

Theories at a loss? EU-NATO fusion and the ‘low-politicisation’ of security and defence in European integration¹

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Abstract

In the European Union, security and defence integration was for a long time seen as impossible or at least highly unlikely. Theories of European integration leaned complacently on the idea that security and defence policy have a *specific character* that explains this state of affairs. Yet, recent developments seem seriously to challenge their assumptions: the new joint EU crisis management with military means is bound at least to affect, if not replace, the traditional defence policy of the member states.

Both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism may be momentarily at a loss with this development, but, as resilient overall theories, they are already finding explanations for it. The problem, however, is that as they are likely to retain their basic assumptions, both fail to detect the change taking place: security and defence change nature in the process of integration, and may actually be losing their ‘specific character’.

I shall argue that a wholly new type of supranational defence is becoming a reality within the European Union – unless a EU-NATO fusion puts on the brakes.

After delineating these two possibilities, I shall look at Finland, whose security and defence policy is oscillating between the two. Finland is an example of how new security perceptions are adopted from the European ‘reference group’ and how these influence the perceived practical defence policy needs of the country. Finland is quickly adapting a supranationalising discourse in its security policy. Yet, it also tries to have a foot in the other camp, and may therefore be pursuing two contradictory objectives simultaneously.

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1. *Theories at a loss? Security and defence in theories of European integration*

For a long time, the absence of security and defence policy from the process of European integration served as solid proof of the validity of realism-based intergovernmental theories of integration. There was a domain in which the states would not renounce their decision-making rights, to which integration would not extend; in short, a domain that confirmed the continuing centrality of the state, and that was security and defence.

True, in the early 1960s, (neo)functionalism had seemed to have the upper hand in the contest for the best theoretical explanation of the new phenomenon called integration. The first steps taken by the EEC seemed to cast doubt on realist pessimism about the possibilities of interstate cooperation. They also gave impetus to thinking in terms of mechanisms of spill-over whereby the states actually would no longer be in control of processes that, guided by other groups' interests, would ultimately supersede them and lead to the formation of wholly new political communities.

This was how Ernst B. Haas defined integration. In *The Uniting of Europe* (1958), Haas defined integration as the formation of a new political community. 'Political community', then, was a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographical space. In Western Europe, the existing national states were (then) such political communities. In the process of integration, however, national political actors were persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the national states. A new political community would subsequently be formed, superimposed over the existing ones (Haas 1958: 4-5, 16).

More precisely, Haas saw integration as a two-way process in which the central institutions affect and are affected by the subject groups (*idem*: xxxii-xxxiii) and in which the actors' values and interests are redefined. While in the beginning, national values direct the decisions, e.g., to join in or to abstain from integration, these values gradually change towards a geographically larger, regional orientation and towards a new 'nationalism'. (*Idem*: 13-14, 19.) Or, as Haas put it in 2001, there was a quasi-automatic spillover: demands for additional central services would intensify as the central institutions proved unable to satisfy the claims of their new clients. In the background, there were

elements of soft rational choice: actors seek to realise their interests with whatever means available, and the interests are value-derived, changing through, for instance, learning. (Haas 2001: 23 and 25.)

Logically, one would think, integration would eventually proceed along its way from 'low' to 'high' politics into the field of security; values would change over time even in these questions, giving way to communitarian rather than national principles. In practice, however, this did not happen. On the contrary, the realist tradition got on its feet again already in mid-1960s. Using events such as the French policies of an empty chair and the ensuing Luxembourg compromise, the realists were able to find evidence that the states remained firmly in control of the process of integration, as indeed of every other process, being as they were the most important international actors.

What is more, the realist tradition rather quickly appropriated integration as a phenomenon that was not proof against realist theory, but rather was evidence of its validity. Security and defence played a crucial role for the theory. The realist-intergovernmentalist tradition was able to depend on the fact that at least these policy fields would remain in the hands of governments, even if the process of integration would otherwise show unexpected vitality and innovativeness. At the same time, it could be argued that these fields were also the most important of all policy fields.

Thus, Stanley Hoffmann, arguing in 1966 that integration takes place if there is a permanent excess of gains over losses, stated that this cannot be true of political integration or high politics. There, the goals and methods differed crucially from those in low politics realms. Similarly, in 1982 he wrote that economic and monetary regimes were understandable, following as they did the logic of state interest, but they were not 'real' integration in the sense that they did not weaken the state. On the contrary, a defence community would be a decisive change: it would solely weaken the state, as defence is of a zero-sum nature: one's gain is another's loss. Thus, if a defence community is formed, the state will be weakened, and, in Hoffmann's definition, real integration is taking place.

This was a safe argument, as defence integration seemed still very unlikely at that time. More widely, the argument also validated the realists' interpretation of integration as only taking place according to their 'rules', that is, when, and only when, it was in the states' interests.

Indeed, the unlikelihood of a defence community was so blatantly evident that even the (neo)functionalists agreed that integration would not reach any area of the member states' policies. Spillover notwithstanding, it was not that there ultimately would not be any policy fields left untouched by the process of integration. Even when arguing, in 1961, that the nation-state was in full retreat in Europe, Haas remarked that the different "functional contexts" were autonomous: integrative forces in one kind of activity did not necessarily infect other activities, even within the same organisation. (Haas 1961: 366, 373.)

As Rosamond (2000: 62) points out, Haas saw that not all sectors would have equal spillover potential. The dynamism of integration had to be started by fields that were economically significant, with a day-to-day impact upon people's lives. Defence and culture would not be such fields. Moreover, to overcome the inherent autonomy of the various policy fields, one would need a central institution, a supranational body with considerable power of initiative that would then take over the issue beyond the influence of the member states' changing policy aims. There was, thus, a clear borderline; integration in security and defence would not be achieved.

Progressively, the argument became increasingly convincing as more arguments were gathered to sustain it. It was noted, for instance, differences in views among the members were far too great, and that there was a division of labour between the different organisations that assigned security and defence to NATO and not to the EC.

The main reason, however, why the process of integration would not come to include security and defence was that these fields formed the core of national sovereignty. The member states would not give up their autonomous decision-making power in these questions to common institutions or supranational authorities. The governments did not consider it to be in their interests to coordinate their foreign policies. These issues thus did not follow any logic of 'automaticity', but instead showed that any development towards closer cooperation was dependent on the interests of the governments. Foreign policy, linked to statehood, sovereignty, national identity and political accountability, could not easily be lifted to the domain of common policies. (Cf. Wallace 1996: 440-441 and Wallace 1982: 64.) Defence, then, was only even more clearly outside the scope of supranational integration. As van Staden (1994: 153) put it, "for the foreseeable future none of the

EC members can be expected to commit itself to majority decision-making or to accept the authority of a supranational body in questions of life and death.”

This transtheoretical consensus on the specificity of security and defence was more than understandable, as no progress towards integration of security and defence policies was visible in the ‘real world’, the EC. Not even the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 with its pompous declarations of a common foreign and security policy having been “hereby established” or the subsequent Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, that attempted verbal acrobatics to show that some progress had been made between 1991 and 1997, convinced anyone that there was a real intention to proceed in this field, not to speak of measures taken. The ‘common foreign and security policy’ was a mere series of words.

Theories by nature perpetuate an observation, turn a situation into a rule. The view on the eternally intergovernmentalist nature of security and defence policy became only stronger, as the theorists had time to perfect their explanations of why this was so. At the same time, scholars may not only become blind to contrary evidence but also come to serve the purposes of policy-makers who want things to remain as they are, and gladly use the arguments on the inherently intergovernmental nature of security as it is in their interest to keep it such.

So, the late 1990s truly surprised most theorists and practitioners. A common security and defence policy was suddenly no longer impossible: on the contrary, it entered the EU with great ease and velocity. The Petersberg tasks had been added to the EU by the Amsterdam Treaty. In 1998, it was declared that the EU would need to be capable of autonomous operation, even with military means, and in 2000, new institutions started working on an *ad hoc* basis while the member states started to commit considerable military capabilities at the Union’s disposal. Common defence was no longer such an abstract thought, either: an autonomous action capability would in any case require common standards, planning and operating procedures for the participating countries’ armed forces. Many remarked that since 1998, more progress was achieved in the field than in the previous 50 years of EU history (e.g., Howorth 2001: 767).

This amazing development left the two self-righteous theories in stark contrast with what had actually taken place. Yet, theories would not be theories if they were unable to cope with

problematic and challenging new evidence. They might be at a loss, but only momentarily. Both could soon jump on the train again and find a way to accommodate events: to explain why it actually is clear and evident that integration proceeds into the realm of security and defence. In doing this they replicate what already happened earlier in the case of realism, which after some contortion, was able to qualify as a theory of integration. ‘Integration’ had been a phenomenon that by definition was almost impossible ever to happen, if their assumptions were correct. Having to face, however, the shock of the imminent reality of integration among Western European states in the early 1960s, they developed the argument of integration as being something that strengthens the state. In this way they had saved their own assumptions. (See Ojanen 1998: 141-146.)

2. Two ex post facto explanations – but with the same shortcoming

The neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist theories can, in fact, equally well provide an *ex post facto* explanation of security and defence political integration in the EU, ‘appropriating’ the new phenomenon from their respective assumptions, the logic of a creeping supranationalism and the logic of state interests. In explaining the phenomenon, they make the surprise effect of the late 1990’s security integration disappear.

Neofunctionalists were able to use the recent development as a confirmation of the force of spillover, and lift the exemption that different policy fields would be autonomous, originally made to accommodate the scarce progress towards a common foreign and security policy. The spillover mechanism is such that even common security and defence policy eventually will have to become part of the Union. It is an important part of the credibility of other fields, notably the common foreign policy, but it is also a proof of the member states’ commitment to integration and increases their, and the outsiders’, faith in the enterprise. One could even argue that common security and defence policy has a compelling presence; one cannot write down in the treaties that the Union will *not* proceed in this realm.² The intergovernmentalists, who look at the member states’ interests,

² Unless this was agreed explicitly as a part of a EU–NATO fusion, which then would give the non-EU NATO countries, and notably the USA, a say that reaches far beyond the defence policy field because of the very spillover mechanism and the interlinkages between the fields (see below).

could, in turn, easily see that the states would clearly gain from joining forces, shared planning, common standards, and of course from defence industrial cooperation.

The problem with these explanations is caution in renouncing the basic assumption that the two have come to share, that security and defence is something qualitatively different from other policy fields. Both posit a clear borderline between low and high politics, notions that are more or less taken for granted as well.

The intergovernmentalist view would continue using the borderline to show that the process eventually stops somewhere, wherever it is no longer in the states' interests. Interestingly a new use for this unquestioned specificity of security and defence is now also emerging. Security and defence are presented as a field that has great integrative potential. It is not only a field that resembles any other policy field in that it is amenable to being further integrated, but one that can advance the whole integration process. Howorth (2001) makes this argument clearly. In his view, ESDP development is in a position to give a new boost to the process of integration precisely since it is different from the other fields. The difference is visible in the dynamics and mechanisms of policy formulation and policy adjustment that are of a different order in the CFSP and especially the ESDP from those that pertain in other key policy sectors of the EU: traditional intergovernmentalism and transgovernmentalism³ remain the dominant mode (Howorth 2001: 766). For instance, defence budgets are of special nature: member states are not likely to yield sovereignty over defence spending (*idem*, p. 782).

These were seen previously as problems; now, the ESDP is reckoned to have a “galvanising effect of ESDP” on the process of integration. This effect stems more precisely from the specificity of military crisis management. Security policy demands “more robust – and swift – handling” than foreign policy (*idem*, p. 767). Also, the new degree of protagonism in the security field intensifies the process; in Howorth's view, less because of any neofunctionalist logic and more for the “simple reality that the politics of security and crisis management demand rapidity and efficiency of decision-making” (*idem*, p. 769) in responding to external events.

³The term ‘transgovernmentalism’, by H. Wallace and W. Wallace (2000) *Policy-Making in the European Union*. (4th edition), denotes the intensive integration between national policy-makers outside the normal institutions of the EU.

Thus, new interpretations quickly appear: it is now the realm of security and defence that has most integrative potential; while for Haas (above) it had been the field with least such potential! Yet, one could argue that it is not that integration changes, as the process expands to new fields; it is rather security and defence that change. Indeed, the specificity of the process of European integration lies exactly in the capacity to transform policy fields. More specifically, the process renders this policy field 'normal', low-political.

If the EU operated in a 'vacuum', this transformation would be clearly visible. Yet, the EU is embedded in a context of contradictory processes. There are now two competing models of organising security and defence policy within the EU: a supranational and an intergovernmental one, and the relations between the EU and NATO are of paramount importance in this competition. The two alternatives, supranational defence and EU-NATO fusion, are explained below.

3. First alternative: supranational defence in the European Union

It is not necessarily true that security and defence would be somehow inherently different from other policy fields. On the contrary, the particularity of the European integration process is exactly that it renders defence similar to other fields. Just as the engines of the process of integration vary, what is seen as high and low politics may also change places. Security policy became the engine of integration in 1998 after the others had lost their driving force: the Eastern enlargement started to be postponed and the EMU decision had been made. Security policy could well again be losing that role to JHA cooperation. On the other hand, if security policy was previously a high political issue, it is now more on the 'lower' side.

What made security and defence high politics in the first place? They were depicted as being at the core of state sovereignty; they were a national interest, as was the protection of national armaments industries. Conscript armies and territorial defence were also elements used for keeping the nation together or, historically, forming it. Thus, the emphasis was strictly intergovernmental in character. Besides, defence was not a EU matter as it clearly belonged to NATO and leaned on the US presence.

Yet, it has always been difficult to draw clear boundaries or dividing lines around this ‘security and defence’ or, indeed, around ‘state sovereignty’. The line drawn in the Single European Act of 1986 that brought the coordination of positions on “political and economic aspects of security” into the EC, while leaving out what was supposed to be the more sensitive ‘rest’, was not particularly clear. The border between crisis management and defence that many EU member countries would like all to see is another example of lines drawn in water.

Now, security and defence are being ‘low-politicised’. Security is a EU matter, the era of conscription and territorial defence seem over – after all, there are other ways of keeping the nation together than a conscript army. Considerable convergence can be detected in the member states’ policies; that this convergence is to a large extent the heritage of NATO and WEU cooperation does not diminish its value. Supranational institutions enter the play too: the European Commission claims its role in the slice of defence that is linked to the common market, trade, procurement, and cooperation the armaments industry.

If there is something particular in defence, it could paradoxically be that defence is the simplest field of all to be integrated. Talking defence between defence specialists is easy, and military crisis management is easier than civilian crisis management. Indeed, building up a crisis management capacity did not start in the ‘easy’ field of civilian (civil administration) cooperation, but in the military field– and the civilian field is often acknowledged to be the more difficult one.

What makes security and defence so ‘easy’? First, it is a question of practical cooperation. As Howorth (2001: 780) puts it, military officials have little difficulty in reaching clear agreement on action to achieve a practical result. Second, large-scale industries are involved: instead of protectionism, there is a quest for cooperation to increase competitiveness. Third, there is the need to reform the military – to spend less, if possible, while achieving something that would be more up-to-date in relation to new security threats. Fourthly, it is easy to draw on models and decisions already made in other organisations: to set up new institutions (NATO model) or to commit troops and weapons (originally committed for the use of the WEU or the UN).

There is, in fact, a fair amount of consensus in this field. Heisbourg (2000: 5), when analysing the rapid proceeding of ESDP, notes that “in contrast to other European initiatives in areas lying close

to the heart of state sovereignty” (euro and Schengen) the ESDP has enjoyed a broad consensus (the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in this field is for him one reason for this consensus). Moreover, as “the very nature of political-military decision-making requires speed and efficiency”, this new field can boost European integration generally (Howorth 2001: 780). One could argue that the often expressed claim that there will be no common security and defence policy without a common foreign policy (e.g., Sjursen 1998: 111-112) is not true. The order of appearance would seem to be the opposite: a common defence policy could, in the EU, bring about common foreign policy.

Once defence is ‘in’ the Union, the process of supranationalisation starts. Defence is thus affected by the processes of socialisation, both of people working with the questions and of member states. Glarbo (2001) delineates a constructivist account of the EPC and lists several significant channels of socialisation within common foreign policy: the informal and relaxed Gymnich meetings between foreign ministers (a “highly unorthodox institutional novelty” that soon “enjoyed formidable success”), and indeed, a “coordination reflex” among those involved. Policy coordination is (no longer) a deliberately chosen means of pursuing preferences (in which case it could fall under the intergovernmentalist view) but “a naturally ‘done thing’”. The diplomats have ‘internalised’ this behaviour; Glarbo even claims that social integration is emerging as “the natural historical product” of the day-to-day practices of political cooperation (Glarbo 2001: 148, 155).

Against this background, the plans for establishing a formal defence ministers’ council are of great interest. Howorth points out that such a council would undoubtedly have neofunctionalist integrationist dynamics. Moreover, if, and as, the defence ministries assume a greater role through ESDP, this will again be a boost, since they have “propensity for consensus” and “a far greater degree of agreement” between them than between the ministries for foreign affairs as to the ESDP development. Yet, he also notes that this ‘risk’ has contributed to the emerging centrality of the Political and Security Committee instead, as an institution emanating from the ministries for foreign affairs. (Howorth 2001: 767, 782.)⁴

⁴ Thus, the defence ministers would arguably need less ‘socialisation’ than the other ministers. At the same time, it is somewhat embarrassing for the theory that exactly those ministries that have *not* been involved in the process of integration would be those with greatest consensus among themselves.

As to the socialisation of member states, peer review and explicit criteria for participation could be 'borrowed' from other fields, as has already been discussed. One model is the EMU and its convergence criteria, that in the field of defence could in principle yield criteria such as comparable levels of, or a minimum of, defence expenditure, professionalisation (rapid reaction capacity, interoperability), specialisation, a common market for defence (common defence procurement) and more industrial cooperation (e.g., Missiroli 1999). Heisbourg (2000: 9) sees that there already is a strong convergence, and *solidarités de fait*. One concrete step to be taken would in his view be budget comparisons, or actually a harmonisation of EU defence-budget presentations to ensure a high degree of transparency and comparability, despite the fact that some countries might try to invoke national-security reasons to avoid exposing their budgetary shortcomings. (*Idem*: 11-12.)

What would then be special to supranational defence can be found if we look at why the EU is special. First, "[t]he EU has a potentially powerful legitimising role which post-Cold War NATO has not been proven to possess" (Heisbourg 2000: 15). To retain this, there is a need to keep the constituents informed and, through an EU-wide debate, ensure public support (Howorth 2001: 779).

Indeed, there *is* a constituency, contrary to what is often assumed. For instance, Van Staden (1994: 150) argues that foreign policy and defence have no clear constituency in Western European societies: there are no well-organised groups to make demands for further cooperation in the field. In his view, the EU Commission has not succeeded well, and the USA has been in a sense a driving force. Yet, these 'facts' seem no longer true. The constituency is there, and it might be rapidly growing. It is composed of defence industry interests but also of public opinion. Indeed, there is even a constituency in the traditional sense of the word, made out of individuals, a public opinion on European security, if only the public is allowed to participate in debates on defence issues, and eventually – following Haas' definition – shift their loyalties and expectations from states to central authorities in this field, too. Thus, there is more to the benefits of supranationalisation than merely the single market: the potential for transparency could be included.

Second, what is particular in the European Union is that all policy fields tend to mix with other fields – in a way that at times has negative effects in that it leads to strange package deals being made. A proof that security indeed is an integral part of the EU construction is that it is widely recognised that a failure in ESDP – first concrete operations – would have devastating

consequences, and that for fields other than the ESDP proper: Howorth (2001: 773) says that failure would compromise the entire transatlantic relationship and place a heavy question mark over the other political dimensions of EU integration.

Third, the supranational bodies are there to take care of their special role, in Haas' words, of overcoming the inherent autonomy of the various policy fields and taking over the issues beyond the influence of the member states' changing policy aims (see above). The European Commission is, as Patten (2000) points out, competent in the civilian side of crisis management and wants to extend the benefits (and rules) of the single market to the armaments industry. The role of the European Parliament has traditionally been very limited, as defence has been kept intergovernmental. Howorth (2001: 778) points out that many MEP's wish to claim oversight of the emerging defence and military projects of the EU, and adds: "Notwithstanding the relative inappropriateness and the almost total lack of precedent for such oversight in most national parliamentary traditions, this aspiration does reflect the cultural difference between the EU (at least as hitherto constructed) and the USA as a superpower."

In practice, these features give a picture of what the shared starting points for a common defence policy can be. Howorth (2001: 779, 787) finds among them "almost certainly" the aspiration to ensure that political control should be exercised over all aspects of military developments, as well as the emphasis on civil-military relations, which is in his view a ESDP specificity *vis-à-vis* the USA "which will, in time, become its anchor and its strength". Andréani *et al.* (2001: 74-76) would add to the list of European specificities the aim of addressing root causes of conflicts rather than using power against their symptoms, generosity in development assistance and willingness to share the benefits of multilateralism.

Supranational defence would mean that answers to the central questions that are still open in the ESDP – such as what the EU force is supposed to do, and how much is spent on it (Heisbourg 2000) – would emanate not only from member states, but also their parliaments and public opinion, as well as common institutions, as they would in other fields. And this is the point: there is nothing special about defence that would impede this from happening.

4. Second alternative: EU-NATO fusion as a counterforce to low-politicisation

While the low-politicisation of defence policy proceeds, there is another development potentially going in the opposite direction, or putting the brakes on supranationalisation. If one looks at factors that triggered the rapid development of the EU's 'defence dimension', two important ones are, first, the EU's internal need for new dynamism after EMU – with security and defence taken in as the new engine – and second, a new emphasis on crisis management in all relevant European organisations.

Crisis management became trendy in the 1990s. For various reasons the different organisations were looking at it as a new field of activity. The defence organisations NATO and WEU had to find new, broader activities, after their traditional defence function ceased; but so had the EU, which was looking for something more military to give credibility to its common foreign policy. From two opposite directions, thus, the organisations' tasks and fields of competences started to converge, become increasingly overlapping. At times, it would even seem as if the organisations would swap identities: NATO would become a political organisation, while the EU would become a military one. The new overlap implied that there was a need to find rules and roles, if not altogether a real division of labour between the organisations in crisis management.

At the same time, the EU's need for a military capacity to back up its security and defence policy now makes it necessary to build working relations with NATO. Earlier, the problem was solved by having recourse to the WEU that, in turn, would have particular relations with NATO to get the necessary capacities together. The EU is now, after the almost total merger of the WEU, itself its military arm, but really autonomous EU capacities are seen as either impossible or undesirable. Therefore, negotiations on the relations between NATO and the EU have become increasingly central, and complex. A significant problem is that it is not easy to delimit clearly the issues under discussion. It is not a question of a mere agreement on the possibility to use some NATO assets; it is also a matter of the two organisations' decision-making autonomy. Indeed, the relations seem to have become rather wider than narrowly defined, as, e.g., the emerging practice of joint meetings on all levels shows. This could ultimately lead to a EU-NATO fusion.

EU-NATO fusion would mean making the EU's crisis management capacity, and thereby the ESDP, dependent on systematic and formal cooperation with NATO. Because of the inherent interlinkages between different fields in the EU, a fusion would imply that the non-EU NATO countries, particularly the USA, would become involved in the EU's other policy fields as well, not only the ESDP. The only way to avoid this would be to build a 'fire-wall' to impede 'filtering' or impeding the spillover that would otherwise take place. This 'fire-wall' would isolate security and defence from other fields of EU policy, making it an exception where decision-making rights would be shared with NATO. As a consequence, the fire-wall would mean isolating defence from the EU's overall development and keeping it firmly intergovernmental, letting military decisions fall in the field of NATO. In this fusion alternative, NATO would thus provide the crucial answers to questions on ESDP development, as it would be very likely that it would already have them.

In practice, EU-NATO fusion would mean that NATO sets the norms for crisis management as well as for the member states' military forces. Would this be what Howorth (2001: 783) calls "the Natoization of the Union, or the US hegemony via the back door"? EU-NATO relations have started taking shape largely based on the heritage of WEU-NATO relations. Some would say that the EU needs some re-education in order to cope with the new field and the new partner, to be able to speak the same language. Thus, it is argued that the EU should develop a "military culture" (Andréani *et al.* 2001: 39). Examples of traditional 'state-like' elements entering the Union can already be found, such as the ability to defend the external borders (Amsterdam Treaty). Similarly, openness and transparency, advocated in other EU fields, are not the first principles in the EU's new role as an international actor. On the contrary, the High Representative of the CFSP has claimed that the EU should have common CFSP strategies that are not public, in that a strategy that is known to all cannot work (see Howorth 2001: 781 on Solana's arguments).⁵

Others think that EU-NATO fusion is commendable as it permits the EU to retain its 'civilian power' outlook through a division of labour where NATO takes on the 'dirty job' of actual military operations. Yet, both the civilian power thinking and the idea of a division of labour might in the end be somewhat conservative.

⁵The problem, however, is that a strategy that is not public cannot be proven to have worked, either, as its goals have not been revealed.

Andréani *et al.* (2001: 18-19) take up the harmful consequences of the early division of labour between the EC/EU and NATO: Europe, “spared the challenge of coping with its own defence, could enjoy the luxury of developing its identity as a civilian power”, something that in their view had negative effects on integration. The reasons they give are the ensuing narrow strategic horizons and inexperience in power politics, but one could also argue that there was an absence of a positive effect, a delay in supranationalising defence.

The logic of EU integration means an eventual supranationalisation of defence, while the NATO logic keeps it traditionally intergovernmental. The largest NATO member, the USA, would hardly want to be part of any supranational arrangement, nor would it, because of its size, be welcomed to join one. Defence in NATO is intergovernmental in outlook, something that does not refer so much to the mode of decision-making (as consensus achieved with various means may be the real decision-making mode in both organisations) than to the absence of linkages between issues, the spillover potential. Issue linkages and spillover may imply strange package deals between issues that hardly relate to one another, but they can also imply a healthy ‘proportionalisation’ or ‘relativisation’, discussing priorities, as in any budget negotiation. These benefits of supranational defence risk being lost when NATO and the EU are linked closer together.

5. Conclusions in the Finnish way: trying to have it both ways⁶

How does the situation look in practice from the point of view a EU member state? The case of Finland provides an interesting example of how a country is both drawing a line and being prepared to jump over it. In Finnish EU policies, ‘compatibility’ has been the keyword: compatibility between the Finnish policies of military non-alignment and the evolving European foreign, security and defence policy. The logic has been that there is a borderline, between low and high politics, or, in a newer form, between crisis management and common defence, that no one intends to cross and that thus makes compatibility possible.

In practice, however, Finnish security and defence policy is an example of how defence can be easily internationalised in rhetorically and practically over a short period of time, even without being

⁶ For a more detailed account, see Ojanen, forthcoming (2002).

member of a military alliance. The Finnish governments' security policy reports, or 'White Papers', give interesting indications of an unconcealed change in Finnish security political discourse. On the one hand, the reports use 'EU-ish' expressions that as such are among the least-informative commonplaces one could find, but that are arguably put there as 'statements of faith', sentences that serve to strengthen a shared interpretation and a shared approval of a fact and thus show Finland's loyalty and belongingness. The report on security policy of 2001 (p. 22) notes, for instance, that "[t]he Amsterdam Treaty [...] has made EU decision-making more effective" and "[t]he EU's enlargement policy has enhanced stability in Europe".

On the other hand, Finland also seems readily to mould the definition of its own security and defence policy according to the scope of EU action. The security report of 1997 (p. 84) stated that the "central tasks [of the Defence Forces] include guarding our territory and ensuring its integrity, defending the nation, providing military training on a basis of general conscription and participating in international peacekeeping in a manner determined by the political leadership of Finland". Now, in the report of 2001 (pp. 43-44), Finnish security policy is said to focus "*primarily* on crises that affect Finland" (italics added), but not only: one of the tasks the Finnish Defence Forces is said to have is a capability for "managing crises in unstable regions outside Finland's borders." The threat scenarios included in the report involve regional crises that may only have an indirect effect on Finland. (Pp. 47-48.) Even Africa is mentioned, paving perhaps the way for future involvement.

The Finnish defence discourse as a whole seems to have changed through a new emphasis on international military cooperation. This serves not only to pacify the international community but also to strengthen the Finnish military: "[m]ultifaceted international military cooperation increases openness and trust between countries and improves the international community's capacity to prevent and resolve military conflicts" while "[p]articipation in international crisis management provides experience that can be of use in national defence and in maintaining readiness in crisis situations. The Finnish Defence Forces' international cooperation also reinforces the credibility of the country's national defence capability." (Report 2001, p. 26.)

Finnish defence has made some way from being a "credible national defence" to one that is said to be more credible if internationalised. If the security political report of 1997 (p. 59) still stated that "[a]s a country that belongs to no military alliance, Finland decides independently what level of

resources to devote to her defence and what military operations are appropriate in various situations”, these decision-making rights are now shared with others. Now, ”[t]he objectives of national and international action are increasingly consistent with one another” (report 2001, p. 44), which is one way of saying that the Finnish objectives have been made more consistent with others’ objectives.

Finland would not object to a development towards a supranational ‘common market defence’. It has shown willingness to accept flexibility in foreign and security policy, as well as majority voting. What are the Finnish motivations? Willingness to be there, in what is perceived as the core of the Union, is certainly one reason. New security perceptions are adopted from the European ‘reference group’, to which Finnish political leaders are closely tied through a complex web of agreements, package deals, solidarity and loyalty, and these influence the perceived practical defence policy needs of the country. Public debate in Finland seems also to pave way for more EU autonomy in relation to the UN, relaxing, thus, the Finnish emphasis on the need for a mandate.

Yet, Finland also follows closely what the larger member states do; its ‘option’ of joining NATO is there as an extra tool if needed. The idea of accepting some kind of common defence commitments is approached and made more easily acceptable by using the argument of shared responsibility and the shame of free riding. Neither has the government much objected to ‘Natoish’ security rules limiting access to documents on crisis management or PFP cooperation; these rules are seen as a natural part of tightening links to NATO cooperation.

It is often argued that the smaller and newer member states of the Union do not have much of an influence on how the issue of European security and defence policy unfolds. Yet, Finland’s keeping one foot in the camp of the EU-NATO fusion might go against the supranational development of the Union that Finland otherwise gladly furthers. If Finland is truly for the Commission’s role and an enhanced role for the EU, it should perhaps advocate supranational defence rather than EU-NATO fusion.

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