

Soft security problems in Northwest Russia and their implications for the outside world

A framework for analysis and action

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Contents:

I	Introduction: a holistic approach to soft security problems	3
II	The severity of Russian soft security problems for the outside world	3
	<i>Nuclear safety – waiting for a catastrophe?</i>	4
	<i>Environmental problems: from individual risks to potential catastrophes</i>	9
	<i>Infectious diseases: a creeping crisis?</i>	11
	<i>Illegal immigration: still under control?</i>	13
III	Russian decision-making in soft security issues	17
	<i>State agents in soft security: the sources of impotence</i>	18
	<i>Business and soft security: extra benefits by violating laws?</i>	21
	<i>Does civil society matter?</i>	22
	<i>The conflicting nature of Russian soft security decision-making</i>	24
IV	International co-operation: widespread but fragmented	25
	<i>The international agents</i>	25
	<i>Problems of co-operation</i>	30
V	Towards a more intensified soft security analysis and action	32

I Introduction: a holistic approach to soft security problems*

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the traditional security dilemma based on the perception of a military threat between Russia and the West has largely given way to a variety of new challenges related to non-military security, so-called soft security threats. These threats are not merely problems internal to Russia, but constitute existing or potential problems for other countries as well.

Soft security threats in Northwest Russia are the main focus of this paper. They are of particular significance to Finland, the other Nordic countries and the Baltic States because of their geographical proximity. Ultimately, these threats pose a challenge for the whole of the European Union and the wider international community.

This paper aims at proposing a framework that could act as a starting point for further research and debate, as well as for political action. The 'holistic approach' offered here starts with an understanding of the various soft security problems as a whole, calling the attention and co-operation of all segments of domestic societies and international community, rather than dealing with them as isolated problems that would be the responsibility of only sectoral officials and administrative organs.

Firstly, the paper identifies and offers a general description of the currently recognised and potentially most serious soft security risks in Northwest Russia. Secondly, it discusses the Russian agencies related to soft security decision-making. Thirdly, the prospects of international co-operation for solving soft security problems in Northwest Russia are discussed.

II The severity of Russian soft security problems to the outside world

The concept of soft security threats is relatively vague. Therefore, from the point of view of the problem's cross-border implications in particular, the following **continuum** for the basis of risk assessment is proposed.

Risks for individuals exist when there is an identifiable threat, which, however, remains fairly limited in terms of its effects, such as a higher probability for an individual to become a victim of a crime or disease within a given area. International dimensions of these kinds of risks are indirect in nature, mainly concerning disturbances to the co-operation and integration processes between Russia and other countries.

* This paper is a preliminary report resulted from the project "Soft Security Policies of the Russian Federation - The Northern Dimension" of the Programme on the Northern Dimension of CFSP by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (UPI) and Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP). The project was carried out in autumn 2000 and early 2001. Christer Pursiainen has edited the text and co-authored its sections with the assistance of Nikita Lomagin and Pekka Haavisto.

Community risks exist when a whole neighbourhood is at risk of being affected, for instance, by a specific environmental or a health problem. International dimensions of these risks are still indirect in terms of their immediate effects, but they may raise the question of the need for preventive or more proactive policies and aid programmes from agents outside Russia.

Cross-border threats exist when a risk constitutes a direct and immediate challenge beyond Russia's borders, such as cross-border organised crime or illegal immigration. Co-operative policies and co-ordination between Russia and its neighbours become necessary, particularly at the level of state structures.

Creeping crises are identified as being when there is an increased potential for an identified risk becoming a major crisis for individuals and communities alike, such as infectious diseases, also having cross-border effects and the potential to become major problems in the neighbouring areas. Pre-emptive strategies are needed, often including not only bilateral but also multilateral co-operation.

Potential catastrophes are such situations as a threat of a nuclear catastrophe or major environmental catastrophes affecting large areas in a clear crisis situation. Wide international multilevel co-operation is needed in preventive operations as well as in preparing for emergency situations.

From the perspective of their severity and potential international dimensions, the problems in Northwest Russia related to nuclear safety and environmental problems, infectious diseases, and illegal immigration in particular can be highlighted. The main problem from the point of view of research, societal debates and balanced political action is that many of these problems are regarded as very sensitive by Russian officials, or they are otherwise difficult in terms of obtaining reliable data. In many cases, the information proposed from different sources is very controversial, ranging from alarmist worst case scenarios to total negligence of a problem. Nevertheless, in the following, the main factors and dynamics of the above mentioned soft security problems are briefly and illustratively discussed.

Nuclear safety – waiting for a catastrophe?

Nuclear safety problems¹ are risks along the whole above-defined continuum: they threaten individuals or local neighbourhoods where the hot-spots exist – often resulting in long-term health problems among the local population – but at the same time they belong clearly to the most risky category and may result in major catastrophes and crisis situations having far wider territorial effects beyond Russia's borders.

Within the complex of problems in this field, two main sets of sources of serious risks can be identified: **malfunctions in the operation of the nuclear reactors** of the power plants, and **nuclear waste** problems, the latter both of civilian and military nature.

Starting with the first set of risks, there are nine operational nuclear plants in Russia with a total of 29 reactors. Environmentalists both in Russia and elsewhere declare that none of these meet western standards, particularly the 12 so-called water-cooled and graphite-moderated RBMK reactors of the type that exploded in Chernobyl in 1986.

For Northern Europe, the two power stations that are located in Northwest Russia are of particular concern. The Leningrad power station is situated in the town of Sosnovy Bor, 80 kilometres west of St. Petersburg and close to the border with Finland. The power plant currently has four reactors of the RBMK-1000 type in operation. Originally, it was planned to shut down the two oldest reactors in 2003 and 2005 respectively, but in 1999 it was decided that their life span was to be prolonged by at least ten years until new reactors can be built, in order to secure the power plant's operation. The Kola nuclear power plant in turn is located about 15 kilometres west of the city of Polyarnye Zori, nearby the borders of both Norway and Finland. The plant has four so-called VVER-440 pressured water reactors. Both environmentalists and Western official sources consider the operation of the reactors in these plants as not meeting the necessary safety standards. The impact of the nuclear power plants on the gross energy supply of Northwest Russia is high, amounting to about 40% of the total, compared to only 12-14% in Russia in general. Finland also imports energy from the Leningrad power station.

Information concerning the safety of the nuclear plants is highly controversial. Russian official sources tend to downplay the problems. Should one follow the media and NGO-reporting on the condition of Russian nuclear power plants, there are reasons to doubt the safety of the plants considering the lack of protective measures. The main sources of potential malfunction in the operation of the plants are those related to the poor general condition of the Russian infrastructure, the outdated technology and poor condition of the plants themselves, as well as social and human factors, which have resulted in strikes, lack of training, and low or unpaid salaries and a consequently unmotivated labour force.

The most recent "We were just half an hour from another Chernobyl"² –situation was reported by the Russian and foreign media in September 2000 in the Sverdlovsk region, illustrating what could be the chain of events on the eve of a major nuclear catastrophe in today's Russia, suffering from a deteriorating infrastructure. The situation arose because of a short circuit in the regional electricity supply, which caused a sudden blackout in three nuclear reactors. The on-site diesel generators built for just such an emergency situation failed to start automatically, because of their poor condition. Consequently, the

cooling system at the heart of the plant stopped working, and the temperature in the core reactor rose to dangerous level, before the staff managed to start the generators after about half an hour.

The versions of the severity of the above discussed situation vary, however. According to the media reports, while the head of the plant praised his staff who managed to repair the diesel generators in time and said that this had prevented a serious accident, the representatives of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy denied the whole crisis situation and claimed that everything went according to plan and that the on-site emergency electricity generators had started immediately.

In addition to potential malfunctions, the **nuclear waste produced in the power plants** causes another set of problems. The Norway-based NGO Bellona, one of the most alarmist voices concerning nuclear safety and environmental issues in Russia, describes the situation of nuclear waste storage at the Leningrad power station as follows:

“There is a storage pond next to the reactor hall, to which the used fuel elements are transferred for interim storage and cooling. There is also a larger storage area that lies only 90 meters from the Gulf of Finland. This storage facility is in an extremely poor state of repair, with large cracks in the walls and roof. Rainwater runs in and contaminated water runs out. All five of the storage buildings are today completely full. It has therefore been decided that the distance between each fuel element in the ponds will be halved, something that entails a further safety risk.”³

The safety conditions of Leningrad nuclear power plant's spent fuel storage have been questioned not only by environmentalists and outsiders, but also from inside the plant. Since 1996 there has been an argument, recently involving a court case, between an operator of the spent nuclear fuel storage and the administration of the plant, the former claiming that the safety rules and standards in handling the spent fuel are not followed, and the latter denying these claims and trying to fire the operator in question.⁴

Western official sources, having some possibilities for on-site monitoring, do not usually make a fuss or provide detailed information about the safety problems of these nuclear power plants' operation or waste treatment, seemingly because it would harm their efforts to co-operate with Russia in enhancing nuclear safety in Russia. The very fact that outside sources such as the EU are spending large amounts of money to assist Russia in nuclear safety questions implies that the official Western information and conclusion is rather closer to the critical NGOs attitudes than those of Russian official sources.

Along with nuclear waste originating from nuclear power plants, **much of the most problematic nuclear waste is of military nature** and inherited from the Cold War period. The famous so-called Yablokov Report released in March 1993 provided details on the dumping of radioactive waste in the waters around

Novaya Zemlya and in the Kara Sea, which began in 1964 and continued until 1990. At least 17,000 barrels of solid radioactive waste were sunk in the waters around Novaya Zemlya. Thirteen nuclear reactors from submarines were buried in the Kara Sea and in Novaya Zemlya's coastal fjords. In addition, between 11,000 and 17,000 containers with radioactive waste content, estimated at more than 60,000 curies, were dumped in the area. The containers were encased in cement and steel shells which were in some cases already leaking when they were submerged. In some instances, sailors shot holes into the containers to make them sink more quickly.

While nuclear waste is no longer deliberately dumped at sea, the same problem will sooner or later be caused by sunken nuclear submarines, the most recent example being the Kursk which sank in August 2000 in the Barents Sea, and before that the Komsomolets which sank in 1989 in the Norwegian sea and which was carrying nuclear weapons. The Komsomolets was successfully sealed some years later, as its torpedoes were leaking, but the walls of the nuclear reactor may start to fail as a result of corrosion under the impact of sea water in 15-20 years. While the Komsomolets sank in deep water of about 1,000 meters, the Kursk is located in relatively shallow water of only 100 meters, with its two nuclear reactors containing about 1.2 tonnes of radioactive material, with a half-life of thousands of years. Even if it could withstand corrosion for decades, it remains dangerous for its environs. Should sea currents disperse this toxic material, fish stock would be affected and there would be no guarantee that humans would not be affected as well. On the other hand, a rescue operation, planned for the year 2001, is also regarded dangerous as the submarine might break up, and once on the surface the problem of its disposal remains.

Paradoxically, the growing environmental awareness in Russia has not only positive implications. As a result of not dumping nuclear waste at sea, the amount of waste on land has increased, with no proper dismantling and reprocessing procedures. It is estimated that Russia's current nuclear waste load is six million curies, which is the equivalent of 120 Chernobyls. The Kola Peninsula is estimated to be the home of about 18% of the world's naval nuclear reactors and the highest concentration anywhere. Ten years ago, the Northern Fleet had about 230 large vessels, including 166 submarines. Today, about 100 Soviet-built submarines await decommissioning, each usually equipped with two nuclear reactors.⁵ Although most of them are officially said to be tied up in ports and guarded, many observers note that they are in fact virtually abandoned and many are at risk of sinking. Most of these abandoned submarines are located near Murmansk, a town with a population of half a million, near Finland and Norway.

Solid radioactive waste is stored at 11 separate sites around the peninsula, while liquid waste is stored at the 5 main naval bases on the Kola. An illustrative example is the storage in Andreeva Bay, often called "a Chernobyl in slow motion", located close to the borders of both Norway and Finland. There are reported to be 21,000 spent fuel assemblies, enough for 90 nuclear reactors, and 12,000 cubic metres of

solid and liquid radioactive waste in concrete bunkers. The criticism notes that the concrete is very poor and that there are cracks and a constant danger of leakage into a sea in which fish are caught.

Another well-known example of a serious individual hot-spot is the service ship *Lepse* in Murmansk. The story behind this is that in 1966, the nuclear-powered icebreaker *Lenin* met with an accident and its three nuclear reactors were disposed of at sea, having been destroyed by a meltdown of the reactor core. However, today 640 spent nuclear fuel assemblies from the icebreaker's reactors are still aboard the *Lepse*. Due to the lack of cooling, some of the fuel assemblies became enlarged, and in order to deal with the danger the workers used sledgehammers, damaging them further. Consequently, the entire area is contaminated, and any attempt to remove these damaged nuclear elements is regarded as extremely dangerous. Even if the ship should stay where it is, the Norway-based NGO Bellona again pictures the worst case scenario as follows:

“In the event that the *Lepse* should sink or capsize, there is a risk that an uncontrolled chain reaction could start in the spent nuclear fuel. This could lead to an explosion with an ensuing release of radioactivity.”⁶

According to the Russian authorities, it would be too expensive to transfer all the waste in the region to Siberian reprocessing plants; the necessary infrastructure and transport vehicles for the transfer are not available. Several alternative solutions have been proposed. One solution could be storage facilities built locally, perhaps in concrete in military tunnels near Ara Bay; another solution proposed is based on storing the waste in concrete and metal casks. The Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy (Minatom) has, in 2000, completed a plan for the country's first-ever regional dumping ground for radioactive waste from the nuclear-powered submarines of Russia's Northern Fleet. According to this solution, the dumping ground is to be built on Novaya Zemlya, while specialists are also considering an alternative option for the location of the dumping ground on the Kola Peninsula.

Paradoxically, a Minatom plan, launched in the spring of 2000, aimed at legalising the import of spent nuclear fuel from other countries.⁷ The spent fuel would be reprocessed to isolate uranium and plutonium for future use, and the remaining waste put into protective storage. According to calculations by the ministry, importing 20,000 tons of waste from the West and Asia could add as much as \$21 billion to the budget, claimed to be used at least partially for dealing with the existing nuclear waste problem. In April 2001, the State Duma passed, with an overwhelming majority, an amendment to the law “On environmental protection“ which would make all this legally possible.

Environmental problems: from individual risks to potential catastrophes

As well as nuclear safety problems, other type of environmental problems related to **soil, water and air pollution**, in particular, are usually understood as constituting a potential threat to neighbouring countries as well. In general, environmental problems range along the whole spectrum of soft security risks, from individual and community risks to major catastrophes.

The general picture of Russia's environmental situation appears grim. Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, chairman of the already abolished State Environment Committee, revealed that the air in 120 Russian cities is five times more toxic than acceptable levels. The main sources of pollution are factories that produce paper, metals and chemicals. According to him, the worst affected regions are Arkhangelsk, Lipetsk, Bratsk, Yekaterinburg, Norilsk and the region around Moscow. Moreover, more than 14% of Russia's territory is in extremely poor environmental condition, affecting 61 million of the country's 147 million people.⁸

Other sources have maintained that every third child in Russia may be ill because of environmental pollution and half of Russia's people drink water that does not meet safety guidelines.⁹ According to Greenpeace, about 5% of all the oil extracted in Russia leaks out of its pipelines every year, which amounts to some 15 million tonnes a year.¹⁰ The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) survey from 1999¹¹ concluded that Russia is in environmental crisis. The report notes that Russia's environmental crisis has broader European and global implications, and that the country remains a major contributor to regional and global environmental problems such as acid deposition and greenhouse gas emissions.

There are several **environmental hot-spots** in Northwest Russia. One, which has been an object of international attention, is the Krasny Bor polygon that has received over 1.5 million m³ of hazardous waste since 1969. Most of the waste is left untreated in landfill sites, whatever their concentration or toxicity, and this has been going on for 30 years. Consequently, the site constitutes a concentration of hazardous and toxic chemicals, whose resultant admixture or derivatives can be shown to have direct access to the surrounding environment, also posing a threat to neighbouring countries:

“The area surrounding the Polygon is subject to a high watertable, constituting the headwaters of streams, which feed directly to the rivers Tosna and Izorha and thereby to the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland.”¹²

Another concern with international implications is Russia's plan to construct new oil terminals on the Gulf of Finland. One of them is the Primorsk oil terminal,¹³ to be built less than 30 kilometres from the

Finnish border, towards St. Petersburg. Russian environmentalists have raised the question of leaking oil pipelines. They maintain that environmental legislation has not been followed and, consequently, the risk of major accidents is high:

“We did not find any waterproofing either on the pipe, nor, which is more important, on the welds. So the pipe corrosion has started even before its coming into use. The pipe’s wall thickness is about 8-10 mm. You can imagine how long it will last in such conditions, and the oil will be pumped through the pipes at 60 atmospheres pressure.”¹⁴

Finland, in turn, is especially worried that Primorsk and other new oil harbours planned by Russia would bring a considerable increase in oil tanker traffic to the Gulf of Finland and also increase the risk of oil spills and major accidents. Finland is particularly concerned about the prevention of accidents during transport from the port, since it is not clear whether double-skinned oil tankers will be used. The growing traffic and increasing oil transports have caused Finland in particular to propose a more developed sea traffic control system for the Gulf of Finland.¹⁵

The terminal is initially planned to export 12 million tonnes a year of Russian oil but this will rise to 40 million. Russia currently exports up to 18 million tonnes oil via seaports in Latvia and Estonia and the Primorsk terminal would replace some of this capacity. It is estimated that 0.02% of tanker-transported oil contaminates the sea as result of accidents.

Finland’s aim is reported not to be the prevention of the construction of the Primorsk terminal, but to promote the open exchange of information on the best ways of minimising its environmental impact. Consequently, Finland has demanded that Russia assesses the environmental impact of the planned oil terminal. Finland feels that Russia is bound to carry out this impact assessment by the terms of the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a transboundary context, since Russia has signed the agreement. However, Russia has refused to allow an environmental impact assessment on the oil terminal because it has not ratified the treaty. The EU is reportedly backing Finland’s calls for an assessment of the environmental impact.

There are several other concerns, too, including the huge amounts of unprocessed waste waters of St. Petersburg and spillage of toxic waste from industry into Lake Ladoga and rivers through which the toxic material could reach also the Gulf of Finland.

Infectious diseases: a creeping crisis?

The poor social and economic situation in Russia is clearly identifiable at the general level of life expectancy. Over a ten year period, the cumulative drop in life expectancy for men was 6.3 years and for women 3.2 years. Low health status, poor nutrition and unhealthy lifestyles, combined with the transition-related stress and anxiety, pulled down the male life-expectancy. The worst situation can be found in Pskov region, Karelia, Arkhangelsk region and the Leningrad region where life expectancy is below the Russian average.¹⁶ In Karelia, a neighbouring republic to Finland, for example, the average life expectancy of women declined from 74.2 years in 1990 to 72.3 years in 1999. The decline in the average life expectancy for men is more dramatic, falling from 63.8 years in 1990 to 57.3 years in 1999. The average life span of people in Russia, as well as in the Northwest region (except for St. Petersburg) is 5-10 years shorter than in most Western countries.

Given the above development, the social gap between Finland and its neighbouring Russian regions has grown, bringing with it some serious soft security problems. While child prostitution – the Finns abusing underage Russian girls – and similar problems are a result largely of the structural situation caused by the social gap, and belong to what above was called risks for individuals, there are some health problems that may have much wider societal effects beyond Russia's borders.

The poor social and economic conditions, together with other factors, have led to several serious epidemics in Russia, threatening both Russia and its environs. While it is hard to imagine large-scale civil emergency situations comparable to major nuclear or environmental catastrophes, infectious diseases in Russia can still be considered in terms of potential creeping crises demanding effective international co-operation and pre-emptive strategies before they reach uncontrolled dimensions.

Of the variety of diseases, **tuberculosis** has once again become a major issue in Russia, and it is reported to be a principle cause of young adult deaths in today's Russia. In 1999, approximately 75,000 people were diagnosed with active, infectious tuberculosis, which raised the civilian incidence to 50 per 100,000 people. Among the civilian cases, the magnitude of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis is regarded as alarmingly high, being 4-7%. The problem becomes multiplied by 40-50 times should one look at the situation in prisons. In several regions is greater than 3,000 cases per 100,000 prisoners. Most problematic is that this prison-based epidemic is rapidly spreading to the civilian population. A minimum of 30,000 annually released prisoners are believed to carry an active form of tuberculosis, and about 240,000 annual releases are believed to carry a latent form of the disease that can become infectious in the future.¹⁷

HIV/AIDS is another major health problem in today's Russia. The first official case of HIV in the Soviet Union was recorded at the end of 1986. Soviet officials realised the danger rapidly, but responded to it in

way which cannot be regarded as very democratic. Between 1987 and 1989, a system of regional AIDS centres were established to carry out a massive testing and limited prevention activities. Within a few years, over 142 million people had been tested, the majority without their knowledge or consent, and a positive result was often followed by punitive actions. However, the political and economic instability of the early 1990s is said to have resulted in a general lack of interest in HIV/AIDS by the officials.¹⁸

The problem did not disappear, however. The Federal Law on "Prevention of AIDS in the Russian Federation" is still on paper, and the Federal Programme "Anti-AIDS" receives only one fifth of the finance originally planned. What is most problematic here is the rapid accumulation of the problem. The number of HIV carriers and AIDS patients increased to 57 per 100,000 citizens by the end of 2000, which is a four-fold increase since the beginning of the year. From January 1987 to December 2000, a total 83,054 HIV-carriers and AIDS patients were revealed, including 1,135 children aged under 14, among them 427 children born to HIV-infected mothers. In 2000 alone, 51,952 HIV and AIDS cases were diagnosed, which is 2.9 times more than in 1999. Altogether there are, according to the Federal Centre for AIDS Prevention in March 2001, 101,976 people infected with the HIV virus in Russia. Most of the HIV-infected live in the Moscow region (14,396), Moscow (10,881), the Irkutsk region (8,842) and St. Petersburg (7,582). Most of them are men, and over 60% aged between 20 to 30. The rate is expected to grow in 2001 especially in St. Petersburg, the Leningrad region, the Samara, Kemerovo, Perm and Ryazan regions and the Altai territory.

Experts have estimated that up to 0.7 million to one million HIV carriers in Russia could die within the next decade. The World Health Organisation recently issued a warning about the spread of AIDS in Russia, saying the real number of HIV sufferers was up to ten times that indicated by the health ministry. About 90% of those infected today are teenagers and youngsters under 25, and consequently Aids will become one of the most important factors in the depopulation of Russia.¹⁹

Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are definitely considered to be the most dangerous infectious diseases that threaten Russia and its environs. However, there are several other threats, too. For instance, there are alarmist reports concerning **Hepatitis B and C**.²⁰ According to information from Russian officials, in 1994 the number of Hepatitis C cases was 3.2 per 100,000 people, which is already higher than in many other countries, but the number of cases has been increasing by about one hundred per cent per year. In 1999, it was officially up to 19.3 cases per 100,000, but is believed to be much higher in reality.

Russia's current health infrastructure seems to be incapable of handling the growing problem of infectious diseases, mostly due to a lack of resources. This is not only a duty of health officials, however. It is notably that the fighting against many infectious diseases means first of all fighting drug abuse. While in the period 1987 to 1996 up to 90% of AIDS infections resulted from sexual activity, the main source of

spreading infection is now the injection of drugs, which is widespread in big cities. Drug abuse has grown 20 fold over the last 10 years and the trend is upwards. Registered addicts number 450,000. More than 50% of the cases of Hepatitis are also believed to be caused by drug abuse.

So far, documented cases in which infectious diseases originating from Russia have had effects beyond its borders in Northern Europe are rare.²¹ There are some clear reasons for that. The social status of the populace infected by tuberculosis, for instance, is such that those people are unlikely to travel abroad. The same goes for most drug users, and, consequently, the HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis B and C infected.

However, the rapid increase of HIV infected people in Russia is bound to also increase the probability of the diseases' cross border effects.

Illegal immigration: still under control? †

Compared to the above issue areas, all other soft security problems are secondary in their severity. From the point of view of the EU, in worst case scenarios they constitute what were above called cross-border risks. On the other hand, they are every-day problems for the authorities in Russia and its neighbours. These include organised crime, illegal immigration, smuggling of drugs and other illegal items, child prostitution, etc. Of these kinds of threats, illegal immigration and transnational organised crime are the most serious, and for border authorities are often the one and same thing. According to the director of the Russian border authorities:

“This enemy is strong, clever and deceitful. As its weapons, it has the latest technical equipment to falsify and produce documents for illegal immigrants and international terrorists for crossing the border, for producing and transferring narcotics, weapons of terror, and components of weapons of mass destruction.”²²

While all of the above mentioned cross-border problems deserve their own treatment, in the following only illegal immigration is discussed in some detail.

The formal distinction between legal and illegal migration is obvious; it is the immigration law of the receiving country that defines whether foreigners enter, stay or work legally or illegally in a society. As to sources of migration from Russia to the European Union, the question is not so much of Russians themselves but of those who use Russia as a means of entry into Europe. In the beginning of the 1990s, there was some alarm in the Western European countries concerning the first possibility; large-scale

† Particularly this section is based on an unpublished draft written by Lomagin.

migrations from a Russia in which the right to leave had become legal and which was facing deteriorating socio-economic, political and ecological problems, could not totally be ruled out.

Plausible parameters such as mass unemployment, civil war, ethnic strife and new Chernobyl-type disasters could provide – separately or in combination – appropriate incentives for mass migration. This proved not to take place. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up new land routes to Europe from Asia and turned once-closed cities into nodal points of migrant travel.

Illegal trafficking in people and illegal immigration from Russia are caused by a number of factors. The most important are as follows: 1) the high level of socio-economic disparity between Russia and its neighbouring countries (according to some analyses, 1 to 20, for instance, between Russian Karelia and Finland); 2) an open border regime between Russia and almost all CIS countries that makes Russia both a transit country for illegal migrants and huge reservoir of all those who are not happy in their home countries; 3) a lack of resources and experience to tackle the problem of illegal migration; 4) the lack of a mechanism for the deportation of foreigners, stateless persons and third world nationals who violate the Russian Law for Exit and Entry; 5) inadequate attention to the problem of illegal migration from federal and local authorities.

Increasingly well-organised criminal groups trading in human freight – a less risky but scarcely less lucrative commodity than drugs – have emerged to co-ordinate smuggled passages into a Europe largely closed to legal migration: “The penalties are less severe than for drugs, the up-front investment much smaller, and the evidence has legs and tends to run away.”²³

However, Russia did not become just a transit country for those who wanted to immigrate to the developed countries; it also became the victim of such migration. It has to accommodate those who went from zones of conflict or cannot return home for various reasons (political, economic, personal) and, even if many of them would prefer not to stay in Russia but to go further, for various reasons they often decide to stay. Thus, though the problem of migration is a potential problem for neighbouring Western developed countries, it is a more concrete problem for Russia itself.

The issue of illegal immigration via Russia became a matter of public debate as early as 1992²⁴ and one of the first publications on this subject in St. Petersburg appeared in June 1993.²⁵ According to the Russian Security Service (then MBR), the radical increase in illegal immigration occurred in the second half of 1992 and coincided with the liberalisation of movement across the Russian border. Thus, since 1992 the country has been faced with a problem that was not easy to solve. Today, it is estimated that there are about 700,000 – 1,000,000 illegal immigrants in Russia.²⁶ The most cost-effective form – voluntary repatriation – is in most cases impossible, since nobody wants to go home. The Russian government, in turn, does not want to spend hundreds of millions on the repatriation of immigrants because the countries

of origin are not prepared to share this burden. The status of refugees for immigrants would also cause huge expenditures for the state, and moreover, few foreigners are seeking that status in Russia. Most of the illegal immigrants reside in bordering regions of the Russian Federation, as well as in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region are among most-favoured places in Russia for foreigners, including possible migrants. In total, in 1999 the Migration Service of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region dealt with 1,200 migrants who applied for refugee status or temporary asylum. The applications of 500 of them were rejected, but none were deported. Most of these people have tried to illegally cross the state border of Russia, when their papers have been examined by the Migration Service.²⁷ This examination, as well as control under applicants and those who failed to obtain appropriate legal status is problematic since there are no centres for the temporary housing of forced migrants and applicants for refugee recognition, although the existence of such centres is stipulated by the federal Law “On refugees” and by the Russian Government decree “On measures for the prevention and limitation of uncontrolled external migration”.²⁸

In most cases, illegal migrants enter Russia through the countries with a soft entry regime, namely through CIS countries. The statistical data of the Migration Service of St. Petersburg and Leningrad region proves this to be true. The main routes of illegal migrants go through the states of Central Asia (Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan). While in Russia, illegal migrants mostly use the railways because they are least subject to control by the law enforcement authorities.

It is also possible to gather information from various non-official sources. According to information from the public organisation “Afghani cultural centre” there are more than 10,000 citizens of Afghanistan who live in St. Petersburg and the region illegally. The regional branch of the Rwanda public organisation “ICHUMBY” in turn suggests that up to 5,000 people from Africa reside in the city. According to the non-official data of the National communities’ Department of the Committee for the Foreign Relations of the Government of St. Petersburg, up to 2,000 Vietnamese, more than 1,000 Chinese, and more than 100 natives of Iran live in the city illegally. Citizens of Pakistan, Sudan, Libya and of some other states have also been detained by the Interior Ministry for remaining in Russia illegally.

There is a constant tendency of illegal migration of citizens from the ‘near abroad’ – Ukrainians, Armenians, Azeries, etc. The main concern is about national Diasporas of Tadjiks and Moldovans. In the summer season their number increases 10 fold and reaches 10-15 thousand people who reside in the nearest suburbs of St. Petersburg and mainly beg in the city. It is argued that illegal foreigners in the city of St. Petersburg and the region fuel crime. According to the Ministry of Interior data from the end of 2000, there were 823 crimes registered for the previous 5 months, among them 228 against foreigners and

595 committed by the foreigners. A total of 656 people have been brought to trial for criminal activities. In 1999, 291 people were expatriated from Russia. Every month more than 1,500 people are punished for various administrative violations including passport-visa regime violations (mainly for the near abroad). Currently, the Migration Service has information that some educational institutions of the city are actively used by criminals and middle-firms for false invitations with the stated purpose of visit as being 'for study'. In fact, these invitations enable illegal migrants to enter Russia.²⁹

From the above follows the question of how many of those illegally in Russia would try to illegally enter the European Union. The EU has now eliminated most internal borders, but the pan-European police force needed to control a growing flux of people scarcely exists. Of the EU countries, Finland has the only common border with Russia, and could theoretically be an ideal route from Russia to the EU. According to the official report of the Finnish Ministry of Labour of 1998, illegal immigration to Finland has so far been very rare. Only a few individual cases have been detected. Usually, the cases include the use of forged documents, due to which the real identity of the persons has often remained unknown. In these cases the persons condemned have usually tried to obtain financial profit. In addition to this, a private person has illegally brought some 50 Kurds to Finland, claiming humanitarian reasons. In the cases involving financial profit there have been signs of organised international activity. According to the Finnish Frontier Guard Service, 1,583 persons were turned back in external border traffic in 1998. Most of these were Russians and Estonians.³⁰

The most common reason was the lack of residence or work permits. Since 1993, Polish passports have been misused in Finland. For example in 1995 the "Polish" citizens that tried to enter Finland turned out to be Kurds. In summer 1996, possibly as many as 200 citizens of Sri Lanka were smuggled from Russia to Norway via Finland. Citizens of Sri Lanka living in Finland also participated in the operation. In summer 1997, a substantial amount (about 500) of visas issued on false grounds were detected on the Russian border. The persons that tried to enter the country were Russians. In 1997, a little more than 500 people tried to enter Finland without visas.

In November and December 1997, a new phenomenon was an increase in attempts to enter the country illegally by train. Seven cases were detected: groups of 2 to 11 persons arrived from Russia and all of whom claimed asylum immediately on the border. They were citizens of Sri Lanka, China, Algeria and Palestine. The trips of all the groups turned out to be organised. They had forged passports bearing the names of Singapore, Korea and Malaysia. Since 1998, attempts to enter the country illegally have clearly increased. The people involved have mainly come from countries in Asia and the Middle East. The most common methods are the use of forged documents or hiding in vehicles. According to newspaper sources in May 2000, the Russian authorities for their part revealed about 1,700 efforts to cross the border illegally within about one and a half years.³¹ Nevertheless, illegal immigration to Finland is still relatively

rare. In 2000, the Finnish Frontier Guard reports only 47 attempts to cross the border from Russia to Finland illegally.

Finland does not yet seem to be much of a target of illegal arrivals and the country is not used as a country of passage, either, and at the moment there is no special pressure from Russia on Finland. In 2000, according to the Finnish Frontier Guard's report, there were only 47 detected cases of illegal attempts to cross the border to Finland from Russia!³² The detected cases show however that illegal arrivals and crossings take place all the time. Smugglers search continuously for new routes and methods for illegal entry into Finland or via Finland to third countries, the latter possibility becoming easier when the Schengen agreement has been put in force.

However, one of the most challenging and controversial issues in the discussion about illegal immigration is the estimation of its scale. By definition, illegal immigrants are not registered in official records. They avoid contact with governmental and formal sectors. Therefore, reliable numbers are almost impossible to obtain. On the other hand, there is a huge demand for numbers and estimations among policy-makers. All we know for sure is that the number of illegal migrants has greatly increased in the last decade.³³

III Russian decision-making in soft security issues

The Russian Federation is a participant in several soft security related international regimes and it has its own legislation concerning all the issues dealt with above. In terms of dealing with soft security issues in political decision-making bodies at a principal level, it often takes place under the title of **sustainable development**. For example, a Presidential decree 'concerning the state strategy of the Russian Federation for the protection of the environment and the ensuring of sustainable development' was adopted in February 1994.³⁴ This legislation outlined the official commitment of the Russian government to sustainable development. It contained a series of generalised statements underlining the need to achieve economic development and growth in balance with the surrounding environment. Furthermore, it stimulated the publication of a plan of action for the country's environment covering the period 1994-1995. In 1996, a further Presidential decree outlined the 'concept for the transition of the Russian Federation to Sustainable Development'. It states that:

“...the Russian Federation considers it necessary and possible to carry out a sequential transition to sustainable development to ensure a balanced achievement of social and economic goals, together with a solution to the problems of preserving a favourable environment and natural-resource potential on order to meet the needs of both current and future generations.“

As to the concrete Russian agents, while there has been considerable turmoil in Russian administrative structures, and the concrete role of different parties may vary and change from one issue to another, administrative areas, individual cases, etc., in analytical terms the main agents are nevertheless fairly easily identifiable. While **the state structure** with its hierarchy forms the basis of any analysis of soft security issues, **the military** should be regarded as a more or less autonomous part of this structure. However, there are other groups, too. Those Russian agents that may also play a crucial role in soft security questions include **the business elites**, as well as **non-governmental organisations** at the level of civil society.

To measure the implementation of the principles of sustainable development, we can look policy changes, institutional reform and social mobilisation. From the point of view of policy changes, environmental and many other soft security concerns have played an increasingly marginal role towards the end of the 1990s. This has also been a period in which soft security authorities have faced a serious lack of resources. From the point of view of institutional reform, the general weakening of the independent control authorities is a step backwards concerning the implementation of the internationally agreed principles of sustainable development.

In western societies the most important factor regarding the implementation of sustainable development has been social mobilisation. The public participation in environmental issues, the business community's interest in sharing these values with the public and the pressure on all political decision-makers have been relevant when putting the ideas of sustainable development into practice. In Russia, the biggest failure has been the lack of this social mobilisation as a whole.

State agents in soft security: the sources of impotence

Given the variety of factions involved, soft security issues often become subjects of long and complex political processes. Starting from within the state structure, several sources of conflict can be identified from within and during this process. The first is that between **the executive and the legislative bodies** of power at the federal level, particularly important when the question is about an amendment of existing laws or the creation of new ones.

In principle, Russia's 1993 Constitution gives overwhelming power to the executive, or literally to the President, but when it comes to federal law-making, co-operation between the executive and the legislative is needed. While President Yeltsin's era was characterised by frequent deadlocks between these state institutions, especially between the President and the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Parliament), with President Putin in power there seems to be a growing mutual understanding and co-operation between the federal executive and legislative powers. The present State Duma, elected in

December 1999, is so formed that the executive can almost always, often case by case, build up a supporting coalition for its bills, whereas there is no political basis for a lasting opposition that could challenge the executive power's policy in more principal terms. In spring 2001, plans and concrete efforts were made to unify four State Duma fractions to organise a more lasting pro-government party that would be enough to give more than 50% support for any government proposals.

Basically, this is not a very different situation to that of democratic countries with majority-based governments. However, the executive in Russia is clearly formed quite independently of the Parliament, and does not reflect the power balances between the parties in a same way as is the case in most parliamentary democracies.

The executive itself is not cohesive, however. There is room for considerable disagreements and **struggles between the various state bureaucracies**. A traditional source of power struggles within the executive power in Russia has been a form of 'duplication' of state bodies. However, one can identify a recent tendency to create more clear-cut institutional solutions in order to harmonise state policy. In the present situation, with a strong and active president, it seems that the government, i.e. the cabinet of ministers, will play a more technical role. In terms of security of all kinds, the Security Council, working directly under the President, is clearly more powerful. The Security Council's independent role and structure has been constantly growing. The harmonisation of interests of the 'power ministries', particularly the ministries and agencies for defence, home, security and justice affairs, is supposed to be achieved within the framework of the Security Council. Therefore, the Council includes representatives from all of the power ministries and other important state bureaucracies, and is supposed to make balanced decisions in a wide range of issue areas in the field of security.

Looking at the handling of soft security problems, especially from the point of view of environmental and nuclear power administration, in particular, this attempt to harmonise state policy has led to the disappearance or loss of power of those state agents that are supposed to be independent control organisations within state machinery. A good example is the gradually diminishing role during the 1990s of the environmental administration. Putin concluded this development as one of his first acts as the President by totally abolishing the State Environmental Committee in May 2000, whose responsibilities were transferred to its traditional competitor and object of control, the Ministry for Natural Resources.

The same development seems to be on way in the field of nuclear safety, concretised recently in the struggle around the imported spent nuclear fuel issue, discussed above. While Minatom was the father of the idea, at the same time another governmental body in the same issue area, the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation safety (GAN), actively opposed the ministry's plan, claiming that Russia was technically unprepared to accept nuclear materials for reprocessing and storage.³⁵ These protests were

fruitless, however. In general, Minatom seems to be willing to shut down GAN and take over its responsibilities in the same way as the State Environmental Committee's control responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry for Natural Resources, the very body it was supposed to control. The main motivation for Minatom's line is said to be that it hopes to spend less money for upgrading the safety of nuclear reactors than was demanded by GAN.³⁶

One special source of conflict within the state machinery is **the civil-military relationship**. The military is itself one of the main sources of the environmental and nuclear waste problems. The lack of necessary financing, education and resources has resulted to a high probability of miscalculations, irresponsibility and incompetence in the military. However, the public discussion about the soft security problems specific to the military has become more difficult in recent years. Those drawing attention to these matters have been accused of treasury and espionage.³⁷ Since the military – the Russian army and navy – is administratively very autonomous, in many cases the civilian authorities do not even seem to be informed about the military's soft security problems. One can conclude that in soft security issues, the civil-military co-operation is clearly underdeveloped, except perhaps in the civil emergency management where there exists some systematised co-operation at the operative level.³⁸

Yet another source of potential conflicts in Russian state structures is the tension between **the centre and regions** (including local and municipal levels of administration). Over the past ten years, the centre's hold has weakened sharply, and the differences between regions have grown. In many cases, regional constitutions put local laws on an equal footing with Russia's. That had allowed the leadership to ignore federal programmes. In order to establish a more hierarchical power relationship between the centre and the regions, in May 2000 the President introduced a new level of administrative policy, seven new districts (*okrug*), headed by presidential envoys or 'general governors', who are also members of the Security Council and are supposed to represent its policy at the regional levels. These new units are responsible for ensuring that the regions follow the federal laws, while still maintaining the principle of elected governors.

In a reversal of recent trends, the regions have also vowed to transfer a bigger share of tax revenues to Moscow. Under pressure from the President's envoys, the regions have already made amendments to their local laws to match the Russian Constitution and federal legislature. Moreover, President Putin has succeeded in abandoning the automatic right to a seat in Russia's upper house of Parliament for regional governors and presidents, which means, among other things, that they will be deprived of legal immunity, which will thus make them more vulnerable to legal pressures from the federal centre.

As to the soft security issues, the old guard of governors has not been very enthusiastic and able to deal with them in Northwest Russia. Therefore, one might place some hope on the presidential envoys that

may be required to show their competence in this field as well. However, they are not yet in a position to meet the challenge. The seven new governor-generals have neither the constitutional status nor the resources to deal with real problems of their regions. Though they are perhaps more prepared to deal with security issues, including the scope of many soft security issues, they have no resources to do so.

Concerning the question of whether Russian state policy manages to adequately address Russia's soft security problems, according to the results of a survey among Western and Russian decision-makers and specialists, focusing on the environmental administration especially, the respondents generally felt that state policy had failed:

“The reasons given included shortage of funding, ‘lack of infrastructure and commitment’ [...], ‘poor intra- and inter-departmental communication’ [...], ‘a lot of overlapping within the state structures, with no clear delineation of responsibilities’ [...]and ‘a great lack of a coherent, long-term, officially adopted policy’ [...]. Added to these problems is the low importance assigned to environmental issues and one [...] representative stated that ‘the environment is probably considered as a constraint to development rather than as an instrument to improve economic efficiency’ whilst the most pessimistic thought that ‘the environment won’t be a priority until the situation becomes catastrophic’.”³⁹

Business and soft security: extra benefits by violating laws?

Of the interest groups outside the Russian state machinery, the business elites constitute an important power in contemporary Russian politics. Recent developments suggest that when the perceptions of the state interests and those of a specific oligarch or business sector contradict, the state is capable of placing the business under its control if it so chooses.

However, in public debates, the impact of business on soft security questions is often seen as negative. V.I. Danilov-Danilyan, the former head of the abolished Environmental Committee, has put it as follows when describing the forces and motivations behind the decision to abolish his own bureaucracy:

“Certainly there were people interested in our quick abolition. By the means of environmental impact assessment and other checking mechanisms we prevented them from receiving extra benefits from their business. By what means did they derive incredible fortunes? The answer is clear, by illegal and unprecedented use of natural resources. You cannot receive extra benefits from the mining sector without violating environmental law and causing damage to surroundings... Therefore we have a situation in which no environmental impact assessment is welcomed and no room for compromise and complex view is desired.”⁴⁰

NGO reporting in singular cases usually provide similar opinions, complaining for instance of a lack of openness to the public from the side of companies that deal with soft security related projects or industries.

However, a more detailed analysis shows that there is not one single business elite but several, often structurally in very different positions. The most powerful business lobby in Russia is the monopolistic **gas industry**, being virtually a part of the Russian state and the backbone of its economic and social systems. The **oil industry**, by contrast, is much more fragmented, being permanently in the process of splitting, merging and restructuring. Being at the same time dependent on federal and regional authorities, it nevertheless has fairly influential lobbying capabilities in general. The **electricity power industry's** political role has increased recently, and it exerts a large influence, particularly on regional economic strategies. The **nuclear industry's**, as a separate sector, role has become weaker since Soviet times, but it still has some influence at the federal level; it also plays an important role in regions where there are nuclear power plants, or where new reactors are planned to be constructed. The **defence industry** lost its position since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but has increased its lobbying power, especially due to the second war in Chechnya. The **metal industry** has traditionally had a close relationship with the federal authority, and this practise to work through state structures to push forward the industry's interests seems to continue. The banking and **financial sector** is the most politicised economic institution in Russia. While the role of some individuals in this sector has proved not to be as strong as was earlier expected, the whole sector undoubtedly remains important at all levels of political and economic decision-making. This sector tends to be constructed around financial-industrial complexes, and its different parts' interests therefore depend much on the industry they are a part of.⁴¹

Thus, the different business elites do not have equal lobbying capacities and access to political decision making, nor do they have identical interests; the preferences between and within the elites vary, or may be contradictory. One might have a reason to generalise that this also holds true in soft security issues.

Does civil society matter?

Along with the businesses, there are other interest groups working at the grass-roots level of civil society. Although it is generally true to say that Russian civil society is weak, it nevertheless exists. Even more, some segments of it are very active both domestically and transnationally, often in the fields of various soft security problems. The question is then more about what kind of relationship is developing between this civil society and the Russian state machinery, and how much and through which channels public opinion is considered in actual decision-making.

The picture of civil society vs. state relations is not black and white. According to one empirical investigation, during the later years of perestroika one could already differentiate between several kinds of civil society-state relations, depending basically on the nature of the group in question: co-operation; complete antagonism; attempted pre-emption (the respective state organ adopts some of the goals of the association in question and tries to deny its legitimacy); attempted co-optation (if the respective state organ must eventually accept the existence of the association, it tries to subordinate it to official control); and benign tolerance (state agencies pay only little, if any, attention to the existence of the association or group).⁴² At present, all these forms of relationship can be found in Russia, and suspicion in this civil society vs. state/regional authorities relationship often arises from both sides of the barricades.

Nonetheless, it seems that the Russian civil society-state relationship in general, though very complex and unclear, has the potential to move gradually from the 'civil society against the state' situation towards a more co-operative relationship, at least on regional level. The exact relationship between the state and civil society depends not only on the issue area or nature of the activity in question, the different opinions within the state machinery, but also on the situation in a particular region within Russia. The federal, regional and local administrations are usually more sympathetic to associations oriented towards social problems than more sensitive problems such as ecology or human rights, and this often for the simple reason that the socially-oriented civil society as the 'third sector' is taking care of many of the functions that the Russian state at present is unwilling or economically unable to manage. In some cases, civil society agents may have both allies and enemies within the state apparatus. In some regions, the whole attitude towards civil society is more benign and authorities have started to co-operate also in terms of utilising the expertise of human rights organisations, for instance, in trying to implement the requirements arising from membership of the Council of Europe.

When trying to affect the official decision-making in soft security issues, the main instruments for the Russian NGOs are **lobbying through regional decision-makers** sympathetic to a specific issue or NGO, producing or commissioning **reports** on soft security issues and particular cases, organising **seminars**, bringing decisions of authorities to **the court**, collecting **signatures** for or against a specific issue, and demanding **referendums**.

Russian NGOs are often characterised by a high degree of professionalism, and therefore in some cases the government or local officials are genuinely interested to include non-governmental organisations in the network of decision-making, or at least utilise them in terms of suppliers of information; in other cases the issue of inclusion/exclusion in the list of the decision-making circle is one specific battle field between civil society and governmental agents.

Both success stories and failures as a result of these activities can be found. Utilising an article in the Constitution, Russian environmentalists were, in autumn 2000, collecting signatures in order to force a nation-wide referendum on the import of spent nuclear fuel from abroad and re-establishing an independent federal agency for environmental protection in Russia.⁴³ This activity took place in 62 regions out of 89. In St. Petersburg alone, nearly 100,000 signatures were put forward for scrutiny, and altogether over 2.5 million signatures were collected. However, as it turned out, the Central Election Commission, by citing numerous technical inaccuracies, deleted a considerable amount of the signatures collected, which left the environmentalists 200,000 signatures short of the 2 million needed to ensure the referendum. Nevertheless, despite this failure the experience shows that civil society remains active, can engage public opinion, and might perhaps in some cases have real impact on soft security issues. Yet, when the question is about a nationally important issue, related to the official main goal of modernising the country's economy and a return to great power status, NGOs are usually bypassed should their goals conflict with those of the state.

The conflicting nature of Russian soft security decision-making

Thus, several agents participate in one way or another in the decision-making processes around soft security questions. How the actual decisions are made, at what level and by whom, of course, depends on the issue area, the administrative and territorial constraints, the actual case, and often circumstantial factors. Some decisions are clearly made at the top level of the state apparatus, and what remains for the lower levels is to interpret and implement the decisions. This is especially so for projects and decisions that have national and strategic importance, such as energy policy or oil and gas export. Once a presidential decree is signed, there is usually little chance for local or non-governmental agents to protest, and all subsequent protest actions are almost doomed to failure in terms of their real impact.

On the other hand, in many soft security-related cases the picture is much more complex, and the very decision-making includes several agents with conflicting interests. The basic nature of the Russian decision-making process, particularly in environmental questions, has been characterised in a recent empirical study by distinguishing four major phases.⁴⁴ The first, 'normal phase' would be much of a legacy from the Soviet times, a large **bureaucratic circle** including all the main state, regional, and local agents. Formally, this circle or network is based on an extremely long list of official organisations and departments which are obliged to take part in decision-making in the specific field. Arising from the fact that the issues and problems in question almost always result from a conflict, or at least include a serious conflict of interests, each interested group strives for a decision-making network favourable to its own interests.

The second, and more obscure, is the ‘mobilisation phase’, in which **coalitions** and the lines of the conflict are clarified, and where the challengers to the dominant view in particular articulate their positions. These challengers may come from within or outside the decision-making groups.

The third, ‘actual decision-making phase’, should it ever takes place, is dominated by the core agents of the inter-organisational network of decision-makers. **The core** tends to consist of agents that dominate the flow of different kind of resources, and the agents in the core create relatively strong mutual exchange networks leaving the peripheral agents of their organisations in the shadows.

Finally, the last, ‘follow-up phase’ faces the challenge of **implementing** the decisions. The lack of necessary resources, the continuing resistance of some interest groups, poor legislative base, or the overall hostile social and economic context, for instance, may lead to considerable delays, transformation or disregarding of the already adopted decisions. The regional policy-making system in Russia today includes such elements and instruments especially for use during this phase. There is a growing role for juridical departments which control the conformity of the adopted decision to laws, there are some public monitoring systems dealing with the most risky projects, there are some public hearing procedures, and last but not least, there is the growing possibility for the involvement of international or transnational agents, often acting in co-operation with those not satisfied with the adopted decisions.

IV International co-operation: widespread but fragmented

There are several interrelated problems for international co-operation in soft security issues. It goes without saying that **financing** is also a problem here. However, often the problem is **how to make Russia positive towards international co-operation** in the first place, and **how to ensure international control** over those projects financed by the western governments or international organisations. Basically, this is a question of state sovereignty. There are also problems arising from outside Russia, from the complex of the international networks involved. At the outset, international co-operation in the field of soft security problems in Northwest Russia is relatively widespread but fragmented. So the question is **how to co-ordinate the activities** between the variety of agents dealing with basically the same soft security questions.

The international agents

Many forms of international co-operation in soft security issues can be found in Northern Europe. When it comes to **multilateral** inter-state co-operation related to co-operation, there are several international organisations around. The interregional Councils in Northern Europe⁴⁵ have been natural instruments for

dealing with many soft security problems in Northwest Russia. Most of these Councils are post-Cold War phenomena, except **the Nordic Council (NC)** established in 1952 and **the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)** established in 1971. **The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)** was established in 1992, **the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council (BEAC)** in 1993, and **the Arctic Council (AC)** in 1996, and they all were explicitly created to develop East-West relations in the aftermath of the Cold War. Russia is a member state in all three of these Councils, whereas in NC/NCM it has an information office. Soft security questions, especially relating to the environment and health, are among the main issues of the agendas of these Councils.

Several declaratory and some practical steps have been taken within the framework of these Councils. For instance, at the Baltic Sea States Summit in April 2000,⁴⁶ and in its follow-up conferences, the overall aim was defined as “stable growth, sustainable development and the narrowing of economic disparities.” The Chairman highlighted “three areas of particular importance.” Beside the usual “removal of obstacles to trade and investment”, two of these areas were about soft security, namely “human security and the fight against organised crime and the spread of diseases,” and “co-operation on energy and the environment, including climate policy.” As for crime prevention, it was noticed that the Task Force on Organised Crime, established in 1996, has produced important results, among them “25 successful joint operations on drugs, stolen vehicles, illegal immigration and money laundering.” The mandate of the Task Force was prolonged until the end of 2004. Special attention was also paid to co-operation on preventing the sexual exploitation of children.

A similar approach was agreed in the fight against disease, most notably AIDS and tuberculosis, and a Task Force was created to launch a concerted effort for controlling emerging diseases in the region. Chaired by Norway, it was to “elaborate a joint plan to enhance disease control throughout the region.” In practise, the Task Force should link together public health authorities in the 11 member states, as well as stay closely in touch with the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNAIDS and the European Union.

In energy, environmental, and nuclear safety, the ideology was, according to the Chairman, “to solve old problems with new technology.” Cleaner and safer energy producing sources should replace polluting energy sources. Efforts for joint action to improve the water sector and waste water treatment facilities in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, as well as toxic waste treatment in the Leningrad region, were particularly mentioned in the summit conclusions. The need for a “continued co-operation to improve the safety of nuclear power plants” was highlighted, including early warning systems for nuclear accidents and the management of nuclear and radioactive wastes. It was also pointed out that the states should “renew their efforts to bring the negotiations on the agreement for the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme for Russia (MNEPR) to a successful conclusion.”

From other international organisations, **the EU's role** is increasingly important. Concrete EU instruments include the **Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)** between the EU and Russia, the above mentioned **Common Strategy on Russia, the Northern Dimension initiative**, as well as the **Tacis** (EuropeAid) and **Interreg** programmes. Of these instruments, PCA lays down the legal foundation for EU-Russia co-operation. It has hints on soft security-related issues here and then, and for nuclear co-operation it anticipates an EU-Russian agreement on nuclear safety; regarding the environment, it has a one-page article (69) which lists the issues, starting from systems for the monitoring of pollution and ending by emphasising the importance of implementing the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a transboundary context.

The nuclear waste and spent fuel issues are specifically addressed via the Common Strategy on Russia, adopted in 1999.⁴⁷ The European Union's commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten, in January 2001 called on the western European nuclear engineering industry to start cleaning up the nuclear graveyard in Russia's far north. He is reported as saying that the problem of nuclear safety in the far north was the most "dramatic" of all the issues on which Brussels and Moscow should seek enhanced co-operation during Sweden's term of the EU presidency. It is also reported that Sweden, during its presidency in the first part of 2001, is pushing for more ambitious nuclear safety programmes and cleanup operations in the Arctic in return for agreeing to fund the Kursk salvage operation.⁴⁸

The Northern Dimension is intended to be a kind of an umbrella for all co-operative activities in Northern Europe, and it is explicitly connected to the regional Councils in that the implementation and further development of the Northern Dimension is intended to be done in co-operation or even within these regional bodies. Consequently, the Northern Dimension has no resources of its own, but is more of an innovative concept or framework that is supposed to draw the EU's attention to those questions that the Nordic countries regard as important. Its Action programme tries to direct this attention towards certain specific issues.

However, very much depends on whether the gap between declaratory and operational policy can be closed. Of the above mentioned instruments, only Tacis and Interreg are concrete programmes with considerable financial resources. Of these two, looking at Tacis in some detail, we see that nuclear safety has been one of its priorities from the very beginning. According to Tacis's own statement, from "the bilateral and multilateral efforts to provide assistance for safety programmes, the efforts of the European Union have been the largest and most important." This technical and financial assistance, channelled through the Tacis Programme, totalled 317 million EUR between 1991-1999. This aid programme has included an assessment and revision of the design safety of Soviet-era nuclear reactors; on the basis of this, launching the relevant measures implemented with Tacis funding; assisting the plants in preparing technical specifications for the purchase and installation of safety equipment; assisting in the treatment of

nuclear waste, its safe transportation, storage and removal; transferring the necessary methodologies and skills for establishment of fully independent regulatory agencies in the field of nuclear energy.

Environmental projects are also part of Tacis activities in Russia. Since 1996, environmental protection has been structured as a particular sector of its activities, but its financing has been much more modest than the nuclear safety programmes, being about 24 million EUR between 1996-1999. The main objectives have been to assist the Russian authorities to establish and operate a unified environmental monitoring system; waste disposal and reutilization; water management systems reform; industrial and environmental safety; strengthening an environmental protection element in the conversion of the chemical weapons industry and the process of liquidation of chemicals; to support and strengthen the sustainable development of natural reserves.⁴⁹

A US-inspired cross-border initiative comparable to that of Finland's initiative on the Northern Dimension is **the Northern European Initiative** (NEI), already underway. Some soft security issues are taken into account. For instance, nuclear waste control, energy management, multilateral plans to combat tuberculosis and Aids in the region would involve NEI states and non-governmental organisations. The newly announced Great Lakes/Baltic Sea twinning project, funded by the US government, will apply American experience and techniques to the Baltic Sea's environmental problems. As for Russia, it has been proposed that the "NEI would like to be an effective mechanism enabling Russia to work with its Baltic Sea partners to improve the area's economy and environment while building mutual trust and confidence." Moreover, on global issues, "the NEI urges joint planning of Baltic ports and other regional infrastructure projects. It supports regional environmental objectives through CBSS. A notable success story is the coordination of nuclear waste management programmes, to which the US, Scandinavian countries, and the EU have contributed significant funds. It also promotes the US role in the CBSS task force on organised crime"⁵⁰

NATO is another agent, active at least in principle in the soft security questions, as well. In recent years, NATO's relations with Russia have been overshadowed by Russia's opposition to the enlargement process and the war in Kosovo. In Russian internal debates, NATO is still regarded mainly in terms of a military bloc which bases its strategy on the traditional security dilemma between NATO and Russia. NATO instead has emphasised its transformation since the end of the Cold War. This new role includes a wide understanding of security, including an active policy towards civil emergency planning and soft security issues such as environmental protection, nuclear safety and the fight against cross-border crime.

This new NATO approach is reflected and institutionalised not only within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in terms of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, among other arrangements, but also in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the

Russian Federation. The “areas of consultation and cooperation“ explicitly include “nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum“, “developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields“, “conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief“ and “combating terrorism and drug trafficking“. In subsequent meetings, the parties have continued to develop the NATO-Russia security regime along these lines, and, for instance, in December 2000 at the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers, the Ministers discussed the signing of the NATO-Russia Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Protection. The practical record of NATO’s experience in this field of co-operation in Northern Europe is not large, however.

Perhaps a more concrete role has been played by many **United Nations organisations**, especially the **WHO** in its attempts to deal with tuberculosis and Aids in Russia. The **World Bank** also finances, mainly in the form of loans, several programmes in Russia related to soft security issues in the Northwest, particularly those related to health and environmental problems, e.g. financing treatment of infectious diseases or the financing of ecological expertise in the coal and forest industries in terms of sustainable development. Other financial institutions, usually working in co-operation with the EU and Nordic countries, are active in dealing with Northwest Russia’s soft security problems. For instance, **the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)** aims at issuing an eight-year credit of \$5.5 million to St. Petersburg for emergency cleanup of the Krasny Bor toxic dump.

As to the **bilateral** inter-state co-operation, several arrangements can be found, especially between Russia and the Nordic countries. While Norway has been most active in the nuclear waste issue, on a bilateral basis and on the basis of a trilateral Norway-USA-Russia co-operation, Finland and Sweden, as well as Denmark, have been concentrating more on civilian nuclear safety problems and other soft security problems such as social or environmental issues. This bilateral co-operation takes place not only on an ad hoc project basis, but is often institutionalised. In Finland, for instance, the soft security problems of Northwest Russia are dealt with within so-called ‘neighbouring area co-operation’,⁵¹ which has its earmarked budget funds along with international financing sources. This co-operation often includes not only government level contacts but regional cross-border co-operation as well.

In addition to the Nordic countries, the most active country dealing with Russia’s soft security problems in the Northwest Russia has been the USA (in a similar way as Japan is active in the south of Russia) who in general is the major international agent, especially when it comes to the nuclear waste produced by the Northern Fleet; and also problems related to Russia’s ability to comply with arms control agreements, for instance in dismantling chemical weapons. Recently, Great Britain and Germany have also allocated national resources for dealing with these problems.

However, it is not only governments and state authorities that deal with international governance of Russia's soft security issues. **Civil societies** of today are increasingly functioning not only within national boundaries, but also globally and transnationally. A fairly strict definition of transnational relations refers to regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one agent is a non-state agent, or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organisation.⁵² The line beyond which this kind of activity becomes 'official' is vague and obscure, since the definition allows that state agents may be closely connected to these relations.

The transnational character of Russian civil society may not have a great immediate or direct impact on Russian official policy making because of the lacking institutionalisation of domestic civil society-state relations. Nevertheless, indirectly this kind of transnationalism certainly shapes the domestic structures in Russia and helps to legitimise the activities of the civil society agents, which in turn may be reflected in Russian official policies in the longer term. Meanwhile, it keeps Russia open to outside influence and enables communication on a grass-roots level.

In its initial phase, the transnational co-operation in Northern Europe has often included funding and education from the western NGOs, in a way producing hegemonic co-operative practises, but more equal patterns of co-operation have been developed during the 1990s. For the western or Nordic NGOs concerned with soft security issues, their Russian counterparts are often a most important source of information, and through that link the Russian NGOs' voices can also be heard in Nordic state structures or in international organisations. The various Russian NGOs are often the ones with the most extensive understanding of the problems downplayed or neglected by the authorities, and are most prepared to act as the transmitters of early warnings and crisis information. However, the state authorities in the Nordic countries face the challenge whether their current methods are adequate for effectively exploiting the expertise of the various Russian NGOs.

Problems of co-operation

There can be several reasons why Russia sometimes demonstrates reluctance towards international cooperation in soft security issues. For instance, Norway has for several years earmarked more than \$2 million for the cleaning up of Andreeva Bay. While Russia has admitted the improper storage, they have wanted the money to clean up themselves. According to Norway, one hurdle was Russian reluctance to allow NATO visitors to see advanced nuclear submarines docked nearby. Recently, Russia announced its readiness to allow access for the Norwegians to clean the area.⁵³ However, even if the Russian authorities allow their western partners to deal with Russia's soft security problems, in some cases the non-Russian agents have criticised Russia for the lack of financial transparency in those projects funded by outsiders.⁵⁴

Another obstacle to international co-operation is the continuing turmoil of the Russian administrative structures responsible for soft security issues. From the perspective of non-Russian agents, not only is there a lack of information concerning the nature and gravity of the soft security problems, but also concerning the Russian local, regional or federal authorities in charge of solving the problems as well as the division of labour between them. It has often proved difficult to find a responsible party to negotiate with, and the information obtained through the administration has not always been reliable.

As for the co-ordination problem, a good basis for taking a look at the potential problems arising from the organisational fragmentation discussed above is a recent study⁵⁵ concerning in particular the division of labour of the four regional Councils active in Northern Europe. Although far from identical, the Councils exhibit a considerable overlap, both in terms of their geographical area and memberships, as well as of their activities and issue areas. In general, the study argues that there is a trend during recent debates indicating that the classic mode of hierarchical control between and within international organisations is losing ground, and that information flows and incentive systems, enabling autonomic operation of the different entities working in the same field is preferred. Co-operation and co-ordination are emphasised mainly at the level of implementation.

Though basically supportive towards this trend, the study lists and discusses several problems arising from this scheme. 1) Insufficient learning may result from the fact that the same lessons may have to be learned over and over again by different agents; 2) Harmful competition and power struggles can lead to wasted resources and the loss of overall objectives; 3) Avoidance of responsibility can be caused without a clear division of tasks; 4) Opportunism, caused by the unclear structures, may influence the agents to go in wrong directions; 5) Information overload is caused by the autonomous agents' efforts to co-ordinate their activities at the grass-root level, resulting in too many meetings; 6) Wrong (investment) decisions can be made because of a lack of necessary information and co-ordination, caused by the tendency to cut the overhead costs of the autonomous centres.

Basically, the above list of potential problems in the co-ordination between the Councils in question could be widened to the whole issue of co-ordination of international co-operation in the field of soft security problems in Northern Europe, especially those related to Northwest Russia. The need for co-ordination is acknowledged, though, and some efforts have been made. As was mentioned, the Northern Dimension in particular was intended to establish a kind of a co-ordinating umbrella between the varieties of agents. Having no resources of its own, it remains to be seen whether the programme reaches its co-ordination goals, or whether it instead only creates more confusion in terms of the division of labour.

V Towards a more intensified soft security analysis and action

The first theme discussed in this paper concentrated on the soft security problems by describing the state and dynamics of these problems descriptively and illustratively. Nuclear safety problems, environmental problems, infectious diseases as well as illegal immigration, connected to organised transnational crime, were particularly identified as the most serious threat pictures either already existing or potentially arising from Northwest Russia and having an impact beyond Russia's borders.

The discussion revealed that although there are several hot-spots and identifiable problems, it is often difficult to receive unambiguous information about their severity. This state of affairs is reflected in the Nordic countries' and the EU's ability to make balanced decisions. Even if it is possible to gather detailed information on particular threats to security, no administrative branch in the Nordic countries or in the EU has a good picture of the general situation.

The theme is also important from a western civil society debate perspective. Opinion polls have clearly shown that these new soft security threats arising from the current developments in Russia are perceived as greater sources of worry than the traditional fears about military security. However, as the public debate and news coverage often seek sensations and extremes, both decision-makers and the general public have a difficult time in perceiving which threats are actually most urgently in need of action.

In addition to that there is a need for inter-sectoral co-operation around the variety of soft security issues within the western countries, as well as a clear need for more detailed information through case study research, the Nordic and EU countries should also think about how to exploit the expertise of the various Russian NGOs more effectively; they are often the ones with the most extensive understanding of problems downplayed or neglected by the authorities, and are most prepared to act as the transmitters of early warnings and crisis information. For this purpose, the role of Western NGOs as natural partners to their Russian counterparts will become essential.

The second theme was the soft security decision-making in Russia. This factor is most important for outsiders. Not only is there a lack of information concerning the nature and gravity of the problems, but also concerning the local, regional or federal Russian authorities in charge of solving the problems as well as the division of labour between them. It has often proved difficult to find a responsible party to negotiate with, and the information obtained through the administration has not always been reliable. The continuing turmoil in the Russian administration is a fundamental reason for the difficulties with the flow of information. Good examples of this turmoil are the dismantling of the environmental administration and its merger with the Ministry of Natural Resources, as well as regional reforms.

What is needed is a clear picture of who are the real agents in soft security decision-making, how the decisions are arrived at, what mechanisms are involved, etc. In terms of research, there is again a need for detailed case studies; in terms of political action, one should demand more transparency from Russia.

The Nordic countries and the EU should also react sharply to the seemingly diminishing role, or total abolishment, of the more or less independent control organisations within the Russian environmental and nuclear administration. It should be made clear to Russia, that by following the present line, it goes against the practice of most European countries, and that by doing so risks its goals of becoming more integrated into European structures. The Western governments, and the EU, for instance, have also invested money to support the development of independent control systems in Russia's environmental and nuclear administration, a development that now seems to be taking serious steps backward.

The third theme discussed here was international co-operation around the soft security issues originating from Northwest Russia. Given that the different hot-spots and other type of problems threaten other countries as well, it is in the self-interest of the Nordic countries and the EU as a whole, in particular, to help Russia in solving at least the most serious of them. Should one seriously try to integrate Russia into European structures and economic space, these problems have to be resolved before any genuine integration becomes possible.

On the other hand, international co-operation seems to be no easier in the field of soft security than in traditional security; often quite the contrary. In general terms, the experience of international co-operation suggests that what is needed are international institutions and regimes, that is, the states' commitment to certain co-operative norms, rules, and procedures, which may help them to overcome the problems of international co-operation.

For the moment, international regimes around soft security issues, especially those that might be applicable to the soft security problems of Northwest Russia, are fragmented, poorly developed and loosely articulated. Although there are many agents involved, there is no general view of the preconditions for their political settlement from the viewpoint of international co-operation.

The overlapping responsibilities and unco-ordinated actions of the various organisations in Northern Europe further obscures the situation. A concentrated research and political discussion on the problems of soft security co-operation in Northern Europe is needed. Paradoxically, one might start by looking at the "hard security" side, where several well-functioning regimes of confidence building and joint monitoring are present.

¹ If not detailed with a special footnote, the information in this section follows the general picture and information drawn in the electronic journal The Russian Environmental Digest that covers the most important media reporting of the field, as well as *Bellona's* detailed reporting on Russia's nuclear and other environmental problems on www.bellona.no. It should be remarked that information obtained from these and similar sources are sometimes contradictory, biased and subjective; on the other hand it is hard to find any objective statistics or information on these matters.

² The Russian Environmental Digest 11-17 September 2000, Vol. 2, No. 37. The quotation is reported to belong to Alexei Yablokov, a famous environmentalist and former adviser to Yeltsin.

³ See <http://www.bellona.no/imaker?> for Leningrad Power Station

⁴ The GREEN WORLD –Nuclear Safety and Human rights, Press-release November 21, 2000. See <http://greenworld.org.ru>

⁵ Jürg Dedial, Russia's Northern Fleet in Decline: Grave Environmental Problems at Shipyards and Naval Bases, to be found from http://u003sys0.nzz.ch/online/04_english/background/background1999/background9909/bg990918russia.htm

⁶ See <http://www.bellona.no/imaker?> for Lepse.

⁷ The Russian Environmental Digest 16-22 October 2000, Vol. 2, No. 42

⁸ February 9, 2000 Moscow, Itar-Tass and AP.

⁹ See, for instance, <http://www.infomanage.com/environment/russia.html>

¹⁰ See, for instance, Russian Environmental Digest 31 July - 6 August 2000, Vol. 2, No. 31, article 9.

¹¹ See <http://ens.lycos.com/ens/dec99/1999L-12-10-02.html>

¹² See <http://www.taciswaste.spb.ru>

¹³ The Russian Environmental Digest 2 - 8 October 2000, Vol. 2, No. 40, article 2, and *ibid* 9 - 15 October 2000, Vol. 2, No. 41, articles 3 and 4.

¹⁴ Green World Baltic News 56, 27 Nov., 2000, point 1. See also <http://greenworld.org.ru> for more information.

¹⁵ See Helsingin Sanomat 10 February, 2001.

¹⁶ Socialno-ekonomicheskije polozenie respublik i oblastei Severo-Zapadnogo federalnogo okruga. Statisticheskij sbornik. Goskomstat Rossijskoi Federazii, Syktyvkar, 2000, pp 36-39.

¹⁷ The information on Russian tuberculosis epidemic presented in this section rely on www.russia.phri.org/ However, specialists themselves say that it is difficult to estimate the real figures concerning tuberculosis in Russia; see, for instance, the discussion that can be found from www.findarticles.com with the search keywords +tuberculosis +Russia. In December 2000, one specialist was quoted to say that a total of 2 200 000 people are registred with Russia's tuberculosis clinics, which however includes also those who already cured as well as those being in contact with a tuberculosis patient; see Russian Environmental Digest 4-10 December 2000, Vol. 2, No. 49, article 10.

¹⁸ 'Aids in Russia/Spidinfosvjaz' articles', available from www.spiral.com.infoshare/Article1.html

¹⁹ See www.ng.ru/events/2000-11-22/2_aids.html See also The Russian Environmental Digest 26 March - 1 April 2001, Vol. 3, No. 13, article 18; and *ibid.* 2 - 8 April 2001, Vol. 3, No. 14, article 18.

²⁰ The Russian Environmental Digest 9 - 15 October 2000, Vol. 2, No. 41.

²¹ Helsingin Sanomat 11 July, 2000.

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- ²² The Director of the Frontier Guard of RF Konstantin Trotsky, as quoted by Helsingin Sanomat 28 May, 2000.
- ²³ Brunson McKinley, the director general of the International Organization for Migration, as quoted in Roger Cohen, "Europe Tries to Turn a Tide of Migrants Chasing Dreams", The New York Times July 2, 2000.
- ²⁴ The Moscow News, 1992 N 50.
- ²⁵ Peterburgskii transit. Smena June 23, 1993.
- ²⁶ A Letter by the Head of Security Council Sergei Ivanov to the Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov, A21-1578 from May 31, 2000.
- ²⁷ Sergei Tarasevich - then Head of Federal Migration Service in St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast - provided this data in his unpublished report to the Central Office of Migration Service in Moscow in 1999; see also Sergei Tarasevich. Vynuzdennye migranty v Sankt-Peterburge i Leningradskoy oblasti: problemi obystroistava i integracii v usloviyach perekhoda k rynku. Sankt-Peterburg, 2000, pp.1-2; the importance of fighting with illegal migration was also pointed out in the Leningrad Oblast' Governor Decree from May 11, 2000 N 197-III.
- ²⁸ September 8, 1994, N 1021.
- ²⁹ This data is taken from unpublished report "On necessity of creation of Immigration Inspection" by Sergei Tarsevich to the Department of Immigration Control and Refugees from June 27, 2000.
- ³⁰ OECD-report. SOPEMI FINLAND 1998. Seppo Larmo. Ministry of Labour. Employment Service Division. 001000. Helsinki, November 1998, pp. 6-7.
- ³¹ Helsingin Sanomat 28 May 2000.
- ³² See http://www.intermin.fi/raja/default_fi.htm
- ³³ Jahn, A.; T. Straubhaar (1998), A Survey on the Economics of Illegal Migration, <http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/ueberfak/fzaa/german/veranst.../StraubhaarIllegalImmig.htm>
- ³⁴ Rossiiskaya Gazeta 9 February, 1994, p. 4.
- ³⁵ The Russian Environmental Digest 18-24 december 2000, Vol. 2, No. 51, article 3.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, article 9.
- ³⁷ The most famous connected to the Northern Fleet's nuclear waste problems is the so-called Nikitin case; see www.bellona.no
- ³⁸ In preparing for civil emergency situations, the situation is at least formally more institutionalised and clear. The main co-ordinating body for emergency activities is the Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural disasters (EMERCOM), established in 1994 and managing the State Disaster Management System. It is supposed to unify the efforts, manpower and resources of federal agencies, community administration and agencies at all levels, that is, federal, regional, territorial, local, and on-site levels. International CEP handbook 1999-2000, Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC countries, ÖCB – The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning 2000.
- ³⁹ John Massey Stewart, (ed.), *International Environmental Collaboration. Russia: A Case Study*, see the summary on <http://www.ce-review.org/99/12/stewart12.html>
- ⁴⁰ V.I.Danilov-Danilyan, "Quasi-democratic style of our top management", Zelenyi Mir No 14, 2000.
- ⁴¹ Business Elites and Russian Foreign Policy, Russia Beyond 2000 5(2000), the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki 2000.

⁴² Jim Butterfield and Marcia Weigle, 'Unofficial Social Groups and Regime Response in the Soviet Union', in Judith B. Sedaitz and Jim Butterfield (eds.), Perestroika from Below. Social Movements in the Soviet Union, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 175-195.

⁴³ The Russian Environmental Digest, 9 - 15 October 2000, Vol. 2, No. 41, and the subsequent issues of the same electronic journal.

⁴⁴ Oleg N. Yanitsky, Russian Greens in a Risk Society, Kikimora publications, Helsinki 2000, pp. 122-125.

⁴⁵ Åge Mariussen, Hallgeir Aalbu, and Mats Brandt (Nordregio, Nordic Centre for Spatial Development): Regional Organisations in the North, Studies on Foreign Policy Issues, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Utenriksdepartement Report 5: 2000.

⁴⁶ Chairman's conclusions, Baltic Sea states Summit, Kolding, Denmark, 12-13 April 2000; and Chairman's Press Briefing, 13 April 2000, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (Norway).

⁴⁷ As it has been decided at the European Council in Cologne on 3-4 June 1999 (Annex II, Part 2, paragraph 4)

⁴⁸ The Guardian January 19, 2001

⁴⁹ See <http://www.eur.ru/eng/tacis>

⁵⁰ Tatiana C. Gfoeller, "Diplomatic Initiatives: An Overview of the Northern Europe Initiative", European Security, Vol.9, N1 (Spring 2000), p.103-104.

⁵¹ Finland's Strategy for Cooperation in the Neighboring Areas, 26 May 2000, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

⁵² Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction', in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 3-33, here p. 3.

⁵³ The Russian Environmental Digest 11 - 17 December 2000, Vol. 2, No. 50, article 17.

⁵⁴ See 'Report questions semi-state agency involvement in nuclear safety projects' in <http://www.bellona.no/imaker?id=18005&sub=1>

⁵⁵ Mariussen, Aalbu, and Brandt, *op cit.*