

Saving Strangers and Neighbors: Advancing UN-AU Cooperation on Peace Operations

PAUL D. WILLIAMS AND SOLOMON A. DERSSO



Cover Photo: In an official hand-over ceremony in Bangui on September 15, 2014, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) takes over peacekeeping responsibilities from the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). UN Photo/Catianne Tijerina.

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Abbreviations

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDLR	Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
ICGLR	International Conference of the Great Lakes Region
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MICOPAX	Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office to the African Union Mission in Somalia
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

Executive Summary

This report examines how the relationship between the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) can be improved to deliver more effective peace operations. It starts with an overview of how the UN-AU partnership on peace operations has evolved since 2005 and then presents an analysis of UN-AU cooperation in several African crisis zones, focusing on those involving new or significantly reconfigured peace operations in Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan. The report then examines some of the major outstanding challenges facing the UN-AU relationship, paying particular attention to the UN Security Council in New York and the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa. It suggests that the partnership in general and both institutions in particular still face significant challenges and institutional differences that reduce their ability to deploy effective peace operations.

The report offers a number of recommendations for enhancing the UN-AU partnership in this crucial area. Two recommendations are aimed at the United Nations and African Union in general:

- There should be intensified efforts to streamline, harmonize, and institutionalize the process of political decision making, both between the UN and AU, and between the AU and Africa's regional economic communities.
- The new joint framework for an enhanced partnership in peace and security signed between the UN Office to the African Union and the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission should be refined and extended across the rest of the AU Commission, the wider UN family, and the African regional economic communities.

Additional recommendations are addressed to the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council in particular:

- Establish a mechanism for financing UN-authorized AU peace support operations.
- Develop mechanisms to conduct coordinated

and regular assessments of existing and emerging threats to peace and security in Africa, and establish periodic consultations (as envisaged in Security Council Resolution 2033) to minimize policy divergence in responding to those threats.¹

- Invest more resources to consolidate and utilize tools for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.
- Pay greater attention to the resource implications of the councils' respective decisions with regard to peace operations.
- Develop a working relationship between the military staff committees of both councils to feed appropriate military advice on African crises directly into the discussions in New York and Addis Ababa.
- Review the differences in the respective doctrines, policies, and bureaucratic cultures of the two councils with a view to reducing the obstacles to the deployment of effective peace operations.

The following recommendations are aimed at the African Union and AU Peace and Security Council:

- Establish a mechanism to devote a portion of the regular AU budget to finance the union's peace support operations.
- Ensure all members of the Peace and Security Council maintain the required level of technical staff in their missions in Addis Ababa, including military advisors.
- Implement the announced plan to strengthen the mandate, capacity, and visibility of the AU Office to the UN in order to facilitate timely and effective interaction with the UN Security Council.²
- Grant a special status to any African Union member state that is elected to serve on the UN Security Council that is not concurrently a member of the AU Peace and Security Council. This status should include the right to participate in the closed meetings of the Peace and Security Council.
- Engage in intense diplomatic outreach in Addis Ababa to solicit the views of representatives of the nonpermanent members of the UN Security

¹ UN Security Council Resolution 2033 (January 12, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2033.

² African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union-United Nations partnership: the need for greater coherence*, AU doc. PSC/AHG/3.(CCCXCVII), September 23, 2013, p. 9.

Council, and leverage their presence in Addis to enhance policy coherence with the UN Security Council.

- Ensure better follow-up and implementation of the Peace and Security Council's decisions, perhaps through the establishment of monitoring committees or panels of experts as used by the UN Security Council.

Introduction

This report examines how cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) might be enhanced to deliver more effective peace operations in a variety of African conflicts. It is important to get this relationship right, not least because by late 2014 there were record numbers (approximately 130,000) of peacekeepers deployed across Africa and, once again, a majority of items on the UN Security Council agenda were related to African affairs. This document builds upon and updates the analysis and recommendations provided in the International Peace Institute's earlier report on this subject, "Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships," published in April 2013.³ New developments on the continent and in the evolving nature of the partnership between the UN and AU make it useful to revisit and update these issues. It is also timely given that 2015 will see not only the 70th anniversary of the United Nations but also the report of the secretary-general's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

On the continent, since early 2013, developments in several African crises as well as the eruption of new flashpoints produced new AU missions in Mali and Central African Republic (CAR), both of which were subsequently transitioned into new UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, considerable expansions of ongoing missions occurred in Somalia, where the AU's mission, AMISOM, saw the integration of over 4,000 Ethiopian troops, and in South Sudan, where the UN mission, UNMISS,

was reinforced to cope with the country's descent into civil war, including an injection of three battalions of troops from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).⁴ Further challenges emerged for the UN and AU in Sudan. Darfur underwent a surge in violence and the relationship between the hybrid AU-UN mission, UNAMID, and the government of Sudan became increasingly strained as the authorities in Khartoum called for the mission to withdraw and expelled UN personnel. In addition, in October 2014, the AU and UN deployed their first ever missions aimed at "health-keeping" rather than "peacekeeping" in response to the outbreak of a deadly disease, Ebola, in West Africa.⁵

During the same period, there were also significant developments in institutional collaboration between the UN and AU. In May 2013, the UN secretary-general upgraded the importance of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) by appointing its new head, and UN special representative to the AU, for the first time at the level of under-secretary-general. In 2014, UNOAU and the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department also signed a Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which will frame and guide their joint work. Debate also intensified over what should happen when the UN's "Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU" expires in November 2016.

Yet while the UN-AU relationship has clearly deepened and facilitated the deployment of a record number of peacekeepers in Africa, areas of concern, tension, and disagreement persist. First, debate continues over what type of crises should trigger the deployment of a peace operation, especially whether missions should deploy in the absence of a viable ceasefire and/or peace agreement. Second, there have been divergent views over when and how peace operations should use force to combat "spoiler groups" and the extent to which peace operations should become engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities. A third area of disagreement is how to finance

3 Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, "Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships," New York: International Peace Institute, April 2013, available at www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/395-peace-operations-the-african-union-and-the-united-nations-toward-more-effective-partnerships.html.

4 These troops were from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda, despite the latter not being a member of IGAD.

5 The AU Support to Ebola in West Africa (ASEOWA) and the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), respectively.

the AU's peace operations, particularly those authorized by the UN Security Council. A fourth area of concern has been the transition from AU to UN missions, including the alignment of mandates, timetables, standards, and the appropriate division of labor between UN and AU planners, managers, and other key personnel.⁶ All of these issues were reportedly still controversial during a recent debate at the UN Security Council, organized by Chad, about the state of the council's partnership with the AU in relation to peace operations.⁷

In light of these developments, this report proceeds in four parts. Section 1 provides a brief overview of the evolution of the UN-AU partnership on peace operations since 2005. Section 2 then provides an update and analysis of key African crisis zones since early 2013, focusing on those involving new or significantly reconfigured peace operations—namely, in Mali, Somalia, CAR, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan.⁸ The third section then examines some of the major outstanding challenges facing the institutional relationship between the UN and AU, paying particular attention to the two councils in New York and Addis Ababa. It suggests that the partnership in general and both institutions in particular still face some significant challenges and cultural differences that reduce their ability to deploy effective peace operations in the field. The final section offers recommendations for enhancing partnership between the UN and AU in this crucial area.

The Evolving UN-AU Partnership in Peace and Security

The relationship between the UN and AU is multidimensional and multilayered, addressing a wide range of issues through a variety of mechanisms. Debate continues over how best the UN and African regional arrangements can pool their resources and allocate responsibilities in order to deploy effective peace operations. The main elements of the UN-AU partnership with respect to peace operations include consultative meetings, desk to desk reviews, joint mechanisms, and common field deployments.

In 2006, the UN's "Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU" was established to enhance the capacity of the AU Commission and African subregional organizations to act as effective UN partners in addressing Africa's challenges. As this program nears its end (in November 2016), attention has turned to how to operationalize some form of more enduring UN-AU compact.⁹

Since 2007, members of the UN Security Council and members of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) have held annual consultative meetings, alternating between New York and Addis Ababa.¹⁰ These meetings are held in private and not given an official meeting number, and are officially between the *members* of the two councils, not the two councils themselves.¹¹ The meetings

6 This issue was explicitly addressed in the recent lessons-learned exercise on AU to UN mission transitions in Mali and the Central African Republic. See UN Security Council, *Letter dated 2 January 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, UN doc. S/2015/3, January 5, 2015.

7 "UN-AU Partnership," *What's In Blue*, December 15, 2014, available at www.whatsinblue.org/2014/12/un-au-partnership-open-debate-and-negotiations-on-presidential-statement.php.

8 We do not cover recent developments in Darfur, Sudan, since little has changed in the UN-AU relationship concerning UNAMID. The operation has essentially functioned as a blue-helmet mission since 2008 despite its "hybrid" title and leadership structure.

9 The interim assessment panel noted that the program still confronted major challenges in the following areas: "coordination within and between clusters, sub-clusters and the RCM; information and communications within the system and beyond; joint planning and programming of interventions by stakeholders; mainstreaming cross-cutting issues; monitoring of actions; a stronger engagement with the RECs and the NPCA; and, above all resource mobilization." United Nations, *UN Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the AU: Second Triennial Review 2010-2012*, UN doc. ECA/RCM/15/2, March 14, 2014, para. 12, available at www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploads/e1400430_second_triennial_review_of_the_united_nations_ten-year_capacity_building_programme_for_the_african_union.pdf.

10 Thirteen formal meetings were held by the UN Security Council in Addis Ababa in 1972, and another set of five meetings were held in Nairobi 2004 (three related to Sudan, one to Somalia, and one to the institutional relationship with the AU). Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edition, 2014), p. 635.

11 When held at the UN headquarters, for example, the joint meetings are held in a conference room rather than the Security Council chamber.

have helped build mutual understanding by addressing specific crises and operations, as well as broader thematic issues including combating terrorism and institutional collaboration. The communiqué issued after the sixth meeting broke new ground in the extent to which it discussed the substance of the various matters on the agenda. By mid-2014, the eighth annual consultative meeting was held in New York, this time with a new, more rigid format designed by Russia.¹² Nevertheless, discussions continued to address both country-specific and cross-cutting thematic issues, including combating terrorism and cooperation between the two councils.¹³

In 2009, the AU appointed a new ambassador to its observer office to the UN, and in 2010 the UN and AU created the Joint Task Force on Peace and Security. Meeting twice a year at the senior level, the joint task force has helped to review immediate and long-term strategic issues. It has recently adopted recommendations to strengthen the exchange of information between the UN and AU and promote joint analyses of conflicts in order to build a common understanding of the causes and drivers of organized violence in Africa. It is worth considering how mechanisms such as the joint task force could support regional African initiatives such as the Nouakchott process, launched in March 2013 to strengthen regional cooperation across the Sahel-Saharan region for combating terrorism and operationalizing the African Peace and Security Architecture.

In 2011, a major step forward was taken with the creation of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa. UNOAU has played an important operational role in supporting the planning and management of AU peace operations, both directly and by facilitating cooperation between various UN actors and the AU Commission. Politically, it has worked to enhance engagement at multiple levels. In May 2013, the UN secretary-general upgraded the importance of

UNOAU by appointing its new head, and UN special representative to the AU, for the first time at the level of under-secretary-general. In 2014, UNOAU and the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department signed a Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which will frame and guide their joint work.

During 2014, the UN Security Council also held further discussions on the UN-AU partnership with a particular emphasis on peace operations. In July, Rwanda organized one such debate that resulted in Security Council resolution 2167 and led to the establishment of a lessons-learned exercise on transitions from AU peace operations to UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁴ In December, Chad organized a discussion on the UN-AU partnership on peace operations and its evolution, which produced a Security Council presidential statement, but also was reported to have generated considerable argument, particularly over the financial aspects of African peace operations.¹⁵ The council's subsequent presidential statement reiterated "that regional organizations have the responsibility to secure human, financial, logistical and other resources for their organizations, including through contributions by their members," and went on to stress "the need to secure more financial resources from within the African continent."¹⁶

With regard to field deployments, several models of UN-AU operational partnerships have been developed (and are analyzed further below). Since 2004, planned transitions from AU to UN peace operations have taken place in Burundi, Mali, and CAR. In Darfur, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was transitioned into the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) at the start of 2008. The UN has also provided support packages to AU missions, including those in Darfur and Somalia. The UN's Support Office to the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) established in 2009 was particularly notable for its use of the UN's assessed peacekeeping budget to fund the logistical

12 "Annual Meeting with Members of the AU PSC," *What's In Blue*, June 5, 2014, available at www.whatsinblue.org/2014/06/annual-meeting-with-members-of-the-au-psc.php.

13 See UN Security Council, *Joint communiqué of the eighth annual joint consultative meeting between members of the Security Council of the United Nations and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, UN doc. S/2014/400, June 9, 2014.

14 UN Security Council Resolution 2167 (July 28, 2014), UN Doc. S/RES/2167; UN doc. S/2015/3.

15 See UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, UN doc. S/PRST/2014/27, December 16, 2014 and "UN-AU Partnership," *What's In Blue*.

16 UN doc. S/PRST/2014/27, pp. 2 and 6.

support package provided to AMISOM. It was also notable for forcing the UN and AU personnel on the ground to work together to address the operational challenges and overcome the problems posed by their distinct organizational cultures, procedures, and capacities. The UN and AU have also conducted several joint assessment missions in Somalia and CAR.

We submit that the evolving UN-AU partnership on peace operations will continue to be driven primarily by a combination of four factors. First, a widespread recognition that both UN and regional contributions are vital to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa but a lack of consensus over the precise relationship between those contributions, in general and in specific crisis zones. Second, the ongoing debates over how to interpret and implement an interrelated series of international norms, particularly those related to “good governance,” protection of civilians, and the responsibility to protect. Third, that the pragmatic and operational responses to multiple crises in Africa and the large peace operations that have subsequently deployed in Darfur, Somalia, Mali, and CAR have had a major influence on the evolution of the institutional relationship between the UN and AU.¹⁷ Finally, power politics has also played a role inasmuch as the national interests of several key states have also shaped the evolution of the UN-AU partnership on these issues. At the UN Security Council, France, the UK, and the US, known as the “permanent three” or P3, have played the most active role in drafting resolutions related to peace operations, while at the AU, the influence of South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Algeria, and Uganda has been particularly notable. In contrast, civil society has had relatively little input, although it is fair to say its role is increasing rather than diminishing.

UN-AU Relations since 2013: Responding to Crises Old and New

Although the UN-AU partnership has deepened over the last two years (since the previous IPI report on the subject), it has not been a positive period for the continent in terms of crises. Not least, trends in political violence on the continent have continued to increase, particularly in Nigeria, CAR, and South Sudan.¹⁸ Further violence and governance challenges have also bedeviled peace operations in Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, CAR, and the DRC. The result has been the deployment of new missions as well as reinforcement of some existing ones. There have, of course, been other notable political crises in Africa during this period, including the massive level of violence centered on Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria, ongoing constitutional issues in Egypt, Libya’s descent into civil war, and the political crisis in Burkina Faso, where the military assumed power after long-time president Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign after violent domestic protests. But since none of these crises have generated peace operations they do not form part of this study.

During this period, a number of significant characteristics of African-led peace operations became even more apparent. As Ibrahim Gambari, former joint African Union–United Nations special representative for Darfur, recently noted, first, these missions have included mandates for offensive operations that go beyond the usual operationalization of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter evident within UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁹ Second, the risk of spreading regional insecurity generated by these various crises increased the pressure on neighboring states to contribute to these missions. Hence while

17 See Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, “Partnership peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship,” *African Affairs* 113, No. 451 (2014): 254–278.

18 See Jakkie Cilliers and Steve Hedden, “Africa’s current and future stability,” Institute for Security Studies Paper 274, November 2014, available at www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper274.pdf.

19 Ibrahim Gambari, keynote conference speech, “The Future of African Peace Operations,” Cape Town, December 17–18, 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mw8KXtXWK3w&feature=youtu.be.

UN operations might be appropriately characterized as “saving strangers,” recent African-led operations have been predominantly about “saving neighbors.” Third, although the AU has tried to build its capacity to conduct genuinely multidimensional peace operations, it has achieved only very limited success, with most of its missions remaining military-heavy. This caused particular problems in environments that required stabilization and public security tasks, where police officers and other civilian experts would be better suited than soldiers. Fourth, greater emphasis was put on the need to conduct genuinely rapid deployments. Not only was this crucial to meet the expectations of local populations who were told repeatedly that the AU was building a standby force, it also necessitated the development of the new African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) as an interim measure while the African Standby Force was completed.²⁰ Finally, it became clear that the AU’s members, the UN, and the core group of non-African partners failed to generate the resources necessary to sustain African-led operations in the field. This, according to Gambari, was something the AU in particular has to rectify as a matter of urgency.

MALI

In Mali, the UN and AU have faced a complex armed conflict characterized by the splintering of northern factions as well as deepening divisions and fighting between Tuareg and northern Arab communities. In part, this was due to the collapse of the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement, signed by the government and major armed groups in the north on June 18, 2013.²¹ Perhaps even more worryingly, the underlying crises of national governance that precipitated the crisis have not been resolved.

For the UN and AU, this complicated crisis was

compounded by a rather troubled transition from the African-led mission, AFISMA, to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013, during which roughly 6,500 African peacekeepers were “re-hatted” to become UN peacekeepers. This saw arguments between the AU and UN over the latter’s perceived lack of consultation and its downgrading of African peacemaking efforts, as well as a variety of operational tensions related to the transition of mission authority from the AU to the UN.²² Key here was the argument over whether the UN mission should play a direct role in counterterrorism operations and proactively confront the insurgents, and the UN Security Council’s refusal to sanction a special logistical support package for AFISMA funded by the UN’s assessed peacekeeping budget (as had been supplied to the AU mission in Somalia). African concerns were initially expressed by the AU chairperson and the president of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission, who took the unusual step of writing a letter to the UN secretary-general setting out the amendments they wanted to make to the draft version of UN Security Council Resolution 2100, which authorized MINUSMA.²³ The AU subsequently denounced Resolution 2100 as “not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years, on the basis of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.”²⁴ For its part, the UN Security Council noted the AU had not fulfilled its earlier reporting requirement (every sixty days upon the deployment of AFISMA).

The AU and the UN also disagreed over the appointment of the leadership of MINUSMA.²⁵

20 African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalization of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the Establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises,”* AU doc. RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a), 2013.

21 The agreement, which had been signed by the Mouvement national de liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) and acceded to by the Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CM-FPR) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), committed the signatories to a ceasefire, negotiation on a final peace agreement, the cantonment and disarmament (after the signing of the global and final peace agreement) of the armed groups in the north, as well as the redeployment of the MDSF in the Kidal region.

22 For details see UN doc. S/2013/265, May 3, 2013; Solomon A. Dersso, *Annual Review of the AU Peace and Security Council 2013/2014*, Institute for Security Studies, January 2014, pp. 68–69, available at www.issafrica.org/publications/other-publications/annual-review-of-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-2013-2014; and Williams and Boutellis, “Partnership peacekeeping,” p. 275.

23 UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2100.

24 African Union Peace and Security Council, *Communiqué of the 371st PSC Meeting on the situation in Mali*, AU doc. PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLXXI), April 25, 2013, para. 10.

25 Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, “Disagreements over Mali could sour more than the upcoming African Union celebration,” *The Global Observatory*, May 15, 2013, available at <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/05/disagreements-over-mali-could-sour-more-than-the-upcoming-african-union-celebration/>.

Most notably, the AU was disappointed that the UN secretary-general did not appoint Pierre Buyoya, special representative of the AU Commission chairperson and head of AFISMA, to head MINUSMA. There was also tension between the AU and the UN in the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA over who should lead the peacemaking effort in Mali. Although the initial plan was for MINUSMA to take political leadership, major neighboring countries and the AU came to assume the major role in facilitating the peace talks hosted in Algeria.

Since then, the conflict has continued with increasing use of asymmetric tactics, including suicide attacks and IED bombings by several militant armed groups against Malian troops, French forces, and MINUSMA. As a result, MINUSMA quickly became the world's deadliest UN mission, suffering more than forty fatalities and 100 injuries by the end of 2014. The subsequent series of mediated negotiations that began in July 2014 have also struggled to make serious headway.²⁶ The worry is now that two years of international engagement has failed to alter the fundamental characteristics that originally spawned Mali's crisis.

SOMALIA

In contrast, the news concerning UN-AU relations coming out of Somalia remained comparatively favorable; this theater has witnessed the most intense and enduring forms of UN-AU partnership to date. Here, the major changes in the situation since mid-2013 stemmed from three developments. First was the reinvention of al-Shabaab, which pursued a more extreme political stance by relinquishing many of its territorial strongholds and utilizing instead asymmetric tactics such as IEDs, ambushes, assassinations, and commando-style raids.²⁷ The organization also increasingly focused its efforts on expanding beyond Somalia, notably in Kenya where it carried out a large number of attacks, the most spectacular being on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in September 2013 but also including several

massacres conducted in northeastern Kenya. The second development was the ramping up of efforts to develop a set of effective Somali national security forces. Although huge challenges remained, the Somali National Army did make significant contributions to two offensive campaigns during 2014. The third development was the expansion of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which enabled it to conduct more offensive operations against al-Shabaab.

For the UN-AU relationship, the key development was the UN-authorized expansion of AMISOM in November 2013 to over 22,000 uniformed personnel.²⁸ This was based on the recommendation of a joint benchmarking review conducted by a range of actors, including both the UN and AU. Importantly, the review concluded that after nearly two years of adopting a defensive posture, AMISOM and the Somali National Army should take the fight to al-Shabaab to dislodge it from its urban strongholds and weaken its sources of economic strength. As part of the AMISOM expansion, the UN's logistical support package was enhanced to cope with a larger mission, also in order to provide nonlethal support to the Somali national security forces. Most of AMISOM's additional forces were generated by Ethiopia's integration of more than 4,000 soldiers into the mission in early 2014. This expansion facilitated two offensive campaigns during 2014: Operations Eagle and Indian Ocean. During March 2014, Operation Eagle recovered eight districts from al-Shabaab.²⁹ On August 25, 2014, AMISOM and the Somali National Army launched their second offensive campaign, Operation Indian Ocean. This captured approximately a dozen additional settlements from al-Shabaab, including the group's headquarters in Barawe. A further blow came on September 1st when al-Shabaab's leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed by a US airstrike.

While AMISOM and the Somali security forces continue to face some serious challenges, especially related to stabilizing the recovered settlements, there are two significant challenges that AMISOM

26 The first round of negotiations took place from July 14–24 in Algeria, facilitated by a mediation team led by Algeria and comprising the United Nations/MINUSMA, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.

27 See Matt Bryden, "The Reinvention of al-Shabaab," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2014.

28 For details, see Paul D. Williams, "Stabilising Somalia," *RUSI Journal* 159, No. 2 (2014): 52–60.

29 African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Somalia*, AU doc. PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII), October 16, 2014, para. 21.

raises for UN-AU relations. The first concerns the mismatch between the requirements of AMISOM's combat operations and the support package provided by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which was designed for a largely consensual UN peacekeeping operation. The latest report from the chair of the AU Commission, for instance, noted the poor "operational state" of AMISOM's armored personnel carriers, as well as its "shortage of troop carriers, armored vehicles, fuel and water trucks, and ambulances."³⁰ The second issue is whether the UNSOA mechanism could and should be repeated in other theaters. In Mali, the UN Security Council's decision not to create a similar support package for AFISMA caused considerable tension with the AU. The UN took the same view in the Central African Republic, but this time the UN-AU partnership continued to work reasonably well.

While overall the UN-AU relationship has made significant progress in Somalia, there remained some areas of tension. Despite the AU's appreciation for UNSOA, which certainly represented a major improvement on the previous situation, tensions emerged between AMISOM and UNSOA over communication and coordination (including during the 2014 offensives), the gap between the tempo of AMISOM's operation and the pace of delivery of UNSOA's logistic support, and the scope of the support package (particularly in terms of covering AMISOM's civilian component). On the other hand, UNSOA's presence on the ground required UN and AMISOM personnel to work through their distinct organizational cultures, procedures, and capacities to get the job done. The poor relationship between the UN Political Office for Somalia and the AU improved with the arrival of United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), although not without some early conflicts over who should take the political lead on issues from federalism to security sector reform.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The Central African Republic's descent into anarchy and sectarian violence during 2013 provided yet another theater in which the UN-AU partnership was tested. After a rebel coalition known as the Séléka overthrew the government of

François Boizizé in March 2013, the state institutions in CAR—which were already decaying—collapsed entirely and a cycle of violent revenge developed between Séléka forces and the anti-Balaka vigilante militias they catalyzed. The crisis was also notable for unfolding while several external military forces were on the ground in CAR, including troops from the Economic Community of Central African States—known by their French acronym MICOPAX—as well as France and South Africa. In this case, African regional actors, supported by France, retained the lead in the peacemaking efforts; specifically, Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who led the subsequent mediation process.

The UN-AU partnership started early in CAR and certainly benefited from some of the lessons learned from the troubled transition process in Mali. UN participation began as early as April 2013 in the AU-led assessment missions, which developed the concept of operations for the African-led International Support Mission to CAR (MISCA). Following these assessments, in July 2013, the AU authorized MISCA's deployment, necessitating a transition from the MICOPAX regional operation to the AU's MISCA. In early August the refined strategic concept of operations for MISCA was submitted to the UN Security Council. This envisaged MISCA's tasks including civilian protection; stabilization of CAR and restoration of state authority; support for a new disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan; and monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in the country.

MISCA's deployment did not go as swiftly as planned. In part this was because African contributing countries did not come forward with sufficient personnel to meet MISCA's authorized force size. But it was also important that the UN Security Council failed to achieve a consensus on endorsing the mission and authorizing a support package for it as envisaged in the concept of operations. Although UN Security Council Resolution 2121 expressed support for MISCA, it postponed a decision on the type of support it would provide. Instead, it requested the secretary-general to report to the council on detailed options

30 Ibid.

for international support to MISCA, including the possible option of transforming MISCA into a UN peacekeeping operation subject to appropriate conditions developing on the ground. To this end, the UN deployed an assessment mission to CAR from October 27 to November 8, 2013.

The debate over whether to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in CAR was influenced by several factors. First, CAR's crisis was initially viewed primarily through humanitarian lenses since it had few strategic implications for the permanent members of the UN Security Council. France continued to hold the UN "pen" on CAR, as it did with the Central African region more broadly. Second, there was no appetite within the P3 for replicating the UNSOA model in Somalia—that is, where the AU mission receives logistical support paid for from the UN's assessed peacekeeping budget. There were also debates over competing priorities, with France and the UK in particular arguing over the relative merits of prioritizing the new MINUSMA mission in Mali or AMISOM in Somalia.

In December 2013, the UN Security Council authorized MISCA's deployment alongside the French Operation Sangaris. The AU force subsequently assumed responsibility from MICOPAX on December 19, 2013, and by February 2014 it had reached its mandated strength of 6,000. At this point, the UN Security Council also authorized a European Union force of roughly 1,000 troops to deploy in CAR. Also in February 2014, the UN deployed its MISCA support team, which would later become the nucleus of the transition team from the AU's MISCA to the new UN operation.³¹

As in Mali, the UN did not provide MISCA with a support package along the AMISOM/UNSOA model. This prompted AU officials to express their concern that much more effort was being put into the UN takeover than into enabling MISCA to accomplish its responsibilities. This was especially problematic given that MISCA's various logistical

and capacity constraints badly limited its ability to implement its mandate effectively. In March 2014, a UN report concluded that "the current deployment of international security forces is not sufficient and lacks the civilian component to adequately protect civilians under imminent threat or to tackle the root causes of the conflict."³² The following month, arguments surfaced between the UN and AU in response to the behavior of the Chadian contingent in MISCA, which UN investigators accused of deliberately firing on civilians in an incident on March 29th.³³ More generally, Chadian troops were widely seen as being partisan in favor of the Séléka forces. Chad withdrew its contingent of more than 800 troops in April. This is not the only case that raises some of the problematic aspects of having neighboring states play core roles in peace operations, a point of particular concern for the AU if its missions are indeed correctly characterized as "saving neighbors."

On September 15, 2014, MISCA was transformed into the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission to the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), in part by re-hatting some of the MISCA forces. This was facilitated by the early deployment of the UN's MISCA support team and the formation of a joint operation center between the AU and UN. The UN Security Council also authorized the deployment of military enablers to MINUSCA before the transfer of authority, which helped with the initial start-up phase for the military and police components of the mission.³⁴ Unlike in Mali, in CAR continuity of command and control was helped by the MISCA force commander (and some of his key staff officers and civilian personnel) assuming command of the UN force after a competitive recruitment process.³⁵

Since its deployment, MINUSCA has struggled with many of the same challenges that faced MISCA, including violence against civilians and capability constraints involving lack of equipment and enablers. The mission also struggled to move its personnel beyond the capital, Bangui. This

31 UN doc. S/2015/3, p. 5.

32 United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic*, UN doc. S/2014/142, March 3, 2014.

33 See African Union, *Information Note of the Commission on the incident that took place in Bangui on 29 March 2014 and the withdrawal by the Republic of Chad of its contingent from MISCA*, AU doc. PSC/PR.2(CDXXVII), April 9, 2014.

34 UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (April 10, 2014), operative para. 23.

35 UN doc. S/2015/3, p. 5.

problem was partially solved by the UN purchasing a set of expeditionary base camps for some 600 personnel from the United States.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

In the DRC, 2013 saw a major development in African-UN cooperation in the form of the Intervention Brigade deployed within the UN's mission in the DRC, MONUSCO. Faced with continued intransigence by the M-23 rebel forces in particular, in January 2013 the AU Assembly endorsed the proposal of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which called for an "International Neutral Force (INF), on the basis of a linkage with MONUSCO, whose mandate should be revised to be more coercive."³⁶ This was followed by an expression of support from some members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to deploy the troops required for such a force. On March 28, 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2098 authorized the deployment of the Intervention Brigade "on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping."³⁷ The Intervention Brigade was charged, among other things, "with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups ... and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities."³⁸

The Intervention Brigade comprises just over 3,000 troops with battalions from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, under the command of a Tanzanian general. In contrast to many UN peacekeeping operations the brigade includes special forces, sniper teams, and attack helicopters. In partnership with the Congolese armed forces, the Intervention Brigade launched its first offensive operations against the M23 in August 2013 and

defeated the rebels by the end of that year. The conflict involving the M23 was officially concluded in December 2013 by an accord signed between the rebels and the DRC government, which was facilitated by Uganda, acting as chair of the ICGLR.

In early 2014, the Congolese armed forces and the Intervention Brigade dislodged the Allied Democratic Forces rebel group from its bases in eastern DRC. The brigade's next target was the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a predatory rebel movement now based in eastern DRC that was established by the members of the notorious Interahamwe, a Hutu power group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This prompted the FDLR to signal its readiness to surrender on condition that an inter-Rwandan political dialogue be initiated. In July 2014, SADC and the ICGLR gave the FDLR a six-month timeline for disarming with a midterm review of progress in October 2014. The Intervention Brigade's military pursuit of the FDLR was then put on hold, although many Security Council members and various organizations' and countries' special envoys felt that military action should have been taken against the group.³⁹ With the midterm review indicating a lack of progress in the FDLR's voluntary disarmament process, on November 5, 2014, the UN Security Council called on MONUSCO and the Congolese government to immediately update operational plans for military action against the FDLR that should begin no later than January 2015. The reasons commonly cited for the delay in MONUSCO operations against the FDLR are reluctance from the Tanzanian and South African forces, due to political disagreements between the governments of the two countries and Rwanda, and logistical challenges raised by the UN's decision to move its force's headquarters to Beni to counter attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces.⁴⁰

36 See African Union, *Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa*, AU doc. Assembly/AU/3(XX), 28 January 2013, para. 9.

37 UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (March 28, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2098. Despite these caveats, one legal analysis of the Intervention Brigade suggests it has rendered the UN peacekeepers a party to the armed conflict in DRC and hence forfeited their legal protection from attacks. Scott Sheeran and Stephanie Case, "The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo," New York: International Peace Institute, November 2014.

38 UN Doc. S/RES/2098.

39 See UN Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region*, UN doc. S/2014/697, September 24, 2014, para. 5.

40 Jason Stearns, "With deadline fast approaching, politics and logistics get in the way of operations against the FDLR," *Congo Siasa*, December 17, 2014, available at <http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/>.

SOUTH SUDAN

In South Sudan, the outbreak of civil war in late 2013 spawned a huge humanitarian crisis. It also generated another mediation process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and reinforcements and a reconfigured mandate for the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMISS. In this case, the UN and African Union have adopted largely similar objectives and agreed on the most appropriate instruments in response. They have also ceded the lead in peacemaking to IGAD, although it is debatable whether this was the correct approach.

The civil war was caused by a split in the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement, essentially over which candidates should contest the scheduled 2015 elections and to a lesser extent over governance within the party. The opening shots were fired on December 15, 2013, when fighting erupted among members of the president's Tiger battalion and subsequently spilled onto the streets of Juba. In the following months, the young country became engulfed in civil war as the Sudan People's Liberation Army rapidly splintered and in some cases degenerated into little more than groups of marauding predators. The war also involved troops from rebel movements in Sudan and the Ugandan People's Defense Force, both of which fought on the side of President Salva Kiir and his government.

UNMISS was caught by surprise and forced into the difficult position of reacting to spirals of violence, shifting frontlines, and large numbers of displaced persons. Although its bases were not designed as protection sites, UNMISS opened its gates to tens of thousands of South Sudanese who sought protection in its compounds in Juba, Bor, Akobo, Bentiu, Malakal, and Melut. Within weeks, UNMISS was sheltering approximately 100,000 displaced people who fled the fighting and sought refuge around UN bases. Apart from the immediate pressure this put on UNMISS, it also restricted the peacekeepers' ability to respond to other areas, in which the majority of the civilian population still lived.

In response, the UN Security Council moved to reinforce UNMISS to 12,500 military and 1,323 police. The plan was for these personnel to be found via temporary transfers from existing peacekeeping operations through inter-mission cooperation.⁴¹ Faced with a government that was killing some of its own civilians, UNMISS also realigned its mandate, organizational structure, and activities to prioritize civilian protection, human rights monitoring and reporting, and facilitating humanitarian assistance over the original elements of its mandate focusing on statebuilding and extension of state authority. Predictably, this drew criticism from the government, which accused UNMISS of losing its impartiality, and placed the mission in a more difficult political position with its host.⁴² In January 2014, UNMISS weapons and ammunition were temporarily confiscated in Juba and senior officials accompanied by government forces threatened to break into the UNMISS base in Bor.

International attempts to mediate an end to the war were led by IGAD, but they failed to fundamentally alter the behavior or incentives of the elites on both sides. The result was a series of brokered ceasefires throughout 2014 that were broken almost immediately. In an effort to stabilize the situation, on March 3, 2014, IGAD authorized the deployment of a Protection and Deterrent Force in South Sudan. The force was envisaged as drawing troops from "IGAD plus" countries—namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Rwanda, and Burundi. The initial proposal for the Protection and Deterrent Force to be deployed as a standalone mission parallel to UNMISS created tension between the AU and IGAD on the one hand, and between the AU and the UN on the other. The two main sources of this tension concerned the financing of the force's deployment and the relationship between the force and UNMISS. However, subsequent discussions resulted in the integration of a 2,500-strong Protection and Deterrent Force into UNMISS as part of its troop surge (up to 12,500 troops).

The South Sudan experience has thus become the latest case in which African regional organizations'

41 United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, UN doc. S/2014/158, March 6, 2014, para. 55.

42 President Salva Kiir raised his concerns during the UN General Assembly in September 2014. See "South Sudan's Kiir concerned by UN Civilian Protection Focus," *Reuters*, September 27, 2014, available at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/27/uk-un-assembly-southsudan-idUKKCN0HM0NC20140927>.

decisions to deploy forces to a particular conflict influenced the shape of UN decision making and its response to conflict. It is also another case where neighborhood politics have proved problematic for peacekeeping, this time through the Ugandan intervention in its northern neighbor.

Ongoing Challenges in the UN-AU Partnership

As the foregoing review suggests, the UN-AU partnership has clearly continued to deepen and evolve in 2013 and 2014, but challenges remain at both the strategic and operational levels. One recent analysis captured some of the more negative African sentiments in the following manner:

Overall, it can be said that the support received from the Security Council for enhancing the institutional relationship between the United Nations and the African Union has fallen short of African expectations. This partly reflects the preference of some Security Council members to engage in cooperative efforts with the African Union on a case-by-case basis, rather than in open-ended commitments. The possibility of extensive financial outlays at a time when the United Nations has been facing restricted resources has also contributed to such caution.⁴³

This section discusses some of the most significant challenges, focusing first on shared problems before turning to some of the challenges specific to the two councils in Addis Ababa and New York.

SHARED CHALLENGES

It is unrealistic to expect institutions as large and multidimensional as the UN and AU to constantly agree on political responses to emerging crises or to remain completely immune from the pull of national interests of particularly influential member states. Nevertheless, they have expressed an interest in aligning their approaches wherever possible. This will be easier if the institutions can overcome some persistent challenges.

The first, and in many ways the most fundamental challenge, is for the UN and AU to ensure that their visions of peace operations are

complementary and not contradictory. There are deliberate reasons why the UN speaks of “peacekeeping operations” while the AU embraces the much broader notion of “peace support operations.” Among the most important questions the UN and AU need to resolve about the purposes of peace operations are (1) whether they should be deployed in theaters that lack a viable peace process or even ceasefire; (2) whether peace operations should engage in counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorism; and (3) to what extent should they prioritize atrocity prevention. At present, if the AU forces do indeed possess any comparative advantages, they would appear to revolve around their ability to embrace mandates that involve combat tasks. The principal problem, however, is that the AU lacks the capabilities to carry out such mandates without major external assistance.

At the operational level, both institutions face a range of capability gaps that bedevil their missions, especially those in the less benign theaters found across Africa. Key among them are gaps related to rapid deployment, police, and other civilian capacity; aviation (military and utility); transportation; medical, engineering, and logistics units; and intelligence-gathering mechanisms. For the AU, the management, support, and planning elements within the AU Commission’s Peace Support Operations Division are also severely overstretched.⁴⁴ This has also hampered the union’s ability to support and sustain its field missions.

Mission transitions also pose a variety of unique challenges for both institutions. Most fundamental is the need to generate consensus about the mission mandate. Divergent views on this issue across the AU and UN will complicate any transition process, as the case of Mali illustrates. Instead, AU and UN mandates should demonstrate a “unity of strategic vision” to facilitate any transition process.⁴⁵ They must also be realistic. Yet, the lessons-learned study conducted by the UN secretary-general concluded that in both Mali and CAR, “the planning ... in terms of troop strength and capabilities, was influenced predominantly by the estimated

⁴³ Sievers and Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, p. 636.

⁴⁴ Back in 2008, a UN consultancy team recommended that the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division required at least 200 personnel to manage AU operations. Today, however, the division can muster less than 60 personnel, only two of whom are full-time, regular AU Commission employees with other part-time or seconded staff from other institutions and donors. Markus Derblom, Eva Hagstrom, and Jennifer Schmidt, “UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa,” Stockholm, Sweden: FOI, Swedish Defense Research Agency, November 2008, p. 21.

⁴⁵ UN doc. S/2015/3, p. 3.

availability of voluntary contributions rather than the actual needs on the ground.”⁴⁶ Fifteen years after the Brahimi Report, it still remains necessary for the secretariats at the UN and AU to tell their respective councils what they *need* to hear, not what they *want* to hear, with respect to planning for peace operations.

The second challenge with respect to mission transitions is to ensure that timetables for planning, procurement, hiring of personnel, and personnel rotations are synchronized in advance to avoid unnecessary obstacles. Third, the personnel and equipment provided by AU contributing countries should also meet UN standards. This was a problem in both Mali and CAR.⁴⁷ The remedy will require early coordination on the force generation process conducted by both institutions. Fourth, both institutions need to address the effects of a lack of adequate mission support and logistics to AU missions on the implementation of the mandate and any transition period to a UN operation. Fifth, due consideration must be given in advance to the ways in which mission transitions should harness regional input with regard to peacemaking and mediation efforts, including once the transition process has finished. The recent recommendation by the UN secretary-general to develop a “creative and flexible transition toolbox embodying a common vision” is a step in the right direction.⁴⁸

Both institutions also have to confront the issue of where Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) fit into the decision-making process when responding to particular African crises. This has not been resolved by the AU’s adoption of a memorandum of understanding with most of the RECs and regional mechanisms engaged with the African standby force in 2008.⁴⁹ Indeed, it is why the AU PSC has recently called upon the commission to prepare a new report analyzing how it can more effectively involve the RECs and regional

mechanisms in the pursuit of peace and security in Africa.⁵⁰

Both institutions also face challenges in aligning their respective bureaucratic procedures, including decision-making timetables. Although there is little prospect of the two councils making joint decisions—at least on a regular basis—it is important to recall the very different organizational cultures wherein the UN Security Council gives “the pen” for particular missions and issues to specific member states, whereas at the AU Peace and Security Council, the commission staff play a much more influential role in drafting communiqués. Arguably the closest the two councils have come to adopting genuinely joint decisions occurred in relation to the crisis between the two Sudans in April and May 2012, when the UN Security Council adopted almost word-for-word an earlier communiqué by the AU PSC setting out the preferred approach for the peace process.⁵¹ At other times, however, attempts to develop a genuinely joint approach have run into problems, including in Mali, where the UN and AU diverged over the most appropriate tactics for achieving the desired results. In some cases, there has been no visible attempt to forge a joint approach, most notably in the fundamentally different responses that the AU and UN adopted to Libya’s civil war in 2011.

CHALLENGES FOR THE AU PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

The AU’s Peace and Security Council also faces a range of challenges, which continue to hamper its ability to deploy effective peace operations. Perhaps most fundamental is the persistent lack of adequate and predictable funding for the AU’s peace and security activities, peace operations included. The fundamental cause of this situation is the lack of indigenous funding provided by the AU’s member states. Specifically, the AU lacks the equivalent of the UN’s assessed peacekeeping budget and, to

46 Ibid., p. 8.

47 UN and joint UN-AU-ECCAS assessments identified critical shortfalls of AU troops below UN standards in Mali (March 2013) and CAR (May 2014). There were also some problems with some African contributions related to the UN human rights screening policy. UN doc. S/2015/3, p. 6.

48 The proposed toolbox would include guidance and standards on joint assessments and planning; pre-deployment visits and force generation; coordination mechanisms; continuity in command and control; transfer of civilian capacity; support mechanisms; and arrangements to increase troop standards. UN doc. S/2015/3, p. 10–11.

49 African Union, *Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa*, June 2008.

50 AU doc. PSC/PR/COMM.2(CDLXXVII), December 18, 2014.

51 See the text of UN Security Council Resolution 2046 (May 2, 2012) and AU doc. PSC/MIN/COMM.3(CCCXIX), April 24, 2012.

date, does not apportion a dedicated part of the AU's regular budget to support its peace operations.⁵² But the situation is not helped by the PSC's continued inability to give greater consideration to the resource implications of the decisions written into its communiqués.

A second set of challenges stems from the fact that AU member states that do not meet the criteria for membership of the Peace and Security Council, as set out in Article 5(2) of its 2002 protocol, continue to be elected onto the council.⁵³ This impedes the PSC's activities in a number of ways, including in its ability to discharge its responsibilities effectively and credibly advance the cause of "good governance" on the continent—something that the AU has repeatedly emphasized is directly connected to peace and stability.

The PSC's inability to convert early warning of impending crises into decisive early action also presents an obstacle to delivering effective peace operations inasmuch as it forces these operations to remain reactive efforts to manage major crises rather than proactive, early initiatives to prevent them.

The PSC also has a weak record of implementing its decisions, notably those related to armed conflicts and sanctions regimes. This issue was given particular attention in the conclusions of two of the recent PSC retreats on its working methods.⁵⁴ The problem of implementation has at least three dimensions. First, the PSC lacks an effective mechanism to follow up and monitor the implementation of its decisions. Second, the PSC has not always given due consideration to the amount of resources required to achieve its stated objectives. And, third, implementation is also hindered by its members' basic lack of leverage over the respective conflict parties they are trying to engage.

A final challenge relates to the PSC's presence in New York and its interaction with the UN Security Council. The PSC certainly needs a larger presence in New York to help feed its positions into the UN

Security Council's decision-making process in a timely manner. But it is also hampered by the fact that not all elected African members on the UN Security Council (the A3) hold concurrent seats in the PSC. Hence, greater clarity is required about the relationship between the PSC and the A3, especially concerning members of the latter that do not hold seats in the former.

There is also the problem of policy incoherence and lack of coordination between the AU and the RECs. The current inability of African organizations to coordinate their positions on particular crises in a clear and timely manner means that there is not always an African regional consensus from which to build broader international support. Part of the PSC's job in New York would therefore be to develop workable approaches for facilitating policy coherence and operational coordination with the African RECs.

CHALLENGES FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Like the AU PSC, the UN Security Council also faces some significant challenges in its pursuit of more effective peace operations, particularly in some African theaters. It shares with the PSC some of the challenges related to implementing and following up on its decisions, as well as thinking through the resource implications of the mandates it has authorized.

Perhaps the most controversial challenge facing the UN revolves around the financial support it should provide to the AU. Although the UN has its own system of financing "blue helmet" peace operations, it continues to face the problem of how it should support missions that it has authorized but does not lead, such as those that have now deployed in Somalia, Mali, and CAR. The 2008 Prodi Panel recommended two options to deal with this eventuality. First, UN member states should establish a multidonor trust fund to support AU peacekeeping capacity. The challenge is that such trust funds are not a reliable way to sustain operations, especially those that engage in enforce-

52 The one instance in which the AU dedicated a portion of its assessed contribution to a peace operation was in January 2013 to pay for part of the AFISMA budget in Mali.

53 These include respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law, and human rights; contributing to the AU peace fund; entering into conflict resolution initiatives; and having adequately equipped and staffed delegations in Addis Ababa and New York. See Dersso, *Annual Review*, pp. 6–7. See also, African Union, *Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, Durban, July 2002.

54 See the conclusions of the PSC retreats discussing its working methods in Yaounde, Cameroon (November 15–16, 2012), and Djibouti (February 9–10, 2013).

ment.⁵⁵ Nor is the UN the best entity to manage such funds compared to the bilateral donors concerned. Prodi's second option was that funds from the UN-assessed peacekeeping budget should be used to support UN-authorized AU peace operations for a period of no longer than six months, with each decision taken on a case-by-case basis, with approval by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, and with the AU mission transitioning to UN management within six months. While the UNSOA mechanism established in 2009 did provide important support to AMISOM via the UN's assessed peacekeeping budget, other AU missions in Mali and CAR did not receive similar support packages. The UN Security Council so far has rejected calls for the UN secretary-general to make a roadmap for implementation of the recommendations of the Prodi Panel report.⁵⁶ Some permanent members of the UN Security Council also remain opposed to the idea that the UN's assessed peacekeeping budget should be used to finance AU missions. And yet they have failed to articulate an alternative to the Prodi Panel's second recommendation (above) that would effectively address the problem.

A second challenge is how to structure consultation with the AU on major decisions related to peace and security in Africa.⁵⁷ In one sense, this is about ensuring that the two councils' bureaucratic procedures are in sync. But the more difficult political question is, what status should the UN Security Council give to AU views? In short, what does the Security Council need to do to ensure that the AU's views have been "duly considered"?⁵⁸ To this end, it would be useful for the two councils to agree on working procedures for the AU to submit requests for financial or diplomatic support. Such procedures would also need to take into account the related question of how the views of Africa's RECs should be fed into the UN Security Council. One option would be to explicitly report the views of the AU and relevant RECs in UN secretary-general reports on matters of African peace and

security.

Finally, as noted above, the UN needs to clarify its own position on a variety of fundamental questions related to peace operations: Should peace operations be deployed in theaters that lack viable peace processes? Should they engage in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism? And to what extent should they be used to consolidate state authority in countries where the regime is considered illegitimate by significant sections of the local population?

Recommendations

Based on our analysis of current trends and challenges in the UN-AU partnership that have materialized since the last IPI report on this subject, we submit the following recommendations to the UN and AU.

First, there should be intensified efforts to streamline, harmonize, and institutionalize the process of political decision making, both between the UN and AU, and between the AU and Africa's RECs. If the AU and RECs can coordinate their own positions and speak in unison, this is likely to facilitate greater UN Security Council support for policies that align with clear preferences expressed by the region concerned.

Second, the new joint framework for an enhanced partnership in peace and security signed between the UN Office to the African Union and the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission, which describes a strategic partnership based on unity of purpose and "jointness" wherever possible in understanding peace and security issues and in planning and undertaking appropriate responses, should be refined and extended across the rest of the AU Commission, the wider UN family, and the African RECs.

Additional recommendations are addressed to the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council in particular:

⁵⁵ For instance, in Mali the trust fund for AFISMA received only \$44 million in pledges, while the fund for MISCA in CAR received only \$5 million. Moreover, most of the pledged contributions were earmarked for non-lethal assistance, which precluded the AU using them to reimburse Contingent Owned Equipment costs. UN doc. S/2015/3, p. 7.

⁵⁶ The most recent occasion was at the debate on the UN-AU partnership for peace operations convened by Chad on December 16, 2014.

⁵⁷ A related complaint raised by India is that the members of the UN Security Council disregard the voices of non-council members while acting on matters important to them. See "India criticizes UN Security Council for ignoring 'non-member' states," *Economic Times* (India), December 17, 2014.

⁵⁸ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security, *Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence*, AU doc. PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), January 9, 2012.

- Develop, as a matter of urgency, a mechanism for financing UN-authorized AU peace support operations. The Prodi Panel’s recommendations remain the most sensible starting point for discussion. However, at best, they offer only an interim solution to a fundamental problem—the lack of indigenous sources of funding for AU peace operations (see below). The UN secretary-general’s recent lessons-learned exercise on AU to UN mission transitions in Mali and CAR recommended a joint UN-AU lessons-learned exercise “to review and assess the various mechanisms available to improve the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing” for AU peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council.⁵⁹
 - Develop mechanisms to conduct coordinated and regular assessments of existing and emerging threats to peace and security in Africa. These could build on the joint framework for an enhanced partnership (mentioned above) and the joint task force already in operation, as well as on the lessons learned from previous joint UN-AU assessment missions.⁶⁰
 - Invest more resources to consolidate and utilize tools for preventive diplomacy and peace-making.⁶¹
 - Pay greater attention to the resource implications of the councils’ respective decisions with regard to peace operations.
 - Develop a working relationship between the military staff committees of both councils to feed appropriate military advice on African crises directly into the discussions in New York and Addis Ababa. This will require African states on the PSC, and especially those members of the A3, to ensure that they have a full complement of military advisors as part of their delegations to both councils.
 - Review the differences in the respective doctrines, policies, and bureaucratic cultures of the two councils with a view to reducing the obstacles to the deployment of effective peace operations.
- The following recommendations are aimed at the African Union and AU Peace and Security Council:
- As a matter of urgency, the AU should develop a mechanism to devote a portion of its regular budget to finance its peace support operations. This could build on its January 2013 decision to cover part of the African stabilization mission in Mali’s (AFISMA) budget from assessed contributions of AU member states, pending the finalization of the discussion on alternative sources of financing. Such a mechanism would enable the AU to implement the system of financing for peace operations set out in the protocol that established the Peace and Security Council in 2002.
 - The AU should act on its announced plan to strengthen the mandate, capacity, and visibility of the AU Office to the UN to facilitate timely and effective interaction with the UN Security Council.⁶² Such a presence is required not only to help explain the PSC to the New York community, but also to help explain how the New York system works to the PSC. This problem is particularly acute because few African ambassadors at either the UN or the AU PSC have experience working in both councils, or even in other multilateral institutions. Ideally, this office should involve the convening of representatives of the AU PSC member states in New York, as well as some bureaucratic and analytical capacities to support such a group. The AU leadership should continue its efforts to find donors to support staffing for such an office, but they should also endeavor to find indigenous funds.
 - All members of the PSC should maintain the required level of technical staff in their missions in Addis Ababa, including military advisors. This is necessary to have well-informed participation in the PSC’s activities and constructive engagement with the UN Security Council. Currently, not all PSC members retain experts dedicated to

59 UN doc. S/2015/3, p. 10.


60 The Security Council has recently acknowledged the need for the UN and AU to enhance their partnership in relation to “pre-deployment joint planning and joint missions assessment processes to promote common understanding and increase effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.” UN doc. S/PRST/2014/27, p. 4.

61 As acknowledged in UN doc. S/PRST/2014/27, p. 5.

62 African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union-United Nations partnership: the need for greater coherence*, AU doc. PSC/AHG/3.(CCCXC VII), September 23, 2013.

deliver the responsibilities that come with their membership in the PSC. As a result, not all member states come to PSC meetings with adequate information and analysis on the conflict situations under consideration. This limits the PSC's effectiveness and its ability to engage with the UN Security Council on substantive issues.

- The so-called A3 states—African states elected to the UN Security Council—should provide the critical link between the two councils. However, this is difficult when A3 states are not concurrent members of the AU or PSC, and when A3 states that are members of the PSC do not coordinate their positions in both fora. To remedy the first problem, the PSC should grant a special status to any African Union member state that is elected to serve on the UN Security Council that is not concurrently a member of the PSC. This status should grant that state the right to participate in the closed meetings of the PSC. The first candidate for such status is Angola, which assumes its seat on the UN Security Council in January 2015 but will not be a member of the AU PSC. The dedicated PSC presence in New York (see above) should help remedy the other problem.
- Engage in intense diplomatic outreach in Addis Ababa to solicit the views of representatives of the nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council and use their presence in Addis Ababa to enhance policy coherence with the UN Security Council.
- Ensure better follow-up and implementation of the Peace and Security Council's decisions, perhaps through the establishment of monitoring committees or panels of experts as used by the UN Security Council.



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