the Terrorism Research Initiative and regular contributor to Perspectives on Terrorism.
VI. Announcement

TRI Award for Best PhD Thesis 2014: Call for Submissions

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to enhance the quality of research in the field of Terrorism Studies. For this purpose it has established an Annual Award for the Best Doctoral Dissertation on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. Last year’s call for PhD theses submitted or defended in 2013 before an academic institution resulted in 29 entries. The jury, consisting of the directors of the Terrorism Research Initiative, identified three finalists and among them the winner—Dr. Tricia Bacon (American University, Washington, D.C.).

With this announcement, a new call is made for PhD theses submitted or defended at an academic institution in the year 2014. The winner will be announced in August 2015 and can expect an Award of US $ 1,000.- and a document signed by the jury, acknowledging the granting of the award. Altogether three finalists will be identified. They will all receive a document signed by the jury. The deadline for entries (in English, or with translation into English) is 31 March, 2015. Theses should be submitted in electronic form to the chairman of the jury, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, at <apschmid@terrorismanalysts.com>, together with a cover letter (1-3 pp.) explaining its merits as the author sees them. Theses can also be submitted by academic supervisors.
VII. Notes from the Editor

About Perspectives on Terrorism

*Perspectives on Terrorism* (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.

PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at [www.terrorismanalysts.com](http://www.terrorismanalysts.com). It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

*Perspectives on Terrorism* has sometimes been characterised as 'nontraditional' in that it dispenses with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal's articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to.

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Anne Speckhard (Georgetown University Medical School, USA)

Currently there are several vacancies on the Editorial Board. Readers of Perspective on Terrorism are invited to submit names of possible candidates. Selection will take place on the basis of the publication record of those nominated, taking also into account their contribution to a better gender and geographical balance of the Editorial Board.

Members of the Editorial Board act as peer-reviewers for articles submitted to Perspectives on Terrorism. In addition, the Editorial Board relies on the special expertise of other experienced researchers. In particular we would like to acknowledge the contributions of

Dr. Dean Alexander

Dr. O. Shawn Cupp
People Behind the Terrorism Research Initiative

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) has three Directors: Robert Wesley (President), Alex P. Schmid and James J.F. Forest. TRI has an International Advisory Board (currently 11 members), a Consortium of Participating Institutions (currently 17 institutions and centers) as well as Group of Individual Researchers (currently 120) guiding and supporting its efforts. They are listed below.

International Advisory Board of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Adam Dolnik, University of Wollongong, Australia.

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Consortium of Participating Institutions

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Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) at Campus The Hague of Leiden University, Netherlands.

(Handa) Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), University of Wollongong, Australia.

Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, USA.

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Department of International Relations, University of Minas (PUC), Brazil.

Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), Monash University, Australia.

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.

Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, USA.

The Institute of International and European Affairs, (IIEA), Dublin, Ireland, with a branch in Brussels.

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Athens, Greece.

Research Unit, Political Violence, Terrorism and Radicalization, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark.

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