Perpetuation of instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: When the Kivus sneeze, Kinshasa catches a cold

By Joyce Muraya and John Ahere
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Occasional Paper Series: Issue 1, 2014
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Acknowledgements
The authors extend their appreciation to all colleagues who supported the development and finalisation of this paper, including Daniel Forti, Charles Nyuykonge and Sabrina Ensenbach for their invaluable contributions to the paper’s structure and content and to Petronella Mugoni for her assistance in formatting the paper. The authors also appreciate the cooperation of colleagues in ACCORD’s Peacebuilding and Peacemaking units, for affording them the time and space to conduct the research necessary for writing this publication.

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ISSN 1608-3954
ACCORD, Private Bag X018, Umhlanga Rocks 4320, South Africa
Language editing: Petronella Mugoni
Quality control: Sabrina Ensenbach
Layout and design: Keegan Thumberan
Printer: Fishwicks, South Africa
Subscribe to receive email alerts or copies of any ACCORD publications by sending an email to publications@accord.org.za.
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**Acronyms and abbreviations**

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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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| ADFL    | Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo  
          (*Alliance de Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo*) |
| CAF     | Country Assistance Framework |
| CAR     | Central African Republic |
| CNDP    | National Congress for the Defence of the People  
          (*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*) |
| DRC     | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| FAR     | Rwandan Armed Forces  
          (*Forces Armées Rwandaises*) |
| FARDC   | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
          (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*) |
| FDD     | Forces for the Defence of Democracy  
          (*Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*) |
| FDLR    | Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda  
          (*Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*) |
| GPRSP   | Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| ICGLR   | International Conference on the Great Lakes Region |
| ISSSSS  | International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy |
| M23     | March 23 Movement  
          (*Mouvement du 23-Mars*) |
| MLC     | Movement for the Liberation of the Congo  
          (*Mouvement de Libération Congolais*) |
<p>| MNCs    | Multinational Corporations |
| MONUC   | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| MONUSCO | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| NGOs    | Non-governmental Organisations |
| PRSP-I  | Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |</p>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy (<em>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</em>)</td>
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<td>RCD-ML</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy-Movement for Liberation (<em>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD-N</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy-National (<em>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National</em>)</td>
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<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rwanda Defence Force</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAREC</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-affected Areas</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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<td>UNSSSSS</td>
<td>UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy</td>
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Abstract

The current instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) can be traced back to late former President Mobutu Sese Seko’s rule during the late 1980s. The country’s economic depression was exacerbated by the end of the Cold War in 1991, leading to disengagement with the international economic and political system. The DRC has been the source of numerous conflicts over many years. The 1990s saw the country’s peace and security degenerate further, creating challenges that continue to preoccupy the world today. In recent times, the epicentre of the violence in the DRC has been North and South Kivu (the Kivus). The dynamics in the two provinces are complex, causing the Great Lakes region to be characterised by huge human security challenges. This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the linkage between the conflicts in the Kivus and persistent periodic instability in the DRC. It delves into and critiques post-crisis recovery efforts implemented in the country since the end of the Second Congo War. The paper concludes that, among other strategies, resolving the various conflicts in the DRC depends on understanding the causes of specific clashes, such as those in the Kivus, as this can contribute to the uncovering of sustainable solutions to armed confrontation. The paper offers proposals which, if implemented, could contribute to moving the Kivus, and by extension the DRC, beyond intractability.

Introduction

For at least two decades, many parts of the DRC have been characterised by turmoil. The armed conflicts in the country find their genesis in the early 1990s, when the 1994 Rwandan genocide caused a flood of refugees into the DRC (Di Piazza 2008). This influx increased ethnic strife between different groups in the country, as well as between locals and the refugees, leading to the eruption of a regional war in 1996. That year, Laurent-Désiré Kabila led a coalition of Congolese rebel movements, supported by the Rwandan and Ugandan national armies, in military strikes inside the DRC aimed at deposing Mobutu. In May 1997, Mobutu fled the country and, upon marching into the capital, Kinshasa, Kabila named himself president, effectively signalling the end of what is now referred to as the First Congo War (1996–97). Prunier (2009) cautions
against viewing the Rwandan genocide and its consequences as the cause of the implosion in the Congo Basin but explains that it acted as the catalyst to a crisis that had been latent for many years. In 1998, Kabila fell out with his Rwandan and Ugandan allies, sparking armed confrontation. Ruddock (2001) notes that after serious military losses by the Kabila regime, subsequent foreign intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe (allied to Kabila) resulted in thousands of troops occupying parts of the DRC. A broader regional war, now known as the Second Congo War (1998–2003) but also referred to by many as ‘Africa’s world war’, broke out (Karbo and Mutisi 2012:396). The devastating five-year conflict claimed the lives of more than three million people due to violence, disease and starvation (Di Piazza 2008). Joseph Kabila, a general in the Congolese army, rose to power after a bodyguard (in Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s employ) assassinated his father on 16 January 2001. Laurent-Désiré Kabila had been in power for almost four years at the time of his death.

The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, commonly known as the Pretoria Agreement, which was signed on 16 December 2002, signalled the beginning of the end of the Second Congo War. The agreement provided a negotiated framework which detailed how the DRC would move towards achieving a widely accepted and functional transitional government that would cater to the interests of many of the parties involved in the conflict and prepare the country for national and provincial elections with the support of the international community. The agreement created the basis for the development of a transitional constitution, which underpinned the formation of an interim government on 18 July 2003. Since 2003, the DRC has had a recognised sovereign government in Kinshasa. The country, however, continues to face challenges to peace that primarily emanate from the eastern part of its territory. Joseph Kabila runs a country that is grossly fractured and constantly experiences state consolidation challenges.

This paper makes linkages between the realities in the Kivus and the (in)stability of the DRC. The choice of the Kivus is due to an appreciation that the wars in these provinces of the DRC are complex and intertwined, and contribute to national instability. In this paper, the choice of the Kivus stems from the authors’ summary that each time the Kivus sneeze, Kinshasa catches a cold.
The steadiness of Kinshasa, as the capital of the DRC, is important since it is the locus of legitimate political power. Each rebellion that has been mounted in the Kivus in recent years has had Kinshasa as the ultimate target. The strength of Kinshasa is therefore symbolic of the general stability of the DRC, and by extension, the Great Lakes region.

Eastern DRC experienced the deadliest violent conflict the country has ever seen, apart from the Katanga rebellion (1960–65) in which Laurent-Désiré Kabila was involved.¹ The first rebellion following the end of the Cold War aimed to oust Mobutu and began in the city of Goma in the mid-1990s. Eastern DRC was also the entry point of the second rebellion in the late 1990s. In mid-2004, there was a crisis in Bukavu as a result of fighting between forces loyal to Colonel Jules Mutebutsi and General Prosper Nyabiolwa. The two sides were wrestling for control of Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu Province which shares borders with Rwanda. Although theoretically integrated into the Congolese army, Mutebutsi was affiliated to rebels from the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)) based in Goma, North Kivu (International Crisis Group 2004). In mid-2007, North Kivu experienced low-level combat between government forces and troops led by renegade Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda. Nkunda, who was an RCD commander during the Second Congo War, was integrated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)) – the regular Congolese army – and promoted to the position of general after the Pretoria Agreement was signed in 2002. The aforementioned low-level combat in 2007 was the result of tensions that followed Nkunda’s defiance of FARDC orders to leave North Kivu (where he was stationed) and his subsequent capture of Bukavu. Following his defection, he proceeded to form the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)) in December 2006. The rebellion escalated into a major confrontation that exacerbated long-lasting animosity between Tutsi, Hutu and other groups. Clashes resulted in the deaths of thousands of fighters and civilians, and the forced relocation of more than 2.6 million people (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2013).

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The complexity of the conflicts in eastern DRC stems from the fact that all the actors have legitimate grievances but, at the same time, are responsible for extensive human rights violations. There are many Congolese and foreign armed groups operating in eastern DRC. Groups and allegiances are formed along community and patrimonial lines, with some aligned to Rwanda and Uganda as a result of support received in the past (Enough Project 2012). In March 2012, forces of the March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23)) rebelled when General Bosco ‘the Terminator’ Ntaganda led a mutiny of soldiers from the FARDC (Rift Valley Institute 2013). The Rift Valley Institute (2012) contends that the M23 at its peak reportedly had an estimated 1 500 to 2 500 combatants who fought the Congolese army in Rutshuru, North Kivu. The M23, an extension of the CNDP rebellion (under another name), was powerful because it was allegedly backed by Rwanda, with heavy weapons, troops, recruits and territory (United Nations Security Council 2012).

This paper is divided into three segments. The first attempts to explore some of the dynamics that characterise the context in which the conflicts in the DRC have occurred. The second advances arguments which aim to explain why the conflicts in the DRC may have persisted in spite of efforts to resolve them. The third part examines some of the major post-crisis recovery strategies that have been employed by national and international actors to contribute to transforming the DRC.

The DRC situation

Of paramount importance is understanding the intricacies of the conflicts in the DRC as they assist in unmasking underlying issues that may lead to the escalation or de-escalation of conflicts. Wehr (2006) posits that:

> [a]s conflict emerges, it produces considerable confusion…. Unwise and costly decisions are made from a lack of understanding of what is occurring. Since the way in which a conflict emerges largely determines how costly it will subsequently be, those involved must have the clearest possible understanding of what is going on.
To understand and analyse a conflict practitioners should consider the particular aspects of the conflict. In the DRC these include, but are not limited to the following issues:

- state bureaucracy
- national boundaries which are a legacy of colonialism
- marginalisation and disenfranchisement of communities
- ethnic consciousness and identities
- corruption.

**The formation of state bureaucracy and failure to build Congolese capacities**

It is worth noting that during the more than 70 years that the Belgians ruled the DRC, they treated the Congolese harshly, exploited them economically and neglected them politically (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2009). Shurtleff and Aoyagi (2009) further contend that the Congolese were poorly prepared for independence, as they did not have any infrastructure on which to build an independent state. Throughout the colonial period, Belgium never prioritised the development of an African educated class with the capacity to assume political power and control over the vast country post-independence. It was no surprise then that the new political elite proved entirely incapable of managing the challenges of a newly independent state (Falola and Oyebade 2010). This incompetence resulted in anarchy – political, military, ethnic and racial tensions swept through the country within days of independence. Mobutu’s first coup, on 14 September 1960, brought in an interim government that replaced parliament for six months between 1960 and 1961. This administration was mainly composed of university students and graduates (International Business Publications 2011). Rickety civilian governments in Kinshasa came and went, even as real power was purportedly in the hands of the ‘Binza Group’, which was made up of close associates of Mobutu who lived in Binza, a prosperous suburb in the capital (International Business Publications 2011). The existence of this group and its machinations cultivated a weak, inefficient, inept and ineffective bureaucracy characterised by patron-client relationships throughout Mobutu’s tenure (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006). Even after Mobutu’s fall from
power, civil service leadership in the DRC, particularly in the cabinet, was often beholden to political interests, while the majority of the civil service remained susceptible to political influence, severely undermining meritocratic promotion (Stearns 2012).

Governance of the Kivus has historically been a contentious matter, especially since the end of the Second Congo War. The rebellions that have been, and continue to be mounted in the region tend to have at their core questions about the identity of the political and military leaders exercising power in the Kivus. The successive governments in Kinshasa have always been keen to influence the leadership of the Kivus, in the process contributing to disagreements that have led to armed conflicts, including Kinshasa’s attempted redeployment from the Kivus of Ntaganda and ex-CNDP officers (mainly Tutsis) in the FARDC. This was a contributing factor to the M23 rebellion (Rift Valley Institute 2012).

Demarcation of colonial boundaries and post-independence impacts
The West greatly influenced contemporary DRC. Belgium’s King Leopold II owned the DRC, then known as the Congo Free State, as a private commercial empire following the application of arbitrary boundary demarcations that separated African nations (Frederking 2007). From the beginning, the Belgians tried to restrict the influence of Rwanda’s monarchy on the populations of eastern Congo (Vlassenroot 2004). In 1910, an agreement was reached between Belgium and two other European powers to redraw the boundaries of the independent state of Congo. As a result, the Kivu–Mulera–Ndorwa belt became a shared region among three European imperialist powers through the 1911 Anglo–German–Belgian Agreement (Murindwa-Rutanga 2011). From then on, Kinyarwanda speaking people in North Kivu were considered indigenous and subsequently provided with their own customary authority, a situation that was immediately disputed by the other ethnic groups living in this region (Vlassenroot 2004).

There are pre-colonial maps which show that large portions of North Kivu were formerly the territory of Rwanda (Turner 2007). This includes the area of Bwisha, whose inhabitants speak Kinyarwanda. The decision by African
countries to accept borders that were the result of colonial demarcations meant that the boundaries of the DRC did not respect the distribution of ethnic groups.

Specifically, the Tutsi ethnic group overlapped the borders of Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (DeRouen and Heo 2007). Many Tutsi naturally identified with their ethnic group before locating themselves within colonially constructed state boundaries (DeRouen and Heo 2007). In this context, Kahler (2002) posits that:

> scrutiny of the concept of territoriality leads to a more contingent and mutable formulation of unit variation rather than the conventional, static view of territoriality within international relations – a ‘Westphalian’ system populated by precisely delimited, territorial states (quoted in Kahler and Walter 2006:1).

This also helps to explain ideological interpretations of those Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) proponents who considered the Kivus an extension of Rwanda. Rwandan authorities rejected the territorial conception of the state and privileged the notion of a political community that extended to the entire Tutsi diaspora (Fofana 2009). Fofana (2009:36) maintains that when the RPF took power in 1994, it established what Mahmood Mamdani termed a ‘Zionist-type state’ that was bent on ensuring the survival of the Tutsi ethnic group, based on an overwhelming sense of moral responsibility for the survival of all Tutsis and in support of their ‘nation’. Rather than a Westphalian model that separates the modern state system, distinction is based on the domiciles of individuals and groups in a specific territory (Kahler and Walter 2006).

**Post-independence marginalisation and disenfranchisement of communities**

Sarkin (2001) postulates that pre-colonial social groups and local identities in the Great Lakes region were based on very different considerations from those used by colonial powers to demarcate boundaries and construct states. The colonisers imposed artificial borders that did not take cognisance
of patterns of placement or what was best for the people living on the land; leaving identity issues to simmer over the years. In the DRC, the colonial powers established a divided ethnic and civic legal system to rule the territory. The central state administered the civil law, while the local authorities, who oversaw the application of customary law, presided over the ethnic system. What resulted was, according to Mamdani (1990), a kind of dual citizenship, with certain rights being explicitly tied to membership of particular indigenous ethnic groups. In the same vein, Breytenbach et al. (1999:34) observe that:

[w]hile everyone has been a citizen of the Congo since 1960, not everyone has ethnic citizenship and land rights. Only those who are considered to be indigenous have a native authority and consequently ethnic citizenship. Since immigrants (e.g. Banyamulenge, or rather Tutsis living in the Kivus for 300 years) do not have a native authority of their own, they are considered non-indigenous and are exempted from ethnic citizenship.... Consequently, these aliens were denied customary access to land because they had no native authority in colonial days.

The duality of the legal system exacerbated ethnic divides amongst groups of people occupying this region. The Zeitgeist of this colonial legacy was perpetuated via a state ethnicity that had an institutional underpinning in what Vlassenroot (2000) describes as the continuing presence of a parallel, exclusive and mono-ethnic traditional land tenure system. In this set up, there is systematic exclusion of segments of the population belonging to certain ethnicities from accessing, controlling and using land.

Discriminatory patterns which characterised the DRC’s post-colonial governments did little to address this and actually stymied any nationalist sentiments in excluded groups. Mobutu’s regime systematically excluded most Tutsi from citizenship, local power and economic security while simultaneously denying them opportunities that accrue from citizenship. From as early as 1973, political leaders sought to deny Tutsis national identification documents. This was in spite of statutory frameworks, put in place in 1972, which granted
them citizenship. As a result, situations arose where although on paper Tutsis were recognised as citizens, they did not reap dividends associated with citizenship. This led to ethnic consciousness fomenting, based on sentiments of exclusion by other groups. The legitimate opportunity to own and access land, the ultimate resource in the Kivus, was linked to Congolese citizenship (Africa Canada Accountability Coalition 2010).

Furthermore, continued mistrust between the Tutsi and Hutu in neighbouring Burundi and Rwanda reinforced Tutsi separateness in the DRC. There was mutual suspicion on the part of both groups, characterised by endemic fear of being attacked by the other, which placed each side on high alert. This kind of situation tends to ‘produce an environment where groups fear their entire existence is under threat, leading them to engage in pre-emptive attacks’ (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2010). The political and national exclusion of the Banyamulenge – comprising the Tutsi population in the Kivus – saw them align with armed groups according to their interests; the most recent being the M23, which was primarily made up of Tutsis. The Banyamulenge’s support for and participation in the activities of formidable armed groups that advanced their cause only served to further enforce the contempt that other groups already held for them. During the Second Congo War the RCD, soon after its formation, took control of major towns in North and South Kivu. This prompted Laurent-Désiré Kabila to form alliances with Mai-Mai groups, the Burundian Hutu armed group Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD)), and the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armée Rwandaises (FAR))/Interahamwe. Consequently, Kabila’s security services and like-minded groups started to ethnically profile and target individuals they deemed to be Tutsi or Banyamulenge, resulting in the detention of people, appropriation or destruction of their property and, in some cases, the murder of those targeted (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010).

Similarly, in pre-emptive efforts aimed at suppressing the growing influence of the Rwandan population, many of the native authorities in the Kivus created their own military, known as the Mai-Mai and made up of Hunde, Nande and Nyanga militia (Mamdani and Jordan 1998). The Mai-Mai had a strong aversion
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for Rwandan troops, whom they associated with the quest for Tutsi dominance in the Kivus. With this rationale, the movement committed to fighting Rwandan and Ugandan troops, who they considered sympathisers of Banyarwandan interests in the Kivus.

**Cultivation of ethnic consciousness and identities**

The structural legacy of ethnic cleavages in the DRC has been attributed to Belgian colonial rule (Wright 2008). The prolonged usage of terms such as ‘Bangala’, ‘Lulua’ and ‘Kasaians’ to refer to particular groups or tribes is what, according to Lemarchand (1964), contributed to the growth of a separate ethnic consciousness among various groups. Remnants of this colonial legacy exist up to this day in conflict-affected regions in the DRC (Sarkin 2001). Whereas the Belgians cultivated the seeds of ethnic consciousness, Mobutu institutionalised and entrenched it during his rule. In 1978 for example, Mobutu purged the Kinshasa-based military of all officers from the Kasai, Maniema, Bandundu and Katanga provinces because he deemed them disloyal (Stearns 2011). The army was reorganised, with members of Mobutu’s own small Ngbandi tribe placed in key command positions, and individuals from the Kivus barred from taking up influential posts. ‘If you were not from Équateur, you were nobody,’ observers explained (Stearns 2011:115).

Ethnic identities in the Kivus have divided communities and aided the creation and propagation of armed groups. In these areas, conflicts are two-fold. First are clashes at local level, in which Kinyarwanda speakers are pitted against the autochthonous populations, as demonstrated by the antagonism between Rwanda-backed forces and the nativist Mai-Mai groups which have continuously objected to the presence of foreigners in the Kivus. In the First Congo War they fought alongside Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (**Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (ADFL)**), going on to support him when he began to object to the presence of the Tutsi population in the Kivus. Even with the advent of democracy ushered in by the 2006 elections, Turner (2007) explains that mixed areas, such as Uvira in South Kivu and Goma in North Kivu, experienced fighting as self-styled ‘autochthones’ attempted to prevent the registration of what they considered ‘foreigners’. Second, the areas experienced regional level conflict
which pitted Kinyarwanda speaking groups against each other. There is a history of antagonism between the Hutu and Tutsi, which culminated in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. Spill over of ethnic rivalries into neighbouring DRC could not be avoided due to an influx of Rwandese refugees who entered the country through the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, fleeing massacres at home. It is estimated that as many as 850,000 Rwandese refugees arrived in the Goma area, while another 332,000 arrived in Bukavu (Prunier 2009). Some refugees were former members of the defeated FAR and the Interahamwe, a militia group linked to political parties which were involved in orchestrating the genocide. These groups make up the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)).

What seemed to be pre-emptive efforts intended to protect ethnic rights contributed to the formation of movements in support of exclusionary rights. As was the case amongst the Tutsi population in the Kivus, Rwanda’s support for Kabila during the First Congo War was motivated by a desire to oust Mobutu, who allowed the suppression of Tutsi rights, and aligned himself with Hutu rebel forces, helping them to re-arm. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) therefore sought to protect the rights of the Tutsi living in the Kivus and contain the rebel Hutu forces that had fled Rwanda following their defeat in the 1994 genocide. Similarly in 1998 the RCD, led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, took the town of Goma and began a campaign against Laurent-Désiré Kabila who, within a year of his victory, had managed to alienate his former regional allies. He had marginalised the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi from power and expressly sought to gain the support of the Congolese by fermenting hatred against the Banyamulenge (Breytenbach et al. 1999). This precipitated the beginning of the Second Congo War, a battle which pitted the DRC, supported by Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe, against the rebels, backed by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (Stearns 2011).

Insurgent groups such as the M23 came out in support of the Tutsi population in the Kivus. The M23’s main opponent was the FDLR, a Hutu group. In 2006 the CNDP, populated by former RCD rebels based in Goma, and coordinated by Laurent Nkunda, also claimed to protect the Congolese Tutsi and fought the FDLR. Nkunda’s defection from the FARDC and his rebellion
against Joseph Kabila’s government were based on claims of his defence of the interests of the Tutsi minority, who were constantly attacked by Rwandan Hutu militias in the Kivu conflict. He continued to lead his troops in the conflict until his arrest by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).

**Corruption and kleptocracy**

The levels of corruption in the DRC are egregious, with roots that stretch back to the unbelievable kleptocracy that characterised Mobutu’s rule (Kibasomba and Lombe 2011). Wedeman (2012) defines kleptocracy as denoting a state ruled by thieves, in which dishonest officials transform the state into an instrument of private plunder. He explains that kleptocracy begins to emerge when the ruler, not just his henchmen, turns to fraud as a means of personal enrichment and uses his authority to divert resources away from the state and into his own pockets. Mobutu exported much of what he stole, allegedly transferring more than US$ 100 million a year to banks in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe. His subordinates also stole what they could and police officers and soldiers reportedly engaged in extortion. The collapse of the economy of the DRC in the late 1980s and early 90s can be linked to kleptocracy and corruption. Despite the peace agreements signed between 2002 and 2007, and the democratic elections held in 2006 and 2011, this legacy still dominates the Congo’s political, administrative and military culture. Greed is still the reason for the majority of candidates to apply for government posts or stand for election into parliament (Kibasomba and Lombe 2011). Loaded with immense natural resources, nowhere has corruption and kleptocracy been more greatly at play than in the Kivus. The stakes in this region are so high that political and military leaders have allegedly used the illegally acquired wealth from these resources to, among others, rig elections in order to maintain the status quo and perpetuate the vice (Rift Valley Institute 2012).

**Why do the conflicts in the DRC seem intractable?**

Having discussed the dynamics of the conflicts in the DRC, this section examines why, in spite of tremendous efforts to resolve them, the conflicts in the DRC have over the years become seemingly intractable. The analysis will focus on questions of territoriality and the problem of state consolidation, availability
of strategic minerals, cross-border ethnic identities, abandonment of mediation processes after peace agreements, stunted growth of supranational organisations and the shifting epicentres of conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

Lingonge (2004) posits that the war in the DRC was one of the most complex and intractable ones to take place on the African continent. With the recent escalations that have occurred in spite of the signing of numerous peace agreements, it could appear to a conflict management practitioner that the conflicts remain intractable. Crocker et al. (2004) affirm that many scholars use the term ‘intractable conflicts’ to mean contestations that can never be solved or effectively managed. Their view, however, is that intractable conflicts are stubborn or difficult, but not impossible to manage. They opine that what separates intractable conflicts from others is a difference in the willingness or susceptibility of parties to entertain political options rather than violence. It is the view of Crocker et al. that will guide the usage of the term intractable conflicts in this paper.

After the outbreak of the Congo wars, there were tremendous efforts made to not only mitigate the effects of the violence but also deal with the causes of the conflicts. Among these were numerous peace accords which were negotiated and endorsed. In spite of these agreements, the conflicts have over the years periodically escalated into runaway violence, especially in the Kivus. Table 1 reflects some of the major peace agreements reached since 1999. It is important to note at this point that there are indeed other less prominent, yet equally crucial, bilateral agreements that were reached between some of the parties, for example l’Accord des Cascades between Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (Mouvement de Libération Congolais (MLC)) and President Joseph Kabila on 19 February 2002. This agreement was crucial in advancing the deadlocked Sun City negotiations.
Table 1: Peace agreements in the DRC reached in the period after the First Congo War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Place and date of signature</th>
<th>Parties involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement</td>
<td>Lusaka, Zambia on 10 July 1999</td>
<td>Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the MLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun City Agreement</td>
<td>Sun City, Rustenburg, South Africa on 19 April 2002</td>
<td>DRC government, MLC and a majority of civil society and unarmed political opposition groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria Accord</td>
<td>Pretoria, South Africa on 30 July 2002</td>
<td>Governments of the DRC and Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda Agreement</td>
<td>Luanda, Angola on 6 September 2002</td>
<td>Governments of the DRC and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC</td>
<td>Pretoria, South Africa on 16 December 2002</td>
<td>The Government of the DRC, the RCD, MLC, the political opposition, civil society, RCD-Movement for Liberation (RCD-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML)), RCD-National (RCD-N), and the Mai-Mai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Final Act</td>
<td>Sun City, South Africa on 2 April 2003</td>
<td>Participants at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace agreements between the government, the CNDP and other armed groups</td>
<td>Goma, DRC on 23 January 2008</td>
<td>The Government of the DRC and over 20 armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region</td>
<td>Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 24 February 2013</td>
<td>Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo, the DRC, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are a variety of reasons why the aforementioned peace agreements have not led to sustainable conflict resolution in the DRC. These are discussed below.

**Territoriality and the problem of state consolidation**

It is understood that countries that have vast territories, like the DRC, often experience challenges in consolidating the state. Herbst (2000) suggests that countries are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders. Control in this case is assured by developing the necessary infrastructure to broadcast power and gain the loyalty of citizens (Herbst 2000).

The geography of the DRC is unique in terms of the distribution of the population. The Congo is a classic ‘rimland’ country, as it has a high population density in the frontier areas and low concentration of citizens in the interior. Due to the sheer size of the country, plus the fact that the little infrastructure in place is in disrepair, the border regions have remained vulnerable to external interferences and loyalties to authorities other than the government. ‘Particularly in the densely populated eastern provinces, plenty of major urban areas were politically challenging Kinshasa’, Exenberger and Hartman (2008:247) explain.

Ever since the attainment of independence, the DRC’s central government has never been able to disperse authority to its periphery and fully control its entire territory (Karbo and Mutisi 2012). This has largely been influenced by the lack of infrastructure. The DRC possibly faces the most daunting infrastructure challenge on the African continent (Foster and Benitez 2011). The long periods of conflict severely damaged the majority of the country’s infrastructure networks, which are in urgent need of rehabilitation. It is noteworthy that even before the first war in 1996, the inadequacy of basic infrastructure made it cumbersome to knit together the country’s disparate economic and population centres. Power, road and rail networks are in dire need of rehabilitation and development. In a country as big as Western Europe the paved road network is limited to fewer than 3 000 kilometres (Foster and Benitez 2011). The poor road infrastructure, especially in the Kivus, impedes access to markets, limits commercial activity and stifles livelihoods. It also increases insecurity due to the isolation of populations from the rest of the country, as well as their inability to access social and administrative services (Graham 2014).
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This state of affairs has a negative impact on national security. The feasibility of waging a civil war is largely deterred by the presence of a strong state with sufficient coercive capacity to manipulate, to a large degree, the political environment of its territory. If the state lacks strong institutional governance mechanisms, it becomes susceptible to the machinations of political and other groupings attempting to exercise various forms of control. Weak political structures such as these create power vacuums that are often bolstered by the implicit need for a governing hierarchy as dictated by societies. Due to the vacuum created by this situation, rebels and militias have little difficulty in taking control of large swathes of areas in eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivus. A weak government also presupposes a lack of capacity to constitute a strong army to defend the state should its security be threatened.

In spite of the aforementioned argument, in the international system, there are countries with large geographical territories which do not have state consolidation problems. These states have, in the past, undergone wars and civil strife but yet managed to consolidate. The three most dominant countries in the international system – Russia, the United States of America and China – also happen to be geographically wide.

**Presence of strategic minerals**

The presence of strategic minerals in under-developing nations acts as a divider, as it carries greater potential for conflict than minerals in general (Westing 1986). Strategic minerals are those which are important to a state’s economy, particularly in the area of defence.

Westing (1986) adds that whether natural resources carry the potential for conflict depends on the extent to which:

- the military and industries rely on the natural resource in the short to medium term
- the natural resource crosses political and ideological divides during its supply and routing
- there is contestation for the territory in which the natural resource is found.
The DRC is endowed with vast natural resources, which include massive reserves of gold and diamonds, most of the world’s reserves of columbo-tantalite, numerous mines of silver, cadmium, copper and zinc, and rare minerals such as cobalt, nickel, niobium, tantalum, beryl, cassiterite and wolfram. Many of these resources are located in the Kivus, Katanga, Kasai and Maniema and are largely untapped (Autesserre 2010). These resources, it is argued, are drivers of conflict in the Congo, as they sustain the various armed groups financially and provide incentives for continued participation in the conflicts (Fridell and Konings 2013).

Turner (2007) explains that although the DRC is one of the largest countries in Africa, during the Congo wars it was held to ransom and pillaged by neighbours far smaller than it is. Geopolitical concerns may explain the underlying reasons for the first invasion of the Congo. The First Congo War ushered in a new wave of illegal exploitation of the DRC’s resources by foreigners, aided by Congolese (Turner 2007). Turner’s statement support past findings of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC which reported large-scale looting by the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda during the war. Once obtained, minerals were either taken back to the countries or exported to international markets by these forces and other nationals (United Nations Security Council 2001).

The Kivus were at the epicentre of this dynamic as these provinces are the richest in high-value low-weight mineral resources, and are located near the DRC’s borders with Uganda and Rwanda, which function as easy channels for exporting resources for quick profit by the forces and governments involved (Fridell and Konings 2013). Exploitation of and trade in mineral deposits located in eastern DRC contributed substantially to the start and continuation of violence. The emergence of a war economy in the DRC enabled many to accumulate wealth that they otherwise would not have been able to attain (Dunn 2001). For instance, national and foreign actors and their local proxies, competing for control of mining sites, contributed to outbreaks of violence. The illicit exploitation of natural resources enabled combatants to finance the acquisition of weapons and fund their war efforts. The armed groups also used
extreme violence against civilians to gain control over either resource-rich areas or the ability to exploit them (Autesserre 2008).

Another aspect of the Congo wars is that local actors also participated in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the eastern provinces. Rebel groups and militias secured, taxed and supervised the acquisition and transportation of valuable raw materials in their areas of control. When FARDC brigades were eventually dispatched to the eastern Congo provinces, they also became involved in the mining. The soldiers either dug minerals or taxed local production, while the officers facilitated and benefitted from illegal exportation to Rwanda, Tanzania or Uganda (Autesserre 2008). The state’s inability to provide financially for its army also meant that the FARDC profited from the prevailing state of war and anarchy, collaborating with rebels and foreign armies in extracting and looting resources. A 2010 report by the UN panel of experts shows that FARDC troops were involved in illegal mining (United Nations Security Council 2010).

The conflicts in the DRC have also been allegedly fanned by the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) which sought mining concessions and contracts in the DRC under conditions that were more preferable than would be possible in peaceful and stable states (Shah 2010). MNCs developed networks of key political, military and business elites to exploit the DRC’s natural resources. According to Shah (2010), MNCs also allegedly engaged in trade with rebels who, as already alluded to, set up financial and administrative systems that enabled them to collect revenue from the minerals. This income reportedly allowed all the belligerents to fund their participation in the conflicts, as well as to enrich themselves.

Taking into account the argument posited above, it is also important to note that the presence of strategic minerals in a country does not by default place it on the verge of armed conflict. It is the intense competition over these resources, in the context of weak or non-existent regulatory frameworks, which makes violence highly likely to occur.
Cross-border ethnic identities

Cross-border ethnic identities tend to internationalise conflicts as arguments and battles spill over into one or more countries. Ethnic identities can lead people to see their personal interests as united with the interests of a particular group (Joireman 2004). To this end, ethnic unrest in one country can be supported by the same ethnic group located in another state (Schnabel 2002). According to Jesse and Simon (2004), studies have shown that even if there is no common border, ethnic and religious linkages between groups in different countries increase the chances of escalation or diffusion of war.

Challenges of a cross-border nature can also entwine with conflicts among local elites. From a cross-border conflict perspective, a neighbouring country can influence certain parties to initiate violence (Brosché and Rothbart 2012). With close to 500 ethnic groups, the DRC is one of the most ethnically diverse states on earth (Karbo and Mutisi 2012). An examination of similar diversity in different contexts has revealed that neighbouring countries have provided military support to rebel groups active in local elite conflicts (Brosché and Rothbart 2012). The motivation for such support in the DRC has rarely been altruistic. External actors have used dissident clusters as proxies for their own parochial interests, which has in turn increased the proliferation of rebel groups. The involvement of different players has multiplied the problems in the Kivus, since the different actors tend to have competing agendas.

According to Taras and Ganguly (2009), conflict in the DRC became internationalised when, among other reasons, the Tutsis who had routed the Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi seemed intent on building an empire, with the consequence that Tutsi leaders in Rwanda were perceived by other groups as the masterminds of a Tutsi imperial project that would take control of the weak or even collapsed state of the region. Ultimately, a combination of cross-border ethnic identities and the internationalisation of conflicts have contributed to making the conflicts in the DRC perpetual.

Abandonment of mediation processes after peace agreements

A peace agreement between conflicting parties is not necessarily the panacea that will cure their problems. Even after signing an agreement, the mediator and
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parties need to put in place frameworks to ensure constant dialogue on issues that are potentially divisive. This, however, rarely happens. Mediators are often faced with the dilemma of moving mediation processes forward, to hastily reach an agreement and stop violence, as opposed to lengthening engagements to ensure that the assistance offered to parties supports them to adequately address the underlying issues that lead to and perpetuate violence.

The mediation initiatives that have been undertaken in the DRC have tended to be an end in themselves rather than being a means to the desired end – the resolution of conflict. This is echoed by Solomon and Mngqibisa (2004), who note that various interventions in the conflicts in the DRC have been characterised by third parties attempting to arrive at paper peace agreements as quickly as possible. They caution that the process of achieving an accord is often more important than the settlement itself. Often, intangibles such as psychology and personality matter as much as material interests.

The recurrence of violence after negotiated peace agreements in the DRC could also suggest failures in consolidating peace and quickly delivering on human security needs in post-conflict environments. Ayangafac and Cilliers (2011) contend that cessation of hostilities through post-agreement imposition of massive humanitarian and peacekeeping operations by the international community, which temporarily provides an external guarantee against escalation of violence, does not amount to peace. These operations should, instead, contribute to the resolution of root and proximate causes of conflicts.

**Stunted growth of supranational organisations**

In a globalising world, virtually all states in the international system are members of one or more supranational organisations, or are aspiring to be associates. A supranational organisation is an entity, group, union or conglomeration of multiple countries that surrender certain amounts of government power to the union. Supranational institutions include entities such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), East African Community, and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), among others. White (2005) argues that the world order has been moving towards greater centralisation, and that the idea of supranationalism is congruent with the rationalist school of
thought of international relations which contends that centralisation is meant to create a world community which could foster more cooperation among states and, by extension, stem armed conflicts.

It is the stunted development of supranational organisations which, as this section propounds, has contributed to the longevity of the conflicts in the DRC. Were supranational organisations to work as effectively as intended, or guided by the letter and spirit that led to their formation, then some regional dimensions of national conflicts would be addressed. The supranational organisations that the DRC is a member of (i.e. the UN, AU, Southern African Economic Community, Economic Community of Central African States, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and ICGLR) have not lived up to their fullest potential to be able to stem the regional dimensions of the conflicts in the DRC. This has largely been due to their failure to measure up to some elements which White (2005) contends are important for the effectiveness of supranational organisations.

The decisions of the supranational organisations that the DRC belongs to have not been particularly binding on member governments. Some of the countries bordering the DRC have in the past gone against UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to halt the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC (United Nations Security Council 2012). Also, the decision-making organs in these organisations have been entirely dependent on the cooperation of all governments, as was clear during the talks to deescalate the violence between the DRC government and the M23 in late 2013; where the decisions of the ICGLR at some point depended on the DRC’s, Rwanda’s and Tanzania’s willingness to cooperate (Matsiko 2013). An ideal situation would have been for the majority of the members to take a decision for the general stability of the region; the potential lack of cooperation between the aforementioned countries notwithstanding. In addition to the fallibilities already alluded to, supranational organisations (with perhaps the exception of the UN) also have neither the power to enforce their decisions nor the financial autonomy to act independently and decisively. In situations where the institutions were able to decide, bureaucratic processes and inadequate political will caused delays in their eventual actions, with grave consequences on lives in the DRC.
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The shifting epicentres of conflicts in the Great Lakes region

In spite of an appreciation that the conflicts in the DRC have an impact on almost the entire Great Lakes region, national initiatives, going by their visibility, continue to outnumber regional programmes to deal with the conflicts, particularly those in the Kivus. Mwagiru (1997) makes a case for the application of a conflict systems approach in the management of cross-border wars. He explains that conflict systems champion the belief that every war has intimate relationships regionally, and that what might at first appear to be individualised conflicts are in fact parts of a broader pattern of conflict in a region. The approach rejects the idea that fights do not have cross-border dynamics, and instead visualises individual conflicts as integral parts of a wider conflict system.

Since the Congo wars, the conflicts in the DRC have not been contained within the DRC’s territory. Battles and combatants have penetrated borders, and been linked with the conflicts in Angola, Burundi, the CAR, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda. The parties to the DRC conflicts have also made linkages that went beyond the DRC. The situation in the Kivus must therefore be seen in terms of its reality as part of a wider conflict system.

It is also important that conflict management practitioners ensure that they identify the epicentre of a conflict – the eye of the storm (Mwagiru 1997). Conflict systems, like all organic things, have epicentres around which their existence revolves. It is noteworthy that these may keep shifting. In the Great Lakes region, conflicts have, since the early 1990s to date, shifted between Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, and Rwanda. One of the challenges in the management of conflicts in the DRC is that even when the epicentre changed in the Great Lakes region, conflict management processes have not been rapidly adjusted enough to accommodate shifting balances. The practice has often been to either initiate new approaches to deal with a new epicentre, or to abandon one for another. Amid this, the regional elements of the conflicts in the DRC have not been effectively dealt with by national, supranational and international actors, which contributes to their perpetuation.
**Post-crisis recovery efforts in the DRC**

In as much as the conflicts in the DRC continue to escalate, as has been alluded to in the previous section, it is important to acknowledge that efforts have been made to move the country beyond crisis, especially after the end of the Second Congo War. This section will examine some of the post-crisis recovery efforts implemented, while also taking into consideration the fact that the impact of such efforts can be realised in the medium to long term.

Post-conflict recovery strategies arise following cessation of violence and the adoption of carefully crafted efforts towards the consolidation of peace. There have been post-crisis recovery efforts in the DRC that were put in place after peace agreements had been reached, most notably the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC. This and other efforts aimed to move the DRC beyond the seemingly intractable conflicts.

Successive milestones contributed to what can arguably be viewed as a transitory period towards post-conflict recovery, albeit a tenuous one. The periods following the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC in 2002 and before the 2006 elections were considered times of re-engagement which witnessed a surge in funding from donor countries, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with countries such as Belgium, and the creation of joint programmes such as the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme which involved 40 national and international partners (Brusset et al. 2011). In the same vein, the period following the 2006 elections was characterised by greater international engagement with the DRC government, diversified cross-country investments by donors and multilateral agencies, and greater synergy between development partners.

Following the signing of peace agreements that are a consequence of peace talks, the international community more often than not sets aside financial resources to support the implementation of stabilisation initiatives. Stearns (2013) notes that ‘[s]uch programmes help fragile governments to restore state authority and provide the general conditions that would allow for long-term development to pick up and for victims of the conflict to resume a normal life.’
An overview of post-crisis recovery frameworks

This section will highlight the recovery efforts put in place after the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC. Highlighting these efforts is intended to set the stage for an examination of whether they have effectively contributed to dealing with the structural issues in the Kivus and, by extension, the DRC.

The UN, in collaboration with the Government of the DRC and international partners, developed strategies to support implementation of political agreements and peacebuilding gains. These tactics were designed to build on existing assessments and frameworks. One of these was the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP), which was prepared in two phases. In the first stage, an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-I) was implemented. This was renamed the GPRSP in the second phase, and adopted by the transitional government in July 2006. It was subsequently endorsed by the democratically elected government in March 2007 (International Monetary Fund 2010). A major weakness of the GPRSP was insufficient ownership of it by the political and administrative authorities of the country (International Monetary Fund 2013). Although officially recognised by all stakeholders as the only reference framework for development policies, programmes and actions, most political and administrative authorities and managers paid little attention to it. They programmed, budgeted, implemented and monitored public interventions without considering the framework (International Monetary Fund 2013).

Similarly, in response to the fluid political environment in the run-up to the elections in 2006, international partners mobilised to identify key priorities for the consolidation of peace in the DRC and to come up with a common strategy to achieve recovery and secure development assistance. This was implemented through the Country Assistance Framework (CAF), a joint initiative of the UN and World Bank which was open to all international partners in the DRC (United Nations and World Bank 2008). The CAF focused on enhancing security sector reform, public financial management, natural resources management, public administration and civil service reform, local governance and decentralisation, investment, and public enterprise reform.
However, these efforts were met with scepticism and fear by anti-globalisation activists and national civil society organisations that believe that peacebuilding in the DRC was being used as a Trojan horse to advance rapid neo-liberal political and economic transformation of the country, in line with the interests of the World Bank (Adebayo and Paterson 2010).

The fragile environment in eastern DRC, caused by persisting pockets of militias, continues to impede recovery efforts and implementation of various strategies because of a sustained threat of relapse into violence. To achieve transition in eastern DRC, the UN launched the Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) for eastern DRC in 2008.

Froitzheim (2014) confirms that the UNSSSS, drawing from national and other frameworks, aimed to stabilise the east and protect civilians through:

i. reform of the security sector and the disbandment of armed groups
ii. supporting political processes aimed at implementing agreements
iii. restoring state authority
iv. assisting the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees, and community recovery
v. confronting and combating sexual violence.

The UNSSSS was suspended due to the re-emergence of rebellion in the Kivus in 2007. When the CNDP signed an agreement with the DRC government on 23 March 2009, the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) was launched (Froitzheim 2014); it was intended to be the primary strategy tying international support to the national stabilisation framework, the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War-affected Areas (STAREC). Launched in 2009, the STAREC is a strategic framework which contains key objectives to peace in the Kivus and consolidates peace initiatives with political and military ones. The agenda is managed by the government, although it is primarily funded by donors through a multi-donor funding mechanism. It is based on three main priority areas:

i. security and restoration of the state
ii. humanitarian assistance and delivery of social services
iii. economic recovery.
However, the STAREC/ISSSS joint strategy has not been short of critics. Following completion of the first phase of the ISSSS, donors began questioning the impact of the US$ 270 million already spent. Complaints focused on the lack of ownership and commitment to peacekeeping by the Congolese government, as reflected in poor commitment to post-conflict recovery activities. As reported, of the US$ 430 million in projects for STAREC/ISSSSS, the Congolese government only pledged US$ 20 million. Similarly, with the launch of the ISSSSS, total funding requirements were estimated at US$ 800 million but, by mid-2010, only US$ 160 million had been pledged to the strategy and not passed through the fund, whilst only US$ 15 million was promised through the fund finance mechanism (Brusset et al. 2011). Recent figures indicate that the fund had received US$ 21 838 780 by 2014 (Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office 2014). Even with financial contributions from the donor community, political and diplomatic efforts have not been commensurate with the available finances, with the consequence that they have dismally failed to ensure the active participation of key post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict transformation stakeholders. The post-crisis recovery initiatives in the Kivus – and by extension the DRC – provided an opportunity for international engagement through the work of UN missions in the country as discussed below.

**From MONUC to MONUSCO: A focus on stabilisation**

Within the context of prioritisation of stabilisation strategies, the UN mission was obliged to change tack to be in synergy with STAREC/ISSSSS. In 2009, President Kabila called for UN peacekeeping forces to begin withdrawing from the DRC, arguing that the stability of the country had significantly improved; a situation he largely attributed to the signing of the 2008 peace deal between the Kinshasa and Kigali governments and the integration of former CNDP rebels into the FARDC following the signing of the 23 March 2009 agreement. The UNSC, however, still considered the situation in eastern DRC extremely volatile, given the 1.5 million people displaced due to persisting insecurity. Instead of complete withdrawal, however, a new mission with a stabilisation component was created through UNSC Resolution 1925 (Boutellis and Lacaille 2011). This mission was named the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and replaced the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

The second mission, MONUSCO, was authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to fulfil its mandate relating to, inter alia, the protection of humanitarian personnel, civilians and human rights defenders under imminent threat of grievous harm, and to support the DRC government in its stabilisation and peace consolidation efforts. On 28 March 2014, the UNSC, in its resolution 2147, extended MONUSCO’s mandate until 31 March 2015 and decided that the renewed directive would also include MONUSCO’s Intervention Brigade, within the authorised troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police officers and 1,050 formed police units (United Nations 2014). With the vastness of the Kivus and the existence of many armed groups spread across the country, it is more than likely that these troops will still be stretched for a while. The renewed mandate will, however, provide the teeth that the mission has been missing in decisively dealing with armed groups.

Froitzheim (2014) advances that stabilisation is grounded in the security imperative of removing or reducing threats, by armed groups for example, and encompasses both military and civilian interventions. Thus, stabilisation approaches can range from direct security action to counter threats to aspiring social transformation through interlinking peacebuilding, statebuilding and development initiatives.

MONUSCO has had its fair share of criticism. Peacekeepers have, for instance, been accused of standing by in the past, notably when M23 rebels conquered the city of Goma for 10 days in November 2012 (Vogel 2013). MONUSCO has also been accused of failing in its two objectives: protection of civilian populations and providing assistance in restoring state authority. The mission has a dismal record in terms of its ability to protect civilians. It has been accused of contributing to challenges faced by local populations in differentiating between military operations and humanitarian activities (Vogel 2013). Notwithstanding this, it is noteworthy that towards the end of 2013, the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade obliterated the M23. Even as they execute
their mandate, neither the UN staff involved in peacekeeping nor the UNSC have attempted to design a strategy addressing local causes of the conflicts in the DRC, either during the war or after ceasefires (Menondji 2013). By focusing on national and regional issues, the peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts of UN staff have not been pragmatic in that they have not played very visible roles at local level (Menondji 2013).

**Recommendations**

The examination of conflict dynamics in the DRC and an assessment of factors that could play a part in the perpetuation of conflicts bring to the fore certain issues which, if addressed, might significantly contribute to the resolution of the situation in the Kivus and, by extension, add to the efforts to achieve sustainable peace in the DRC. In the sections below, some recommendations for consideration by local, national, regional and international actors with an interest in the situation in the Kivus are offered.

**Enhance governance and relations between local and national government**

Due to the geographical vastness of the country, it is important that the Government of the DRC continues to prioritise efforts to not only empower provincial administrations, but to also work with and through them to deliver much needed services to citizens. The loyalty of Congolese to the government will, in the long run, be sustainably harnessed through better service delivery. This can best be achieved through working with, and not at odds with, respective provincial administrations under the constitutionally allowable frameworks.

**Encourage recognition of the central role of security**

The capacity to monopolise violence should be entrusted to the government. This has not been the case in the DRC, where rebels and militia have in the past run parallel governments in areas they control. Improvements in the security sector and enhanced state capacity to monopolise violence should be prioritised if the DRC is to make progress within fragmented areas. Addressing problems within the national army should be a high priority on the government’s list, to ensure that issues such as the FARDC’s involvement with armed groups and mineral exploitation are addressed.
In addressing the problem of local armed groups, the government should opt for less militarised forms of interventions as this has greater chances of dealing with the underlying issues that provide the rationale for the formation and sustenance of armed groups. The gun alone will not decimate rebellions.

**Ensure clarity of long-term peacebuilding strategies**

This paper has alluded to some challenges with post-crisis recovery strategies used by the international community, through the UN, in the DRC. Actors and stakeholders in the international community operating or interested in working in the DRC need to do away with approaching the work with piecemeal efforts that focus on quick-impact short-term objectives. Whereas these might have their short-term benefits, for conflict transformation to continue to occur, it is necessary to adopt longer-term strategies towards the achievement of medium to longer-term transformative impacts. While the immediacy of the situation may necessitate the use of short-term strategies such as humanitarian relief, this will only allow for the problems to be addressed in a superficial way. Short-term strategies that address emergency situations should be employed in tandem with longer-term strategies which are more successful at getting to the roots of problems.

Longer-term strategies based on empirical understanding of problems in the DRC should be employed to arrive at a definition of what lasting peace in the context of the DRC means. This shared vision should take into account existing structures and build on what is already available.

**Harness the power of local capacities in analysis and interventions**

International actors should reconsider the tendency to primarily focus on regional and national issues in their analysis of the conflict in the DRC, whilst only offering a cursory view and investigation of local level dynamics. Autesserre (2012) states that most intervention is misguided as foreign diplomats, UN peacekeepers and numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) attribute the fighting to exclusive national and international tensions brought on by power struggles between and among Congolese and foreign elites. Therefore, intervention strategies are considered from a national and regional level, as actors fail to recognise that largely, the main causes of violence are local ones,
which expand. Autesserre (2012) argues that many solutions to these problems have been superficial. She recommends that intervention strategies should take into consideration the fact that national and regional cleavages are as influential as local rifts in prompting fighting in the Kivus, and that a holistic approach should be the only way. International organisations should expand their mandate to not only deal with central governments, as the conflicts in the Kivus are deeply rooted in local and ethnicity-based identities.

However, when analysing the local linkages, there needs to be a clear understanding of the motivating factors behind the different actors. Whilst some groups, like the Mai-Mai, may have tenuous links to political elites and are more rooted in the local realities of rural life, others have had strong linkages with political elites; among them the M23, which allegedly had the backing of the Rwandan government. Thus, taking into consideration these complexities and the extent to which armed actors’ networks run is critical to coming up with pragmatic solutions.

Encourage and support local ownership of socio-economic and political processes

In post-conflict contexts, the notion of local ownership conveys the common wisdom that any peace process which is not embraced by those who have to live with it is unlikely to succeed. This is partly due to the consideration that externally driven peacebuilding processes tend to be unsustainable. Interventions by the international community, therefore, should be need-based while the priorities, sequencing and pace of delivery must take into consideration the dynamics of the respective conflict system, through local ownership and meaningful internal and external coordination (De Coning 2008). This approach also allows for divergence from an overly liberalised approach that includes many prescriptions and demands, to one that acknowledges the fact that conflict transformation has to take into account the existing historical, cultural and social foundations of the conflict area. These include the legacies of violence, impacts of the international system in a conflict society, and the peacebuilding initiatives that the country concerned has experienced.
Increase accountability, coherence and coordination among civil society actors

As of 2010, there were at least 171 organisations active in the peace sector in the Kivus; the majority of which are local entities whose work is supported by international NGOs (Morvan and Nzweve 2010). Engagement has mostly revolved around assisting in mediating local land and inter-family disputes and, to a lesser extent, addressing economic and armed conflicts. This has largely been due to lack of capacity to engage political leaders in constructive dialogue. Field interviews which the authors conducted in August 2012 revealed that in some engagements, civil society is highly politicised and mainly acts as a locus for partisan competition and, for those in power, as a springboard for political careers. Coherence and coordination are negatively affected by polarisation of the activities of these organisations, where they show a clear bias towards their own ethnic and interest groups in the course of their work. Furthermore, there has been an overdependence on international funding, which stymies organisations’ flexibility in making decisions, with the majority bending to the will of donors.

Finally, the authors’ inference from interviews with civil society actors is that civil society in the DRC has been accused of deriving legitimacy from political elites and parties, with the result that they deviate from their main advocacy goals. To this end, civil society actors need to be held accountable for their activities, and must act in line with a clear strategy which deciphers how to effectively coordinate efforts to achieve set and agreed on objectives. If they do not, they will be viewed suspiciously by the very communities they mean to assist.

Conclusion

The conflicts in the Kivus are part of a larger intricate web of conflicts in the DRC. The situation in the Kivus has, in recent times, had massive impacts not only on the country but also the entire Great Lakes region. Each time there has been conflagration in the Kivus, the effects on Kinshasa and the entire country have been massive, to such an extent that they capture national, regional and international attention due to the deadly humanitarian morass that
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accompanies incidences of instability. It is therefore important to properly analyse the dynamics of the situation in the Kivus because by doing so, practitioners and actors will be better able to conceive initiatives which may be effective in not only deescalating conflicts, but also dealing with structural issues that cause and perpetuate them. Inadequate attention to addressing structural issues in the Kivus has contributed to making the conflicts in the DRC seem intractable. This paper has attempted to offer arguments as to why hostilities subsist, in spite of the post-crisis recovery initiatives implemented in the country. These arguments offer perspectives that can enrich conflict resolution programmes and processes.

Even though this paper focused on the Kivus, it should be noted that the Kivus are only part of the vast territory of the DRC, where other regions also experience linked conflicts. However, it is a summation of this paper that the resolution of the conflicts in the Kivus is an indispensable element in the peacebuilding process and the transformative journey of the DRC. Ultimately, the DRC cannot purport to be stable if the situation in the Kivus is not structurally resolved.
References


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Map of the DRC
Perpetuation of instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: When the Kivus sneeze, Kinshasa catches a cold

By Joyce Muraya and John Ahere

22 YEARS OF CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE