



**DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**  
STRANDGADE 56 • 1401 COPENHAGEN K • DENMARK  
TEL +45 32 69 87 87 • [diis@diis.dk](mailto:diis@diis.dk) • [www.diis.dk](http://www.diis.dk)

**CULTURE OF COOPERATION?  
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
IN DANISH HOMELAND SECURITY**

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

*DIIS Working Paper no 2006/2*

© Copenhagen 2006

Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS

Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark

Ph: +45 32 69 87 87

Fax: +45 32 69 87 00

E-mails: [diis@diis.dk](mailto:diis@diis.dk)

Web: [www.diis.dk](http://www.diis.dk)

Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler

Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi as

ISBN: 87-7605-118-8

Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included)

DIIS publications can be downloaded  
free of charge from [www.diis.dk](http://www.diis.dk)

This publication is part of DIIS's Defence and Security Studies project which is funded by a grant from the Danish Ministry of Defence.

**Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen**, Senior Researcher, Department for Conflict and Security Studies,  
[adn@diis.dk](mailto:adn@diis.dk)

# Contents

Abstract .....	2
Resume .....	2
Introduction.....	3
Structure and Culture: Requirements for Civil-Military Cooperation.....	5
The Danish Case.....	11
A Culture of Cross-Governmental Cooperation.....	19
Conclusion: International Implications of the Danish Experience.....	21

## ABSTRACT

The Danish engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan has brought the country to the attention of sympathizers of the international salafi-jihadist network inspired by Al-Qaida. Thus, arguably an activist foreign policy must go hand in hand with a robust, flexible, and coordinated homeland security system. This working paper looks at ongoing Danish efforts to enhance civil-military cooperation in homeland security. Drawing on organizational theory and organizational change theory, the paper argues that civil-military cooperation depends on forging the right structures but also on the promotion of a culture of cross-governmental cooperation to reduce friction between civilian and military organizational cultures as well as battles of turf. It suggests that a targeted effort to promote a culture of cross-governmental cooperation through joint strategic level education and common exercising should be an imminent concern in order to make civilian and military agencies comfortable with new structures and requirements for cooperation.

## RESUME

Danmarks engagement i blandt andet Irak betyder, at Danmark i stigende grad er kommet i søgelyset af tilhængere af den internationale Al-Qaida inspirerede salafi-jihadisme. En aktivistisk udenrigspolitik må derfor følges op af fleksibelt og velkoordineret hjemligt beredskab mod terrorisme. Dette DIIS Working Paper ser nærmere på den danske indsats for at fremme civil/militært samarbejde indenfor terrorberedskabet. Baseret på organisations teori og teori om forandringer i organisationer argumenteres der for, at effektivt civil/militært samarbejde er afhængigt af skabelsen af de rette strukturer, men også af styrkelsen af en organisations kultur hos såvel civile som militære aktører, der lægger vægt på samarbejde på tværs af sektorgrænser. Indlejringen af tvær-institutionel forståelse og koordinering i de respektive organisationskulturer kan søges fremmet via fælles træning og uddannelse på et strategisk niveau og kan medvirke til at gøre såvel civile som militære aktører mere trygge ved nye krav og strukturer rettet mod at sikre tættere samarbejde.

# Culture of Cooperation? Civil-Military Relations in Danish Homeland Security<sup>1</sup>

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

## INTRODUCTION

“This is a warning to all European countries, but first and foremost to Denmark, which still has soldiers in Muslim countries,” ran a message posted on the internet and signed by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades in the wake of the terrorist attacks on London, July 7, 2005.<sup>2</sup>

The Abu Hafs Brigades are not believed to have operational capabilities and the group therefore hardly poses a direct threat to European security. The message nevertheless highlighted a politically awkward fact: being a close ally of the US and maintaining troops in places like Iraq and Afghanistan is likely to bring a country unwanted attention from the international Al-Qaida inspired salafi-jihadist movement. Moreover, intelligence and security services in a number of countries engaged in Iraq have warned that this engagement is a driver of domestic radicalization – radicalization made plain when home grown terrorists struck the London subway in July 2005.<sup>3</sup> In sum, international engagements might well increase the threat to the homelands of America’s European partners.

Foreign and security policy neither should, nor can be adjusted to placate the people who subscribe to Al-Qaida’s world view.<sup>4</sup> Yet, arguably an activist foreign policy like for example

<sup>1</sup> The chapter is based on a review of key policy documents combined with personal interviews with high ranking representatives from the involved Danish agencies, including the Danish National Police, Danish Defense Command, the Ministry of Defense, the Danish Prime Minister’s Office, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency. The interviews were carried out between June and October 2005. The author would like to thank the participants for their time and for sharing their thoughts on the topic. A special thanks to B. Com. Jens Dalgaard-Nielsen for providing insightful comments on issues relating to organizational theory.

<sup>2</sup> Cited in “Ny terrortrussel fra Al Qaida-gruppe,” *Jyllands-Posten*, 13 July, 2005, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Home Office, Relations with the Muslim Community, 6. April 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Keeping a distance to the US is by no means a guarantee against Al-Qaida inspired terrorism, witness the

the Danish must go hand in hand with a robust, flexible, and coordinated homeland security system. Homeland security is in the following defined as efforts to prevent, protect, and respond to terrorism as well as natural or man-made disasters.<sup>5</sup>

The need for enhanced civil-military cooperation to create homeland security is regularly emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>6</sup> This working paper, with a view to extracting lessons of relevance to policy-makers and practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic, looks at ongoing Danish efforts in the field.

Drawing on organizational theory and organizational change theory, the paper argues that civil-military cooperation depends on forging the right structures (joint planning processes; clear distribution of functions and responsibilities; clarity as to chain of command; information sharing; joint exercises and evaluation), but also on the promotion of a culture of cross-governmental cooperation (compatible notions of mission, goal, and methods including a shared belief in the need to cooperate and coordinate across different government agencies). Lacking a culture of cross-governmental cooperation, it is argued, friction between differing civilian and military organizational cultures combined with battles over turfs and funding might undermine the best thought out plans and policies.

The paper opens with a brief discussion of the structural and cultural requirements for effective and efficient civil-military homeland security cooperation. It proceeds to ask to what extent these requirements are met in the Danish case and discusses the hurdles and obstacles encountered in the process of enhancing civil-military homeland security cooperation. Finally,

threats issued against France in 2004 due to its law banning religious symbols including Muslim headscarves in public schools. Roger Cohen, "A French ex-hostage describes his ordeal," *International Herald Tribune*, 10 January, 2005; Alan Riding, "France Reports Threat From an Islamic Group," *New York Times*, 17 March, 2004.

<sup>5</sup> The definition corresponds to the all-hazard approach taken by most European governments. Though the definition of homeland security in the US National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes only terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security is increasingly emphasizing the all-hazard approach as well. For the US definition of homeland security see Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Washington DC, 2002, p. 2. For the emerging emphasis on all-hazards see Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for Department of Homeland Security," Office of the Press Secretary, July 2005.

<sup>6</sup> See for example Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington DC, June 2005 and Ministry of Defence on behalf of the Government, *Et robust og sikkert samfund. Regeringens politik for beredskabet i Danmark*, Copenhagen, June 2005.

it is pointed out how some of these hurdles might be overcome, and what other countries may learn from the Danish experience.

## STRUCTURE AND CULTURE: REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

The militaries of the Transatlantic area have from time to time provided help to national emergency management agencies or rescue services in connection with natural disasters or other emergencies. Thus, military assistance to civilian authorities is not new. Extreme weather conditions as well as accidents and disasters continue to pose challenges, witness the havoc wrought by hurricane Katrina. However, with the rise of Al-Qaida inspired terrorism, risks to the homeland have become more unpredictable in terms of their nature and their scope. Engineered disasters, such as multiple simultaneous terrorist attacks or incidents involving CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) materials have become more likely.<sup>7</sup>

The new threat environment raises new questions and poses new challenges to both the civilian and the military side. The military might be required to perform a broader range of tasks to protect the homeland, and both civilian and military actors will have to become more flexible to permit them to respond to a broader range of potential contingencies. Closer civil-military cooperation is also likely to challenge established procedures, habits, and customs of both civilian and military agencies. In this adjustment process, it is arguably important to pay attention to both structures and culture.

Few would disagree, that for an organization to perform effectively and efficiently, the formal structures need to be calibrated to the task and the environment at hand. Generally, the literature on organizational theory conceives of formal organizational structure as the distribution of functions and roles, communication channels, official hierarchies, lines of command and control, planning and operational processes of a given organization.<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, to date, most analyses of the military's role in homeland security has focussed primarily on the need to adjust organizational structures in light of new homeland security challenges.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington DC, June 2005, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> W. Richard Scott, *Organizations. Rational, Natural, and Open Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1992), pp. 263-264.

## Adjusting structures

A number of Rand studies have pointed to the need for an examination of military doctrine, organization, training, leadership development, and materiel in light of new homeland security tasks. They point out that the military needs to contemplate and plan for multiple tasks such as providing facility security and infrastructure protection (patrolling, protection, air defense systems, expertise as regards protection of IT systems); support to law enforcement (sharing intelligence, training facilities, expertise, specialized equipment, and provide direct support for civil law enforcement); reassurance (presence, patrolling, guard duty); WMD protection (detection, decontamination, evacuation, search and rescue, medical treatment); consequence management (crowd control, provide utilities, food and shelter, removal of debris, reconstruction).<sup>9</sup>

The US Department of Defense has issued a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, in which it addresses overall questions regarding tasks, priorities, organization, training, and materiel. In turn, NORTHCOM – the US command in charge of defense of the homeland – based on fifteen different threat scenarios has drafted plans for the military's role in homeland security based on fifteen different crisis scenarios. Current planning spans from modest support missions with civil authorities in the lead to major emergency management efforts after a mass-casualty CBN-attack – a scenario in which the military due to the scale and severity of the crisis is foreseen to take the lead. On the other side of the Atlantic, European military research institutes have begun to address some of the same questions.<sup>10</sup>

However, a flexible, coordinated, and cost-effective homeland security effort arguably requires not just the armed forces, but all major actors in homeland security to critically analyze existing structures - plans, functions, responsibilities, processes, chains of command, and channels of information. Moreover, the effort should, at least at the strategic level, be joint, not agency specific.

<sup>9</sup> Lynn E. Davis, David E. Mosher, Richard R. Brennan, Michael D. Greenberg, K. Scott McMahon, Charles W. Yost, *Army Forces for Homeland Security* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2004); Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington DC, June 2005; Bradley Graham, "War Plans Drafted to Counter Terror Attacks in the U.S.," *Washington Post*, 8. August, 2005. For an example of European research, see Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Mehr Sicherheit – Weniger Souveränität. Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter und die Rolle der Streitkräfte* (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2004).



A coordinated and cost-effective effort requires the civilian and the military side to develop a common understanding of what tasks the military should perform or support, what capabilities it should provide, how fast, and for how long. This requires at least rough agreement on the probability of various scenarios and the response capabilities required in each, as well as an overview over the capabilities already available in the civilian system. In other words, national police forces, emergency management agencies, and the armed forces need to develop common planning scenarios and common planning goals.<sup>11</sup>

Common scenarios and planning goals also entail clarifying who is responsible for what. The establishment of clear areas of responsibilities, however, should be combined with an overview over all levels of the homeland security system to make sure, that important issues do not fall between possible cracks in a layered system.<sup>12</sup> At the operational level mechanisms of coordination, clear lines of authority, and a common situational picture are important to ensure an effective multi-agency response to major incidents.<sup>13</sup> Finally, joint training, exercises,

<sup>11</sup> Lynn E. Davis, "Defining the Army's Homeland Security needs," in Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, *The US Army and the New National Security Strategy* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003), p. 66.

<sup>12</sup> The British experience refined over years of combating IRA terrorism indicates that clarity as to areas of responsibility is central in order to prevent that bureaucratic turf wars impair and delay the effort. The US response to hurricane Katrina in turn illustrated the importance of also maintaining and overall overview over the system to avoid that important issues fall between the cracks. In the US gaps between local, state-level and federal planning efforts have been identified as one of the key problems leading to late and insufficient evacuation, rescue, and relief efforts. "Hurricane Katrina and US homeland security," *IJSS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 11 Issue 7, September 2005; Terence Taylor, "United Kingdom" in Yonah Alexander (red.) *Combating Terrorism. Strategies of Ten Countries* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), s. 197.

<sup>13</sup> For example, coordination of the rescue effort in New Orleans in the wake of Katrina, involving federal, state level and local personnel, was hampered by the existence of three parallel chains of command instead of one. Likewise, the September 11<sup>th</sup> Commission has documented how the rescue effort in the towers of the World Trade Center was hampered by the absence of coordination, unity of command, and a common situational picture. Some floors were searched twice by different services, and according to witnesses, some fire fighters in the World Trade Center's North Tower refused to take evacuation orders from New York Police Department officers after the collapse of the South Tower. Finally, 911 operators, unaware that the South Tower had collapsed, told callers from the North Tower to stay in place and wait for help at points in time when emergency stairwells were still passable. "Hurricane Katrina and US homeland security," *IJSS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 11 Issue 7, September 2005; The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Washington DC, July 2004, p. 295, 310, 318, 321-322.

and evaluation are key to identify gaps in the structures as well as to keeping policies and plans updated and operational skills honed.<sup>14</sup>

International coordination and standardization when it comes to forging these structures would, obviously, add further robustness to national systems. It would facilitate the stepping in of partner countries to support a country whose national capabilities are overwhelmed by a catastrophic incident. The EU is cooperating on a number of homeland security areas, as elaborated elsewhere in this volume. Transatlantic homeland security cooperation is also on the rise.<sup>15</sup>

In sum, the past years have seen an increased focus on the need to forge new plans, priorities, structures, and processes in order to enhance civil-military cooperation in homeland security.

### The Cultural Factor

Though forging the right structures is important, arguably, it is not sufficient. Structural reforms do not automatically lead to cross-governmental cooperation. On the contrary, organizational change theory would point out how structural reforms might trigger defensive reactions because specific organizational beliefs, norms, procedures, and turfs are thus challenged.<sup>16</sup>

This is due to the fact, that organizations cannot be reduced to their formal structures. Over the 1980s organizational theory increasingly came to emphasize the importance of organizational culture – i.e. values, beliefs, and assumptions about mission, goals, and methods shared by the members of an organization - as a key factor impacting on organizational behaviour and performance. The interest in organizational culture originally concentrated on private sector companies. Some theorists argued that culture represented a potential resource that could be tapped to enhance effectiveness and economic competitiveness.<sup>17</sup> In tandem, deeply entrenched cultural beliefs based on an organization's

<sup>14</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Department of Homeland Security. Strategic Management of Training Important for Successful Transformation*, GAO-05-888, p. 1; Daniel R. Walker, *The Organization and Training of Joint Task Forces*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force base, Alabama, April 1996, p. 26.

<sup>15</sup> See Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Daniel Hamilton (eds.) *Transatlantic Homeland Security. Protecting Society in the Age of Catastrophic Terrorism*, (Routledge, 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Jeff Dooley, Cultural Aspects of Systemic Themanager.org, available on <http://www.themanager.org/Knowledgebase/Management/Change.htm> (accessed 18 October 2005).

<sup>17</sup> Donald F. Harvey and Donald R. Brown, *An Experimental Approach to Organizational Development*, (New

historical experience and past successes might prove a liability in a fast changing environment, hampering adjustment and performance. Discontinuity in tasks and environment, it is pointed out, is likely to create the need for cultural adjustments if organizational performance is to be maintained.<sup>18</sup>

Different scholars within the organizational theory field, however, differ on the question of how and to what extent culture can be manipulated. The so-called Cooperate Culture school conceives of culture as a variable which can be manipulated by consultants and organizational executives – instilling a new set of values at the top by education or personnel changes would thus be one way of effecting organization wide change. Other schools are more sceptical and emphasize the existence and strength of subcultures within organizations. Formal leaders, it is pointed out, might have limited influence on these subcultures and thus change entrepreneurs will have to rely on more consensual bottom-up processes based on self-reflection and learning within subcultures. Benefit structures, career paths, and education are emphasized as variables that can be manipulated in order to promote self-reflection and learning and thus towards the desired cultural change. Yet, as compared to the Corporate Culture school, there is greater scepticism as to the possibility for engineering cultural change.<sup>19</sup>

Both schools, however, would agree, that the existing organizational cultures of civilian and military agencies in the transatlantic area are likely to be challenged by the changed risk environment and in particular by the resulting demands for civil-military cooperation in the area of homeland security. Such cooperation is likely to challenge existing values, beliefs, methods, and routines as well as established turfs and budgets and require adjustments within the cultures of both civilian and military organizations. Culturalist theories of organizational change would emphasize how friction between differing organizational cultures may derail even the best thought out policies and plans.<sup>20</sup> Diverging perceptions of the environment and

Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1996), p. 417.

<sup>18</sup> Donald F. Harvey and Donald R. Brown, *An Experimental Approach to Organizational Development*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1996), p. 417. See also Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership. A Dynamic View* (Jossey-Basler, 1985).

<sup>19</sup> Finn Borum, *Strategier for organisationsændring* (København, Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 1995), pp. 75-76.

<sup>20</sup> Indeed, it appears, that the break-down of law and order and the slow relief effort in New Orleans in the wake of Katrina was not due to a shortage of personnel - the US was eventually able to muster 70.000 troops, 21 military vessels and 215 aircraft in the region hit by Katrina – but due to a reluctance on part of civilian actors to *request* this help. US Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing have revealed conflicting perspectives on whether local, state, or federal level authorities are to fault for the failure to request this help in a timely fashion.

of the homeland security mission, diverse notions about goals and methods, different success criteria, and resulting misunderstandings and mutual distrust are likely to complicate the effort.<sup>21</sup>

As argued above, different schools of organizational change theory differ on how difficult it is to bring about cultural change and on whether to rely on top-down or bottom-up approaches in the attempt to prompt cultural adjustment. Yet, both schools would probably agree, that common education, exercises and drills of civilian and military actors could help build mutual trust. Common education, exercises, and drills are, as noted above, crucial in honing skills and checking for gaps in planning and coordination mechanisms. But common education and training might also help promote a common understanding of the mission and the goals, promote a common language, common skills, mutual knowledge, and common experiences. Over time common education and training might serve to make different cultures become more compatible and to promote a common culture of cross-governmental cooperation.<sup>22</sup>

In sum, existing policy studies of civil-military cooperation tend to emphasize the need to adjust military structures in order to create more effective civil-military homeland security cooperation. Yet, arguably it is necessary for all the major actors to jointly adjust their structures. In this process, policymakers pushing for increased civil-military cooperation must pay attention to distinct organizational cultures, which might otherwise undermine the effectiveness of the joint structures. A culture of cross-governmental cooperation could be actively promoted through education and training. In order to forge a flexible and coordinated homeland security system, based on civil-military cooperation, it is necessary to pay attention to both structure and culture.

Spencer S. Hsu, "Repeat of Past Mistakes mars Government's Disaster Response," *Washington Post*, 16. October 2005; Spencer S. Hsu, "Messages Depict Disarray in Federal Katrina Response," *Washington Post*, 18. October 2005; Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, Office of Public Affairs, FEMA, 20 October 2005.

<sup>21</sup> On organizational culture and change see Jeff Dooley, Cultural Aspects of Systemic Themanager.org, available on <http://www.themanager.org/Knowledgebase/Management/Change.htm> (accessed 18 October 2005).

<sup>22</sup> Finn Borum, *Strategier for organisationsændring* (København, Handlehøjskolens Forlag, 1995), p. 70; Daniel R. Walker, *The Organization and Training of Joint Task Forces*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force base, Alabama, April 1996, p. 26.

## THE DANISH CASE

The Danish efforts to promote civil-military cooperation in the field of homeland security should be of broader interest for two reasons.

First, unlike the US, Denmark has not been forced to reform its security system in the wake of a major attack on its soil - a situation not necessarily conducive to well thought through solutions. Instead, reform has been more gradual. Yet, the new experience of being singled out for salafi-jihadist attention adds a measure of urgency to the ongoing efforts and secures counter-terrorism a place near the top of the political agenda. Thus, political pressure might help soften bureaucratic resistance to structural changes that inevitably upsets old turfs, procedures and priorities, or, in other words, challenges organizational culture.

Second, Denmark is a small unitary state. Many key persons in the affected agencies know each other personally and communicate regularly. This should be seen against a backdrop of a tradition for cross-governmental and civil-military cooperation and a predominantly pragmatic view on using the armed forces to support civilian authorities in responding to disasters or accidents, but also in solving a number of routine tasks such as maritime patrolling, search and rescue, and environmental monitoring.<sup>23</sup>

Attempting to promote the cultural adjustments necessary to underpin more cross-governmental cooperation is, as argued above, difficult. But Denmark should be better placed to intensify civil-military cooperation than larger countries with more layers of government and greater distance, both geographically and mentally, between the key persons and agencies. Therefore the Danish case should point to opportunities for other countries, but it might also indicate the sticking points, calling for particular political attention if civil-military cooperation is to become effective – if the implementation of a particular aspect of civil-military cooperation is problematic in a Danish context, it is likely to demand a very targeted effort in larger countries with more strict dividing lines between different government agencies.

The Danish homeland security system did receive a shake-up after September 11, 2001. Among the initiatives were new anti-terrorism laws, significantly expanded resources to the two Danish intelligence services, new equipment to the Danish Emergency Management

<sup>23</sup> Denmark has no coast guard and thus the Danish Defense Command is responsible for and the navy carries out these tasks. Moreover, military special operations forces and police special units have a long tradition for cooperating when it comes to special high-end tasks.

Agency, and a Danish push for reinforced homeland security cooperation in the EU, among others, a proposal to develop a set of EU homeland security headline goals.<sup>24</sup>

As part of the effort to enhance Danish homeland security, civil-military cooperation has been intensified. The Danish Defense Forces Act (2004) established that Danish armed forces have two major tasks: To participate in international crisis management efforts and to support civilian authorities in the provision of homeland security in case of terrorist attacks, disasters or accidents.<sup>25</sup> The major civilian partners in homeland security at the national level are the National Police including the Danish Security Intelligence Service, both reporting to the Minister of Justice, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), originally reporting to the Minister of the Interior.

In an attempt to reduce the number of seams in the system, DEMA was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense as of February 2004. The reorganization has permitted a greater degree of common use of support structures, logistics, schools, depots, and infrastructure. By creating a common pool of resources, more common education, and common planning, it was also hoped, the system would become more efficient.<sup>26</sup>

Some critics argued that DEMA should instead have been transferred to the Ministry of Justice to avoid a militarization of the system. Opponents of this, however, argued that the functions of DEMA had very little affinity with the functions of the police and would fit more naturally under the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the Minister of Defense, through DEMA, is now responsible for coordinating cross-governmental civilian preparedness and response planning. The police, however, is responsible for operational coordination in case of an incident – natural or man-made – that requires a response from more than one governmental agency (for example police, fire fighters, and health workers).<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> For a fuller account of the reaction to September 11 in the Scandinavian countries see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen "Homeland Security and the Role of the Armed Forces: A Scandinavian Perspective" in Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Mehr Sicherheit – Weniger Souveränität. Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter und die Rolle der Streitkräfte* (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2004).

<sup>25</sup> "Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende en samling af det civile beredskab og forsvarets opgaver," Copenhagen, December 2003; Forsvarsforlig, Ministry of Defense, Copenhagen, 10. June, 2004.

<sup>26</sup> Ministry of Defence on behalf of the Government, *Et robust og sikkert samfund. Regeringens politik for beredskabet i Danmark*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 7.

<sup>27</sup> Udvalget for National Sårbarhedsudredning, *National Sårbarhedsudredning*, Birkerød, 2004, p. 28.

To expand the pool of personnel available for homeland security needs the education of Danish conscripts has been adjusted to focus on homeland security tasks. Conscripts currently serve four months and their education comprises basic skills such as guard duty, first aid, fire fighting and civil rescue support. Within three years of having completed the education they can be called up to serve in a “total defense force” with homeland security tasks.<sup>28</sup> The Danish Home Guard is likewise available to support homeland security needs. The Home Guard has almost 60.000 members and a tradition for assisting DEMA or the police in connection with disasters or large public events. If requested by the police the Home Guard assists with specific tasks in peacetime such as monitoring and guarding critical facilities, providing sanitary units, and assist with traffic control.<sup>29</sup>

A new Center for Biological Preparedness likewise is based on cooperation between civilian medical personnel and the military, which makes transport capability available for the center’s bio-hazard teams.

All in all the Danish system has already been revamped to enhance civil-military cooperation in homeland security and civilian and military agencies already cooperate on a number of tasks. Yet, as elaborated below, there are still shortfalls in the efforts to forge optimal structures to coordinate planning processes, operations, exercises, and evaluations – arguably in part due to diverging organizational cultures between the major actors involved.

### Common Planning Scenarios and Goals

To what extent have the actors in Danish homeland security developed a common threat and risk assessment, and a common understanding of what tasks the military should perform or support, what capabilities it should provide, how fast, and for how long?

At an overall level, representatives from the key agencies involved in homeland security at the national level – the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Command, DEMA, and the National Police - seem to share a common notion of the homeland security mission: a flexible and

<sup>28</sup> For a fuller account of the role of the new homeland security force see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Homeland Security and the Role of the Armed Forces: A Scandinavian Perspective” in Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Mehr Sicherheit – Weniger Souveränität. Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter und die Rolle der Streitkräfte* (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2004).

<sup>29</sup> Statsrevisoratet, 7/03 Beretning om hjemmeværnet, <http://www.ft.dk/BAGGRUND/statsrev/0703.htm#V> (accessed 14. October 2004).

coordinated effort, drawing on the total resources of the civil and military sector in an effective manner. They also consistently emphasize the willingness to be pragmatic in the search for mutually acceptable solutions to reach that common goal. They also tend to agree, that small-scale incidents or conventional terrorist attacks are much more likely than large-scale incidents and catastrophic terrorist attacks.<sup>30</sup>

On a number of more specific issues, however, they differ. Firstly, whereas the military appears more willing to spend time and effort planning and training for the full spectrum of potential threats including mass-casualty incidents, the police mainly focuses on smaller events, where the need for resources would not overwhelm civilian actors.

The police emphasize that military units might assist civilian law-enforcement when it comes to monitoring or searching a large area, providing disaster relief, traffic control etc. Representatives of the police, however, insist that whenever a task entails even a small risk that it will be necessary to use force against civilians, it is a job for the police, not military units.<sup>31</sup> There is reluctance when it comes to drawing on the total defense force for any tasks that might bring them into direct contact with the population (this could range from crowd control over some forms of guard duty to the establishment of perimeters around disaster sites). For softer tasks, such as traffic control, monitoring critical infrastructure or searching larger areas, the police prefer to rely on elements of the Home Guard – the so-called police home guard - rather than the total defense force. This reluctance might reflect cultural differences an genuine concern, that military units would be prone to excessive use of force in some situations. Yet, considerations of turfs and budgets might also be in play.

Whereas the military emphasizes, that situations can arise, in which all organized manpower would be needed and should be used across a range of tasks, they refer to the police as the actor, which is requesting and leading the joint effort, and thus should take the lead in developing joint planning scenarios and task lists. This reticence might reflect that Danish armed forces, in line with their American counterparts, do not wish to signal an intention to usurp the area of homeland security. Another reason, however, might be that whereas the military increasingly takes the homeland security part of its mission seriously, international deployments are still regarded as the core task. As the active component of the Danish military in line with the US military operates with dual-capable and in effect dual-hatted forces,

<sup>30</sup> Author's interviews, Copenhagen, 12 and 14 July, 17 and 19 August, 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Author's interviews, Copenhagen, 14 July, 2005.



situations with competing demands at home and abroad might arise. Since a majority of active duty deployable forces will always at any given time be in Denmark either preparing or recuperating from international deployments, it is difficult to imagine situations in which severe manpower shortages could arise at home due to international deployments abroad. Still, certain special capabilities – command and control elements or counter CBRN capabilities - could be in short supply. This points to the question whether certain assets should be earmarked for homeland security purposes. The US military has, for example, dedicated a command and control element together with a number of National Guard WMD-detection teams for domestic use only.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the willingness to push for a systematic planning process, which could reveal the need for the military to earmark resources and capabilities for domestic use only, might be limited. The problem in this respect, however, is that the police has less of a tradition and arguably also less time due to day-to-day operational tasks, for strategic planning (scenario development, simulations and exercises, systematic feed-back from these and subsequent adjustment of plans and policies) than the military side.

As a result, there is currently no systematic effort to develop a range of common planning scenarios and goals like the ones produced by for example NORTHCOM and consequently, there is no clear cross-governmental consensus as to what specific tasks what military units should plan and train for in homeland security and whether certain capabilities should be earmarked for homeland security needs. A joint working group consisting of representatives from the police and the military is currently looking at various coordination issues, chiefly, though, legal and financial aspects of civil-military cooperation.

In sum, whereas the actors in the Danish homeland security system do have a common frame of reference regarding the overall mission – a flexible and coordinated effort drawing on the total resources of the civil and military sector in an effective manner – they have yet to converge on common planning scenarios and common planning goals, making explicit what tasks the military should perform and what, if any, capabilities should be earmarked for

<sup>32</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington DC, June 2005, p. 39. A related issue pertains to the planning horizon of different actors in the homeland security system. Whereas domestic situations requiring a manpower surge can arise with little or no warning (accidents, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, political events requiring a high level of security), the military planning horizon is typically longer and does not necessarily permit for the kind of flexibility the police would like to see.

domestic use only are still to be developed. Developing joint scenarios, including high-end incidents, and planning goals would not only make the Danish system better prepared to handle extreme incidents - a systematic process of imagining, planning for, gaming, exercising and evaluating a range of different scenarios is arguably a key ingredient in creating the flexibility that the major actors themselves identify as a key goal.

## Operational Coordination

To what extent are areas of responsibility and lines of authority and operational command and control clear in the Danish system?

The Danish emergency management system is based on the principle of sectoral responsibility. This entails, that the agency, which in normal times have responsibility for a given area maintains responsibility in case of a crisis, disaster or terrorist attack. DEMA is supervising the emergency preparedness plans and procedures of the different agencies. With the aim to create a more coherent emergency planning system a number of cross-governmental coordination groups have been established and DEMA is currently developing uniform guidelines for vulnerability- and risk assessment to be applied across the government.<sup>33</sup>

The Danish system has three levels, based on the principle that local actors respond first. If an incident exceeds a certain scale, local efforts are supported by resources from the so-called regional preparedness centers. The local chief of police is coordinating multi-agency local crisis management efforts as well as the regional reinforcements. Regional coordinating staffs are responsible for coordinating the response to incidents on a larger scale. Finally, if local and regional resources are overwhelmed by an incident on a national scale or multiple serious incidents in more locations a new National Operative Staff chaired by the National Police Commissioner will be activated to coordinate the effort. The staff is composed of representatives from the National Police, the Defense Command, and DEMA as well as other agencies depending on the nature of specific incidents. The task of the staff is to “establish and maintain an overview” over an incident/incidents in order to “provide the foundation for making decisions about coordination and prioritization” in the management of the incident/incidents.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Ministry of Defence on behalf of the Government, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, June 2005, p. 4.

<sup>34</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 6.

In terms of lines of authority, the Danish system appears clear and should permit Danish authorities to avoid the problems that hampered for example the US response to Katrina, arising from unclear or parallel lines of command and authority.

The national staff is an important innovation. The system of locally coordinated response reinforced, if necessary, by regional or national resources, works well when it comes to handling the most likely smaller or medium size incidents. Yet, it is not geared to handle a situation, where the scale of an incident makes resources scarce and thus requires a central prioritization of national resources between different localities. The national staff has the potential to fill this gap.

Ironically, though, the staff, or in case of internal disagreement, the chairman of the staff, is not given the mandate to decide authoritatively how to prioritize resources in case of more simultaneous incidents and a need that exceeds the available capacity. Some of the involved actors consider such a prospect rather theoretical and believe that should it arise, peer pressure would ensure that the necessary decisions would be taken anyway.<sup>35</sup> Yet, substituting the currently rather vague mandate for one giving staff/chairman the competence to authoritatively decide if necessary, however, would seem like a very inexpensive way of hedging against losing precious time due to arguments internally in the staff or between the national staff and local or regional actors during a national crisis.

Changing the institutional set-ups, however, is not enough. As pointed out by culturalist theories of organizational change and as illustrated with the establishment of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the mere moving of different agencies into the same Department and giving a Secretary the authority to coordinate their activities does not in itself guarantee cooperation. Different cultures still clash inside the DHS and hamper cooperation.

Moreover, pushing too hard for clear lines of command and control might provoke a backlash complicating rather than facilitating cooperation, at least as long as the actors do not, as discussed above, share a common view of priorities and tasks. In other words, leaving delimitation of responsibilities and lines of authority unclear in extreme, but not very likely situations might prevent turf wars and institutional anxieties from erupting. The downside to

<sup>35</sup> Author's interviews, Copenhagen, 14. July, 2005.

this, of course, is that the national system, as argued, will not be in optimal shape to handle a truly grave incident.

### Education, exercises, evaluation

To what extent do the various actors in Danish homeland security train and exercise together and to what extent are the educational programs coordinated and integrated?

As mentioned above, the education of conscripts in the armed forces include homeland security relevant tasks. DEMA has assisted the Danish Army Command in putting together this part of the new education. Moreover, DEMA officers and officers in the military services attend the same schools for part of their education. Finally, once a year DEMA, the Defence Academy and the National Commissioner of Police organize a five-day seminar for employees of the central ministries, involved with national emergency management planning. The focus is on national security and defense policy, national emergency planning, and crisis management.<sup>36</sup>

In the period from the end of the Cold War to September 11, 2001, there was little focus on exercising the national level of the Danish emergency and crisis management system. After September 11<sup>th</sup> Denmark has had two tabletop exercises, one in November 2003 and one in November 2005.<sup>37</sup> The 2003 exercise highlighted problems in terms of willingness and ability on part of the central actors in the national crisis management system to share knowledge and exchange classified information. It also pointed to the need for more cross-governmental coordination of communication with the press and information to the public.<sup>38</sup> The 2005 exercise will provide a benchmark as to whether these shortfalls have been addressed.

Tabletop exercises that cut across more government agencies and levels are crucial, particularly at times where an existing system is undergoing reform. Simulations and exercises

<sup>36</sup> Direktiv for kursus for centrale beredskabsmyndigheder, Beredskabsstyrelsen, available on [http://www.brs.dk/fagomraade/tilsyn/udd/Uddannelseskatalog/direktiv\\_kurser/ledelse\\_og\\_organisation/landsdaekkende\\_totalforsvarskursus/frame.htm](http://www.brs.dk/fagomraade/tilsyn/udd/Uddannelseskatalog/direktiv_kurser/ledelse_og_organisation/landsdaekkende_totalforsvarskursus/frame.htm) (accessed 17 October 2005); Ministry of Defence, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 12.

<sup>37</sup> Danish officials from the national level of Denmark's crisis management system (National Police, Police Security Intelligence Service, Ministry of Defense, Defense Command, Emergency Management Agency) also participate in the yearly NATO tabletop Crisis Management Exercise (CMX).

<sup>38</sup> Øvelsesledelsen, *Samlet evalueringsrapport. Krisestyingsøvelse 2003 (KRISØV 2003)*, January 2004, available on <http://www.brs.dk/info/rapport/krisoevelse2003/evalueringsrapport.pdf> (accessed 19 October 2005).

can help identify potential seams and gaps before an emergency situation makes them apparent. Simulations and exercises also help expose potential dilemmas, giving decision makers a chance to contemplate them at more leisure than during a real incident, and thus, hopefully, help promote better thought through decisions. An intensification of this activity would appear a worthwhile investment to improve the Danish homeland security system. Moreover, live exercises, activating all levels of the homeland security system and actors from the major different agencies involved would be desirable.<sup>39</sup>

To facilitate cross-governmental evaluation a committee – the so-called Kontaktudvalg – composed of representatives from the major actors in the emergency preparedness system has been established. The Kontaktudvalg can charge ad-hoc groups to evaluate specific incident management operations.<sup>40</sup> Arguably, however, systematic evaluation should be carried out by an independent committee specializing in the task instead of members of the evaluated agencies themselves.

## A CULTURE OF CROSS-GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

The discussion above shows, that there are remaining gaps in the structures of the emerging Danish system for civil-military cooperation in homeland security. Common planning scenarios and goals,<sup>41</sup> a national staff with the mandate to make tough decisions if necessary, live national exercises, and an independent evaluation system are still lacking. Yet, on other important issues, the structures appear in good shape: Areas of responsibility and lines of authority are clear when it comes to handling small and medium sized incidents - the creation of a national staff indicates at least an awareness of the existence of a gap when it comes to handling large-scale incidents; education and training is integrated to a remarkable extent; operational coordination between different agencies in local incident management seems to function seamlessly.

<sup>39</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 11.

<sup>40</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Regeringens redegørelse om beredskabet*, Copenhagen, June 2005, p. 13.

<sup>41</sup> The actors in Denmark's homeland security system, for example, have not jointly addressed some of the most grave possible scenarios – in what circumstances would a crisis be so grave that the military, not the civilian side would take the lead? What happens if the national headquarters disappear? Though such scenarios might seem remote, it would make good sense to at least discuss them in order to hedge against being wholly unprepared in case of a catastrophic event.

The relative good shape of the structures of civil-military homeland security cooperation could be seen as an expression of a high level of political attention given to the area over the past couple of years, resulting in pressure on the involved agencies to coordinate their efforts. Political decisions have begun to create some structures that put a premium on cooperation. But also, the Danish tradition for cross-governmental cooperation arguably also means, that a culture of cross-governmental cooperation already exists, as evident in, for example, the common definition of the homeland security mission proposed by representatives of all the major agencies interviewed for this chapter. This culture has probably provided a firm foundation for current efforts to enhance civil-military cooperation.

The Danish reform process has seen examples of cultural clashes and defensive reactions, particularly in the discussion over the National Operative Staff, resulting in a rather weak and vague mandate. Cultural differences are also evident when looking at threat perceptions and planning processes. Whereas civilian actors have been frustrated with what they perceive as an exaggerated military focus on high consequence-low probability scenarios, military actors have been frustrated with a perceived almost exclusive civilian focus on low consequence-high probability scenarios.<sup>42</sup>

Nevertheless, these differences have been contained. The squabbles have not derailed overall progress in enhancing civil-military cooperation in homeland security, neither do they appear to have had any negative impact on operational and practical cooperation.

Arguably, an active attempt at strengthening the existing culture of cross-governmental cooperation is key to further progress when it comes to fixing the remaining gaps in the Danish system. Historical experience indicates that it frequently takes major disasters to significantly alter threat perceptions, worldviews, and organizational cultures and habits. Yet, common education and common exercises might incrementally cause different perceptions to converge.<sup>43</sup>

Education of the various actors in Denmark's homeland security is already to a significant extent integrated – a factor that probably is contributing to the high level of trust between operational personnel from different authorities. Yet, in order to make the threat perceptions

<sup>42</sup> Author's interviews, Copenhagen, 12 and 14 July, 17 and 19 August, 2005.

<sup>43</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Department of Homeland Security. Strategic Management of Training Important for Successful Transformation*, GAO-05-888, p. 1.

and different cultures converge at the central level, common education of leaders about strategic issues, with an eye to further a common understanding of threats, probabilities, priorities, and tasks could be stepped up. The current five day “Totalforsvars kursus” could be expanded to a longer course with a yearly update, obligatory for key administrative and operational leaders. Such a course could be modelled on the yearly security policy course of the Danish Chief of Defense – a full-time course with a duration of two weeks, but with a two week interval between the two weeks, to permit the participation of high-level individuals, who cannot be absent from their desks for two consecutive weeks. More frequent gaming and live exercises should further the convergence of perspectives as well.

This, in turn, would not only facilitate the task of developing common planning goals, but might also with time make all the involved actors comfortable with a national operative staff with real power, by making the actors confident that they see the problem, the tasks, and the objectives in a more or less similar manner.

In sum, culture impacts the extent to which common structures are accepted and common plans effective. Structures that compel different agencies to work together, in turn, are likely to impact culture over time and lead to a strengthening of a culture of cross-governmental cooperation. The limited scope of this case study does not permit for strong generalizations, but the Danish case indicates, that decision makers and agency leaders seeking to promote civil-military homeland security cooperation need to pay attention to both structures and culture – in particular the latter appears to have been neglected in the studies and actual policies in the area of civil-military homeland security cooperation of recent years.

## CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DANISH EXPERIENCE

The new security environment is characterized by a higher level of uncertainty. A number of high consequence and low or uncertain probability threats to homelands on both sides of the Atlantic have emerged. Creating standing new civilian capabilities to deal with all high consequence-low probability threats would be prohibitively expensive. This has given rise to new demands for civil-military cooperation and for a military contribution to provide homeland security on both sides of the Atlantic.

Denmark has been particularly well placed to push for such cooperation, leveraging off from a tradition of civil-military cooperation and with a good deal of political pressure on the

involved agencies to coordinate their efforts. The result is, with some remaining gaps, a system characterized by a high level of integration and coordination when it comes to education, training, and practical operational cooperation.

Arguably, the Danish case indicates the importance of paying attention to both structure and culture in the effort to enhance civil-military homeland security cooperation. Proclamations of political intent and re-organization of governmental structures do not suffice. Even in a Danish context, where the small size of the country means that most key actors know each other personally, where the tradition for cross-governmental cooperation is strong, where the military has long carried out or supported a variety of tasks at home, and where political pressure for a coordinated civil-military efforts is high, turf considerations and differences between the cultures of civilian and military agencies have made for a number of complications, particularly in regard to forging new structures for national crisis management and with regard to systematic strategic homeland security planning.

Civil and military threat perceptions and priorities are likely to diverge even more in most other countries. A targeted effort to make them converge through joint strategic level education and common exercising should thus be an imminent concern in order to ensure that new structures for civil-military cooperation do not give a false sense of security, but actually contribute to a robust and flexible protection of US and European homelands. In a world, where the boundary between internal and external security can no longer be upheld, and where a high international profile is likely to increase the risk to the homeland, such a system is not just key to domestic safety and security, but also to the ability to stay engaged in stabilization and reconstruction missions abroad.



## **DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES AT DIIS**

The Defence and Security Studies of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), The Defence and Security Studies focuses on six areas: Global security and the UN, the transatlantic relationship and NATO, European security and the EU, Danish defence and security policy, Crisis management and the use of force and New threats, terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Research subjects are formulated in consultation with the Danish Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The design and the conclusions of the research are entirely independent, and do in no way automatically reflect the views of the ministries involved or any other government agency, nor do they constitute any official DIIS position.

The output of the Defence and Security Studies takes many forms – from research briefs to articles in international journals – in order to live up to our mutually constitutive aims of conducting high quality research and communicating its findings to the Danish public.

The main publications of the Defence and Security Studies published by DIIS are subject to peer review by one or more members of the review panel. Studies published elsewhere are reviewed according to the rules of the journal or publishing house in question.

### **Review Panel**

Christopher Coker, Reader, London School of Economics and Political Science

Heather Grabbe, Advisor to the EU Commissioner for enlargement

Lene Hansen, Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen

Knud Erik Jørgensen, Associate Professor, University of Aarhus

Ole Kværnø, Professor, Head of the Institute for Strategy and Political Science, The Royal Danish Defence College

Theo Farrell, Senior Lecturer, University of Exeter

Iver Neumann, Senior Adviser, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Research Professor at NUPI

Mehdi Mozaffari, Professor, University of Aarhus

Robert C. Nurick, Director, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen

Terry Terriff, Senior Lecturer and Director of the Graduate School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham

Ståle Ulriksen, Deputy Director and Head of the UN Programme, NUPI  
Michael C. Williams, Professor, University of Wales at Aberystwyth

**More Information**

For more information about The Defence and Security Studies please consult DIIS's web site ([www.diis.dk](http://www.diis.dk)), or contact Head of Department of Conflict and Security Studies Peter Viggo Jakobsen at DIIS on tel: +45 32 69 87 63 or e-mail: [pvj@diis.dk](mailto:pvj@diis.dk)

For more information about the topic of this publication please contact the author on tel: 32 69 87 83 or e-mail: [adn@diis.dk](mailto:adn@diis.dk)