Trilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Expectations and Limitations

A conference report of the ROK-Japan-US Trilateral Young Leaders Dialogue
Edited by Julia Cunico, Brad Glosserman, and John K. Warden

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Julia Cunico
Director, Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program
Introduction

The US-Japan and US-ROK alliances are, and for decades have been, a cornerstone of Asia-Pacific security, helping to maintain regional stability while allowing Japan and Korea to focus on economic development. A key part of the US relationship with each country is extended deterrence. Through legal and political obligations, the United States says that an attack on either ally will be treated as an attack on the United States and met with an appropriate military response, possibly even with nuclear weapons. For the United States, the key challenge is ensuring that allies are sufficiently assured without unnecessarily provoking potential adversaries.

At the Track II level, the Pacific Forum CSIS has worked to find ways for the United States to correctly tailor its assurance of Japan and South Korea. Over the last several years, the Pacific Forum CSIS has hosted separate bilateral US-Japan and US-ROK strategic dialogues, which have explored respective threat perceptions, strategic priorities, and defense policies. These Track II exchanges have helped to reduce misunderstanding, both among the participants and in their respective governments. Indeed, they set the groundwork for the Track I extended deterrence dialogues that the United States established with Japan and South Korea in 2010.

The Pacific Forum CSIS has also prided itself on including the next generation in these discussions. As part of the Young Leaders (YLs) program, young professionals have been able to observe and participate in both the US-Japan and the US-ROK strategic dialogues. Their participation provides two primary benefits. First, they offer a unique perspective that often contrasts with senior participants whose views are clouded by the Cold War. Second, they interact with and learn from senior participants, gleaning insight from their experience and expertise.

Official and unofficial bilateral dialogues have allowed the United States and its respective allies to make great strides in aligning expectations and policies but work remains. US interests in Northeast Asia require Washington to encourage its allies to participate in trilateral cooperation. Facing a stronger, more assertive China and a more provocative, less predictable North Korea, security and foreign policy professionals in the three countries recognize the importance of greater trilateral security cooperation. Yet, they remain dissatisfied because serious political and emotional hurdles remain.

Recognizing the importance of Northeast Asian trilateralism and the obstacles that remain, the Pacific Forum CSIS with support from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in 2013 established a US-ROK-Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue. The meetings have brought together experts and officials to explore the benefits of trilateral cooperation, the obstacles that remain, and potential strategies for improving Japan-Korea relations.

In addition to substantive dialogue, the participants at the most recent meeting, which took place in Maui on July 23-24, 2014, took part in a two-stage tabletop exercise (TTX),
which was designed to test how each of the three countries would respond to a “gray zone” provocation by North Korea. Stage one began with North Korea sinking a Japanese vessel amid increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Stage two started with a US-Japan retaliatory strike against a North Korean naval base, followed by a North Korean artillery barrage against isolated South Korean farmland (with several civilian casualties) and a North Korean nuclear detonation over the Sea of Japan/East Sea (with no casualties). In each stage, teams of US, Japan, and ROK nationals conferred and offered recommendations for how their country should respond.

As in the bilateral discussions, the US-Japan-ROK dialogues also included next-generation participants. 17 Pacific Forum YLs observed the discussions and then participated in the TTX. Rather than being divided into country groups, the YLs formed a single team that recommended actions for all three governments in each stage of the exercise. The YL team functioned as a control group whose recommendations could be compared to senior participants to identify generational differences. On many issues the perspectives of the generations converged, but, in general, the senior teams were primarily focused on the need to re-establish deterrence by moving up the escalation ladder, while the YL team was relatively more concerned by the risk of escalation.

The Maui TTX was a success and offered important insights about the challenges and opportunities for trilateral cooperation in a potential crisis. It also showed the benefits that TTXs provide to next generation participants, challenging them to think through a difficult situation and adopt the perspective of government decision makers. As a result, the Pacific Forum encouraged the YLs who participated in the exercise to design their own crisis scenario, which would be run at a future YL event. In the weeks after the meeting, teams of YLs designed their own US-Japan-ROK crisis scenario and wrote background guides for the respective country teams.

Four months later, the Pacific Forum CSIS with support from the SKC Corporation held the 1st US-ROK-Japan Young Leaders Dialogue on November 12-14, 2014 in Seoul. Approximately 35 US, ROK, and Japanese next-generation experts and select senior advisers joined a two-day discussion of the ROK-Japan bilateral relationship and the US-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship. The conference also featured the table-top exercise that was designed by YLs who attended the senior-level dialogue in Maui.

The following is a summary of what the Pacific Forum CSIS hopes will be the first of many YL Asia-Pacific security dialogues. It includes conference materials, key findings, the TTX scenario and background guides, and information about the participants.
Overall Key Findings from the Conference and the Tabletop Exercise

By John K. Warden

All sides agreed that poor relations between Tokyo and Seoul are the biggest stumbling block to US-Japan-ROK cooperation. Until the bilateral relationship improves, trilateral cooperation between the three will remain limited.

Despite shared interests and values, the Japan-ROK relationship remains strained. Tensions were on full display in Seoul when a senior Japanese participant mentioned bilateral historical issues and elicited a heated and emotional response from a senior Korean participant.

Nonetheless, while polls show Japanese and Korean views of each other’s country are at historic lows, they also show that majorities want the relationship to improve.

The underlying desire for improved relations, however, may not last. The most significant long-term concern for the Japan-Korea relationship is deteriorating public sentiment. Both governments should better explain their policies toward the other. One way to facilitate understanding is to translate official websites and statements into the other’s language.

Policymakers and experts in both countries must ensure that enduring animosity is not passed on to the next generation. Increasing people-to-people exchanges between the two countries is one way to head off this future.

Most Japanese and Korean participants focused on creative ways to improve relations between their two countries while avoiding historical issues. For example, the United States, Japan, and Korea might pursue a trilateral information sharing agreement (in place of the failed Japan-Korea General Security of Military Information Agreement) to advance military cooperation in a way that would be more politically palatable in Seoul and Tokyo. Others suggested that Japan and Korea increase discussions about Korean unification.

Many participants stressed that Japanese and Korean leaders must, at a minimum, avoid enflaming public opinion.

2015, the 50th anniversary of the normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea, provides a unique opportunity to improve relations. Japanese participants noted that Prime Minister Abe is working on a statement and expressed optimism that his statement could help quell hard-line conservative voices in Japan. Korean and US participants were skeptical that a statement by Abe would markedly change public opinion in South Korea.
While Japanese and US participants understood the limited nature of Japan’s move toward exercising the right of collective self-defense, Korean participants voiced apprehension about Japan’s changing defense policy.

In addition to substantive dialogue, participants took part in a two-stage tabletop exercise (TTX). Move one began with the sinking of a Japanese merchant vessel in Busan Port. A North Korea-affiliated terrorist group took credit for the attack and levied additional threats against the US and South Korea, but there was some indication that the North Korean government was directly involved. Key findings from the TTX include:

During move one, the US, Japan, and South Korea were primarily concerned with dealing with the humanitarian consequences of the attack and gathering information. While each team raised their military to higher alert, none felt there was sufficient evidence to retaliate against North Korea.

The Japanese team offered South Korea all available capabilities for search and rescue, minesweeping, oil cleanup, and evaluation of the blast. South Korean and US participants were surprised by the Japan team’s deference; many thought that Japan would insist on more access to the site of the incident.

Unlike the senior TTX in Maui, each team recommended that their government communicate directly with North Korea, both to determine the extent of its involvement and to try to deescalate the crisis.

In move two, US and ROK intelligence sources confirmed that the North Korean government, not a terrorist organization, carried out the attack on the Japanese vessel using two submarines. Tensions between the two sides increased, and North Korea fired artillery shells near the Northern Limit Line, issued a nuclear threat against all three countries, and raised the alert of its nuclear forces. As the US and the ROK began military exercises, an ROK frigate hit a floating mine (with limited damage) and a Japanese destroyer, observing the exercise, received a direct hit from a torpedo (with 28 fatalities). A US destroyer detected and sank two DPRK submarines in the area. An hour later, four other DPRK submarines were identified in international waters en route to a DPRK submarine base.

Japan, South Korea, and the United States had difficulty coordinating a mutually satisfactory response due to differences in perceptions and expectations. The US team felt that the sinking of two DPRK submarines constituted proportional retaliation and was primary concerned with deescalating the situation. The South Korean team, similarly, did not think that the DPRK’s actions crossed a red line and sought patience before US retaliation. The Japanese team, by contrast, was unnerved by the reluctance of the US and ROK to support further retaliation.

The Japan team made clear that, even after a direct attack on its destroyer, Japan’s constitution would not permit Japanese retaliation because the attack could not be
interpreted as a precursor to an invasion of Japan. As a result, Japanese Self-Defense Forces would only be able to exercise *unit defense*, not *self defense*.

US and South Korean participants were shocked by Japan’s restraint. As a result, participants recommended that Japanese actors clearly communicate Japan’s intentions and restrictions to the US, ROK, and neighboring countries to reduce misperceptions and misunderstandings about Japan’s defense policies.

One critical difference between the TTXs in Maui and in Seoul was the balance between the merits of deterrence and the risk of escalation. Whereas many seniors focused on the need to reestablish deterrence by moving up the escalation ladder, the YLs, for the most part, found the risk of escalation more concerning. This difference, however, was likely driven as much by differences in professional backgrounds as by differences in age; the Maui meeting had far more deterrence specialists.

North Korea’s intentions and decision making calculus are opaque, which prevents the crafting of an effective, coordinated response to crises. Participants recommended greater focus on understanding North Korean perceptions and intentions.

*These findings provide a general summary of the discussion. While meeting participants contributed to this document, the views expressed are not necessarily endorsed by each participant. This is not a consensus document.*
Key Findings: Republic of Korea
By Jeongwon Hannah Choi, Na Hee Kim, Se Eun Yim, Sohee Kim, Min Jung Lee, and Hyeon Young Ro

During the tabletop exercise (TTX), there were two priorities for the Korea team. First, the team had to divine North Korea’s intentions for its aggressive action and examine the consequent relationship between South Korea and North Korea. The team recognized that the relationship between the two Koreas would greatly depend on South Korea’s response to the incident. Therefore, ascertaining whether North Korea aimed to merely provoke the allies or instead was ready to start a war was the single most pressing issue. The ROK team also factored in the impact of the incident on Korean unification.

Second, the ROK team tried to balance each country’s role, responsibilities, and equities. In the TTX, many Japanese were killed or injured by North Korean actions; the ROK team was conscious of the need for Japan to protect its citizens and take appropriate measures toward North Korea. At the same time, however, the Korea team needed to secure the Korean Peninsula and its own sovereignty by preventing Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from entering South Korean territory. In addition, to ensure military preparedness, the South Korean team recognized the importance of good communications with the United States. However, the Korea team did not put much emphasis on approaching the SDF since Korea was not ready to cooperate with the Japanese military until Tokyo fully explains its legal interpretation of collective self-defense. As a result, the ROK team sought to work more closely with the US and other actors, such as the UN.

The Korea team was acutely aware of the huge economic and social impact such a contingency would have on Korea, which needed instant countermeasures to save lives and stop the environmental disaster; cooperation with the US and Japan was essential. We agreed that the investigation into the causes of the disaster needed to be conducted by an international group as occurred in the case of the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan. To promote such cooperation, the Korea team emphasized the role of the United Nations. First and foremost, however, the alliance between the US and ROK was critical to maintaining stability on the Korea Peninsula.

While the ROK team agreed that South Korea had to prevent a war, we were divided about whether to retaliate against North Korea. Some Korean participants worried that retaliation might trigger escalation, while others asserted that the right level of retaliation would bring about long term peace on the Korean Peninsula. One reason we had difficulty coming to agreement on this question was the failure of the three countries to create a single national security contingency plan. Here, the lack of information sharing between Korea, Japan, and the US may be critical. Since a trilateral intelligence exchange doesn’t exist among the three countries, reactions to the scenario were more restrained than expected as there was a fear of inadvertent escalation by another country/partner.
The most surprising fact for the ROK team was Japan’s legal interpretation of self-defense. To be clear: the ROK team is not talking about revision of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, but rather, the team is talking about the meaning of self-defense. Japan appealed to Korea and the US to act because Tokyo had few options given its legal constraints. Many Japanese YLs were not supportive of the Abe administration’s effort to revise the Constitution; most Koreans believe his agenda is widely supported, Yet, even as Japanese participants explained their legal interpretation of self-defense and that the purpose of the SDF is to protect Japanese territory and nationals, ROK concerns that the SDF would become an ordinary military and a potential threat to Korea because of the territorial dispute between Korea and Japan regarding the Dokdo Islands were not assuaged.

Koreans expected a more robust response from Japan to the sinking of its ship, including the deployment of the SDF. Instead, Tokyo asked the US to engage more actively, and expecting more aggressive action by South Korea, Japan was cautious when asking for South Korea’s permission to permit the SDF to be deployed. This was the most striking scene from the Korea team’s point of view.

The Korea team was also surprised by US reactions to the scenario. During the discussion, the US tried to remain neutral between Korea and Japan when dealing with historical issues. The US made clear that it would provide whole-hearted support for an ally if it was attacked. Yet, we were surprised to see disagreements between the US and Japan about the appropriate proportional response to the North Korean attack. While their differences reflected legal constraints and diplomatic approaches, the TTX showed that even countries that share information do not always agree on outcomes.

The most important lesson for the Korea team was the powerful negative impact of the absence of intelligence exchange. All three countries must share information to respond promptly to crises to protect their national interests.
Key Findings: Japan
By Rachel Ianacone, Yoshifumi Ide, Tomoko Kiyota, and Daichi Uchimura

During the tabletop exercise (TTX), in move one, Japan raised overall security awareness and emphasized an intention to cooperate with the United States (US) and Republic of Korea (ROK). For instance, Japan offered minesweeping capabilities to the ROK, while preparing for joint Combat Air Patrols with the US over Japan’s soil. Actions were also taken to secure the safety of Japanese commercial shipments and flights, and we offered environmental cleanup support and Search and Rescue assistance to the ROK.

When faced with sequential provocations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), behind closed doors, Japan gave the green light to the US to use their bases in Japan. The team decided on three phases of messages with China if the situation continued to escalate, with the final stage being a trilateral message (with the US and ROK) condemning the DPRK’s actions.

In move two, after the torpedo attack, Japan increased Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) patrols and prepared to defend around its mainland. The team concluded the attack fell into the so-called “Gray-Zone” legally, and therefore Tokyo could not take immediate military action. The team did reinstall economic sanctions on DPRK and recommended to the United Nations that other countries support the sanctions. The team expected that the US and ROK would act militarily against DRPK; the team saw Japan’s role as maintaining close coordination with the two countries and offering various assistance such as logistics, ISR, minesweeping, etc.

Due to Japan’s strict constitutional interpretation, the Japan team thought that Japan was prohibited from taking military action in this situation, since the incident did not occur on Japanese soil or in Japanese waters. We noted a significant misperception about the Japanese military’s ability to respond during the TTX. Therefore, all Japanese actors (government, academia, etc.), need to clearly communicate intentions and restrictions on Japanese action to the US, ROK, and neighboring countries to reduce misperceptions and misunderstandings.

This trilateral dialogue with Young Leaders brought a different perspective, in part because we are further removed from the historical issues that occurred during WWII. This difference was most apparent when an ROK senior leader participant got very emotional about the comfort women issue. The Young Leaders held a more mature conversation on these topics.

The security environment surrounding Japan has been changing rapidly since the end of the Cold War; the DPRK has been developing missile and nuclear weapons and China’s military development and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s aggressive actions near Japanese waters also worry Tokyo.
To deal with the new security environment, Japanese policy-makers must conduct comprehensive security policy reform, including revising article 9 of the constitution, as well as maintaining strong relations with the US. In addition, Tokyo must provide clear explanations to neighboring countries to avoid misunderstanding.
Key Findings: United States
By Kent Boydston, Lisa Collins, Daniel Foulkes, Zachary Hosford, Tom Le, James Platte, and Nate Walton

Discussions of the opportunities and challenges in trilateral relations between Japan, South Korea, and the United States focused on the difficulties in the Japan-South Korea bilateral relationship, with history disputes featuring prominently.

The United States has taken a more neutral position on these issues and encourages Japan and South Korea to resolve these issues bilaterally, while both Seoul and Tokyo look to Washington to engage more in resolving these disputes. This last point recurred throughout the tabletop exercise, as there was a significant misalignment of expectations of the role of the United States between the Japanese, South Korea, and US teams. Significantly, history and diplomatic disputes were not nearly as big an obstacle to trilateral cooperation as were misperceptions and misaligned expectations.

From the tabletop exercise, the key findings for the US team are:

While Japan, South Korea, and the United States agreed North Korea is a common threat/enemy, when faced with a North Korean provocation, the three countries had difficulty coordinating a mutually satisfactory response due to differences in perceptions and expectations.

The United States took a whole-of-government response to the North Korean provocations, with limited military action, increased economic sanctions, and UN Security Council action.

The United States expected Japan and South Korea to respond more promptly and with greater force.

Both Japan and South Korea expected the United States to take a leading role and strong military action against North Korea and put less value on non-military responses.

The United States was primarily concerned with de-escalation and consequence mitigation. Washington did not want to prompt further North Korea action or to draw China into a regional conflict.

The United States is more concerned with China’s position and potential response and overall regional security than Japan and South Korea

US policy makers must have a better understanding of Japan’s legal and operational constraints, as well as the impact of repeated North Korean provocations on South Korea’s military, politics, and society.
North Korea’s intentions and decision making calculus are not well known and presented a major obstacle to crafting an effective, coordinated response, and North Korea well used this opacity to its advantage. Greater focus must be placed on understanding North Korean perceptions and intentions in order to better formulate trilateral policy toward North Korea.

It is difficult to craft appropriate responses to North Korean actions that fall between small-level provocations and a coordinated war campaign. Japan, South Korea, and the United States must establish clearer policies toward North Korea at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to better deter and combat North Korean aggression.
Key Findings: Comparison between Maui and Seoul
By Akira Igata, Gibum Kim, Jonathan Miller, and Aiko Shimizu

The Seoul Young Leader trilateral meeting provided a natural follow up to the senior-level trilateral that was held in Maui in July 2014. As in Maui, all sides agreed that strained ties between Tokyo and Seoul are the biggest obstacle to enhanced trilateral cooperation. These strains were manifest in Seoul when a senior Japanese participant mentioned bilateral historical issues and elicited a heated and emotional response from a senior Korean participant. This exchange gave Young Leaders a close look at the powerful emotions that hinder cooperation. Young Leaders were nonplussed by this display, with the ensuing discussions focusing on forward-looking perspectives and areas for cooperation. Ill will between Seoul and Tokyo was identified as a chief obstacle for trilateral cooperation in Maui, but the Seoul conference had a more positive outlook about the prospects for ROK-Japan cooperation.

A critical difference between the two tabletop exercises was the two groups’ respective judgments about the merits of deterrence vs. the risk of escalation when faced with further provocations from North Korea. While seniors focused on deterrence by stepping up the escalation ladder to restrain North Korea from taking further actions, the Young Leaders thought that the risk of escalation outweighed the merits of deterrence and opted for a proportional response. In step two of the Seoul tabletop exercise (TTX), the key concern was whether the sinking of a North Korean submarine by the United States should be considered proportional to the North Korean attack on Korean and Japanese vessels. (It should be noted, however, that in the Seoul exercise, no country was unanimous in its conclusions.)

The TTX in Seoul was instrumental in alleviating some anxiety that Korean Young Leaders had about possible Japanese reactions. Some Koreans expected Japan to respond much more vigorously to North Korea’s sinking of a Japanese vessel. The Japan team argued that this scenario does not meet the three conditions that permit the “use of force” in self-defense according to the July 2014 Cabinet decision, thus obliging Japan to exercise restraint. Overall, there was hesitation among the three groups to take more action against North Korea and an expectation that each of the other countries would do more. This stemmed from two causes: a failure by some US and Korean Young Leaders to understand that Japan cannot make a large-scale attack unless there is a direct attack on Japanese territories that endangered Japanese nationals, and differences in how the groups interpreted the North Korean attack. Therefore, in both the senior and the Young Leader exercise, both Japanese groups exercised restraint in taking unilateral actions against North Korea and worked to utilize alliance mechanisms first.

In the Maui and Seoul simulations, participants agreed on: the need for better trilateral information sharing; the importance of aligning expectations during crises; the US role as a facilitator but not a mediator between South Korea and Japan; and the danger of political leaders exploiting national sentiments for domestic political gains. In contrast, while there was almost no attempt to communicate directly with the North Koreans...
during the senior exercise, Young Leaders tried to reach out more to Pyongyang. For example, the Japanese group said it would use communication channels between Japan and North Korea that are primarily for conversations regarding North Korean abduction of Japanese nationals to address the provocation issues. The Korean YLs were also interested in using similar back-channel options with North Korea, although eventually they decided against it.

Despite some evident tensions between senior Japanese and Korean participants, there was a focus by most YLs in Seoul on moving forward the bilateral relationship between Seoul and Tokyo and not focusing on historical issues. For example, in Seoul, YLs discussed positive ways to improve bilateral cooperation through the trilateral vehicle, such as the push for a trilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement rather than the more contentious bilateral agreement between Japan and South Korea. Other examples included a greater focus on non-traditional security areas such as Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, and counter piracy. One former YL panelist also discussed the possibility of involving more liaison officers (of the outside participant country) in joint-operations by US-Japan and US-ROK.
Busan Port Crisis Scenario: Move 1 (a fall day in 2014)

The merchant vessel *M. Star*, an oil supertanker operated by the Japanese company Mitsui O.S.K. Lines under a Marshall Islands flag, approached the Busan Port carrying 270,000 metric tons of crude oil from the United Arab Emirates. Just after the ship entered the port, a large explosion under the starboard bow left a gaping hole in its hull. The initial blast killed 16, including 11 Japanese and 3 Korean nationals, and caused oil to rapidly flow into the port. The remaining crew of 15 was forced to abandon ship as the *M. Star* rapidly descended to the ocean floor.

Three hours after the blast the oil tanker was entirely submerged with almost all of its petroleum cargo now filling the Busan Port. The Busan Port Authority has locked down the port. Cargo ships that were scheduled to depart from or arrive at the Busan Port are now facing enormous losses as time-sensitive products cannot be delivered. The oil spill is rapidly spreading into the ocean, and the coastline of Busan and other southeastern cities of Korea have become contaminated.

There is mass speculation about the cause of the blast and rumors are spreading that it may have been caused by a mine, and that there may be more nearby. According to uncertain intelligence reports, 2 vessels thought to be North Korean Yono-class submarines fled the Busan Port shortly before the blast.

On YouTube, a video clip posted by the username, ‘KoreaLiberator’ has gone viral. In the video, a man claims that he is a member of Revolutionary Organization (RO) and masterminded the *M. Star* attack. He further states that RO planted a bomb on the *M. Star* to protest the use of the South Korean National Security Act to imprison “true liberators who have tried to rescue the South Korean people from tyranny.” The South Korean, US, and Japanese media have picked up the video clip and reported extensively on the incident.

The man in the video demands the release of three prisoners within the next week. If they are not released, he claims the next target will be the USS *George Washington*, which is currently docked at the ROK Naval Base at Busan, not far from where the blast occurred. The *George Washington* came in two days prior for the annual ROK-US combined training exercise (which will also include Japanese observers). Although the man in the video does not mention the North Korean government, the media and South Korean public suspect that the DPRK is involved. North Korea previously issued a statement condemning the ROK-US exercise, but has not commented on the Busan Port incident.

Busan Port Crisis Scenario: Move 1 Questions

*You are in a meeting 36 hours after the initial blast preparing to offer advice to your President or Prime Minister via a national security advisor. Your group is interagency in character, featuring inputs from defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence.*
1. How would you recommend that your government respond to the incident? Identify at least 5 actions.

2. What countries or organizations should your government contact? What message should it deliver to each?

3. What public message, if any, should your government deliver? Highlight at least 3 themes.
Busan Port Crisis Scenario:
Interjection (48 hours after the initial blast)

Pyongyang (KCNA) -- The spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) issued the following statement:

Marshal Kim Jong-un offers his sincere congratulations to our Korean brothers for their heroic act of patriotism at the Busan Port. Our brothers have shown that provocation by the impotent puppet regime, and their Japanese and American masters, will not stand.

It is the puppet regime with its scheduled military exercise that initiated this cycle of provocation. The US and the puppet regime, much upset by increasing voices of criticism, are claiming that these are "annual exercises for defense." But they should know that such deceptive and shameless sophism works on no one. The present situation shows who truly stands for detente and peace on the Korean Peninsula and who is a hypocrite, provoker standing in the way of improving north-south relations.

We sternly warn the US and South Korean authorities to stop the dangerous military exercises which may push the situation on the peninsula to a catastrophe. They should clearly understand that the north-south ties will plunge into unimaginable holocaust should they go ahead with the provocation, defying our warning.

Additional Question

4. How does this statement change your response, if at all, to questions 1, 2, and 3? If it does change your calculus, why?
Busan Port Crisis Scenario: Move 2
(1 week after the blast, the day of the US-ROK exercise)

The RO agent who appeared in the video taking credit for the attack has been identified as Kweon Min-joon. Kweon was apprehended at Incheon airport trying to board a plane to Beijing with a false South Korean passport. Initial results from interrogations, documents recovered from Kweon’s residence, and electronic intelligence indicate that he is closely tied to the North Korean government, but he, and the Revolutionary Organization, was meant to be a diversion. Seoul is confident that the attack on the M. Star was directed from Pyongyang. Multiple US and ROK intelligence sources have confirmed that 2 North Korean Yono-class submarines left the Busan Port less than an hour before the explosion. Sweeps of the port after the attack revealed an undetonated mine that malfunctioned. Forensic evidence proved that the mine was manufactured in North Korea.

For the most part, the oil spill has been contained, but port operations have not been restored. At the request of the government of Japan, the ROK granted a Japan Coast Guard search and rescue and investigation team access to Busan Port, both to recover the remains of the Japanese nationals that were aboard the ship and investigate the explosion. Tokyo has issued a statement offering political support to South Korea, while demanding a response to the attack on its vessel. However, it has also signaled to Washington that it would expect consultations before any of the 8 US bases in Japan are used for a military operation against North Korea. In private communications, Beijing has condemned the attack, but it has thus far been unwilling to denounce North Korea in a public statement.

In a joint decision, Washington and Seoul decided to go ahead with their joint naval exercise. Over the last week, North Korea has conducted its own exercise, firing over 200 artillery shells near the disputed Northern Limit Line. There were no casualties, but many of the shells landed on the South Korean side of the line. The United States and South Korea have heightened the alert of their military forces, and the United States has already begun to shift additional assets to East Asia. Beijing has back-channeled to Washington calling for restraint.

North Korean state media released another statement saying that the ROK-US naval exercise will “provoke a nuclear firestorm.” The latest statement also condemns Japan, warning that if they send observers that it will be seen as a “grave, unpardonable provocation” and that “Tokyo will not be safe.” The North Korean armed forces, including the People's Strategic Rocket Forces, have also been moved to high-alert. North Korean state media announced that a Nodong missile test is imminent.

As it moves into position for the US-ROK joint exercise, the ROKS Incheon hits a floating mine. The damage is limited and not structural, but there have been several injuries. Minutes later, the Japanese destroyer JS Hatakaze, which was in the area observing the exercise, receives what appears to be a direct hit from an unidentified torpedo. Details are still arriving, but at least 28 Japanese sailors were killed. During the
attack, the USS *Mustin* detected a Yono-class submarine in the area and fired a Mark 46 torpedo, sinking the North Korean vessel. About an hour later, 4 other Yono-class submarines were identified in international waters returning to the Port of Ch'ahonodongja, one of two submarine bases in North Korea.

**Busan Port Crisis Scenario: Move 2 Questions**

*You are in a meeting preparing to offer advice to your President or Prime Minister via a national security advisor. Your group is interagency in character, featuring inputs from defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence.*

1. *How would you recommend that your government respond to the latest provocations? How will this response be coordinated with other governments?*

2. *What public message, if any, should your government deliver? How has your message changed since the initial Busan incident? Why?*

3. *In what way, if at all, would you recommend that your government retaliates? Using what means?*
Busan Port Crisis Scenario: ROK Team Background Guide

The Revolutionary Organization

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Context

The South Korean government has often coordinated and worked closely with the United States during crises, particularly when an external security threat is involved, such as the March 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. The ROK and United States also cooperated in the case of the Sewol ferry sinking, which, while similarly a tragic disaster, was considered a domestic accident.

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The shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which claimed the lives of 2 ROK soldiers and 2 civilians and wounded 18 others, was an unambiguous attack by North Korea.² The ROK government and military responded, returning fire with a total of 80 shells. President Lee also directed the military to strike a missile base near its coastal artillery positions if there were signs of further provocation. In addition, the ROK, in close cooperation with the United States, strengthened surveillance of North Korea. Media images of the shelling prompted a quick international response. Many countries immediately condemned North

² “Two civilians found dead on S. Korean island shelled by N. Korea,” Yonhap, 24 November 2010.
Korea for the attack. However, both Russia and China instead urged both Koreas to demonstrate restraint and avoid escalation.

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When considering a response, the most important consideration for the South Korea is the safety and security of its citizens. This would raise questions such as: are there additional South Korean casualties beyond the initial reports? Are ROK ships that transit through Busan and other ports at risk? And given that the ship attached was Japanese, how will Seoul coordinate with Tokyo?

Current Regional Environment

President Park Geun-hye described the region as bifurcated with rapid economic growth and cooperation alongside historical tension and accelerated military competition. To address this “Asian Paradox,” Park proposed a “Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative” that calls for building political and military confidence, intensifying economic cooperation, and attaining mutually beneficial human security dividends.4 The initiative has had limited success.

Early in its tenure, the Park administration made significant efforts to improve relations with China. Park notably visited China before Japan—a first for a ROK President since Seoul normalized relations with Beijing. This highlighted Seoul’s perception of China’s rising importance and the troubled state of relations with Japan. President Xi also visited the ROK before going to North Korea—the first for any PRC leader since the establishment of PRC-ROK diplomatic ties. Immediately following this visit to Seoul, a

3 Ashley Rowland, “Navy recovery vessel USNS Safeguard en route to South Korea,” Stars and Stripes, 23 April 2014.
ROK public opinion survey reported 64.7% of South Koreans assessed the summit positively with a nearly identical percentage believing the meeting produced positive outcomes for the ROK. Nevertheless, 69.9 percent and 63.6 percent respectively considered China’s economic and military rise a threat. Furthermore, Xi avoided naming North Korea in comments calling for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This fortified the ROK’s belief that China has not yet shifted its support from North to South Korea.

ROK relations with Japan are considered uneasy at best. Thorny historical and cultural issues—comfort women, Japanese textbooks, Takeshima/Dokdo, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine—have long plagued Japan-ROK ties. The Japanese government’s review of the Kono statement exacerbated the ROK’s suspicion of the Abe administration. Nevertheless, a near majority of the ROK public supports a ROK-Japan summit. A similar percentage is in favor of the signing of a General Security of Military Information Agreement. Furthermore, the ROK and Japan continue to conduct naval exercises together with the United States and cooperate with each other in a ROK-US-Japan trilateral context. Yet, the ROK military and government was criticized when it was reported Japan’s Self-Defense Force provided ammunition for South Korea’s Peacekeeping Unit in South Sudan, even though the ROK request for support was made through the UN.

Security & Crises Management Organizations and Mechanisms

During peacetime, the ROK military, through its Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Command, is responsible for the defense of the ROK. It has operational control (OPCON) of all ROK forces, which guard the DMZ, ROK airspace and seas. Also on the Korean peninsula are three US commands—US Forces Korea (USFK), United Nations Command (UNC), and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). USFK consists of 28.5 thousand US troops.

If war with North Korea becomes imminent and both the ROK and US presidents decide to move to Defense Condition (DEFCON) level III, CFC is transitioned to a war-fighting headquarter with OPCON over the majority of US and ROK forces. However, during peacetime and cases not involving an all-out North Korean attack, it is the ROK JCS that assumes responsibility for the defense of South Korea.

The ROK Defense Security Command (DSC) is responsible for counter-intelligence, collection and processing of military-related intelligence, and certain criminal investigations. It is charged with supporting counter-espionage, counter-terrorism, and psychological warfare operations. DSC scrutinizes North Korean movements.

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
The ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) has the complementary mission of collection, preparation, and distribution of security intelligence to counter government subversion, espionage, terrorism, and organized crime. It is also responsible for conducting investigations into crimes of insurrection and treason. Some have accused the NIS of exaggerating charges against left-leaning elements in the ROK such as the RO.

Currently, there are competing proposals to reorganize the ROK safety and crises management structure. Park and the ruling Saenuri Party have proposed an amendment to the National Government Act, which would disband the Coast Guard and National Emergency Management Agency and transfer their jurisdiction to a National Safety Office that would be established. The opposition Democratic United Party however has proposed transforming the Coast Guard and National Emergency Management Agency into a Marine Safety Agency and Fire Department under a Ministry of National Safety.

Economics: Trade and Commerce in the Busan Port

Busan Port is the world's fifth largest container port and the leading trans-shipment port in Northeast Asia. It handles more than 17 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) annually, and exchanges with more than 500 ports in 100 countries. The Busan Port serves as the hub of a trade network connecting ports in China, Japan, and Russia. The two largest international container terminals, Shinsundae and Gamman, are adjacent to the international passenger terminal. Thus, maintaining the normal flow of trade, commerce, and tourism is particularly important to the regional economy. Incoming and outgoing tourists are estimated at 85 thousand per day. It will be critical to work closely with US shipping companies and international shipping organizations to ensure a calm response that measures the risk without a large impact on trade flows.

A large portion of South Korea’s trade heavily depends on China and Japan. In 2012, trade with China accounted for almost 25 percent of the ROK’s total exports. Japan is South Korea’s second largest trading partner in the region and fourth in the world.\(^9\)

Domestic Dynamics: North Korean Refugees and Espionage

The rate of successful North Korean settlement in South Korea is below 15 percent, resulting in high crime rates by defectors. A study conducted by the Aid Association for North Korean Refugees in 2012 concluded that 80 percent of North Korean defectors were living with a monthly salary under 1.5 million won which is well below the national average of 2.1 million won. Unemployment rate was 7.5 percent in 2013, more than two times higher than the nation's average.

With regards to espionage activities, 49 agents were caught since 2003 and 21 spies disguised themselves as defectors. North Korea's State Security Department, Reconnaissance General Bureau, Military Security Command, and the Korean Workers'...
Party's Office 35 are all known to have dispatched agents into South Korea as defectors. Their primary mission is known to be assassination of high-ranking North Korean defectors, political maneuvering, and extraction of secret information.
Busan Port Crisis Scenario: Japan Team Background Guide

The Revolutionary Organization

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The shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which claimed the lives of 2 ROK soldiers and 2 civilians and wounded 18 others, was an unambiguous attack by North Korea. The ROK government and military responded, returning fire with a total of 80 shells. President Lee also directed the military to strike a missile base near its coastal artillery positions if there were signs of further provocation. In addition, the ROK, in close cooperation with the United States, strengthened surveillance of North Korea. Media images of the shelling prompted a quick international response. Many countries

11 “Two civilians found dead on S. Korean island shelled by N. Korea,” Yonhap, 24 November 2010.
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When the *Sewol* ferry capsized in April 2014, the ROK government labeled the accident a “domestic, civil matter.” Although the international community sent their condolences and offered search, rescue, and humanitarian support, the ROK government initially looked only to its own disaster relief center and coast guard. Announcing the situation was “under control” and external help “unnecessary,” the coast guard rejected offers to help with the rescue operation. The ROK government later accepted search, rescue, and recovery support from the United States, which committed MH-60 Seahawk helicopters, MV-22 Ospreys, UH-1Y Hueys, and the USNS Safeguard to this mission.\(^\text{12}\)

The *M. Star* provocation, if indeed perpetuated by the North, would be a significant escalation, comparable only to the 2010 sinking of the South Korean corvette, *Cheonan*, in which over 100 Korean sailors perished. The context and potentially the magnitude are different, but the action itself should not be a complete surprise. However, the North’s provocations in recent years have largely been directed at the South. In this scenario, the attack directly impacts Japan and resulted in the deaths of many of its citizens. The culpability of the regime in Pyongyang remains foggy at this point, but *post-mortem* intelligence would likely be able to determine the nature of any connection between the attackers and the regime.

*Political Factors*

When considering a response, the most important consideration for the Japan is the safety and security of its citizens. This would raise questions such as: are there additional Japanese casualties beyond the initial reports? Are Japanese ships that transit through Busan and other ports in the ROK at risk for future attacks? Japan also needs to determine how it can best work with South Korea. An immediate priority for Japan would be dispatching a coast guard search and rescue and investigation team access to Busan Port, both to recover the remains of the Japanese nationals that were aboard the ship and investigate the explosion.

There are several important domestic actors whose reaction to the crisis may influence how the Japanese government acts. Japan’s domestic party politics must be considered. The current Abe administration is the first long-time ruling administration since the Koizumi era and generally enjoys popular support. Abe’s intra-party support is therefore likely to remain strong at the outset of the crisis as the Japanese public rallies around what will likely be perceived as an attack on Japan and its people. But as the crisis develops, politicians will be quite sensitive to the reactions of the public. Japanese leaders will have to consider how its response might engage public debates on Japan-ROK relations, Japan-DPRK negotiations over abductees, the US-Japan alliance, and collective self-defense among other things.

\(^{12}\) Ashley Rowland, “Navy recovery vessel USNS Safeguard en route to South Korea,” *Stars and Stripes*, 23 April 2014.
Economic Factors

The closure of Busan Port poses several concerns. First, the closure of a port of this magnitude will result in a significant negative impact to the regional economy (approximated at a loss of ~$1B per day of closure) due to higher transportation, storage, and export costs. Depending on the length of the Busan Port closure, goods-producing and freight companies may be forced to lower wages, lay off personnel, or raise the price of goods in order to offset higher costs. It will be critical to work closely with Japanese shipping companies and international shipping organizations to ensure a calm response that measures the risk without a large impact on trade flows.

Several leaders of the Japanese transportation industry may be more than willing to provide assistance. Following the exodus of transportation companies to Busan in 1995, many Japanese ports reduced their cargo handling capabilities or simply allowed their equipment to deteriorate, due to the decreased volume of cargo. For this reason, while Japanese port availability is not a major concern, most of the goods will simply sit in port, awaiting the re-opening of Busan to conclude their transport. All transport vessels have alternate ports selected in case of emergency, such as stopping in Shanghai or never leaving Los Angeles. Nonetheless, the shock of the attack has caused global markets to tumble.

Security Factors

Several institutional factors should be kept in mind when thinking about Japan’s reaction to the crisis. First, the Japan-ROK relationship is fragile. Japan and the ROK do not have a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which is needed for the exchange of sensitive information. The United States currently has GSOMIAs with both Japan and the ROK, but the negotiation to sign a GSOMIA between Japan and the ROK broke down in 2012.

Furthermore, Japan and the ROK lack formal bilateral coordination mechanisms. Japan and the US have a formal bilateral coordination mechanism that can be promptly established in a time of crisis, a lesson learned during the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, but such mechanism does not exist between Japan and the ROK, which could impede trilateral cooperation.

Historical/Cultural Factors

Following the sinking of the M. Star oil tanker, Japan needs to work cooperatively with South Korea, but given the historical/cultural issues that have strained bilateral relations, the challenge Japan faces is how, and to what extent, to put aside historical and territorial issues in order to address the crisis. Thorny historical and cultural issues—comfort women, Japanese textbooks, Takeshima/Dokdo, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine—have long plagued Japan-ROK ties. In particular during Abe’s tenure in office, these cultural and historical issues have operated to wedge a chasm between Japan and its neighbor.
However, with respect to the situation in Busan, Japan will hope to sideline historical grievances in the name of collaboration with the ROK.

The Abe administration should also consider how its management of the *M. Star* crisis will impact Japan-DPRK ties. Prior to the sinking of the *M. Star*, Japan has reached out to the DRPK on the abduction issue. Japan has long claimed that during the latter half of the 20th the North Korean government abducted an unspecified number of Japanese nationals. Tokyo continues to pressure North Korea to, at the very least, be more transparent on the issue. In total, the abduction issue has endured as an acrimonious point of conflict in Japan-DPRK relations, burdening Tokyo’s participation in the Six Party Talks and complicating the prospect of normalization of diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Japan must determine to what extent, if any, it should weigh the abduction issue when formulating a response to the circumstances in Busan.
Busan Port Crisis Scenario: US Team Background Guide

The Revolutionary Organization

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\textsuperscript{13} Na Jeong-ju, “Lee Warns Against Speculation Over Cheonan,” Korea Times, 5 April 2010.
\textsuperscript{14} “Two civilians found dead on S. Korean island shelled by N. Korea,” Yonhap, 24 November 2010.
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**US Security, Allies Response**

When considering a response, the most important consideration for the United States is the safety and security of US citizens and US armed service personnel in the region. US Forces Japan consists of approximately 38,000 military personnel, 43,000 dependents, and 5,000 civilian employees. Meanwhile, the US Forces Korea has nearly 30,000 troops, along with thousands of additional civilians and dependents, based in South Korea. This would raise questions such as: were any American citizens amongst the casualties or can we presume all the dead were Japanese and South Korean nationals? Are US ships (naval and commercial) that transit through Busan and other ports in the ROK at risk for future attacks? Similarly, it will be critical to work closely with US shipping companies and international shipping organizations to ensure a calm response that measures the risk without a large impact on trade flows.

Another area that will impact the US response is the reaction from both Japan and South Korea. As is consistent with US policy on North Korean provocations in the region, Washington will look to ensure a coordinated response that is measured and proportional.

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15 Ashley Rowland, “Navy recovery vessel USNS Safeguard en route to South Korea,” Stars and Stripes, 23 April 2014.
As this attack was committed in South Korean waters, the US will also consider how US Forces Korea will interact with the South Korean government (along with Japan) in responding.

The scenario will also necessitate the United States – in tandem with its allies – assembling a strong intelligence assessment determining Pyongyang’s level of involvement in the attack. This intelligence assessment may include forensics on both the nature and origin of the explosion. Other questions arise too: If the Kim regime is linked to the attack, to what extent was it involved and is the evidence solid enough to pursue retaliation (sanctions or otherwise) against the North? Are there any links to the terrorist group and other cells in the Japan, South Korea, or elsewhere?

It is critical for the US to consider this attack in light of its broader alliance and deterrence commitments to both Japan and South Korea. The response from Washington will also have an international audience. Despite important differences, the US response to provocations in Syria and the Ukraine has raised doubts in Asia about Washington’s resolve to meet such aggression with strength.

Reassuring Japan and South Korea of a strong US response will be of the utmost importance, but it is also critical to avoid a more intense or unintentional confrontation with the North. Official reaction, if any, will likely be defensive or brash as usual, but it is critical to try and obtains signals – either through diplomatic channels from other partners in Pyongyang or other intelligence – on the North’s reaction and whether the state was surprised or planned attack. Moreover, it will be important to consider how China will react to this incident and its stance on a US or allied response to the North. China’s relationship with North Korea is complication, but in recent years, China has been more willing, both publicly and privately, to condemn and exert pressure on the Kim regime.

Security & Crises Management Organizations and Mechanisms

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16 Ibid.
Trilateral Cooperation and Crisis Management

In addition to gauging a response to the North, there are also likely to be critical areas for trilateral cooperation focusing on logistical and crisis management issues. Some key considerations might include: the need for Search and Rescue efforts in the Busan port, potential clean up and environmental concerns emanating from the blast, coordination and potential assistance from customs, coast guard, and police agencies. The US can look at previous examples of its humanitarian assistance disaster relief in the region such as Operation Tomodachi in Japan and efforts to assist South Korea after the *Sewol* ferry sinking in April 2014.
**PROGRAM AGENDA**

**Wednesday, November 12th**

17:00  **Young Leaders Orientation Session**  
Chaired by Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS  
Venue: Pine Hall, 4th Floor, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill

18:00  **Korean-American Association —Korean-American Friendship Night**  
with Chairman HAN Sung Joo, Korean-American Association  
Venue: Vista Hall, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill

**Thursday, November 13th**

08:30  **ROK-JAPAN-US TRILATERAL YOUNG LEADERS DIALOGUE**  
Venue: Aston House, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill

08:35  **Introduction by Jun PYON, Adjunct Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS**

08:40  **Welcome by Ralph COSSA, President, Pacific Forum CSIS**

08:50  **Welcome by CHOI Shin Won, Chairman and CEO, SKC Corporation**

09:00  **Session 1: Challenges and Opportunities of the ROK-Japan Bilateral Relationship**  
Moderator: Brad GLOSSERMAN, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS  
ROK speaker: KIM Tae-hyo, Professor, International Politics, Sung Kyun Kwan University  
Japan speaker: Kenji KANASUGI, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Japan in Seoul  
US speaker: Edward K.H. DONG, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of the USA in Seoul

10:45  **Coffee Break**

11:00  **Session 2: Challenges and Opportunities of the ROK-Japan-US Trilateral Relationship**  
Moderator: Ryo HINATA-YAMAGUCHI, Visiting Professor, Pusan National University  
ROK speaker: LEE Chung Min, Professor of International Relations, Yonsei University  
Japan speaker: HANAZAWA Yuichiro, NHK Correspondent, Seoul (Invited)  
US speaker: Kevin SHEPARD, Deputy Director, US-ROK Combined Forces Command Strategy

12:45  **Lunch with Guest Speaker –Key-young SON, Humanities Korea Professor, Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University**  
Venue: Aston House, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill
APPENDIX A
CHAIRMAN CHOI, SKC CORPORATION
PRESENTS THE
ROK-JAPAN-US TRILATERAL YOUNG LEADERS DIALOGUE
SHERATON GRANDE WALKERHILL, SEOUL
NOVEMBER 12-14, 2014

PROGRAM AGENDA

14:15 Session 3: The Next-Gen Way Forward – Making a difference today for tomorrow’s success
Venue: Aston House, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill
YL Alumni ROK Speaker: Jun PYON, Adjunct Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS
YL Alumni Japan Speaker: Ryo HINATA-YAMAGUCHI, Visiting Professor, Pusan National University
YL Alumni US Speaker: Leif-Eric EASLEY, Assistant Professor, Ewha University

15:45 Coffee Break

16:00 Table Top Exercise Preparations
Facilitator: John K. Warden, WSD-Handa Resident Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS

18:00 Dinner with CHOI Shin Won, Chairman and CEO, SKC Corporation
Venue: Room Name TBA, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill

Friday, November 14th

08:30 Trilateral Table Top Exercise
Venue: Cosmos Hall, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill

10:00 Coffee break

10:15 Group discussion and presentations
Facilitator: John K. Warden, WSD-Handa Resident Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS

11:30 Working Lunch – Trilateral Table Top Exercise
Venue: Cosmos Hall, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill

13:15 Group discussion and presentations
Facilitator: John K. Warden, WSD-Handa Resident Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS

14:45 Coffee break

15:00 Consolidation, Overview and Recommendations
Moderator: Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS

16:30 Break for room reset

17:30 Farewell Reception including VIPs and senior speakers
Venue: Cosmos Hall, Sheraton Grande Walkerhill

19:00 Program Concludes
# APPENDIX B

**CHAIRMAN CHOI, SKC CORPORATION PRESENTS THE ROK-JAPAN-US TRILATERAL YOUNG LEADERS DIALOGUE**  
SHERATON GRANDE WALKERHILL, SEOUL  
**NOVEMBER 12-14, 2014**

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Institution</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1. | Mr. Kent BOYDSTON (USA) | David L. Boren Fellow  
University of California, San Diego/Yonsei University |
| 2. | Ms. Jeongwon CHOI (ROK) | Student/Korea Emerging Leader                          |
| 3. | Ms. Lisa Dalem COLLINS (USA) | Program Officer, Center for Global Governance  
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies |
| 4. | Mr. Daniel FOULKES (CRC) | Graduate Student  
Hannam University                                    |
| 5. | Mr. Zachary M. HOSFORD (USA) | Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Security Program  
Center for a New American Security                     |
| 6. | Ms. Rachel IANACONE (USA) | Mansfield Foundation Fellow  
United States Air Force                                  |
| 7. | Mr. Yoshifumi IDE (JPN) | Graduate Student  
Waseda University                                        |
| 8. | Mr. Akira IGATA (JPN) | Doctoral Student  
Graduate School of Law, Keio University                   |
| 9. | Mr. Gibum KIM (ROK) | Program Officer  
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies                   |
| 10. | Ms. Nahee KIM (ROK) | Graduate School of International Studies,  
Yonsei University                                         |
| 11. | Ms. Tomoko KIYOTA (JPN) | Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS                                         |
| 12. | Mr. Tom P. LE (USA) | PhD Candidate of Political Science  
University of California Irvine, Hiroshima City University |
| 13. | Ms. Min Jung LEE (ROK) | Student/Emerging Leader  
George Washington University                               |
| 14. | Mr. Jonathan Berkshire MILLER (USA) | Senior Advisor - Asia-Pacific  
Canada Border Services Agency |
| 15. | Dr. Jim PLATTE (USA) | Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS                                         |
| 16. | Ms. Hyeon-young RO (ROK) | Non-resident Korea Foundation Fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS                                         |
| 17. | Ms. Aiko SHIMIZU (JPN) | Research Fellow  
East-West Center                                           |
| 18. | Mr. Daichi UCHIMURA (JPN) | Non-resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow  
Pacific Forum CSIS                                         |
| 19. | Nathaniel WALTON (USA) | Principal  
Sachem Strategies                                         |
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<tr>
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<td>Mr. John K. WARDEN (USA)</td>
<td>Resident WSD-Handa Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Ms. Se Eun YIM (ROK)</td>
<td>Non-resident Korea Foundation Fellow and Graduate Student, Pacific Forum CSIS and Ewha Womans University</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Dr. Leif-Eric EASLEY (USA)</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Ewha University</td>
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<td>23.</td>
<td>Dr. Ryo HINATA-YAMAGUCHI (JPN)</td>
<td>Visiting Professor, Pusan National University</td>
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<td>24.</td>
<td>Mr. Jun PYON (ROK)</td>
<td>Associate Political Affairs Officer, Department of Political Affairs - Northeast Asia Team, United Nations</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>Dr. Kevin SHEPARD (USA)</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Combined Forces Command Strategy, USFK/CFC/UNC</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI (JPN)</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>28.</td>
<td>Mr. Seunghyuk LEE (ROK)</td>
<td>Program Officer, Asan Institute for Policy Studies</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Mr. Joseph OH (USA)</td>
<td>Analyst, Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea Future Operations Plans Division</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Mr. Shin Won CHOI</td>
<td>Chairman and CEO, SKC Corporation</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>Mr. Ralph COSSA</td>
<td>President, Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>Ms. Julia CUNICO</td>
<td>Director, Young Leaders Program, Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Mr. Edward K.H. DONG</td>
<td>Minister-Counselor, US Embassy Seoul</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>Mr. Brad GLOSSERMAN</td>
<td>Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>Mr. Yuichiro HANAZAWA</td>
<td>Correspondent, NHK, Seoul</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>Mr. Kenji KANASUGI</td>
<td>Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, Japan Embassy Seoul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. Dr. Tae-hyo KIM  
Professor, International Politics  
Sung Kyun Kwan University

38. Dr. Chung Min LEE  
Professor of International Relations  
Yonsei University

39. Dr. Key-young SON  
Humanities Korea Professor  
Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University
APPENDIX C
CHAIRMAN CHOI, SKC CORPORATION
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NOVEMBER 12-NOVEMBER 14, 2014
PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

Mr. Kent BOYDSTON (USA) received his Master’s degree from the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at UC San Diego where he focused on international economics and international politics. He also worked at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation researching defense transparency in Northeast Asia. As an undergraduate at the University of California, Irvine, Kent completed his honors thesis on Chinese security concerns with ethnic Koreans in China and later moved to South Korea where he taught English at a rural elementary school and university. He also taught English during the first semester of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology in North Korea. Kent spent the summer of 2013 at the US Department of State’s Office of Korean Affairs interning as a Harold W. Rosenthal Fellow. He is currently studying Korean at Yonsei University and working on research as a David L. Boren Fellow.

Ms. Jeongwon “Hannah” CHOI (ROK) is a senior student at Northfield Mount Hermon, a private boarding school in Massachusetts. She has been an active Emerging Leader since 2012 with a special interest in security affairs surrounding the Korean Peninsula. She will be pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in international relations in the United States starting Fall 2015.

Ms. Lisa COLLINS (USA) is a Program Officer in the Global Governance Center at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Ms. Collins has worked at the institute since its inception in 2008 and witnessed the organization grow from a small staff of five to a major organization with over 80 people in the last five years. Her research interests include Northeast Asian security issues, the intersection between international law and international relations, global governance, nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, human rights and refugee law, and the US-ROK alliance. Prior to joining the institute in 2008, she was a graduate fellow in the Korean Flagship Language Program at the University of Hawaii and Korea University. Ms. Collins received a BA from Oberlin College in Ohio and a JD (juris doctor) from the University of New Mexico.

Dr. Leif-Eric EASLEY (USA) is an Assistant Professor in the Division of International Studies at Ewha University and a Research Fellow at the Asan Institute in Seoul. At Ewha, Dr. Easley teaches international security and changing levels of trust in the bilateral security relationships of Northeast Asia. He received his PhD and MA from Harvard University’s Department of Government. Dr. Easley was the Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University. He was also a visiting scholar at Yonsei University, the University of Southern California’s Korean Studies Institute, and the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. Professor Easley was a Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leader and among the first class of Kelly and Sasakawa Fellows. He completed his BA in political science with a minor in mathematics at UCLA. His research appears in academic journals and volumes, supplemented by commentaries in major newspapers (http://www.leifieasley.net).
Mr. Daniel Foulkes (CRC) is a graduate student from Costa Rica currently studying at Hannam University in South Korea. He is a grantee of the Korean Government. He studied at the University of Costa Rica and also at the University of Oslo, in the areas of Communications, Journalism and Media. His previous work experience was in the regional office of UNESCO San Jose in the Natural Sciences Sector. His personal background is also international, where his parents are nationals from the United States and Chile.

Dr. Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi (JPN) is a Visiting Professor at the Pusan National University, Department of Global Studies, and also an Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, and a Sergeant First Class in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (reserve). Ryo has presented and published a variety of papers on defense and security issues in the Asia-Pacific and received his PhD from the University of New South Wales - Canberra with a dissertation on North Korea’s military capability management. Ryo is a former Korea Foundation Language Training Fellow and received his MA in Strategic and Defense Studies and BA in Security Analysis from the Australian National University. He previously held positions at the Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, FM Bird Entertainment Agency, International Crisis Group Seoul Office, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Embassy of Japan in Australia, and the Japan Foundation Sydney Language Centre. He has extensive international experience, having lived over 20 years in Australia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the US. Ryo is a native speaker of Japanese and English, is fluent in Korean, and also has some knowledge of Chinese and Malay.

Mr. Zachary M. Hosford (USA) is an Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). His recent work has focused on the future of the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances, China’s military and nuclear force modernization, and maritime security in Asia. In 2013, he was awarded the Bacevich Fellow position at CNAS, and he previously served as a Research Associate and as the Special Assistant to the two co-founders of the organization, Kurt Campbell and Michèle Flournoy. Prior to joining CNAS, Hosford worked at the Arms Control Association and the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ramallah. His writing has been published in The Diplomat, World Politics Review, Arms Control Today and Infinity Journal. Hosford earned his MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and his BA from Franklin & Marshall College.
Capt. Rachel IANAConE (USA) is a United States Air Force Officer and is currently a Mansfield Fellow in Tokyo. She received a Bachelor of Arts in Japanese from Portland State University where she graduated Magna Cum Laude. She also holds a Masters of Business Administration from Colorado State University. She has been stationed at Yokota Air Base, Japan and Kadena Air Base, Japan. Capt. Ianacone worked with the Japanese Self-Defense Force, Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau, and other agencies in the Government of Japan. After these two assignments, she transferred to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington where she was a Wing Executive Officer and has enjoyed participating in half marathons and a couple of triathlons. She has been awarded three Air Force Commendation medals and a Defense Meritorious Service Medal. She has a husband, Garrett, who is also active duty, and a Shiba Inu Chai.

Mr. Yoshifumi IDE (JPN) is currently a Master’s student at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University doing research in international security that focuses on psychological explanations of decision-making in foreign policy in Northeast Asia. Previously he graduated from Faculty of Law, Seikei University in March 2014, having spent a semester at the Faculty of Social Science, University of California, San Diego in 2012. Ide is politically active in Japan’s Liberal Domestic Party chapter in Kanagawa Prefecture, where he is involved in LDP policies such as tax reform, revision of the constitution, and others as a political intern. Ide has also traveled widely in Asia, Europe, and Northeast America, visiting more than 20 countries.

Mr. Akira IGATA (JPN) is a PhD student at the Department of Law, Keio University. He received his undergraduate training at Georgetown University (one-year exchange program, Heiwa Nakajima Foundation scholar) and International Christian University (Chris-Wada scholar). He received his MA in political science (international relations) from Columbia University (Japanese government fellowship scholar). He was a recipient of the security studies fellowship from the Research Institute for Peace and Security (2010-2012) and has been involved in several projects of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation. He notably contributed, as a researcher, to The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Disaster: Investigating the Myth and Reality (Routledge, 2014) and wrote the chapter entitled, “The Gulf War and Japan’s National Security Identity” (forthcoming, co-authored with Michael J. Green), for a book on Japan’s “lost decades.”

Mr. Gibum KIM (KOR) is a program officer in the Office of the Vice President for Research and the Center for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Prior to joining the Asan Institute, he was an intern researcher at the International Policy Studies Institute Korea. He has also worked as a professional researcher at the Research Institute for Language and Information at Korea University. He earned both an MA and a BA in Political Science at the College of Political Science and Economics, Korea University. His research interests include East Asian regional security, multilateral security cooperation, weak states, and human security.
Ms. Nahee KIM (ROK) is an MA candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Korea, where she focuses on development cooperation and trade & economic development. She is also a Research Assistant in the field of international security. Previously, she interned at Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding under the auspices of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). She has a keen interest in developing cooperative relations in the Asia-Pacific region and political economy dynamics of Northeast Asia. She received her BA in Human Ecology from Seoul National University, Korea.

Ms. Tomoko KIYOTA (JPN) is a Sasakawa Peace Foundation resident fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, where she focuses on Indo-US-Japan trilateral relations. She defended her dissertation in March 2014 and soon will receive a PhD from the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Takushoku University, Tokyo. She was a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Karnataka from April 2012 to February 2014. She worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan as a political analyst from April 2010 to September 2011. She was a research intern at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi (November 2008 to May 2009) and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies Analyses, New Delhi (July 2009 to January 2010). Her doctoral thesis explores India’s arms development and the Military-Industrial Complex. She also contributed papers on India-Japan relations and Japanese national security to several international conferences.

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI (JPN) is a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). He is also teachin at Hosei University. In addition, he is a senior nonresident research fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), and an international advisor to the Project 2049 Institute. He was a visiting scholar at CSIS Japan Chair and US-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. His research focus is the US-Japan alliance and maritime security. He received a security studies fellowship from the RIPS in 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize. He has published numerous articles both in English and Japanese, and his recent English publications include "US-Japan Joint Maritime Strategy: Balancing the Rise of Maritime China" (CSIS, March 2014). He is preparing his first book on maritime security. He received a master’s degree from Doshisha University.

Mr. Tom LE (USA) is a PhD candidate in the department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine and a 2013-2015 Fulbright Graduate Research Fellow at Hiroshima City University. He is also a non-resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow. He holds BAs in political science and history from the University of California, Davis. Tom's doctorate dissertation examines demographic, technical, political, and normative constraints and restraints on the Japan Self-Defense Force and their effects on the US-Japan alliance and East Asia regional security. His research interests include militarism norms, the military/security balance in East Asia, and qualitative methods.
Ms. Min Jung LEE (ROK) is an undergraduate student at George Washington's Elliott School of International Affairs in Washington, DC and has been accepted to the graduate program at the Johns Hopkins University. She has been an active emerging leader since 2012 and is interested in international security affairs with a particular focus on Northeast Asia. She has previously worked at the Korea Institute of International Economic Policy and at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea at the United Nations in New York.

Mr. Jonathan Berkshire MILLER (USA) has held a variety of positions in the private and public sector, most recently as a senior advisor on the Asia-Pacific for the Canada Border Services Agency and a fellow on East Asia for the EastWest Institute. He is also a non-resident SPF fellow with Pacific Forum CSIS and chairs the Forum’s Japan-Korea Working Group. He formerly worked on international security issues at the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canada. Jonathan is a regular contributor to several academic journals, magazines and newspapers on Asia-Pacific security issues including the Economist, Foreign Affairs, Forbes, Oxford Analytica and Newsweek. He has also published widely in other outlets including the Non-Proliferation Review, Global Asia, and Jane’s Intelligence Review.

Dr. Jim PLATTE (USA) is a Sasakawa Peace Foundation Resident Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and an international relations scholar specializing in energy security, nuclear proliferation, and East Asian politics. He received his PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in February 2013. His dissertation was a comparative study of nuclear fuel cycle decision making in India, Japan, and South Korea, for which he conducted research in all three countries. He also studied Japanese nuclear policy as a 2012-13 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Japan. Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School during the 2011-12 academic year and worked as a counterproliferation analyst for the US Department of Defense. He holds an MA in Science, Technology and Public Policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs and an MS and BS in nuclear engineering from the University of Michigan.

Mr. Jun PYON (ROK) is an Associate Political Affairs Officer covering Northeast Asia and Australia at the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the United Nations in New York. He received his MA in international relations and international economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and BA/MA in International Studies and Government from the Johns Hopkins University. He has previously worked at INP Consulting Group, a political risk consulting company based in Seoul, the Pacific Forum CSIS as its 2006-2007 Vasey Fellow, the Brookings Institution, and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).
Ms. Hyeon-young RO (ROK) is an inaugural non-resident Korea Foundation Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. Ms. Ro received her MA in Asian studies from Georgetown University, and BA in political science from Korea University in Seoul. She has worked as a teaching assistant for Korean language courses and research assistant for Dr. Christine Kim at Georgetown University. The most recent work experience she had was at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul as an intern program officer. She also worked as an intern in the political section in the Embassy of the United States of America in Seoul and was an intern reporter at the Chosun Ilbo, the top major newspaper in South Korea. Her fields of interest include international relations and international political economy, particularly trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). She is working on a research project regarding a China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement and Japan’s FDI policy.

Dr. Kevin SHEPARD (USA) is the Deputy Director for US-ROK Combined Forces Command Strategy. He focuses on US-ROK alliance coordination and combined strategic planning to best facilitate accomplishing Alliance goals. He worked on US-ROK alliance issues and inter-Korean relations as a James A. Kelly Korean Studies Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and as a researcher at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies. He holds a PhD in North Korean Politics and Unification Policies from Kyungnam University’s Graduate School of North Korean Studies, as well as an MA in International Policy Studies from the University of Sydney and an MA in East Asian Languages and Literatures (Korean) from the University of Hawaii. His research interests include North Korean policy-making; capitalization & marketization in the North and its impact on society; cooperation schemes for DPRK infrastructure development; and North Korean foreign relations.

Ms. Aiko SHIMIZU (JPN) is a Research Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington. She was previously a resident SPF Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. Her professional experiences include working at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Ms. Shimizu received her bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Studies from the University of Chicago and her graduate degrees from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Mr. Daichi UCHIMURA (JPN) is a non-resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS. He concurrently works as a political and security risk analyst based in Tokyo. He is also a Reserve Self-Defense Force official. His research interests include the geopolitics of East Asia, naval strategy, and Japanese foreign and security policy. He holds an MA in war studies from King's College London, where he wrote his dissertation on naval modernization and Chinese diplomacy. Previously, he was a short-term research assistant at the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) in London.
Mr. Nathaniel WALTON (USA) Nate Walton is a principal at Sachem Strategies, a public policy consulting firm headquartered in Boston and Washington, DC. Nate’s career in public policy began as an undergraduate, when he served as state chairman of the Maine College Republicans, earning national recognition for his leadership. Upon his graduation, Nate accepted a position at Harvard University, where he managed a US Defense Department grant. In 2011, Nate founded Sachem Strategies. His initial work was focused on advising the Romney/Ryan presidential campaign on national security issues. He was also a senior fundraiser for the campaign as well as a national leader of its youth coalition. Under Nate’s leadership, Sachem Strategies has earned a reputation as a rising leader in its industry, providing counsel to defense and technology businesses on government relations. In addition, Nate serves as a top fundraiser for senior members of Congress with oversight in the areas of defense, technology, and international trade. Nate holds a BA in political science from Bates College and a Master of Public Policy from Brown University.

Mr. John K. WARDEN (USA) is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS where he works on East Asia security issues including US alliances, Japan’s island disputes, extended deterrence, and nonproliferation. He received his MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University, where he also served as a research assistant and as editor-in-chief of the Georgetown Security Studies Review. Previously, he worked as a program coordinator and research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, contributing to projects on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and US alliances. He served as executive director for working groups on US-Russian arms control and US-China nuclear dynamics, managed a project on the US nuclear posture, coordinated the US-Japan-ROK Track II Trilateral Dialogue on Nuclear Issues, and twice directed the Nuclear Scholars Initiative, including editing the accompanying journals. Mr. Warden has published articles in Proceedings Magazine, PacNet, Infinity Journal, The National Interest, and The Diplomat. He earned his BA in Political Science and History from Northwestern University.

Ms. Se-Eun YIM (ROK) is pursuing her MA degree at Ewha Womans University, Graduate School of International Studies, focusing on development cooperation and international relations in East Asia. She also received her BA in international studies from Ewha Womans University. Ms. Yim has experience working for the G20 Seoul Summit, Saenuri Party, and Teach For All Korea. She has submitted and presented her academic works at conferences such as the UN Women World Program (UNWP)’s World Congress of Global Partnership for Young Women and the Global Educational Leadership Conference, co-hosted by the UN Academic Impact and the Teach For All Korea. Her current research interests involve examining international relations in East Asia, international cooperation for promoting peace, and the impact of domestic politics on foreign policies.
Staff and Observers

Mr. Seukhoon Paul CHOI (ROK) is a Strategist for United Nations Command/ROK-US Combined Forces Command/US Forces Korea, where his primary responsibilities include advising senior Command staff on diplomatic, informational, military, and economic issues. He is also a non-resident James A. Kelly fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. Previously, he was a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, consultant to The Asia Foundation, visiting scholar at Fudan University, and an Army officer at the Korea Military Academy. He has an MA in International Cooperation from Seoul National University GSIS and a BA in Philosophy, Politics & Economics from the University of Pennsylvania.

Ms. Julia CUNICO (USA) is the Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program and was a 2014 resident Kelly fellow. She is a recent graduate of Columbia University’s Master in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution program. Previously, she worked as associate director for programs at the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) in Washington, D.C., managing the logistics for hundreds of KEI events and coordinating the internship program. Following her tenure at KEI, she joined the Columbia University team of Nobel Laureate Economist Joseph Stiglitz as special assistant, where she was responsible for coordinating his speaking engagements, travel, teaching, and writing. Her areas of interest include Korean peninsula security; environmental conflict; and climate change. Ms. Cunico received her BA in politics and Asian studies from Fairfield University in Connecticut.

Mr. LEE Seunghyuk (ROK) is a program officer in the Department of External Relations at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. His research interests include the state of the North Korean regime, Northeast Asian regional security, and non-traditional security. He received a BA in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego, and a M.P.P. from the Korea Development Institute (KDI) School of Public Policy and Management.

Mr. Joseph OH (USA) is an analyst for the Future Operations and Plans with US Forces Korea (USFK). He also serves as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the US Army Pacific Support Unit. Mr. Oh previously served as an Intelligence and Plans Officer for USFK Air and Missile Division. He received his BA in Business Economics from the University of California Santa Barbara.