

CONFLICT TRENDS

ISSUE 4, 2014



CONTENTS

EDITORIAL 2 by Vasu Gounden

FEATURES 3 **Beheadings and the News Media: Why Some Conflict Atrocities Receive More Coverage than Others**




by Virgil Hawkins

10 **Conflict Resolution in the Central African Republic: What Role for Civil Society?**



by David Kode

19 **Maritime Security in Africa: Potential for the Private Sector?**



by Dirk Siebels

FACT FILES 27 **African Union Panel of the Wise**

by Elizabeth Buhungiro

31 **COMESA'S Committee of Elders**

by Temitope Edward Akinyemi

FEATURES 34 **Arms, Wildlife and Disease: The Need for Integrated Responses to Complex Transnational Challenges**




by Shannon Dick

42 **The MONUSCO Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and Challenges**



by Frederik Rosén and John Karlsrud

49 **The Peacebuilding Potential of Islam: A Response to the Boko Haram Crisis**



Sunday Paul Chinazo Onwuegbuchulam, Ayo Whetho and Khondlo Mtshali

Cover: Photo by Carsten ten Brink. Fishing boats near the Limbé oil rig, Cameroon (January 2011).



BY **VASU GOUNDEN**

The year 2014 has been challenging for peace and security on the African continent. Asymmetric warfare and armed insurgency pervades northern Nigeria, northern Mali and the Kenya-Somalia border region. Failure to swiftly resolve South Sudan's internal armed conflict, approaching a full year in December, has sent destabilising reverberations throughout the Horn of Africa. The continued breakdown of civic, political and economic institutions in the Central African Republic and Libya heightens the potential for long-term social fragmentation in these resource-rich countries. The Ebola outbreak, which has now killed over 5 600 people and cost millions of dollars in lost gross domestic product (GDP), threatens to unravel decades of progress in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction across West Africa.¹

These challenges are urgent and complex long-term threats to the continent's stability and socio-economic development. While Africa has rapidly enhanced its collective capacities to respond to peace and security challenges – as evident in the maturation of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture – this is not enough to eliminate violence and instability completely. Although it remains critical for African countries to mitigate violent conflicts in the short term, these threats will continue to proliferate so long as member states fail to address the underlying and structural causes of conflict and instability, which are predicated upon the triple threats of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Macro statistics on these structural threats are startling. Although the proportion of individuals in extreme poverty (less than US\$1.25 a day) has declined since 1991, the absolute number of people in extreme poverty has risen from 290 million to 414 million – that is, 34% of the continent.² Recent studies estimate that over 70% of the continent's collective working force, which is becoming increasingly younger as it exponentially grows, resides in informal sectors that contribute anywhere from 20% to 40% of African countries' total GDP.³ With the continent's continued integration into the global economy, wealth and income inequalities are also exacerbated. Although the continent has 12% of the global population, it only possesses 3% of total global wealth. In addition, 85% of that wealth is concentrated in the hands of just 100 000 of the continent's 1.2 billion people – that is, less than 0.0001% of people.⁴

Combating the threats of poverty, unemployment and inequality, and thereby eliminating the underlying causes

of violence and instability, requires that African countries undergo structural transformations that include improving skills and securing access to opportunities and capital for all citizens. Deficits in skills, opportunities and capital are deeply rooted structural challenges. The systematic erosion of education and meaningful economic opportunities was a defining feature of the continent's colonial era. Many of these residual imbalances were exacerbated and amplified in the decades of poor governance and systematic marginalisation that followed the continent's wave of independence in the early 1960s.

African countries that have achieved recent successes in promoting peace, stability, sustainable economic growth and inclusive development – such as Botswana, Ghana and Rwanda – are those that have strived to transform and improve their populations' skills and access to opportunities and capital. This emphasis on building peoples' capacities must be accompanied by effective governance, widespread infrastructure development, and larger investments in social expenditure and service delivery. This is ultimately essential to ensure that every citizen can participate in a country's development and growth freely and equally.

All African countries should therefore devote their long-term efforts to improving their citizenry's skills and broadening their access to opportunities and capital. While mitigating conflicts will remain an important and immediate task in the near future, our successes in purging violence and instability from the continent will be determined by how well we resolve the structural and underlying causes of conflict. **A**

Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director of ACCORD.

- 1 World Health Organization (2014) 'Ebola Response Roadmap Situation Report – 26 November', Available at: <http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/144498/1/roadmapsitrep_26Nov2014_eng.pdf> [Accessed 26 November 2014].
- 2 African Economic Outlook (2014) 'African Economic Outlook 2014 – Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialisation', Available at: <http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/E-Book_African_Economic_Outlook_2014.pdf> [Accessed 26 November 2014].
- 3 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2014) 'Africa Must Generate Resources from Within its Economies', press release, 15 October, Available at: <<http://www.uneca.org/media-centre/stories/africa-must-generate-resources-within-its-economies>> [Accessed 26 November 2014].
- 4 Credit Suisse (2014) 'Global Wealth Report 2014', Available at: <<https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file?fileID=60931FDE-A2D2-F568-B041B58C5EA591A4>> [Accessed 26 November 2014].

BEHEADINGS AND THE NEWS MEDIA: WHY SOME CONFLICT ATROCITIES RECEIVE MORE COVERAGE THAN OTHERS

BY VIRGIL HAWKINS



In August 2014, a captive of an extremist militant group was beheaded by his captors. Authorities in the victim's home country described the action as inhumane and an act of terrorism. The incident was covered by the local press and in brief by a select few international news agencies, but did not attract any degree of global media attention or signs of widespread indignation. The victim's name was George Mwita. He was a Kenyan truck driver, who had been abducted in Kenya by the Somali rebel group, Al-Shabaab. His death came three days after a similar incident that attracted massive media coverage worldwide, and that seemed to send shockwaves across the globe – the apparent beheading of United States (US) journalist James Foley

by the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. In response to the latter case, US President Barack Obama stated that the incident was “an act of violence that shocks the conscience of the entire world”.¹ Numerous heads of state, including those representing Australia, Gabon, Indonesia and Uruguay (just to name a few), made statements expressing their

Above: A man holds up a sign in memory of United States journalist, James Foley (22 August 2014). Foley was abducted in Syria in late 2012 and then beheaded by a masked member of the Islamic State in an act filmed and released on video.



In a press conference United States President, Barack Obama, condemned the Islamic State militants who beheaded an American journalist as “a cancer” and said “their ideology is bankrupt” (20 August 2014).

outrage at the killing. A large number of media corporations throughout the world also seemed to agree that this event had “shocked the world”² – and their heavy coverage of the incident certainly contributed to ensuring that such shock was indeed widely felt. According to one poll, 94% of Americans had heard about the incident – a level of awareness higher than that for any other news event polled in the past five years.³

But in a world in which an estimated half a million people die violently each year,⁴ what made this death so particularly shocking – not just to those who loved him, knew him, or even to other people in the country that gave him citizenship, but to ‘the world’? The act of beheading is indeed a reflection of a particularly brutal and intentionally symbolic means of killing that should be expected to cause shock among those who witness or learn of it. The complete removal of the head from the body demonstrates that the act of taking life in itself is deemed insufficient by the perpetrators in making their point. This, in some ways, could be considered as an aspect that sets this form of killing apart from some others. But even in today’s world, beheadings are not necessarily as rare as we might hope they would be. The government of Saudi Arabia, for example, beheaded 19 people in August this

year alone after convicting them of a variety of criminal acts.⁵ A considerable number of non-state actors from the Middle East to Africa and Latin America, including belligerents in armed conflicts and drug cartels, have also used beheadings as a brutal way of instilling fear in their opponents and making their point. But what made the case of James Foley so much more shocking and infinitely more newsworthy on a global scale than any other beheadings that occurred under similar circumstances, such as that of George Mwita, for example?

Examining the Factors that Determine Newsworthiness

There are a number of factors that can be considered to make ostensibly similar cases different in terms of the attention and indignation they generate. James Foley was a journalist, a non-combatant whose profession involved seeking and sharing facts on the ground. George Mwita, while also a non-combatant, was a truck driver making a delivery of *miraa*, the mild stimulant widely used in the region. The profession of James Foley may have had some impact as a factor, but it must also be noted that 51 journalists have been killed in the line of duty throughout the world since the beginning of 2014.⁶

If we consider the level of innocence of the victims to be important, it is also worth noting other cases as well, such as those involving children, who inherently possess a high level of perceived innocence and who should be those most in need of our protection. At least two children have been beheaded and mutilated, for example, during the ongoing conflict in the Central African Republic by the predominantly Christian anti-Balaka militia, simply because they were Muslim.⁷ The geopolitics of the place of the killing could also serve as a factor. Foley's death happened in Syria, which hosts a conflict with major implications for regional stability in an oil-rich region. Yet the conflict in Syria has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives since 2011, 40 of whom have been journalists,⁸ and the conflict has long since merged with that in Iraq. No other victim of this conflict has attracted a comparable level of attention or indignation in the past.

Another difference is the availability of footage. No footage was released showing the final moments of George Mwitwa, but in the case of James Foley, we could actually see a very deliberate and provocative scene of brutality (although not the killing itself). Yet the IS has

IN A WORLD DOMINATED TO A LARGE EXTENT BY THE IDEOLOGY OF STATE-CENTRISM, WHETHER OR NOT A DEATH BY VIOLENT MEANS IS SEEN AS BEING NEWSWORTHY OR NOT DEPENDS LARGELY ON THE NATIONALITY OF THE VICTIM

already, on numerous occasions, gone public with footage of many other killings, of combatants and non-combatants alike, including mass executions. Similarly, footage has been released by the militant group in Nigeria, Boko Haram, of a number of beheadings of their captives – most recently that of a wing commander in the Nigerian Air Force, which also included a final statement by the victim.⁹ It should also be noted that footage released by the IS of its beheading of non-Western victims, and by Boko Haram of its beheadings, typically shows the actual act of the killing, unlike that released by the IS of its Western victims.

Without belabouring any further what is painfully obvious, these factors were not key to the levels of



WILLIAM THOMAS CAIN

The media photographs a picture of Nick Berg that rests on the mailbox of his home in Pennsylvania in the United States. Berg was a civilian contractor working to rebuild Iraq in 2004 when he was captured and beheaded by an Al-Qaida affiliated group in alleged retaliation for the United States abuse of Iraqi prisoners of war.



The National Broadcasting Company (NBC) News host Matt Lauer (left) interviews kidnapped journalist James Foley's parents on "The Today Show" (17 October 2013).

coverage or global indignation. Clearly, the fact that James Foley was a US citizen played a huge role in the attention generated. In a world dominated to a large extent by the ideology of state-centrism, whether or not a death by violent means is seen as being newsworthy or not depends largely on the nationality of the victim. Hence, strong US media interest in the death of a US victim was a certainty. But the fact that the victim was a US citizen had powerful implications for the news media beyond the borders of the US, for a number of reasons. Research to date has found that an audience's perceived ability to identify with a victim – based on racial, cultural, linguistic, religious, socio-economic and other forms of affinity – contributes to the level of media coverage.¹⁰ The selective focus on and indignation against the recent beheadings of US, British and French citizens throughout the Western media in places as distant as Australia, for example, in stark contrast to non-Western victims killed under somewhat similar circumstances, would appear to support such findings. The power that the US government and major US media organisations have in influencing the global news flow must also be noted.¹¹ Events that attract saturation coverage in the US are inevitably picked up and followed closely by a large number of media organisations outside

that country, both Western and non-Western. Finally, and equally importantly, the execution video of James Foley was designed to serve as a direct challenge to US foreign policy. Although the video portrays an attempt to use US hostages to stop US bombings against the IS, it has been widely interpreted as representing a threat to the US itself. The expectation that this would lead to an expanded bombing campaign against the IS by the world's most powerful military force has also served to enhance the prominence of the incident. All these factors could be considered to have contributed to the perceived newsworthiness, and the unparalleled level of attention and indignation regarding this incident beyond the borders of the US.

Creating a Media Event

But it is not only a question of which incidents the media chooses to focus its gaze. Another important matter concerns the impact of those choices. The international media itself played a major role in giving the James Foley incident the impact that it had – a role that was expected of it by the makers of the video, and one that the media willingly accepted. The fact that the supposed executioner spoke in English and directly addressed President Obama,



Al Shabaab kidnaps 5 in Lamu

2014-10-11 08:40

Nairobi - Suspected Al-Shabaab militia on Friday abducted five Kenyans at Kiunga, along the border with Somalia in the coastal town of Lamu.

Lamu County Commissioner Njenga Miiri confirmed the incident, saying the heavily armed militants hijacked two vehicles which were ferrying miraa (khat) within Kiunga area.

"We are pursuing the gunmen. We believe they are Al-Shabaab members," Miiri told Xinhua by telephone. "The five comprising of drivers and loaders are in the hands of Al-Shabaab. But we have launched security operation to help free the Kenyans."

Miiri said a combined team of military and police officers have been deployed in the region to help crack down on the insurgents.

In August, Al-Shabaab militants beheaded a Kenyan driver abducted at Kiunga. The body of George Mwita was discovered on Aug. 22 during a rescue operation carried out by Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) soldiers and police within the vast Boni forest, where the militants were hiding.

Inspector General of Police David Kimaiyo said police have extended the dusk-to-dawn curfew in Lamu in a bid to restore normalcy in the volatile region.

Since the curfew was imposed in July, the county has experienced a reduction of incidents of insecurity, and life as well as economic and social activities are gradually returning to normal, according to the police.

- Xinhua

For the latest on national news, politics, sport, entertainment and more follow us on Twitter and like our Facebook page!

Share:



Comment

George Mwita's beheading was only briefly covered by local press and a few select international news agencies, but did not attract anywhere near the degree of global media attention or widespread indignation that James Foley's beheading received.

the symbolism of the orange prison suit worn by the victim, the fact that the video was filmed in multiple takes and was heavily edited, and the use of a lapel microphone on both the victim and the hooded man holding the knife to ensure the quality of sound – all of these factors suggest a very deliberate and calculated attempt to maximise media attention and shock in the outside world. It was produced with the intention of creating a media event. It would appear that in its release of online footage, Boko Haram is attempting to do the same, although the production values fall far short of those seen in the James Foley video and those of other Western victims that followed .

In the case of Syria and Iraq, the media in the outside world helped fulfil this intention. The event instantly became the top news story for a great many media outlets, and to highlight this particular atrocity, the media worked to invoke grief, sympathy and outrage among its audience, and impress upon it the gravity of the loss of this particular life. With so many tragic and violent deaths in the world, the context that gives meaning to a particular death is of critical importance. Reports of deaths, even in great numbers, cannot compete with context in this regard. Joseph Stalin's famous observation that a single death is a tragedy, while a million deaths is but a statistic, has a certain truth to it. The failure of the media in the outside world to make a concerted attempt to arouse substantive indignation in response to conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), even as the rise of the unparalleled death toll, counted in

the millions, was repeatedly revealed, finally reaching 5.4 million,¹² is evidence of this uncomfortable reality. But by the same token, even a single death can only become a 'tragedy' in a far-reaching sense if it is given substantive context and a deeper meaning. This means giving a victim a name, a human face, a family, a life story in news reports. It means interviews with colleagues and loved ones, and anecdotes from happier times emphasising their love for their family, kind deeds done and good intentions, aspirations, innocence and the weight of loss that their death brings to others.

WITH NO FOLLOW-UP REPORTS BY THE MEDIA OUTLETS THAT DID CHOOSE TO REPORT THE INCIDENT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NEVER ANY INTENTION TO PROVOKE AN EMOTIONAL ENGAGEMENT AMONG THE AUDIENCE REGARDING THE INCIDENT

African victims of such tragedies are not given this context in media reports in the outside world. The African victims of groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or the anti-Balaka in the Central African Republic are rarely given a name, let alone a face or other humanising features or personal details. An examination of the content of the small number of



Journalists listen to a panel discussion about the importance and dangers of reporting on world conflicts at a “Free James Foley event” in Boston, United States (3 May 2013).

news articles returned by a search of English language media sources using the LexisNexis database with the search term ‘George Mwita’ revealed almost no personal information about the victim beyond his name and the fact that he was a truck driver. With no follow-up reports by the media outlets that did choose to report the incident, it is clear that there was never any intention to provoke an emotional engagement among the audience regarding the incident. We see a similar lack of detail, and of attempts to seek out detail, regarding the reports on the two children beheaded by the anti-Balaka – although admittedly, limited access may well have hindered further investigation not just regarding the crime, but the identities of the victims.

Why does Outside Media Attention Matter?

There is a yawning gap between the levels of worldwide media coverage of conflict-related atrocities. Certain atrocities attract lengthy, sustained and emotive media coverage and worldwide indignation, while other similar atrocities – if they are covered at all – appear fleetingly, and in a succinct and matter-of-fact manner on the media agenda. Atrocities in Africa almost invariably fall into the latter category in media coverage outside the continent. This trend with regard to individual atrocities mirrors a larger and long-standing pattern of entire conflicts on the

continent that are largely ignored by the media, including some of the world’s deadliest. In 2014, for example, ‘chosen’ conflicts in Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Syria and Iraq have dominated Western media coverage, while ‘stealth’ conflicts in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia and the DRC have tended to garner only sporadic coverage.¹³

USING THE LEXISNEXIS DATABASE WITH THE SEARCH TERM ‘GEORGE MWITA’ REVEALED ALMOST NO PERSONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE VICTIM BEYOND HIS NAME AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS A TRUCK DRIVER

Clearly, the disproportionately heavy coverage of certain atrocities when compared to others that are similar in nature is problematic, not least because it invalidates the ostensibly ‘humanitarian’ emphasis of the response – humanitarian concerns only apply if they are applied to humans without distinction according to skin colour or nationality. But the quantity and content of media coverage of distant atrocities as a whole is something that needs

to be carefully considered. If beheadings are filmed, and the footage is edited for effect and actively promoted to the outside world by the perpetrators, then one might be justified in assuming that their objectives are related to a desire to terrorise their opponents and gain infamy, with a view to attaining a status in the global arena that might not otherwise have been possible, by virtue of actual military, political or economic levels of power. In such a case, heavy foreign media coverage of such incidents could be considered by the perpetrators to be empowering.

WHAT THE NEWS MEDIA CHOOSES TO COVER AND HOW IT CHOOSES TO COVER IT CONTINUES TO DESERVE OUR ATTENTION, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT PERTAINS TO THE VIOLENT AND SENSELESS TAKING OF HUMAN LIFE

But at the same time, the indignation that is generated by such public displays of brutality can also mobilise the outside world to take measures aimed at curtailing the activities of such militant groups. This may include steps taken to limit the flow of weapons, funding and recruits; galvanise diplomatic pressure; and/or even some form of military intervention. Perhaps of equal importance, dispassionate and nuanced media coverage of the actions of such groups can give the public and policymakers outside the region a better understanding of the problem being faced, and thus put them in a better position to make decisions that have a higher likelihood of being effective in ameliorating the situation, when compared to knee-jerk reactions aroused by emotive coverage.

In a world in which virtually unlimited amounts of information flow freely on the Internet, and in which powerful online social networking services facilitate user-to-user sharing of information on a massive scale, it is tempting to think that the traditional news media has become disempowered. But although major changes have occurred in the dissemination of news, there is no question that the news media retains an exceptionally powerful role in news-gathering and in agenda-setting. What the news media chooses to cover and how it chooses to cover it continues to deserve our attention, particularly when it pertains to the violent and senseless taking of human life. ▲

Dr Virgil Hawkins is an Associate Professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan. He is also a Research Associate at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Co-Founder of the Southern African Centre for Collaboration on Peace and Security.

Endnotes

- 1 White House (2014) 'President Obama Delivers a Statement on the Murder of James Foley', 20 August, Available at: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/08/20/president-obama-delivers-statement-murder-james-foley#transcript>> [Accessed 5 October 2014].
- 2 See, for example, Sky News US Team (2014) FBI: Islamic State's Jihadi John Identified. *Sky News*, 26 September; and Rajhatta, Chidanand (2014) Terror Group Releases US Scribe After 2 Years. *The Times of India*, 27 August.
- 3 Murray, Mark (2014) 'ISIS Threat: Fear of Terror Attack Soars to 9/11 High, NBC News/WSJ Poll Finds', *NBC News*, 10 September, Available at: <<http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/isis-threat-fear-terror-attack-soars-9-11-high-nbc-n199496>> [Accessed 2 November 2014].
- 4 Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2011) 'Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011', Available at: <<http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2011.html>> [Accessed 5 October 2014].
- 5 Human Rights Watch (2014) 'Saudi Arabia: Surge in Executions', 21 August, Available at: <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/21/saudi-arabia-surge-executions>> [Accessed 7 October 2014].
- 6 Reporters Without Borders (2014) '2014: Journalists Killed', Available at: <<http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-barometer-journalists-killed.html?annee=2014>> [Accessed 8 October 2014].
- 7 Tran, Mark (2013) 'Children "Beheaded and Mutilated" in Central African Republic, says UNICEF', *The Guardian*, 30 December, Available at: <<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/30/children-beheaded-mutilated-central-african-republic-violence-unicef>> [Accessed 2 November 2014].
- 8 Reporters Without Borders (2014) 'Syria', Available at: <<http://en.rsf.org/syria.html>> [Accessed 8 October 2014].
- 9 Alamba, Sunday and Faul, Michelle (2014) 'Boko Haram Video Shows Beheading of Nigeria Pilot', *Associated Press*, 3 October, Available at: <<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fa762658743f43ed8cc1a9be82f89ab3/boko-haram-video-shows-beheading-nigeria-pilot>> [Accessed 2 November 2014].
- 10 Tims, Albert R. and Miller, M. Mark (1986) Determinants of Attitudes Towards Foreign Countries. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 10 (4), pp. 471–484; and Hanusch, Folker (2008) Valuing Those Close to Us. *Journalism Studies*, 9 (3), pp. 341–356.
- 11 McCombs, Maxwell (2004) *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion*. Cambridge: Polity, p. 113.
- 12 International Rescue Committee (2008) 'Special Report: Congo', Available at: <<http://www.rescue.org/special-reports/special-report-congo-y>> [Accessed 1 October 2014].
- 13 Hawkins, Virgil (2014) 'Off the Radar: Stealth Conflicts and the Media', *Fair Observer*, 19 September, Available at: <http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/off-the-radar-stealth-conflicts-and-the-media-32071/> [Accessed 8 October 2014].

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: WHAT ROLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY?

BY DAVID KODE



GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

Introduction

The Central African Republic (CAR) is currently facing a humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by events following the *coup d'état* that ousted President François Bozizé in March 2013. In the aftermath of this coup, the conflict has assumed a largely sectarian dimension between the Muslim-dominated Séléka coalition and the mostly Christian self-defence militia known as anti-balaka.¹ Both groups have gone on rampages committing atrocities, killing civilians and, in certain instances, mutilating bodies and burning them. The members of the groups also torture and rape civilians, loot and burn down houses and villages, and target convoys of people who are fleeing to neighbouring countries. Since the coup in March 2013, atrocities have

allegedly been committed by the Central African Armed Forces – *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA) – and the Presidential Guard of President François Bozizé, while the Séléka and anti-balaka militias are also guilty of committing serious crimes against humanity.

The CAR is facing the worst crisis in its turbulent history, and thousands of civilians have been killed since March 2013. As of August 2014, over 400 000 Central Africans had fled to other countries in the region – notably Cameroon,

Above: The Central African Republic is facing the worst crisis in its turbulent history. Thousands of civilians have been killed since March 2013.



Fighters for the Séléka rebel alliance stand guard in front of the presidential palace in Bangui, Central African Republic, after ousting President François Bozizé (25 March 2013).

Chad, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – and approximately 1 million people have been displaced.² The justice system is functioning poorly, perpetrators of violence enjoy impunity and the formal economy has regressed uncontrollably. Civilians taking refuge in churches and camps are being attacked, and some are abducted and taken to undisclosed locations.

The transitional government is currently led by former Bangui mayor and businesswoman Catherine Samba-Panza. She was appointed by the National Transitional Council to take over from Séléka leader and self-proclaimed president Michel Djotodia in January 2014, following pressure from African leaders and their French counterparts for him to relinquish power. Djotodia, who had led the onslaught against Bozizé during the March 2013 coup, had failed to exert control over Séléka fighters, despite the fact that he publicly announced that they had been disbanded in September 2013. His actions further increased the economic and financial woes of the CAR, as he prioritised his personal security and used state funds to rebuild the Roux military camp, where Séléka fighters were stationed and which served as his residence.³

The rise of the anti-balaka was in response to the carnage unleashed by members of the Séléka when Djotodia was president in the aftermath of the coup. As the violence intensified, Séléka fighters targeted Christian communities,

making no distinction between anti-balaka and ordinary civilians. Anti-balaka militias also targeted all Muslims, with the assumption that they are all part of the Séléka group. While the conflict has now taken a religious dimension, it will be erroneous to categorise it as a religious war. It is a crisis rooted in the political, social and economic failures that have characterised the CAR's post-independence history, and the current malaise must be viewed in light of the country's past.

This article argues that the resolution of the conflict cannot occur without a proper understanding of the historical dynamics of the CAR and the severe political, economic, social and governance challenges that have characterised its polity. The sectarian conflict is underpinned by decades of economic failures, corruption, nepotism, poverty and prioritisation of development initiatives in certain regions over others. More importantly, the role of civil society and, in particular, interfaith dialogues and grassroots interventions, must be at the centre of conflict resolution efforts as fighting between the anti-balaka and Séléka has created deep divisions and mistrust between Christians and the Muslims and exacerbated social tensions within and between these communities.

Efforts by religious leaders to restore unity through interfaith dialogues and community forums must be supported by the transitional government and regional and international actors. In line with United Nations (UN) Security



Members of the anti-balaka, a Christian militia, patrol outside the village of Zawa in the Central African Republic (April 2014).

Council Resolution 2124 of April 2014, 1 800 peacekeeping forces have been deployed in the CAR, adding to the 4 800 African and 2 000 French forces. The UN has assumed control of the peacekeeping forces under the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The current international peacekeeping force is not entirely enough to deal effectively with the security challenges. Military intervention must be accompanied by technical, material and financial support for civil society-led initiatives aimed at rebuilding trust and relationships between the divisive communities.

The Central African Republic in Context

Formerly known as Ubangi-Shari, the CAR is one of Africa's poorest and most turbulent countries and has consistently experienced different phases of political insurrections since it achieved independence from France in 1960. Almost all of the country's presidents in the post-independence period came to power through coups, and their tenures in office have often been characterised by

corruption and the flagrant abuse of human rights. Even after the country went through a democratic transition in 1993, its polity has been overshadowed by coups and threats of coups, military uprisings and mutinies. The CAR's chequered political history can be blamed on severe political and governance failures, high levels of impunity enjoyed by its political leaders in the face of gross violations of human rights, nepotism, corruption and deficiencies in its internal security architecture.

Defects in policing and security in general have been the hallmark of all post-independence regimes. Challenges with internal security of the state are made worse by the presence of rebel groups from Chad, DRC, Sudan and Uganda, which have used the CAR's territory as launch pads to attack government forces in their respective countries. There is also the threat emanating from the circulation of arms by different local warring factions, especially in the north.⁴ The presence of rebel factions along the CAR's borders is an indicator that the governments of Chad and Uganda took their war into the

CAR as they pursued armed groups that have sought refuge in CAR territory.

All but one of the CAR's presidents came to power through coups and were ousted in the same manner.⁵ In the latest episode, on 10 December 2012, a coalition of rebel groups acting under the banner of the Séléka movement began an insurgency in the country and, in the process, captured major towns as they advanced towards the capital city, Bangui. The rebels accused the government of reneging on the 2008 Peace Agreement, signed after the so-called Bush War, which lasted from 2004 to 2007.⁶ They cited key provisions in the agreement, including demands to release political prisoners and members of armed groups from the country's jails. The rebels were also adamant that their goal was to oust incumbent president Bozizé from power. The strong demands of the rebels, coupled with military victories against Bozizé's troops and the refusal of France and the United States (US) to heed Bozizé's calls for military intervention, compelled him to sign a peace agreement with the rebels on 11 January 2013 in Gabon's capital city, Libreville. But history never fails to repeat itself in the CAR and, in March 2013, the rebels launched another major offensive. This time, they captured Bangui, after again accusing Bozizé of failing to honour key provisions of the Libreville Accords and, in particular, the inclusion of members of rebel groups in the country's armed forces.

The Economy of Conflict in the Central African Republic

Aside from the CAR's chequered political history, a major source of instability has been the marked economic and social differences and extremely high levels of poverty. The CAR is landlocked, the transportation system is poor, the labour force in the country is largely unskilled, and income is unevenly distributed among the 5.2 million citizens in the country. The economy depends on proceeds from the exportation of diamonds and from international assistance – especially from its former colonial power, France. Despite the presence of huge quantities of diamonds in the country, a large proportion of the revenue from the sale of diamonds has often ended up in the bank accounts of the country's elite, who own diamond companies and siphon funds that could otherwise be used for the development of the state. The inability of different regimes to pay the salaries of civil servants for several months at various times has been a major source of instability in the country.

High levels of poverty, especially in the north, led to its marginalisation – and this region serves as a base for the major CAR rebel factions and an abode for rebel groups from neighbouring countries. Those who are recruited by the rebel groups raise concerns over the absence of basic services and an overall lack of development.⁷ The marginalisation of most regions of the country in economic, political and social terms



GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

Muslim Seleka fighters patrol as they search for anti-balaka Christian militia members near the town of Lioto in the Central African Republic (June 2014).

rendered citizens in these parts wary of different Bangui governments, and made it difficult for various presidents to have complete administrative and political control over all regions. Most governments that have ruled the CAR have focused more on consolidating their power and less on developing the economy and building political institutions. The effect of this is that the government's influence and control has often been limited to the capital city of Bangui, at the expense of other regions.

THE ARMED BANDITS ARE USUALLY VERY ORGANISED AND HAVE A BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORY THAN SOME OF THE CAR'S OFFICIAL SECURITY

Insecurity Fuelled by Intrusion of Rebels from Neighbouring Countries

The presence of different rebel groups in the CAR adds to tensions already evident between the CAR and its neighbouring states. Clashes between the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR) rebel movement from Chad and the Chadian armed forces destabilised the northern part of the CAR, particularly between 2008 and 2012. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has had a base in south-eastern CAR since 2006 and has carried out reprisals and rampaged communities through abducting, raping and killing ordinary civilians.⁸ The LRA committed gross human rights abuses; its actions negatively affected economic activities and forced civilians to flee from affected areas, and this ultimately retarded development.⁹ The group continues to pose serious threats to the population in the area, despite there being about 700 soldiers from the Ugandan military – and, during Bozizé's tenure in office, about 150 soldiers from FACA – in the area.¹⁰ From 2009, the presence of the LRA in the CAR attracted the attention of the international community to the dire situation in the country and the human rights violations occurring, but did not elicit sufficient action to assist in redressing the challenges faced by the CAR.¹¹

The *Mouvement de Liberation du Congo* (MLC) of former vice president of the DRC, Jean Pierre Bemba, was invited by former CAR president Ange-Félix Patassé to help stave off incursions spear-headed by Bozizé. The MLC is reported to have committed human rights violations between 2002 and 2003 and atrocities against civilians as it supported Patassé's forces against those of Bozizé. The country is also awash with armed bandit groups, known as *Coupeurs de route* or *Zaraguinas* (highway men), who operate along roads in different parts of the country and target road users, indiscriminately robbing them of their possessions and money and posing further security threats. The armed bandits are usually very organised and have a broader understanding of the country's territory than some of the

CAR's official security.¹² In response to the activities of the *Coupeurs de route*, self-styled defence groups were formed to counter threats from the road bandits. The self-defence groups are, for the most part, poorly equipped. They are mostly based in the north-western region of the country and apart from targeting the road bandits, they occasionally engage in fighting with rebel groups, especially the People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD).¹³

Prior to the recent conflict, it was estimated that FACA had about 5 000 personnel including soldiers, the presidential guard and other security personnel. Most members of FACA are based in Bangui. FACA has a history of being poorly equipped and its members are underpaid, hence the propensity for them to organise mutinies and coups. Other segments of the security forces, such as the *gendarmerie* and police, lack capacity and resources. While this can be attributed to the economic and governance failures that have beset the state, the country's leaders have used this weakness as a strategy to deliberately withhold support and promote factionalism within army ranks, while empowering presidential guards (considered more loyal) and pre-emptively squashing coups and insurrections.¹⁴ It is not very surprising, therefore, that when rebels marched to the presidential palace in March 2013, members of FACA fled in the face of battle, leaving South African troops stationed in the capital to defend the presidential palace.

Conflict Resolution in the Central African Republic: What Role for Civil Society?

In January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza took over as interim president and immediately called for national reconciliation and for the rebuilding of the army, police and security agencies. However, progress on these has been minimal, as systematic and reprisal attacks continue. In the absence of structured security agencies, the Séléka went on a rampage – killing, looting, pillaging, raping, and burning down houses and villages. The violence that has been perpetuated by the anti-balaka and Séléka represent the highest threats to the transition process. The current conflict has exposed the governance failures the CAR has experienced throughout its post-independence history. The absence of a strong judiciary, prisons and police means criminals can do whatever they want. This only increases the cycle of violence. Prosecutors, lawyers, judges and police are too afraid to carry out investigations, because of the threat of reprisals from armed groups, and some have been killed. Journalists, human rights defenders and politicians who speak out against the violence have also been targeted and killed.

Amid the political tensions, insurrections and uncertainties that have figured prominently in post-independent CAR, civil society groups have been active. Prior to the conflict, hundreds of non-governmental organisations and human rights groups carried out activities in the country. Freedom of the media is generally respected, and while private radio stations and newspapers operate,



Catherine Samba-Panza was sworn-in as the interim president of the Central African Republic on 23 January 2014.

their influence has generally been limited to Bangui. Since the outbreak of the recent conflict, civil society activists, human rights defenders and journalists have resorted to self-censorship or have left the country following threats from Séléka members for reporting on atrocities.¹⁵ In the current conflict, civil society representatives have been targeted by the belligerents because of the nature of their work – reporting violations of human rights and assisting victims of these atrocities. Civil society organisations have also been targeted because of the composition of their staff members, who represent different ethnic, religious and social backgrounds.¹⁶

Civil society has played other roles in efforts to resolve the conflict in the past, and in ensuring that perpetrators of human violations are held accountable and victims receive justice. In 2001, the CAR acceded to the Rome Statute, giving the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over the country and making the CAR eligible for investigations in cases where crimes against humanity were committed. On 22 May 2007, the ICC initiated investigations into atrocities committed between 2000 and 2003, at the request of former president Patassé.¹⁷ Exactly one year later, the ICC produced a warrant for the arrest of Bemba, former vice president of the DRC and leader of the MLC, for war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out in the CAR. Human rights groups – including the *Organisation pour la compassion et le développement des familles en détresse* (OCODEFAD),

the *Ligue Centrafricaine des droits de L'homme* (LCDH) and the *Observatoire Centrafricaine des droits de l'homme* (OCDH) – played pivotal roles in documenting atrocities and human rights violations committed by government forces and rebels, including recording testimonies of victims and providing assistance to victims of these human rights abuses.¹⁸ These organisations called on the ICC to investigate violations of human rights and bring the perpetrators to justice, as the CAR judicial mechanisms were unable to persecute individuals for such crimes.

In December 2012, an inter-religious forum, the Inter-Religious Platform (IRP), was created in the CAR by leaders of Christian and Muslim faiths – Reverend Nicolas Guérkoyamé Gbangou, president of the Evangelical Alliance of Central Africa; Archbishop Dieudonné Nzapalainga, president of the Episcopal Conference in Central Africa; and Imam Oumar Kobine Layama, president of the CAR Islamic Community – when Bozizé called on Christians to violently confront Muslims in the country to prevent a complete takeover of the CAR by radical groups.¹⁹ The IRP laid the foundation for inter-religious dialogues, which have been ongoing, to stem the violence and reunify communities. The IRP released a public statement, condemning the atrocities and war crimes committed by Séléka and calling for national discussions between faith groups and communities, the participation of civil society in political processes and for belligerents to grant safe access to humanitarian organisations. In October 2013,



Displaced people camp in a building on the grounds of Saint Antoine de Padoue Cathedral in Bossangoa, Central African Republic (November 2013).

leaders of the Christian faith, including Reverend Gbangou and Archbishop Nzapalainga, convened a gathering, during which they condemned the atrocities committed by the anti-balaka and called on the international community to intervene to free the country from the grip of extremists. The Christian leaders highlighted the humanitarian crises and the carnage caused by fighting, and emphasised that Christians and Muslims have always lived in peace.

Interfaith dialogues have been facilitated by Archbishop Nzapalainga, Reverend Gbangou and Imam Layama. The three religious leaders have undertaken global advocacy meetings with French president Francois Hollande, during which they called for intervention by the international community. On 13 March 2014, they met UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and reiterated the importance of having a multinational peacekeeping force in the CAR. Late in March 2014, they met with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, and emphasised the importance of having the international community involved in efforts to resolve the crisis. The High Commissioner committed to continuing advocating for an international peacekeeping force. These meetings raised awareness about the atrocities committed in the CAR and, to a large extent, contributed to the deployment of a larger UN peacekeeping force and increased support for local civil society.

The religious leaders have gone from village to village, requesting Christians and Muslims to reunite, despite the hostility faced in certain communities. Churches have

been used to shelter Muslims who escape the violence, and peace committees have been created in Bangui and other towns to facilitate dialogues in communities. The peace committees also record details of killings. Mediation committees were created in Bangassou, in the south-eastern region, led by a female Muslim mayor who facilitates interactions between Christians and Muslims with the hope of reuniting communities.²⁰ Leaders of Christian and Muslim communities in the town of Bambari work together to prevent further divisions and intercommunal strife, by speaking to communities and using a local radio station to publicise messages of tolerance and peace. The religious leaders and civil society require financial and technical support to continue such peace endeavours, including establishing more community radio stations to spread tolerance and peace in different local languages.

Conclusion

The priority for transitional authorities and the regional and international community is to restore peace and calm in the CAR. The transitional government, like most of the post-independence regimes, has not been able to deal adequately with the security question in most parts of the country. The increase in the number of peacekeeping forces and the new lead role taken by the UN is a welcome development, but it is clear that more troops are needed to stop the violence and atrocities committed against civilians effectively. If the violence is stopped, humanitarian agencies will gain access



United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (centre right) meets with religious leaders of the Central African Republic (from left): Imam Oumar Kobine Layama, Reverend Nicolas Guérkoyamé Gbangou and Archbishop Dieudonné Nzapalainga (13 March 2014).

to victims of the war, and interfaith dialogues and community consultations can be held in an environment devoid of fear and insecurity. The transitional government also needs support from the international community to rebuild security services, the judiciary and the prisons, to guarantee a functioning justice system. There must be openness and transparency in the recruitment of members of FACA, and this must take into account the ethnic and religious diversity of the country. The process of disarming and demobilising Séléka and anti-balaka fighters must be intensified and expanded, with support from regional players and the international community. In addition, the governments of Chad, Sudan and Uganda must collaborate with the transitional authorities in the CAR to eliminate threats posed by rebel groups from these countries operating along the border and parts of the CAR.

In the context of sectarian violence and the inability or unwillingness of Séléka militia to distinguish between anti-balaka and Christians, as well as the indiscriminate killing of Muslims by anti-balaka, it is imperative for grassroots groups, civil society and religious and community leaders to play a critical role in bridging divisions and to assist communities in healing. Religious leaders have been active in promoting interfaith dialogues, and the role of civil society is increasingly critical in these processes. Civil society needs to develop its capacity and technical expertise further in documenting atrocities and working with international

peacekeeping forces and religious leaders to facilitate national reconciliation. There is also the need for civil society to enhance its capacity to facilitate voter education and the monitoring of elections.

The special investigations cell (*Cellule Special d'enquêtes*) set up by transitional authorities in April 2014 to investigate atrocities committed in Bangui will benefit from the experiences and knowledge of civil society. Resources are needed to thoroughly investigate crimes committed by the different warring factions, and those found guilty of these crimes must be held accountable for their actions. It is also important that perpetrators of violent crimes do not use government positions to benefit from immunity for their actions. For lasting peace to take root, the international community and regional actors must work with grassroots organisations and religious leaders to bridge sectarian divides. Before elections planned for 2015 are held, the current transitional government must prioritise internal security and mending rifts between Christian and Muslim communities.

Since independence, the CAR has been a theatre of instability, conflict and political insurrections. To address these political and security challenges, the international community and CAR leaders must ensure that they build necessary mechanisms and institutions to develop the economy and address social challenges. More should be done to extend administrative control and economic

development to all parts of the country, and not just prioritise development efforts in Bangui. Addressing social and economic difficulties will reduce high levels of poverty, ensure that salaries of the military and civil servants are paid consistently and reduce social discontent, which has been the cause of mutinies and coups in the past. The CAR also needs new leaders with a vision to reconcile the country and move away from its heinous past by denouncing nepotism, corruption and impunity and respecting the rule of law, the constitution and the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. **A**

David Kode is a Policy and Research Officer for CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

Endnotes

- 1 *Séléka* means 'alliance' in Sango, a local language widely spoken in the CAR. The *Séléka* coalition was officially disbanded in 2013, but has continued to operate in the country. It is known to have many fighters from Chad and Sudan, is predominantly Muslim and was originally composed of the *Union des Forces Démocratique pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR), *Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix* (CPJP), *Union des Forces Républicaines* (UFR), *Alliance pour la Refondation* (A2R) and the *Convention Patriotique du Salut du Kodro* (CPSK). The anti-balaka or 'anti-machete' is composed of armed militias, predominantly Christian fighters, and can be traced back to the 1990s, when it was initially formed to combat widespread violence and insecurity.
- 2 The International Criminal Court (2014) 'Situation in the Central African Republic 11 Article 53(1) Report, International Criminal Court, the Office of the Prosecutor', Available at: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/statement/Documents/Art%2053%201%20Report%20CAR%2011%2024Sep14.pdf> [Accessed 1 October 2014].
- 3 The International Crisis Group (2014) 'The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation, Africa Report, International Crisis Group', pp. 5–6, Available at: <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-la-crise-centrafricaine-de-la-predation-a-la-stabilisation-english.pdf>> [Accessed 12 September 2014].
- 4 Human Rights Watch (2007) 'Central African Republic: State of Anarchy, Rebellion and Abuses Against Civilians', p. 30, Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/car0907webwcover_0.pdf> [Accessed 13 September 2014].
- 5 The exception is current interim president Catherine Samba-Panza, who was appointed following the resignation of Michel Djotodia in January 2014. She was elected from a list of eight candidates and will lead the country until elections are organised in 2015.
- 6 In 2008, the government of the CAR signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with different rebel factions including the APRD, FDPC and UFDR, under the auspices of Gabon's President Omar Bongo, following fighting between government forces and the rebels. The CPA granted amnesty to members of the armed groups for crimes committed in CAR territory and committed to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former fighters, among other things.
- 7 Human Rights Watch (2007) op. cit.
- 8 Human Rights Watch (2012) 'LRA Attacks Escalate', Available at: <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/20/central-african-republic-lra-attacks-escalate>> [Accessed 15 September 2014].
- 9 Ahere, John and Maina, Grace (2013), *The Never-ending Pursuit of the Lord's Resistance Army: An Analysis of the Regional Cooperative Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA. ACCORD Policy and Practice Brief*, 24, Available at: <<http://www.accord.org.za/images/downloads/brief/ACCORD-policy-practice-brief-24.pdf>> [Accessed 7 November 2014].
- 10 International Crisis Group (2010) 'Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive, International Crisis Group Policy Briefing, 12 (January 2010), Available at: <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/B069%20Central%20African%20Republic%20Keeping%20the%20Dialogue%20Alive.pdf>> [Accessed 24 January 2014].
- 11 The UN Security Council Resolution 2021, adopted on 10 October 2013 in an effort to seek solutions aimed at stemming the deteriorating political and security situation in the CAR, raised further concerns about the human rights violations committed by the LRA and the threat that the armed movement is to the country. The UNSC requested countries and regional actors to intensify attempts to root out the threats posed by the LRA.
- 12 Amnesty International (2007) 'Masked Bandits Run Riot in the Central African Republic', Available at: <<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR19/005/2007/en/Defb4d1f-d369-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/afr190052007en.pdf>> [Accessed 27 January 2014].
- 13 Spittaels, Steven and Hilgert, Filip (2009) 'Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic, International Peace Information Service, Available at: <http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=257> [Accessed 28 January 2014].
- 14 Boggero, Marco (2008) Local Dynamics of security in Africa. *African Security Review*, 17 (2), pp. 16–27.
- 15 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2013) *Situation of Human Rights in the Central African Republic*. Report, 12 September, p. 16.
- 16 The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Central African League for Human Rights (LCDH) (2014) 'Central African Republic, "They Must All Leave or Die", FIDH, LCDH Investigative Report Answering War Crimes with Crimes Against Humanity', p. 49, Available at: <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_rca_2014-uk-04.pdf> [Accessed 7 October 2014].
- 17 Davenport, Kelsey (2010) 'The Role of Civil Society in International Law: The Relationship Between Civil Society Organisations and the International Criminal Court in the Central African Republic', Available at: <<http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/davenport-role>> [Accessed 5 October 2014].
- 18 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2007) 'The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Serious Crimes Committed in the Central African Republic, Listen to Victims Deter Criminals: The ICC Investigation Must Break the Cycle of Impunity', pp. 1–2, Available at: <http://www.iccnw.org/documents/FIDH_CAR_PR_22may07_eng.pdf> [Accessed 6 October 2014].
- 19 Nzapalainga, Dieudonné, Layama, Omar Kabine and Linden, Ian (2014) 'African Meeting Summary, Conflict in the Central African Republic: Religion, Power and Respect for Reconciliation', pp. 3–4, Available at: <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/270114CAR.pdf> [Accessed 7 November 2014].
- 20 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2014) 'Preliminary Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Central African Republic', Marie-Therese Keita Bocoum, p. 7, Available at: <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/.../A_HRC_26_53_ENG_AUV.docx> [Accessed 4 October 2014].



MARITIME SECURITY IN AFRICA: POTENTIAL FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR?

BY DIRK SIEBELS

Introduction

Maritime matters have long been neglected in most African countries. While almost all coastal states on the continent claim an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that stretches out to 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) from the coastline, little effort has been made to realise the ocean's economic potential. In recent years, however, the picture has started to change.

Problems with piracy off Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea are the most headline-grabbing phenomenon. More importantly, pirate attacks have highlighted the challenges associated with a lack of security at sea. Illegal fishing, smuggling of drugs and weapons or human trafficking could all have serious ramifications

on land. Offshore oil and gas production offers vast opportunities, but can only take place in a more or less secure environment. Finally, maritime trade and, to a lesser extent, tourism are important ingredients for future economic growth; yet again, though, security at sea is a critical factor.

The African Union (AU) has recognised the importance of maritime matters. In January 2014, the AU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the 2050 Africa

Above: Suspected Somali pirates keep their hands in the air as directed by sailors aboard a guided-missile cruiser, in the Gulf of Aden (February 2009).



Security personnel hold up fish caught by two Italian fishing boats. The boats, with a crew of 14 people, were seized by Libyan authorities who claimed they were illegally fishing in Libyan waters (October 2012).

Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy. In developing the AIM Strategy, the AU tried to mobilise as many stakeholders as possible because “the approach to regulation and management of maritime issues and resources cannot be confined to a few select sectors or industries”.¹

PRIVATE MARITIME SECURITY COMPANIES (PMSCS) ARE USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED GUARDS ON MERCHANT VESSELS, PROTECTING SHIPS AGAINST PIRATE ATTACKS

This article concentrates on two aspects that are important for many coastal states in Africa: sustainable fishing, and offshore oil and gas production. These aspects are good examples for the potential of enhanced maritime capabilities. Furthermore, the article discusses the potential for an enhanced role of the private sector. Private maritime security companies (PMSCs) are usually associated with armed guards on merchant vessels, protecting ships against pirate attacks. In addition, PMSCs could provide a range of other services, such as

helping African governments to develop their maritime capabilities much faster than they could on their own.

Illegal Fishing Threatens Marine Resources

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing covers a number of related issues. At the heart of the matter, any country has the right to regulate fishing within its EEZ and to impose quota or licensing requirements on fishing vessels. Selling fishing licences could provide a steady income to many African coastal and island states, yet without the necessary enforcement, such documents quickly become worthless.

It is nearly impossible to find reliable figures about the extent of IUU fishing in African waters. In February 2009, a comprehensive study about the extent of illegal fishing worldwide² concluded that developing countries in general are most at risk. Statistics and estimates for the period between 1980 and 2003 showed that West Africa, in particular, has been affected. The total estimated catches was consistently between 30% and 40% higher than reported catches, due to a combination of rich fishing grounds and a severe lack of regulatory oversight.

Since then, other studies have shown the effects of IUU fishing on a national level. In Senegal, for example,



Many African countries have incurred huge financial losses caused by illegal fishing.

illegally caught fish could be worth up to US\$300 million per year. At the same time, the share of artisanal fisheries has dropped from 80% two decades ago to just 50% today.³ In other words, fishermen and their families are in danger of losing their livelihood, while the price of fish – an important source of protein for large parts of the Senegalese population – is increasing.

Unfortunately, IUU fishing is not just a West African problem. In Madagascar, for example, marine resources have always been important for many communities, both as a staple food and as a source of income. Knowledge of the trends and composition of fisheries is limited nonetheless, and most figures available are nothing more than general estimates. According to a thorough review of catch statistics between 1950 and 2008, the total volume of fish caught in the island nation's EEZ was likely to be twice as high as official data suggested, yet monitoring capacities remain almost non-existent. The authors of the study concluded that "tensions are likely to increase in the future, and food insecurity may become a growing concern for coastal populations in the near future".⁴

The implications of illegal fishing should be obvious, yet they have been comprehensively ignored in the past. Monitoring of fishing grounds and enforcing licensing

regimes has only been an afterthought, although such tasks could be an important role for navies or coastguards. As almost all naval agencies in Africa suffer from a lack of resources, creative solutions have to be found. Pooling of resources could be an important step in this regard, but additional capabilities – for example, effective coastal surveillance equipment and new vessels for fisheries protection – are usually necessary. Some of these capacities could even be provided by the private sector.

Oil and Gas Offers Potential for Economic Growth

As outlined previously, many African countries have occurred huge financial losses caused by illegal fishing. While it is almost impossible to compile detailed statistics, the examples from Senegal and Madagascar illustrate the extent of the problem. Outside academic circles, however, there have been very few discussions and publications about the long-term implications of illegal fishing, and perceptions are shifting very slowly.

Offshore oil and gas is a completely different phenomenon. Until very recently, the only countries with a significant amount of offshore oil production were Nigeria and Angola. Within less than a decade, many

new discoveries have been made and some new fields have already come on stream. Ghana, arguably the most prominent example, started to export oil from the Jubilee field in December 2010. Some of the proceeds have been spent on an impressive procurement programme for the Ghanaian Navy, including two refurbished fast patrol boats from Germany and four new patrol boats built in China.⁵ Further offshore discoveries have been made since then and, in November 2013, officials in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire declared that both countries will start negotiations to settle a dispute over their maritime boundary.⁶ The boundary has never been officially delimited, but the urgent need for resolving the problem of overlapping claims has been brought about by the potential for valuable oil and gas reserves in the disputed area.

On the other side of the continent, an oil and gas bonanza has started in Mozambique. After the largest natural gas discoveries worldwide were made offshore, Anadarko Petroleum and Eni agreed to build the second-largest liquefied natural gas plant in the world.⁷ Various companies are also hoping to find offshore oil that is easier to extract, process and export.⁸

In neighbouring Tanzania, the numbers may not be quite as impressive, but the country is set to become

another important producer of natural gas. Over the coming decade, investments for offshore exploration and production are projected to grow to between US\$10 billion and US\$20 billion, showing the huge potential of – mainly offshore – energy resources.⁹

THE BOUNDARY HAS NEVER BEEN OFFICIALLY DELIMITED, BUT THE URGENT NEED FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF OVERLAPPING CLAIMS HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE POTENTIAL FOR VALUABLE OIL AND GAS RESERVES IN THE DISPUTED AREA

These are just the most prominent examples; offshore exploration is currently taking place in almost all coastal states in sub-Saharan Africa. Marin Katusa, energy analyst for a United States (US)-based investment research provider, even believes “that Africa – not the Middle East – will be the most important energy producer for the world in 2040 or even 2030”.¹⁰



Ghana's President, John Atta Mills, turns on the valve to allow the first barrel of crude oil to flow from the Jubilee offshore oil field (15 December 2010).



A crew member sits on a fishing net as Sierra Leonean security forces guard the Marampa 803, a vessel apprehended for alleged illegal fishing activities (January 2012).

Many observers share such optimism surrounding current oil and gas discoveries in Africa. There has been little or no exploration in the past, and technical solutions necessary for many ambitious offshore projects have only been developed in recent years. While offshore oil and gas provides huge opportunities, the necessary security measures have to be implemented at the same time. Otherwise, exploration vessels, oil and gas installations or offshore supply ships could become prime targets for pirates, local rebel groups or terrorists. Due to a lack of assets, equipment and training, national security forces may not be able to provide the level of security required by oil majors, but private security companies could be an effective short-term remedy.

Private Maritime Security is Professionalising

The private security industry gained a notorious reputation after civilians were killed in various incidents involving US-based security firms in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even before that, many African governments were wary of private security after different companies were involved in a number of conflicts and coup attempts. Arguably, the most prominent one was Executive Outcomes (EO), a private army that consisted of ex-South African combat veterans. EO's interventions in civil wars in Angola and

Sierra Leone received much attention. Despite significant criticism, however, both governments were essentially saved from being overthrown by rebel forces, as EO was brutally effective in all operations for which the company was contracted.¹¹

All these operations, however, were conducted on land. Private security at sea is a much more recent phenomenon, with very different characteristics. Faced with a growing number of pirate attacks off Somalia, the shipping industry quickly realised that even large-scale naval operations combined with various measures to protect merchant ships (for example, travelling on different routes or at higher speeds) were not enough to contain the threat. Even though most ship operators had been at least sceptical towards armed security guards on their vessels, the mindset within the industry changed almost overnight when it became clear that embarked security personnel were able to protect ships, crews and cargoes.

Armed security personnel on merchant ships were an unforeseen development, so there were almost no rules and regulations in place. Many aspects of PMSC operations were conducted in 'grey areas', further complicated by the interplay between various jurisdictions. By its very nature, the maritime industry

operates in an international context and PMSCs had to observe local laws in their own country of registry, the countries surrounding the western part of the Indian Ocean and in the respective flag state.¹² A typical example would be a United Kingdom-based PMSC sending a team of four armed guards (two of them British, the other two Indian) to Sri Lanka, where they would embark on a Liberian-flagged ship on a voyage to Egypt.

Despite the legal challenges and the fact that private shipping companies were employing armed security personnel to conduct military-style operations, private maritime security became a billion-dollar industry within a very short time. In a comprehensive analysis for 2012, *Oceans Beyond Piracy* estimated that the shipping industry spent between US\$1.1 billion and US\$1.5 billion on armed guards,¹³ yet there was virtually no PMSC that had been founded more than three years ago.

More recently, however, the industry has faced various challenges. Growing competition and a reduced threat level in the western part of the Indian Ocean have led to declining revenues for many companies. At the same time, many efforts have been made towards the regulation of PMSC operations, driven by national governments and the

shipping industry. Many larger private security companies were also the driving factor behind a new International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard that companies have been able to obtain since early 2014. Such an internationally recognised standard allows for independent certification, while national governments are able to maintain control over aspects they regard as critical.

For security companies with a certain market share, it makes commercial sense to support the introduction of an ISO standard. Although every bit of regulation will make it slightly more expensive to conduct their business, economies of scale will work in favour of the larger companies. Many smaller companies will struggle to obtain an ISO certification, making it less attractive for potential clients to employ their services.

Even though regulatory efforts are directed almost solely to the employment of armed guards on merchant ships, such efforts should be regarded as an opportunity by African governments. They could put the expertise PMSCs are able to offer to good use. While the provision of armed guards for the protection of merchant ships has been the most widely discussed service, PMSCs

GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS



Private security at sea is a fairly recent phenomenon, but has become very popular overnight as it is clear that embarked security guards are necessary to protect ships, crews and cargoes.



Private maritime security companies often employ former military personnel who are highly trained and vastly experienced.

often employ former military personnel – and more often than not, they are highly trained and vastly experienced. Coastal states in Africa could use these skills to address their short-term needs with maritime security problems, some of which have already been discussed.

EMPLOYING PRIVATE COMPANIES TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC SERVICES, HOWEVER, COULD HELP MANY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ADDRESS SHORT-TERM GAPS AND GIVE THEM TIME TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES

For governments, cooperation with partners from the private sector is a controversial issue, particularly when it comes to security-related tasks. Such tasks are regarded as one of the most important obligations of any nation-state and African governments are highly suspicious, as they want to avoid constraints on their sovereignty. Being able to assert that sovereignty in an area that stretches more than 350 kilometres out to sea, however, means that a government has to provide ships, personnel and a sufficient operating budget, among other things. If only

some parts are missing, sovereignty at sea will be virtual. Organised criminals or foreign fishing vessels can then use this ungoverned space to their advantage.

Private-sector involvement cannot be the solution to all security problems in the maritime domain. The necessary legal framework, for example, has to be provided by national governments, while politicians are usually reluctant when the provision of security is outsourced to the private sector. Employing private companies to provide specific services, however, could help many African governments address short-term gaps and give them time to develop their own capabilities.

After all, even an unlimited budget would not instantly enable any nation to protect its EEZ. Sustainable development of naval or coastguard capabilities should take place within a strategic framework, involving all stakeholders in the maritime domain – such as local fishing communities, police and customs authorities or port operators. Long-term procurement and recruitment plans have to be derived from such a framework, and capability gaps can then be addressed individually.

In the meantime, some problems have to be solved sooner rather than later. For example, EEZ surveillance is an issue for virtually all coastal states in Africa, resulting in problems with smuggling and illegal fishing. Such aspects have long been ignored, but perceptions are changing –

more often than not fuelled by the promise of new income streams from offshore resources. On the basis of transparent contracts and under close scrutiny of national governments, private companies could help to address many of the short-term problems in Africa's maritime environment without compromising the sovereignty of national governments.

Conclusion

Despite the attention pirate attacks off Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea have received in recent years, piracy is merely a symptom of much deeper problems. Maritime security is much broader, as the AU's AIM Strategy underlines. On a regional level, heads of state in West and Central Africa signed a code of conduct in June 2013, declaring their intention to address a number of issues, ranging from smuggling to piracy and illegal fishing.

INVOLVING THE PRIVATE SECTOR WILL LIKELY BE CONTROVERSIAL, BUT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO YIELD IMPORTANT DIVIDENDS

Regional and continental agreements are an important first step. Providing security in the maritime domain, much more than on land, is impossible without at least some cooperation with neighbouring states. Even if Sierra Leone had the capabilities to protect its EEZ, illegal fishing vessels could just divert to Guinean or Liberian waters. So far, however, steps towards closer cooperation have been tentative at best, and most progress has been made on paper. Whether good intentions will be translated into practice over the coming years remains to be seen.

Involving the private sector will likely be controversial, but has the potential to yield important dividends. These include the sale and monitoring of fishing licences, but improved security at sea might also have other positive impacts. Examples include foreign investment in port infrastructure or an increase in offshore energy production. In general, PMSCs can help to address short-term capability gaps, allowing African countries to focus on the development of these capabilities over time. Most importantly, Africa has to start looking further out to sea, because the maritime domain is inextricably linked to long-term growth and development. **A**

Dirk Siebels is a PhD Candidate at the University of Greenwich and an Associate Analyst for Risk Intelligence, a risk consultancy specialising in the maritime domain.

Endnotes

- 1 African Union (2014) '2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy', Available at: <[http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/2050%20AIM%20Strategy%20\(Eng\)_0.pdf](http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/2050%20AIM%20Strategy%20(Eng)_0.pdf)> [Accessed 11 July 2014].
- 2 Agnew, David, Pearce, John, Pramod, Ganapathiraju et al. (2009) Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing. *PLoS ONE*, 4 (2), pp. 1–8.
- 3 Belhabib, Dyhia, Koutob, Viviane, Sall, Aliou et al. (2014) Fisheries Catch Misreporting and Its Implications: The Case of Senegal. *Fisheries Research*, 151, pp. 1–11.
- 4 Le Manach, Frédéric, Gough, Charlotte, Harris, Alasdair et al. (2011) Unreported Fishing, Hungry People and Political Turmoil: The Recipe for a Food Security Crisis in Madagascar? *Marine Policy*, 36 (1), pp. 218–225.
- 5 Naval Today Staff (2012) 'President Commissions Four New Vessels for Ghana Navy', Available at: <<http://navaltoday.com/2012/02/21/president-commissions-four-new-vessels-for-ghana-navy/>> [Accessed 11 July 2014].
- 6 Coulibaly, Loucoumane (2013) 'Ghana, Ivory Coast Aim to Settle Maritime Boundary Peacefully', Available at: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/us-ivorycoast-ghana-border-idUSBRE9AP11W20131126>> [Accessed 11 July 2014].
- 7 Gismatullin, Eduard and Humber, Yuriy (2012) 'Eni-Anadarko African LNG Plant to be World's Second-largest', Available at: <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-21/eni-anadarko-plan-world-s-second-largest-Ing-plant-in-africa.html>> [Accessed 11 July 2014].
- 8 Gismatullin, Eduard (2013) 'Oil Hunted in Mozambique After World's Largest Gas Discoveries', Available at: <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/oil-hunted-in-mozambique-after-world-s-largest-gas-discoveries.html>> [Accessed 11 July 2014].
- 9 East African Business Week (2014) 'Tanzania Gas Projected to Hit U.S. \$20 Billion', Available at: <<http://allafrica.com/stories/201406240352.html>> [Accessed 11 July 2014].
- 10 Casey Research (2012) *The Global Race for East African Oil: An Investors Market Report*, p. 8.
- 11 Howe, Herbert (1998) Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36 (2), pp. 307–331.
- 12 The flag state is the state where the respective ship has been registered. Shipowners do not have to register their ship in their own country. Instead, they can choose another flag state for a variety of reasons. The three largest ship registries are Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands.
- 13 Oceans Beyond Piracy (2013) *The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012*, p. 20., Available at: <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ecop2012final_2.pdf> [Accessed November 2014].

AFRICAN UNION PANEL OF THE WISE

BY ELIZABETH BUHUNGIRO

The Panel of the Wise (PW) is a consultative body of the African Union (AU), composed of five appointed members who each serve a three-year term. The PW is one of the pillars of the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) sets up a five-person panel of “highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent”.¹ They are tasked with supporting the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. The role of the PW is therefore primarily to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. The PW’s functioning modalities allow it – as and when necessary and in the form it considers most appropriate – to pronounce itself on any issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. Based on this mandate, the PW was thus equipped with the ability to initiate preventative diplomacy measures on the continent, which is a unique feature of this APSA component.

- Selection Criteria**
1. Regional: representative of the north, east, south, west and central regions of the continent.
 2. Diversity of expertise: from various segments of society.
 3. Track record: have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent.
 4. Gender balance, in line with AU requirements.



GEORGES DE KERNILE

President Ahmed Ben Bella – First Chairperson of the Panel of the Wise

Ahmed Ben Bella (1916–2012) was a Pan-Africanist and Algerian nationalist leader. He was instrumental in Algeria’s struggle for independence, and subsequently became the first President of Algeria in 1963. As the leader of a sovereign Algeria, he advocated for democracy. Ben Bella proclaimed himself as a peaceful person and believed: “Peace does not include a vendetta; there will be neither winners nor losers.”

- Mandate of the Panel of the Wise**
- 01 Support and advise the Chairperson of the Commission and the AU PSC in the area of conflict prevention.
 - 02 Advise both the Commission and PSC on issues that are necessarily considered by the policy organs of the AU, such as issues of impunity, justice and reconciliation, as well as women and children in armed conflict, and impact on the most vulnerable.
 - 03 Use its good officers to undertake conflict mediation and broker peace agreements between warring parties.
 - 04 Help the AU Commission in mapping out threats to peace and security by providing regular advice and analysis, and requesting the Commission to deploy fact-finding or mediation teams to specific countries.

Evolution of the PW: Growing Membership and Evolving Structure

The first PW was appointed in 2007 with a mandate that ran until 2010. It comprised President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, as the chair; President Miguel Trovoada of São Tomé and Príncipe; Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, former Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); Elisabeth K. Pognon, former president of the Constitutional Court of Benin; and Brigalia Bam, the former chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa.

The first panel led the initial efforts to institutionalise the PW while implementing its mandate. Notably, in 2008, it introduced annual thematic reflections/horizon-scanning exercises as research initiatives to initiate policy debates with AU policy organs (that is, the AU Commission, the PSC and the AU Assembly PSC) on structural issues and emerging threats to peace and security. The first PW also brought about the consolidation of working modalities between the PW and other APSA pillars.



At the July 2010 General Assembly of the Heads of State of the AU in Kampala, Uganda, President Ben Bella and Salim Ahmed Salim were reappointed for another term, ending in December 2013. Three new members were also appointed: Mary Chinery Hesse of Ghana, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Marie Madeleine Kalala-Ngoy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the Assembly also agreed to establish a subsidiary group pegged to the five-member organ, which would be named Friends of the Panel of the Wise. This organ essentially comprised outgoing members of the PW, to share their experiences with new members.



AU IMAGE

The Second Panel of the Wise convened its Second Retreat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to examine the challenges to peace and security in Africa. The retreat was centred on the theme, 'Institutionalizing the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise): Contribution to Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance' (April 2013).



The second PW was instrumental in actively pursuing actions to alleviate election-related disputes through the conducting of systematic pre-election assessment missions. The new members created the Pan African Network of the Wise (PanWise), which brings together the PW and regional counterparts with complementary responsibilities, mediators and peacemaking mechanisms from member states and civil society organisations. This enables the PW to cement its partnership with regional economic communities (RECs) in strengthening and harmonising prevention and peacemaking efforts in Africa under a single umbrella.



AU IMAGE

A joint high-level delegation of the African Union Panel of the Wise and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Committee of Elders, working closely with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, carried out a week-long pre-election assessment mission to Kenya ahead of its 4 March 2014 general elections. The mission was conducted within the framework of the implementation of the Decision on the Report of the Panel of the Wise on Strengthening the Role of the African Union in the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Election-Related Disputes and Violent Conflicts in Africa (January 2013).



Method of Work

The PW meets at least three times annually to deliberate on its work programme and to identify regions or countries to visit. It organises annual workshops on issues related to conflict prevention and management, and produces a thematic report that is submitted to the Assembly of African Heads of State and Governments for endorsement.

The PW work plan includes: pre-election assessment missions; statutory meetings held three times a year; an annual PW retreat; an annual opening session of the PSC on Women and Children; attendance of the PW at the AU Summit; activities such as the implementation of the knowledge management framework (KMF) for mediation, trainings and communication (between panel members and RECs); dynamic early warning measures or preventative diplomacy; and horizon-scanning (regular reflections on different themes).

In addition to the above, its Secretariat is responsible for the following activities: (1) coordination of AU activities related to capacity building in mediation; (2) capacity-building support provided to AU envoys, AU field offices and RECs on preventive diplomacy and mediation; (3) coordination of the annual thematic reflections of the PW; and (4) coordination of the departmental KMF and other related mediation support tools.

Achievements of the Panel of the Wise

PW Focus Areas	Achievements
Election-related disputes and political violence	<p>In 2008, following electoral disputes in Kenya and Zimbabwe, the PW, at the request of the PSC, launched a reflection on the given theme and submitted a report to the AU Summit in July 2009 on election-related violence and conflict, with the aim of strengthening the AU’s capacity to observe elections at national, regional and continental levels. The recommendations made in the report were endorsed by the AU Assembly in July 2009. The recommendations forwarded by the PW were organised under six clusters:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • preventative diplomacy and early warning mechanisms; • electoral governance and administration; • AU coordination and electoral assistance; • post-election conflict transformation mechanisms; • AU coordination of electoral assistance and international cooperation and partnership; and • strategic interventions by the PW.
Peace, justice, non-impunity and reconciliation	<p>In 2009, the PW motivated the engagement of peace and security stakeholders in a reflection on issues relating to non-impunity, justice, transitional justice and reconciliation, given the related indictments of President Bashir of Sudan. The decision to fight impunity, in relation to reconciliation and healing, has led to extensive discussions and production of an AU transitional justice framework, which was adopted by the AU PSC in May 2011. Subsequently, in January 2014, the Assembly declared 2014–2024 as the ‘Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa’.</p>
Eliminating vulnerabilities of women and children in armed conflict	<p>In November 2009, the PW decided to adopt the situation of women and children in armed conflict as its main theme for 2010. This was informed by empirical evidence that women and children suffer most wherever and whenever there is a breakdown of social order. Based on one of the PW’s initial recommendations, the PSC decided to establish an annual open session on women and children in armed conflicts. The reflection has also led to the establishment of an AU Peace and Security Gender Mainstream Department, aimed at promoting peace and security, as well as the appointment in 2013 of an AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security.</p>
Strengthening political governance for peace, security and stability horizon-scanning and structural conflict prevention	<p>In April 2011, at the request of the PSC, the PW reflected on the AU’s instruments on unconstitutional changes of governments following the political developments that were taking place in North Africa. The aim was to come up with recommendations for the PSC on how best the AU instruments could be improved and made more effective. The PW organised two workshops in Tunis, Tunisia, in April 2012, on ‘Strengthening Political Governance for Peace, Security and Stability in Africa’. Following these discussions, a thematic report was produced in April 2012, with the following themes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • challenges and prospects of the North Africa revolts; • the third wave of democratisation in Africa and the challenges of managing transition; and • the implementation of the AU and regional instruments or unconstitutional changes of government. <p>The PW is currently in the process of finalising its report on its latest thematic reflection, devoted to ‘Strengthening Political Governance for Peace, Security and Stability’.</p>



Current Panel of the Wise

The third and current members of the PW were appointed by the AU Assembly of Heads of State meeting in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in July 2014. The members were formally inaugurated at an official ceremony in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in September 2014, and include: Luisa Diogo of Mozambique, the chairperson; Edem Kodjo of Togo; Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe of Uganda; Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria; and Albina Faria de Assis Pereira Africano of Angola. Members of the previous PW continue to engage in peace, security and development issues on the continent as Friends of the PW.

During their first deliberations in Addis Ababa, the new PW members decided to intensify their good office actions by undertaking early engagements with countries approaching presidential and parliamentary elections, so as to reduce and/or alleviate election disputes and conflicts. The new PW is expected to substantively address the current and future peace and security situation on the continent. This will include reflecting on the role of the PW in mitigating emerging threats to peace and security; engaging in early preventive action; preventing election-related disputes and promoting good governance; and fully operationalising the PanWise with the conduct of regional and national capacity-building exercises and joint actions.

Members of the Panel of the Wise



Dr Luisa Diogo
Chairperson

Dr Luisa Diogo served the government of Mozambique in several capacities including national budget director; programme officer for The World Bank in Mozambique; Deputy Minister of Planning and Finance; Minister of Planning and Finance; and became the first female prime minister of Mozambique from 2004 to 2010. Diogo advocated for free sexual health services throughout the continent to reduce infant mortality, maternal mortality and reverse the spread of AIDS. Diogo is currently an AU Peace Ambassador. She focuses on gender equality and women's empowerment.



Edem Kodjo

Edem Kodjo is a Togolese politician and diplomat. He was Secretary General of the OAU from 1978 to 1983. He served as prime minister from 1994 to 1996, and again from 2005 to 2006. Edem Kodjo was also president of the Patriotic Pan-African Convergence, a political party in Togo.



Dr Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe

Dr Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe is a Ugandan surgeon and politician, who was vice president of Uganda from 1994 to 2003. In August 2013, she was appointed by United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon as his Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa. She also worked with the AU and UN to encourage women's participation in peace and development processes on the continent.



Lakhdar Brahimi

Lakhdar Brahimi is a former Foreign Minister of Algeria, who until May 2014 was the UN and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria. He has been a UN Special Envoy for several countries, including Afghanistan and Iraq. From 1996 to 1997, he undertook a series of special missions to Zaire, Cameroon, Yemen, Burundi, Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire on behalf of the UN. He is currently a member of The Elders, a group of world leaders working for global peace.



Dr Albina Faria de Assis Pereira Africano

Dr Albina Faria de Assis Pereira Africano of Angola has served her country in different capacities as a teacher, engineer and a minister. She oversaw the expansion of the oil sector in Angola as the country's Oil Minister from 1992 to 1999. She is currently the Special Advisor for Regional Affairs to Angolan President José Eduardo Dos Santos.

AU COMMISSION IMAGES

Elizabeth Buhungiro is an Intern in the Peacemaking Unit at ACCORD.

Endnotes

1 African Union (2002) 'Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union', Available at: <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf> [Accessed 6 November 2014].



COMESA'S COMMITTEE OF ELDERS

BY TEMITOPE EDWARD AKINYEMI

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Committee of Elders (CCoE) was established at the Eleventh Summit of the COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government in Djibouti in November 2006. It was subsequently launched in 2008. The CCoE consists of experienced, respected and distinguished individuals drawn from COMESA member states. CCoE teams are often deployed on election observation missions, on invitation from the member state. The mission conducts its assessment and renders its advice on the electoral processes, based on the constitution of the affected state.

Broad Functions of the CCoE

The imperative for the establishment of the CCoE was borne out of the realisation that peace, security and stability are fundamental prerequisites for the attainment of sustainable development. To this end, members of the CCoE are mandated to use their good offices to provide support for ongoing mediation efforts; engage in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution within the region, targeting all stages of the conflict cycle; and providing measures and advice to mitigate conflict within member states. The elders are involved in issues related to the maintenance of peace. These issues include election monitoring, peace mediation, preventive diplomacy and early warning on conflict within member states.

Mandate of COMESA Committee of Elders

- 01 Provide leadership to the COMESA election observation missions.
- 02 Participate in international consultations relating to continental peace, security and stability
- 03 Lead pre-election missions aimed at assisting COMESA member states to hold elections to address issues that give rise to post-electoral violence – especially critical in member states emerging from conflicts
- 04 Facilitate fact-finding missions and shuttle diplomacy efforts to member states.
- 05 Support the consolidation of democracy and good governance in accordance with articles 3(d) and 6 of the COMESA Treaty, which is vital for deepening regional integration.



COMESA

Some of the CCoE members with other observers at a pre-election mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Elders are Ambassador Simbi Veke Mubako (second from right), Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat (fifth from left) and Sir James Mancham (fourth from right).

The CCoE has monitored several elections across the region, with remarkable success in the reduction of incidences of violence where it has been deployed. Some countries where the CCoE has provided assistance for elections between 2008 and 2013 include: Zambia, Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Swaziland and Madagascar. The election observation missions are meant to express the solidarity of COMESA with its member states in the efforts of the governments, all political actors and civil society groups working to create conducive environments for the conduct of free, fair, credible and peaceful elections.

Notable Achievements of the CCoE in Conflict Resolution

The CCoE plays important roles in conflict resolution by promoting dialogue among parties in conflict situations and offering early warning to governments to prevent the escalation of violence between political actors and groups. For example, the role of the CCoE in resolving disputes between Madagascar's former president, Marc Ravalomanana, and the then president of the transitional government, Andry Rajoelina, paved the way for Madagascar's peaceful election in 2013. According to Elizabeth Mutunga, who heads COMESA's governance and security programme, the elders have recorded a 75% success rate in conflict prevention since the CCoE inauguration in 2006.¹



Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat (centre) greets team members during a COMESA electoral observer mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (28 November 2011).

The Committee of Elders and the African Union Agenda on Peace

The mandate of the CCoE is complementary to that of the African Union (AU) in the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The synergy between the regional mandate of the CCoE and broader continental aspirations of the AU was reflected in the recent Fifth Annual High-level Retreat of the Special Envoys and Mediators on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa, which was held from 21 to 23 October 2014 in Arusha, Tanzania. This event, at which the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) provided technical support, was themed 'Silencing the Guns – Owning the Future'. Bringing together many high-level stakeholders from within the continent and beyond, the event addressed the challenges of governance on the continent, characterised by violent electoral contestations and conflict, among other problems. Stakeholders at the event noted that in spite of obvious progress being made on the continent in recent times, the aforementioned challenges present immense threats to sustainable peace, security and development. Deliberations involving stakeholders, including the CCoE, were deemed crucial to silence the guns on the continent by 2020, in line with the commitments of the AU, and supported by the CCoE and similar structures in other regional economic communities and mechanisms.



Participants at the Fifth Annual High-level Retreat of Special Envoys and Mediators on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa, held in Arusha, Tanzania, from 21 to 23 October 2014.

Members of the Committee of Elders

Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat – Kenya

Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat is a Kenyan diplomat. He has held numerous positions, including ambassadorial posts to France and the United Kingdom; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Kenya's Special Envoy to the Somalia peace process; and Commissioner of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 2009-10. He also initiated and facilitated peace talks in Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia between 1985 and 1992. He is the current chairperson of the CCoE and has served two terms (2009-present). In July 2013, he led the COMESA election observer team during presidential elections in Zimbabwe.



COMESA

Ambassador Immaculée Nahayo Nyandwi – Burundi

Ambassador Immaculée Nahayo Nyandwi is a Burundian politician. She was the first woman to be elected as Speaker of the National Assembly in Burundi, and served in that capacity from 2005 to 2007. She was also elected as the Speaker of the African Parliamentary Union (APU), a post that she held till March 2007. She has served two terms on the CCoE, having been appointed in 2009.



UNI IMAGES

Ambassador Berhane Ghebray – Burundi

Ambassador Berhane Ghebray is an Ethiopian diplomat and has been a member of the CCoE since 2010. He led COMESA election observation missions during the Madagascar presidential elections in October 2013 and in Malawi in May 2014. Before that, he was the ambassador of Ethiopia to Benelux and the European Economic Community.



COMESA

Betty Oyella Bigombe – Uganda

Betty Oyella Bigombe is a Ugandan politician and diplomat. In her capacity as Minister of State for Pacification of North and Northeastern Uganda, she fostered dialogue to restore peace in northern Uganda, following challenges and insecurity brought by the Lord's Resistance Army. She was appointed as the vice chairperson of the CCoE in 2010. In September 2013, she led a team of election observers to the legislative election in Rwanda.



UNI IMAGES

Ambassador Simbi Veke Mubako – Zimbabwe

Ambassador Simbi Veke Mubako is a professor of law. He has also served as a judge in the High Court of Zimbabwe and as the ambassador of Zimbabwe to the United States. Mubako was appointed as a member of the CCoE in 2010, and subsequently led the pre-election assessment mission in Kenya during the 2013 presidential



COMESA

Mary Catherine Nkosi – Malawi

Mary Catherine Nkosi is a Malawian banker and financial expert. Prior to her appointment as a member of the CCoE in 2013, Nkosi was the first female Deputy Governor of Malawi's Central Bank, and served in this position for 10 years.



COMESA

Felix Mutati – Zambia

Felix Mutati is a member of the Legislative Assembly in Zambia. He also served his country as the Deputy Minister of Finance, Minister of Energy and Hydro Power Development and, most recently, Minister for Trade and Commerce. He led the COMESA election observation team during Egypt's presidential elections in May 2014, having been part of the CCoE since 2013.



COMESA

Ambassador Dr Mahjoub Al-Basha – Sudan

Ambassador Dr Mahjoub Al-Basha is a Sudanese diplomat who has served his country in various positions, including as head of the Diplomatic Institution of Sudan and Ambassador of Sudan to Eritrea. He has served as a member of the CCoE since his appointment in 2013.



COMESA

President, Sir James Richard Marie Mancham – Seychelles

Sir James Richard Marie Mancham was the founding president of Seychelles and occupied this position from 1976 to 1977. During his term of office, he made efforts towards opening up Seychelles to the world and promoting tourism. Mancham is a recipient of various awards for his efforts towards global peace.



COMESA

Endnote

1 Lablache, J. (2014) 'COMESA's Committee of Elders and Election Management Bodies Meet in Seychelles', *Seychelles News Agency*, Available at: <<http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/1025/COMESAs+committee+of+Elders+and+Election+Management+bodies+meet+in+Seychelles>> [Accessed 6 November 2014].

Temitope Edward Akinyemi is an Intern at ACCORD.

ARMS, WILDLIFE AND DISEASE: THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED RESPONSES TO COMPLEX TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES

BY SHANNON DICK



UN PHOTO/ARI GAITANIS

The proliferation of conventional weapons, wildlife trafficking and the spread of disease profoundly affects many African countries. The unchecked flow of arms, for example, fuels armed conflict and violence throughout the region; illicitly trafficked wildlife commodities helps fund terrorist activities; and the spread of disease weakens state institutions and capacities to counter security threats. The inextricable links between these challenges pose a risk to national security, threatens stability and development throughout the continent, and presents wider global consequences. Porous borders, the lack of adequate national

infrastructure and security controls, and the diversion of global attention to an increasing number of international crises often perpetuate these complex transnational challenges. Local, regional and international approaches to mitigate these risks must emphasise the development of local capacities and include local communities and stakeholders.

Above: An Ebola treatment facility run by *Médecins Sans Frontières* in Guéckédou, Guinea.



A Libyan soldier walks among weapons that were seized from Libyan rebels at the port in Tripoli (July 2011). 11 rebels were arrested transporting about 100 light machine guns from Tunisia. The weapons originated in Qatar.

Poorly Regulated Arms

Throughout Africa, countries struggle with the legacy of conflict and with weapons that are used to perpetuate violence. Porous and poorly regulated borders facilitate the fluid transfer of arms across the continent through a variety of means, often to the detriment of civilian populations. These weapons contribute to violent crime, armed conflict, political instability and immeasurable human suffering – and their proliferation can undermine economic development and sustainable security worldwide.

Unregulated arms flows impact many African countries, directly and indirectly. Thousands of people are killed or injured each year due to armed conflict across the continent, and the prolific spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) fuels the continuation of conflicts, disrupts post-conflict development and impinges economic growth. Indeed, reports estimate that armed conflict costs Africa roughly US\$18 billion annually.¹ And while it is difficult to estimate the value of illicit arms transfers that occur throughout many African states, porous borders and the lack of comprehensive arms regulations contribute to this largely uninhibited flow of weapons and extend the deadly legacy of such weapons as they traverse national boundaries.

The devolution of Libya after the fall of Gaddafi highlighted this problem, as thousands of SALW wound up in the hands of civilians, former rebels and criminals in

Libya and in neighbouring countries – with many adding to the swells of a burgeoning black market. These weapons have since been found in conflicts across northern and central Africa, and are believed to have been used by such nefarious actors as Boko Haram, which continues to conduct a campaign of terror in and around Nigeria.

Sub-Saharan Africa has also been plagued by loosely regulated weapons. While non-state actors are a major source of illicit weapons through black market sales, national governments have also been found to transfer weapons to armed groups – such as those operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Sudan, among others – in violation of United Nations (UN) arms embargoes. Government stockpiles also represent a significant source of weapons. For example, the Small Arms Survey found that Sudan's government stockpiles are the primary source of weapons for actors engaged in all sides of the years-long conflict in Sudan and South Sudan.² Additionally, insecure and poorly managed stockpiles are at risk for looting as well as unplanned explosions, which can have lethal effects on surrounding communities. Explosions at a weapons depot in Congo, for example, killed hundreds of people and injured thousands in 2012.³ Without adequate safeguards and control mechanisms to ensure the security of weapons caches across Africa, poorly regulated arms can be quickly and easily diverted to illicit actors and pose continued risks to local populations.

As arms proliferation facilitates extended conflicts throughout Africa, development is hindered and sustainable security and stability efforts are delayed. Persistent armed conflict can limit access to much-needed resources such as humanitarian and economic aid, and can disrupt government efforts to provide security and repair damaged infrastructure. Additionally, protracted armed conflicts and perceived instability can dissuade potential investors from providing developmental assistance, in effect limiting the ability of many countries to rebuild and establish the laws, regulations and infrastructure needed to mitigate armed conflict and prevent future challenges.

Threatened Environment

Armed non-state actors and persistent instability fuelled by armed conflict provides a ripe context for exploiting many of Africa's valuable natural resources. Environmental crime poses a number of ecological concerns, as well as security and development challenges throughout Africa. Poachers and illegal loggers, for example, wreak havoc on biodiversity, hinder economic development, threaten public health and put regional security at risk through their illicit activities, as well as through their connections to and relations with various organised criminal groups

and terrorist organisations. Recent reports have found that armed groups in the Central African Republic finance their activities in part through the trafficking of natural resources such as diamonds and ivory, and that the terrorist group Al-Shabaab may derive roughly 40% of its funding through illegal ivory sales.⁴

While it is difficult to ascertain the exact value of transnational environmental crime, it is estimated that such crime is worth US\$70–213 billion a year.⁵ This figure includes estimates for illegal logging, poaching, fishing, mining and trafficking in a number of different wildlife commodities worldwide. Environmental crime creates lucrative benefits for many criminal syndicates. Illegal trade diverts revenue away from legitimate jobs and businesses and instead fills the coffers of illicit actors. The potential profits to be gained by engagement in these illicit activities illustrate the magnitude of challenges faced by many African states in trying to combat environmental crime. The low-risk, high-reward nature of these crimes – and the vocational opportunities they can provide for individuals lacking many viable alternatives – makes it difficult for governments to mitigate the detrimental impact that these illegal activities have on biodiversity, security and economic development.



Without adequate safeguards and control mechanisms to ensure the security of weapon caches across Africa, poorly regulated arms can be quickly and easily diverted to illicit actors.



Armed groups in the Central African Republic finance their activities in part through the trafficking of ivory and diamonds. The Al-Shabaab terrorist group allegedly also derives a significant percentage of its funding from illegal ivory sales.

For example, the poaching of elephant tusks and rhino horns throughout central, eastern and southern Africa threatens the overall population of these creatures and poses an increasing risk to park rangers. South Africa alone saw a 50% increase in the number of rhino poached in 2013 compared to the previous year, and over 100 000 elephants were illegally poached from 2010 to 2012 throughout Africa.⁶ The ivory trade also has a human toll, with at least 1 000 park rangers killed in the last 10 years while trying to protect elephants.⁷ Poaching has disastrous repercussions for local economies, as it adds to an existing array of development challenges and can undermine a country's efforts to maintain its natural resources. Many local economies in Africa, for example, depend in large part on tourism – driven by diverse natural environments and rare species – yet threats to elephant and rhino populations, and the security risks associated with the prevalence of poaching, impact the tourism industry and impede economic growth.⁸

Illegal logging raises similar challenges to environmental, national and economic security for many African countries. In Africa, wood is largely used for fuel and charcoal, and the unregulated trade in charcoal is estimated to cost African countries US\$1.9 billion annually in direct revenue losses.⁹ Additionally, illegal logging can fuel conflicts, as timber can

be used as a resource to fund arms sales and other illicit activities with deadly consequences. Just as countries are affected by the lack of comprehensive controls to secure arms flows throughout Africa, lax controls and permeable borders also fuel conditions for environmental crime. Many of the criminal organisations that traffic arms and drugs throughout the region are often involved in the illicit wildlife trade as well.

The propagation of logging and deforestation has also raised concerns about its potential influence on the spread of disease. Reports of potential triggering events for the recent Ebola outbreak have conjectured the link between deforestation, drier ecological conditions, the frequency of human contact with infected animals and fragile public health systems.¹⁰ While such connections are currently only speculative, they raise important questions about the tools and resources available to local governments to effectively address these challenges.

Fragile Health Systems

The current Ebola epidemic devastating multiple countries in West Africa underscores the risks posed by underdeveloped national infrastructure. Many national public health systems were previously decimated from years



Security forces stand at a checkpoint outside the Ebola quarantine area of West Point. In an attempt to contain the virus, Liberia imposed a quarantine in West Point, an informal settlement in the capital city, Monrovia (August 2014).

of armed conflict and limited resources. As a result, many local municipalities were underequipped and unprepared for what has become the largest Ebola outbreak in recorded history and the first of its kind in West Africa, with over 13 000 reported cases and nearly 5 000 deaths from the virus as of 31 October 2014.¹¹ To date, the virus has spread predominately within three countries – Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone – with cases documented in Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain and the United States as well.

As the disease spreads, economic consequences such as disruptions in farming, restrictions in trade flows and holds in investments abound – particularly in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which represent the most affected countries in both lives lost and in economic impact. It is anticipated that these three countries will incur combined costs of around US\$359 million by the end of 2014.¹² This represents a significant proportion of their national economies, and reports estimate that this figure could grow between US\$97 and US\$809 million in 2015, depending on the extent of direct intervention to contain the disease.¹³

The epidemic is also straining already-fragile public health systems. Prior to the outbreak, Liberia and Sierra Leone had a ratio of one and two doctors for every 100 000 people respectively; Guinea had a ratio of 10 doctors for

every 100 000 patients, and all three countries largely lacked the facilities and equipment necessary to treat incoming patients adequately.¹⁴ Since the Ebola virus spread throughout Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 269 healthcare workers have died as a result of the disease, further straining the depleted health systems and hindering adequate responses to the outbreak.¹⁵

These countries lack the capacities and resources necessary to respond effectively to the public health crisis and address threats to their local populations and economies. Additionally, instability and fear wrought by the continued spread of the disease could lead to renewed armed conflict, exacerbating the destructive effects of the blood-borne disease and posing even greater risks to security.

Global Collaboration with Local Buy-in

The challenges presented by poorly regulated arms transfers, wildlife poaching and the current Ebola epidemic are extensive and have wider global implications if not addressed in a coordinated, timely and effective manner. Yet, given these challenges, myriad international concerns can overshadow the transnational security concerns in Africa. For instance, while elephant and rhino poaching are at all-time highs and West Africa struggles with a deadly Ebola

epidemic, the international community is also focused on a number of other security challenges, such as the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and continued unrest in eastern Ukraine. Fortunately, a variety of efforts have been developed to address the different challenges faced by many African countries and to promote better security and stability throughout the continent.

COUNTRIES WILL ALSO NEED STATUTORY REGULATIONS AND PENALTIES FOR THOSE THAT CONTRAVENE THE LEGAL ARMS MARKET AND PROMOTE WEAPONS DIVERSION TO THE ILLICIT MARKET

In the past decade, significant steps have been taken to control the unregulated transfer of conventional arms. The Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and All its Aspects (PoA) was adopted in 2001 to help countries regulate the flow of SALW in and through their territories. Many of the suggestions contained

within the PoA are supported by the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted in April 2013 and expected to enter into force in December 2014. The ATT establishes legally binding standards to regulate international transfers of conventional weapons, and provides criteria for countries to consider when making arms transfer decisions to mitigate weapons diversion.

While these international initiatives are useful – and are complemented by regional agreements, such as the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Southern African Development Community Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials – the success of each will hinge on the ability of states to effectively implement and enforce the provisions of the agreements. This means that many African countries will need to enhance their national control systems and appropriate infrastructure to ensure effective implementation. Part of successful implementation will mean establishing comprehensive border control measures, including enhancing customs protections and developing appropriate national legislation. Countries will also need statutory regulations and penalties for those that contravene the legal arms market and promote weapons diversion to



GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

A ranger performs a post mortem on the carcass of a rhino after it was killed for its horn by poachers at the Kruger National Park in South Africa (27 August 2014).



Members of a social mobilisation team walk through the streets, carrying posters with information on the symptoms of Ebola and best practices to help prevent its spread, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (August 2014).

the illicit market. A harmonised regional approach may help countries learn from each other and establish best practices and develop better cooperation measures.

The leading global effort to regulate trade in wildlife components and mitigate the extent of environmental crime around the world is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The convention provides a number of trade restrictions for different forms of wildlife, with the aim of ensuring that global trade in wildlife components does not threaten the survival of many different species. Additionally, in 2010, five international organisations came together to form the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICWC) – which includes the CITES Secretariat, the International Police Organization (INTERPOL), UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Bank and the World Customs Organisation – to support local law enforcement in addressing perpetrators of wildlife crime. While some success from these initiatives has been seen – such as the development of national laws to address poaching and illicit trafficking – there remains a need for increased international collaboration and widened efforts across Africa to better understand and support the needs of local wildlife services,

enforcement agencies and judicial bodies to track and deter perpetrators of environmental crime.

MANY COUNTRIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, EXPERTISE AND FUNDS TO BUILD TREATMENT FACILITIES

The Ebola outbreak has posed unique challenges for affected African countries and the international community. In response, the UN established the first-ever emergency health mission – the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) – to coordinate global responses and intervention efforts to address the public health crisis. Additionally, many countries have contributed medical supplies and equipment, logistical support, expertise and funds to build treatment facilities, all in efforts to help stem the spread of the virus. Yet, as more countries join the international effort, the spread of disease is outpacing coordinated responses. Health professionals and volunteers have noted scarce resources and limitations in treating

those infected. Continued efforts must work towards building resilient health systems and government institutions able to address a multitude of health crises in a timely, resourceful and sustainable manner.

While these and other initiatives address the many challenges faced by African nations independently, they do not account for the interwoven nature of these issues to a considerable degree. Three key features could support such an approach. First, collaborative efforts should leverage the resources and expertise of various partners to strengthen local infrastructure and better combat the risks posed by poorly regulated arms flows, threats to the environment and fragile public health systems. International partners should prioritise local innovation to reinforce and maximise the positive effects of regional and global programmes, and tailor such efforts to a specific country's given needs. Success will depend in large part on a country's ability to effectively implement and enforce national laws and regulations, as well as regional and global initiatives. Having the requisite capacities in place to do so can greatly increase a country's ability to address these challenges.

Second, global initiatives should develop short-, medium- and long-term strategies that take a holistic approach to addressing these challenges, and which include state governments, regional and international organisations, the private sector and civil society working together – rather than focusing solely on the immediate security and development challenges posed by various transnational challenges independently.

Finally, international efforts should cultivate local buy-in to help ensure sustainability of these initiatives and mitigate future threats. Although international actors have often been at the forefront of developing solutions to many problems throughout Africa, input and resources from local communities must be included to ensure meaningful and sustainable success. As the risks of returning to conflict in fragile societies are great, international efforts should make local coordination and participation a priority and encourage national and regional institutions to establish systematic responses that reach across the security, development, economic and public health spectrum to fit their individual needs.

The transnational challenges that affect many African states do not exist independently of one another. Thus, innovative efforts to address these challenges present a unique opportunity to engage a variety of local, regional and international actors from the security, development, environmental and health domains. These non-traditional partnerships could leverage the expertise of one another and provide a way forward for systematically addressing the challenges posed by the interconnected nature of arms flows, environmental crime and public health crises. ▲

Shannon Dick is a Research Assistant with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.

Endnotes

- 1 Oxfam (2007) 'Africa's Missing Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict', Available at: <<http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/africas%20missing%20bils.pdf>> [Accessed 24 September 2014].
- 2 Small Arms Survey (2014) Signs of Supply: Weapons Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan. In *Small Arms Survey 2014*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 213.
- 3 Small Arms Survey (2014) 'Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites', Available at: <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Q-Handbooks/HB-03-UEMS/SAS-HB03-UEMS-Intro-Part-I.pdf>> [Accessed 26 September 2014].
- 4 Agger, Kasper (2014) 'Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic', Available at: <<http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/behind-headlines-drivers-violence-central-african-republic>> [Accessed 24 September 2014]; and Kalron, Nir and Costra, Andrea (2011) 'Africa's White Gold of Jihad: al-Shabaab and Conflict Ivory', Available at: <<http://elephantleague.org/project/africas-white-gold-of-jihad-al-shabaab-and-conflict-ivory/>> [Accessed 29 September 2014].
- 5 Nellemann, Christian, Henriksen, Rune, Raxter, Patricia, Ash, Neville and Mrema, Elizabeth (eds) (2014) 'The Environmental Crime Crisis – Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources. A UNEP Rapid Response Assessment', Available at: <<http://www.unep.org/unea/docs/RRAcimecrisis.pdf>> [Accessed 1 October 2014].
- 6 Department of Environmental Affairs, South Africa (2014) 'Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics', Available at: <https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/rhinopoaching_statistics_17jan2014> [Accessed October 1 2014]; and Scribner, Brad (2014) 100,000 Elephants Killed by Poachers in Just Three Years, Landmark Analysis Finds. *National Geographic*, 18 August.
- 7 International Fund for Animal Welfare (2013) 'Criminal Nature: The Global Security Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade', Available at: <<http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/ifaw-criminal-nature-UK.pdf>> [Accessed 1 October 2014].
- 8 The World Travel & Tourism Council reported that travel and tourism contributed approximately US\$170 billion to Africa's gross domestic product (roughly 8.5% of GDP), and estimated it to rise by 4.1% in 2014. See: World Travel & Tourism Council (2014) 'Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2014: Africa', Available at: <<http://www.wttc.org/focus/research-for-action/economic-impact-analysis/regional-reports/>> [Accessed 2 October 2014].
- 9 Nellemann, Christian et al. (2014) op. cit.
- 10 Bausch, Daniel and Schwarz, Lara (2014) Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea, Where Ecology Meets Economy. *Public Library of Science Neglected Tropical Disease*, 8 (7).
- 11 World Health Organization (2014a) 'Ebola Response Roadmap Situation Report, 31 October 2014', Available at: <http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137424/1/roadmapsitrep_31Oct2014_eng.pdf?ua=1> [Accessed 3 November 2014].
- 12 The World Bank (2014) 'The Economic Impact of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic: Short and Medium Term Estimates for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone', Available at: <<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/20218/907480WP0Econo00201400901700PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1>> [Accessed 2 October 2014].
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 World Health Organization (2013) *World Health Statistics 2013*. Geneva: World Health Press, pp. 123–127; and World Health Organization (2014b) 'Ebola Situation in Liberia: Non-Conventional Interventions Needed', Available at: <<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/8-september-2014/en/>> [Accessed 2 October 2014].
- 15 World Health Organization (2014a) op. cit.

THE MONUSCO UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

BY FREDERIK ROSÉN AND JOHN KARLSRUD

UN PHOTO/SYLVAIN LECHTI



Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones were introduced to the United Nations (UN) Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – MONUSCO – in December 2013. The procurement reflects the fact that UAVs have become standard equipment for modern militaries and therefore is a natural step for UN peacekeeping operations to take. UN UAVs are useful to provide intelligence and situational awareness and can enable better troop protection and, potentially, improve the ability of the mission to protect civilians. It is worth noting that the UAVs were added to MONUSCO in December 2013,¹ shortly after the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was deployed in MONUSCO. The FIB was used to “neutralize and disarm” the M23 rebel group, and marks perhaps the high point of authorised use of force in UN peacekeeping.² The simultaneous turn towards peace enforcement and the introduction of UAVs in UN missions was coincidental, as UAV procurement efforts have been

made over many years, yet combined they add significant changes and pose new challenges for MONUSCO.

This article adds to the discussion on what the newly added UAV capabilities may mean for UN peacekeeping operations. The article does not focus on what the drones can do or how they may and may not be used. Instead, it draws attention to a few less-scrutinised implications of introducing drones to UN peacekeeping – some moral and legal obligations that may be triggered by using UAVs or by having UAVs available, and how the use and availability of UAVs may generate new dilemmas. There are three overall issues that warrant particular attention:

Above: Unmanned aerial vehicles or drones were introduced to MONUSCO in December 2013 to enhance protection capabilities.

1. UAVs can enhance situational awareness pertaining to detecting or verifying situations falling under MONUSCO's mandate. In this regard, UAVs not only allow for better protection of civilians, but the enhanced situational awareness may also trigger the obligation to react to protect civilians.
2. The enhanced situational awareness makes it more likely to discover situations that do not fall within MONUSCO's protection mandate, but which, however, require assistance. This may present the leadership of MONUSCO with additional situations that necessitate decisions on whether to engage or not.
3. UAVs provide an effective precautionary measure to protect civilians during military operations. The availability of UAVs in UN peacekeeping, therefore, increases the available sources of information that should be scrutinised when applying the rule of precaution in attack, as enshrined in international humanitarian law in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.³

Increased Awareness Means More Difficult Choices

In addition to enhancing the mission-specific efficiency and lifesaving abilities in peacekeeping missions, the surveillance power of UAVs presents the MONUSCO leadership with situations that are not mission-specific, but which call for critical and timely decision-making. The improved situational awareness and resulting rise of hard choices reflect how UN peacekeeping today takes place in an increasingly transparent global arena. As a consequence, it will become even more difficult to deny awareness of emergency situations and still more implausible to explain failures to engage with lack of knowledge of the situation. This will slowly but surely create a situation for UN peacekeeping, where the leadership needs to be more explicit about choices to engage or not and invest more resources in clarifying how resources, capabilities and decisions are weighed against mission mandates. Difficult decisions that were once only made behind closed doors will now be pulled into the limelight.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT WILL BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO DENY AWARENESS OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AND STILL MORE IMPLAUSIBLE TO EXPLAIN FAILURES TO ENGAGE WITH LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION

To prepare for this new reality, to which the UAV programme contributes, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should thus focus its elaboration of policies and guidelines for engaging new surveillance technology not only on the possible benefits that UAVs can



The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous (centre) is briefed on the unmanned aerial vehicles before an official launch ceremony in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo (3 December 2013).

bring, but also pay attention to and highlight the attendant political challenges that unavoidably will arise from the inclusion of UAVs, and other new surveillance platforms, in UN missions.

Does More Information Necessarily Lead to More Action?

The history of UN peacekeeping suffers from too many examples where there has been knowledge about attacks, but where protection has failed, often due to simple reluctance to engage. A recent evaluation of how and if UN peacekeeping operations implement their mandate of protection of civilians (PoC), conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, put it in these stark terms: "...[T]he evaluation noted a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack," and the use of force "appears to be routinely avoided as an option by peacekeeping operations".⁴ In this regard, the previous UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUC), has repeatedly been accused of being incapable or even reluctant to act.⁵ MONUC did nothing to protect civilians during the Kisangani



Members of the South African contingent of MONUC are seen in a base in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (14 February 2008).

massacre in May 2002,⁶ and refused to act in Ituri in 2003, resulting in a scathing report by the MONUC's first Force Commander:

...[The contingent] refused to react by opening fire after proper challenge and in accordance with the mandate to protect the population and in accordance with quite unambiguous rules of engagement. Instead, they persisted in only firing in the air, declaring that they could only act under Chapter VII and engage in combat with prior authority of [their parliament].⁷

IN NOVEMBER 2008, AN ESTIMATED 150 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THE TOWN OF KIWANJA IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE DRC, HALF A MILE AWAY FROM ONE OF THE LARGEST MONUC FIELD BASES IN THE AREA

There are other examples. In May 2004, the Uruguayan battalion commander gave control of the airport in Bukavu to rebel leader Laurent Nkunda, and the UN failed to protect the city.⁸ In November 2008, an estimated 150 people were killed in the town of Kiwanja in the eastern part of the DRC, half a mile away from one of the largest MONUC field bases in the area. *The New York Times* subsequently reported that as the killings took place, the peacekeepers were "struggling

to understand what was happening outside the gates of its base (...) Already overwhelmed, officials said, they had no intelligence capabilities" and "[t]he peacekeepers said they had no idea that the killings were taking place until it was all over".⁹

The two typical justifications for not engaging are: (1) lack of knowledge or lack of ability to confirm incoming reports about atrocities; and (2) the inability to engage due to impermissible environments – typically due to the danger of ambush when moving troops at night or by potholed roads surrounded by thick forest.

In such cases, UAVs can be used for swift confirmation of reports, and live footage can strengthen the impulse and capability to act much more than unverified human intelligence. The mere availability of UAVs may therefore invalidate excuses for not trying to verify rumours about an imminent rebel threat to a village. Furthermore, the UAVs can provide effective surveillance coverage during the night, allowing peacekeepers to move without falling into an ambush. Enhanced situational awareness does not mean that action will follow suit, but it makes it more difficult for troop-contributing countries to excuse inaction with lack of knowledge about what is happening outside the gates of the bases. As such, the introduction of UAVs to UN peacekeeping may create a 'force-activating effect'. For the DPKO, the UAVs can help establish the necessary conditions for peacekeeping troops to get out of their bases and engage with armed groups, increasing access to information about these groups



In May 2014 MONUSCO peacekeepers were involved in a rescue operation after unmanned aerial vehicle pilots spotted a capsized boat on Lake Kivu.

and their whereabouts, while at the same time minimising the risk the troops could be exposed to in doing so.

Taking Non-mandated Action

UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have a long history in assisting with all kinds of tasks outside their mandate, including rescue operations. In this regard, another and perhaps more complicated aspect of the UAV programme is that it will furnish PKOs with information about incidents which do not fall under the mandate, but which call for assistance. A recent example, where MONUSCO engaged in a rescue operation after UAV pilots detected a capsized boat, highlights the dilemma of acting or not in emergency situations not directly covered by MONUSCO's mandate.

In early May 2014, the UN News Centre reported that peacekeepers from MONUSCO were involved in a rescue operation after UAV pilots spotted a capsized boat on Lake Kivu in the eastern part of DRC. MONUSCO immediately sent three boats and two helicopters and managed to rescue 14 civilians, while more than 10 drowned.¹⁰ The story captured headlines – not least because of the UAV involvement. The rescue was used to provide positive press coverage for MONUSCO, and also helped to raise awareness about the use of MONUSCO drones among the local population. This positive spin on the MONUSCO drones came at an opportune time: MONUSCO had made much effort to demystify the UAVs and emphasise their potential to save the lives of peacekeepers as well as civilians and, more generally, the

mission was in need of positive press. According to UN staff, MONUSCO's image benefited from the rescue story.¹¹ The Italian private contractor Selex ES, which provides the UAVs to MONUSCO, was also quick to capitalise on the story and draw the conclusion that “the rescue proved that RPAS [remotely piloted aircraft systems] – or drones – can be effectively used to identify refugees who encounter trouble during sea voyages and alert rescue forces”¹² – hence using the Kivu rescue operation as a selling point for their UAVs to the commercial market for maritime surveillance.

To Engage or Not

While at sea, it is unlawful not to help a ship in distress. This obligation is part of the laws of the sea and does not apply to rivers and lakes. However, even if not covered by mission mandates or laws, there is a strong moral duty to help persons in distress. And this moral duty may also bear political implications for the decision of whether to engage or not in rescue operations. We could thus ask how the recent story of MONUSCO detecting the shipwreck on Lake Kivu would have come across if MONUSCO had detected the incident but decided not to engage? In that case, the mission would have had to explain its inaction, and could have encountered severe criticism for letting people drown – even if rescue operations fall outside MONUSCO's mandate. MONUSCO could, of course, have concealed its knowledge to avoid such accusation of inaction. But if it later became publicly known that the mission knew but decided not to act, such a decision

could backfire significantly on the mission. The fact that the information streams sent by the drone are recorded and stored added further complications. Unless these recordings were deleted, they would remain as evidence for the future of MONUSCO's knowledge of the capsized boat and their decision not to act. And if deleted, this would have created a conspicuous 'gap' in data, which may have raised questions of why data was deleted, and related suspicions. Similarly, if the UAV team had registered the accident without reporting it to relevant authorities in the DRC, they could also have faced allegations of inaction leading to the loss of lives. The point to be made is that the mere detection by the UAVs of the incident forced MONUSCO leadership to make difficult decisions.

On the other hand, the decision to engage in the rescue operation is also not without political implications. The next time a boat capsizes and no help is provided, there may be little understanding why the UAVs failed to detect the incident. Similar negative headlines may spread in the international news. The regular boat accidents on Lake Kivu could thus become another significant challenge for MONUSCO. If MONUSCO receives information of a possible boat accident, and if the UAVs are available at that particular moment, it would be difficult for MONUSCO not to send them out to inspect. And if they confirm an accident, it would be difficult for MONUSCO not to deploy a rescue operation. The point to

be made is that while the Lake Kivu rescue operation provided some much-needed positive press for MONUSCO, as well as an opportunity to spread good news about how the new UAVs can help save lives, the story could also create expectations that can be difficult to live up to and thus bring an extra burden to an already-overstretched mission.

Knowledge as an Unavoidable Side Effect

UAVs unavoidably generate much surplus information, in addition to the more narrow mission to assist with enforcing MONUSCO's mandate. In the Lake Kivu rescue example, the UAV hovered over the lake for the purpose of testing sensor equipment and coordination with the lake radars and the boats that MONUSCO operates. The UAV pilots discovered the capsized boat during a random zooming in on boats on the lake. It is doubtful whether the boat would have been detected during a simple flyover – for instance, while returning to base. With current technology, no broader scanning of the landscape is possible in a way that would distinguish a distressed boat from a non-distressed one. The suggestion that UAVs cover considerable territory whenever they are in the air does not apply. But the UAVs will supply MONUSCO with surplus information, and this will increase as sensors improve and more UAVs are added. And the more UAVs are used for training drills and general policing, the more 'broad'



GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

Better situational awareness may enforce the obligation to act on reports of atrocities; the facts and footage established by aerial surveillance may force peacekeeping troops to act by depriving them of the kind of plausible deniability weak situational awareness offers.

information will be acquired. For instance, one could imagine that UAVs could be used to monitor areas where trafficking of arms or other illegal goods occurs, which could impact the conflict economy in the DRC. In MONUSCO's mandate, there is emphasis on such cross-border activities that have a major impact on the security situation in eastern DRC.¹³ Monitoring trafficking is a policing task, which involves extensive hours of surveillance of large areas. If MONUSCO monitors activities on Lake Kivu, the mission will most likely spot capsized boats on a regular basis, as maritime safety on the lake is low. In a place like the DRC, aerial surveillance provides large amounts of extra information compared to what may be acquired by ground inspection.

Add to this the privacy issues that stem from conducting aerial surveillance in densely populated areas. Unless we assume that completely different ethical standards apply in the non-Western world, the ethical dilemmas related to privacy and surveillance that propel heated discussions in, for instance, the US and European states about the regulation of UAVs, should also be considered when drones are used in the non-Western world.¹⁴

In the Lake Kivu rescue example, it is clear how a conventional peacekeeping dilemma could be reinforced by the increased situational awareness generated by new surveillance equipment: the more information the UN has about the mission areas, the more 'non-mandated' situations it will face that call for a mission response, and the more frequently mission leadership is likely to have to make difficult decisions on whether to respond or not. This calls for a more precise interpretation of mission mandates. For example, the mandate for MONUSCO obliges the mission to protect civilians, but it is not entirely clear how this should be put into practice, especially with the UAV capabilities now available. Assistance in everyday accidents does not fall within the mission mandate – although the mission, of course, may and should assist persons in need to the extent possible, as there is a natural moral duty to do so. On a more general level, the Lake Kivu rescue example can be used to reflect on what it means to be a UN peacekeeping mission in an age of all-embracing situational awareness. While we are not yet entirely there, the technology is available, and the current UAVs in the DRC must be considered as the first steps towards an era of significantly enhanced situational awareness, brought about by technology and innovation.

UAVs and the Legal Obligation to Take Due Precaution in Attack

One last set of implications related to the availability of UAVs is their possible use as a precautionary measure to protect civilians during military operations. From the perspective of international humanitarian law (IHL), there is actually an obligation to use UAVs if available for "precaution in attack".¹⁵ The IHL rule of precaution is codified in Article 57 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, and is considered customary international law.¹⁶ In short,



Unmanned aerial vehicles can enhance situational awareness pertaining to detecting or verifying situations falling under MONUSCO's mandate.

the principle obliges commanders to do everything feasible to verify the target ahead of attack to protect civilians; not before all feasible information has been collated may proper precaution be said to have been taken. In this regard, UAV technology may remove a number of classical dilemmas related to precaution, namely (1) precautionary measures versus tactical considerations – that is, the time to gather and process additional information, or the risk of revealing tactics or loss of other military advantages; (2) precautionary measures versus personnel considerations – that is, the risk

THE ETHICAL DILEMMAS RELATED TO PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE THAT PROPEL HEATED DISCUSSIONS IN, FOR INSTANCE, THE US AND EUROPEAN STATES ABOUT THE REGULATION OF UAVS, SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED WHEN DRONES ARE USED IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD

to the soldiers and the operators of weapon systems; and (3) precautionary measures versus material considerations – that is, the risk to the military equipment and weapon systems. In the context of UN peacekeeping, the most important consideration may be that UAVs present the mission with an effective tool for taking precaution to avoid ‘collateral damage’ during military operations. Furthermore, peacekeeping troops are obliged under international law applicable to armed conflict to call in the UAVs if possible and if this may enhance their capability to verify targets. It could therefore be considered whether the rules of engagement for peacekeeping troops should highlight this obligation. These considerations also point toward a future where UN peacekeeping may experience an upgrade in surveillance technology. In this case, considerations need to be made about the implications of new technology for the application of humanitarian law and human rights law whenever peacekeeping troops engage armed forces.

Conclusion

This article has argued that while UAVs can enhance situational awareness, troop protection and the protection of civilians, they are also likely to increase the moral and legal obligations of UN PKOs. Better situational awareness may enforce the obligation to act on reports of atrocities; the facts established by aerial surveillance may force peacekeeping troops to act by depriving them of the kind of plausible deniability weak situational awareness offers; and when engaged in armed combat, PKOs are obliged under IHL to use the UAVs if these are available, and if they can improve target verification. In addition, the article has highlighted how the surplus information collected by UAVs may present PKO leadership with situations that call for assistance, even if they do not fall directly under the mandate. Such information may place additional burdens on PKOs, by calling for difficult leadership decisions and action. The MONUSCO UAVs highlight some of the legal, moral and political implications of new surveillance technologies. These implications will increase at the same pace as the surveillance technology matures, and will gradually transform the reality in which UN peacekeeping operates. It will thus be essential to unpack the legal, moral and political-pragmatic obligations and dilemmas that arise from the introduction of UAVs to UN PKOs, revise and update existing guidelines and standard operating procedures, and draft new guidelines where necessary. **A**

Dr Frederik Rosén is a Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen, Denmark.

Dr John Karlsrud is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), working on peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian issues.

Endnotes

- 1 United Nations News Centre (2014) ‘UN Mission Helps Rescue Shipwrecked Passengers in Eastern DR Congo’, Available at: <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47727#U5BswKPU-70>> [Accessed 14 June 2014].
- 2 United Nations (2013) *S/RES/2098*. 28 March. New York: United Nations, p. 7.
- 3 International Committee of the Red Cross (1977) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.
- 4 UN (2014) *Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, A/68/787*. New York: United Nations, p. 1.
- 5 The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established with UN Security Council Resolution 1279 on 30 November 1999, and renamed MONUSCO with UN SCR 1925 on 28 May 2010. See United Nations (1999) *S/RES/1279*, 30 November. New York: United Nations; and United Nations (2010) *S/RES/1925*, 28 May. New York: United Nations.
- 6 On 14 May 2002, 160 people were massacred in Kisangani while MONUC failed to intervene. For more, see Marks, Joshua (2007) *The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC’s Peacekeeping Operations. African Security Review*, 16 (3), p. 71.
- 7 Holt, Victoria, Taylor, Glyn and Kelly, Max (2009) *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*. New York: UN DPKO and UN OCHA, pp. 251–252 (inclusions in brackets in original).
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 257–259.
- 9 Lydia Polgreen (2008) ‘A Massacre in Congo, Despite Nearby Support’, Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/world/africa/11congo.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>> [Accessed 9 November 2014].
- 10 MONUSCO NEWS (2014) ‘MONUSCO Peacekeepers Rescue 14 People from a Sinking Boat on Lake Kivu’, Available at: <<http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=10927&mid=14594&ItemID=20526>> [Accessed 9 November 2014].
- 11 UN Staff (2014) Interview with the author on 21 August, Berlin.
- 12 Selex ES (2012) ‘Selex ES Falco Saves 14 Lives within the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Available at: <<http://www.selex-es.com/-/falco-saves-lives>> [Accessed 14 June 2014].
- 13 UN (2010) *op. cit.*, p. 2.
- 14 See, for example, Stanley, Jay and Crump, Catherine (2011) *Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft*. New York: American Civil Liberties Union.
- 15 See Quéguiner, Jean-François (2006) Precaution Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities. *International Review of Red Cross*, 88 (864), p. 794.
- 16 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise (2009) *Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 51.

THE PEACEBUILDING POTENTIAL OF ISLAM: A RESPONSE TO THE BOKO HARAM CRISIS

BY SUNDAY PAUL CHINAZO ONWUEGBUCHULAM, AYO WHETHO & KHONDLO MTSHALI



GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

Introduction

The role that religion plays in conflict and peacebuilding has generated a great deal of debate in academic circles. There are two broad strands in this debate: the perspective that views religion as inherently volatile and as the source of violent conflicts; and the counter-argument, which sees religion as a resource for peace. Particularly, it is the case that some Muslims have been complicit in engendering violent conflicts in different parts of the world. Their complicity in violent conflicts can be traced in history. In recent years, these conflicts have metamorphosed as religious issues mixed with political and ideological factors in various parts of the world. The Boko Haram crisis and the escalating violent attacks of this group in Nigeria is a case in point that serves to show the severity of this problem. However, in spite of its link to violent conflicts, many scholars argue that Islam has a role to play in peacebuilding.

This article interrogates the potential role of Islam in peacebuilding. The article is an advocacy piece that posits

utilising the resources in Islam towards a sustainable resolution of the Boko Haram crisis. The aim is to present a tool of conflict transformation and peacebuilding that is based on the inner strengths and potential for peace in Islam. This is envisaged by John Paul Lederach in his theory called the Integrated Model of Peacebuilding.

The article first presents the theoretical framework on which the thesis of the paper is based. This is followed by a literature review that examines the historical role of Islam in engendering both peace and conflict, in particular in Nigeria. The final section interrogates the internal resources that Islam can mobilise for peacebuilding in Nigeria.

Above: At least 21 people were killed in an alleged Boko Haram bomb blast that tore through a crowded shopping district in the Nigerian capital city, Abuja, during rush hour (25 June 2014).



Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan talks to a few girls (of the more than 200 kidnapped) who escaped from their Boko Haram captors, at the presidential villa in Abuja (22 July 2014).

Theoretical Framework

In his book, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Lederach presents his Integrated Model of Peacebuilding.¹ The components of this model include: structure, process, reconciliation, resources and coordination. Lederach contends that to achieve lasting peace in situations of conflicts in the contemporary world, new approaches must be developed that are broad and inclusive of the people and contexts in which conflict is produced. Lederach envisions a peacebuilding model that goes beyond traditional conflict resolution to a form of conflict transformation which is integrative and long-lasting, and which "focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships and engaging the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central component of peacebuilding".² It is further based on his elicitive approach, which advocates situating the emergence of conflict in a particular locality and finding the resources for its transformation and peacebuilding in that same locality. In the elicitive methodology, people in the conflict are not just recipients of conflict transformation interventions – they are key resources.

Lederach's framework is applicable to the Nigerian context as it elaborates on components such as 'resources' and 'structure'. Building on this framework, this article presents the resources that ground Islam's utility in

peacebuilding and the structures which can help coordinate peacebuilding efforts in the conflicts in Nigeria.

The Ambivalent Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding

Focusing on Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Hans Küng analyses the part that these religions have played in engendering conflict in the 21st century.³ According to Küng: "Today, all three are accused, as 'monotheistic religions', of being more inclined to use force than 'polytheistic' religions or 'non-theistic' religions (such as Buddhism)".⁴ For Küng, it is the case that accompanied by ethnic factors, these monotheistic religions contribute to the incidences of violence in the world today, as can be seen in such places as "Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Sri Lanka, India, Nigeria".⁵ Using the context of northern Nigeria, Shedrack Best argues that "religion is becoming a divisive issue, and constitutes a growing flash point".⁶ However, according to Best, some conditions make it possible for religion to become a factor in engendering violent conflicts. These conditions include: "[F]undamentalism, intolerance and lack of mutual respect, threats and threat perceptions, the emergence of a conflict issue, the lack of enforcement of law and order."⁷ Given these conditions, religion "can be and often is a source of conflict in terms of identities, religious issues, and the various roles it plays in conflict".⁸

Conversely, Jeffrey Haynes in his study focuses on the role that religion plays in conflict, conflict resolution and peacebuilding in developing nations such as Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia.⁹ Haynes asserts that “available evidence indicates that the norms, values and teachings of various religious faiths – Christianity, Islam and Buddhism... can demonstrably inspire and encourage devotees to work towards resolving conflicts and develop peace via utilisation of explicitly religious tenets”.¹⁰ Ron Kronish is concerned with the tragic reality that religion in general is part of the problem in the issue of religious conflict, especially as it plays out in Israel.¹¹ It is this reality that necessitates the question of whether religion is, in fact, a positive force for humanity or not. For Lillian Curaming, the focus is on the concept of peace and the roles that people are called on to play in their religions in realising peace.¹² Curaming situates the concept of peace in a religious/spiritual setting: “Peace is a spiritual concept; peace seen as a secular construct has had a poor record of accomplishment.”¹³ This assertion underscores the role that religion can play in the pursuit of peace.

Religion as a Central Force that Motivates and Mobilises People

It was Samuel Huntington who asserted that “in the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central force that motivates and mobilizes people”.¹⁴ Historical and contemporary realities corroborate Huntington’s claim; religion has been used as a force to motivate people to engage in both conflict and peace efforts. A meaningful explanation of the Jihad in Islamic history cannot be divorced from an understanding of the ability of religion and faith to motivate and mobilise people of that faith. This suggests that when it comes to the issue of faith, there is a strong sense of emotion that is attached to it. It is no wonder, then, that the critics of religion seem to dismiss it as irrational, as it is based on strong emotions. They denounce the emotive nature of religions, claiming that this makes religion dangerous, especially when it mixes with politics.¹⁵ This view comes to the fore in discussions regarding the role of religion in the affairs of the state. However, it should be noted that there are premises for and against the pejorative view of religion. Although some analysts may ignore or



GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

Faith is at the core of many people’s consciousness and motivates them significantly in their everyday lives. This is why religion is such a powerful force in many states and in world politics.



Followers of an Islamic sect stage a peaceful rally in Nigeria's northern city of Kano (August 2011).

dismiss religion as irrelevant, events in which the religious element features demonstrate that religion has a great impact and control in the lives of people and affairs of the state.

Against this backdrop, Leroy Rouner quotes George Washington – who, in his Farewell Address, asserted that “of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports...”¹⁶ Religion is that phenomenon which shows humans as having an understanding of reality that transcends the physical realm and which points to a greater value in the transcendental. The main aspect of religion is faith in a transcendent being, which guides the lives of those who adhere to a particular religion that subscribes to this belief in the transcendent reality. Religion then becomes an issue of faith, and faith is understood as an attestation of the heart and mind of transcendent spiritual reality, which cannot be ordinarily substantiated by reason and empirical tests.

Humans' ability to believe in the ultimate reality is justified in many ways by the different religions. In such justifications there is, almost always, no way of verifying empirically such faith and beliefs. However, this is not to suggest that faith should be dismissed as unreal or lacking efficacy as far as human behaviour is concerned.

The dismissal of faith in contemporary but ever-secularising society may, in fact, be problematic, as people of faith will in most cases assert that their faith is at the core of their being. For example, initial attempts at explicating the 'clash of civilisations' thesis focused on the perceptions associated with the apparent Islamic fear of Western secularisation and the West's fear of forced religion. It is in this context that religious causes of – or elements – in conflict have featured prominently in the anthropological discussions on the issue of faith.

The reality is that faith is at the core of many people's consciousness and motivates them in their everyday lives. This explains why religion is such a powerful force in many states, and in world politics. Religion finds ambivalent expression in the lives and actions of its adherents. The lives of the people of faith are controlled by the teachings of their founder and their sacred books. Their lives are also directed by the injunctions and preaching of the leaders of these religious groups who, in most cases, are revered. The ability of these leaders to command respect is rooted in the understanding that they are quite learned and trained in the spirituality and language of the religion. Adherents may accept the views of religious leaders as inerrant interpretations of what their faith is all about. And such views may guide the actions of believers.



The top-level Muslim leadership in Nigeria has a significant role to play in bringing the potential of peace in Islam to work in addressing the Boko Haram situation.

Therefore, religious leaders can motivate and move people to wage violent resistance or even go to war, just as they may persuade individuals and groups to undertake humanitarian efforts. The religious constituency exerts enormous influence in countries where religion holds the allegiance of large segments of the population. In such countries, the religious constituency may serve as agents for political mobilisation or even lobbying for votes. In Nigeria, for example, voting along religious lines is a common occurrence. In addition, the religious affiliations of political leaders have been sources of discord and tension within the country, as evident in the Boko Haram crisis.

Focus on Nigeria: Politicisation of Religion and the Boko Haram Challenge

Lamin Sanneh notes that “the Western colonial encounter with Muslim Africans strengthened their political resolve and offered them the resources and prestige of an organized modern state. Yet the mixing of religion and politics in that fashion implicates both of them, with religion becoming a tool of control and politics a cover for intolerance.”¹⁷ Even today, this is the underlying factor in Nigerian politics, which results in conflicts, as people can no longer distinguish religious

issues from political issues. This is because “to most Nigerians, religion and faith are important aspects of everyday life as it (sic) controls the laws, how people think and act, what you believe, and what you value among others; in fact, religious considerations have created a situation of (unnecessary) state’s veneration of religious groups especially, Islam and Christianity”.¹⁸ Hence, religion is “a potent political force that cannot be ignored in any national issue, be it foreign or domestic, while it continues to be manipulated in furtherance of the objectives of politicians”.¹⁹ In this regard, Nigerian pre-independence and post-independence politicians have done the Nigerian nation a disservice. Their inability to distinguish a religious agenda from a political agenda is at the root of the ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. The rate at which religious euphoria was raised among Islamic and Christian adherents both in the north and south respectively, led to people being mobilised along those lines, always ready to take up arms against the other in the fight for supremacy in Nigeria.

Today, this phenomenon is evident in the generation of conflicts by pseudo-religious fundamentalist groups such as Boko Haram. The Boko Haram crisis underscores the underlying problem of animosity between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, which has been further used as

a political tool. The violent onslaught of this group was exacerbated by the 16 April 2011 election of a Christian, Goodluck Jonathan, as president of the country. Raufu Mustapha affirms that “some school of thought suggests that northern political forces, unhappy with the southern Christian president... have deliberately fuelled the carnage that has characterised Boko Haram”.²⁰ In their report, Benjamin Maiangwa and Ufo Uzodike also note that “Boko Haram insists not only on dividing Nigeria into north and south but also on placing the whole country under the shari’ah law. It has also demanded the conversion of President Jonathan to Islam as *conditio sine qua non* for dialogue and ceasefire.”²¹ Hence, we can surmise that the politicisation of religion is an issue which generates conflicts in Nigerian society, but it is acknowledged that the conflict also enmeshes other variables such as ethnicity.²²

The problem of the politicisation of religion and the conflicts it generates in Nigeria notwithstanding, the question is: if religion is such a powerful motivating and mobilising force, which has been used to foment trouble and conflicts in the world, are there any inherent traits in religion (Islam in particular) that could be mobilised to constructive ends? In the following sections, this article discusses the utility of Islam to peacebuilding. Tapping into the potential of peace in Islam could be a possible solution to the Boko Haram problem in Nigeria.

Fundamental Values Reinforcing Islam’s Potential for Peacebuilding

Islam is a religion that values peace and love. This is a basic tenet of the Islamic religion and that which controls adherents’ lives and their dealings with people around them. This theme of love of God and neighbour is expressed thus:

Of God’s unity, God says in the Holy Qur’an: Say: He is God, the One! God, the Self-Sufficient Besought of all! (Al-Ikhlās, 112:1–2). Of the necessity of love for God, God says in the Holy Qur’an: so invoke the Name of thy Lord and devote thyself to Him with a complete devotion (Al-Muzzammil, 73: 8). Of the necessity of love for the neighbour, the Prophet Muhammad... said: None of you has faith until you love for your neighbour what you love for yourself.²³

It is clear that in Islam there is potential for peace, as love of God is paramount and the prophet Muhammad unequivocally pronounced that no one could have faith in God without love for one’s neighbour. The injunction to love God and one’s neighbour is necessarily tied to the tenet of peace and non-violence. If it is the case that one truly loves God, then one should also extend that love to one’s neighbour; the two aspects of love are not mutually exclusive, they are necessarily tied to each other. This injunction is at the root of Muslims’ love for their neighbours, as exemplified in one of the pillars of Islamic faith, namely



GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

Islam is a religion that values peace and love.

the Zakat – which is a call to all Muslims to contribute and offer something to the poor and those who are less privileged in society. This is a pillar in Islam that is not taken for granted. For example, in the holy month of Ramadan, all believers have to contribute towards charity, based on love of neighbour and love of God.²⁴

TAPPING INTO THE POTENTIAL OF PEACE IN ISLAM COULD BE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE BOKO HARAM PROBLEM IN NIGERIA

Mohammed Abu-Nimer examines the work of two Islamic scholars (Hashimi and Sachedina) who enunciate the Islamic principles that clearly provide a strong base for a solid peacebuilding approach in Islam:²⁵ “According to these principles, human nature is to aspire to peace and not to war or violence. Humans seek harmony with nature and other living beings; in addition, humans can learn to be peaceful and change their wrongdoing since they are born innocent and not evil.”²⁶ Also, while focusing on the conflict between Jews and Muslim Arabs in Israel, Yaacov Yablon notes: “... Islam views peace as part of the religious aim to realize God’s kingdom on earth.”²⁷ Furthermore, according to Yablon: “One origin of the word Islam is *Salam* which means ‘peace’ [and in] the Quran relationships with non-Muslims should be based on justice, mutual respect, and cooperation.”²⁸ For Tsjeard Bouta et al., the Islamic principles that relate to peace include: *Salam* (peace); *Tawhid* (unity of God and all beings); *Rahma* (compassion); *Fitrah* (individual responsibility to uphold peace); justice, forgiveness, vicegerency and social responsibility.²⁹

The Possible Role of Islam in Peacebuilding in Nigeria

According to Perry Schmidt-Leukel:

The issue of war and peace is... deeply embedded in the teaching and doctrines of the major religious traditions of the world. Building on their specific sources of religious insight – wisdom, enlightenment, revelation – they have provided basic explanations of the existential, cosmic, and at times even metacosmic roots of violence and war. And drawing on the same sources, each of them has proclaimed peace... as an ultimate value.³⁰

This assertion lends credence to the utilities of peacebuilding in the world’s religions, including in Islam. The missing link might be the lack of courage and coordination among the members of these religions to make this potential and resources for peace a reality. It is in view of the need for coordination of the resources of peacebuilding of conflicting parties that Lederach presents ‘structure’ as a component in the Integrated Peacebuilding Model towards finding peace in intrastate conflicts. The structures are called levels of leadership, which Lederach thinks of as a

pyramid. The structure of leadership, according to Lederach, includes the top level, middle range and grassroots. These levels of leadership also translate to three approaches to peacebuilding, which include the ‘top-down’ approach, ‘middle-out’ approach and ‘bottom-up’ approach.³¹

To help coordinate an effective peacebuilding effort that will utilise the resources in Islam to address the Nigerian Boko Haram crisis, the top-level Muslim leadership has much work to do. The important characteristics of this level of leadership are that they are highly visible, they are generally locked into positions of exclusive power and influence, and they are under pressure to maintain these positions.³² These characteristics of the top-level leadership lead to a top-down approach to peacebuilding. Practically, the Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), which is a top-level leadership organisation made up of Islamic leaders in Nigeria, has a role to play in bringing the potential of peace in Islam to work in the Nigeria Boko Haram situation. This role in peacebuilding in Nigeria can involve the presentation of a common front, condemning fundamentalist elements in their religion and a commitment to work for all that augurs well for peace, as the teaching of Islam implores its adherents to. The NSCIA has an essential role in influencing those at the grassroots level of their religion through these teachings, enunciating the peacebuilding values in Islam. The influence of the teachings of Islam by this leadership structure could change the hearts and minds of adherents and move them towards a particular orientation. The mobilisation towards violence needs to be replaced by the positivity of peace, based on an effective framework of religious peacebuilding. In working proactively for peace, Muslim leaders in Nigeria can use their abilities to convert and bring their adherents to understand the value of love of God and neighbour. When this value is emphasised in interpersonal and inter-religious interactions, this will effectively move adherents to work for peace and for all that which leads to peaceful coexistence.

Conclusion

Religion’s influence in the public sphere has remained strong, despite the reality of secularisation. In particular, Islam has a big role to play in the task of peacebuilding in Nigeria, as it contains potential that can be utilised for peace. This potential is predicated on the values of love and peace in Islam. The inability of members of this religion to entrench the values of love and peace in Nigeria can be attributed partly to the politicisation of religion and the influence of fundamentalists, such as Boko Haram. These negative factors notwithstanding, Islamic adherents can play a decisive role in promoting peace in Nigeria through a conscious effort towards bringing to actuality the potential of peace in this religion. It is time that genuine Muslims reassert themselves and the resources in their religion and contribute to the realisation of peace in Nigeria. There is much work for the Islamic leadership structure, especially spiritual leaders and imams, in Nigeria. They have to

coordinate this peacebuilding effort by first unequivocally condemning what is not Islamic about fundamentalist groups such as Boko Haram, and then working towards entrenching the utilities of peace in their religion.

Peacebuilding efforts towards a response to the Boko Haram crisis by Muslim leaders in Nigeria also require that they and their scholars and adherents eschew interpretations (of texts) that can be construed as justifying violence against fellow humans. Effective peacebuilding by religious actors is dependent on harnessing the positive elements and resources in the religion. In addition, other negative elements that precipitate or sustain conflict must be addressed through multipronged initiatives such as education and social activism. This approach takes cognisance of the complementarity of faith-based and secular peacebuilding. **A**

Sunday Paul Chinazo Onwuegbuchulam is a PhD Candidate in the International and Public Affairs Cluster of the School of Social Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

Ayo Whetho is a Lecturer in Political Science and a PhD Candidate in the International and Public Affairs Cluster of the School of Social Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

Dr Khondlo Mtshali is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

Endnotes

- 1 Lederach, John Paul (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. 27.
- 2 Ibid., p. 24.
- 3 Küng, Hans (2005) Religion, Violence and 'Holy Wars'. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 87 (858), pp. 253–268.
- 4 Ibid., p. 254.
- 5 Ibid., p. 253.
- 6 Best, Shedrack (2001) Religion and Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria. *University of Jos Journal of Political Science*, II (III), pp. 63–81.
- 7 Ibid., p. 65.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Haynes, Jeffrey (2009) Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 47 (1), pp. 52–75.
- 10 Ibid, p. 72.

- 11 Kronish, Ron (2008) Interreligious Dialogue in the Service of Peace. *Crosscurrents*, Summer 2008, pp. 224–246.
- 12 Curaming, Lilian (2012) Religion as a Motivating Force in the Pursuit of Peace. *Dialogue and Alliance*, pp. 35–39.
- 13 Ibid., p. 35.
- 14 Huntington, Samuel (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 66.
- 15 Bhiku, Parekh (1999) The Voice of Religion in Political Discourse. In Rouner, Leroy (ed.) *Religion, Politics, and Peace*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 63–84.
- 16 Rouner, Leroy (1999) Introduction. In Rouner, Leroy (ed.) op. cit., pp. 1–13.
- 17 Sanneh, L. (1999) Church and State Relations: Western Norms, Muslim Practice, and the African Experience: A Comparative Account of Origin and Practice. In An-Na'im, A.A. (ed.) *Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, p. 92.
- 18 Muhammad, A.A. (2008) Religious Conflicts in Nigeria and its Implications for Political Stability. *The Social Sciences*, 3 (2), p. 122.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Mustapha, Raufu (2012) 'Boko Haram: God and Governance in Nigeria', Available at: <<http://gga.org/analysis/boko-haram-god-and-governance-in-nigeria>> [Accessed 20 May 2014].
- 21 Maiangwa, Benjamin and Uzodike, Ufo (2012) 'The Changing Dynamics of Boko Haram Terrorism', Available at: <<http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/07/20127316859987337.htm>> [Accessed 20 May 2014].
- 22 See Salawu, B. (2010) Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 13 (3), pp. 345–360.
- 23 Volf, Miroslav (2000) Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: The Theological Contribution to a More Peaceful Environment. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29 (3), pp. 861–877.
- 24 See *The Holy Quran* (Surah 21:73).
- 25 Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (2003). *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, p. 5.
- 26 Ibid., p. 6.
- 27 Yablon, Yaacov (2010) Religion as a Basis for Dialogue in Peace Education Programs. *Cambridge Journal of Education*. 40 (4), pp. 341–351.
- 28 Ibid., pp. 343–344.
- 29 Bouta, Tsjeard, Kadayifci-Orellana, Ayse and Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (2005) *Faith-based Peace-building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-faith Actors*. Washington, DC: Clingendael Institute & Salam Institute of Peace and Justice, p. 12.
- 30 Schmidt-Leukel, Perry (ed.) (2004) *War and Peace in World Religions: The Gerald Weisfeld Lectures 2003*. London: SCM Press, p. 3.
- 31 See Lederach, John Paul (1997) op. cit., p. 44.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 39–40.

CONFLICT TRENDS

Editor-In-Chief

Vasu Gounden

Managing Editor

Venashri Pillay

Language Editor

Haley Abrahams

Design & Layout

Immins Naudé

Contributors

Temitope Edward Akinyemi

Elizabeth Buhungiro

Shannon Dick

Virgil Hawkins

John Karlsrud

David Kode

Khondlo Mtshali

Sunday Paul Chinazo

Onwuegbuchulam

Frederik Rosén

Dirk Siebels

Ayo Whetho

Publisher

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

Private Bag X018
Umhlanga Rocks 4320
South Africa

Tel: +27 031 502 3908

Fax: +27 031 502 4160

Email: conflictrends@accord.org.za

Website: <www.accord.org.za>

ACCORD is a non-governmental, non-aligned conflict resolution institution based in Durban, South Africa. The institution is constituted as an educational trust. Views expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of ACCORD.

All rights reserved, apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act.

Conflict Trends is a quarterly publication. Back issues can be downloaded from the ACCORD website at <www.accord.org.za>

ISSN 1561-9818

Printing

Colour Planet, Durban, South Africa