THE PROS AND CONS OF SUBSIDIARITY

THE ROLE OF AFRICAN REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

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Abstract

The paper critically analyses the emerging international norm of subsidiarity according to which “Africa are responsible for African conflicts”, which is found to be a possible justification for “buck-passing” on the part of the West, leaving the continent with the fewest military means to deal with the largest number of the most destructive armed conflicts. The paper then provides an overview of the various regional and subregional organisations in Africa, including the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as well as a host of less important organisations. It concludes with a survey of the various forms of support promised to these organisations by the West.
1. Subsidiarity, Regional organisations and Hegemons

Since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly fashionable to suggest that regional organisations should play a more prominent role—often argued as an application of the principle of “subsidiarity”. However much may be said in favour of this principle as a general norm, it also has its pitfalls, which will be mentioned below. Not only does it entail a prominent role for regional as opposed to global organisations; it also envisages a central role for organisations as such (as opposed to states) which some find unrealistic and/or undesirable. Finally, there is a controversy over the compatibility of this role for organisations with hegemony—a concept which seems to increasingly acquire derogatory connotations which some (including the present author) regard as unwarranted.

1.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY

The origins of the principle of subsidiarity go way back, inter alia to the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (Leo XIII, 1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (Pius XI, 1931). According to the latter, the principle entails that

a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.¹

Besides European Union law, where it is one of the central principles (e.g. enshrined in the new Constitution for Europe signed in June 2004)² the principle is also enshrined in international law, defining certain roles for regional organisations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter thus stipulates that

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority (art. 53.1) (. . .)

The Members of the United Nations (...) shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.” (art. 52.2)
Regional organisations thus represent instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts is concerned, but it is also underlined that different rules apply to the use of non-peaceful means with the stipulation that “No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council” (art. 53.1). The UNSC thereby reserves for itself the right to either authorise military action by regional organisations, or withhold such authorisation, in which case the use of forces constitutes a violation of art. 2.4 of the Charter, according to which “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (…)”.³

The UN Charter also mentions the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” (art. 51), the latter referring to alliances such as NATO.⁴ However, such alliances do not constitute such regional arrangements or agencies as referred to in chapter VIII. In Europe, for instance, the regional organisation is the OSCE rather than NATO or even the EU; and in Africa the relevant regional organisation was the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), a position now assumed by its successor, the African Union (AU), more on which below.

1.2 THE PROS AND CONS

The gist of the norm of subsidiarity is thus that regional and subregional organisations should be the “first resort” for problems transcending national borders, leaving the “international community” and global organisations like the UN to deal only with those problems that cannot be solved at lower levels (see Fig. 1).⁵

A number of considerations do indeed speak in favour of such a division of labour. For instance, in the case of an intra-state conflicts, adjacent countries are often more inclined to get involved because they almost inevitably suffer from the consequences of the conflict, e.g. in the form of a flow of refugees—as illustrated by the figures for refugees in the Horn of Africa in Table 1. Hence, states may be more likely to honour their obligations as members of a region or subregion, i.e. as neighbours, than as members of the international community, as doing so corresponds to their national interest.
Furthermore, neighbouring countries are often in a better position to comprehend a conflict than distant ones, as they often (but not always) share the same culture. Finally, the regional level of action is often most suitable for managing problems of ethnic groups and nations “straddling borders”, such as the Hutus and Tutsis of Central Africa, as well as for handling other border-transcending issues, such as shared rivers and similar environmental matters, cross-border migration and transborder crime, and perhaps for dealing with border disputes.7

Notwithstanding all these attractions, however, the subsidiarity norm is not without its problems. First of all, regional or subregional organisations may either be missing or too weak for the task. Few regions have as strong economic, political and normative foundations for regional collaboration as has (Western) Europe, where a particular form of regionalisation predominates, namely regional integration. In most other parts of the world, and certainly in Africa, other and less ambitious modes of regionalisation are the best that can realistically be hoped for. By implication, to relegate the responsibility for such complicated matters as conflict prevention, management and resolution to such regional or subregional organisations may be a recipe for failure, as the requisite means may not be available at these levels, simply because of a general lack of resources affecting both the members and the organisation as such.

Secondly, subsidiarity may come to be seen as a justification for what is really “buck-passing”, i.e. for neglecting Africa (as well as most other parts of the developing world) and leaving the solution of its problems to the Africans themselves—even though is not really obvious why, for instance, Mauritania should have a greater

![Chart 1: Global Military Expenditure 2003](image_url)
responsibility towards, say, Lesotho than any other UN member state. To thus devolve responsibility to Africans may, however, be very appealing to the developed world for whom Africa’s importance is rapidly declining, thereby also making less and less foreign assistance available. The “war against terrorism” proclaimed by the United States may entail (for good or bad) a slightly greater attention being paid to (at least parts of) Africa, but it remains to be seen whether this will last.

Thirdly, what makes such buck-passing even less fair when applied to Africa is the fact that it will be the strong who are passing the buck to the weak, who neither have the economic nor the military capacity to shoulder the burden, as will be obvious from the distribution of global military expenditures in Figure 1. If we compare this distribution of military capacities with the needs, i.e. the number of armed conflicts by region, the division of labour comes to look even less fair (see Table 2). Even though Africa’s share of the world’s major armed conflicts has declined significantly, it is still very substantial and the numbers even conceal such devastating conflicts as the one in the DRC.

### 1.3 ORGANISATIONS AND HEGEMONS IN IR THEORY

Subsidiarity usually means devolving responsibility to a particular category of actors, namely regional or subregional organisations or institutions.

Even though the terms are often used as synonyms, it is relevant to distinguish between institutions and organisations. One point of departure may be Hedley Bull’s definition of institutions as “a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of a common goal.” This concept of institutions is thus broader than that of organisations, and institutions may or may not include organisations, identified as such by a certain physical permanence and such observable features as offices, staffs, letter-heads, logos and in today’s world homepages—which some institutions have, but others lack. The institutions listed by Bull included the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, the managerial system of the great powers, and war as well as the state itself. Institutions are thus very similar to regimes, defined as “sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge.” Organisations usually require regimes or institutions in order to function, but they add to these a formal shape as well as a physical presence.

There is far from unanimity among international relations scholars about the importance of international organisations, i.e. about whether institutionalisation and multilateralism matters. Both classical and neo-realists downplay the importance of organisations, seeing them almost exclusively as instruments for states, especially great powers, and thus as reflecting the distribution of power within the system. Not only do great powers thus decide on what the organisation can do, but they also reserve to themselves the option of doing what they think needs to be done unilaterally. Indeed, according to realists the very presence of organisations may produce what may be called “negative synergies”, making the combined strength of an organisation less than the sum of its parts, simply because all members will be tempted to “free-ride” on each other—an instance of the collective goods problems to which we shall soon turn. If this holds true it would be preferable to count on initiatives by individual states (e.g. regional or global great powers) acting unilaterally than to unrealistically pin one’s hopes on multilateral and institutional action—and Africa has certainly seen such unilateral action, as when Tanzania intervened in Uganda to overthrow the dictator Idi Amin.

Both classical liberalism and modern neo-liberal institutionalism place greater emphasis on institutions, crediting them with an identity of their own and a considerable potential autonomy. Arguably, institutionalisation thus holds the promise of, in due course, transcending the anarchical self-help system of international relations, i.e. pointing towards genuine integration, as has been the case of the European Communities. Such integration, in its turn, is credited with an even stronger peace-furthering potential than that of non-institutionalised interdependence on which it rests, thus holding out the prospects of transforming a region into a “security community” within which war has become inconceivable.

Finally there are several more “post-modern”, “reflectivist” or “constructivist” theories with implications for international institutions and organisations—e.g. such as emphasise the role they play in framing or even creating national identities and interests, or such as see institutions and organisations as creating “epistemic communities”, thereby also contributing to the formation of larger communities among states and/or between their respective societies.

Hegemonic stability theory seems to occupy an intermediate position between realism and liberalism. It is inspired by the Italian communist leader Antonio Gramsci and particularly by his *Prison Notebooks*, which dealt with national affairs, explaining how the capitalist class was able to
co-opt (strata of) the working class into a grand coalition under its own leadership (“hegemony”), inter alia by ideological means. The concept has subsequently been applied to international relations by kindred spirits from “critical IR theory” such as Robert Cox, who defined international hegemony as “the formation of a coalition of top-down forces activated by a common consciousness in which those at the bottom are able to participate”. The term has also been used by mainstream authors belonging to the International Political Economy (IPE) tradition such as Charles Kindleberger and (partly) Robert Gilpin as well as by IR theorists such as Robert Keohane. Hegemony differs from simple domination in that the hegemonic power has to forge consent around their own values (e.g. free trade) and strategies as common ones, which means that (in the words of Gramsci) “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogical relationship”. A hegemonic role thus also constrains the hegemon as it cannot afford to (be seen to) behave too selfishly, but must show concern for the common good, or at least appear to be doing so.

Quite a strong case can be made for a central role of hegemons within international organisations, be they global, regional or subregional, *inter alia* because their presence may be a hedge against the problem of free-riding which tends to haunt organisations as a special case of the “collective action problem”. If a good is common in the sense that everybody can enjoy it, it is an almost irresistible temptation to leave the “production” of the good to others. However, IR analysts, including realists such as Robert Gilpin, have highlighted the fact that special rules seem to apply to the largest members of a system. For them there may actually be a direct correlation between consumption and production of common or public goods, simply because their share of total “production” is so large that it has noticeable implications for what will be available for “consumption”. Hence, the very largest members not only have the leverage to punish free-riding, but also an obvious incentive to do so in order to achieve a fair distribution of the production.

Hegemony may thus be a partial solution to the problem of how to produce public goods, not only in the economic sphere but also, for instance, with regard to peace and security. The preconditions for such a hegemony were to a certain extent present within the two opposing alliances during the Cold War, just as they were within the international monetary system as long as the US dollar remained the universal reserve currency. Similar preconditions of hegemony may also be present on a regional or subregional level in such cases where one state surpasses all the rest in terms of most relevant elements of power, as seems to be the case of South Africa in Southern Africa and of Nigeria in West Africa. However, hegemony is not merely a matter of power preponderance, but also presupposes a certain commonality of values, which obviously prevented the establishment of a South African hegemony in the era of apartheid.
Hegemony may further facilitate the creation and maintenance of the regimes often constituting the foundations of organisations, and the function of which is to regulate international relations in the self-interest of all states, inter alia by reducing transaction costs and minimising “negative externalities”, thereby allowing for mutually advantageous cooperation and promoting the production of public goods. It seems a reasonable assumption that the “regime entrepreneurs” (also called “drivers”) will typically be the great powers, acting in their own interest, but thereby also promoting the common good by adopting and enforcing the sets of norms and rules constituting the regime, preferably multilaterally, and also abiding by these norms and rules themselves.31

2. Regionalism and/or Subregionalism?

A devolution of responsibilities to regional organisations obviously presupposes a division of the world into regions. Unfortunately, however, not only has the regional level generally been disregarded in the IR literature, but the definition and delimitation of regions remain controversial, both theoretically and politically.

2.1 CRITERIA OF REGIONNESS

What is clear is that a region is a subset of the global international system. How to delimit such a subset, however, is controversial because several criteria might be applied, each yielding a different result—none of them, of course, being more correct than the others.32 Moreover, for analytical (and sometimes also political) purposes it may be useful with a further subdivision to the level of subregions or even smaller groupings. For instance, if one treats “Africa” as a region, then North and sub-Saharan Africa might appear the most obvious next level, implying that subregions such as the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, West or Southern Africa would then, at most, qualify a “sub-subregions”. Moreover, we would need additional “sub” prefixes to label any subset within them, such as the Mano River states or subsets consisting of merely parts of adjacent states such as the “region” comprising Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern Congo.

Furthermore, the right choice of criteria for delimitation is not obvious. The first possible criterion that springs to mind is simple geographical (or geopolitical) proximity, as a region is usually held to consist of contiguous states. For instance, one would never label the Commonwealth a region for the simple reason that it comprises non-contiguous states. This contiguity criterion, however, begs the question of where to draw the outer borders, unless there happen to be clear natural boundaries.
The African continent happens to be fairly clearly delimited in the sense that all of “Africa” is within the continent which contains only Africa—the only exceptions being the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula outside the continent and tiny parts of Spain (i.e. of Europe) within the continent in the form of exclaves on the coast of North Africa. However, it is far from obvious that countries like Egypt or the rest of the Maghreb really belong to Africa rather than to the Middle East—or even to an emerging Mediterranean region. Moreover, in relations between peoples, societies and states, “functional proximity” is not merely a matter of physical distance, but also a function of topography, infrastructure, technology and economic factors. For instance, the fastest route of travel between several African capitals happens to be via Europe (albeit increasingly Johannesburg), simply because intra-African transport networks are so under-developed, partly as a legacy of colonialism.

A second possible criterion is a variation of the geographical one, but focusing on ecosystems such as shared rivers (as in the Nile Basin Initiative). In several cases, belonging to such an ecosystem creates a certain commonality, at least in the sense of mutual dependency and shared interests, but it may also form the basis of conflicts over the division of “shared” natural resources.

Thirdly, one might apply the criterion of cultural affinity, which happens to almost coincide with that of “civilisations” as used by Samuel Huntington, who predicted a clash between some of the world’s (alleged) nine great civilisations. The criterion may, however, be unwieldy as cultural homogeneity is usually more pronounced when seen from the outside (where it is viewed as “otherness”) than from the inside. Furthermore, “culture” has many aspects (e.g. religious, ideological, and ethnic) which do not automatically yield the same delimitation. A variation on this theme is the notion of regions as “imagined communities”, in analogy with nations as understood by Benedict Anderson and other social constructivists. Like nations, regions may be constituted as such by the members “imagining” themselves as belonging together, and the rest of the world acknowledging them as such, regardless of whether either has any “objective” foundation.

The latter variation brings us into the sphere of politics, where a fourth convenient political or legal criterion of delimitation may recommend itself in the form of membership of institutions or organisations defined as “regional”, e.g. by the United Nations. The main problem with this is that most African regional and subregional organisations remain so fragile (and the commitment to them by members so weak) that it is counter-intuitive to accept them at face value as a criterion for regionness. Moreover, large parts of Africa are almost devoid of (significant) organisations, as is the case of the Great Lakes “region”. A final problem with this criterion is the
considerable overlap between the membership of these organisations (*vide infra*), implying that many states would have to be counted as simultaneously belonging to several different regions.

A fifth possible criterion is the “scientific” or empirical criterion of interaction density, according to which regions may be identified as such by their above-average density of interaction. Most analyses have focused on trade and similar forms of economic interaction, but this would yield rather meagre results in all of Africa because of the low level of intra-African trade (even within economic communities such as ECOWAS or SADC), at least as far as the formal economy is concerned. However, one might also look at phenomena such as labour migration and other cross-border human interaction which might arguably also form the basis of regionalisation and regional delimitation, yet with the implication that the contours of regions would then vary according to focus.

As a variation of this empirical criterion, we might define regions as having an above-average intensity of interaction and interdependence in the specific field of peace and security. Barry Buzan has thus suggested the term “regional security complex” (RSC) for “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”. By logical implication, the delimitation of an RSC would have to be determined empirically, but this in turn presupposes a clear criterion for what to count as security issues. The theory has subsequently been amended (mainly by Buzan’s colleague Ole Wæver) to allow for, in principle, any issue to count as one of security, depending on what is “securitised” — a “speech act” in which an issue is referred to as being urgent and having “existential” significance and thus as warranting a resort to “extraordinary measures”. The actual security concerns of states and other actors are then what should count and which should serve to delimit an RSC (i.e. a region or subregion), regardless of whether these concerns are about traditional security matters such as wars or arms races or about non-military matters such as organised crime, environmental degradation, drought or HIV/AIDS, i.e. the whole range of issues that are sometimes referred to as components of “human security”. In the following I shall take this criterion as the analytical point of departure.

### 2.2 DELIMITATION OF REGIONS AND RSCS

Considering Africa’s size and diversity it seems obvious to seek a subdivision, if only for analytical purposes, into more manageable entities. One might, for instance, subdivide the continent into simple geographical subregions, as done by the Africa Institute of South Africa, yielding six subregions as set out in Table 3.
The OAU in 1976 stipulated that “there shall be five (5) regions of the OAU, namely, Northern, Western, Central, Eastern, and Southern”, yet without specifying which states were to belong to which subregion. The Secretary General was supposed to report back to the following session on this, but apparently did not, thus leaving the question of authoritative subdivision open. The African Union has, likewise opted for a subdivision into five regions, as set out Table 4. However, this subdivision contains several paradoxes, e.g. the fact that present and former SADC members Mauritius and the Seychelles are counted as belonging to East Africa, and Rwanda (along with Uganda) is counted as belonging to a different subregion than Burundi or the DRC.

Table 3: Geographical Subregions in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Africa</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sahrawi)</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Togo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Africa’s Subregions according to the AU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Southern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Cote d'I.</td>
<td>Guin.B.</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>RoC</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Sierra L.</td>
<td>绍兴</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sao T&amp;P</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have recently sought to apply the above RSC theory to Africa, in principle proceeding from the criterion that members of such complexes should be interdependent with regard to security, whilst (in principle) determining this on the basis of which issue areas are “securitised”. Distinguishing between Cold War and post-Cold War patterns, they were able to identify only one-and-a-half full-fledged RSCs prior to 1990, i.e. those of the Middle East (including North Africa) and Southern Africa, plus a “proto-complex” covering West Africa and a “pre-complex” encompassing the Horn of Africa, whereas East-Central Africa remained “an unstructured region”. After 1990 the situation gradually became clearer, according to the two authors, who were in 2003 able to identify two-and-half RSCs, i.e. (parts of) the Middle East, Central and Southern Africa, plus two proto-complexes in West Africa and the Horn, respectively.\textsuperscript{47}

Finding the terminology rather confusing, and the actual delimitation less than obvious, I have opted for a slightly different subdivision of Africa into (sub-)regional security complexes, set out in Table 5. It deliberately disregards the “rule” that RSCs are not allowed to overlap, i.e. that countries can only belong to one RSC, for the simple reason that several countries do seem to belong to more than one, usually because they are straddling the border between RSCs. This is the case of Mauritania (North and West Africa), Egypt (North Africa and the Horn of Africa), the DRC, Angola and Tanzania (the Great Lakes subregion and Southern Africa), and Kenya arguably belonging to both the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes subregional security complexes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RSC</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Possible/ peripheral members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sahrawi</td>
<td>Chad, Mauritania, Sudan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan</td>
<td>Chad, Egypt, Kenya, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Togo, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome &amp; Principe, Senegal, Mali, Gabon, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Cameroon, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>DRC, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 THE ORGANISATIONAL LANDSCAPE

Africa is home to quite a number of regional as well as subregional organisations, as set out in Table 6 which merely lists some of the existing organisations included in the CIA’s \textit{World Factbook}, including such as are mainly, but not exclusively, African. Unfortunately, however, there may be less to the apparent pattern of organisational density than meets the eye, as some of the listed organisations seem to be little more than empty shells. Moreover, only few of them are
devoted to security and conflict matters or have a scope or strength allowing them to “branch out” into this field.

Table 6: African Regional and Subregional Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Total memberships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✔</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sahrawi</td>
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There seems to be little correspondence between the borders of RSCs and subregional organisations, which may be quite a serious problem, as RSCs (almost by definition) represent the required geographical scope for addressing security-related problems, e.g. by subregional organisations. Even more seriously, there seems to be no correspondence at all between the need for and the availability of security- and conflict-related organisations, as those subregions most in need of strong organisations (the Great Lakes, for instance) have none.

However, this mismatch need not be a serious problem under a regime built on subsidiarity, as subregional organisations are merely intended as first resorts. When they are unavailable or inadequate for the task, the responsibility for dealing with problems simply moves one step up
the hierarchical ladder, i.e. to the regional level. We shall therefore begin with the regional organisation for the African continent, the OAU and its successor, the African Union.

3. From OAU to AU, Now with NEPAD and CSSDCA

Even though one may well dispute whether the African continent constitutes a region, considering that North Africa may just as well be counted as part of the “Greater Middle East”, both the existence of organisations with a continental scope and the actual interaction with sub-Saharan Africa by certain Maghreb countries (e.g. Libya and Egypt) seems to indicate that the continent is in fact a meaningful entity, as does the existence of a corresponding ideology.

3.1 PAN-AFRICANISM

In analogy with, for instance, pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism continues to play a certain role, at least in the discourse in and on Africa. It is an ideology with historical roots that can be traced at least as far back as the 19th Century and with a considerable present standing. It consists of several elements.

- A shared mythology of a glorious past of African unity, unfortunately based on extremely weak historical evidence.
- A collective historical memory of victimisation, stemming from the slave trade and the colonisation of Africa, and shared between the African peoples and the diaspora. Hence also the incidence of pan-African ideology among African diaspora communities, inter alia in the United States and the Caribbean, where it sometimes takes rather baroque forms such as Rastafarianism.
- A sense of community, i.e. of all of Africa “belonging together”, perhaps even in the sense of forming one nation.
- A shared hope for an “African renaissance”, pronounced on several occasions, but most recently and eloquently by South African president Thabo Mbeki.

The Pan-African Congress in 1945 first enunciated the pan-African ideal in a “Declaration to the Colonial Peoples”, and this call was followed up by the leaders of the various liberation movements which sprang up in the course of the 1950s. The ideology continued to influence them after the transformation of many of these leaders into presidents or prime ministers of the
independent states coming into being since the late 1950s, as was the case of Kwama Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere.\textsuperscript{58} There was, however, no unanimity among the proponents of pan-Africanism, even at this early stage, but a division between radicals and gradualists. The former regarded the formation of states as a detour from the goal of one pan-African polity, whereas the latter viewed state formation as an indispensable step towards the goal of unity which gradually receded into the background.

3.2 THE OAU

When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963, it thus reflected a compromise between the two positions. On the one hand it was certainly inspired by the ideology of pan-Africanism, and the preamble of the OAU Charter\textsuperscript{59} thus referred to

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and cooperation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences.
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}

The same commitment to unity was reflected in article II, which referred to “the unity and solidarity of the African states”, but when it came to the basic principles, referred to in article III of the Charter, the emphasis shifted to the existing states. The following were listed:

1. The sovereign equality of all Member States.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediator conciliation or arbitration.
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of a neighbouring States or any other States.
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories, which are still dependent.
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

For all their indisputable merits, these principles were bound to make the OAU a guardian of state rights, even at the expense of the rights of the African peoples and the lofty aspirations referred to in the charter’s preamble, including “freedom, equality, justice and dignity”—values which have on numerous occasions been violated by incumbent African regimes.
The founding of the OAU might thus be seen as the codification of an embryonic “Westphalian system” in Africa, based on the states emerging from decolonisation within the borders that had been established by the former colonial masters according to criteria which had absolutely nothing to do with the interests of the inhabitants. Indeed, the OAU might be seen as a “safety net”, protecting the newly independent states through their process of state-building. Besides thus helping with state-building, the organisation probably also contributed to keeping the number of inter-state wars in Africa impressively low—even though there is, of course, no telling how frequent they would have been in the absence of the OAU.

One of the defects of this system is that the implicit privileging of existing states within predetermined borders has been an almost insurmountable obstacle to dealing constructively with intra-state conflicts, be they secessionist struggles such as that of Eritrea, power struggles or outright genocides as that in Rwanda in 1994. Another defect was that states enjoyed the same rights regardless of their form of government, providing dictatorships with few incentives to democratise. Indeed, African despots could count on the support from other African governments and the OAU to withstand pressure from the West or the international community to introduce democracy.

The OAU was not particularly successful in promoting human rights either, notwithstanding its adoption in 1981 of an “African Charter on Human and People’s Rights”, which listed all the civil rights as well as numerous “second generation human rights”. Even though it was in 1998 decided to strengthen this human rights regime by the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, this did not enter into force until 25 January 2004, i.e. after the OAU had been replaced by the AU. The court is intended to adjudicate in cases presented to it by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (established by the OAU in 1998), as well as to try cases brought before it by individuals and NGOs, but only in so far as the states involved allow such jurisdiction. The court’s decisions are legally binding, but it remains to be seen whether states will actually help enforce its sentences. If not, little may come out of it.

There was also less than met the eye to the establishment, through the Abuja Treaty of 1991, of an African Economic Community (AEC) under the auspices of the OAU. Indeed, even though the treaty formally entered into force in 1994, virtually nothing has been implemented, and the economic relations between the states of the continent thus remain quite insignificant. On balance, the OAU thus does not seem to have accomplished much with regard to the promotion of the “liberal peace”, which has become so fashionable in the West (and among IR liberalists), neither with regard to democratisation and human rights nor trade and economic
interdependency—all of which would presumably have furthered peace and thus constituted indirect strategies of dealing with conflicts.67

The record of the OAU was not much more impressive in the field of directly security-related activities.68 First of all, the OAU was involved in setting norms and standards, but was quite ineffective in enforcing them. This was, for instance, the case of the “OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism and Civil Conflicts” (signed in 1977, in force since 1985), which did little to prevent the actual use of mercenaries and PMCs (private military companies) by African states such as Sierra Leone or Angola.69 Another example of OAU norm-setting was the proclamation in 1996 of Africa as a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Pelindaba Treaty, which had, by the time of writing, not yet entered into force.70 The fact that Africa in now free of nuclear weapons has probably much less to do with this treaty than with the unilateral decision by South Africa to abandon its clandestine nuclear weapons status,71 combined with the fact that no other African state seems to have ever so much as contemplated going nuclear—with the possible exception of Libya which has now abandoned whatever ambitions it may have had. Besides this treaty, the OAU did not really venture far into the field of arms control,72 except for a rather ineffectual “Bamako Common African Position on Small Arms”, signed in 2000,73 yet with no verifiable impact on state behaviour.

In 1999, the OAU further adopted a “Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism” which entered into force in October 2002, committing member states to “prevent their territories from being used as a base for the planning, organization or execution of terrorists acts” (art. 4.2a) and to collaborate with each other in the fight against terrorism, e.g. by sharing information and extraditing suspects—but also underlining that “armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces” was not to be regarded as terrorism (art. 3.1).74

Following the adoption of the Cairo Declaration of 1993 the OAU established a “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”. This step was motivated by the recognition that “no single factor had contributed more to the present socio-economic problems on the Continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between African countries”. The objectives of the Mechanism were quite ambitions, ranging from “the anticipation and prevention of situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown conflicts” through “peace-making and peace-building” to peacemaking in full-blown conflicts and post-conflict peace-building. The Mechanism was built around a Central Organ, with the OAU Secretary General and the Secretariat together constituting its operational arm, but it also featured an annually elected Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.75
The OAU also on a couple of occasions ventured into field of direct peace support operations. This was the case of the deployment of an “OAU Neutral Force” in Chad in 1981-82 which was singularly ineffective, according to most accounts. The deployment in Rwanda of an OAU Military Observer Team (1990-91) followed by Military Observer Groups (1991-93) also did absolutely nothing to prevent the 1994 genocide. After the Rwanda debacle the OAU fielded Observer Missions in Burundi (1993-96) and in Comoros (1997-99) as well as an OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea, none of which seems to make much of a difference.

The main obstacle to the OAU playing any significant role in any of the above conflicts (to say nothing of the conflicts in which it did not even seek involvement) was probably the strong norm of non-interference in domestic affairs, which made the organisation powerless to do anything about most of the violent conflicts on the continent which (legally speaking) were exactly that, as they pitted incumbent rulers against challengers from within the country who were struggling either to overthrow the government or to secede from the state.

In all fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that these were norms shared by the OAU with the rest of the proverbial “international community” and that they were in perfect conformity with international law. In 1999, moreover, the OAU took a modest step away from the general norm of recognising and defending whichever regime was in power by deciding (at the Algiers summit) to ban leaders installed through coups. However, it was not until the OAU was replaced with the AU, that any real departure from the norm of “sacrosanct sovereignty” took place.

### 3.3 THE AFRICAN UNION

The principled decision to establish what is now the African Union (AU) was taken at the OAU summit meeting in Sirte, Libya, in 1999. In preparation of this summit, the Libyan dictator Qadhafi had used his country’s oil wealth to ensure the support for his vision of a united Africa from several African leaders, inter alia by paying the OAU arrears of seven African countries and by ensuring a luxurious all-expenses-paid summit.

Following a hectic drafting process, OAU ministers in June the following year reached agreement on a draft treaty, and at a summit meeting in Lomé, 11 July 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) was signed by 53 African heads of state. It formally entered into force in 2001 with the ratification by two thirds of the member states—which criterion was met (perhaps not entirely by coincidence) when Nigeria deposited its instruments of ratification. The entry into force allowed for the solemn proclamation of the AU at the 5th extraordinary summit.
of the OAU (2 March 2001) in Sirte, but it was decided to let the new organisation coexist with the OAU for one year in order to smooth the transition.

In July 2001 another summit was convened, where Amara Essy (Cote d’Ivoire) was appointed new Secretary General and a decision on the “Africa Initiative” was adopted—along with a declaration on Zimbabwe which cast some doubt on the sincerity on the break with the past, as this mainly urged the Brits to honour their “colonial obligations” without criticising Robert Mugabe. On the 17th of October the same year, i.e. a month after the terrorist attacks against the United States, a Summit of heads of state passed a declaration on terrorism, which seems to have earned the new organisation in statu nascendi some goodwill in Washington. Later, an actual “action plan on terrorism” entered into force, binding the signatories to, among other things, refuse safe haven for terrorists. At a subsequent conference on terrorism, however, concerns were expressed about Western double standards, showing that the AU was not a mere pawn in the “new cold war” under conditions of unipolarity.

Following the above preparatory steps, the AU was solemnly inaugurated at a summit in Durban, 9-10 July 2002. To its credit, the summit refused to recognise the regime in Madagascar because of its unconstitutional basis, i.e. in conformity with decisions taken in Lomé in 2000. Nigerian President Obasanjo explained this refusal in the following words: “We have put our foot down. If at this stage of the African Union we don’t do things on principle, we are going to fail before we start”. A number of important decisions about principles and structure were also taken at this summit, e.g. about the establishment of an AU Security Council.

Before proceeding with this, however, let us pause to look at the most central document of the AU, the Constitutive Act (CAAU). The preamble of the CAAU paid tribute to the ideology of pan-Africanism with the claim that it was

INSPIRED by the noble ideals, which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States; and (...)

GUIDED by our common vision of a united and strong Africa and by the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among our peoples.
The general principles entail the same duality as characterised the OAU, as they list as objectives both to “achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa” and the to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States” (art. 3a-b). The document does, however, contain a significant departure from the past, which may help reconcile the two principles through an explicitated exception. While upholding the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, it establishes the right of the AU to intervene in cases of “war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. A decision to thus intervene may be taken by the Assembly with a two-thirds majority vote (art. 4h and 7.1). It further allows the Executive Council, composed of representatives of all states, to meet in extraordinary sessions if the need should arise (art. 10.2). While these decisions would seem to provide scope for the AU to take action in cases such as the Rwandan genocide, it remains to be seen which practice will develop.

The CAAU further underlines the need to “promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda” (art. 3f), just as it expresses the determination “to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law”. More concretely, the constitutive act ambitiously envisages “the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent” (art. 4d), to which we shall return below.

As far as structure is concerned the CAAU envisages quite an elaborate organisational setup, featuring an Assembly of the Union, an Executive Council, a Pan-African Parliament, a Court of Justice, a Commission, a Permanent Representatives Committee, various specialised technical committees and financial institutions and an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (art. 5). Most of these institutions had by the time of writing (December 2004) been established and begun their work. For instance, the African Parliament was thus inaugurated on the 18th March 2004.

Most controversial seems to have been the institutions most directly involved with peace and security—as should come as no surprise to IR Realists who would expect states to be most reluctant to relinquish sovereign rights in this domain of “high politics”. Considerable progress has nevertheless been achieved, at least as far as decisions and institutionalisation is concerned.

At the Addis Ababa summit in July 2002 it was agreed to establish a Peace and Security Council (PSC), intended as “an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction”. Besides functions...
taken over from the OAU’s “Mechanism”, the PSC is intended to develop the common defence policy for the Union mentioned in CAAU (art. 3e). Even though its structure exhibits clear inspiration from the UN Security Council (the supreme authority of which is explicitly acknowledged) it differs from the latter by having neither permanent members nor veto rights, but all its fifteen members are to be elected, ten of them for a two-year term and five for a three-year term. Even though elections are supposed to take into account geographical representativity and rotation, membership of the Security Council will also entail obligations in terms of payment of dues and contributions to the operations and the Peace Fund set up to fund them.

Among the functions of the Security Council are peacekeeping and even intervention in the aforementioned contingencies of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, in which it is also envisaged to play a pro-active role by making proposals to the Assembly. It is further supposed to ensure collaboration between the AU and subregional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC. In its deliberations and activities, the Security Council will be supported by a so-called “Panel of the Wise”, consisting of “five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent” (art. 11).

The protocol establishing the PSC formally entered into force in January 2003, but the actual launch of the PSC, including its Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution only took place on the 25th of May 2004.

Under the auspices of the Security Council, the CAAU further envisaged to establish an African Standby Force (ASF), to be “composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice”. Such deployment is envisioned to take place both for preventative purposes, in the form of forceful interventions, and for post-conflict peace-building (art. 13). Partly in order to make this feasible, a Military Staff Committee should be established and a certain standardisation of equipment as well as doctrines undertaken.

The first steps to implement thus consisted in a meeting of experts and the preparation of concept papers, followed by a series of consultations and meetings between the chiefs of staff and defence ministers of member states. One of the first tangible achievements was an agreement (May 2003) on a “Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee”. This was followed by the adoption (January 2004) of a “Draft Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy”, and (at an extraordinary AU Assembly, 28 February 2004) by a “Solemn Declaration” on the same topic, acronymed the “CADSF”. In this declaration, the states acknowledged
(art. 5) ... a definition of defence which encompasses both the traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use of the armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects which relate to the protection of the people’s political, cultural, social and economic values and ways of life [and that] ... each African country’s defence is inextricably linked to that of other African countries, as well as that of other regions and, by the same token, that of the African continent as a whole.

In the same vein it was also acknowledged that

(art. 6) ... ensuring the common security of Africa involves working on the basis of a definition which encompasses both the traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as the non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intra-state conflict. The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well. This newer, multi-dimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalization on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation.

The main emphasis was thus, quite logically, placed on internal threats such as intra-state war and genocide (art. 8.ii). Whilst paying due tribute to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, the right of the AU (enshrined in the CAAU) to intervene in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity was also reiterated, albeit with an addition of a fourth contingency that might trigger intervention, namely “a serious threat to legitimate order”.

In article 12 a commitment to collective defence was formulated in the words that “any threat or aggression on one African country is deemed to be a threat or aggression on the others, and the continent as a whole”. More concretely, the following were identified (art. 13j) as the ambitions of the CADSF:

...enhance AU’s capacity for and coordination of, early action for conflict prevention, containment, management, resolution and elimination of conflicts, including the
deployment and sustenance of peacekeeping missions and thus promote initiatives that will preserve and strengthen peace and development in Africa.

This bears a striking resemblance to the ambitions of the European Union, where such tasks are usually referred to as “Petersberg Tasks”, but the AU is more ambitious than its European counterpart by also envisaging to “facilitate the establishment of a threat deterrence and containment capacity within the AU” (art. 13r). Even more ambitiously, it was decided to establish an African Standby Force, “based on brigades to be provided by the five African regions” to be completed by the year 2010.

All of the above is, of course, so far little more than words—and the experience from the OAU certainly cautions against automatically assuming full implementation of all decisions. What nevertheless speaks in favour of some optimism is that fact that the AU took upon itself to oversee the peace process in Burundi, which has been one of Africa’s most intractable conflicts, inter alia through the deployment of peacekeepers, provided by South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique—and that this mission seems to have been concluded satisfactorily and then handed over to the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). At the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004 it was further decided to dispatch monitors as well as a 300-strong protection force (comprising mainly Nigerian and Rwandan troops) to the troubled Darfur region of Sudan, mainly intended to allow for a return of the estimated more than one million refugees in neighbouring Chad.

One explanation of the impressive progress made since the 1999 Sirte Summit may be that what began as “just another of Qadhafi’s crazy ideas” has been embraced by the continent’s two great powers, Nigeria and South Africa, who seem to be playing a “shared hegemonic” role (vide infra). The reason why they decided to lend their support to the AU project may be that both were allowed to proceed with their respective favourite projects under the auspices of the new organisation—South Africa with its NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) project and Nigeria with its initiative for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), to both of which we shall now turn.

3.3.1 NEPAD

The origins of NEPAD (initially under the name “New African Initiative”, NAI) date back to the Sirte summit of the OAU in September 1999, where South African president Mbeki and Algerian president Bouteflika were mandated to negotiate a general debt cancellation for Africa. This duo was subsequently (as a Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in April 2000) expanded to a troika with Nigerian president Obasanjo. What was now called the Millennium Partnership for
the African Recovery Programme (MAP) was endorsed by the OAU in 2001 when it was acknowledged as Africa’s principal development initiative and a Programme of Action was adopted.

NEPAD still has quite a loose structure and thus does not really qualify as an organisation. A fifteen-member Task Force was in 2001 appointed to oversee the implementation of the Programme of Action, a five-member Steering Committee has been appointed, and a small Secretariat. It was in September 2002 recognised by the United Nations as “a serious commitment to address the aspirations of the continent”. The main objectives of NEPAD are the eradication of poverty and creation of sustainable development, but as a precondition of such development it also features a “Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance Initiative”. A set of criteria for good governance has been developed and a “peer review” mechanism (African Peer Review Mechanism, APRM) has been launched which is to assess both the political and the economic credentials of African states—a potentially highly controversial endeavour, even though states are free to submit themselves to a review or not.

At the Durban summit of the AU in 2002 (but under the auspices of NEPAD), the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance contained the following paragraph:

We are determined to increase our efforts in restoring stability, peace and security in the African continent, as these are essential conditions for sustainable development, alongside democracy, good governance, human rights, social development, protection of environment and sound economic management. Our efforts and initiatives will also be directed at seeking speedy peaceful solutions to current conflicts and at building Africa’s capacity to prevent, manage and resolve all conflicts on the continent.

The Peace and Security Initiative was in 2001 described as including a recognition that “Long-term conditions for ensuring peace and security in Africa require policy measures for addressing the political and social vulnerabilities on which conflict is premised”. It further emphasised the need to strengthen Africa’s conflict-management capacity, especially with regard to “prevention, management and resolution of conflict; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines”—a very tall order, indeed, but still quite unspecified. One of the reasons for the conspicuous vagueness of NEPAD about conflicts may be that agreement has been reached between South Africa and Nigeria about a division of labour, according to which this would fall under the “jurisdiction” of CSSDCA.
3.3.2 The CSSDCA

The origins of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) are to be found in the so-called “Kampala Movement”, the nucleus of which was the African Leadership Forum (ALF). It was launched in 1988 by Olusegun Obasanjo who was at that time former Nigerian president (originally appointed by the military), but who is today the democratically elected president of his country. The ALF in 1990-91 held a number of preparatory conferences, e.g. with the OAU, civil society organisations and countries of the North, gradually developing the vision of the CSSDCA as a counterpart of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and its pos-Cold War successor, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe)—as had been suggested by academics such as Laurie Nathan for some time.

In May 1991, the ALF convened a conference in Kampala, jointly with the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), with Ugandan president Museveni as the chair and attended by his colleagues from Zambia, Sudan, Botswana and Mozambique. The conference adopted the Kampala Document, which recommended the launch of a CSSDCA, intended as

... an effective process among African countries which would create a framework for preventing, containing and eliminating pernicious intra- and inter-African conflicts and serve as an instrument, for the management and resolution of such disputes and conflicts as well as for the sustenance of regional co-operation, integration and development.

Where the CSCE had established three “baskets”, the Kampala Document envisaged the establishment of four “calabashes” on security, stability, development and cooperation, each containing various initiatives. Some of these were quite controversial, e.g. to modify the principle of sovereignty to acknowledge a shared African responsibility for the protection of human rights in member countries.

When it was tabled by then OAU chairman Museveni, the proposal to launch a CSSDCA was merely “noted”, but not adopted by the OAU in 1991 (partly because of the opposition from Sudan and Libya). The initiative thus remained dormant until 1999 when the idea was resurrected from near oblivion by Nigerian president Obasanjo at the OAU summit in Algiers. It was formally endorsed by the organisation, and the first meetings (at ministerial level) under its auspices took place in May 2000. The subsequent OAU Summit (Lomé in 2000) then adopted the Solemn Declaration on the CSSDCA, and it was agreed that a Standing CSSDCA Conference would be established, to convene every two years during the Summit. Furthermore, review
meetings of senior officials were to take place in-between the biannual summit sessions.\textsuperscript{121} In preparation of the 2002 OAU/AU summit in Durban a number of experts meetings were held in December 2001 (in South Africa) on the development and cooperation calabashes, and in May 2002 (in Ethiopia) on those on security and stability, and a “unit” was created under the AU Secretariat to take care of CSSDCA matters.

The Memorandum of Understanding on the CSSDCA of July 2002\textsuperscript{122} listed a number of core values, which entailed the adoption of a very broad concept of security, reminiscent of (perhaps even inspired by) European and American academic literature, but also echoing the debate launched by the UNDP on human security:\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{quote}
Security as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that goes beyond military considerations and embraces all aspects of human existence, including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community and national life.
\end{quote}

It also acknowledged that “Good governance (...) is a pre-requisite for sustainable peace and security in Africa”; and it embraced interdependency and cooperative security theory with its formulation that “The security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole”. As a means to realise these values, the MOU envisaged “a collective continental architecture for promoting security and inter-African relations, that goes beyond the traditional military definition and embraces imperatives pertaining to human security, principles relating to good governance, the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights.” It further expressed the intention to strengthen capacities for conflict prevention and management, e.g. via the OAU “Mechanism” described above.

Under the heading of “key performance indicators” were included a number of more concrete objectives such as the signing of non-aggression pacts, the formulation of a common defence policy for Africa, stand-by arrangement for peace support operations, police collaboration, various initiatives to control the flow of small arms and light weapons, the establishment of national institutes for conflict prevention and management (with some involvement of non-government agencies), the establishment by 2005 of an operational early warning mechanism as well as a strengthening of confidence-building measures (CBMs). In the latter field, however, the MOU strayed quite far from the European model of CBMs (basically comprising transparency-enhance measures such as notification and invitation of observers to military manoeuvres).\textsuperscript{124} In the African version, a number of other activities were listed such as
annual border post activities, joint border patrols, joint border development and management, regular consultations amongst security agencies operating along the borders, joint training programmes for personnel operating at the borders, including workshops and seminars to educate them on regional and continental agreements on free movement of persons, goods and services and stabilising measures for localised crisis situations for inter-state relations.

The gist of these recommendations was formally confirmed at the Durban summit in 2002, but as with so many other African initiatives, it may be prudent to wait and see whether implementation will meet the expectations—which may well presuppose a continued commitment by the regional great powers, i.e. mainly Nigeria and South Africa.

3.3.3 Subsidiarity under the AU?
The principles of subsidiarity have not been formally codified by the AU, as they have by the EU (vide supra), but the relationship between the global, regional and subregional organisations still seem to be in the process of being worked out.

First of all, the AU pays due tribute to the subsidiarity principle “upwards” by acknowledging the supreme authority in matters of peace and security of the UN Security Council. As for the implications “downwards”, the matters are less clear. There are no references to the subregional organisations as instances of first resort, but they are rather referred to in AU documents as mere “implementing organs”, e.g. in the “Solemn Declaration an a Common African Defence and Security Policy” (art. 26). In the Protocol on the PSC the contribution of subregional mechanisms is duly acknowledged as is the “need to develop formal coordination and cooperation arrangements” between them and the AU’s PSC. Both documents are abounding with vague terms such as partnership, consultation, harmonisation and cooperation, but they contain little concrete in terms of divisions of labour and responsibilities—except for reference to MOUs on cooperation to be negotiated and signed.

More concrete plans have, however, been developed with regard to the aforementioned stand-by forces (ASF), where the fielding of five subregional (i.e. multinational) brigade-size on-call units as well as a standing brigade at the AU level are envisaged. The plans for their use—when or if they will ever be ready—seem to follow the subsidiarity principles quite closely, as they are envisioned to undertake the less time-critical missions whereas the AU brigade is supposed to be tasked with both swift deployment to intervene in an emergency and with filling possible gaps at the subregional level.
4. Subregional Organisations in Africa

Besides the above all-African regional organisations, sub-Saharan Africa is also host to a number of subregional organisations (see Table 5 above). Most of these are devoted to economic collaboration (but without any major significance in this field) and only three have so far had any noteworthy role to play in the field of conflict and security: ECOWAS in West Africa, SADC in Southern Africa and, to a much more limited extent, IGAD in the Horn of Africa.

4.1 ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 as a vehicle for economic collaboration, but it has increasingly become involved in conflict management. As early as 1976 a treaty on “Non-Recourse to Aggression” was signed, followed in 1978 by a “Non-Aggression Protocol” and in 1981 by a “Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence.” Only in the 1990s, however, did ECOWAS embark on actual crisis management and resolution, and then without the privilege of being able to put the requisite institutions in place at a leisurely pace before going into action. Rather, the organisation was forced to improvise and “muddle through” as best it could, driven by events on the ground.

What spurred this development was the effective break-down of the state in Liberia in 1990, following the attack by Charles Taylor’s NPFL guerrillas, which threatened to destabilise the region as a whole. These events occurred immediately after the inauguration of the Standing Mediation Commission, which undertook a couple of (fairly unsuccessful) missions to the collapsing member state. The obvious need for something more “robust” led to the creation of a subregional peacekeeping force, euphemistically labelled ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which was deployed to Liberia in August 1990 with the task of defending the incumbent regime of Samuel Doe. Since then, ECOMOG forces have also been deployed to neighbouring Sierra Leone in 1998 after the overthrow of elected president Kabbah. Both deployments were arguably reasonably successful, and the performance of the ECOMOG forces largely satisfactory, even though their achievements have not been tantamount to conflict resolution.

ECOWAS subsequently deployed a small peacekeeping operation in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-99, which ended in failure. According to Adekeye Adebajo, this failure was partly due to the absence of Nigeria: “Lacking the regional Gulliver, the Lilliputian peacekeepers had to withdraw from Bissau by June 1999”. In late 2002, ECOMOG troops were deployed to Cote d’Ivoire to
monitor a ceasefire in the civil war that had been ravaging this country, and they were subsequently integrated with a UN mission in 2004. Something similar happened in Liberia when a peace agreement had been reached between then president Charles Taylor and the rebels, which ECOMOG assumed responsibility for monitoring until its forces were converted into a UN mission less than a month later.  

The deployments have been accompanied by a strengthening of the structural framework, e.g. in the form of an Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAFC) with a joint commander and the establishment of a Defence Council. ECOWAS has also taken steps (at the summit meeting in Lomé in 1997) to create an early warning and conflict resolution mechanism, including plans for an early warning centre, to which should be added the establishment of a Mediation and Security Council. Most of these plans, however, remain to be implemented and their practical consequences have been minor. For instance, ECOWAS proved unable to prevent the crises in Guinea Bissau in 1998-99 or in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999/2000.  

In 1993 the Treaty of ECOWAS was amended (24 July) to accommodate a number of innovative measures in the field of peace and security. The preamble thus spoke of “integration” pointing forwards to an economic union. Under the fundamental principles (art. 4) were listed, among others, the equality of states, solidarity and collective self-reliance, non-aggression, maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, promotion and protection of human rights and democracy. In art. 59 on regional security, it was stated that member states

(2) (…) undertake to co-operate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State conflicts, paying particular regard to the need to:

a) maintain periodic and regular consultations between national border administration authorities; b) establish local or national joint commissions to examine any problems encountered in relations between neighbouring States; (…) c) employ where appropriate, good offices, conciliation, meditation and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes; f) establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate;

ECOWAS now has a fairly elaborate organisational structure, featuring the following main bodies: An Authority of Heads of States and Government, a Council of Ministers, a Community Parliament (inaugurated in 2000), an Economic and Social Council, a Community Court of Justice, an Executive Secretariat and a Fund for Cooperation Compensation and Development. To these have been added various specialised bodies such as a Mediation and
Security Council. At the summit in Lomé (10 December 1999) a protocol was adopted concerning the “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security”. This body is responsible for “collective security and peace” (art. 1) and tasked with the promotion of democracy (art. 2) and the prevention, management and resolution of both internal and international conflicts (art. 3) and well as the furthering of cooperation with regard to conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping, control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines. It envisaged the constitution and deployment of “a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the subregion, whenever the need arises”. The Mechanism features the following institutions (art. 4):

- An Authority of Heads of State and Government (art. 5)
- A Mediation and Security Council comprising seven elected member states plus the current chairman of the Authority and his predecessor. Decisions are to be taken by a two-thirds majority and might entail mandates for forceful interventions (art. 8-10)
- An Executive Secretariat tasked with fact-finding, mediation and similar activities (art. 15)

A number of organs were further established to assist the Mediation and Security Council (art 15), including a Defence and Security Commission, comprising the chiefs of staff and other military and civilian personnel (art. 18-19), a Council of Elders consisting of “eminent personalities” who should be available for mediation and similar tasks, and the aforementioned ECOMOG. It was described as “several stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment” (art. 21-22) and charged with military tasks ranging from observation to peacekeeping and even humanitarian intervention as well as what are rightly civilian tasks such as policing—a very tall order, indeed. For this purpose it was further decided to create “composite stand-by units” for ECOMOG and to develop common training programmes and instruction manuals (art. 28-30).

A subregional peace and security observation system known as the Early Warning System was further established (Art. 22-24) consisting of an Observation and Monitoring Centre located at the secretariat and in charge of data collection and analysis on behalf of the Executive Secretariat (art., 23) as well as four “observation and monitoring zones” tasked with data collection (art. 24)

The Mechanism is to be applied (art. 25) in cases of external aggression and conflicts between member states as well as in cases of internal conflicts insofar as they either “threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster” and pose serious threats subregional peace and security and in the case of successful or attempted coups against democratically elected governments. The protocol further
envisaged “a graduated strategy for building peace” including such activities as the supervision of elections and general support the development of democratic institutions (art. 42), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, also for child soldiers (art. 44) and measures to control the flow of small arms (art. 50-51).

It is obviously easier to sign agreements than to implement them, but the implementation of these various measures does seem to be proceeding fairly smoothly. The Mediation and Security Council was thus inaugurated on the 15th of May 2000, the Council of Elders has held its inaugural meeting, and a peace fund has been created, intended to allow for a swift response to crises, but critically dependent on contributions from donors.

Even though ECOWAS is far from flawless, its track record is thus quite impressive. What may make support for it particularly attractive to the donor community (i.e. the West) is that its activities come cheap. For instance, whereas the cost of each UN soldier forces in Liberia was $500,000 p.a., that of UNOMOG troops was a mere $30,406. Perhaps even more importantly, ECOMOG forces have proven to be far less casualty-scared than, say, those of the United States or other western powers. The Nigerian casualty toll in Liberia and Sierra Leone has thus been estimated at nearly one thousand, but whereas the USA “ran away” from Somalia after having lost a mere eighteen troops and the Belgians from Rwanda after losing ten, Nigeria remained in place.

The greatest weakness of ECOWAS may be its critical dependency on the contribution of Nigeria, both in military and other terms, and the accompanying suspicions that the organisation is little more than a convenient multilateral framework for Nigerian interventions. The deployments have all placed severe strains on the capacity of the smaller member states, and there is little reason to expect this to change. Some of these forces, and especially those of Ghana, do however have a long experience with peacekeeping missions (mainly under UN auspices) which may partly make up for their modest numbers.

Nigeria’s position may thus be a rather clear case of hegemony, albeit not really in the usual derogatory sense of the term, more on which in the concluding section. Even though Nigeria’s commitment to ECOWAS appears firm, the democratic form of government may not really help in this respect. It was easier for a military dictator like Abacha to dispatch troops to foreign countries and have their corpses sent home in body-bags than it may be for a democratically elected president such as Obasanjo, who is dependent on the consent of the electorate. It may thus require a lot of genuine leadership to achieve this consent of the population to sacrifice the lives of citizens to save strangers. By the time of writing in October 2004, the issue did not
appear to have surfaced in Nigerian party politics, but it just may in the future, with potentially critical implications for ECOWAS as a whole.

Another potentially critical factor is the rivalry between the Anglo- and Francophone states in West Africa, which has been lurking beneath the surface all along. The present domestic turmoil in the Cote d’Ivoire has weakened the Francophone “bloc”, but it is conceivable that France might, at some stage decide to “pull some strings” within la Francophonie, which just might weaken Nigeria’s hegemonic position and thereby perhaps ECOWAS as such.

4.2 SADC

Until the early 1990s, the Southern African RSC clearly constituted a “conflict formation” or a “conflict system” as war was all too conceivable among members of the subregion, especially between South Africa and the rest (vide infra). Indeed several wars and other major armed conflicts did take place, some of which were of indigenous origins while others were by-products of the Cold War, i.e. “proxy wars”, in which the two superpowers supported opposing sides in a regional conflict as an alternative to fighting it out among themselves. This was, arguably, the case of the civil wars in Mozambique and, to an even greater extent, Angola.

Since the dismantling of the apartheid regime and the integration of South Africa into the subregion, however, war among the states comprising it has become increasingly unlikely, perhaps even inconceivable in the sense that war does not even figure as a contingency for national security planning. The subregion may thus constitute, or at least approach, the status of a “security community” (in the classical sense of Karl Deutsch) between the members of which war has become inconceivable.

Evidence of this is the steadily progressing institutionalisation of the subregion around the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It had its origins in the loose organisation of the Frontline States (FLS, collaborating against the apartheid regime in South Africa) and its economic counterpart, the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference, established in 1980), partly as a counterpart to the economic bloc forged around the apartheid state, SACU (Southern African Customs Union).

In 1992 SADC was launched and the new South Africa soon acceded to the organisation (1994). Among the stated objectives of SADC were some which may appear well-intended, but entirely unrealistic such as to “promote the interdependence and integration of our national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the Region” (preamble). The basic
principles included “the sovereign equality of all Member States; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and the peaceful settlement of disputes”, as formulated in the SADC Treaty (art. 4). The field of “politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security” was mentioned as one among several areas of cooperation (art. 21g).

The membership of SADC was gradually enlarged to include the DRC (after the fall from power of President Mobuto), Mauritius and the Seychelles (which left the organisation in 2004, mainly for economic reasons). Other states (e.g. Rwanda) have indicated their interest in joining, but so far SADC seems to have exhibited a slight preference for deepening over expansion, even though Madagascar joined in 2004.

The structure described in the treaty was quite elaborate, featuring the following main bodies: a Summit of Heads of State or Government, a Council of Ministers, various commissions, a Standing Committee of Officials, a Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary and a Tribunal (articles 9-16). This structure has been gradually been formalised, to some extent inspired by the OSCE and (to a lesser extent) the EU. In 2001 the treaty was amended, inter alia with a view to referring properly to the new African Union and to accommodating new offices, including “troikas” for the various bodies (vide infra)—an arrangement intended into ensure continuity by including the incumbent office-holder as well as his immediate predecessor and successor (art. 9A). Moreover, amendments have regulated (in art. 10A) the structure, competences and objectives of the “Organ on Politics, Defence and Security” (OPDS, often referred to as “the Organ”).

The Organ been established by the SADC summit of 1996, but had initially enjoyed a curious special status—also because its first chairman was Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, who obstinately remained in office until 2001 even though the chairmanship was supposed to have rotated on an annual basis. Among the institutions of the Organ was the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)—a left-over from the FLS, established as early as 1975. In 2001, however, the Organ itself was subsumed directly under SADC, and its members were stipulated as the respective ministers for foreign affairs, defence and public or state security. It now has two subordinate bodies, i.e. the ISDSC, comprising the ministers of defence and of state or public security and the ISPDC, consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs.

Among the objectives of the Organ, as stipulated in the 2001 Summit’s “Protocol on Politics, Security and Defence Cooperation” (art. 2), are the following:
a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, interstate conflict and aggression; (…)

d) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;

e) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;

f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;

g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices (…) and encourage the observance of universal human rights (…);

h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;

i) develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to address:

(i) cross border crime; and

(ii) promote a community based approach to domestic security; (…)

k) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations (…)

The methods envisaged to further these goals (art. 3) include preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication, as well as the establishment of an early warning system, but the Summit may also resort to enforcement action, albeit only as a matter of last resort and only with the authorization of the UN Security Council. It was further envisaged to establish collective security arrangements under the auspices of a Mutual Defence Pact.¹⁶³

SADC has also taken some steps to address the serious problem of small arms proliferation in the region—partly as a legacy of the end of the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique—e.g. with a “Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials”.¹⁶⁴ The military activities have, likewise, been expanded, mainly in the form of training for peacekeeping activities, (e.g. at the now defunct Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, RPTC, in Harare),¹⁶⁵ towards which end a couple of military exercises have also been conducted, including the “Blue Hungwe” and the “Blue Crane”.¹⁶⁶

More controversially, two military deployments have taken place, ostensibly under the auspices of SADC. First of all, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia became militarily involved in the DRC, i.e.
in what was formally speaking a text-book collective defence operation intended to protect a member state against aggression from Rwanda and Uganda. However, the deployment only received a SADC mandate *ex post facto*, and the intervention has been highly controversial, both with regard to the accomplishments, costs and the underlying motivations, as it seems that Angola was mainly driven by national security concerns related to UNITA operations out of the DRC, and Zimbabwe by the desire to exploit Congolese natural resources. Secondly, South Africa and Botswana launched a singularly ill-fated intervention in Lesotho in 1998, which likewise received a SADC mandate, but only after the fact.

Besides providing forces for peacekeeping activities, SADC is officially committed to function as a collective defence organisation. In 2003 a Mutual Defence Pact was thus signed, including an apparently NATO-inspired (and similarly vaguely formulated) collective defence clause in article six:

1. An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action.
2. Collective action shall be mandated by Summit on the recommendation of the Organ.
3. Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate.

More concretely, the Pact (in art. 9) envisions collaboration in military training and joint exercises, yet without entailing any binding commitments on the signatories. It further refers to joint research and development (R&D) and production of military equipment. Considering that the only state in the region with any significant arms industry is South Africa, this clause may be almost tantamount to an invitation to purchase South African weaponry.

Generally, SADC is hampered by the apparent rivalry between South Africa and the rest, based on the fact that the RSA possesses all the wherewithal of hegemony (both in military, political, economic, demographic, and geographic terms) or even regional unipolarity (see Table 7). It thus seems unlikely that the other states in SADC will be able to field any major military operations without the participation of the RSA—in analogy with the situation of Nigeria in West Africa. While other states may be uncomfortable with the prospects of such hegemony, the most outspoken among the opponents of South African hegemony has been Zimbabwe. The ongoing
crisis in this country has obviously weakened the standing of the Mugabe government and, by implication, the anti-South African “bloc”.

Table 7: SADC Countries compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Populat. (000)</th>
<th>GDP (Bill. US$)</th>
<th>MILEX (Mil. USD$)</th>
<th>Troops (000)</th>
<th>MBT</th>
<th>AIFV/APC</th>
<th>Artil.</th>
<th>Cbt. Ac.</th>
<th>Arm. hel.</th>
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<td>10.1</td>
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<td>107.5</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>600,370</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>53,625</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>30,355</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>553.9</td>
<td>3,961.0</td>
<td>353.7</td>
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<td>4171</td>
<td>1,274</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA/Total (%)</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Generally, the RSA has been mindful of the problem and gone out of its way to allay such concerns, but the facts remain. The field in which the South African dominance is most pronounced may be that of the economy, where all the other SADC member states are far more dependent on South Africa than vice versa. While all of Africa only accounts for three percent of South Africa’s imports and fourteen percent of its exports, its share of the imports by other SADC member states is much larger, ranging from ten percent in Angola, through 35, 41, 43 and 55 percent in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia to 77, 80, 84 and 90 percent in Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho, respectively. SADC developments thus seem promising, but very much dependent on South Africa’s continued commitment to the organisation and the acceptance by the other members of its role as benevolent hegemon and primus inter pares.

4.3 IGAD

Several competing schemes for subregionalism in the Horn of Africa have, at various stages, popped up, including that of a idea of “Red Sea Federation”, comprising Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Somalia, yet none of them had made much headway.
The Horn does, however, feature one subregional organisation, namely the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. It was founded in 1996 on the basis of IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification) which had been launched in 1986. Its membership comprises Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan and (since its independence in 1993) Eritrea. Its central organs are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat, which is located in Djibouti and headed by an Executive Secretary. As all other subregional organisations in Africa, IGAD is based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all member states and non-interference in their internal affairs (art. 6A), yet with the option (which may be mainly theoretical) of taking decisions through qualified (two thirds) majority in the Council of Ministers (art. 10.5).

Even though the main objectives of IGAD were initially economic and included the fostering of “comprehensive cooperation” as a path to economic integration, article seven of the IGAD Agreement also highlighted the goals to “promote peace and stability in the subregion and create mechanisms within the subregion for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue” and to “facilitate repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees and displaced persons and demobilized soldiers” (art. 13A.S). The agreement also obliges member states to deal with disputes “within this subregional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organisations” (art. 18A).

In conformity with these lofty goals, IGAD has embarked on the implementation of a five point programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management, launched in 1998. At the Khartoum summit in 2000, the establishment of the “mechanisms in the IGAD subregion for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts” was endorsed. At the subsequent summit meeting in January 2002, an elaborate protocol was adopted on the “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States” (CEWARN). CEWARN is very ambitiously intended for both early warning and response (art. 5.1). However, in actual fact it seems to entail little more than an enhanced exchange of information, including the establishment of various databases (art. 7.4) on the basis of which the intention is to “develop case scenarios and formulate options for response” (Annex I.1.c). In addition to the central mechanism, the intention is to also establish national units and to liaise with NGOs and civil society organisations involved in the gathering of information (art. 12.1.b).

Under the auspices of the Political and Humanitarian Affairs Section a number of programmes have also been initiated with a potential impact on peace and security issues. However, few (if
any) had actually commenced by the time of writing in December 2004: A disaster risk management capability, a pilot programme for the reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees, internally displaced persons and affected host communities, an assessment of the capacities for conflict prevention, management and resolution in the IGAD subregion, training of the IGAD Secretariat and national ministries in conflict prevention, management and resolution, initiatives to curtail illicit trafficking of small arms and for mine clearance and mine victims assistance. In the spring of 2004, moreover, decisions were taken to form an Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) as one of the building blocks of the African Stand-by Force described under the AU, and the first meeting of defence ministers took place in July 2004. However, it remains to be seen whether the brigade will actually materialise, and whether it will be an IGAD project. Even though the meetings have taken place under the auspices of IGAD, participants have also included Rwanda and (the new SADC member) Madagascar, whereas neither Somalia nor Eritrea have attended.

IGAD has for quite some time been active, albeit not entirely successful, in the Sudan and the Somali peace processes. As far as the former is concerned, IGAD has, inter alia, established a permanent secretariat for the Sudan peace process (located in Nairobi), appointed special envoys and hosted negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLM. The main achievement in this respect has been the signing (20 July 2002) of the Machakos Protocol, which still seems to hold some promise for a lasting resolution of the conflict. Since then a series of agreements have been reached on the following outstanding issues: the structure of government (18 November 2002), the cessation of hostilities (4 February 2003), the general principles of power and wealth sharing (6 February 2003), security issues during the interim period (25 September 2003), power sharing (26 May 2004) and the special problems of Abyei (26 May 2004) and the Southern Kordofan, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile (26 May 2004), followed in June 2004 by an “agreement on agreements”, confirming the previous protocols and committing the parties to continue. However impressive this sequence may appear, it must be added that IGAD had (by December 2004 at least) done nothing to address the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region, leaving this to the AU.

As for Somalia, various mediation efforts have been undertaken by IGAD, mostly intended to somehow create unity among the rivalling clans and factions around the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was “elected” by the Arta conference in Djibouti in 2000, attended by two thousand delegates. This so-called “Eldoret process” began with a gathering of Somali political leaders in October 2002 in Kenyan town Eldoret, under the auspices of IGAD. On the 7th of October the Eldoret Declaration on “Cessation of Hostilities and the Structure and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process” was adopted. Besides a cease-fire
(which was almost immediately violated) it entailed agreement on the basics of a new federal constitution entailing considerable devolution of power to inclusive and representative local and regional political structures; and an invitation to the international community to monitor the process. Subsequently, the signatories reconstituted themselves as a “Leaders’ Committee”. One of the problems was, however, that the follow-up conference in Eldoret became chaotic, both because of disagreement between the Leaders’ Committee and the “Somali Advisory Group” which had also been appointed, and because of the huge turn-up for the conference.

In 2003, the process was continued, now under the leadership of the new IGAD envoy, Kenyan Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, and relocated to Mbagathi outside Nairobi. By then, however, what had begun as a promising process had, according to the International Crisis Group, evolved toward “an unimaginative ‘cake-cutting’ exercise in power-sharing by an un-elected and only partially representative political elite that threatens to repeat the history of earlier failed initiatives”. Regional rivalry between, on the one side, Ethiopia, sponsoring the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC) and, on the other side, Djibouti and various Arab countries, supporting the TNG, did not help at all. By the summer of 2004, however, a parliament had been appointed (rather than elected) which had selected the former warlord and leader of the semi-autonomous Puntland region, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed president of Somalia. Whether he will ever move the site of his “government” from Kenya to Somalia was by the time of writing still unclear.

Because of the lack of resources within the subregion, the IGAD countries depend on external support, for which purpose an “IGAD Partners Forum” has been established on the basis of the previous “Friends of IGAD”. Besides this potential weakness, the main obstacle to a strong organisation in the Horn of Africa, for which the need is so obvious, is the rather intense hostility between several members (e.g. Ethiopia-Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan-Uganda) and the absence of any obvious leader. Even though Ethiopia might seem the obvious candidate for this role, its legitimacy would be questioned by too many of the other members for it to be able to command consent.

### 4.4 OTHER SUBREGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Besides SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD a number of other subregional organisations in Africa have either stated ambitions to play a role with regard to conflicts or actual activities in this domain, including COMESA and ECCAS.
4.4 COMESA

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, COMESA (not to be confused with COMESSA, i.e. the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States, also known as CEN-SAD) was founded in 1993 as a successor to a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), and formally came into being the following year. The members include the Great Lakes countries Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, countries of the Horn such as Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, the present, former or future SADC members Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe—but significantly neither South Africa nor Botswana or Lesotho (which are members of SACU, vide supra)—and two otherwise unattached countries, Egypt and the Comoros.

The main objective of the organisation is the create a customs union as a first step towards regional economic integration, but COMESA also has ambitions to play a role in conflict and security matters, inter alia to “to cooperate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among the Member States in order to enhance economic development in the region,” as it was stated in the COMESA Treaty (art. 3d), which also committed the members to “foster and maintain an atmosphere that is conducive to peace and security through co-operation and consultations on issues pertaining to peace and security of the Member States with a view to preventing, better managing and resolving inter-State or intra-State conflicts” (art. 163).

In its programmatic document, Vision and Strategy, the link between economic and conflicts was spelled out in terms reminiscent of those used about the European Union in the 1950s.

COMESA recognises that without peace and security, there can not be meaningful development. But we also know that most of the military conflicts in the region have economic roots, i.e. access to, and sharing of economic resources. COMESA’s approach to the issues of wars is three-fold: first, it will concentrate on creating an environment that enables trade and investment to take place, and one that creates more opportunities for interaction, co-operation and integration. This will in turn not only provide opportunities for economic growth, but will also create a greater awareness oneness, thus diminishing incidences of conflict.

After a meeting of COMESA’s Intergovernmental Committee in November 1999 in Lusaka, the Secretariat commissioned a study on how to involve COMESA more directly in efforts to secure peace and rebuild war-torn economies in the subregion (if so it is). In March 2000, a decision was taken to develop a legal framework on peace and security and on a three-tiered structure composed of heads of state and government, ministers of foreign affairs; and a Committee on
Peace and Security.202 A meeting of this Peace and Security Committee was planned for the 2-3 June 2004 in preparation of the summit scheduled for 9 June, but the results have not been made public. Instead, the Summit communiqué urged Member States (sic!) to set up a mechanism for sharing information for the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region, which made very little sense indeed, as this is surely a task for the organisation as such.

At a meeting of the COMESA Foreign Ministers in Lusaka in April 2001 it was agreed to prioritise the control of the proliferation of small and light weapons, the campaign against landmines, and the control of arms sales, and at a subsequent meeting in May 2002, agreement was reached on tasking national parliaments to promote “a culture of peace and security”, e.g. by strengthening the accountability of governments in these matters. However significant this may all sound, very little has actually been implemented.

4.4.2 ECCAS

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in 1983 on the basis of two smaller economic organisations, UDEAC (Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale) and GEPGL (Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs) plus Sao Tomé and Principe. The members are Angola (which had merely observer status until 1999), Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tomé and Principe.203

According to its founding treaty ECCAS was mainly intended to create a customs union, but the organisation was (on paper) given a rather elaborate organisational structure, the main bodies being a Conference of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice, a General Secretariat and a Consultative Commission, in addition to which the establishment of a number of technical committees was envisioned (art. 7).204 However, ECCAS was almost completely dormant until 1999, when efforts were undertaken to resuscitate the organisation, e.g. with the addition of a parliamentarians forum in 2002. In February 2000 it adopted a “Mutual Assistance Pact,”205 apparently inspired by NATO and formally committing member states to come to each other’s assistance in the case of aggression from non-members (articles 2 and 3) and to prepare for this through joint military manoeuvres (art. 5.2). Decisions to activate these steps should preferably be taken by consensus, but might also be taken with a two-thirds majority (art. 7). The 2000 meeting also adopted a protocol on the establishment of a “Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa” (COPAX), which underlined sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs as the guiding principles (art. 3), but which also mentioned the need for, e.g., CBMs and common approaches to such problems as refugees and internally displaced persons as well as transnational crime and arms trafficking (art. 4).206 Out of this have
sprung decisions (in June 2002) to establish a “Defence and Security Commission” (DSC), a Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) and an early warning mechanism (MARAC), standing orders for all of which have been adopted.

- The DSC is described (in art. 1) as an advisory organ consisting of (representatives of) the chiefs or staff and police chiefs plus experts from the ministries of the interior, defence and foreign affairs and other ministries, when appropriate.207
- FOMAC is described as consisting of “interservice, police, gendarmerie contingents and of civilian modules” (art. 1) with the size of up to three brigades with appropriate naval and air support (art. 5)—but with a light brigade of 1600 troops as the immediate objective—and to undertake missions such as observation and cease-fire monitoring, preventing deployment, peacekeeping, enforcement of sanction and even humanitarian intervention (art. 2), both on behalf of ECCAS, the OAU/AU) and the UN (art. 8).208
- MARAC is supposed to be responsible for data collection and analysis about impending crises and conflicts (art. 1), to be gathered by national bureaus and collated in a central data base.209

This rather elaborate organisational structure notwithstanding, it remains to be seen whether anything tangible will come out of these decisions. By the time of writing there was nothing to indicate this.

4.4.3 Miscellaneous

Besides COMESA and ECCAS with possible prospects of playing a role, the African continent is also host to several other organisations with stated ambitions of playing a role in the field of peace and security, but with very dubious prospects of actually doing so.

- The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was founded in 1989 and comprises Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, but significantly not Egypt.210 Even though its founding treaty211 mentions the objective of “contributing to the preservation of the peace based on justice and equity ” (art. 2), the AMU has not really made any contribution to this—in fact the organisation has been almost moribund since its creation. A decision was taken in 1999 to relaunch the AMU,212 but not much has come out of this. The main reason for this is probably the never-ending dispute between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara (Sahrawi). An indication of the problems of AMU was the postponement sine die of the summit scheduled for December 2003, both because of this rivalry and due to a Mauritanian-Libyan dispute, the former accusing the latter of supporting an attempted coup.213 It also did not help forge a sense of unity within the organisation that Libya
decided to withdraw from the Arab League. The only factor which may warrant some cautious optimism about the future of the AMU is thus the apparent wish of the European Union (and to a lesser degree NATO) to create some unity, manifested *inter alia* in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue process.

- The East African Community, EAC, comprises Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. In 1998, it adopted a Memorandum of Understanding on defence matters, but this has yet to show any practical significance.

- The Non-Aggression and Defence Agreement (ANAD) was established in 1977 and comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. However, it remained dormant until 1996, when a decision was taken to reinvigorate it. In 1999 decisions were taken to set up a peace force and an intervention fund, but no steps seem to have been taken to implement this decision.

- The Entente Council includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and Togo, but does not seem to play any significant role.

- The Mano River Union (MRU) comprises Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, but throughout the 1990s it was completely inactive because of the intense conflict involving the two former. In 2000, however, attempts were made to revitalise it, e.g. with a decision to set up a joint security commission, yet without much actual progress being achieved. At a meeting of the foreign ministers in August 2001 it was decided to convene a summit to decide on CBMs and the like, and an agreement has been reached on joint border controls and confidence-building units as well as on a ten-year action plan for, *inter alia*, demobilisation of child soldiers and repatriation of refugees. However, the only recorded step towards implementation has been a deployment of Guinean troops along the border with Liberia as well as some plans for the creation of safe corridors for refugee repatriation.

### 4.5 ASSESSMENT: VARIABLE GEOMETRY OR CONFUSION?

There are thus a number of subregional organisations in Africa which might, at least in principle, serve as instances of first resort for the prevention, management or resolution of conflicts on the continent. Moreover, there seem to be a willingness to streamline the relations between these various subregional (or even smaller) organisations and the AU. This allows for a degree of optimism, as what we see emerging may prove to be a fruitful form of “variable geometry” rather than a “quilt” that might provide numerous loopholes and allow for buck-passing—like what we saw in Europe in the handling of, for instance, the Yugoslav succession wars, where it was not clear whether this was the responsibility of the UN, NATO, the EU or the OSCE.
Variable geometry might hold some attractions if it were to facilitate, for instance, the use by the AU of Arab troops provided by members of the AMU to peacekeeping forces in the Sudan (e.g. in Darfur) to serve alongside non-Arab troops provided by IGAD member states, so as to inspire confidence with both the local rebel movements (SLA and JEM) and the government in Khartoum. However, when the available resources are scarce and there are few benefits to be gained from becoming involved in conflicts such as that in Darfur, overlapping memberships of subregional organisations may also make it all too tempting for everybody to avoid engagement by claiming that the responsibility belongs somewhere else. Moreover, if the envisaged subregional brigades envisaged by the AU are ever to become a reality, they will have to be based on well-defined subregional organisations with fixed memberships, as it would surely be a recipe for confusion to have, for instance, Tanzanian troops “double-hatted” to serve both in an East African and a Southern African brigade.

5. Conclusion: Obstacles and Opportunities

It seems that the main problems with African regionalism in the field of security stem from a combined lack of resources and commitment. Not only do member states of regional and subregional organisations lack the political, economic and not least military means to contribute to the organisation, e.g. for peacekeeping operations; they also tend to succumb to the same temptations to free-ride as do states elsewhere in the world.

5.1 MAKING THE BEST OF HEGEMONY

It also seems that those subregional organisations which function best, i.e. ECOWAS and SADC do so thanks to the commitment of their dominant powers, i.e. Nigeria and South Africa, respectively—whereas the lack of strong subregional hegemons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa may go some way towards explaining that the absence of strong organisations. If this holds true, quite a strong case can be made in favour of subregional hegemony. Several variants of the general hegemonic stability theory have been suggested, which may prove relevant for the analysis of Africa.
What one might call “subaltern hegemony” is based on what has been called “sub-hegemons” or even “sub-imperialists”. During the Cold War, the two superpowers (and especially the United States under the “Nixon Doctrine”) supported regional and subregional great powers, e.g. with generous arms supplies in the understanding that they would uphold “order” (as defined by the superpower) in their respective subregions. This would surely have very little attraction to any African states today.

Shared hegemony by two great powers has been labelled “bigemony”. Even though the term was originally applied to the United States and Japan for Asia, it might also be applicable to a shared hegemony of Nigeria and South Africa on the African continent. Not only do both play a certain hegemonic role in their respective subregions, but they also seem increasingly inclined to collaborate with each other, e.g. within the African Union, in providing both leadership and resources.

“Cooperative hegemony” might be defined as a grand strategy and a type of regional order based on “soft rule within and through co-operative arrangements”. This would supposedly be an appealing strategy to major powers exhibiting deficiencies in one or several respects, e.g. by “only” excelling in “soft power” as is arguably the case of the European Union in Europe. However, it is not obvious which African state might fill this role, but the two “bigemons” could certainly emphasize soft over hard power.

Unfortunately, however, both soft and hard power preponderance tends to provoke resentment, as is obviously the case of both Nigeria and South Africa. As some South Africans have convincingly argued, their county has literally “bent over backwards” to allay their neighbours’ concerns, but to no avail. While this may well be frustrating there seems to be no alternative for the hegemons to continue taking deliberate steps to promote confidence among weaker neighbours in their own benevolence and concern for the common good, as opposed to their own national interests. This will require for the hegemons to strictly abide by the rules determined (mainly by themselves) for the entire group of countries, i.e. not succumbing to the temptations of (U.S.-style) “exceptionalism”; to systematically prefer multilateral action to unilateralism, even though the latter remains an option; and preferring non-military to military solutions to problems, whilst not shying away from the latter if necessary. Both Nigeria and South Africa seem at present to be aware of the pitfalls of preponderance and to do their utmost in the above respects. If they continue along this road, their shared leadership within the AU and their respective subregions bodes well for the future of peace and security in the continent.
5.2 WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM OUR FRIENDS: WESTERN SUPPORT?

One of the main problems, both for the would-be hegemons and smaller African states, is the mismatch between needs and capabilities. On the one hand, the number of violent conflicts in need of conflict prevention or management initiatives, including military peace support operations, is very high. On the other hand, the military capacities available for such operations remains inadequate. Fortunately, some assistance is likely to be available from the prosperous West.

The United States has thus created the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which has subsequently been renamed ACOTA (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance), providing training to military staff from a selected number of African states. France has launched RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix), and the UK has on several occasions dispatched British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs), which have now been subsumed under a larger “Global Conflict Prevention Pool”. Besides the great powers, a number of smaller states of the West (including the author’s home country, Denmark) have also provided some support, as has the European Union, most recently at the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting, Dublin, 1 April 2004. Perhaps even more importantly, at its meeting on Sea Island, 10 June 2004, the G8 launched a “G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations”, entailing a commitment to “train and, where appropriate, equip a total of approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010”, a good part of which will surely be Africans. All this is a poor substitute for the actual involvement to which these countries are both legally and morally obliged, but it is probably better than nothing.

6. Endnotes


2 “Provisional Consolidated Version of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (CIG 86/04). The formulation is “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level" (Title III: Union Competences, Art. I.9: Fundamental Principles, para 3).


12 Ibid., pp. 68 and 71.


Neumann, Iver B.: “Self and Other in International Relations”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 139-175. See also Lapid, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwill (eds.): *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).


The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, also known as West Sahara was recognised by most other African states and therefore granted representation in both the OAU and the AU. However, as Morocco lays claim to the territory, it neither recognises Sarawi nor accepts other states to do so, which explains why Morocco has neither joined the OAU nor the AU.


“Democratic Peace”


101 The structure of the PSC is illustrated in www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/sirte.pdf.

For a list of countries which had by that time ratified the protocol see www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/PSCratifi.pdf.


See Western European Union, Council of Ministers: Peterson Declaration (19 June 1002), at www.weu.int/documents/920619naen.pdf, Chapter II, art. 5.


See also Nieuwkerk, Anthoni van: “The Role of AU and NEPAD in Africa’s New Security Regime”, in Field (ed.): op. cit. (note 102), pp. 41-62.


At www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_upload/NEPAD_2dCORE_2dDOCUMENTS.

“The New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (October 2001), art. 73-74, at www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_upload/NEPAD_2dCORE_2dDOCUMENTS.

For an overview of the process see Deng, Francis M. & I. William Zartman: A Strategic Vision for Africa. The Kampala Movement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002). One of the authors of which (Deng) was also a central participant in the process and an appointee of Obasanjo to head the ALF, and is thus not exactly unbiased.


130 www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/13ProtMutualDefAss.pdf.


162 Isaksen & Tjønneland: op. cit. (note 159), pp. 15-16. See also the chart at www.sadc.int/english/about/organogram.html.


166 Berman and Sams: op. cit. (note 75), pp. 169-172.


See “Operational Structure of IGAD” at www.igad.org/about/op.html.


On the establishment of a CEWERU in Eritrea see IGAD News, no. 11 (February 2004), p. 5.


See “Political and Humanitarian Affairs Section”, at www.igad.org/sectors/ph/.


www.igad.org/pressroom/agreement.doc.


www.igad.org/pressroom/RESOLUTION%20OF%20SOUTHERN%20KORDOFAN%20-%.

See above, note 110.


See “Joint Communiqué Issued by the IGAD Special Summit on Somalia, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 October 2004”, at www.igad.org/pressroom/special_summit_on_somalia_communque.pdf.

The members of the IPF are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA as well as the European Community, the UNDP and the World Bank. See “IGAD Partners Forum”, at www.igad.org/partners/; and the interview with the IPF chairman, Guido La Tella, in IGAD News, no. 3-4 (July-August/September-October 2002), pp. 6-7.


Berman and Sams: op. cit. (note 75), pp. 198-201.


231 Available at www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/peace.html.