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REGIONAL HISTORIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY
SEGURIDAD — A LA AMERICANA

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Abstract

The argument of this paper is that there is nothing new about the political connection made between development and security. This has characterized US relations with Latin America grounded in the Monroe Doctrine (giving the US right to intervene) that dates back to 1823. The focus here is on the 1960's, the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, when the security-development complex was put firmly in place through the build-up of the region's armed forces militaries and an aggressive, anti-communist ideology under the aegis of the US military. In this context, the paper revisits a visionary paper written by the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado in 1966 when in exile, giving his (Latin American) analysis of the security-development complex and need to react against US economic hegemony, an important strand in dependency theory.

Introducing security

Security is a concept that has lost its moorings. It is a term that shifts disconcertingly between levels and scales. It signals an ideological / political doctrine, a policy parameter (as in national or homeland security), a multifarious set of activities carried out in its name, uniformed squads (mainly men) who carry them out overtly or covertly and individual workers, some having the logo 'security' emblazoned on their work clothes. We like to think we know roughly what security means, that there is something that unites meanings across scale, time and space. But this gets harder to see. Security looms large in public arenas at certain times, then recedes into the background, though in 'risk societies' the concept never disappears. We are living through an intensely security-minded period at present when it is impossible for politicians and the media to report on 'the news' without making repeated references to security. This means the word has become a gloss for a general mood, a widespread sense of threat that is linked in the popular imagination with the need for strong (macho) action to defend the known, the ordered and the civilised against the barbarians at the gate.

Three propositions guide this paper. The first is that 'security' still carries an underlying association with territorialisation and sovereignty in that images conjured up take a territorialized form, though now more open and destabilized on account of forces of globalisation. Thus a dominating metaphor still depicts the beleaguered 'good' in a formerly secure homeland, threatened by a mobile incursive 'enemy' that can deploy weapons of mass destruction (in a time-span of 45 minutes!), fanatical suicide bombers and terrorist infiltrators. The discourse of security has a tendency to constantly shift scales and also to hark back to a common foundational image. Thus security as a policy and practice needs to be pinned down, its representation unpacked and the concept investigated as being multi-layered and having a long history. The second proposition is that at a particular political conjuncture 'security' became linked with a notion of 'development', the foundational period being the 1960's. At times thereafter their connections were more hidden, at others more blatant. For while security and development came to occupy the same ideological / discursive terrain, it has usually been politically expedient to pretend they belong in different camps. Thus it is worth investigating the foundational period of the 1960's, for arguably this can offer some guidance as to what takes place later when security once again becomes uppermost in the public imagination, as we find at the start of the 21st century.

The third proposition is that connections between security / development have been particularly resonant in the regional history of the Americas where 'Seguridad a la Americana' as a

mobilizing political concept goes back to the early 19th century. At the hemispheric scale security as a political goal emerged when Anglo-led society in the newly independent United States of America opted to protect the Hispanic-led societies to the South that had fragmented into many independent Republics after the end of colonial rule. It was in the 19th century that security was made a cornerstone of US foreign policy. On it were legitimated political doctrines that dovetailed with a new vision of sovereignty through which the US consistently meddled and / or made inroads into the affairs of countries considered to be in its 'backyard'. One can argue that it was in the Americas that a particular interpretation and practice of national and hemispheric security took shape and a long-term association between security and development built up.

Security / development in the Americas should not be seen as merely exemplifying or illustrating a global trend, rather it was the reverse. The Americas were the crucible, testing ground, initial field of operations, where politics and policies of security were played out and in so doing were welded with 'development'. The magnitude of this ideological and political burden means that one cannot understand political history in the Americas without acknowledging the power of the security / development discourse; nor can one hope to delineate security / development as a discourse without acknowledging the way these two concepts have been embedded in US geo-political, expansionist and imperialist ambitions.

The aim of this paper is to review aspects of the regional history of the Americas by exploring the events through which the concepts of security and development were first brought into the same discursive field and by enquiring into the responses this elicited among radical intellectuals from South and North who adopted a critical view. In a short paper, I need to concentrate attention on a particular time frame and voice. The period under review is the pivotal 1960's, when US security in the hemisphere became enmeshed within new notions of 'subversion' and 'counter-insurgency' on the one side and provoked a new appraisal of poverty and social unrest on the other. The decade began with two galvanizing events, the Cuban Revolution (1959) and inauguration of a popular President in the USA, John F. Kennedy (1960) and it saw the consolidation of what appeared at first sight as a contradictory US policy towards the Americas: the massive expansion of US military aid and first continent-wide development effort, known as the Alliance for Progress.

With respect to voice, the material discussed in this paper comes from a selected group of secondary sources. Central are views presented during the 1960's by radicals in South and North, many of whose writings were published in Readers (most notably, *Latin America: Reform or Revolution*, edited by Petras and Zeitlin, 1968; and *Latin American Radicalism: a Documentary*

Report on Left and Nationalist Movements, edited by Horowitz, de Castro and Gerassi, 1969) that inspired and politicised a succession of younger generations. In this turbulent period, Latin American radical intellectuals formulated a critical thesis on events that have an eerily contemporary ring. My decision to return to texts of the 1960's is not simply to set the historical record straight or to unearth the genealogy of a security-development discourse. I wish to explore whether the scenarios, structures and relations characteristic of that period can provide insights to debates on 'security-development' issues at the present time, when global political actors have again put security at the top of the political agenda. The paper builds heavily on later texts that provide illuminating syntheses of the period, most notably Jenny Pearce's analysis of Central America (1981) and Clara Nieto's recent tour de force on US-Latin American relations (2003), where a hemispheric history is recounted from a Latin American perspective. I also draw on authoritative accounts of Latin American intellectual thought by Cristóbal Kay and David Lehmann, Brian Loveman's and Samuel Fitch's histories of military-civil relations in Latin America and Mark Duffield's perceptive analysis of the merging of security and development under neo-liberalism seen from a broader perspective.

The discussion will be organised as follows. In the first section, the antecedents of US relations with the Americas in the South will be sketched out by reviewing the main Doctrines promulgated by US Presidents with respect to security. Also briefly discussed will be the exemplary case of Guatemala in 1954, this being the precursor of US policy linking military action and economic aid. The second section will look at how security and development actions became linked and theorized in the 1960's, by exploring a key text of the period, *US hegemony and the future of Latin America*, by the Brazilian economist, Celso Furtado. A short concluding section will sum up what this regional history suggests about the nature of sovereignty.

Antecedents of US – American relations in the 1960's

THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY

When I grew up in the 1960's, there was extreme suspicion about what the US was up to in Latin America. One saw a CIA plot in everything and everywhere. But there was little that was new in the ideas about security underpinning US thinking about 'its backyard' in the 1960's. The position of the US had been first formulated back in 1823 in the Monroe Doctrine;

remarkably, this doctrine has been drawn upon time and time again ever since. James Monroe (1817-25) had presided over the US at the time when Latin Americans were fighting the Wars of Independence and succeeded in liberating themselves from Spanish colonial rule. In the doctrine, the US warned the European powers, then angling for political and economic advantage in the hemisphere, that the US would consider European direct intervention in the newly emerging Latin American Republics as a threat to the peace and security of the United States itself. The doctrine declared that the free and independent American continents were henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by a European power and that the US assumed the role of protector and defender of these nations against Europe. The paternalism underlying the doctrine was bolstered up by the claim made at the end of the century as to the US's 'manifest destiny'. The US considered itself to possess moral and ideological superiority over less civilised nations and with a special mission to impart a particular brand of economic, social and political organisation among the Hispanic nations in the South. Thus by the end of the 19th century, protection against European aggression was coupled with a civilising mission to bring improvement and freedom to countries fighting a doubly burdensome heritage: colonial rule and the cultural duality of Hispanic overlordship and indigenous servitude, both of which were considered inferior to the Anglo-Saxon's aptitude for progress.

An amendment made to the Monroe Doctrine by President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-9) was to have far-reaching consequences. Roosevelt was very clear about the strategic importance of the hemisphere for US interests while at the same time being constantly irritated by their unstable governments. In 1904, a Roosevelt Corollary was added that extended the right of the US to intervene in the internal affairs of countries in the hemisphere when need arose.

Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrong doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power (quoted by Pearce, 1981: 11).

Actions spoke louder than words. In the early 20th century, Central American and Caribbean countries suffered continual intervention and many landings by US marines to 'protect North American lives and interests' (Nieto, 2003: 19). At this time, the US took over Panama, made it a semi colony and built the Panama Canal to provide a rapid transit route across the narrow isthmus joining the Americas. 'Security' was linked to geo-political concerns and the US took steps constantly to prevent any rival power (Europeans or Japanese) from building a competing transport route through Nicaragua or Colombia.

BIG STICK OR GOOD NEIGHBOUR?

US foreign policy towards the Americas in the early 20th century has been labelled Big Stick politics. Through it, dictators who were prepared to go along with US economic interests were shored up, and armed intervention remained a constant threat especially in the countries nearest to the US. This variant of US policy was suspended during the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945), when a counter mode of US relations in the hemisphere came to the fore, that of Good Neighbour. This led to some curbing of militarism and signing of a protocol of non-intervention by the US and Latin American governments. Abrupt reversals - from domination to protection - as presaged by the Monroe Doctrine, were to characterize US policy towards the Americas of the South throughout the 20th century. It meant that different US presidencies became associated with one variant of US policy or the other, although in practice there were stronger continuities in US intervention than appeared on the surface.

Justification for US intervention in the Americas in the name of security took on a new urgency at the end of World War II. In the polarisation between communist and capitalist worlds, and in light of Churchill's powerful image that an Iron Curtain was going up across Europe, President Harry Truman pledged that the US would protect 'free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure' and defend the 'free world' against the communist threat. As Nieto (2003: 25) comments, the Truman Doctrine rationalized Cold War Policies and globalised the Monroe Doctrine. When in the 1950's the US became gripped by a 'fundamentalist' anti-communist fervour, this was channelled into new rounds of intervention and military involvement first of all in Latin America where support was offered to authoritarian regimes and military strongmen, no matter how undemocratic and abusive of human rights, that were prepared to stand up against communism.

GUATEMALA, 1954

In the late 1940's, the US bracing itself to withstand Soviet attack passed a National Security Act and created a series of new security institutions: the National Security Council, CIA and Department of Defence. In the Americas, the first country to fall victim to the Cold War interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was Guatemala. In Guatemala tentative moves had been made by a liberal reformist government in the late 1940's to pass legislation giving minimum rights to workers, free speech and educational reform. In 1952, under the government of President Jacobo Arbenz a modest land reform was attempted. As Pearce (1981: 28-31) reports, the intention behind the law was to modernize the agrarian sector and create an internal

market. It aimed to expropriate unused land from large landowners and distribute it amongst the land-poor peasantry. But landowners were opposed, above all the United Fruit Company, a US multinational that had become the biggest landowner in the country. United Fruit owned over half a million acres of which only 15% was under cultivation. Under the agrarian reform law, some 387,000 acres would be confiscated for distribution to some 180,000 peasant households, and in return a compensation of more than one million dollars offered to the Company. This action branded the Guatemalan government as communist inspired.

On the grounds that US economic interests were threatened, the CIA organised a military coup in 1954. A right-wing colonel, graduate of the US Command and General Staff School at Fort Lauderdale, led the coup supported by US arms and dollars and a rebel force trained in Honduras. The new government revoked the progressive legislation and a US prepared programme of modernization introduced, the basis of which would be US foreign investment. Now US foreign aid poured in and was used for the first time as a weapon of US foreign policy. 'Liberated' from communism, the country was intended to become an anti-communist showcase and bulwark of the 'free world'.

Guatemala seemed a presentiment of future US policy. But events were to take a less predictable course following the Cuban Revolution, inauguration of President Kennedy who took an unusual interest in Latin America, and the emergence of political radicals who kept watch, unearthed, documented, and communicated through networks of their own plentiful evidence of US government hypocrisy, duplicity and immorality with regards to the Americas and Vietnam.

Linking security with development

EDGING CLOSER: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

Up to the 1960's, US military aid to Latin America was given largely on the pretext of defending countries of the hemisphere against an external aggressor. This changed as a result of Cuba, first when the revolutionary Government slid into the Soviet economic camp and later in 1962 as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis that dangerously provoked a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. There was a realisation that most armed conflict would now take place in the Third World and that the US had to prepare for a different kind of 'non-conventional', guerrilla-style war to protect their interests. As a prelude to this, Kennedy

agreed to a 5-fold increase in the US army's special forces, who were expert in dealing with subversion, counter insurgency tactics and rapid deployment of force (Pearce, 1981). A much-quoted comment by Kennedy (in an address to Latin American leaders in 1961) revealed the way he interpreted the security doctrines he had inherited:

But let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that the inter American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action – if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside communist penetration then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our nation (quoted by Morray, 1968: 102).

A similar warning was given in a study presented to the Council on Foreign Relations: 'if the leaders of Latin American states attempt irresponsible use of their numerical strength in the Organisation of American States, if they carry to extremes the doctrine of non-intervention, if they leave the US with no alternative but to act unilaterally to protect itself, they will have destroyed not only the basis of co-operation for progress but all hope of a secure future for themselves' (ibid).

In 1963, the Military Assistance Programme of the US focussed specifically on expanding counter insurgency tactics that were defined by the Pentagon as a combination of military, para-military, political, economic, psychological and civic action carried on by a government in order to destroy any movement of subversive insurgency. Thus it was under Kennedy that US military aid was for the first time channelled to Latin America for the purpose of shoring up internal security. Under the Military Assistance Programme, the US expanded the training 'for jungle warfare' and equipping of Latin American militaries, tried to weld national armies into an Inter-American Peace Force and also advocated the need for Latin American militaries to promote civic action. It was now up to the military to engage in state-building activities such as in road construction and irrigation schemes to and improve the army's image as saviour of the nation in the eyes of local people. The US was prepared to expand its financial support, and military aid doubled from some \$35 million per year in the 1950's to \$70 million per year in the 1960's (Saxe-Fernandez, 1969). Between 1950 and 1970, more than 700,000 officers from countries in conflict graduated from US military schools (Nieto, 2003: 72). Their training had included not only military and security matters but also instruction in anti-communist ideology and democratic principles. The objective, as Nieto (2003: 72) commented, 'was to prepare a military elite capable of assuming leadership in countries where social and student protest deemed communist or communist-leading had the potential to explode into revolu-

tionary situations.’ The support given to Latin American militaries to realize social and economic reform was one of the most controversial and negative legacies of the Kennedy administration (Nieto, 2003: 93). Participation in matters of internal security with Washington’s blessing turned to repression, and dirty wars carried out by militaries against their own civilian populations.

The tough talk of Kennedy on security issues and build-up of expertise in counter-insurgency in military establishments North and South were accompanied by a very different message, written in the language of the Good Neighbour. In government circles, it was recognised that to prevent a second Cuba, there needed to be a much greater injection of foreign aid in the South and encouragement given to socio-economic reform. This thinking incorporated a New Deal kind of policy rhetoric that had been introduced in the US homeland under President Franklin D. Roosevelt for development within a capitalist and democratic framework as well as proposals for structural reform, especially agrarian reform, advocated by Latin American economists belonging to the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), known also by its Spanish acronym, CEPAL, based in Santiago, Chile. For a brief moment, the Alliance for Progress programme brought consensus in the hemisphere; at the inaugural meeting held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961, one saw unlikely encounters such as between Dean Rusk (Secretary of State of the US) and Che Guevara (representing Cuba).

In its first formulation, the language of the Alliance for Progress was distinctly radical. The text of the Charter drawn up argued for the need to find an equitable system of property ownership to replace the old colonial system in which huge latifundia were juxtaposed with the dwarf holdings of the poor, a more equitable distribution of income and development of a capital goods industry so as to reduce colonial-style dependence. However, US delegates consented to the inclusion of ‘nationalist’ goals in the Charter only on condition that US interests were also represented, namely encouragement given to the flow of foreign investment, promotion of US exports to Latin America and insurance against risk of appropriation for US companies. The US offered \$20 billion in foreign aid over a ten year period (Nieto, 2003: 70). The alliance was conceived as a plan of co-operation with each country setting aside resources to realize structural reform.

The euphoric moment passed. Other voices were soon heard in Washington stressing the need to link economic aid with military security. Thus a statement made before the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1962 noted: For the Alliance for Progress to have a chance of success, governments must have enough power to control subversion, prevent terrorism and eliminate violence which may reach unmanageable proportions. In time, the

economic aid delivered through the Alliance for Progress became seen as complementary to the serious business of supporting the armed forces in Latin America, now heralded as 'not only the sole force of stabilization but also promoters of democratic institutions and progressive changes of a socio-economic nature.' Latin American states soon found out that the Alliance was only open to certain kinds of leaders who promoted certain kinds of Progress. This led the radicals to claim that the whole purpose of the Alliance had been to buy time, and revive faith in the potential of the existing bourgeois social order to support US interests (Murray, 1968). Soon the contradictions at the heart of the Alliance for Progress became apparent to all as partners were increasingly using force to create the appearance of peace and stability. This led to a wholesale decline in democratic liberties and the slide towards authoritarianism, dictatorship and repression.

In the end, ruling oligarchies in Latin America had little to fear from the radical rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress text. Awkward clauses, especially about agrarian reform, were abandoned. The Alliance was used to restore business confidence; the aid forthcoming through the Programme was tied to the purchase of US goods and services, and spent on infrastructure projects to open up new areas for foreign capital. At the same time, ruling elites made sure to curb popular organisations and trade unions by passing socially repressive legislation. Even by 1964, Kennedy admitted to being depressed about the failure of the Alliance. Governments in Latin America were clearly reluctant to carry out social and political change and in practice the aid had been subject to many conditions and was not as 'free' as promised at Punta del Este.

After the assassination of Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson entered the White House and used the Alliance for Progress demonstratively to support authoritarian regimes. The US swung back to Big Stick interventionist policies, soon seen in the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 when 400 US marines and some 40,000 infantry soldiers were sent to put down a national rebellion and occupy the country. Though this belligerent act was strongly criticized throughout Latin America and at the United Nations the US was accused of violating the principle of non-intervention, the House of Representatives in the US immediately approved a resolution authorizing the US Government to intervene in the affairs of other nations including armed intervention where there was a risk of communist subversion. This, as Nieto (2003: 101) comments, gave rise to a new Johnson Doctrine of intervention. As right-wing military coups took power the Johnson Doctrine was endorsed especially in the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile) and Central America (Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic). Military regimes imposed peace and order by force and Latin American nations were locked into a dependent position both politically and economically, as source of raw materials for the US and market for US manufactured goods.

Theorizing the linkage between security and development: revisiting Furtado

Celso Furtado was a distinguished economist who in the late 1940's had joined ECLA. The group of economists and economic historians, working under Raul Prebisch, formed a kind of 'think tank' to reflect on Latin America's economic and social history in order to come up with proposals as to how Latin America could prepare for a better future. His analysis of Latin American development was summarised in an influential book (published in Portuguese in 1961 and in English in 1964), *Development and Underdevelopment: a structural view of the problems of developed and underdeveloped countries*. He shared the two central pillars of ECLA thinking. One was that development paths in the periphery of the world capitalist system were bound to diverge from the industrialized North, the other was that state agencies (rather than spontaneous market forces) would be the principal driving force in the development process. ECLA's diagnosis was that Latin American countries had to stop being exporters of primary products and should follow an inner-directed strategy of development.

Following several years with ECLA, Furtado returned to Brazil where he held ministerial posts and tried to put ECLA thinking into practice. But in 1964 a military coup supported by the US overthrew Joao Goulart, the popular, democratically elected, President. Nieto (2003: 165) comments, with Goulart's departure Brazilian democracy died: 'The long period of the neo-fascist National Security Doctrine dictatorships began, launching a twenty-one-year-long era of brutal repression.' Furtado (2003) recalled following a lifetime in exile, how before dictatorship Brazil had been industrializing and experiencing sweeping social transformations. The earlier economic model was ensuring that people were being incorporated into modern society. But all this came crashing down as a result of the coup. True enough the Brazilian economy kept growing, but the style of development had changed, and the social forces present earlier disappeared. After the phase of autonomous development had ended, 'we entered the peace of the cemeteries; it was the era of dictatorship. Thirty years went by without real thinking and without the chance of participating in social movements.'

In 1966 Furtado, then in exile in Paris, published a short polemical article, '*US hegemony and the future of Latin America*', in *The World Today*, house journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, that was later reprinted in radical readers (including Horowitz, de Castro and Gerassi, 1969, from which the following page references refer). It bears the marks of

ECLA's diagnosis of development problems as well as the radical viewpoint emerging amongst intellectuals in the South at the time. Its main arguments ran as follows.

i) Latin American autonomy was being seriously reduced due to US 'security'

In the early 1960's, Latin Americans had become aware that the 'easy' phase of economic growth, brought about by increasing the export of primary goods and first phase of import substitution, was becoming exhausted. But countries of the region were also increasingly aware that the margin for self-determination, as to their ways of coping with the tendency towards economic stagnation, was being daily reduced 'as the imperative of US "security" calls for a growing alienation of sovereignty on the part of national governments' (1969: 61). A feeling of revolt was spreading in Latin America, particularly among the young; Latin America was entering a 'revolutionary' phase where changes in technology and in collective aspirations were taking place but where neither could be absorbed by institutions ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of modernization. The challenges were 'of direct interest to the authorities responsible for security in the US who are in a position to interfere decisively in the working out of a solution for these problems'(1969: 62). Latin Americans therefore needed to understand what US security was all about, and assess the degree to which the interests of US security were compatible with Latin America's imminent socio-economic 'revolution'.

ii) The US was defining and imposing hegemonic control over its sphere of influence

Furtado saw that a new international order was evolving as a result of the cold war. The US now acknowledged that a conclusive victory over communism was not possible, and the supreme aim of its foreign policy had become the defence of the integrity of the free world. This demanded that the perimeter of the US sphere of influence be strictly delimited and that social techniques be developed and applied in order to prevent significant changes from taking place in the social structures of countries found within this sphere. The conclusive test had come in October 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis; this dangerous confrontation had almost unleashed nuclear war and had established that the USSR could not give unlimited guarantees to defend a country in the North American sphere of influence that attempted to break free from US hegemony.

iii) In the US sphere of influence social stability was paramount

Once the US sphere of influence had been established and outside military interference neutralized, the question then arose as to whether US hegemony was able to maintain a sufficiently high degree of social stability within its area of influence. This brought up the issue of technological development and the speed with which modern technology could penetrate the

underdeveloped world, overcome initial resistance and ensure continuity. However, technological change would inevitably provoke social dislocation. While in earlier years, social instability in the Third World had been viewed in the US as an aspect of the cold war, later 'the doctrine emerged, formulated by MIT technicians led by W.W. Rostow, according to which the aims of US foreign policy could more easily be fostered by properly organizing "foreign aid" programs for underdeveloped countries' (1969: 65) In this way, it was assumed by the US that the development process could be oriented from the outside and that the US could 'create independent, modern and developing States' (ibid). This theory 'produced its most brilliant efflorescence in the Alliance for Progress' (ibid). But all forms of economic change, even those oriented from the outside, were bound to create social instability. Those writing on the Alliance for Progress in the US had also been aware that 'programmes designed to promote socio-economic development will create tensions and dislocations as the old and indigenous way of life is replaced by a new and alien mode of living'. This meant that the most effective type of foreign aid, seen through US eyes, was aid that satisfied and shored up local elites who undertook to keep their countries out of communist or Soviet control. During periods of social turmoil, the military would be called upon to back the civil police in providing stability.

iv) 'Security' versus 'development'

For the US the basic problem of the time was security, 'that is to say, the question of the type of world-wide organisation that will prevail as a consequence of the current technological revolution, and that must be compatible with the preservation of the American way of life inside the US territory and defense of American economic interests outside'(1969: 66) But for Latin America, the great problem was development, defined as gaining access to the fruits of the technological revolution. The technology Latin America would have to assimilate in the late 20th century was saving in manpower and exacting with regard to the size of the market. This tended to lead to monopolies and oligopolies, concentration of income, and patterning of demand. This meant in turn that investment was directed to certain industries that were capital intensive. For Latin America to get round this economic bind would require profound changes in institutional framework so as to de-concentrate income, widen the market and make development sensitive to the specific needs of the region. This could not be left to spontaneous market forces, but required 'deliberate action of central decision-making organs' (1969: 68). The term "the Latin American Revolution" referred to the creation of a system of political institutions that could guide the social changes needed to make development viable.

v) Economics replaces politics in US security policy

In relation to US security, one should see the Cuban missile crisis as bringing the Monroe Doctrine up to date. Given that military aspects of 'security' had been solved for the time being, this meant that economic aspects now came to the fore. Thus the domestic problems of each country, particularly in the economic sphere would become of increasing interest to the organs responsible for US external security. This was because the most probable path a country would take to try move out of the US sphere of influence would be to change its economic policy (and thus move in a socialist or communist direction). When US security was defined as implying the maintenance of the social status quo, it was clear that the autonomy of countries to supervise their own development was reduced to very little. The doctrine implied that decisions about development would be taken at a higher level, at the political centre (in other words in the US).

vi) US corporations as the basis of a development model for Latin America

It was important to ask what type of 'development' the US envisaged for Latin America. This had not been the subject of open discussion since Congress regarded economic aid as a mere complement of military aid. But it was clear that private US companies were expected to play a decisive role and that US aid policy would be conducted principally through them. Such a trajectory was attractive to local ruling classes, but the large corporations with advanced technology and high capitalization, backed by numerous privileges 'produces the same effect in an underdeveloped economy as large exotic trees introduced into an unfamiliar region: they drain all the water, dry up the land and disturb the balance of the flora and fauna'(1969: 72). The entrance of US corporations would only heighten differentiation of income and living standards and lead to open or disguised unemployment. This scenario was completely contrary to the kind of development process needed in the continent which should involve the mass of the population. To be meaningful, it was essential that development remained in national hands.

FURTADO IN PERSPECTIVE

What can we now learn from Furtado? In what ways has the world he observed been superseded? First, Furtado's analysis confirmed the importance of looking at security / development through the lens of political economy at the level of the hemisphere. As Horowitz (1969) notes in his introduction to *Latin American Radicalism*, a body of critical writing was emerging that no longer confined itself to nation-building concepts and looked instead at Latin America 'as a real entity'. In this: 'It is the line, perhaps the chain, between the United States center and the Latin American peripheries that becomes the organizing link for under-

standing what constitutes Latin America' (Horowitz, 1969: 11). From a hemispheric perspective, Furtado was pioneering a way of thinking that became labelled as the 'dependency' approach. In this, he saw the kind of US foreign investment and embodiment of modernity then entering Latin America as being neither benevolent nor benign. Instead, the kind of capitalism fostered by the US and favoured by local ruling elites would lead to greater poverty.

Second, Furtado believed that development as meaning the raising of living standards could not be oriented, let alone imposed, from the outside. As a nationalist, he belonged to a wider group of intellectuals from the non-aligned Third World who insisted that alternative paths to development were still possible, and that underdeveloped countries could still choose between them. The moral challenge of the 'non-aligned' Third World as well as the belief in the possibility of choosing between alternative development models petered out in the 1980's.

Third, in Furtado's thinking (following the ECLA view) social instability was an inevitable accompaniment to economic change, was not dangerous or unduly threatening to national security, and certainly did not warrant repression. Instead, development should aim to incorporate the entire population and social tensions, movements and oppositions should have a chance to play themselves out. These reactions were part and parcel of the development trajectory. For Furtado, the main de-stabilising forces and threats came from the international arena, not from internal factors such as political capacity, or inherent violence in the countries themselves. In this, Furtado's view was distinctly different from later 'wisdom', where as Duffield (2001) argues, social conflict and the 'new wars', under a liberal agenda, were seen to result from multiple, largely internal factors, including problems of political transition in which underdevelopment (rather than the development process) was re-problematized as being dangerous.

Fourth, Furtado belonged to the generation of Third World intellectuals for whom distribution of income was reflected in the way wealth was produced and thereby to the relations linking developed North with under-developing South. Development was synonymous with raising living standards and making income distribution more equal. He believed technological change to be the key to modernization and subscribed to a view of stages of economic growth. In this, he judged that without far-reaching institutional reform, economic growth was blocked.

Finally, Furtado expressed the belief common among Third World intellectuals of the time that the state was the prime agent that should lead the development process. But despite the alarming spread of militarism, exemplified by the coup deposing Goulart in his own country,

Brazil, he was reticent about investigating the tendency of Latin American societies to exacerbate their own problems and, in a very real and terrifying sense, dig their own graves. Latin America succumbed in the 1970's to military regimes which labelled social unrest as dangerous and made brutal attempts to cleanse the body politic of unwanted radical political 'elements' leading to mass killings and disappearances, especially in the more industrially advanced parts of the continent: Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The kind of internal war unleashed went far beyond the scope of radical analysis. Furtado had not taken on board the extent to which militarism suffused Latin American society and had a crucial bearing on the way a security-development discourse was to be played out. While US hegemony could be highlighted, it did not 'explain' the brutality of Latin American militaries once they had taken over the reins of government nor account for the support they received from local elites. This raised issues of post-colonialism, nation-building and sovereignty that could not be addressed under the ECLA conceptualisation of political economy.

Militaries and sovereignty in the Americas

Latin America suffered from intense military traditionalism. This drew on the Warrior-Conquistador imagery of the colonial period that was later transformed and 'nationalized' following the Wars of Independence of the 1820's. Nationalist armies had successfully thrown out the colonial power and after Independence the militaries claimed a tutelary, guardianship role, seeing their historical mission as overseeing the destiny and values of the patria (Loveman, 2001). National military institutions claimed they had preceded the birth of the nation itself. In almost every Constitution passed in the region, a wide role was assigned to the armed forces; they were not only to protect the Constitution but also permitted to intervene politically when it was not respected. Military treatises enshrined the right of the military to 'save' the patria, and fostered a view that the armed forces were better at doing this than any civilian institution could be. It was the duty of the military to prevent the nation from falling into barbarism and to assume responsibility for its order and security. Thus one sees that in its view of 'internal security', military tradition in Latin America carried some semblance to the doctrines and political thinking of the US at the hemispheric level.

During the 1960's, militaries in Latin America were exposed to new codes and practices of professionalism. While the old professionalism had been directed towards external defence and fighting regular armies, the focus now shifted to issues of security and national development. Thus within both military training and the military institutions' self identification,

national security became increasingly interwoven with responsibility for civic action, winning hearts and minds (a phrase made infamous by the US military in Vietnam) and a particular vision of development. New recruits were offered an education that included economic planning and the identification and diagnosis of 'obstacles' to development. As a result, militaries believed themselves increasingly competent to take over the state apparatus and to run the country should they believe themselves called upon to do so.

As a result of this military modernization process and inscribed in the new education and ideology of the military's active duty to promote security / development, high-ranking members became a new, highly mobile, elite. They sought out intelligence, made networks and discussed situations with like-minded military men from other Latin American states and above all, with counterparts from the US. As US aid to Latin American militaries expanded and training opportunities in the US opened up, the military elite of Latin America developed ever-closer political ties and working relations within the hemisphere. There was a remarkable duality of thought found South and North in the Americas that linked intense nationalism (that it was the duty of each country's military to protect) with intense internationalism (that stemmed from the shared life worlds and ideology of the military as a caste, that saw itself as superior to and more authorized to act than civilian citizens).

The military and the security-development doctrine espoused were supremely important in extending and consolidating a network of powers and counterpowers that flowed across 'cultural' and territorial boundaries. This reflected a special kind of sovereignty. In US history, understandings of sovereignty had been linked to the utopia of wide-open spaces, of operating on the frontiers of an unbounded terrain, leading to the extension of what Hardt and Negri (2000) call imperial sovereignty. Imperial sovereignty differed from colonialism, although there was a constant danger it would lapse into colonialism (as was nearly the case in Panama), for it had no need to annex or destroy other powers it faced. On the contrary, it opened up and became configured in them. Though Latin American militaries on the face of it were intensely involved with the defence of national territory, at the same time non-territorialised networks fomented at a hemispheric plane were drawing up new agendas as to new forms of management and control within networked relations of governance. Later the importance of the latter kind of networks would expand under the neo-liberal framework emerging in the 1980's (Duffield (2001). For the militaries of the Americas, there would be no abrupt change from being purely nationalist and territorially based to becoming more involved with non-territorial, mutable and networked relations of governance.

In sum, the argument here is that in this regional history of security-development, one finds evidence for the rise of hemispheric networks among militaries in which ideology and support emanating from the US circulated and imperial sovereignty embodied and extended. The brutality and repression of Latin American militaries towards their own civilian populations mirrored what the US military did away from home. After the end of the cold war and under emerging neo-liberalism, the picture changes. Subsequently there has been a tendency for security to get privatized, development to become marketized, states to retreat and militaries to lose all legitimacy as protectors of the nation, being undermined by charges of human rights abuse and corruption. But the security-development complex has by no means disappeared, instead it has become the preserve of different social actors, operates at different regional and global scales, and takes increasingly clandestine and shadow networked forms.

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