ISSUE

CHAILLOT PAPER Nº 134 – May 2015

CSDP in action

What contribution to international security?

BY
Thierry Tardy



Chaillot Papers

ISS European Union Institute for Security Studies

EU Institute for Security Studies

100, avenue de Suffren

75015 Paris

http://www.iss.europa.eu

Director: Antonio Missiroli

ISBN: 978-92-9198-365-0

ISSN: 1683-4917

QN-AA-15-001-EN-N

DOI: 10.2815/634719

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur.

Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon.

European Union
Institute for Security Studies

CSDP IN ACTION – WHAT CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?

Thierry Tardy

CHAILLOT PAPERS *May 2015*

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The author

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Foreword

According to the Lisbon Treaty, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) covers a relatively large ground and, at least potentially, could become the embryo of a future common European defence, including a dedicated technological and industrial base as well as shared civilian and military capabilities. In practice, however, CSDP as we know it largely coincides with the array of past and present peacebuilding missions and operations conducted under the EU flag since early 2003. These, in turn, are part and parcel of a broader spectrum of international peace operations carried out under different flags – especially the UN and NATO, but also the AU and even OSCE – since the end of the Cold War in such diverse regions as the Western Balkans, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and, albeit to a much lesser extent, Asia.

CSDP missions and operations, therefore, need to be seen (and evaluated) as both a key component of EU efforts in the field of security and defence – especially at a time when the Union is reassessing their foundations, rationale, ends and means – and a piece of a wider international puzzle that needs to be put in context, in the light also of a rapidly evolving global security environment.

This is precisely what Thierry Tardy's *Chaillot Paper* sets out to do: explore, analyse, assess and evaluate the specific contribution of CSDP missions and operations to international peace and security as well as their nature, potential and limits within the current EU system. The study provides both a detailed comparative overview of CSDP foreign interventions (civilian and military) and an in-depth analysis of the broader challenges confronting multilateral peace operations worldwide. By doing so, it constitutes not only a comprehensive and balanced assessment of the EU's own *acquis* in this field, but also an invaluable and timely source of inspiration for the ongoing debate on the future of global security and Europe's own 'strategic review'.

Antonio Missiroli

Paris, May 2015

Introduction

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has conducted 32 operations as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Ten of these operations have been launched since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, which brings the number of ongoing missions to 16 as of May 2015, for a total strength of 6,000 personnel deployed. These operations are the most visible manifestations of EU activity in fragile states and the most tangible expression of the EU's contribution to international peace. Through them, the EU has revealed a certain capacity as a crisis management actor, in Europe and beyond. It has demonstrated its added value and comparative advantages, making CSDP a framework of multilateral security governance.

Yet, the last five years also highlight the real difficulties the EU has encountered in projecting its role as a security player on the international scene. CSDP operations have become important tools of the EU's external action, but they also show the limits of what the EU and its member states are able and willing to do to make the world more secure. While international politics has undergone major changes over the last five years that directly impact on European security, recent EU operations have been relatively modest, and with a few exceptions, member states have by and large proved less inclined to invest in CSDP. Why is this so? Is this specific to the European Union or applicable to multilateral crisis management more generally?

The December 2013 European Council discussed defence issues for the first time since 2008. Aware of the breadth of the challenges being faced, it stressed that 'the EU and its Member States must exercise greater responsibilities in response to those challenges if they want to contribute to maintaining peace and security through CSDP'. It also made a 'strong commitment to the further development of a credible and effective CSDP', and pledged to evaluate progress on these issues at the June 2015 European Council. In the meantime, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was invited to 'assess the impact of changes in the global environment', and to 'report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union', possibly in view of the elaboration of a new EU strategy.[1]

1. European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 19-20 December 2013.

CSDP operations will no doubt be an important component of such a strategy. Indeed, they are supposed to be one instrument of a broader EU policy or strategy. They are one dimension of the comprehensive approach, of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of the EU's external action, and even of multilateral peace efforts. They may constitute a central element of a strategy, but cannot be considered a substitute for it.

This is a plea for a CSDP embedded into a strategic framework, but also for an objective appraisal of what CSDP can realistically achieve. CSDP operations have in most cases been limited in size and scope. With a few exceptions, they are not designed to generate a strategic impact in the recipient state or region. It follows that CSDP operations are of a 'sub-strategic' nature. This is not to suggest that their relevance should be downplayed, or that being 'sub-strategic' is good enough. It is certainly not. But equally the 'strategic' importance of CSDP should not be overestimated. What CSDP operations achieve can only be sustained, and assessed, in a timeframe or context that go beyond the narrow CSDP agenda.

This *Chaillot Paper* looks at CSDP operations and missions, and examines their purpose and how they fit into the broader crisis management environment and multilateral efforts towards international peace. It aims at analysing CSDP by relocating it in a broader framework, so as to shed light on the intrinsic constraints that it faces and that, as a consequence, inevitably limit its overall impact or degree of success.

While this *Chaillot Paper* scrutinises some of the limitations of CSDP over the last five years, it also examines the EU's added value and the extent to which CSDP is moving forward at various levels, in a process that shows increasing professionalisation in 'running' CSDP operations, and eagerness to learn the lessons from past experiences.

The *Chaillot Paper* includes three chapters. The first chapter presents the crisis management environment and its related constraints. It offers a brief conceptual framework of crisis management that recapitulates what the EU does in the CSDP field. The second chapter examines how CSDP fits into this environment. It does so by focusing on CSDP operations and missions, the challenge of maximising impact through internal and external coordination, and what this all says about the security culture of the EU. The third and last chapter highlights the difficulties inherent in evaluating CSDP and aims to unpack some of the achievements and structural limitations of EU operations and missions.

Chapter 1

A complex environment

CSDP operations and missions take place in a broad security environment that has undergone major transformations over the past two decades. Those evolutions are connected to the changing nature of security threats as much as to the concomitant adaptation of policy responses. For the EU as much as for any other crisis management actor, effective crisis management requires a sound understanding of the environment in which it operates, both in terms of 'the problem to be tackled' and in terms of 'the types of policy responses that are required'.

At least two major evolutions have occurred in the field of crisis management over the last twenty years. First, the range of activities that fall within the remit of crisis management has become increasingly complex and multifaceted; second and partly as a consequence, the range of actors that contribute to crisis management has enlarged and diversified.

This chapter looks at the EU's security environment by first attempting to define what crisis management is about. It then identifies some key constraints that all crisis management actors face, and that need to be factored in as working hypotheses.

What is crisis management?

Crisis management is an ill-defined concept that encompasses a diverse array of activities and the meaning of which varies depending on the security culture and mandate of the institution that carries it out. In broad terms, crisis management is about preventing a crisis from occurring, responding to an ongoing crisis, or assisting in the consolidation of peace (or order) once the acute phase of a crisis has passed. It is not necessarily *per se* about conflict resolution.

The purpose of crisis management is to respond to the immediate needs of a crisis and/or contribute to the strengthening of long-term peace in a situation of relative stability, at the request of the authorities of the recipient state. With a few exceptions, crisis management actors do not act in substitution of local actors that theoretically remain in charge of public policies on their own soil.

In the context of this paper, crisis management is characterised by its security focus, its multidimensionality and its complexity.

Security-centred

First, crisis management is a security-centred activity in the sense that the crises at stake have to have a security dimension, although the response may go well beyond purely security-focused measures. Security is understood here in its widest sense. It combines a traditional definition of state security (crisis management often involves reinforcing the state apparatus) with a more human security approach that establishes the link between the security of the state and that of individuals. This widened security agenda links to the nexus between security and development according to which no long-term peace can be sustained without a parallel process of economic development.

Crisis management can be of a military or civilian nature, but most crisis management operations combine the two aspects. Indeed, the hybrid civil-military nature of crisis management has become one of its central features.

In its military dimension, crisis management implies the deployment of troops in contexts that differ from traditional war-fighting or openly coercive operations in several respects. First, when it features as part of the mandate, the use of force is never central to the *modus operandi* of a crisis management operation but only comes in support of a broader political objective or allows for specific action, such as civilian protection or confrontation with armed elements ('spoilers'). Second, crisis management has remained essentially a consent-based activity, i.e. it is conducted with the consent of the host state's authorities. Coercion may be used against third parties, but in principle not against sovereign states. Third, the dynamics of third-party intervention in crisis management are such that interveners are not supposed to take sides for one or the other party to the conflict. Often the operation is deployed in support of a sovereign state but it should not be mandated to assist the state to defeat a political enemy. Finally, in most cases crisis management operations are not designed, equipped or trained to resort to coercion in a sustained manner. Exceptions exist, and indeed recent examples have shown, from the NATO operation in Afghanistan to the African Union (AU) operation in Somalia, how tenuous the distinction between crisis management and war fighting can be. The mandate of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIP) in support of the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also attests to a trend towards crisis management operations demonstrating increasing robustness. In an EU context, the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (*Atalanta*) and EUFOR RCA provide examples of operations that potentially entail a certain level of coercion. Yet the idea of consent-based, non-coercive, third-party intervention still characterises crisis management more than any other definition or practice.

Multidimensional

Second, the diversity of crisis management activities as well as their military-civilian nature underline their multidimensionality. In most crisis situations, the magnitude of the needs over a long period of time requires a wide range of policy tools and responses. The multifaceted nature of crisis management is also a result of the increasing level of intrusion into the domestic affairs of recipient states resulting from third-party interventions, which deal with a wide array of public policy domains, well beyond the security apparatus. In practice, the crisis management spectrum encompasses activities that relate to security, civilian protection, the rule of law, security sector reform, institution-building, electoral support, economic recovery and development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, good governance, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, etc. This makes civilian activities, implemented by international, non-governmental and local actors, prominent in most crisis management operations.

Multidimensionality also implies the multiplication of actors that take part in the broad peace efforts, based on their respective mandates and comparative advantages. Alongside the UN, regional organisations have over the last two decades emerged as important security actors that have embraced crisis management as one of their primary activities. In the field, there is hardly any deployment that does not bring together several organisations that operate in parallel or in sequence. Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali or the Central African Republic have shown how these various actors interact. Incrementally, this has led to the development of more or less institutionalised and reciprocal partnerships. The United Nations has been seeking partnerships with regional organisations since the end of the Cold War. Reciprocally, all new peacekeeping actors have looked to the UN, and then also to other regional actors, for cooperation and the development of mutually-beneficial relations.

This, in turn, has led to a certain degree of 'hybridisation' of operations, whereby operations are no longer the product of one single institution but rather the result of the interaction of several conflict management policies and/or cultures. By interacting with each other, institutions are mutually influencing their own ambitions, decision-making processes, financing procedures, command and control arrangements, operational practices and reporting mechanisms.

Such relations display cooperation, coordination, and division of labour among different actors, but also competition and hierarchical tensions between institutions whose political clout and operational capacity can vary a lot from one to the other. As a consequence, cooperation is more or less balanced and reciprocal.

The multi-actor and multi-level nature of contemporary crisis management means that any security actor needs to think about its own role as part of a bigger picture, where no actor can pretend to make a lasting difference if its action is not part of a broader policy bringing together the full panoply of military, economic and political instruments.

Within institutions, the need for internal coordination has also arisen as a consequence of the multifaceted character of crisis management. Its multidimensional nature implies the coexistence of different entities within the same institution that are simultaneously involved in peace activities. This raises the question of the coordination of these actors so as to maximise the effectiveness of their action. The efforts made over the last decade by all crisis management actors to conceptualise and give substance to the notions of 'integration', 'comprehensive approach' or 'security-development nexus', all reflect the broad consensus that crisis response can only have a lasting impact if it is coordinated. For institutions that aspire to embrace the full spectrum of crisis management – such as the UN, the EU or the AU – the coordination of the military and civilian components of their operation is key to their overall impact.

Complex

Third, crisis management is inherently complex as a result of the nature of its core objective, namely 'security and peace'. This paper will not enter the debate on the meaning of 'security' and 'peace'; suffice to say that both terms carry different meanings depending on who is defining them (military organisation vs. development NGO; state vs. individual; external vs. internal actor; government vs. militia group; etc.). This debate aside, there is a consensus in the policy and academic communities that peace needs to be home-grown and cannot be imposed from the outside. The number of parameters and constraints that come into play for peace to be restored or to emerge in the aftermath of conflict is such that the capacity of any external actor to deliver on its 'peace and security' mandate is inevitably limited. This means that any actor that aspires to play a role in crisis management needs to display a certain level of expertise as well as a capacity to adapt to ever-changing environments. In any case, the nature of crisis management requires a certain level of modesty from its main players, just as it entails a certain degree of inevitable frustration.

Overall, all crisis management actors face the same type of difficulties, although some are obviously better equipped or more experienced than others. Practically, this means that there is no crisis management actor that can over time display a demonstrably better record in terms of effectiveness or impact than others. There are niches in which some institutions have specialised, but the broad crisis management spectrum represents a perennial challenge for all actors that aspire to play a major role in it.

Constraints as working hypotheses

In many ways, crisis management mirrors trends in international politics. The changing nature of the international system, the erosion of state sovereignty, the evolution of threats and their de-territorialisation, and the widening of the notion of security all impact crisis management at various levels. Moreover, as already mentioned, crisis management is partly about transforming societies so as to help the recipient states

to move away from fragility and conflict. As such it is a highly political endeavour, and on top of that one carried out by external actors.

This being said, it is noteworthy that the crisis management domain is the object of a large consensus within the community of states that design its political and legal framework and are involved in mandate implementation. There are divergences and debates about the virtues and limitations of third-party interventions, the extent to which these are informed by liberal assumptions and what they say about international politics. There are also areas or countries where a third-party intervention is unlikely due to the presence of a big power. And the host states can in principle set the limits of what they are ready to accept.

Yet, in contrast to the Cold War period, over the past two decades crisis management has been relatively unaffected by power politics and the possible paralysis that it could entail. By and large, the UN, the EU and even NATO have remained relatively unconstrained in their crisis management policies, in terms of both selection of cases for intervention and mandate design. This characteristic distinguishes crisis management from 'high politics' issues that may oppose big powers in a more obvious way.

While crisis management is relatively immune from traditional power politics, it suffers from difficulties that relate to the objectives and structure of the missions. In essence, all crisis management actors face challenges emanating from both the complexity of the situations to be tackled and the shortcomings in the policy responses. At least three parameters impact on the effectiveness of crisis management, namely (i) states' commitment; (ii) institutional know-how; and (iii) the local situation and resilience/resistance to change.

Support

When implemented through international organisations such as the UN, the EU or the AU, crisis management is dependent on the institutions' member states both for their political support and material resources (capabilities, human and financial resources). In practice though, most operations suffer from inconsistent or faltering support. Several reasons explain this.

The first relates to the disconnect between the nature of the conflict or crisis to which an external intervention is supposed to respond and the security priorities of potential contributing states. Often the crises in question do not pose a sufficiently serious threat to the contributing countries to justify a sustained level of political and material commitment. Examples abound of operations lacking resources to implement the given mandate or hampered by declining political support once the period of humanitarian emergency or media attention has ended.

Similarly, states may contribute to an operation for reasons that have more to do with their own foreign policies than with the needs of the country in crisis. There exist various types of motivation that come into play in justifying states' contribution to crisis management operations and some of them are unrelated to the crisis under consideration. Rather they relate to broader geopolitical considerations, solidarity

with allies, the need to deploy troops or assets (to maintain a given area of expertise or justify a budget) or in some cases economic motives.

In the same vein, some operations are established in the absence of a comprehensive assessment of those needs, and for reasons that primarily relate to external factors, such as the drive to ensure visibility of the institution, the policy of one member state in the region, or simply pressure to respond to the public outcry created by a humanitarian emergency.

Finally, crisis management can entail a financial commitment that states may be reluctant to sustain over time. In all these cases, states' support is likely to fluctuate based on a large array of factors more or less related to the crisis and its needs.

Expertise

Second, the complexity of crises requires a particularly high level of organisation and know-how that even the best-equipped institutions have difficulty in acquiring and maintaining. Difficulties in this field are observed both at HQ and field levels. Shortcomings relate to deployment and support structures (logistics, engineering, management, recruitment, etc.) as well as to the quality of human resources, especially in some niche areas (leadership positions, experts, judiciary, etc.). Relevant linguistic skills are also in short supply.

Beyond the resource issue, another major challenge is the difficulty in designing the appropriate responses to a given conflict. The various institutions involved in crisis management design their own responses on the basis of their own mandate or niche capability (security institutions do security, development actors do development, mediation teams do mediation, etc.). They also have built up a repository of lessons learned and best practices to draw on when faced with a new situation. However, many of the contemporary crises are so inextricable that they are simply not amenable to an identifiable solution, however multifaceted and long-term such a solution might be. Crisis management is partly about transforming political and social behaviours in the host state. This is inherently complex and difficult to conceptualise, especially in a generic manner. External actors are inevitably limited in the leverage they can exert.

Local actors

Third, the effectiveness of crisis management largely depends upon the propensity of local actors, both official and from civil society, to accept or even co-design the various external programmes. Local ownership has become a *leitmotiv* of crisis management. Alongside the possibility for the main recipients of an operation to shape its mandate, the issue is also that of the capacity of the local actors to accept and

digest the societal changes that an operation may imply. At best, peace arises as the hybrid product of external and local policies. But local actors can also be 'spoilers' of a peace process or operation – and become direct threats to the external peacekeeping presence. When this is the case, crisis management operations are, by and large, ill-equipped to respond. Because they are designed to support a peace process rather than become a party to the conflict, peace operations require a certain degree of security ('negative peace') to be effective.

UN and AU operations have been deployed in situations of open conflict. But either a 'no peace to keep' situation has paralysed the activity of the institution (as was the case for the UN in South Sudan or Northern Mali) or, in the case of the AU in Somalia, it has simply transformed the operation into a peace enforcement endeavour. This raises the issue of how adapted and adaptable peace operations are to the evolution of threats and conflicts and whether they should shift towards more robustness – for example, to confront armed groups, terrorism or organised crime.

Conclusion

This first chapter has offered an overview of the environment in which EU operations and missions take place. Such an environment is complex, irrational and constrained. On the one hand, crisis management is ambitious and, as such, it creates expectations and hopes that crisis situations will find solutions. On the other hand, the complexity of the crises, together with institutions' and states' uneven levels of commitment, make the entire enterprise inherently difficult, and often doomed to under-deliver.

In this environment, there is no institution or state that performs conspicuously better than others, nor are there policy responses that are known to 'work' and which would just need to be implemented to make peace sustainable. All institutions, including the EU, are struggling daily with the challenges of institutional efficiency, operational effectiveness and strategic purpose.

Chapter 2

CSDP in the evolving crisis management architecture

The EU is one actor among many in the crisis management arena, and not necessarily the most powerful or most knowledgeable. The EU displays a certain number of strengths that create comparative advantages and, potentially, make it one of the most effective crisis management actors. However, the complexity of the environment and the multiplicity of the actors present suggest that there are inherent limitations to what the EU can achieve through its CSDP operations and missions.

The type of activities that the EU carries out in a crisis management capacity are indicative of the position it occupies in this environment. What operations has the EU run over the last five years? How integrated into the broader spectrum of crisis management activities have these operations been? To what extent is an emerging EU security culture harnessing CSDP operations?

By looking at these various issues, this chapter examines the type of crisis management actor the EU has become through CSDP.

CSDP operations and missions

CSDP operations are the most visible activity of the EU in the international security domain, and have been the most tangible examples of the 'coming of age' of CSDP as well as of EU security 'actorness'. In EU parlance, CSDP military activities are called 'operations' while civilian activities are called 'missions'. By design, EU crisis management operations are either of a military or of a civilian nature. Although the Treaty on European Union (TEU) does not preclude the deployment of operations that could combine military and civilian elements, the EU planning and conduct structures, together with the relevant financial regulations, have so far prevented the creation of integrated military-civilian operations.

MAP: ONGOING CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS AS OF 30 APRIL 2015



According to the Lisbon Treaty (Art.42.1), CSDP shall provide the Union with an 'operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets' that can be used on 'missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter'. CSDP operations are further defined in Article 43.1 TEU, which proposes an expanded list of the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks' that includes 'joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.' The article adds that all these tasks 'may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.'

Since 2003, the EU has launched and run 32 operations and missions, 10 of which were military, 21 civilian, and one – in Darfur – mixed. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, four military operations and six civilian missions have been launched (see Table 1).

In total, there are 16 ongoing CSDP operations as of May 2015, five military and 11 civilian. Of these 16 operations, three are in Europe, one in the Caucasus, two in the Middle East, one in Asia, one in North Africa, and eight in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Gulf of Aden (see Table 2 on p. 20 and Map on p.18).

TABLE 1: CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS ESTABLISHED SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LISBON TREATY (1 DECEMBER 2009)

	DATE OF LAUNCHING *(termination)*	ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT AS OF 30 APRIL 2015
MILITARY OPERATIONS		
EUTM Somalia	April 2010	168
EUTM Mali	February 2013	584
EUFOR RCA	April 2014 *(15 March 2015)*	750 (when deployed)
EUMAM RCA	March 2015	53
CIVILIAN MISSIONS		
EUAVSEC South Sudan	June 2012 *(Jan 2014)*	50 (when deployed)
EUCAP Nestor Horn of Africa	July 2012	74
EUCAP Sahel Niger	July 2012	77
EUBAM Libya	May 2013	6
EUAM Ukraine	Dec 2014	66
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Jan 2015	51

TABLE 2: ONGOING CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS AS OF 30 APRIL 2015

	DATE OF LAUNCHING *(mandate until)*	**ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT** (incl. local staff)
MILITARY OPERATIONS		
Althea Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec 2004 *(Dec 2015)*	837
EUNAVFOR Atalanta Gulf of Aden	Dec 2008 *(Dec 2016)*	1,719
EUTM Somalia	April 2010 *(Dec 2016)*	168 (11)
EUTM Mali	Feb. 2013 *(May 2016)*	584
EUMAM RCA	March 2015 *(12 months as of full operational capability)*	53
Total military personnel		***3,361***
CIVILIAN MISSIONS		
EUBAM Rafah	Nov 2005 *(June 2015)*	8 (5)
EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories	Nov 2005 *(June 2016)*	102 (42)
EUSEC RD Congo	June 2005 *(June 2015)*	51 (25)
EUPOL Afghanistan	June 2007 *(Dec 2016)*	386 (182)
EUMM Georgia	Oct 2008 *(Dec 2016)*	334 (111)
EULEX Kosovo	Dec 2008 *(June 2016)*	1,495 (753)
EUCAP Nestor Horn of Africa	July 2012 *(Dec 2016)*	74 (29)
EUCAP Sahel Niger	July 2012 *(July 2016)*	77 (32)
EUBAM Libya	May 2013 *(Nov 2015)*	6 (3)
EUAM Ukraine	December 2014 *(Dec 2016)*	66
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Jan 2015 *(Jan 2017)*	51 (10)
Total civilian personnel		***2,650***
Total of personnel deployed in military and civilian operations		***6,011***

Military operations

The level of activity in military CSDP has been modest over the last five years. Among the four operations launched, two are training missions (EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali) and one is an advisory mission (EUMAM in the Central African Republic). Only EUFOR RCA deployed combat units in an executive operation. As of May 2015, there is no medium- to large-scale ground military operation under CSDP. The largest operation is the maritime operation – EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* – off the Somali coast. In total, the five ongoing military operations deploy approximately 3,400 personnel.

- The EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) was launched in April 2010 as the first military training mission. It is mandated to train the Somali armed forces, initially in Uganda, before it moved to Mogadishu in early 2014. EUTM has trained more than 4,000 Somali soldiers. The training mandate was incrementally enlarged to include advisory and mentoring activities of the Somali armed forces. Together with operations *Atalanta* and EUCAP Nestor, EUTM Somalia is now one of three CSDP operations in the Horn of Africa.

- Similarly, the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) was launched in February 2013 principally to train the Malian armed forces. The mandate also includes an advisory role in support of the reform of Mali's military sector. The deployment of the operation has been confined to the capital city Bamako (Mission Headquarters) and to the training site in Koulikoro. Twenty three EU member states contribute to the operation. As of May 2015, six battalions of roughly 600 troops each have been trained by EUTM. The operation has also run decentralised re-training sessions (in the battalions' own bases).

- EUFOR RCA was launched in April 2014 to provide stability in parts of Bangui in the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as secure the city's airport for an initial period of six months. It was later extended for a further three months before handing over to the UN operation (MINUSCA). The launch of EUFOR RCA took place under difficult circumstances. Deployed in support of the AU mission in a highly unstable environment, it was potentially one of the most dangerous EU operations ever launched. Its mandate was robust with the use of force authorised to protect the civilian population. The mission's strength was relatively modest (roughly 750 troops), and its mandate was limited in both space (two districts of Bangui and the airport) and time. A clear exit strategy of eventually handing over to the AU was initially agreed (in practice, however, it was handed over to the UN). Despite these precautions, very few member states saw the CAR as a priority for the EU. Six force generation conferences were needed to acquire the planned strength, and in the end, France provided the majority of the missing troops. The second-largest troop contributor was a third country – Georgia – which delivered a company-sized unit.

- In March 2015, an EU advisory mission – EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) – took over EUFOR RCA, with a mandate to support the CAR authorities in the reform of the security sector as well as the management of the CAR armed forces.

The other two ongoing military operations, established prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, are operation *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the anti-piracy operation EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* in the Gulf of Aden.

- Operation *Althea* was established in 2004 to monitor the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement after the NATO-led force withdrew. It is the only ongoing operation run under the 'Berlin Plus' framework, by which the EU draws on NATO assets for an operation that is commanded by the NATO Deputy SACEUR. Its mandate has adapted over the years and now includes broad tasks of supporting stability in Bosnia. It has a troop strength of just over 800, compared with 7,000 at its deployment.

- Operation EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* in Somalia was established in December 2008 off the coast of Somalia to respond to piracy activities threatening both UN World Food Programme and commercial ships. It has deployed between four and seven ships for a staff strength of approximately 1,700 personnel as of 30 April 2015. Its Operation Headquarters (OHQ) is located in Northwood in the UK. *Atalanta* operates alongside a NATO maritime operation as well as a US-led and several national operations, and together with two parallel CSDP missions (EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor).

These military operations fall within the tasks defined in Article 43 TEU. Most specifically, the two training missions and the advisory mission in CAR can be listed as 'military advice and assistance tasks', while *Althea* and EUFOR RCA are 'peacekeeping tasks' or 'tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation'. As for *Atalanta*, it can be categorised as a 'humanitarian and rescue task' as well as a 'task of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.' Yet EU official documents never use such categorisations; it is simply assumed that EU operations and missions fit into the Article 43 TEU typology.

The two training missions are very specific military operations both because they have a primarily training mandate and because they explicitly rule out any participation in combat. Their capacity-building role has nonetheless become central to CSDP in both the military and civilian domains. EUMAM RCA also falls within this capacity-building category of operations.

Althea and EUFOR RCA are more traditional peace operations, mandated to assist in the *stabilisation* of countries that have been weakened by conflict. Finally, *Atalanta* marks the engagement of the EU in counter-piracy through a naval operation. It attests to a certain flexibility of CSDP both in terms of adaptation to the changing environment and ability to resort to a variety of military tools in crisis management.

The duration of EU military operations tends to be inversely correlated with the degree of risk taken. Operations located at the upper-level of EU military tasks (and implying risks for the troops deployed) have lasted less than a year, while longer-term operations have been less risky. In this context, operation *Atalanta* may count as an exception as it contains an evident coercive dimension, yet the nature of the threat is low in traditional security terms and indeed no casualties have been reported.

Most importantly, these operations, as well as all previous CSDP military operations, fit into the definition of crisis management presented in the first chapter in the sense that they fall short of war-fighting or openly coercive operations. They are, similarly to UN operations, third-party interventions that are not supposed to take sides, or identify and militarily defeat a political enemy. Some operations, like *Atalanta* or EUFOR RCA, contain a coercive dimension, to defeat pirates in the case of *Atalanta* and as part of the civilian protection mandate in the case of EUFOR RCA. Yet these operations do not have peace enforcement mandates, which makes them conceptually distinct from operations such as the NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011 or the French-led operation in Mali in 2013.

There is theoretically nothing that prevents the EU from engaging in peace enforcement, and indeed the expanded 'Petersberg tasks' include 'tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making' – to be understood as peace enforcement. But CSDP has so far been implemented in a very different manner, and nothing in recent developments or in member states' policies suggests that this is likely to change.

Finally, these operations are seldom *the* solution to the crisis considered. At best they create the space for a political settlement to be reached, but are not *per se* conflict resolution mechanisms.

Civilian missions

From the outset civilian missions have been more numerous than military operations. Their geographical distribution is also more widespread. While eight of the ten military operations have taken place in Africa, nine of the 21 civilian missions have had an African focus. But five of the six missions created since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty are in Africa. As of 30 April 2015, the eleven ongoing civilian missions comprise 2,650 personnel deployed in theatre.

All civilian missions correspond more or less to the 'military advice and assistance tasks', or 'conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks' enshrined in Article 43 TEU. More precisely, they fall within the three broad categories of *strengthening missions*, *monitoring missions*, and *executive missions*, although this latter category counts only one operation.

- *Strengthening missions* are mainly about capacity-building in the field of rule of law. They aim at assisting the recipient state in the reform and

strengthening of its judicial and law enforcement institutions. This is done through monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA), as well as training and in some cases the provision of equipment. Monitoring is about observing performance, efficiency and work methods of the local entity, so as to improve them. Mentoring and advising refer to the support provided to the local counterparts; it is about knowledge transfer and personal and institutional change. In parallel, training has become a key instrument of strengthening missions and capacity-building, as in missions such as EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS (and to a lesser extent EUBAM Rafah), and the two EUCAP Sahel missions in Niger and Mali. The overall objective of these missions is to strengthen the rule of law in accordance with best practices and internationally-accepted principles.

The six civilian missions established since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (see Table 1 on p. 19) are strengthening missions. EUBAM Libya's mandate is to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country's borders. EUCAP Nestor aims to enhance the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania). EUCAP Sahel Niger was established to support the Nigerien security agencies in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. EUCAP Sahel Mali delivers strategic advice and training for the internal security forces in Mali. These two missions are part of the EU 'Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel'. EUAM Ukraine provides strategic advice for the development and reform of Ukrainian security services. Finally, EUAVSEC South Sudan (terminated in January 2014) assisted South Sudan to establish an aviation security organisation and to strengthen aviation security at Juba International Airport.

The pre-existing missions EUPOL COPPS, EUSEC RD Congo, and EUPOL Afghanistan provide other examples of strengthening missions, as well as EULEX Kosovo which falls within the two categories of strengthening and executive missions (see below). These missions are relatively small in size, with an average actual strength of less than 80 personnel.

- *Monitoring missions* provide third-party observation of an activity or a process, be it the performance of a given sector (police, justice, border, etc.) or the implementation of an agreement (ceasefire line, peace agreement, etc.).

  Examples of ongoing *monitoring missions* are EUBAM Rafah and EUMM Georgia, both mandated to monitor a contested or hazardous boundary line between two political entities. In Rafah, the EU mission was established in the context of Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005. It plays the role of third-party monitor at the Rafah (Gaza) crossing point. The operation also carries a capacity-building function. In Georgia, the mission was deployed following the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 to monitor the situation around the separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the past, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, established

to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), provided another example of a monitoring mission.

- The third category of civilian missions is that of *executive missions*, i.e. operations that can perform certain functions in substitution to the recipient state. The only example of such a mission is EULEX Kosovo which has executive responsibilities in the areas of war crimes, organised crime and high-level corruption, as well as property and privatisation cases. Created in 2008 to accompany the transformation process in Kosovo, EULEX has focused on assisting the authorities in Pristina in establishing the rule of law, specifically by supporting the police, judiciary and customs sectors. In this role, it also falls in the category of strengthening missions. One distinctive aspect of EULEX is that it operates in a place that shares a European perspective with other Western Balkan countries. This not only determines in part the type of activities carried out by the EU as a whole, but it also creates leverage and legitimacy for the CSDP mission (although the non-unanimous recognition of Kosovo by EU member states limits such leverage).

With an average duration of a little over five years, civilian missions tend to last longer than military ones. Yet they lie at the heart of the tension between the long-term needs of countries in transition and the 'shorter'-term commitments of EU member states. This is especially the case for *strengthening missions* that accompany reform processes – of the security sector in particular – that by nature require a long-term engagement.

Starting operations

EU operations and missions are established by the Council of the EU – acting by unanimity and following crisis management procedures that were reviewed in 2013. The Council formally adopts two decisions. The first one 'establishes' the operation on the basis of the Crisis Management Concept (elaborated by the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, CMPD). This decision marks the beginning of the operational planning phase as follows:

- identification of an Operation Headquarters (OHQ) and appointment of an Operation Commander, for military operations;

- the Head of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) takes over as Civilian Operation Commander and a selection and appointment process is undertaken for the Head of Mission, for civilian missions;

- elaboration of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) by OHQ and CPCC respectively;

- beginning of the formal force generation process.

Once planning and force generation are completed, the Council formally 'launches' the operation through a second decision. Operations and missions are placed under the 'political control and strategic direction' of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is a defining feature of CSDP activities.

The 2013 crisis management procedures have introduced a 'fast-track' process that allows for a shorter planning phase (through a single planning document) if circumstances require a rapid reaction. Such fast-tracking has been used in the planning of EUFOR RCA. A planning exercise – the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) – was also designed to allow for a broad political assessment of the situation and of the appropriateness of a CSDP operation.[2] As of May 2015, PFCAs have been drafted in four cases: Ukraine, CAR (prior to the creation of EUMAM RCA), Libya, and Boko Haram.

Together with the 'normal' and 'fast-track' procedures, a third type of planning and conduct of CSDP operations is defined in Article 44 of the Lisbon Treaty, by which the Council may 'entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task'. An Article 44 operation – yet to be implemented – would still be created by the Council acting unanimously, but the participating member states would retain responsibility for the planning and command of the operation. In essence, Article 44 is about granting greater flexibility and speeding up reaction time. It aims to facilitate the deployment of CSDP operations by creating a framework which allows willing member states to go ahead with an operation as efficiently and effectively as possible.

In legal terms, CSDP operations and missions are established on the basis of a combination of a Council decision and either an invitation by the host state or a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In practice, all civilian missions (with the exception of EULEX Kosovo) have been established on the basis of an invitation of the recipient state. Military operations, for their part, fall into two categories: some were created on the basis of a Chapter VII UNSC resolution (*Althea* in Bosnia, *Atalanta* in the Gulf of Aden, EUFOR RCA, as well as in the past the two operations in the DRC [2003 and 2006] or the one launched in Chad [2008-09]); others were created on the basis of an invitation (EUTMs Mali and Somalia, EUMAM RCA).

Quite a few of the latter, as well as some civilian missions, are still referred to in UNSC resolutions. Such reference provides a degree of legitimacy to the EU endeavour. It also helps in future coordination with other international and local actors as various EU entities can draw on the UNSC text to justify their presence. In all cases the host government has consented to the EU deployment.

2. Based on shared analysis (bringing together the EEAS and the Commission), a PFCA sets 'the political context [of the crisis], articulating what the crisis is, why the EU should act (based on the EU's interests, objectives, and values) and what instruments could be available, and best suited, for that action'. See EEAS, 'Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations', June 2013.

Financial regulations differ between military and civilian operations. CSDP civilian missions are funded by the CFSP budget, as well as by member states through personnel seconded to the missions. In 2014, the committed budget for the ten ongoing civilian missions amounted to €273 million for a total CFSP budget of €314 million. The Council's decision establishing a mission also sets its budget for a given period. As an example, the budget of the largest mission – EULEX Kosovo – from June 2013 to June 2014 was €110 million; that of one of the smallest – EUBAM Rafah – from July 2013 to June 2014 was €940,000.

In the military domain, Treaty provisions prohibit 'expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications" (art.41.2) being charged to the Union budget. As a consequence, military operations are financed by participating states that cover their own expenses (according to the 'costs lie where they fall' rule). Only some 'common costs' are shared and covered by the Athena mechanism which is made up of contributions from member states (except Denmark) in accordance with a GNP scale. It is often assumed that these common costs represent between 10 and 15 percent of the total cost of an operation, but this has never been substantiated by any thorough analysis, and the figure is likely to be inaccurate in most cases. The Athena budget for 2014 was approximately €78 million for the five military operations.

The financing mode of military operations makes it impossible to assess their overall budget. Practically, the only way to assess the cost of EU military operations would be to add up the common costs and the expenses of all participating nations, when available. Yet these figures are not systematically accessible and expenses may not be calculated consistently from one country to the other.

Discussions on new sources or mechanisms of funding for both military and civilian operations have been ongoing over the last two years, notably on the occasion of the review of the Athena decision, but also in the context of the 'Train and Equip' programme.[3] Debates have revolved around two different sets of issues: one linked to the availability of financial resources for CSDP operations and missions and better burden-sharing of the costs of military operations; the other is focused on the extent to which EU money – possibly development funds – could be used to finance activities peripheral to CSDP operations, such as equipping forces trained by the EU. Both levels are highly sensitive, in part because they affect member states' contributions and, in part because they may lead to a new interpretation of what the EU (Commission-run) budget may fund.

3. In the case of Athena, the newly-adopted Council decision includes a provision that regulates the administrative management of third party financial contributions – including from the Union – by Athena (Council Decision, 2015/528, 27 March 2015, art. 30). In the case of 'Train and Equip', the High Representative and the Commission have released a Joint Communication on 'Capacity-building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises' that makes recommendations to facilitate the use of EU financial instruments to build the capacity (in the military domain in particular) of third states (JOIN(2015) 17 final, Brussels, 28 April 2015).

The coordination imperative

As seen in the first chapter, the complexity and multidimensionality of crisis management mean that it is an activity that can only be conducted on a cooperative basis among a multitude of entities. For the EU as much as for most other crisis management actors, the coordination/cooperation imperative has translated into two parallel lines of effort: one internal and one external. Internally, the necessity to act in a more strategic manner has led to the development of the so-called comprehensive approach. Externally, its increasing crisis management role has led the EU to work and develop partnerships with a range of other crisis management institutions.

Internal coordination: the comprehensive approach

The EU's external action takes many different forms, including CSDP operations and missions. The effectiveness and impact of these operations require a certain level of strategic purpose and consistency between the various CSDP components.

The Lisbon Treaty called for enhanced coordination of the EU's external action, and the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) is just one illustration of this imperative. In December 2013, a Joint Communication of the Commission and the HR/VP on the 'comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises' defined the comprehensive approach as an ambition to make the EU's 'external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic' by 'drawing on the full range of its instruments and resources.'

In practice, the CSDP-level of the comprehensive approach implies increased coordination within a CSDP operation as well as between an operation and other EU actors such as member states, the EU Delegation *in situ* and the Commission. In the case of military operations, the civil-military interaction becomes an important part of the comprehensive approach.

There are two broad aspects of the comprehensive approach: one relates to the existence of a shared strategic vision of the various EU entities involved in a CSDP operation or associated with it; the other relates to the implementation of various aspects of CSDP operations' mandates in accordance with that shared vision and in a coordinated manner.

The comprehensive approach is an aspiration, a guideline, a process more than an end goal. Political, cultural, administrative, and even personality-related obstacles are likely to remain as inherent limitations to its full implementation. At the three levels of interaction between the civilians and the military, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, and the EU and its member states, differences in working methods, institutional cultures and degrees of politicisation make coordination a permanent challenge. Also, the extent to which the various EU actors are able to define a shared strategic vision and create incentives for all

parties to coordinate their action with others, is an area where there is still room for improvement.

Despite these structural impediments, progress is visible on different fronts, and EU policy in the CSDP domain is more integrated in 2015 than it probably ever was before. Recent evolutions, such as the increasing participation of Commission staff in EEAS-led CSDP-related planning and working groups, the socialisation process between military and civilian personnel within the EEAS, the mutual acknowledgement of the interconnection of security and development, the transformation of EC Delegations into EU Delegations, the creation of coordination bodies or processes (Crisis Platforms, PFCAs, CSDP Lessons Management Group, etc.), the elaboration of Regional Strategies, have all to some extent contributed to shaping a culture of coordination that is not comparable with what existed twelve years ago, when the first ESDP operations were established. The two cases of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, for which Regional Strategies have been adopted, provide examples of a level of integration of the various layers of the EU presence – CSDP operations and missions; EU Delegations; security and development actors – that could have hardly existed a decade ago.

Inter-institutional cooperation

While the comprehensive approach is primarily about EU internal coordination, it also contains an external dimension, i.e. the necessity for the EU to reach out to other crisis management actors as well as to local parties.

Through CSDP operations and missions, the EU has become a member of the restricted club of crisis management actors, together with the UN, NATO, the OSCE, or the African Union. This means that it has become an option for its member states' crisis management policies, but also that it is being seen as a crisis management actor by the wider international community. One expression of this is the integration of the EU in the crisis management institutional network. Although the EU is not, strictly speaking, a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it has defined from the outset its ambition with reference to the United Nations' broader responsibility and role. In the meantime, other regional institutions – such as NATO or the AU – but also third states, have progressively become part of the EU's various circles of interaction.

Twelve of the 16 ongoing CSDP operations are deployed where other international organisations are also present in a crisis management role. Six of the ten military operations carried out since 2003 were sequential with other operations, i.e. they took over existing operations (run by NATO or the UN) or handed over to other international organisations. Ten of the current EU missions operate where there is simultaneously a UN peacekeeping operation or a UN special political mission. In some phases of the evolving situations in Mali or the Central African Republic, the EU was one among three or even four other international organisations or intervening states (in a security role). The EU has thus become an actor of the above-mentioned 'hybridisation' of peace operations.

Arguably this evolution requires to be addressed through an array of policy responses ranging from loose coordination mechanisms to largely-institutionalised partnerships. The most developed partnership is the one with the UN. Since the EU-UN Joint Declaration of September 2003, the two organisations have developed and institutionalised their cooperation in ways unmatched by other organisations. In 2012, an EU 'Action Plan on CSDP support to UN peacekeeping' helped revitalise the partnership at a moment when the level of CSDP activity was rather low. The Action Plan defined a series of initiatives to move the relationship forward, with the hope on the UN side that the partnership would also take the form of national European contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (this partly happened with the Netherlands' and Sweden's contributions to the UN operation in Mali – respectively 550 and 250 personnel). In 2014-15, the deployment of EUFOR RCA as well as EUCAP Sahel Mali, in both cases in parallel with UN operations, allowed for renewed cooperation between the two institutions. In parallel, a new framework on the 'UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management' covering the period 2015-2018 was being elaborated.

The EU-NATO relationship is less developed, both for political reasons (the so-called 'participation problem') and as a result of a lower level of field interaction. The 'Berlin Plus' framework that defines the nature and conditions of NATO support to EU-led military operations is largely outdated. Operation *Althea* in Bosnia is the only Berlin Plus operation, yet its scheduled termination is likely to also mark the end of the framework. Furthermore, NATO has been absent from Africa where the bulk of CSDP activities takes place. The three theatres where EU-NATO cooperation has been tested in the last five years are Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden. In principle, formal communication between the two institutions is not possible outside of the Berlin Plus framework. In practice though, inter-institutional relations have developed informally to the extent possible, although the Afghan and Gulf of Aden situations have also highlighted competition dynamics between the two organisations. Looking ahead, while the EU-NATO relationship is politically sensitive, it is also the one that offers the most obvious potential for fruitful cooperation.

The EU has also developed its relationship with the African Union in the framework of the EU-Africa Partnership. Cooperation mainly takes the form of capacity-building in support of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). One of the main instruments of the partnership is the African Peace Facility (APF, financed by the European Development Fund) that funds the AU's and sub-regional organisations' activities at three different levels: peace support operations, capacity-building (support to the Stand-by Force, to the AU Peace and Security Department, etc.), and early response. More than €1.2 billion has been allocated to African peace and security through this channel since 2004. AU-led peace operations have largely benefited from APF support, most notably AMISOM in Somalia (more than €600 million since 2007), but also the two operations in Mali (AFISMA) and the Central African Republic (MISCA). The APF envelope for the years 2014-2016 is €750 million.

In 2014, EUFOR RCA was originally established as a bridge to the AU-led MISCA. Though initially the source of tensions between the two organisations, as EUFOR could be interpreted as the sign that the AU was under-delivering, the EU operated alongside the AU until the UN took over from the latter in September 2014.

Finally, the EU has also established close links with a number of third states. Approximately 45 non-EU states have participated in CSDP operations since the first mission in 2003 (about 30 if one deducts the countries that have joined the EU since 2004). In 2014, 15 partner countries participated in CSDP operations and missions. And 16 have signed a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU which provides a legal and political framework for such cooperation.[4] While third states' contribution is usually modest in size, it can also be substantial, as illustrated by the strength of the Turkish contingent in operation *Althea* or the Georgian contingent in EUFOR RCA.

At these different levels, the EU's positioning fits the inter-institutional framework presented in the first chapter of this paper, in the sense that the EU has interacted with other institutions in a process that combines a genuine wish to develop cooperation mechanisms based on its comparative advantages with the will to assert itself as an autonomous, at times self-interested, crisis management actor.

These various interaction processes have contributed to the credibility and legitimacy of the EU in the crisis management field. Institutions like the UN or the AU have to some extent been expecting support or cooperation from the EU, as illustrated in the CAR with EUFOR RCA acting as a bridging operation to the AU (eventually the UN) or in Somalia where the EU has played a key role in funding AMISOM. And reciprocally, any EU planning process takes account of the presence of these other actors as components of the international crisis management efforts.

Towards an EU security culture

The EU's ambition in the security field, through CSDP operations in particular, theoretically requires the parallel development of some sort of doctrine, i.e. a certain level of consensus and convergence about how the EU should respond to security threats, ultimately also through the use of military force. Such agreement on when and how to respond implies a similar convergence in member states' respective threat assessment exercises. Collective action presumably presupposes a *rapprochement* both in the diagnosis and in the nature of the response.

4. Albania, Canada, Chile, Colombia, fYROM, Georgia, Iceland, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, USA. Signatures are pending for Australia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The question then is the extent to which the EU as an institution has developed a security culture of its own – defined in terms of shared ideas and beliefs in the security domain leading the organisation to act in a specific manner – and of which CSDP operations and missions are an expression.

This debate relates to that on strategic culture and 'grand strategy', i.e. the ability of the EU to design long-term responses to existential threats, within and beyond the security domain, and including through the use of military force.

However, CSDP calls into question the existence of an emerging security culture more than that of a 'grand strategy'. This is especially the case in the military domain, where the nature of the EU – neither a state nor a military alliance – inherently limits the development of a strategic culture. In this context, the level of convergence among member states on both threat assessment and the merit of military force in policy response is insufficient to allow for a distinct EU strategic culture. Depending on their size, history, and conception of their own role – as well as that of the EU – on the international scene, states have developed distinct strategic cultures that are often at odds with each other and can hardly coalesce into a shared European one. As a consequence, EU military operations have been characterised by a rather timid conception of the use of force, at odds with what the doctrine of a fully-fledged security actor would imply. Some mandates have been relatively robust (*Atalanta*, EUFOR RCA) yet fall short of responses at the upper level of the military spectrum. As a matter of fact, CSDP military operations have never been really tested by parties opposing the EU presence overtime and against which it has had to respond through the use of military force.

Most importantly, CSDP operations and missions have not so far been 'strategic enough' to be the main expression of a strategy. The bulk of the 30 or so CSDP operations to date have been of a 'sub-strategic' level in the sense that, with a few exceptions, they have not taken the form of large-scale operations nor have they been drivers of major changes in the recipient state(s) or region(s). This assessment does not carry any intended negative connotation, rather it reflects the nature of CSDP operations which by essence are not about generating a strategic impact, are not about a 'grand strategy'. Operations in the Balkans or in the Gulf of Aden have come close to strategic-level activities as they concern the stability of areas of strategic importance for the EU and have entailed a certain level of engagement over time. However, most CSDP operations are too small or short-term to signify an EU strategic involvement. And while it is understood that the EU's external action must fall within an overall strategy, at best CSDP operations are one element of that strategy, not *the* strategy.

This being said, 32 CSDP military operations and civilian missions do attest to the existence of a certain EU vision of security policy that is distinct from any other institution's conception. This specific EU security culture reflects a certain approach to handling crises, through a mix of civilian and military responses, preferably short-term and consensual interventions, almost always in support of existing sovereign state authorities, and in accordance with international legal in-

struments and a set of values and principles. Essentially, CSDP is about responding to threats that are not direct or immediate. It is about projecting security outside of the EU area so as to contribute to the stabilisation of states or regions that may potentially be the source of further destabilisation or threaten EU societies more directly.

Such culture has been developed by design as much as by default, i.e. it results from the difficulty to embrace a broader spectrum as much as from the desire to pitch at a different level and through EU-specific tools or methods. The EU policy in Kosovo or in Mali is illustrative of a security culture that emphasises the rule of law, good governance and security sector reform, and that proceeds through capacity-building and advisory tasks, often in cooperation with other crisis management actors.

Though intergovernmental, this EU policy is distinct from any national policy, and also distinct from the sum of its parts. In practice, not only do member states have to adapt to a particular CSDP operation's mandate, but their own security policy is overtime being shaped by the EU security culture. Through shared threat assessment exercises and collective decision-making processes and operations, the CSDP framework has also bolstered a certain level of solidarity among member states. The process is obviously difficult and the emerging security culture is a work in progress. Yet, member states have established a new framework for their security policy which in return is shaping their own mindsets.

In this context, some member states feel closer to the current EU security culture than others. To the extent that what is emerging falls short of a fully-fledged security role, this also creates frustration among those who want to see the EU assume the role of a genuine military power and deplore the gap between the magnitude of current security threats and what the EU is able to handle. This is at the core of the CSDP debate, as it raises the question of what the EU is supposed to become, and what its member states collectively want to achieve. In other words, is CSDP as it has so far developed good enough or should it develop further so as to enable the EU to perform at a different and more optimal level? Over the last five years, efforts have concentrated more on improving what exists than on trying to shift the level of ambition. This debate will be at the heart of the forthcoming reflection on a new strategy for the EU.

Conclusion

CSDP is the means through which the EU has become an actor of multilateral crisis management. Not only has the EU become an option for its member states in this regard, but it is also a partner for other international institutions, that turn to the EU in recognition of its comparative advantages.

The debate is no longer about whether the EU is a security actor or not, but rather what kind of security actor it has become and how strategic it is. These questions can hardly be addressed without a dose of criticism or disappointment. But the EU has undoubtedly achieved a lot, and CSDP attests to the emergence of an 'EU reflex' in the security domain.

Chapter 3

What contribution to international security?

More than any other aspect of the EU's external action activity, CSDP is the focus of intense scrutiny. The questions of its effectiveness and impact are omnipresent in academic and policy circles. How useful, effective and strategic are CSDP operations? What impact do they have? Is the EU displaying comparative advantages that other institutions lack? Is the EU under-delivering in CSDP – and if so, why?

This chapter first examines the necessity of measuring impact and learning lessons, and the limitations that accompany this process. It then assesses the extent to which CSDP is indeed a contribution to international peace. It finally highlights a number of structural constraints that have limited what the EU has been able to achieve as part of its peace promotion mandate.

The challenge of measuring impact

The EU aspiration to play a role in security governance and, 17 years after Saint-Malo, its record in CSDP, raise the question of its performance, of the type of impact that it produces, and of its degree of success. There are at least three reasons why performance needs to be assessed. One relates to institutional efficiency, i.e. the evaluation of the level of EU performance (is the EU efficiently delivering on its mandate?), which in turn leads to adaptation, both within the assessed mission and in more generic terms. The other pertains to political visibility and the idea that declaring success is central to the profile of decision-makers – member states – as well as of the EU as an institution (is the EU living up to expectations?). A third reason, of course, relates to the necessity for a security actor to indeed somehow contribute meaningfully to international security.

Methodological limitations

The notions of the 'success' or 'failure' of CSDP operations are widely debated in think tanks and policy circles, often in vague and peremptory terms. Operation *Atalanta* or EUFOR RCA are usually presented as being successes while EUBAM Libya, EUSSR in Guinea-Bissau, or EUAVSEC in South Sudan tend to be portrayed as failures. Media coverage is often severe in its own assessment of the level of performance of the EU in the security domain, and more prone to castigate EU inefficiency or dysfunctionality than to identify positive developments or successful interventions. This is not specific to the EU, as all institutions involved in peace and security activities are by and large subjected to the same simplification and rather negative assessment. Measuring success is nonetheless not easy and raises a whole set of methodological questions.

First, 'success' in the peace and security domain is an inherently subjective concept. CSDP operations are all to an extent mandated to promote peace and security in the recipient country. These notions are by nature subjective and determined by perceptions more than by objectively observable variables. Activities such as security sector reform or capacity-building relate to 'theories of change', i.e. the idea that peace and stability will result from change in the society, political system, distribution of power, etc., which is triggered by the external intervention. These changes can be assessed very differently depending on the assessing body (member states' representatives, military, civilian, humanitarian, EU staff, local elite, local people, etc.). Success furthermore carries a political dimension that impedes attempts to assess it in any scientific manner. In some cases, the mere fact that an operation has been created is hailed as a 'CSDP success' regardless of what it has achieved on the ground. As outlined in the first chapter, what then matters may be unrelated to the country in crisis (necessity for the crisis management actor to be present to live up to expectations, demonstrating a comparative advantage, testing procedures, etc.), and therefore determines the evaluation of success. In other cases, a positive output of an operation can be different from the objective with which it was originally tasked (for example, operation *Atalanta* has allowed for the establishment of a wide network of cooperation with third states, notably through the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia), and the operation may therefore yield benefits not directly linked with its mandate.

The political nature of the operations furthermore makes it difficult for decision-makers to acknowledge partial failure. Indeed, no CSDP operation has ever been officially presented as a failure. Equally importantly, member states resist any endeavour to assess the performance of CSDP operations which would imply a parallel evaluation of their own performance, individual or collective. Institutional inertia is also part of the problem. The various EU entities are wary about any internal exercise that would possibly stigmatise their own deficiencies, and insist on keeping control over their own evaluation.

Second, the measure of success requires clarity on what exactly is being measured. Is it the level of efficiency of CSDP structures in planning and implementing a man-

date, the results and benefits of mandate implementation (output and outcome), or the effect of mandate implementation on the situation in the host country (impact)? Arguably there are cases where a mandate has been efficiently implemented yet with little benefit or impact on the ground. The measure of outcome – which is what is currently being measured – is also methodologically problematic, with issues relating to the identification of indicators/benchmarks as well as to the methods used (quantitative vs. qualitative) to measure those indicators. As for impact, although gauging this is no doubt important to the legitimacy of the intervention (has the operation positively changed the situation?), such evaluation is practically almost impossible. Impact relates to a longer-term timeframe and usually depends on a wide range of factors, among which the CSDP operation is just one. In a training mission for example, while the expected outcome is 'better skilled personnel', one possible impact would be 'increased security where the trained personnel operate'. In practice though, the number of variables to be factored in would make such an exercise onerous. Furthermore, establishing a causal link between a given activity and the observed outcome or impact is equally difficult. How do we know for sure that it is the presence of an EU operation (rather than other external or internal factors) that explains an observed improvement in the security situation? Conversely, how do we know that the situation would not be worse in the absence of the operation?

Third, beyond these methodological caveats, any measure of success should also take into account the level of ambition of a given operation. When a mandate is about reforming governance structures in a war-torn society in less than ten years, as in Kosovo, what characterises success is necessarily different from missions mandated to monitor a ceasefire line, as in Georgia, or to assist militarily in the implementation of a peace agreement, as in Bosnia. In all fairness, many operations are deployed in countries where the level of fragility and dysfunctionality is such that what can realistically be achieved is in any case extremely limited. This is especially the case when operations function, as described before in this paper, at a sub-strategic level, with a format and duration that do not allow for a major and lasting impact. In these cases, the likelihood that the operations will be perceived as failing is high from the very start, as in Libya, South Sudan or Afghanistan. This leads to the dilemma of combining a certain level of political ambition with the concern not to raise excessive expectations.

Finally, analysing EU performance cannot be done in abstraction from other security actors' own policies. All security actors – be they institutions or states – face huge difficulties in calibrating their responses to the evolution of threats, and none are performing conspicuously better than others. In the changing crisis management landscape presented in the first chapter of this paper, a key question is whether the EU's performance is comparatively and qualitatively better than, equal to or worse than that of other security actors. A general overview of the EU's CSDP activities hints at an assessment of comparable and in some cases even better performance given the quality of the EU staff, in both military and civilian operations. There is no tangible indication that the EU would perform less effectively than any other comparable organisation.

The emerging culture of evaluation

A culture of evaluation of CSDP operations and missions has long been resisted within the EU, for political as well as institutional reasons. For some member states, CSDP is above all a political activity that should not be too closely monitored and evaluated. The type of political control that the PSC exerts over CSDP operations is deemed to be sufficient. Scepticism over evaluation is even stronger in the military sphere, where member states appear reluctant to have their own operations assessed and compared. More recently, others have pushed for more accountability of EU operational activities, and therefore an improved reporting system. In parallel, the creation of the EEAS has led to an incremental professionalisation of its working methods, including in the evaluation field. While performance evaluation is still not mainstreamed within the EEAS, a lot has been achieved in the development of a culture of evaluation and lessons learnt.

On the civilian side, all missions collect data and do regular reporting to the CPCC based on tools that are being incrementally developed and harmonised. Guidelines on benchmarking were adopted by the PSC in 2011, to be applied in new missions as well as progressively in all existing missions. The OPLAN defines the mission's tasks for each 'Line of Operation' identified in the CONOPS (including relevant 'Desired Outcomes') and provides the tasks' benchmarks to measure progress. This leads to a Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) that lists concrete 'Actions' to be carried out. For each Action, the MIP outlines the expected results and a roadmap. In parallel, the Head of Mission's six-monthly reports map out the overall trend of mandate implementation. Internal Support Reviews and an Impact Assessment Methodology are also being elaborated.

Benchmarking and evaluation is mainly the responsibility of each Operation Headquarters (OHQ) for military operations. As a NATO-commanded operation, *Althea* follows the NATO benchmarking system. The British-led OHQ for *Atalanta* has designed a mission-specific 'Measures of Effectiveness' tool, and the two EUTMs both use their own matrix based on a series of benchmarks to measure task performance and achievement.

Overall, the benchmarking and evaluation system is a work in progress. Indicators/benchmarks are almost exclusively quantitative and no qualitative data is being systematically collected, while arguably many critical facets of peace and security cannot be quantitatively measured**.** Furthermore, the measure of task performance and achievement may not always be pertinent to the measure of success. In the end, the reports produced tend to downplay potential difficulties and only provide a partial vision of missions' overall performance. The extent to which the benchmarking system is not only a bottom-up process but also allows for top-down adjustments of the mission's mandate based on the data collected is also an issue.

At a more strategic level, the CMPD conducts Strategic Reviews prior to the renewal of mandates. These reviews aim at assessing the political situation in the host country and the degree of necessity to prolong or adapt the mission under review.

The PSC is also regularly briefed by Heads of Missions, notably on the occasion of their six-monthly reports. Yet the political level is not necessarily the best arena for lessons learnt exercises. Also, end-of-mission reports are not designed to effectively feed the evaluation and lessons learnt processes. The idea of conducting impact assessment of missions is also being discussed in the context of the above-mentioned Impact Assessment Methodology.

Finally, the EEAS has largely institutionalised its CSDP lessons learnt process. In 2013, a Lessons Management Group (LMG) was established, together with a Lessons Working Group (LWG) at expert level. The LMG is composed of all EEAS services involved in CSDP as well as of the Commission's DG DEVCO, ECHO, and Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). On a yearly basis, the LWG draws on feedback from the CMPD, the CPCC, the EUMS, and EU Delegations to produce the CSDP Lessons Learnt Report. The Report selects a limited number of key lessons identified and makes recommendations. As an example, the 2004 key lessons pertain to the added value of the PFCAs, the overlap and synergies of various planning documents, training in CSDP, secure communication, and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions. A follow-up exercise then aims to ensure that measures are taken to address the key lessons identified. The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) has also designed courses on the basis of such lessons.

This process has not led to the creation of a special unit dedicated to lessons, as is the case at the UN for example. Nonetheless, the instruments that are incrementally put in place attest to a professionalisation of working methods at different levels of the crisis management apparatus as well as a desire to upgrade the capacity of the EU to assess and reform the way it is conducting CSDP operations.

CSDP as a tool for stability and peace

Crisis management or long-term peace consolidation?

The question of what CSDP should be about is open to debate. Should its main purpose be to respond to the immediate needs of a crisis – as the notion of 'crisis management' suggests – or should it include broader and longer-term goals?

According to the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP provides the EU with a capacity for 'peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter' (Art.42.1). EU documents also extensively use the term 'crisis management' to refer to CSDP operations and missions,[5] without however providing a definition.

5. For example in the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Crisis Management Procedures, or the Crisis Management Concept. According to the Lisbon Treaty (art.38), the PSC exercises the 'political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations referred to in Article 43.'

As seen before, strictly understood, crisis management refers to the policy tools that can be activated to respond to a situation of crisis, with the objective to remedy the consequences of the crisis, to contain its spread, and perhaps create political space for a longer-term resolution. It takes the form of a third-party intervention that is not supposed to last and is not necessarily an instrument of conflict resolution. EUFOR RCA or the initial phases of *Atalanta* or EUMM in Georgia provide examples of this narrow approach. In reality though, we have seen that most CSDP operations go beyond the remit of this narrow crisis response agenda, to encompass a longer-term capacity-building or peace consolidation ambition. By their nature, EULEX Kosovo, EUSEC DRC or *Althea* in Bosnia embrace a long-term agenda that gives the concept of crisis management in a EU context quite a broad meaning.

Beyond this terminology debate, the question arises whether long-term activities that are not responses to an immediate crisis should come within the remit of CSDP or rather be the responsibility of other EU actors (EU Delegations, Commission, etc.) or even non-EU entities. Obviously the question concerns civilian missions rather than military ones. Missions such as EUAVSEC South Sudan have been challenged in line with this argument.[6] But more generally, many activities that pertain to training or support to administrations could conceivably be carried out through other channels than CSDP missions. And indeed they are, most notably by the Commission.

Yet the Lisbon Treaty also defines CSDP operations as encompassing a broad range of activities that are not all directly targeted at the response to the acute phase of a crisis: examples include 'military advice and assistance tasks', 'conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks', or 'post-conflict stabilisation tasks'.

Another aspect of the debate relates to the importance given to the political and security dimension of long-term stabilisation of fragile states. While capacity-building activities such as training or reform of the judiciary may not be *per se* about managing an ongoing crisis, they fall within the range of stabilisation or peacebuilding undertakings that aim at strengthening fragile states so that they do not relapse into conflict. This links to the security-development nexus and the necessity to combine security-focused activities with development efforts. By nature, these activities contain a political and security dimension that justifies the presence of a CSDP operation.

This does not mean that CSDP is necessarily the most appropriate tool to address a particular crisis nor that a CSDP mission should be deployed on the ground for too long. One challenge for the EU is therefore to calibrate its response while taking account of the needs of a particular crisis and the appropriateness of CSDP in response to this crisis. This is where the comprehensive approach comes in, both with the PFCA as an upstream planning document that aims at identifiying the appropriateness of CSDP in a given context (and breaking with the assumption that CSDP is *the* EU answer to any given crisis), and with 'transition strategies' that de-

6. See European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs,'Report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)', (12562/2011 – 2012/2138(INI)), Brussels, 31 October 2012, p.12.

termine to what extent non-CSDP instruments can take over some aspects of the CSDP tasks, once the CSDP-specific needs are no longer present.

The need for an objective assessment of the pertinence of CSDP is not contested. Yet this has to be reconciled with the political nature of CSDP which may mean that, at the end of the day, an operation is *the* response opted for by states despite what a rational assessment would suggest, or on the contrary that the EU commitment has to be short-term irrespective of the long-term needs of a particular situation.

The benefits and added-value of CSDP

CSDP operations have been confronted with a number of difficulties that should not be minimised or overlooked. The overall assessment should not, however, miss the point that CSDP has become one instrument of global crisis management, which is itself subject to huge constraints, and as such it constitutes a meaningful contribution to multilateral efforts towards international peace and security. There are at least five areas where positive developments have been observed over the last five years and which highlight the comparative advantages of the EU in crisis management.

First, CSDP operations have allowed for the development of an EU expertise in a number of key areas such as security sector reform (SSR), the rule of law, military and civilian training, maritime security or border management. These activities are central to crisis management and are likely to become even more important in the coming years. Through operations in Niger, Mali, Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, the DRC, and Kosovo, the EU has acquired a know-how and expertise that demonstrates its comparative advantages and added value in the broader crisis management constellation.

Second, the diversity of political, economic and security instruments has enabled the EU to respond in a multidimensional manner to situations where other crisis management actors are less well-positioned. The emerging comprehensive approach creates a potential for a multi-layered response that has already, although imperfectly, been observed in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. There is a theoretical match between the multidimensionality of crises and the multidimensionality of EU instruments that *de facto* makes the EU a prominent actor of crisis management.

Third, the EU has been able to demonstrate its added value in places where other institutions could not necessarily intervene, for material reasons or considerations of legitimacy. In the military domain, despite well-known and acknowledged force generation problems, the ability of the EU to deploy operations that bridge to the AU or the UN so as to give them time to deploy (e.g. EUFOR RCA), has proved its worth and is likely to be replicated in the future. For various political reasons, the EU launched CSDP operations in Georgia, Ukraine and even Kosovo in circumstances where none of the other crisis management actors could intervene. In Sub-

Saharan Africa, where the two main other institutions are the UN and the AU, the EU displays a force projection capacity or a degree of political backing that are far from ideal yet stand as comparative advantages. Also, the state-backed nature of CSDP, namely the ability of CSDP missions to draw on the political clout generated by the collective commitment of 28 member states, has constituted a strength that other actors (such as the Commission or other international institutions) do not necessarily enjoy.

Fourth, when measured against their mandates, CSDP operations have by and large delivered in an efficient manner. All military operations have implemented their mandate more or less as planned and in accordance with the set objectives. They all have arguably contributed to the security and stability of the areas where they were deployed. Operations *Atalanta* and EUFOR RCA are cases in point, with mandates that have concretely and positively impacted the local environments.[7] The two training missions have revealed a high degree of professionalism from the participating nations and indeed contributed to the reorganisation of Mali's and Somalia's armed forces. The fact that their long-term impact is probably less obvious is a different question that is not directly related to mission performance. In the civilian sphere, whenever political and security conditions have permitted, mandates have been implemented in a relatively efficient manner, and CSDP missions have filled gaps in areas where other actors are less well-equipped. Strengthening missions are the ones facing the most difficult task of changing individual and institutional behaviours, yet they are part of broader and long-term stabilisation efforts. Kosovo is a case in point where, despite the remaining challenges, what EULEX has achieved in eight years in a country where the political, administrative and societal problems were huge, is tangible. In more general terms, given the scope of CSDP mandates and their 'sub-strategic' nature, and at the same time the magnitude of security needs in most countries where missions are deployed, the assessment of their performance can hardly be made at a macro-level, i.e. with regard to their impact on international peace and security.

Finally, in addition to these four main areas, one improvement that has come about with the creation of the EEAS is the incremental professionalisation of CSDP. Operations and missions do suffer from a number of structural difficulties. Yet the process that has been initiated with the creation of the EEAS and with it the development of analytical tools (conflict analysis, PFCAs, lessons learned, etc.), planning and command and control capacities, together with parallel efforts in the field of internal and external coordination (comprehensive approach, third states, etc.), and more recently reflections relating to 'transition strategies', the 'Train and Equip' programme or new financing mechanisms, have laid the grounds for a more effective CSDP.

7. Most notably, the number of successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden has been significantly reduced since the deployment of *Atalanta*. According to the EEAS website, in 2011, '174 merchant vessels were attacked and 25 ships pirated with 736 seafarers held hostage. In 2013, seven ships have been attacked, none pirated. So far, in 2014 two ships have been attacked. Still, 30 crew members remain in captivity.'

The inherent limitations of CSDP

We saw in the first chapter of this paper that states' commitment, institutional know-how, and local situation and resilience to change were key parameters of the effectiveness of crisis management. This fully applies to CSDP. CSDP operations are expressions of what the EU and its member states are ready to do in response to a given conflict or crisis. These are very seldom the ideal responses to the conflict. This is so simply because states and the EU are constrained in their responses and also because there are crucial dimensions of peace and security that lie far beyond the reach of any external crisis management operation. This being said, there are at least three key 'ingredients of success' (or, when not present, of 'failure') for CSDP operations: commitment of the member states, coherence and efficiency of the EU operation, and host state buy-in. At these three levels, EU operations are encountering difficulties that directly affect their coherence and overall impact.

Member states' commitment

To a large extent, CSDP is a states-led process. The nature of CSDP is such that nothing is possible in this field without the initiative, commitment and support of member states. The term 'political will' – or the lack thereof – is excessively used to signify this inescapable link between states' postures and common EU action. From the decision-making process leading to the establishment of an operation to the provision of capabilities, financial resources and political support of the operation itself, the role of member states is central.

In practice, this means that an operation can hardly be launched and run if it is not supported by at least a few member states that are ready to put their political weight behind it – and provide the human and financial resources to make the operation happen. While theoretically, an operation can be created (by the Council) at the initiative of the High Representative, with very few exceptions all CSDP operations and missions have been established at the initiative of member states. And over the last few years, there have been several instances where the EEAS made proposals for possible CSDP operations that were in the end not taken up by member states.

As previously mentioned, whenever used appropriately, the intergovernmental nature of CSDP generates a political leverage that lends invaluable strength to the operations. However, many of the CSDP operations suffer from insufficient political support from a majority of EU member states, in both the military and the civilian spheres. This impacts negatively on the number of operations, their level of ambition, as well as on the kind of resources with which they are provided.

Since 2010, ten CSDP operations (four military and six civilian) have been created, which makes an average of less than two per year. This is not necessarily a low ratio, although given the volatility of the current international environment more operations could have been forthcoming. What is more revealing of the (low) level of com-

mitment of member states is the type of operations created, as well as the allocated resources. In the military domain, two of the four operations are training missions and one (EUMAM RCA) is a modest advisory mission. Notwithstanding the utility of these operations, they hardly attest to a grand collective ambition for the EU in the military domain. Civilian missions have also been modest in size – although not necessarily in ambition.

Almost all operations established since 2010 have encountered difficulties in finding the required resources. The force generation process of EUFOR RCA was revealing in this respect. Once operations are established, a related issue is that of the quick turnover of military personnel, especially at key command positions, which does not facilitate continuity in mandate implementation. Similarly, civilian missions are facing recurrent human resources shortfalls, and quite a few missions are understaffed as a consequence. This is due in part to the fragmentation of the recruitment process – with several national administrations involved (Interior, Justice, etc.), an unevenly developed culture of civilian crisis management within EU member states, and the difficulty to attract skilled personnel for deployments in sometimes dangerous environments. The level of financial commitment is equally limited, both for civilian missions and military operations. Those shortcomings have largely constrained CSDP operations and projected a negative image of the EU and of its aspiration to play a central role in security governance. Member states' weak commitment has also translated into the insistence on short mandates, even for challenging operations that – in the SSR domain for example – would require a long-term presence. The non-deployment of the Battle Group is another illustration of this deficiency, with EU states resisting using the instruments that they have collectively designed.

At least four reasons account for this state of affairs. First, as already mentioned, member states' different strategic cultures inherently limit the cases where an EU operation benefits from broad political support. Simply put, what matters to some states does not necessarily matter to others, and CSDP therefore tends to reflect the lowest common denominator in this regard. In the military sphere, most EU states have developed a risk-averse approach to their crisis management policies, which complicates their engagement in military operations that carry potential risks to their own troops. These postures also draw on the lessons of some major military operations of the last decade – Afghanistan in particular – that have only vindicated states' prudence *vis-à-vis* multilateral interventions.

Second, the type of rational cost/gain calculations that decision-makers make when considering creating or participating in a CSDP operation often works against such a decision being taken. This is mainly due to the nature of crisis management, which is largely about tackling distant rather than immediate threats. In other words, the payoff structure of CSDP is all the less obvious as operations – existing or potential – are perceived as too disconnected from immediate national security interests. Ongoing debates about the degree of centrality of Sub-Saharan Africa for the EU's security are illustrative of this disconnect between local security needs and EU member states' security policies.

Third, there is undeniably a financial aspect to member states' limited appetite for CSDP operations. All institutions and public policies have been hit by financial austerity and CSDP has not been immune. This has shaped decision-making processes in all states and ministries, as well as negatively influencing the payoff structure. The size of the civilian missions' budget – €273 million for a total CFSP budget of €314 million in 2014 – has remained very limited compared with other EU funds. As for the military domain, failed attempts to expand the common costs (covered by the Athena mechanism) in the latest revision process so as to minimise the effect of the 'costs lie where they fall' rule, attest to these financial impediments. Although it cannot be claimed that non-deployments of EU Battle Groups have been the result of the implied financial burden on the countries on stand-by, the financial arrangements for military operations militate against their feasibility.

Fourth, fifteen years after the launching of ESDP/CSDP, the extent to which it has indeed become a 'common' policy is not empirically demonstrated. Depending on the situations and member states, the EU is not necessarily the first 'port of call' and other crisis management instruments may be activated. In this exercise, the EU features as one among a few other options, and not necessarily the preferred one. National policies, NATO, and to a lesser extent the UN, are equally important security policy options. Indeed there are quite a few cases where some states are more active through national channels than through the existing CSDP operation or mission. This not only complicates the implementation of the comprehensive approach, but it also raises the question of the added value of CSDP where it is not the main instrument of the EU security presence.

EU capacity, clear and realistic mandates

The second 'ingredient' of success of CSDP operations relates to the capacity of the EU to plan and run operations in an effective manner. It has been stated several times in this paper that the EU had made significant progress in building its capacity to analyse, decide, plan, and run military and civilian operations. Nonetheless, the EU still suffers from a number of shortcomings that impede its ability to run operations effectively.

First, CSDP operations still need to be better connected with a broader foreign policy framework of which they are just one element. This leads back to the role of member states in demonstrating the relevance of CSDP, but the strategic planning capacity of the EU as a whole is also concerned. Regional strategies have helped forge that link, and the work being done on a possible new 'EU strategy' will also provide a framework, but there are still issues regarding the strategic purpose of missions that remain isolated from a broader EU strategy. Debates on 'exit' and 'transition' strategies, whereby a CSDP operation hands over to other forms of EU engagement, so as to sustain what the CSDP effort has achieved, also attest to the difficulty of designing different phases of the EU presence in a strategic manner.

Second, despite the efforts produced in the context of the comprehensive approach, inter-agency coordination or the lack thereof remains a source of potential underperformance. Relations between HQ and the field, between operations and EU Delegations, and among operations wherever there are several, continue to raise issues of diverging institutional cultures, different priorities or even competition. The civil-military relationship is an important dimension of comprehensiveness and also one of its stumbling blocks.

Third, the EU crisis management structures – currently under review – remain underdeveloped. In the military domain, the EU largely outsources to states – and theoretically to NATO – the planning and conduct of military operations. This has its advantages, and relates to deeper political considerations that will not be elaborated upon here. Yet the EU is unlikely to become the security provider that the Lisbon Treaty refers to in the absence of an appropriately-designed military structure within the EEAS. Likewise, the civilian part of the EEAS crisis management structures is limited in size, and has only recently started to be upgraded.

Finally, CSDP observers often underline the political and administrative inertia of the EU which may play against the type of flexibility required in crisis management. The crisis management procedures were reviewed and simplified in 2013 yet the entire planning process and the degree of state control over it make launching any new operation a slow and sometimes unnecessarily politicised process. The paradox here is that member states may complain about the inertia of the institution while being simultaneously reluctant to relinquish their control over it, in both the military and civilian domains. Such rigidity was lately illustrated (although there were also signs of an eagerness to adapt) by the parallel debates over the revision of the Athena decision and the 'Train and Equip' programme, in both of which cases the controversial issue at stake was access to funds for CSDP operations.

This being said, the EU must also be given clear and realistic mandates. Crisis management mandates often raise expectations that are unlikely to be met in two years or solely through the deployment of an operation. Rule of law or SSR mandates are cases in point, given the long-term challenges of such tasks in fragile states. Here lies the tension between the requirement to define what is to be achieved through the operation (end-state) versus the necessity to set a limited timeframe (end-date). When a mandate is implicitly about transforming a failed state into a democratically-run market economy in only a few years (end-date), the strongest politically-backed and institutionally-efficient process is still likely to produce partial results. But at the same time agreeing on an end-state runs the risk of never-ending deployments.

Host state buy-in

The necessity to ensure the local buy-in of any CSDP activity has become a *leitmotiv* in EU doctrine. CSDP operations have all been created on the basis of the consent of the host state, and in some cases a formal invitation, which is a pre-condition

of local ownership. As seen before, the successful conduct of the mission is critically dependent on consent and local ownership**,** as no sustained stability can be imposed from the outside. Be it in capacity-building, monitoring or peacekeeping, there is very little that the EU can do in the absence of a full and sustained buy-in from the recipient state.

However, the EU is, just like all other international crisis management actors, confronted with the difficulty of how to operationalise local ownership. The challenge is to secure buy-in not only at the highest level of the state authorities, but also within the ministries/administrations that will be the targets of the EU operation. When mandates imply, as is often the case, changes in the distribution of power or in governance structures and responsibilities within the host state, consent is all the more difficult as the interlocutors feel threatened in their own positions by the EU intervention. Performance is also dependent upon the ability of the host state to absorb the kind of assistance that an operation brings, and in the end to own the entire process. Local ownership therefore has two equally important dimensions: it is about the EU ability to empower local stakeholders as much as it is about the absorption capacity of the host country. Consent is also difficult to sustain, especially when the legitimacy of the EU presence erodes over time.

In this context, local perceptions of the EU as a neo-colonial actor, especially in Africa, together with criticism of the 'liberal peace' agenda that most CSDP operations are seen to epitomise, tend to undermine local buy-in and therefore the overall EU performance.

On the EU side, obstacles range from mistrust *vis-à-vis* local actors and the difficulty in identifying different layers of legitimate interlocutors to a certain preference for 'unilateral' policies rather than complicating the process through the involvement of local actors, and sometimes the poor quality of local leaders.

In the context of this paper, and more specifically this section on the inherent limitations of CSDP, the issue of local ownership reinforces the notion of crisis management as a third-party intervention that can only be successful if local actors not only accept external assistance, but also become the principal actors of transformation. In most cases, this propensity of local actors to make the process theirs lies beyond the power of CSDP or even EU interventions.

Conclusion

The issue of evaluating the success or failure of CSDP operations is central to academic and policy debates, and key to the further improvement of EU practices. This is a front where the EU is moving forward. Yet measuring success is not easy for methodological and political reasons, while success itself is a permanent challenge given the ambitious and intricate nature of crisis management.

In this context, CSDP has proven its added value through a series of operations that have contributed to the broader stabilisation of the countries in which they have been deployed. In parallel, it is the entire CSDP machinery that has gone through a process of professionalisation that, five years after the establishment of the EEAS, is quite visible.

In the meantime, CSDP is confronted with structural difficulties that tangibly hamper its performance. Overall, it is a working hypothesis that the 'ingredients of success' will never be fully met. CSDP operations are therefore doomed to operate in an imperfect world, and to reflect what EU member states, the EU as an institution and the host country are ready to provide or accept at a given moment.

Conclusion

This *Chaillot Paper* has examined CSDP operations and missions by embedding them in the broader environment of multidimensional crisis management. This approach has highlighted some comparative advantages of the EU, but also the fact that many of the difficulties encountered in the security domain are not specific to the EU but are shared by all other security actors. However, this should not be interpreted as an invitation to lower the level of ambition or revise the EU's standards downwards; rather the aim is to provide an analytical framework for an objective assessment of what the EU is trying to do through CSDP.

Structural difficulties have not been downplayed. They are real, and likely to remain in the coming years. They relate to member states' policies, the EU's internal structure, and the broader inextricable challenge of managing crises and building peace.

But CSDP has also proven its added value and made the EU a key actor of crisis management both generically and through specific niche capabilities. In the meantime, CSDP has over the last five years gone through a process of professionalisation and improvement of its underlying working methods, thereby demonstrating an ability to adapt to the evolving crisis management needs.

In this environment, CSDP is only one piece of a crisis management puzzle that includes at least three other pieces: one is CFSP or rather the EU's external action, and the necessity to embed operations and missions in a broader EU agenda; the second one is the constellation of crisis management actors with which the EU has to interact; and the third one is the local environment and the many variables that come into play to transform a situation of extreme fragility into one of transition towards sustainable peace. At best, CSDP is a small part of a much bigger game.

Annex

Abbreviations

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUTM	EU Training Mission
fYROM	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GNP	Gross National Product
HQ	Headquarters
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan
MISCA	*Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine* (African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RCA	*République centrafricaine* (Central African Republic)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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