SADC 2014 – 2015: Are South Africa and Zimbabwe shaping the organisation?

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Summary

This policy brief discusses the chairing of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its key institutions by South Africa and Zimbabwe, for the duration of their tenure from 2014 to 2015. It highlights the constraints and opportunities of their agenda-setting functions, considers change or continuity in the SADC institution and makes some recommendations on how both countries can shape SADC’s policy responsibilities. It is argued that the relationships between domestic context, foreign policy organisational structure, leadership and political agency will determine Zimbabwe and South Africa’s performance in SADC in the coming year.

Key points

1. Leadership in SADC’s steering institutions remains an imperative for an effective and well-functioning organisation.

2. A cordial relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa is important for the performance of their SADC functions, but not essential.

3. Decision-making within SADC is hierarchical but mostly consensual in nature, rather than being monopolised by the country chairing the Summit or even the OPDSC.

4. South Africa and Zimbabwe are expected to manage the competing dynamics of cooperative collective governance and the habitual political ‘territorialism’ that characterises SADC.

5. A core priority for Zimbabwe and South Africa is to conceptualise realistic alternatives that will reduce SADC’s dependency on donor funding for its integration agenda.

As Zimbabwe and South Africa preside over two key bodies of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for a year, questions have been raised about the likely impact of domestic developments in and the foreign policies of the two states on the agenda and politics of the regional organisation. Zimbabwe presides over the affairs of SADC in its capacity as overall chair, while South Africa chairs SADC’s security body, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). Their respective deputies are Botswana and Lesotho.

Lesotho was, in fact, scheduled to take over the leadership of the security organ from Namibia this August, but this was deferred to 2015 because of the current political impasse in its governing coalition and a shaky security situation that prevails over its capital. Its appointment may however be deferred again if the political and security problems persist, notwithstanding a SADC political intervention in the country. Lesotho has been subjected to a SADC diplomatic initiative facilitated by Namibia from June and implemented by South Africa after it took over the OPDSC chair in August. The country’s political problems developed into a security crisis in September 2014 and it
has since been hamstrung as an effective deputy to South Africa, also with mooted elections towards a new government in February 2015.

While both Zimbabwe and South Africa have chaired SADC institutions before, the uniqueness of their roles this time around lies in the prevailing political context as well as the interrelationship between their domestic and regional political leaderships. South Africa’s take-over of the chair of the OPdSC at this time is significant as there were concerns about Lesotho’s leadership ability in light of ongoing political uncertainty in the mountain kingdom. The concerns about a Lesotho-Zimbabwe combination serving SADC in times of great internal economic and political difficulty have thus dissipated. But questions do remain about Zimbabwe’s potential role, while in the case of South Africa these revolve around the country’s domestic interests and pragmatism, and how this will affect its leadership, particularly given its track record while presiding over SADC affairs.

The importance of the two institutions being presided over by Zimbabwe and South Africa should not be underemphasised in view of the systemic roles they play and the complementarities of these roles. South Africa and Zimbabwe are expected to manage the competing dynamics of cooperative collective governance and the habitual political ‘territorialism’ that characterises SADC. A cordial relationship between the two countries is important for the performance of their functions, but not essential. In a multilateral context, cordial relationships are not as critical as adherence to rules and norms governing the behaviour of actors for the functioning of institutions. Their political agency or capacity to initiate change in SADC in other words and the constraints they may face are of greater significance.

The SADC organisational context

The SADC institution, located in Gaborone, Botswana, is accountable to the Summit of Heads of State or Government. The Summit meets at least once a year and may hold extraordinary meetings at the request of any member. Summit decisions are reached by consensus. Both the Summit and the OPdSC are led by a system of cooperation and coordination known as a troika. This entails the outgoing, current and incoming chairs liaising with regard to the stewardship of the affairs of the bodies. Crises are dealt with by ‘double troika’ meetings between the members of the Summit and the OPdSC. The chairmanships are held for one year in rotation among member states.

In 2014/15 the SADC chair is Zimbabwe, which hosted the Summit under the theme ‘economic transformation and leveraging resources for sustainable economic and social development through beneficiation and value addition’ in August 2014. This theme was indicative of SADC’s focus for the year in addition to its ‘developmental agenda’ centred on achieving socioeconomic development and political and human security. Zimbabwe’s main responsibility as the chair of SADC’s supreme policy-making institution is to help shape SADC’s developmental agenda and the 2014–2015 work plan by overseeing formal policy reform and defining organisational practice.

Zimbabwe will be guided by the Council of Ministers (COM), a pivotal institution that meets at least four times a year and reports to the Summit. It advises on policy issues and the efficient functioning of the SADC Secretariat, the implementation and administrative organ of SADC. COM also develops and elaborates on the SADC ‘common agenda’ and strategic priorities for the year, and approves and oversees the implementation of SADC policies, strategies and programmes, in particular the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative...
Plan (SiPO). The Secretariat, which has limited operational autonomy and reports to the COM, is headed by the executive secretary from Tanzania, Dr Stergomena Tax. It is responsible, amongst others, for implementing the decisions of the Summit, the OPDSC and the COM. The point to be highlighted is that decision-making within SADC is hierarchical and mostly consensual in nature, rather than being monopolised by the country chairing the Summit or even the OPDSC.

Since Lesotho’s internal political problems persisted, SADC leaders at the 2014 Summit elected South Africa as the 2014/15 OPDSC chair

However, there is an interesting caveat to this. Countries chairing the Summit have the power to influence decisions that may be taken without the requisite consensus. The exceptions include the amendment of SADC treaties and the dissolution of SADC or any of its institutions requiring a decision by three-quarters of all Summit members, the imposition of sanctions in certain instances, and a decision on whether to take enforcement action failing peaceful efforts to resolve a conflict. It should be noted that SADC has a limited set of policy oversight instruments, comparatively few supranational institutions, very few field agencies in member states and very limited budget resources, which come primarily from foreign donors. In consequence, the Secretariat has been forced into a predominantly regulatory mode of governance, and the Summit and the COM retain a powerful hold over policymaking in SADC.

The other key SADC structure is the OPDSC chaired by South Africa in 2014/15. This organ is responsible for providing policy direction on regional peace and security issues between SADC Summits. Several committees, including the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDSC) support the troika of the OPDSC. The MCO comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, and public and state security in each member state.

The SADC Secretariat plays an important implementation and coordinating role in this structure but is not involved in decision-making. The executive secretary, assisted by a director, oversees the Secretariat’s activities and brings issues concerning peace and security that require the attention of the OPDSC to the troika and the MCO. The key policy frameworks guiding decision-making are the SADC Treaty, the OPDSC Protocol and SiPO. The latter is a political and security cooperation blueprint historically poorly implemented by member states.

South African’s replacement of Lesotho

It was South Africa that flagged the seriousness of security concerns in Lesotho when it inferred the threat of a military coup in the country in June 2014, and cautioned against ‘any unconstitutional change of government’. This warning brought to the fore fears of a possible external military intervention from South Africa through SADC in particular, which would have been a repeat of one orchestrated in 1998. While the political developments were relatively minor at that stage, Lesotho’s internal political problems, linked to fissures in its governing coalition, persisted. For this reason, SADC leaders at the 2014 Summit elected South Africa to replace Lesotho as the 2014/15
chair of the OPDSC. According to South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), its selection was unanimous. Indeed, no SADC member state went on record to express a reservation, but there is a perception that South Africa’s election may have come about in part as the result of the working visit by President Zuma to Lesotho on 29 July 2014 where such a proposal may have been made.

South Africa’s nomination was a ‘surprise’ development to some observers in light of the fact that two weeks prior to the SADC Summit, the Lesotho coalition parties met with the then OPDSC chair, Namibia, and the SADC executive secretary. It was confirmed that ‘considerable progress has been made towards ensuring the smooth functioning of the coalition government [in Lesotho]’. This appeared to indicate that the coalition impasse was close to being resolved. An agreement signed between the government coalition and SADC parties was to be implemented by Lesotho’s prime minister, Thomas Thabane, but this undertaking was not honoured. The subsequent political crisis in September 2014 culminated in military action in the capital described by Thabane as an attempted coup d’état.

The background to developments in Lesotho is a history of partisanship, military rule, one-party dominance and intractable post-election conflicts. The background to developments in Lesotho is a history of decades of political partisanship, military rule, one-party dominance and intractable post-election conflicts. The recent developments have also resulted from months of political wrangling within Lesotho’s first three-way governing coalition. The coalition was established in 2012 after the country’s general elections produced a hung parliament. The prime minister has since presided over a fragile coalition government comprising his party, the All Basotho Congress (ABC), Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing’s Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Basotho National Party (BNP) led by minister Thisele Maseribane. The fragility largely resulted from the fact that the coalition was a politically expedient one between parties that had fundamental ideological differences and conflicting ideas on governing the country.

A power struggle developed between the prime minister and his deputy, who at the time of writing was facing serious corruption charges from the very government he is part of. Tensions in the coalition had come to a head by March 2014 when the LCD began to orchestrate motions of no confidence against the prime minister in parliament. When the latter prorogued/suspended parliament in June as a result, the LDC pulled out of the governing coalition and formed a new coalition with the opposition Democratic Congress (DC). The proroguing of parliament heightened the LCD’s demand of a new government with itself at the helm since it would be unable to form a new government with the DC unless the parliamentary suspension was lifted. Tensions heightened in September 2014 when the prime minister announced the dismissal of a key supporter of the deputy prime minister, General Tlali Kamoli of the Lesotho Defence Force. Kamoli not only rejected his dismissal but descended on the capital and undertook actions of a military nature that were seen as an attempted coup. Through South Africa and SADC’s intervention, a fresh resolution to the crisis was agreed to in Maseru on 2 October 2014. The country is mooted to hold elections in February 2015, although the security situation remains unresolved as
per the SADC Maseru declaration and concerns about military meddling in politics and vice versa remain. SADC’s role in helping stabilise Lesotho however remains relevant as the country is still in line to take over the OPDSC chair from South Africa in 2015, after its elections.

Tasks with regard to SADC’s agenda for 2014 – 2015

The core issues on SADC’s agenda to be presided over by Zimbabwe and South Africa revolve around the following action plans:

• Review of SADC’s socio-economic development plan, the RISDP.
• Re-energising integration in terms of managing and implementing the tripartite free-trade agreement signed with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC).
• Resource governance and beneficiation, and accelerating the implementation of SADC’s Industrial Development Policy Framework and work programme signed in 2012.
• Strengthening the capacity for conflict prevention and resolution in general, with the focus on addressing the security challenges in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in particular, Lesotho and post election stabilisation in Madagascar.

In terms of the latter, additional tasks include the development of a working relationship with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to manage peace and security, and the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). South Africa is also expected to support Madagascar in the context of dialogue, national reconciliation and nation-building processes; to facilitate Lesotho’s peace process; and support the work of SADC Election Observer Missions in Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique in 2014.12

Another core priority for Zimbabwe and South Africa is to conceptualise realistic alternatives that will reduce SADC’s dependency on donor funding for its integration agenda. Donor funding accounts for 79% of the SADC budget; member states contribute just 21%.13

South Africa and the OPDSC

South Africa’s work during its OPDSC term will, among others, entail supporting the organ’s work financially with regard to peacekeeping, conflict resolution and mediation processes in particular; coordinating key meetings of the ISPDC and the MCO; and providing policy leadership and direction to the OPDSC by coordinating the work of SADC member states in politics and security and SADC desks at foreign ministries in particular. The country’s policy orientation, according to a press briefing on South Africa’s OPDSC chairmanship, will be geared towards ‘the consolidation of a regional and continental peace and security architecture focusing primarily on conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy and early warning systems’.14 While the modalities for this remain to be seen, it does however underline elements of a proactive leadership at the OPDSC and to re-energise otherwise dormant initiatives.

Under the administration of President Zuma, this has in fact been the case as is evident from the track record. South Africa was elected as the incoming chair of the OPDSC in August 2010 and assumed the chairmanship from August 2011 until July 2012, with Angola holding the SADC chair. It was during its two-year stint at the OPDSC that South Africa pushed for progress on key political and security cooperation initiatives that notably have since lost traction.15 These were:

• The launch of SADC’s Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC), which is tasked with helping to anticipate, prevent and manage conflicts.
• The review and finalisation of SADC’s politics and security cooperation blueprint, SIPO, which was approved at the August 2010 SADC Summit.
• The strengthening of SADC’s Mediation, Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Mechanism in terms of assisting with its operationalisation.

In addition, South Africa and SADC stepped up mediation efforts in three conflicted countries, namely Madagascar, the DRC and Zimbabwe, albeit with varying levels of success. When mediating the constitutional crisis in Madagascar from 2009 onwards, South Africa was instrumental in overcoming some of the major hurdles in the political negotiations. For instance, in talks mediated by President Zuma between the two Malagasy leaders in the Seychelles in July 2012, Ravalomanana and Rajoelina set aside their political differences in preparation for the country’s July 2013 elections. A consensus around a SADC proposal for elections ensued that eventually saw the election of Hery Rajaonarimampianina as president after the December 2013 runoff poll.16 The endorsement of the outcome by local and international observers lent credence to South Africa’s and the OPDSC’s efforts to promote democracy in the region.
Arguably, a case can also be made for a successful South African-led SADC diplomacy in the DRC. However, in this case, South Africa was criticised for supporting a faltering democratisation process in order to advance its own economic and other strategic interests. For instance, the DRC elections in 2011, at which Pretoria presided both over the process and the regional observation task force, was deemed by many observers to be flawed. President Zuma and Angola’s President Dos Santos subsequently positioned themselves as DRC President Kabila’s major regional backers.

In February 2013, a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region was signed in Addis Ababa by 11 concerned states and intergovernmental organisations. Working through SADC, South Africa has also been instrumental in securing the deployment of a special peace enforcement unit, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which has, within a relatively short period of time, been successful in altering the military dynamics in the volatile east of the DRC.

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When it comes to Zimbabwe, President Zuma’s stance on the peace process in that country arguably also set the tone for SADC. South Africa and SADC were guarantors of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA) and, as the lead SADC mediator in Zimbabwe from 2009, president Zuma was responsible for holding the GPA parties to account with regard to its implementation and the country’s readiness to conduct harmonised elections in July 2013. Instead of doing so, South Africa promoted a so-called ‘regionalised version of quiet diplomacy’ on Zimbabwe. This largely failed to hold President Mugabe and the other GPA parties to account as far as SADC’s roadmap to the 2013 elections was concerned. In fact, and notwithstanding reports of mass irregularities in the polls, Zuma was one of the first to congratulate Mugabe on his ‘profound victory in the harmonised elections’. SADC followed suit in August 2013 in Malawi when it endorsed the elections as ‘free, fair and generally credible’. The credibility of the polls was questioned by local and international actors, including SADC’s current deputy, Botswana, which led a lone battle to challenge the electoral results by demanding an independent SADC audit of the results. This issue is still pending with the SADC Secretariat.

Against this mixed bag of results and limited ‘political success’, the five key issues discussed below will determine South Africa’s performance during its tenure.

1. **SADC institutional capacity**

   - The first problem is that South Africa has a relatively ‘weak’ deputy in Lesotho, one that is embroiled in a political and security crisis that is likely to result in a change of government after the scheduled elections of 2015. Lesotho is likely to remain on the agenda of the OPDSC beyond its elections in February 2015.

   - Capacity constraints within the SADC Secretariat, ranging from human to financial limitations, are a particular challenge.
• In terms of the OPDSC work plan, other challenges include, but are not limited to the following:
  – Poor establishment of sub-national structures for policy coordination and implementation (i.e. the SADC National Committees).
  – Weak collaboration with civil society/non-state actors in the security and governance work of SADC, despite the necessity for such participation being recognised in SIPO and other documents.
  – Overall lack of effective policy implementation and monitoring mechanisms. This was flagged by South Africa as the outgoing chair of SADC as far back as 2005.
• Financing the SADC budget is an incessant challenge. With 79% of the SADC budget being contributed by donors, calls by the SADC Secretariat to lessen dependence on donor funding are not misplaced, although no alternative resource mobilisation framework has been proposed. The OPDSC’s work is affected by this problem since SADC is averse to more donor funding being taken on. This could put a further strain on South Africa’s resourcing of the work.

2. Bringing the REWC into operation

Since its launch in 2010, the REWC has been veiled in secrecy, with speculation that it exists merely as an intelligence based system to protect ruling regimes in the region. SADC structures fail to identify governance and security shortcomings in member states, even though this could help SADC to prevent conflict in the region. While South Africa as the chair of the OPDSC cannot make unilateral decisions on the future of the REWC, it can initiate debate by tabling the issue for discussion at the Summit. This will depend on whether Pretoria considers early warning as a strategic issue and as an important part of its OPDSC work.

3. Traction as regards SIPO II

According to DIRCO (August 2014), ‘as the Organ Chair, South Africa will lead SADC in implementing its peace and security agenda in line with SIPO II’. Exactly what this means remains to be seen.

4. Progress on governance and observing elections via the SADC Electoral Advisory Council

While oversight instruments for political governance are strongly resisted by SADC member states, the Secretariat’s capacity for the same is lacking, particularly throughout electoral phases. Supporting the establishment of the proposed SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) will be less contentious if its work becomes part of the strengthening SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, whose revision must be finalised. The rolling out of SADC's mediation and preventative diplomacy structures developed in 2010 would also smoothen the process of making SEAC function.

5. Bringing the SADC Standby Force into operation

The SADC Standby Force was launched in 2007. Bringing it into operation is primarily the function of the Planning Element within the SADC Secretariat under the supervision of chiefs of defence and police, and the MCO. Although it is a
security structure, the chair of the OPDSC has had no special role in rationalising
the standby force. Lesotho was to host a field training exercise for AMANI Africa II
in October 2014, but the venue was moved to Bloemfontein in South Africa. The
AMANI AFRICA II cycle aims to make the African Standby Force fully operational
by 2015.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s dynamics for SADC leadership are somewhat different to those of South
Africa. For now, its domestic problems are less about political stability then about
succession and contestation for power post-Robert Mugabe, and to some degree the
re-establishment of confidence in the country’s ailing economy. Since the July 2013
elections, which Mugabe’s ZANU-PF won resoundingly, the ruling party has been driven
by reports of factionalism. Vice-President Joyce Mujuru is pitted against the powerful
Minister of Justice, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as it seems increasingly apparent that a
Mugabe candidacy for the 2018 elections is highly unlikely because of age and ill health.

However, the entry into active politics by Grace Mugabe, the president’s influential wife,
has added another dimension to the succession battle. In August, she was elected to
lead the ZANU-PF Women’s League, a position that catapults her into the ruling party’s
most powerful organ, the Politburo. The question now is whether she is positioning
herself as the successor to Mugabe, or simply wishes to bolster the Mnangagwa camp.
It remains to be seen how these developments will affect Zimbabwe’s leadership of
the region.

History attests to the pitfalls of factionalism in multiparty Zimbabwe. In the 2008
elections, ZANU-PF lost its parliamentary majority to the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) following similar jostling for power. As a result, ZANU-PF had to ‘endure’
five years of a government of national unity brokered by SADC and underwritten by the
AU under the GPA.

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The GPA committed the ZANU-PF and the two MDC splinter groups to a consensus-
based political and economic stabilisation roadmap, which resulted in a referendum,
a new constitution promulgated in May 2013, and the establishment of more inclusive
election and governance institutions. The overwhelming ZANU-PF victory of July 2013
ended the GPA coalition and once again reasserted the ZANU-PF as the dominant
entity. It goes without saying, however, that the on-going economic crisis in Zimbabwe
has been personified in the figure of its president, Robert Mugabe, who has continued
his control over party, and ultimately national and foreign policy.

Decision-making in ZANU-PF thus resembles a pyramid, with the president’s rhetoric
and views often setting the agenda for the party and government. This situation is
likely to result, on the one hand, in a SADC leadership characterised by the president’s
continued offensive against the perceived array of forces opposing his rule and, on
the other, attempts to pin Zimbabwe’s woes on a larger anti-imperialist and Pan-
African predisposition.
Zimbabwe’s general socio-political environment is also key in defining the country’s external posture, with the issues given priority by the government being decisive. While the country continues to be marked by a decline in democracy and human rights, it is a probable economic breakdown and the presence of the military complex in the political state apparatus that will changes can be initiated by Zimbabwe outside the scope of the organisation’s work plan, a plan that has already been consented to by its member states. While some generalisations about the relative influence Zimbabwe and South Africa could have on SADC still have to be proven correct, the scope of their roles will be constrained by SADC’s institutional context. Multiple agents compete to direct and control change in SADC. For this reason, policy shifts outside the scope of what has already been agreed to can only be minimal. In addition, SADC leadership goes hand in hand with the congruence of diplomatic strategy and tact, the tasks to be attempted, a favourable political context and the right economic circumstances.

Zimbabwe can thus affect SADC’s work plan in only four areas:

1. **International engagement**

   The restrictions on Mugabe as far as engaging with the broader international community and participation in international forums may undermine Zimbabwe’s ability to enhance regional cooperation and diplomacy with SADC’s traditional partners. It should be remembered that Zimbabwe has snubbed international engagements with the EU, SADC’s main donor, despite attempts by the EU to normalise relations with the country. President Mugabe and his wife are still the subject of a Europe-wide travel ban, although the restriction can be suspended temporarily to allow the president to engage in international forums. The travel bans date to the early 2000s, when Western nations implemented sanctions on President Mugabe and his allies for human rights abuses and alleged election rigging, and after Zimbabwe embarked on its controversial land-reform programme. The decision to boycott the last EU-Africa summit was strongly endorsed by ZANU-PF, which has for the most part had a frosty relationship with the EU since 2000, and has labelled the Europeans as paternalistic and colonial.

2. **Donor relations and resource mobilisation**

   In the light of the poor relations with the EU and the call by SADC’s executive secretary to lessen dependence on donors for the operation of the organisation’s integration agenda, Zimbabwe might elevate non-traditional donors like China to a ‘partner of choice’ in SADC’s foreign and security policy activities. This possibility was given impetus at the recently concluded SADC Summit when President Mugabe stated that the regional block should wean itself from its dependence on foreign partners. As an alternative to internal resource mobilisation is being explored by SADC, Zimbabwe may test its ‘Look East Policy’, regionally.

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**ZANU-PF has labelled the Europeans as colonial and Zimbabwe may elevate donors like China to SADC’s ‘partners of choice’**

Influence Zimbabwe’s foreign disposition. The latter is strongly linked to discussions around succession within ZANU-PF. It should also be remembered that Mugabe’s regime, in particular a part of the political elite, is still being targeted by European Union (EU) and US sanctions. Government is also still trying to find ways of averting a return to a crisis economy as has previously been experienced for several years. The cash-strapped Zimbabwean government is struggling to bankroll most of its projects, but has nevertheless crafted a $933 million supplementary budget to stimulate economic recovery.

There is a widely held view that that since the government of Zimbabwe wants to divert attention from domestic issues, it will attempt to use its SADC chairmanship to rebrand its economic credibility. It will try and focus on issues perceived to give its leadership mileage, for example, the matters of indigenisation and economic empowerment, which most countries in the region would support in principle. However, the Zimbabwean model cannot in practice be exported to the region as the other SADC member states have to be guided by their domestic legislation and diverse economic circumstances.

President Mugabe is also in the running for the chairmanship of the AU from January 2015, having been elected as first deputy chair at the last AU Ordinary Session in January 2014. It is plausible that Zimbabwe will use both the SADC and AU platforms to rebuild its president’s international legacy as a Pan-African icon. This would further motivate Zimbabwe’s choice of issues to be popularised within SADC.

**SADC: change or continuity under Zimbabwe?**

The centralised, institutional and policy-making aspects of SADC are rigid and so it is difficult to see how major
3. Agenda setting

If Zimbabwe appears to act more autonomous politically, it will merely be to bring to the table certain policy issues for discussion within existing policy frameworks. New policy agendas from Zimbabwe that have a domestic bearing on other SADC member states are unlikely to be accommodated without the necessary consensus from the Summit.

4. Organisational culture

The prevailing organisational culture of SADC will not be changed immediately by Zimbabwe. However, its influence will either entrench or dilute the institutional culture of an organisation that remains highly centralised, secretive and politically charged by member-state oversight.

Conclusion

Although part of the failure to make meaningful progress with the regional integration agenda has been the widely varying priorities of SADC member states, as well as the SADC Secretariat’s lack of supranational authority and muscle, leadership in SADC’s steering institutions remains an organisational necessity. However, as far as South Africa and Zimbabwe’s tenures are concerned, the expectation in terms of SADC’s workplan is policy continuity rather than drastic change. This view is based largely on the fact that decision-making processes of SADC are not linear and largely based on consensus notwithstanding the political interests associated with the leadership of the two countries. Moreover, both countries are historically bound together by the liberation ethos and solidarity that has mostly underlined political culture in SADC, in terms of bilateral relations and even its policy of intervention.

Enduring perceptions about South Africa’s self-interest and a growing awareness of increasing ANC-linked commercial interests in the region should not be underestimated

Their political engagement in SADC regarding the promotion of democratic accountability will be guided by historic affiliation and will continue to contribute to the reluctance, for instance, of criticising undemocratic regimes such as Angola and Swaziland. As far as Zimbabwe’s performance at the Secretariat is concerned, it will be the undercurrents of its foreign policy choices and postures that will likely influence its leadership style in SADC. This may result in either a watershed in the relationship between SADC its donors in particular, or in new opportunities for exploring alternative relations with other development partners. South Africa’s tenure, as in the past, will largely provide much needed leadership and policy dynamism at the OPDSC, and will probably make some headway in improving its capacity as a security actor in the region. However, aside from SADC’s institutional constraints, enduring perceptions about South Africa’s self-interest and growing awareness by SADC member states of an ostensible increase of ANC-linked commercial interests in the region remain. The negative perceptions around the blurred lines between ANC party interests and national interest in SA’s regional support further threaten to erode bilateral relations with some countries, and this would have a negative bearing on consensus decision making at SADC, in strategic issues.
Notes


2. More information on these two instruments is found at the SADC website at www.sadc.int. The RISDP refers to SIPO as well.


18. This is discussed in depth in G M Khadiagala and F Nganje, *The evolution of South Africa’s democracy promotion in Africa: from idealism to pragmatism* (unpublished).


20. SADC Communiqué of the 34th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, 17–1 8 August 2014, at www.sadc.int/.../34th_Summit_Final_Communique_English_August_18.


About the author

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