

Africa's current and future stability

Jakkie Cilliers and Steve Hedden

Summary

This paper first presents a summary of recent conflict trends in Africa, largely drawing on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. Then, to provide a picture of the potential future impact of changes in Africa's development and security prospects up to 2063 (a timeline that ties in with the African Union's Agenda 2063 initiative), the paper models the implications of three alternative futures for Africa. These are a 'Base Case' scenario (the current trajectory), an 'African Renaissance' scenario (a best-case scenario) and a 'Politics of the Belly' scenario (in which the trends analysed take a negative course).

A PAPER PUBLISHED in October 2014 by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *Africa's conflict burden in a global context*, analyses information from key datasets to present a picture of the current level of global conflict.¹ The data presented in that paper covers two overlapping periods, 1960 to 2013, and 1989 to 2013, which roughly coincide with the postcolonial period and post-bipolar world order, respectively.

The conclusion reached in that previous paper was, firstly, to recognise the long-term trend over successive decades towards lower levels of armed violence when measured as fatalities per million people and, secondly, to acknowledge the recent increases in armed violence starting around 2010. Not unexpectedly, Africa and the Middle East are the two regions that have the highest conflict burden globally. Conflict in Africa rose much more quickly than the global average during the 1970s and 1980s, and then fell more sharply thereafter before experiencing a more recent upward trend. The paper speculates that this may indicate that the levels of armed conflict in Africa are sensitive to global developments, possibly because of the marginal position that the continent occupies politically and economically, and because of the potential multiplier effect that limited and poor governance has in many African countries.

Over time, the nature of political armed violence in Africa has changed. Unlike other regions, Africa experiences a high level of so-called 'non-state conflict', or conflict between various armed groups and factions that are fighting one another, and not the state. This type of violence is almost certainly due to weak and unconsolidated governance, which characterises many African countries and which allows for the ready translation of political competition into violence. There also appears

to be an increase in incidences of social violence.² While larger-scale armed conflict, with its associated fatalities, is likely to continue its steady decline when reviewing trend lines over long-term horizons, the short-term implications of the increase in social instability and protests are less clear.

The brief analysis of terrorism presented in the aforementioned paper indicates a large increase in terrorist activities globally, and Africa is no exception. However, the mother continent is not the region with the largest burden of terrorist incidents, as measured by international datasets, nor is it the region with the fastest growth rate of terrorist attacks. That region is the Middle East.

Extending the analysis presented in that earlier paper, the first part of this paper uses data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to present a summary of the increases in social instability and protests that have occurred since 2010, including an analysis of where these phenomena have occurred.³ The second part then presents the implications of increased or decreased levels of armed violence on economic growth and poverty, and other dimensions of development in the three alternative scenarios mentioned above.

Although this paper uses only ACLED data, the trends presented here are evident in a number of other datasets. For example, a review of the results from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), available up to 2012, reveals similar trends.⁴ These trends also coincide with data to 2013 from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which were reviewed in the previous ISS paper mentioned above. All the data indicates a general increase in violence since 2010, including violent activities that result in fatalities, across the whole gamut of conflict types.⁵

Trends in political violence

This section gives a summary of trends in political violence in Africa since 2000 at the continental, subregional and country level.

ACLED, upon which the authors rely for the data presented in this section, defines a politically violent event as one where:

... often force is used by one or more groups for a political end, although some instances – including protests and non-violent activity – are included to capture the potential precursors or critical junctures of a conflict. ACLED codes eight different event types as occurring at a specific date (day), location (town) and involving specific groups engaged in a defined action.⁶

There is therefore no fatality threshold for inclusion in the event data that ACLED gathers and it focuses specifically on:


- Tracking rebel, militia and government activity over time and space
- Locating rebel-group bases, headquarters, strongholds and presence
- Distinguishing between territorial transfers of military control from governments to rebel groups and vice versa
- Recording violent acts between militias
- Collecting information on rioting and protesting
- Non-violent events that it considers to be crucial to the dynamics of political violence (e.g. rallies, recruitment drives, peace talks and high-level arrests)⁷



THE SUBREGION CURRENTLY EXPERIENCING THE MOST CONFLICT-RELATED DEATHS IS THE HORN OF AFRICA/ EAST AFRICA

Using the granular ACLED geo-referenced data from 2000 to the end of September 2014, we find that there has been a clear increase in the number of conflict events per day since 2010 (see Figure 1).⁸

Figure 1: Number of conflict-related events in Africa (120-day moving average)




Source: ACLED dataset, www.acleddata.com (accessed 4 October 2014)

Note: This graph was created using ACLED data to 27 September 2014. To remove duplicate articles, the authors removed all events that have identical 'notes' in the raw ACLED data. We did not remove articles that have empty values in the notes column.

Figure 2 presents the daily number of conflict-related fatalities in Africa by subregion over time, again using ACLED data. The data shows that the number of conflict-related fatalities has increased over the last few years, in line with the increase in the number of conflict-related events presented in Figure 1. The subregion currently experiencing the most conflict-related deaths is the Horn of Africa/East Africa. This high level of subregional fatalities is driven primarily by events in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan.⁹

Figure 2: Conflict-related fatalities per day by region (January 2000 to September 2014)



Source: ACLED dataset, www.acleddata.com (accessed 4 October 2014)




THE REGION WITH THE FASTEST GROWTH RATE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IS THE MIDDLE EAST

The only subregion in Africa to experience a decline in conflict during this period is southern Africa.¹⁰ Although southern Africa includes certain countries that only became independent quite recently (Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 1994), it is nevertheless the most stable subregion. With the noted exception of South Africa, governance in the subregion is often authoritarian in nature (albeit in the process of democratising) but more consolidated than elsewhere on the continent.

Drilling down from subregional to country-level analysis, the nation with the most conflict-related deaths in Africa is, expectedly, Nigeria given its large population (it is about 38 times larger than the population of the Central African Republic [CAR], for example). Of the 28 000-plus conflict-related deaths that occurred in Africa during the first nine months of 2014 more than a quarter were in Nigeria. However, if we weight the number of fatalities by the populations of each country, then CAR, South Sudan and Somalia emerge with a much higher conflict burden than Nigeria (see Figure 3).¹¹

Figure 3: Five African countries with the highest fatality rates per million



Source: ACLED dataset, www.acleddata.com (accessed 4 October 2014)

Figure 4 shows conflict events in Africa in 2014 weighted by the number of fatalities and disaggregated by event type. Over 46% of the 11 700 civilian fatalities in 2014 occurred in Nigeria. Although there were almost as many incidents of riots and protests as battles or violent activities against civilians, the fatality rate per event for riots and protests is much lower. Riots and protests occurred throughout the continent but the highest number in 2014 was in Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, and Kenya, in that order.

Almost 90% of all conflict events in Africa in 2014 can be categorised as battles, riots and protests, or violence against civilians, though the fatality rate per event differs for each category.¹²


In summary, conflict events and the associated number of fatalities are rising. The recent increase is largely due to five high-volume cases – Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, CAR and Somalia. Together, these countries account for over 75% of all conflict-related fatalities in Africa in 2014. It is therefore important to emphasise that the increases in conflict are concentrated in a small number of countries and that most African states experience much lower incidences of fatalities per million people than experienced in these five countries.

OF THE MORE THAN

28 000

CONFLICT-RELATED DEATHS THAT OCCURRED IN AFRICA DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 2014, MORE THAN A QUARTER WERE IN NIGERIA

Figure 4: Conflict events in Africa, 1 January 2014 to 27 September 2014



Source: ACLED dataset, www.acleddata.com (accessed 3 October 2014)

Note: Size of bubbles weighted by number of fatalities and colour-coordinated to the type of event shown in the key.

Africa's potential development trajectory: three alternative conflict scenarios

The data presented in the previous section provides only an outline of what is a complex story. Political violence is a symptom of political instability and is caused by various deep drivers. These were examined in a 2013 ISS paper by Cilliers and Schünemann.¹³ That paper analysed seven structural drivers of intrastate conflict, including the impact of a legacy of armed violence, population and social dynamics, and instability associated with political transitions.

Although one cannot predict future levels of conflict, except to point to the broad historical trends, one can nevertheless try to understand the underlying drivers of conflict and the impact of increased or decreased levels of armed conflict and political violence. To do this, the authors use the International Futures (IFs) forecasting system, which is hosted at the Frederick S Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver. IFs is a highly endogenised, large-scale, long-term, dynamic

NIGERIA, SOUTH SUDAN,
SUDAN, CAR AND SOMALIA
ACCOUNT FOR OVER

75%

OF ALL CONFLICT-RELATED
FATALITIES IN AFRICA IN 2014

modelling tool.¹⁴ More information on IFs and the interventions used to create the scenarios are included in an annexure to this paper.

The choice of 2063 as the forecast horizon is based on the Agenda 2063 initiative that the African Union (AU) launched in 2013 as a 'call for action to all segments of African society to work together to build a prosperous and united Africa'.¹⁵ Peace and security is one of eight main objectives set out in the AU's 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. The declaration notes the AU's

...determination to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa, to make peace a reality for all our people and to rid the continent of wars, civil conflicts, human-rights violations, humanitarian disasters and violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide. We pledge not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans and to undertake to end all wars in Africa by 2020.¹⁶

Figure 5 shows the magnitude of internal war under each of the three scenarios discussed in this paper. The graph uses historical data from the PITF (1960 to 2013); this data is then projected up to 2063 using the IFs modelling system. Whereas the previous section relied on ACLED's disaggregated datasets, the PITF is a macro-level dataset orientated towards large-scale conflict. This type of data lends itself well to country-level analysis. It codes only events that incur at least 500 annual fatalities and measures the societal impact of warfare, such as population dislocation and damage to infrastructure. Events are then given a magnitude score on a scale of 1 to 10.¹⁷

Africans achieve, or aspire to greater freedom and accountability as the use of new technologies expands. This often creates tensions


There are many drivers that might affect future levels of conflict globally, and in Africa in particular. Some of the likely reasons for increased global conflict are the insecurity associated with the transition to a more multipolar world and the diffusion of state authority globally. The latter trend appears to be driven by the rise of the middle class and the impact of a globally interconnected world. A third reason could be associated with the global economic downturn since 2008. Although Africa suffered less from the global recession than many expected and generally managed to maintain positive growth, the level of this growth has not been sufficient to meaningfully improve livelihoods. International terrorism, together with its rapid expansion in Africa, is another factor playing an important role in the increase in violence. Furthermore, Africans achieve, or aspire to greater freedom and accountability with every passing year as mobile-phone penetration and Internet access expands. These trends often accentuate the perception of a widening gap between political rhetoric and people's daily experience of corruption and poor governance. They also reveal the extent to which political decisions in many countries are based on patronage rather than national goals.

The Base Case scenario forecasts a conflict environment in which the long-term historical trend towards decreased levels of armed conflict in Africa continues over several decades. In the Politics of the Belly scenario, the recent trend of a rise in levels of armed conflict continues. With the African Renaissance projection, African and international efforts to reduce levels of violence and instability meet with continued success. Violence is not perpetuated within the same country and as individual countries stabilise, so do neighbouring countries.¹⁸



PEACE AND SECURITY IS ONE OF EIGHT MAIN OBJECTIVES OF AGENDA 2063


Figure 5: Magnitude of intrastate violence



Source: PITF data modelled in IFs v 7.08

The broad approach to these three scenarios is set out in Figure 6 and developed in relation to two dimensions of uncertainty: the global context (i.e. friendly or harsh) and the nature of African governance (i.e. development-focused or weak/parasitic).

Figure 6: Alternative future African conflict scenarios



Source: Jakkie Cilliers, Barry Hughes and Jonathan Moyer, African Futures 2050, Institute for Security Studies monograph 175, January 2011, www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono175.pdf, 88

The African Renaissance and Politics of the Belly can largely be seen as best- and worst-case scenarios. Reality will inevitably unfold differently, however, and may well emerge somewhere in between the two. It is important to reiterate that forecasting is a way of helping to understand and envisage the future, and not a sure-fire prediction. The IFs tool is unique, however, as it uses almost 3 000 historical series and sophisticated algorithms based on correlations found in academic literature (see the annexure) to enable useful framing of future possibilities.

6,2%

BASE CASE GROWTH FORECASTS FOR AFRICA

Base Case scenario

The Base Case scenario is best described as a story of Africa's continued growth and development that roughly follows recent positive trends that have, among others, given rise to the narrative of 'Africa rising'.

Things improve across all dimensions of development, but poverty levels come down slowly. Africa is unable to replicate the sustained levels of double-digit growth across its 55 states that have driven the dramatic reductions in poverty in China in recent decades.¹⁹ Average GDP growth per annum until 2063 is forecast at 6,2%, although the rates vary considerably over such a long time horizon, peaking at over 7,5% in 2039 before declining again. Africa is also unable to reduce inequality in any significant way over time from its current high levels, which are comparable to Latin America and the Caribbean's. Growth is therefore not inclusive, and although improved access to education and improvements in livelihoods are evident, the average improvement in the Human Development Index (HDI) is slow compared with the African Renaissance scenario.²⁰ Death rates from communicable diseases fall steadily and by 2029 these are lower than the death rates from non-communicable diseases, as lifestyles change and medical/health facilities improve.

Peace and security improves, but instability remains in a number of long-term fragile states

Africa's very high population growth momentum offsets improvements in development, and the large youth bulge, while a source of labour, is also a possible source of instability if the youth are unemployed. Although services improve for the vast majority of people, pockets of poverty, hunger and instability remain. Peace and security improves, but instability remains in a number of long-term fragile states, including Comoros, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar.²¹

In this scenario member states make commitments to implement decisions taken by the AU and subregional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), but implementation remains limited and slow. Despite the commitment to regional integration, timelines slip repeatedly.

This scenario unfolds against a backdrop of global flux associated with the move towards greater world multipolarity. Power is more diffuse both within and between countries. First China and then India emerge as global powers, but with all the attendant insecurities and fluctuations that accompany great power transitions. Africa benefits from attention as the last large potential consumer market and low-wage manufacturing destination, attracting interest from China, India, the US and the EU. However, the rates of growth in these states vary greatly, from an average of 7% to 8% in India and China to around 1% in the EU, the global growth laggard second only to Japan among the larger economies. Global growth is significantly less based on resources than in previous centuries and Africa's efforts towards beneficiation of the continent's resource bounty as a driver of future growth have limited success.

IN THE POLITICS OF THE
BELLY SCENARIO, BY

2020

AN ARC OF INSTABILITY
HAS SPREAD FROM SENEGAL
IN THE WEST TO SOMALIA IN
THE EAST, ENGULFING MOST
COUNTRIES IN BETWEEN

Scenario: Politics of the Belly

Politics of the Belly is the story of the exploitation of Africa by its governing elite.²² In this scenario, African governments do little to mitigate the deleterious impact of external developments on their economies. Instead, domestic factors only exacerbate negative external developments.

In a number of states, ruling parties, enamoured by the example of Asian authoritarian, state-led development models from a previous era, exploit their power both for personal gain and as a means to retain power. Patronage replaces authoritarianism as the key form of consolidating power, with damaging economic impacts, though there are important exceptions. The impact is most visible in Africa's larger economies, such as Nigeria and South Africa, as well as in aspiring regional leaders, such as Angola and Kenya. In this scenario, Africa sees slow development, instability and grinding poverty in a large portion of its population.

Ruling parties build their support base through corruption and patronage, particularly by using public-sector jobs and allocating resources for personal and party gain. Levels of economic growth, although robust when compared with those of developed countries, are much lower than what is needed to reduce poverty. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, hardly budges – and in North Africa it actually increases over time, although from a lower base than elsewhere in the continent.

An awakening of sub-state factionalism among ethnic and religious groups that had previously been content to remain part of larger countries or straddle borders is evident over time. Examples include Azawad in Mali and Algeria; the divisions in Libya based on its pre-colonial groupings, and in CAR between the mainly Muslim Seleka rebels and the largely Christian anti-balaka vigilante forces; the warring groups in South Sudan; unrest along the coast in Kenya; factionalism

In this scenario, African governments do little to mitigate the deleterious impact of external developments on their economies

in Nigeria; and rumblings elsewhere. As the world becomes more connected, communities seem to desire local and ethnic rather than national identities, and the fluidity of events in places like Iraq and Syria awaken marginalised communities globally. Marginalisation from central authorities has driven countless sub-state armed struggles in Africa and it is easy to visualise

the resonance that this trend might have on the continent in the future. This is particularly the case in larger countries that have traditionally struggled more with improvements in governance than smaller countries.²³

Individual empowerment occurs at the expense of central state authority. This phenomenon is generally associated with the growth of the global middle class, but in this context the impact is to further undermine the capacity and ability of already weak governments to maintain stability and pursue development. Regional integration does not strengthen to any significant extent from its current levels. North African states

By contrast, the unfolding of the African Renaissance scenario is the story of all good things coming together

look towards the Mediterranean and Europe as a source of trade and development, given the turmoil in the Middle East; southern Africa remains divided, as South Africa and Angola compete for regional leadership; and the territorial integrity of Nigeria continues to be threatened by internal squabbles that undermine its regional leadership role. The sum effect is an AU unable to do more than fight fires.

To add to its problems, Africa becomes the next frontier in violent political extremism and associated terror tactics. By 2020, an arc of instability has spread from Senegal in the west to Somalia in the east, engulfing most countries in between. This instability also spreads south along the eastern seaboard of Africa to include Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa.

In addition, new highly contagious viruses spreading in West, Central and East Africa challenge the rapid advances that had recently been made in combating communicable disease. These health concerns reinforce negative stereotypes about the continent, erode investor confidence and hinder development.

Scenario: African Renaissance

By contrast, the unfolding of the African Renaissance scenario is the story of all good things coming together.

A league of forward-looking leaders elected in key states leads Africa's regeneration. This is a scenario where governments in Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya – and later Angola and the DRC – focus their efforts on the improved management of their economies, combating corruption and seeking to advance inclusive growth. Predictability and stability replace the policy turmoil that had previously undermined

investor confidence in key sectors, unlocking foreign investment in agro-industries and manufacturing. Elections occur regularly in more and more countries, and governing parties are often replaced through a process that steadily gains wide public confidence in the associated institutions. Leadership is accountable and sets an example throughout the region, making the implementation of national development plans in accordance with the Agenda 2063 vision its foremost priority.


In a trend that counters global fragmentation, this is a world in which China, India, the US and Europe collaborate rather than compete. Political leadership in these countries overrules domestic conservative groupings, and the largest global powers forge partnerships with one another. China manages its democratic deficit and allows its people greater civil liberties (although it does so more slowly than the way in which it achieved the rapid economic emancipation of its citizenry). Reform of global institutions such as the UN Security Council follows, which, in time, is entirely made up of countries elected by their regions for a set renewable term. Collaboration and cooperation are evident in sectors as diverse as climate change and cybercrime.

Under the African Renaissance scenario, improved governance, the impact of economic growth and policies aimed at including marginalised communities in public life erode potential support for terrorism in Africa

Africa is a large beneficiary of this benign global environment through continued levels of international support, including development assistance. Across the continent, there are improvements in human development, infrastructure and governance. Countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda match the progress made in human development by extending civil and political rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.

Although climate change is also detrimental to Africa in this scenario – as it is with the others – the continent’s poverty burden is nevertheless reduced dramatically and steadily over time by means of inclusive growth strategies. While emerging economies grow rapidly, advanced economies also grow steadily. Africa is able to make steady progress on regional integration. A process that began tentatively with SADC, the East African Community and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa is completed within a decade to establish the Eastern and Southern African Common Market. Larger markets are able to entice foreign multinationals, and the industrialisation of Africa continues apace.

The success of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme results in an agri-revolution for human development during which African food production is able to reverse its long-standing trend towards greater reliance on imported food.²⁴ The average calorific intake per person per day, which had grown slowly from a miserly 2 000 to 2 500 calories from 1963 to 2014, increases to 3 500 by 2063, with the result that malnutrition declines, health improves and productivity increases. Whereas only three African countries had been net exporters of food at the start of the African Renaissance, this number grows as the continent develops into a global food basket.



AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY IS FORECAST TO BE THREE YEARS LONGER UNDER THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE SCENARIO BY 2063 (AT 79,6 YEARS), COMPARED WITH THE BASE CASE


Terrorism in Africa declines in this scenario. Infighting and competition between the various terrorist groups, such as between the Caliphate Soldiers and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, had illustrated the deepening rivalries between the groups. However, with improved capacity and collaboration in the form of a robust African Standby Force, African security services manage to contain violent political extremism. Over time, internal factional struggles detract from the legitimacy of terrorist movements, which splinter repeatedly at every level and lose their support. With steady political liberalisation taking hold in the Middle East, global security increases. Improved governance, the impact of economic growth and policies aimed at including marginalised communities in public life erode potential support for terrorism in Africa.

Implications of the three scenarios

This section examines the impact of the developments associated with these scenarios in more concrete terms, starting with the implications for population size.²⁵

Figure 7 shows the total projected African population size under each of the three scenarios. These numbers reflect the impact that female education, urbanisation and improved healthcare (or lack of it) might have on fertility rates. In the Politics of the Belly scenario, Africa has a population by 2063 that is almost 900 million larger than in the African Renaissance scenario. And in the African Renaissance scenario, Africa has 509 million fewer people than in the Base Case. Average life expectancy is forecast to be three years greater under the African Renaissance by 2063 (at 79,6 years) compared with the Base Case.

Figure 7: Total population for Africa under the three scenarios (millions)



Source: Forecast initialised from 2010 in IFs v 7.08. Historical data from UNDP medium-fertility variant total population by country annually, 1960–2010

Using the 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) figure, the African population experiencing extreme poverty (i.e. an income of less than \$1,25 per person per day) is forecast to decline from around 435 million in 2014 to below 168 million by 2063 under the Base Case forecast, and to below 7 million under the African Renaissance scenario (see Figure 8).²⁶ In this scenario, Africa effectively eliminates extreme poverty by 2047.²⁷ The Politics of the Belly would see Africa with almost 571 million people (18% of its population) living in extreme poverty in 2063.

THE AFRICAN POPULATION EXPERIENCING EXTREME POVERTY IS FORECAST TO DECLINE FROM AROUND

435 MILLION

IN 2014 TO BELOW


168 MILLION

BY 2063 UNDER THE BASE CASE FORECAST, AND TO BELOW

7 MILLION

UNDER THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE SCENARIO


Figure 8: Extreme poverty at \$1,25, using 2005 PPP (millions of people)



Source: IFs version 7.08, initialised from 2010. Population data from UNDP medium-fertility variant total population by country annually, 1960–2010

Africa's average measure on the HDI in 2014 is 0,5 (on a scale of 0 to 1), which is more than 0,17 below the world average. Progress in recent decades has been disappointing. The gap between the average HDI score for Africa and the world average has slowly increased. Under the Politics of the Belly scenario, Africa would not achieve the current world average (the Base Case forecast) on the HDI until 2062. Under the more optimistic African Renaissance scenario, it reaches that target in 2038 (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: HDI history and forecast – the world and Africa compared



Source: IFs version 7.08, initialised from 2010; HDI from UNDP Human Development Report 2012

The annual GDP growth rate measures the rate at which a state's gross domestic product changes from one year to the next. Figure 10 presents the average GDP growth rates for the period 2015–2063 under the three scenarios for Africa and the Base Case forecast for the EU-28, the BRIC countries and the G7.²⁸ Growth rates also change over time. In the African Renaissance scenario the period 2031–2042 sees annual rates of growth for Africa in excess of 10%.

AFRICA'S AVERAGE MEASURE ON THE HDI IN 2014 IS


0,5

(ON A SCALE OF 0 TO 1), WHICH IS MORE THAN

0,17

BELOW THE WORLD AVERAGE

Figure 10: Average GDP growth rates, 2015–2063 (%)




Source: IFs version 7.08

Note: The average growth rates for the world, EU-28, BRIC and G7 countries differ with each scenario. The graph depicts only the average Base Case growth rates for non-African regions.

The dominant drivers of economic growth in Africa are intractable – such as the size of its young population, rates of urbanisation, and improved healthcare and education. The continent’s growth therefore remains surprisingly resilient even in the Politics of the Belly scenario – although this rate of growth is much slower than the 7% average required to alleviate poverty, provide employment and reduce inequality.

While a large and increasing population can be a driver of economic growth, larger populations will have a lower GDP per capita (all other things being equal). This is because growing populations without proportionate economic growth will mean lower overall levels of GDP per capita. Figure 11 presents this measure for each scenario. The GDP per person (in 2005 PPP) could increase from a current \$4 800 to \$52 250 under the African Renaissance scenario by 2063 – an almost 11-fold increase. The worst-case scenario would, however, see little more than a doubling of average income levels from the current figures.

Figure 11: GDP per capita in 2005 PPP (\$000)



Source: IFs version 7.08 initialised from 2010 from World Development Indicators and other sources

THE GDP PER PERSON
(IN 2005 PPP) COULD
INCREASE FROM A CURRENT

\$4 800

TO

\$52 250

UNDER THE AFRICAN
RENAISSANCE SCENARIO
BY 2063


Governance as key

The structural drivers of intrastate conflict in Africa, such as a youthful population experiencing high levels of unemployment in combination with widespread exclusion, rapid urbanisation, and deep-seated poverty and inequality are most intractable in sub-Saharan Africa. The democratic deficit and current momentum of violence in key countries such as Libya and neighbouring Mali point to continued instability in large regions of North Africa.²⁹ These stubborn drivers of conflict will continue to have an influence on future generations because social change takes time. This reinforces the importance of good governance, over which policymakers have much greater influence in the short to medium term.

In a ground-breaking forecast of governance published earlier this year,³⁰ Hughes et al observed that the development of the modern state involves governance transitions towards greater security, enhanced capacity, and broader and deeper inclusiveness. Using IFs, the authors modelled and forecast these dimensions globally.

Figure 12 is an index of Africa's current situation regarding governance security, capacity and inclusiveness on a scale of 0 to 1, and a forecast of these same dimensions for each scenario in 2063. As one would expect, Africa improves along each of these dimensions, with most improvement visible in the security dimension.³¹

Figure 12: African regime security, capacity and inclusion, 2015 and 2063



Source: IFs version 7.08 endogenously calculated



ACUTE CHANGES IN
AUTHORITY PATTERNS OFTEN
LEAD TO REPEAT CYCLES
OF VIOLENCE


The Polity Project in the US, one of the most widely used data series in political science, has established over decades of research that the most durable states are ones that undergo incremental or gradual changes in the patterns of institutional, as opposed to personal, authority. Acute changes in authority patterns (such as those evident in North Africa at the time of writing) tend to be disruptive on a number of fronts and often lead to repeat cycles of violence. Earlier Polity work concluded that states that had internally consistent ('coherent') democratic or autocratic traits tended to be more durable than states characterised by mixed authority traits. In other words, a free market or free press would not comfortably coexist with an authoritarian

government, which explains the discomfort felt by a repressive government with an open and competitive Internet or robust independent press.³²

The dominant form of governance transition in Africa in recent decades is the resumption of the trend towards democratisation.

The most recent Polity IV data codes the annual level of autocracy, democracy and fragmentation, and other characteristics of each state, and has done so for every year from 1800 to 2013. Figure 13 plots the average Polity score (the full range is from +10 (i.e. full democracy) to -10 (i.e. full autocracy) for the world and for Africa from 1960 to 2013. Both lines reflect the steady worsening of democracy globally during the height of the Cold War as the East and West supported regimes allied to their camps. This is followed by a significant release of pent-up demand for democratisation after of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Figure 13 shows that while democracy in Africa was deteriorating faster than the global average until 1990, a quarter of a century of re-democratisation (marked by the resumption of competitive politics) has rejuvenated African societies, broadened participation and permitted the rotation of leaders. Pan-African studies, such as those conducted by Afrobarometer, reveal strong popular support for democratisation.³³

Figure 13: Average democracy score – Africa and the rest of the world compared



Source: Polity IV Project, Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2013, www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (accessed 3 October)

These trends, positive as they are for large segments of Africa’s communities, who often suffer brutal oppression, are not without risk. An ISS paper published in 2013, *The future of intrastate conflict in Africa*, noted that:

Times of change are inevitably disruptive and the evidence shows that ... transitions from autocracy to democracy or adverse regime changes are often unstable and prone to violence. As demonstrated in regions such as North Africa ... a large democratic deficit (lack of democracy) has the potential to trigger instability.³⁴



THE DOMINANT FORM OF GOVERNANCE TRANSITION IN AFRICA IN RECENT DECADES IS THE RESUMPTION OF THE TREND TOWARDS DEMOCRATISATION

In addition, a large number of African nations are trapped somewhere in between the two extremes of the Polity scale – i.e. they are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic – although the exact characteristics of the various dimensions of these so-called ‘anocracies’ are complex and disputed. In broad terms, anocracies are about six times more likely than democracies and two and a half times more likely than autocracies to experience new outbreaks of civil conflict. More than half of the anocracies experience a major regime change within five years and over 70% within 10 years.³⁵

North Africa continues to suffer from a large democratic deficit. In sub-Saharan Africa the two countries that continue to be at particular risk are Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland, both of which have a large democratic deficit (some 14 points on the 21-point Polity scale), and have a pent-up demand for democracy that could result in instability. Others, in declining order of risk based on a large democratic deficit, are the Republic of Congo, Angola, Cameroon, Eritrea, the Gambia, Rwanda and Gabon.³⁶

Despite the expected advance of democracy in Africa, many states can be expected to experience the kind of instability associated with regime transition

Africa is experiencing, and is expected to continue to experience, a steady process of democratisation as its citizens become more educated, wealthier and more aware of global concepts, such as the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. Western donor funding has played an additional role in advancing human rights and democracy, although the politics of conditionality have had a number of negative impacts.

Much has been made of the correlation between democracy and both interstate and internal peace. Whether democracies are more peaceful than other regime types, however, remains statistically uncertain. Although democracies are statistically less likely to go to war with other democracies, democratic states do not appear to be any less warlike than non-democracies. Hegre notes that although democracies are often internally more peaceful, the debate about whether democracy causes peace is far from settled.³⁷

Intrastate wars in democracies, however, are less lethal than in other regime types. Based on an overview of the literature on the issue, Hegre sums up the consensus in the research community that democratic governments use less violence against civilians and engage in less repression, but that rebel groups tend to make more extensive use of violence against civilians when fighting democratic regimes. He speculates that this could be because of the stronger constraints on the use of violence against insurgents by democracies compared with other regime types.³⁸

Looking to the future, the expected steady advance of democracy across Africa should result in reductions in two categories of intrastate violence – battle-related deaths (since intrastate wars in democracies are less lethal) and state-led one-sided violence (since democratic governments engage in less repression).

In summary, despite the expected advance of democracy in Africa, many states can be expected to experience the kind of instability associated with regime transition to greater transparency, inclusion and accountability.³⁹



MORE THAN HALF OF SO-CALLED ‘ANOCRACIES’ EXPERIENCE A MAJOR REGIME CHANGE WITHIN FIVE YEARS

Conclusion

This paper first presented a snapshot of current trends of violence and instability in Africa and then modelled alternative future trends – these are uncertain and do not purport to be accurate predictions. It extended the analysis published in a previous ISS paper, *Africa's conflict burden in a global context*. Using data from programmes such as the UCDP, PITF and the Heidelberg Conflict Monitor, the previous paper presented a story of rapid increases in armed conflict and violence in the decade preceding the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and an even more rapid decline thereafter to levels approximating those several decades earlier.

More troubling, though, are the recent conflict trends emerging in Africa and globally. To gain a more granular picture of these trends at the subregional and country levels, this paper drew from ACLED event data and used the broader lens of political violence rather than fatalities from armed conflict. A review of trends since 2000 confirmed the increases in all types of political violence since 2010.

What is clear is that the changes in Africa's growth prospects during the last decade signify a structural transformation in the fortunes of the continent. Although the road ahead is long and will be characterised by many setbacks, over time economic growth is expected to translate into greater government security and capacity, and eventually greater inclusiveness.

This is important, as the analysis confirms that the single most important driver of stability is the strength and nature of governance. In many senses, Africa was trapped in a vicious circle – many countries were unstable because they were poor, and because they were poor they were unstable. Poor countries have limited capacity because they have low tax revenues and constraints in their capacity to govern or enforce security. Building state capacity requires sustained and fast economic

Over time economic growth is expected to translate into greater government security and capacity, and eventually greater inclusiveness

growth over many years, which is now on the cards. Likewise, sustainable economic growth requires government capacity and security. In addition to their efforts at a national level, African leaders will have to remain committed to conflict prevention and management on the continent, and engage and develop structures such as the African Peace and Security Architecture to manage the inevitable crises.

Africans are now taking the lead in making peace, but have limited ability to undertake expensive peace missions, such as those required in the DRC, CAR, Mali and Somalia. Peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction require resources greater than those currently available in Africa. In the past, the UN and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, provided most of these resources, but all of them now face an increased

Peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction require resources greater than those currently available in Africa

legitimacy and effectiveness challenge. This realisation underpins the need for structural reform, including reform of the UN Security Council, which is at the heart of global governance.

In southern Africa the extraordinarily high level of inequality in countries such as Namibia, Botswana and South Africa presents a potential threat to stability. The large democratic deficit in Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland is certain to pose problems in the future if left unattended. Elsewhere, efforts by leaders in countries such as Zimbabwe, Uganda and until recently Burkina Faso to extend their terms in office (or effect dynastic succession) present obvious challenges as pressure mounts without the prospects for either democratic change or generational succession. The AU and other entities should be working actively with these countries to emulate the example of Mozambique, where President Armando Guebuza recently stepped down after two terms, in line with the country's Constitution. Therefore, a country rated 185th out of 187 on the HDI leads the way in this area.

Although external partners can help build capacity, demonstrate best practices, and train and provide expertise and funding, the development of consolidated African states and their associated stability is a long, fraught process, and ownership must lie with Africans. In a modern, fast-paced world, African leaders need to demonstrate values-based leadership – and more so than ever before. In the process of achieving this, the role of organisations such as the AU, with its various standards on democracy, good governance and corruption, as well as the potential role of the African governance architecture and the Panel of the Wise, will become increasingly important. For them to be effective, however, these institutions need to adopt different practices from those of the past. An approach premised on longer-term stability requires a change in mentality in which a core number of democracies in the union stand together and set clear standards that its members need to uphold.

Annex: Interventions used in the International Futures forecasting system for Politics of the Belly and African Renaissance scenarios

International Futures (IFs) is large-scale, long-term, integrated modelling software housed at the Frederick S Pardee Center for International Futures at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. The Pardee Center is in partnership with the ISS through the African Futures Project, and the partners have published a series of papers on various aspects relating to the implementation of South Africa's National Development Plan and African development (see www.issafrica.org/futures) up to the year 2100.

The IFs system allows researchers to see past relationships between variables, and how they have developed and interacted over time. The Base Case forecast represents where the world seems to be heading given our history and current circumstances and policies. The potential to undertake scenario analysis augments this Base Case by exploring the leverage that policymakers have to push the systems towards more desirable outcomes. The IFs software consists of 11 main modules: population, economics, energy, agriculture, infrastructure, health, education, sociopolitical factors, international political factors, technology and the environment. Each module is closely connected with the others, creating dynamic relationships among variables across the entire system. The full model is available at pardee.du.edu/access-ifs.

The interventions used to create the African Renaissance and Politics of the Belly scenarios in IFs version 7.08 are given below.

African Renaissance

Variable name	Description	Value
ylm (Africa)	Agricultural yield multiplier	1 in 2015, interpolate to 1,2 in 2025
mfpleadr (agriculture)	Multifactor productivity growth rate of system leader	0,01 in 2015, interpolate to 0,02 in 2025
mfpleadlr (energy)	Multifactor productivity growth rate of system leader	0,008 in 2015, interpolate to 0,018 in 2025
mfpleadlr (materials)	Multifactor productivity growth rate of system leader	0,008 in 2015, interpolate to 0,018 in 2025
mfpleadlr (manufacturing)	Multifactor productivity growth rate of system leader	0,012 in 2015, interpolate to 0,022 in 2025
mfpleadlr (services)	Multifactor productivity growth rate of system leader	0,008 in 2015, interpolate to 0,018 in 2025
mfpleadlr (ICTech)	Multifactor productivity growth rate of system leader	0,06
mfpadd (China)	Multifactor productive growth additive factor	0 in 2015 interpolate to 0,005 in 2025

Variable name	Description	Value
mfpadd (WB LatAmer & Car Developing)	Multifactor productive growth additive factor	0 in 2015 interpolate to 0,005 in 2025
mfpadd (South Asia)	Multifactor productive growth additive factor	0 in 2015 interpolate to 0,005 in 2025
tfrm (Africa)	Total fertility rate multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,09 in 2025
contrusm (Africa)	Contraception use multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,15 in 2025
Hivm (Africa)	HIV infection rate of advance, multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,09 in 2025
endemm	Energy demand multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,9 in 2025
protecm (world except Africa)	Protectionism in trade, multiplier on import prices	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,8 in 2025
protecm (Africa)	Protectionism in trade, multiplier on import prices	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,75 in 2025
carbtax	Carbon tax – dollars/ton	90
aidon (OECD)	Aid (foreign) donations as % of GDP	0,21532 in 2015 interpolate to 0,4 in 2025
aidon (EU27)	Aid (foreign) donations as % of GDP	0,31465 in 2015 interpolate to 0,45 in 2025
aidon (OECD)	Aid (foreign) donations as % of GDP	0,15934 in 2015 interpolate to 0,25 in 2025
gdsm	Government expenditure by destination multiplier (military)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,8 in 2025
gdsm	Government expenditure by destination multiplier (health)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,2 in 2025
gdsm	Government expenditure by destination multiplier (education)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,2 in 2025
gdsm	Government expenditure by destination multiplier (R&D)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,2 in 2025
aidlpm	Global financial (portion of aid that actually constitutes loans)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,75
econfreem (Africa)	Economic freedom multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,15 in 2015

Variable name	Description	Value
goveffectm (Africa)	Government effectiveness (quality) multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,2 in 2015
govcorruptm (Africa)	Government corruption multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,2 in 2015
infraelecaccm (Africa)	Electricity access multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,1 in 2025
xfdistockm (Africa)	Foreign direct investment, stocks of investment from abroad, multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,6 in 2025
sanitationm (Africa)	Sanitation, improved, percent of population with access to, multiplier (OthUnimproved)	1 in 2015, interpolate to 0,35 in 2036
watsafem (Africa)	Water source safe, percentage of people with access to, multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,25 in 2040
ictbroadm (Africa)	ICT broadband multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,1 in 2025
sfintlwaradd (Africa)	State failure/internal war, addition – probability	1 in 2015 interpolate to –0,3 in 2025

Politics of the Belly

Variable name	Description	Value
Ylm (Africa)	Agricultural yields multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,08 in 2025
Mfpadd (China)	Multifactor productivity growth additive factor	1 in 2015 interpolate to –0,015 in 2025
Mfpadd (South Asia)	Multifactor productivity growth additive factor	1 in 2015 interpolate to –0,005 in 2025
Mfpadd (WB LatAm & Car developing)	Multifactor productivity growth additive factor	1 in 2015 interpolate to –0,005 in 2025
Envco2fert	CO2 fertilisation effect on crop yields	0,055
Tfrm (Africa)	Total fertility rate multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,1 in 2025
Contrusm (Africa)	Contraception use multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,85 in 2020
Hivm (Africa)	HIV infection rate of advance, multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,2 in 2019
Endemm (Africa)	Energy demand multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,1 in 2020
hlmortcdadtm (Central Africa)	Communicable disease mortality multiplier for adults 15 to 49	1 in 2025 interpolate to 1,5 in 2025 and back to 1 in 2026

Variable name	Description	Value
hlmortcdadm (East/Horn of Africa)	Communicable disease mortality multiplier for adults 15 to 49	1 in 2025 interpolate to 1,5 in 2025 and back to 1 in 2026
hlmortcdadm (Western Africa)	Communicable disease mortality multiplier for adults 15 to 49	1 in 2025 interpolate to 1,5 in 2025 and back to 1 in 2026
Wmigrm	World migration rate multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,75 in 2020
Protecm (World except Africa)	Protectionism in trade, multiplier on import prices	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,2 in 2025
Protecm (Africa)	Protectionism in trade, multiplier on import prices	1 in 2015 interpolate to 1,25 in 2020
Govrevm (Africa)	Government revenues multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,9 in 2020
Govrevm (Africa)	Government expenditures by destination multiplier (military)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,9 in 2020
Govrevm (Africa)	Government expenditures by destination multiplier (health)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,8 in 2020
Govrevm (Africa)	Government expenditures by destination multiplier (education)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,8 in 2020
Govrevm (Africa)	Government revenues multiplier (R&D)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,8 in 2020
Econfreem (Africa)	Economic freedom multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,85 in 2020
Goveffectm (Africa)	Government effectiveness (quality) multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,8 in 2020
Infraelecacm	Electricity access multiplier (total)	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,9 in 2025
Sfdistockm (Africa)	Foreign direct investment (FDI), stocks of investment from abroad, multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,4 in 2020
sanitationm (Africa)	Sanitation, improved, percent of population with access to, multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,9 in 2025
Watsafem (Africa)	Water source safe, percentage of people with access to, multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,9 in 2025
Ictbroadm (Africa)	ICT broadband multiplier	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,9 in 2020
Sfintwaradd (Africa)	State failure/internal war, addition – probability	1 in 2015 interpolate to 0,3 in 2025

Notes

Special thanks are due to Professor Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex, and Dr Julia Schünemann from the ISS for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

- 1 J Cilliers, *Africa's conflict burden in a global context*, ISS paper 273, October 2014, www.issafrica.org/publications/papers (accessed 28 October 2014).
- 2 CS Hendrix and I Salehyan, Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), www.scaddata.org, (accessed 20 October 2014).
- 3 See www.acleddata.com/about-acled/ (accessed 2 August 2014).
- 4 SCAD contains data on a wide range of social conflict events, not just armed conflict. These include protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government violence against civilians and other forms of violence not typically captured in other datasets. See CS Hendrix and I Salehyan, Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), www.scaddata.org (accessed 14 October 2014).
- 5 An important consideration is the prevalence of underreporting biases when relying on event data. Events with more fatalities are more likely to be covered by the media, for example. One way to try to limit this bias in event data is to look at the number of casualties reported for each event. This relies on the assumption that the biases of reporters on the ground are less likely to affect data regarding the number of casualties that occur in any given event. See C Hendrix and I Salehyan, *No news is good news?: Mark and recapture for event data when reporting probabilities are less than one*, www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/research_seminar_papers/salehyan.pdf (accessed 3 October 2014).
- 6 ACLED, Dataset Typology Overview between Sect Event Datasets April 2012, www.acleddata.com/, 1 (accessed 2 August 2014).
- 7 C Raleigh, A Linke and C Dowd, ACLED Codebook 3, released in 2014, University of Sussex, University of Colorado, Boulder, Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo PRIO, 3.
- 8 The increase in the number of reported conflict events does not necessarily mean an increase in violence, since different media outlets may report the same event. Furthermore, since ACLED uses many different media sources, it is possible for a story to be reported many times (if a source publishes an article that originated from a different source), although extensive data cleaning is done.
- 9 For the purposes of this paper, East Africa/Horn of Africa includes Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
- 10 The spike at the end of 2001 is due to a single event on 24 December in Angola, when, according to ACLED, 'Unita generals and colonels were captured. Since the beginning of the month, the new offensive in the province is estimated to have killed 5 400.'
- 11 There have been over 3 000 conflict-related fatalities in the CAR from January to September 2014. That is almost 11% of all conflict-related deaths in Africa, in a country that contains less than 0,5% of the African population.
- 12 Riots and protests have a low ratio of fatalities to events (0,11) while 'battles' and 'violence against civilians' are much higher (4,1 and 3,2, respectively). Over 41% of the 28 000 conflict-related fatalities in Africa in 2014 were civilians.
- 13 J Cilliers & J Schünemann, *The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?* ISS paper 246, May 2013, www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/the-future-of-intrastate-conflict-in-africa-more-violence-or-greater-peace (accessed 3 October 2014).
- 14 The Pardee Center is the ISS partner on the African Futures Project. See www.issafrica.org/futures.
- 15 For information about Agenda 2063, see <http://agenda2063.au.int/en/about> (accessed 15 March 2014).
- 16 See AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, adopted by the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, at Addis Ababa, on 26 May 2013, 5.
- 17 See J Cilliers, *Africa's conflict burden in a global context*, ISS paper 273, October 2014, www.issafrica.org/publications/papers (accessed 28 October 2014).
- 18 These are two of the four scenarios first identified in J Cilliers, B Hughes and J Moyer, *African futures 2050: The next forty years*, ISS monograph 175, January 2011, 88, www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono175.pdf (accessed 2 August 2014).
- 19 See A Burt, B Hughes and G Milante, *Eradicating poverty in fragile states: Prospects of reaching the 'high-hanging' fruit by 2030*, Washington DC: World Bank (forthcoming).
- 20 The HDI is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education and income indices used to rank countries into four tiers of human development.
- 20 See J Cilliers and T Sisk, *Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 'more fragile' countries*, ISS monograph 188, 27 November 2013, www.issafrica.org/publications/monographs/assessing-long-term-state-fragility-in-africa-prospects-for-26-more-fragile-countries (accessed 15 March 2014).
- 22 Politics of the Belly is a translation of the French term, '*politique du ventre*', used by Jean-François Bayart in his 1989 book, *L'État en Afrique: La politique du ventre*. Originally a Cameroonian term

- for patron–client relations in West Africa, the equivalent in East Africa would be ‘It’s our turn to eat’, popularised by Michela Wrong in her 2010 book on Kenyan corruption with the same title.
- 23 JL Herbst and G Mills, *Africa’s third liberation: The new search for prosperity and jobs*, Penguin, 2012.
 - 24 See JD Moyer and E Firnhaber, *Cultivating the future: Exploring the potential and impact of a green revolution in Africa*, African Futures policy brief no 4, 3 September 2012, www.issafrica.org/futures/policy-brief/cultivating-the-future-exploring-the-potential-and-impact-of-a-green-rev (accessed 3 October 2014).
 - 25 We use a five-year moving average throughout.
 - 26 Extreme poverty is generally measured as an income of less than \$1,25 per person per day, at 2005 purchasing power parity. Poverty forecasts are fraught with complex data issues. For example, when the World Bank’s International Comparison Project released its rebasing of global economies from 2005 to 2011, the calculation of the number of people living in extreme poverty globally was reduced by almost 400 million – a figure that reduced the number of extremely poor people in Africa by about 100 million. For a more detailed modelling of the potential for pro-poor developmental policies, see S Turner, J Cilliers and B Hughes, *Reducing poverty in Africa: Realistic targets for the post-2015 MDGs and Agenda 2063*, African Futures paper 10, 26 August 2014, www.issafrica.org/futures/papers/reducing-poverty-in-africa-realistic-targets-for-the-post-2015-mdgs-and-agenda-2063 (accessed 3 October 2014).
 - 27 Defined as less than 3% of the population living on less than \$1,25 a day.
 - 28 The base-case growth rate for China is 5,5%; for India 7%; for Brazil 2,5%; and for the US 1,8%. To avoid duplication, South Africa is included as part of Africa, and not as a member of the BRIC(S) group. We use the G7, and not the G8, as Russia is a member of the BRIC grouping.
 - 29 J Cilliers & J Schünemann, *The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?* ISS paper 246, May 2013, www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/the-future-of-intrastate-conflict-in-africa-more-violence-or-greater-peace (accessed 3 October 2014).
 - 30 BB Hughes et al, *Strengthening governance globally: The next 50 years*, Patterns of Potential Human Progress, Oxford University Press, 2014, www.issafrica.org/futures/books/patterns-of-potential-human-progress-volume-5-governance (accessed 3 October 2014). This is the fifth and final volume of Patterns of Potential Human Progress, published by the Pardee Center.
 - 31 Important as these insights are in seeking to present a picture of current and future prospects for conflict, it is important to underline the tentative nature of such long-term forecasts. The three dimensions (security, capacity and inclusion) presented in the publication by Hughes et al were sequential transitions that reflect the historical processes through which many states developed. The associated African processes occur in parallel rather than sequentially, leading to the conclusion that African governance is most likely to evolve in different ways from the traditional Western model, with which it is often compared. Authors such as Abrahamsen and Williams have therefore started to interrogate concepts such as assemblages (literally, sourcing security and capacity elsewhere, largely from the private sector) as ways in which African governments might compensate for the deficit. See, for example, R Abrahamsen and MC Williams, Security beyond the state: Global security assemblages in international politics, *International Political Sociology*, 3, 2009, 1–17, and R Abrahamsen and MC Williams, Security sector reform: Bringing the private in, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 6:1, April 2006, 1–23.
 - 32 MG Marshall, TR Gurr and K Jagers, Polity IV Project: Dataset user’s manual, political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2013, 6 May 2014, www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (accessed 30 July 2014).
 - 33 See www.afrobarometer.org/ (accessed 30 July 2014).
 - 34 J Cilliers & J Schünemann, *The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?*, ISS paper 246, May 2013, 5, www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/the-future-of-intrastate-conflict-in-africa-more-violence-or-greater-peace (accessed 3 October 2014).
 - 35 The original reference was to MG Marshall and BR Cole, Global report 2011, *Conflict, governance, and state fragility*, Center for Systemic Peace, 2001, 12.
 - 36 All these countries have a deficit in excess of four points.
 - 37 H Hegre, Democracy and armed conflict, *Journal of Peace Research*, 51:2, 2014, 160–161.
 - 38 Ibid.
 - 39 More recent work that uses the Polity components has added to our understanding of regime characteristics and their relationship to violence. Goldstone et al, for example, have worked with a number of the subsidiary regime characteristics, particularly as regards measuring the extent of inclusion, and found that partial democracies with factionalism (that is, where one particular group is advantaged), are an exceptionally unstable type of regime – with Kenya coming to obvious mind. See JA Goldstone et al, A global model for forecasting political instability, *American Journal of Political Science*, 54:1, 2010, 190–208.

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About the ISS

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