

Africa: a Region for Enhanced NATO-EU Cooperation

by Allen Pepper¹



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The African continent is ripe for expanded NATO-European Union (EU) cooperative efforts. Both Brussels-based organizations have been active in Africa in the security and defense arena over the last dozen years, but they have only coordinated their activities in a very limited fashion, sometimes resulting in confusing messages and duplicative efforts. NATO-EU collaboration should advance more rapidly in Africa than it has elsewhere, with the EU in the lead in the areas of crisis management and cooperative security and NATO in a supporting role. This enhanced cooperation with regards to Africa could open the door for better relations between the two organizations in other areas, as well.

Background on the EU-NATO Relationship

When the EU launched the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999,² many analysts immediately saw it as a French attempt to create a rival for NATO. Given the Gaullist tendencies of then French president Jacques Chirac, this analysis was likely somewhat accurate, as the French saw the CSDP as a “vehicle for enhancing the EU’s political credibility.”³ This rivalry, however, is largely a thing of the past. French president Nicolas Sarkozy had already begun downplaying the role of the EU in counterbalancing NATO and the United States shortly after taking office in 2007, and the French reintegration into most of the command structures of the Alliance in 2009 made it clear that France would not abandon NATO to push for an EU-focused security posture. The French 2013 Defense White Paper confirms this, recognizing the complementarity of the two organizations.⁴ The 2014 NATO Wales Summit declaration likewise provides affirmation for the CSDP, recognizing that the EU “remains a unique and

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² Originally named the European Security and Defense Policy, the EU’s 2009 Treaty of Lisbon changed the name to the Common Security and Defense Policy.

³ Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, Washington, DC, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 29, 2008, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32342.pdf> (accessed September 23, 2014), 14.

⁴ French Ministry of Defense, “L’engagement de la France dans l’Alliance Atlantique et dans l’Union



essential partner for NATO,” and highlights the need for strengthening the partnership between the two organizations.⁵

The EU remains very keen on having autonomy of decision in security and defense policy and actions, but the organization has had some successes to help it get past a stage in which it jealously guarded its independence from NATO.⁶ This bodes well for future EU-NATO cooperation. The two organizations currently hold regular joint meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and between NATO's Military Committee (MC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC), as well as having some informal meetings at lower levels occurring as often as once a week.⁷ Nevertheless, the partnership has shown limited effects on the ground, and the two organizations are far from reaching a point of strategic and practical complementarity as the French Defense White Paper somewhat optimistically described. One region in which both organizations have been active but not always complementary is Africa.

Africa Policy and Interests

Both NATO and the EU have 28 member states, and 22 countries are members of both organizations, with the three most powerful non-EU Allies being the United States, Turkey, and Canada. Interest in Africa continues to increase for both the United States and Europe. The United States sees Africa as both a land of tremendous economic growth and a source of threats that can touch American interests. As President Obama highlighted in the West Point commencement address that served as his benchmark foreign policy announcement in his second term, “we have a real stake—abiding self-interest in making sure our children and our grandchildren grow up in a world where schoolgirls are not kidnapped,”⁸ refer-

ring to 2014 abductions by West African terrorist group Boko Haram. Meanwhile, the current economic crisis is pushing Europeans to search for potential markets outside of their own continent, and Africa's fast-growing economies make it particularly attractive for Europe, especially given the long-established ties between the two continents. At the same time, waves of illegal immigrants landing on the Italian island of Lampedusa and the so-called Islamic State's control of some Libyan ports where those immigrants embark indicate that Africa will remain a source of instability and insecurity for Europeans.

In its 66 years of existence, NATO has evolved considerably, from focusing purely on collective defense of its member nations to a broader approach to security that extends beyond Europe to counter threats emanating from beyond the Alliance's territory. The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept outlines three core tasks for the Alliance: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.⁹ The 2014 Wales Summit declaration reaffirms the Alliance's commitment to these three tasks.¹⁰ Two of the three, cooperative security and crisis management, correspond well with likely future Western engagement in Africa. The Wales Summit specifically cites growing instability and multi-dimensional threats in North Africa and arms, drugs, and human trafficking in the Sahel as directly threatening the Alliance's members,¹¹ and cooperative security and crisis management tools are best adapted to dealing with such threats. Despite these threats, NATO has not yet established a strategy dedicated to Africa, nor to the larger category of the “Southern Flank.”¹²

The EU's Security Strategy also forecasts several possible threats to European security, with terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime being those most likely to come from Africa.¹³ The Strategy makes specific reference to West Africa and how the effects of

européenne,” Livre Blanc : Défense et sécurité nationale, 2013, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/enjeux2/politique-de-defense/le-livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-et-la-securite-nationale-2013/livre-blanc-2013> (accessed January 19, 2015).

⁵ North Atlantic Council, “Wales Summit Declaration,” September 5, 2014, www.nato.int (accessed January 15, 2015), paragraphs 102 and 106.

⁶ Briefing by NATO official to NATO Defense College, Brussels, November 12, 2014. Briefing conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁷ *Ibid.* As noted later in this paper, the topics that are discussed in the formal meetings are very limited.

⁸ Barack Obama, “Commencement Address at West Point,” May 28, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-commencement-address-at-west-point/2014/05/28/cfbcdcaa-e670-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html (accessed January 15, 2015).

⁹ North Atlantic Council, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” approved October 20, 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf (accessed January 27, 2015), 7.

¹⁰ North Atlantic Council, “Wales Summit Declaration,” paragraph 7.

¹¹ North Atlantic Council, “Wales Summit Declaration,” paragraphs 32 and 39.

¹² The Southern Flank is a term used to refer in particular to North Africa and the Middle East, but it could also extend to Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹³ European Union, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World,” December 12, 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUp->



organized crime and state failure can spread, furthermore noting the importance of working with the United States and African partners to address various threats.¹⁴ In addition, the European Council published a position paper addressing the management of conflicts in Africa, outlining an approach of prevention, building partner capacity, and active engagement (operations).¹⁵ A new European Security Strategy is expected later this year, but the general threats and lines of effort are unlikely to change considerably.

In addition to the interest in Africa found in the policy documents, we likewise see evidence of that interest in the continent via the missions and operations conducted by NATO and the EU. In the case of the EU, over 60% of the missions and operations conducted within the framework of the CSDP have been in Africa, and Africa is the only non-European region that has an EU fund dedicated to Peace and Security, the African Peace Facility.¹⁶ Africa is also of emerging interest to the United States, but for now, the region remains an area where “European interest exceeds American,” largely due to the colonial history, the growing illegal immigration problem, and the influx of North African extremists.¹⁷ The simple factor of geography plays an important role, as the Mediterranean is as much of a link as it is a barrier between Africa and Europe. Even though the colonial history and the threats emanating from Africa touch some European countries more than others, they are sufficiently strong for most European nations that “the EU can reach decisions more easily on Africa than on many other parts of the world.”¹⁸ Both the United Kingdom and France have extensive history and ties with Africa, and they have sometimes used the EU, with some success, to “multilateralize their African foreign policy.”¹⁹

Partnerships can also be an indicator of interests. Partnerships for NATO and the EU are becoming broad-

er and less exclusive, and the African Union (AU) has similarly been expanding its list of partners. Although most African leaders espouse the mantra of “Africa solutions for African problems” and many have real concerns about neocolonialism, several African countries maintain extensive bilateral defense programs with one or more Western countries. The AU and some of the Regional Economic Communities (REC) and Regional Mechanisms (RM) associated with the different regions of Africa also maintain security and defense partnerships with EU and NATO members. Both the EU and NATO have formal organizational-level partnerships with the African Union, as well. To better understand how NATO and the EU may be involved in Africa in the future, it is helpful to look at the two organizations’ activities in the region over the last several years, as they have sometimes been complementary and sometimes not.

NATO Activity in Africa

NATO has conducted operations and capacity-building efforts in Africa. The Alliance first demonstrated its ability and likely willingness to perform operations in Africa when it conducted its initial NATO Response Force exercise in and around the West African island country of Cape Verde in 2006.²⁰ Five years later, the UN requested NATO’s assistance in enforcing a Libyan no-fly zone and arms embargo to protect civilians under attack by Muammar Khadafi’s forces.²¹ Operation Unified Protector lasted seven months and contributed to Khadafi’s fall in October 2011. The operation was militarily successful in the short term, but its backlash badly destabilized the region. The fall of Khadafi unleashed new levels of instability in Libya and the surrounding countries, with direct negative consequences including the Tuareg re-

load/78367.pdf (accessed September 22, 2014).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ European Union, “Position commune du Conseil de l’Union Européenne du 26 janvier 2004 sur la prévention, la gestion, et le règlement des conflits en Afrique, 2004/85/PESC”, in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, January 28, 2004, <http://data.grip.org/documents/200905131008.pdf> (accessed September 24, 2014).

¹⁶ Interview with EU Directorate General for Development and Cooperation officials, Brussels, February 10, 2015. Currently-serving EU and NATO officials agreed to be interviewed but not to be cited by name.

¹⁷ Kenneth Payne, “The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO,” 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf> (accessed September 23, 2014), 25 and 29.

¹⁸ Alex Vines, “Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa,” *International Affairs* 86(5) (2010), 1091.

¹⁹ Malte Brosig, “The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16, Issue (2011), 108.

²⁰ Brooke A. Smith-Windsor and José Francisco Pavia, “From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea: A New Maritime Mission for NATO?” *NATO Defense College Research Paper*, no. 100, January 2014, 8-9.

²¹ United Nations Security Council, UN Security Council Resolution 1973, adopted March 17, 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf (accessed January 27, 2014).



bellion and Islamist takeover of northern Mali. This regional instability threatens Europe, as well. NATO had the support of the Arab League for its intervention, but it did not receive such a green light from the AU, and South African president Jacob Zuma felt that the AU had been ignored in the run-up to military operations.²² In fact, NATO received very mixed messages from African countries and the African Union itself. The fact that Khadafi bankrolled much of the AU's budget made the organization unlikely to support operations that could lead to his toppling, and some governments were hesitant to publicly state their support for his removal given his past history for causing trouble well beyond Libya's borders. However, South Africa had voted in favor of the UN resolution that led to NATO's intervention, despite President Zuma's complaints about the AU being ignored.

This mitigated success in Libya and the mixed reviews of NATO's operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan are likely to temper enthusiasm for crisis management operations by the Alliance in Africa and elsewhere.²³ In addition, the perception of NATO's lack of political consultation with African leaders leading up to the Libya operation and the negative fallout from the operation damaged the Alliance's reputation in Africa. Rather than a positive influence, some African observers see NATO as a "possible instrument of control bent on the domination of international politics."²⁴ The United States' leadership role in NATO only further complicates the situation since many African leaders grew up in Soviet-linked or Non-Aligned Movement states and therefore are pre-disposed to distrust the United States.

In addition to operational missions, NATO has been involved in activities aimed at building partner capacity

(BPC) in the security and defense arena in Africa. The Mediterranean Dialogue is NATO's formal partnership structure for the Middle East and North Africa countries. While the analogous partnership structure for the Gulf Countries, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, has led to partner country participation in NATO operations, the Mediterranean Dialogue has primarily focused on seminars and dialogue, as its name implies.²⁵ One important aspect of the Mediterranean Dialogue for Africa has been its BPC role, as North African officers regularly attend courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany.

EU Activity in Africa in the Security and Defense Arena

Like NATO, the EU has been active with both operations and BPC activity in Africa. The EU has conducted several operations in Africa over the last dozen years. These include military and civil operations, as well as combined civil-military ventures, all within the framework of the CSDP. While most European countries appear reticent to support UN operations with anything more than Military Observers, they have shown to be willing to contribute to EU-flagged missions.

The EU's missions in Africa have primarily supported larger operations by other countries or organizations. The EU has conducted battalion-sized missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) to reinforce UN, African Union, and French operations, while a larger mission in Chad and CAR helped stabilize an area until the UN mission could be stood up there.²⁶ In general, these operations showed the EU preference for geographically-limited, relatively short-term missions that are under their direct political and military control.²⁷ In particular, they

²² J. Shola Omotola, "The AU and NATO: What Manner of Partnership?" in *AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, Forum Paper 22*, ed. by Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Rome, NATO Defense College, 2013, 71.

²³ Markus Kaim, "Prospects for AU-NATO Cooperation," in *AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, Forum Paper 22*, ed. by Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Rome, NATO Defense College, 2013, 81-82.

²⁴ Bola A. Akinterinwa, "AU-NATO Collaboration: Defining the Issues from an African Perspective," in *AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, Forum Paper 22*, ed. by Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Rome, NATO Defense College, 2013, 53.

²⁵ F. Stephen Larrabee and Peter A. Wilson, "NATO Needs a Southern Strategy," Rand Corporation (commentary originally appeared on *Epoch Times* on February 26, 2014), <http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/02/nato-needs-a-southern-strategy.html> (accessed September 25, 2014).

²⁶ Operation Artemis, for example, was a 2003 operation to bridge to the UN's expansion of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The EU deployed a battalion-sized element to help stabilize a small region until the UN was able to mobilize more troops to move into the area. The EUFOR DR Congo mission in the same country in 2006 also reinforced MONUC at a time of increased instability in the capital. In 2008, following heavy French lobbying, the EU launched the EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic mission to help protect the eastern regions of those countries from spillover from the Darfur conflict until the UN operation could be stood up about a year later. Finally, in 2014, the EU supported the French operation Sangaris and the African Union's International Mission in Support of Central Africa (MISCA) in the Central African Republic (CAR) by standing up a battalion-sized mission to provide security in parts of the CAR capital, Bangui. For more information on the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission, see Malte Brosig, "The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16, Issue (2011), 116.

²⁷ Brosig, "The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU," 113.



demonstrate a preference for operations that can bridge to follow-on UN peacekeeping missions, thus allowing for a clear exit option. It is important not to overstate the effectiveness of any of these operations. As one observer noted, “EU troop deployment only becomes meaningful if set in context with UN and AU missions.”²⁸

In the BPC arena, the EU has conducted a tactical training mission in Mali and stood up civ-mil missions in Mali and neighboring Niger to develop coordination between various security sector actors in those countries.²⁹ Illustrative of the variety of support that the EU can provide, the EU’s civ-mil mission in the DRC led the effort to establish a chain of payment for the newly integrated Congolese brigades and create a biometric record of soldiers, to include issuing ID cards.³⁰ Such initiatives do not draw the press attention that tactical training does, but they arguably have a more durable positive effect on security in the African environment.

Still within the general framework of the EU support to African security and perhaps more important than the European boots on the ground has been the EU funding of African-led and -executed operations. The multi-year Economic Community of Central African States’ Mission for the Consolidation of Peace and the AU’s International Mission in Support of Central Africa, both in CAR, would not have been feasible without EU funding. The EU’s African Peace Facility fund, which will have had nearly €2 billion flow through it by the time the next round comes to an end in 2016, finances African-led peacekeeping operations, an early response

mechanism to kickstart mediation or prevention procedures (or an operation, should prevention fail), and capacity-building measures.³¹ Over 75% of these funds go to support African-led missions and particularly the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).³²

The missions and activities described in the preceding paragraphs paint a picture of relative complementarity between NATO and EU engagement in Africa. NATO executed a high-end combat operation in Libya, and the EU conducted medium-to-low-intensity and magnitude peace support operations in Central Africa. Both have conducted BPC activities, but those highlighted thus far have had NATO active with the countries of the Maghreb and the EU engaged with countries of the Sahel and Central Africa. Two zones in which both the EU and NATO have been very active and sometimes less complementary are Darfur (Sudan) and the Horn of Africa.

Zones of Overlapping NATO and EU Activity: Darfur and the Horn

The Darfur missions are an example of the rivalry that existed between the two organizations in the first years after the launch of the CSDP. NATO and the EU both supported the African-led Mission in Sudan (AMIS) starting in 2005 by coordinating the strategic airlift of nearly 40,000 troops via a special AU Air Movement Cell in Addis Ababa, with the AU in the lead and the EU and NATO providing staff.³³ Although official sources

²⁸ Brosig, “The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU,” 117.

²⁹ Also within the framework of the CSDP, the EU has conducted BPC activities in select African countries, notably in the Sahel. In Mali, the EU Training Mission-Mali (EUTM) has provided operational level advising and tactical level training to help rebuild the Malian Security Forces. EUTM operates alongside other EU-funded or -executed programs in Mali to deliver a somewhat comprehensive approach. Next door in Niger, the EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission aims to help Nigerien authorities in “combating terrorism and organized crime” since 2012. Concretely, this means helping develop coordination between various security sector actors in the Nigerien government and military. The EU began its EUCAP Sahel Mali in 2014 with a similar mission.

The EU has also led several BPC activities in Central Africa. In 2015, the EU undertook a new mission, the EU Military Advisory Mission in Central African Republic (EUMAM-RCA) to support the CAR Authorities in preparing a reform of the security sector, especially with regards to management of their armed forces. In DRC, the EUSEC DRC mission provided advice and support to army integration to developing a rapid reaction force. For more details on these missions, see Stephanie Blair, “Assisting Host Country Militaries: Assessing Lessons from NATO, EU, and Member State Experience,” 7; Lesley Ann Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” *CNA Analysis and Solutions Website*, <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/CRM-2014-U-007203-Final.pdf> (accessed September 19, 2014), 69; and European Union, “EUCAP Sahel Mali,” http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-mali/index_en.htm (accessed February 16, 2015).

³⁰ Vines, “Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa,” 1097.

³¹ Interview with EU Directorate General for Development and Cooperation officials, Brussels, February 10, 2015. The African Peace Facility may be used to fund (1) activities led by the AU or by a Regional Economic Community or Regional Mechanism (not UN missions nor single-country programs); (2) Building Partner Capacity programs with the AU or RECs/RMs, such as the development of the African Standby Force, and the AMANI AFRICA exercise; and (3) the Early Response Mechanism, which provides quick access to funds to kickstart mediation or prevention efforts or PSO operations, when needed. The African Peace Facility also funds nearly 75% of the positions on the African Union’s Peace and Security Commission staff. The funding for the African Peace Facility comes from European Development Funds.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ NATO, “NATO Assistance to the African Union,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8191.htm# (accessed November 17, 2014).



such as the NATO website speak to the complementarity of the two organizations' efforts, other observers note that the arrangement in which both the NATO and EU ran parallel airlift missions coordinated by the AU-led cell was "duplicative and inefficient."³⁴ The French, still under the leadership of President Jacques Chirac at the time, had pushed for the EU to take the mission, while other European Allies wanted to go with NATO because the United States would be the main provider of aircraft.³⁵ In the end, capabilities matter, and the United States' participation was essential.

In addition, NATO supported AMIS by contributing to a UN-led mapping exercise and providing training assistance in pre-deployment certification and lessons learned processes.³⁶ The EU's support also included planning and technical assistance, plus donations of military vehicles and equipment. Perhaps most importantly, the EU supported AMIS financially until it became a joint AU-UN hybrid mission.³⁷

It is in the Horn of Africa that NATO and the EU have come closest to executing what may be called a comprehensive approach to improving security. Both organizations have been active in efforts that range from BPC of Somali forces loyal to the government to counter-piracy maritime patrolling. Originally based in Uganda starting in 2010, the EU Training Mission-Somalia (EUTM-S) trained over 3600 soldiers, as well as tactical-level commanders, NCOs, and specialists in fields such as intelligence and engineering. In 2014, EUTM-S shifted its headquarters to Mogadishu, where its advisors are providing strategic advice to Somali authorities. The EU has also provided extensive funding to AMISOM. Still within the framework of the CSDP, the civ-mil EUCAP NESTOR is a BPC mission focused on "strengthening the seagoing maritime capacity of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles" and strengthening the rule of law in certain regions of Somalia.³⁸ The breadth and size

of these missions appear very impressive, but some observers with knowledge of the situation on the ground judge the EU's BPC missions in the Horn of Africa to be largely fluff that brief well but produce little capacity, with much of the funding funneled to projects that don't really need it (such as EUCAP-NESTOR in the Seychelles).³⁹

NATO's BPC efforts in the region have been more limited, consisting primarily of providing subject matter experts for the AU headquarters division that supports AMISOM and offering the opportunity for some officers involved in AMISOM operations to attend courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau. In addition, NATO has provided airlift for some Burundian and Ugandan troops deploying to AMISOM, as well as providing security escort for ships carrying deploying unit equipment.⁴⁰ Although NATO has agreed annually to continue such support, most recently through 2015, the AU has not formally requested any strategic air or sea moves of units or headquarters from NATO for some years.⁴¹ Despite the fact that the effects on the ground are sometimes less than marketed on official websites, EU, NATO, and U.S. BPC activities in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa have been largely complementary, despite the fact that this complementarity is often largely incidental rather than formally planned.⁴²

While the BPC and AMISOM-support efforts of NATO and the EU appear to be complementary, their counter-piracy operations show signs of overlap and duplication. NATO initially conducted Operation ALLIED PROVIDER for three months in late 2008 in response to a UN request to escort World Food Program (WFP) vessels operating in the pirate-laden waters off Somalia. The EU-NAFOR ATALANTA operation picked up the WFP escort responsibilities in early 2009, and then NATO became active again in the region starting in mid-2009 with Operation ALLIED PROTEC-

³⁴ Archick and Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, 23.35

³⁵ Akinterinwa, "AU-NATO Collaboration: Defining the Issues from an African Perspective," 50-63.

³⁶ NATO, "NATO Assistance to the African Union."

³⁷ Brosig, "The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU," 115.

³⁸ European Union External Action Service, "EU Common Security and Defence Policy CSDP Newsletter," Issue 12 (Winter 2012/2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/publications-and-documents/csdp_newsletter/index_en.htm (accessed January 19, 2015), 17-19.

³⁹ Interview with NATO official, Brussels, February 11, 2015. Currently-serving EU and NATO officials agreed to be interviewed but not to be cited by name.

⁴⁰ NATO, "NATO Assistance to the African Union."

⁴¹ Rick Froh, recently retired NATO official, interview by author, Brussels, February 11, 2015.

⁴² Interview with EU Directorate General for Development and Cooperation officials, Brussels, February 10, 2015. Currently-serving EU and NATO officials agreed to be interviewed but not to be cited by name.



TOR, which evolved into Operation OCEAN SHIELD later that year, with a counter-piracy focus.⁴³ Operation OCEAN SHIELD's mandate has been extended to the end of 2016, so both NATO and the EU are operating in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, along with the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151. These three operations have contributed to the precipitous drop in the number of pirate attacks in the area since 2011, but it's important not to overestimate the effectiveness of the operations, as analysts familiar with the situation note that "the increased use of armed guards has been the single biggest contribution to Somali piracy's decline."⁴⁴

Operations ATALANTA and OCEAN SHIELD both have their operational headquarters in Northwood, UK (home of NATO's Maritime Command), which facilitates coordination, and there has been some sharing of resources in the area of operations.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the two organizations compete to get assets from the same pool of ships. During the heavy storm season, when pirate attacks are less likely, the OCEAN SHIELD mission sometimes has no ships at all.⁴⁶ As a recently-retired senior NATO official noted, Operation OCEAN SHIELD is no longer popular in NATO because of the lack of means being offered by the member countries to the NATO portion of the operations.⁴⁷ This begs the question of why NATO continues with Operation OCEAN SHIELD, but as a currently-serving NATO official noted, once you have an operation, it's hard to end it.⁴⁸

The EU's multi-faceted approach to the instability and insecurity in the Horn of Africa is a good example of why the EU can be a particularly effective partner in the region. British officials judge the EU's efforts in the region to be the most successful CSDP to date, creating a model for working with other actors.⁴⁹ The organization's wide range of domains of action and ability to

fund a variety of programs that touch different aspects of security in the African environment allow it to operate in ways that NATO cannot.

NATO and EU Engagement with the APSA

The AU established an overarching African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) comprising a Commission, a Panel of the Wise,⁵⁰ a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund.⁵¹ The overall intent of the APSA is to put in place the structures and tools to allow the Africans to find African solutions to African problems. This includes both political consultation and regional multinational brigades (the ASF) to respond to crises, if necessary. Despite a target of 2015 for Full Operating Capability of the ASF, this standby capability remains far from operational at the time of the writing of this article. However, the great increase in the number of African-led peace support operations (PSO) indicates that the efforts to build the ASF have not been in vain, as they have helped focus energy and resources to improve African PSO capabilities.

The EU's support to the APSA has been more extensive than NATO's. The AU's Peace and Security Commission and the EU's PSC have held regular consultations. In addition, the EU has provided military advisors and funding to support the CEWS and the Panel of the Wise, as well as funding for training for ASF-tapped units and structures and the associated AMANI AFRICA exercise series.⁵² NATO's support to the ASF has thus far focused on assistance with the evaluation and assessment processes linked to operational readiness, to include training AU officials and supporting ASF preparation workshops.⁵³ Overall, there is a reasonably good

⁴³ James M. Bridger, "Safe Seas at What Price? The Costs, Benefits, and Future of NATO's Operation Ocean Shield," *NATO Defense College Research Paper*, No. 95 (September 2013), 3-5.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁶ Rick Froh, recently retired NATO official, interview by author, Brussels, February 11, 2015.

⁴⁷ Briefing by recently retired senior NATO official to NATO Defense College, Rome, October 17, 2014. Briefing conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁴⁸ Briefing by NATO official to NATO Defense College, Brussels, November 12, 2014. Briefing conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁴⁹ British Foreign and Commonwealth Office briefing to NATO Defense College, London, October 7, 2014. Briefing conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁵⁰ The Panel of the Wise is an assembly of senior African statesmen, who can be called upon to consult with leaders involved in a crisis somewhere on the continent.

⁵¹ African Union, "The African Peace and Security Architecture," <http://peaceau.org/en/topic/the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa> (accessed January 27, 2015).

⁵² Links between the EU and AU Chiefs of Staff and between the European External Action Service (EEAS), the AU's Commission, and the Regional Economic Communities' Peace and Security Departments are envisioned, as well. The EU is now also considering ways to establish a support package in view of accelerating deployment until the AU Operational Headquarters can be stood up and functional. For more information on EU support to the APSA, see Alex Vines, "Rhetoric from Brussels and reality on the ground: the EU and security in Africa," 1092.

⁵³ NATO, "NATO Assistance to the African Union."



attempt to maintain transparency in the support that the EU, NATO, and others provide to the ASF, via the G8++ Africa Clearing House database.⁵⁴ A quick perusal of the database,⁵⁵ however, confirms that there are limits to such computer-based efforts. The old maxim of “garbage in = garbage out” certainly applies, as the information in the database is less complete than desired, leaving plenty of room for efforts to coordinate and rationalize support to the ASF.

Interestingly, despite the fact that pandemics are a security threat for the member states of both the EU and NATO, neither organization executed a military operation to assist efforts to bring Ebola under control in 2014, leaving the military response to individual countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France. NATO did prudent military planning in case a request for support came from the UN, the AU, or an African country, but such a request did not arrive.⁵⁶ The EU’s ability to take a multifaceted, comprehensive approach to such a threat seemed to ideally place it to respond, but the EU response, while extensive, remained completely within humanitarian and development channels.⁵⁷

The examples from the last few pages of operations and programs that NATO and the EU have conducted in Africa demonstrate that the two organizations’ activities sometimes complement one another and sometimes duplicate one another. In some areas, such as support to the AU, the two organizations “pursue similar albeit uncoordinated initiatives.”⁵⁸ Given the vast domain of security in Africa and, more precisely, securing the West from threats emanating from Africa, overlap appears wasteful, and the member countries of the two organizations should seek to minimize or even eliminate it. From the inception of the CSDP, “NATO and the EU never tried to agree on a division of tasks for neither organization was prepared to accept the primacy of the other.”⁵⁹

As noted in the opening pages of this paper, however, the political environment has evolved considerably since the time of that observation.

How NATO and the EU Could Coordinate their Efforts

As NATO and the EU look forward to future partnerships and activities in Africa in the security and defense arena, leaders from the two organizations and their member states should not think in terms of competition or even coordination for coordination’s sake, but rather focus on the accomplishment of objectives using finite resources, while avoiding a “problem of the day” approach. In order for Western governments to best take advantage of the qualities of both NATO and the EU, they should collaborate to more effectively deal with problems upstream, before they degenerate.⁶⁰ Given the operating environment and nature of the threats, this is particularly applicable to the work of the two organizations in Africa. So what would be an appropriate division of labor? Taking into account the overlapping membership lists of NATO and the EU and the hybrid nature of many of the threats emanating from Africa, neither a geographic-based division nor a threat-based approach to divvying up the tasks seems to be appropriate.

Ideally, the EU and NATO would develop a joint strategy to address the “Southern Flank” security threats, with each having specified roles to play based upon that strategy to make the most of complementarity while minimizing duplication.⁶¹ Such a way forward would require the development of a common operating picture and synchronized objectives for a particular issue or situation.⁶² Due to existing friction between the two organizations, however, the development of such a formal strategy is unlikely in the near term. However, both or-

⁵⁴ Sally Khalifa Isaac, “The Transatlantic Partnership and the AU: Complementary and Coordinated Efforts for Security in Africa,” in *AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, Forum Paper 22*, ed. by Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Rome, NATO Defense College, 2013, 218.

⁵⁵ G8, “G8++ Africa Clearing House Database,” <http://www.g8africaclearinghouse.org/home.html> (accessed November 17, 2014).

⁵⁶ Rick Froh, recently retired NATO official, interview by author, Brussels, February 11, 2015.

⁵⁷ European Commission, “EU Response to the Ebola Crisis in West Africa,” February 13, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/wa_ebola_en.pdf (accessed February 20, 2015). As of February 2015, the EU’s Ebola response has included over 414M Euros in aid, in addition to another 800M Euros from the member countries. The U.S. has also responded with over \$1B in aid, with about 30% of that coming from DoD.

⁵⁸ Kai Schaefer, “NATO and the EU as AU Partners for Peace and Security in Africa: Prospects for Coordinated and Mutually Reinforcing Approaches,” in *AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, Forum Paper 22*, ed. by Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Rome, NATO Defense College, 2013, 237.

⁵⁹ Isaac, “The Transatlantic Partnership and the AU: Complementary and Coordinated Efforts for Security in Africa,” 221.

⁶⁰ Stephanie Blair, “Assisting Host Country Militaries: Assessing Lessons from NATO, EU, and Member State Experience,” Findings from Conference organized in December 2013 in Wilton Park, UK, *NATO Defense College website*, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=706 (accessed September 21, 2014), 5.

⁶¹ Interview with a senior American officer stationed at NATO HQ, Brussels, February 11, 2015. Officer agreed to be interviewed but not to be cited by name.

⁶² Blair, “Assisting Host Country Militaries: Assessing Lessons from NATO, EU, and Member State Experience,” 14.



organizations can work toward a *de facto* division of labor that provides unity of effort. They could use NATO's three core tasks (collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security) as a framework.

Although the EU's Lisbon Treaty has a mutual assistance clause,⁶³ NATO continues to be the structure within which the Allies draw their guarantees of collective defense. Even the most Europhile of the Allies, such as France, regularly affirm the importance of NATO in providing such assurance, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Although preeminence in the areas of crisis management and cooperative security is less clear-cut, the EU should have the leading role in the West's multilateral approach to Africa in both these areas. Within the realm of cooperative security, in particular, NATO's practical support should be limited to providing niche capabilities to support EU efforts. This would in essence be an economy of force approach to Africa for NATO, allowing the organization to focus on other regions that are of greater importance to the Alliance as a whole.

Crisis Management

In the area of crisis management, the EU has considerably increased its capacity since the inception of the CSDP. Some tools, such as the EU Battle Groups, seem to be custom-made for the types of deployments that the EU has done in the past in Africa and will likely do in the future,⁶⁴ although the political will to use these tools will always remain an issue. The EU has set goals for civilian and military capability development, and the targets largely correspond to the African environment, as well. They include stability and reconstruction missions with up to 10,000 troops and a civilian component, limited duration rapid response military missions with up to 1500 troops, non-combatant evacuation operations, maritime and air surveillance and interdiction, and civil humanitarian missions.⁶⁵ This list of missions does not include the higher end of combat operations, and the EU would almost necessarily have to request NATO assistance for a multilateral response of that magnitude.

Given the current state of EU capabilities, the organization would need to request NATO assistance even for some of the missions listed above, as well.

The arrangement for the EU using certain NATO capabilities has been in place for more than a decade, as the so-called "Berlin Plus agreements" set the framework for the EU to have access to NATO planning tools and certain NATO assets.⁶⁶ Thus far, these arrangements have only been used for the EU's Operations CONCORDIA in Macedonia (2003) and ALTHEA in Bosnia (2003-present). The transfer of the Bosnia mission from NATO to the EU included the payment for the transfer of some infrastructure. Some EU officials perceived this transfer to be overly burdensome for the EU, and it called the entire Berlin Plus agreements into question for future use.⁶⁷

The member countries of the two organizations should re-look the Berlin Plus arrangements and determine whether the problems lie in the text itself or rather only in the context of when they were first employed in 2004. It is likely the latter. Unfortunately this reexamination is currently blocked by an issue unrelated to Africa but rather related to the Greece-Turkey tussle over Cyprus. Turkey, a non-EU NATO member, objects to Cyprus, a non-NATO EU member, taking part in NATO-EU meetings at the ambassadorial level because Cyprus does not have a formal security relationship with NATO. Greece, Belgium and France have, in turn, objected to discussions on global security challenges in those meetings because not all EU member states are present. This has limited EU-NATO ambassadorial discussions to the topics of improving military capabilities and the Berlin Plus-facilitated EU operation in Bosnia. Both organizations wish to unblock this stalemate, and a non-European topic such as cooperation in Africa could be a mutually agreeable subject to expand the political dialogue.

Cooperative Security

In the realm of cooperative security in Africa, the EU has several comparative advantages with respect to NATO.

⁶³ Article 222 of the EU Lisbon Treaty.

⁶⁴ Archick and Gallis, *NATO and the European Union*, 19.

⁶⁵ Council of the European Union, "EU civilian and military capability development beyond 2010," <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017127%202010%20INIT> (accessed September 22, 2014), 3.

⁶⁶ "EU-NATO : The Framework for permanent Relations and Berlin Plus," *European Council Website*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf> (accessed September 22, 2014).

⁶⁷ Interview with NATO official, Brussels, February 11, 2015. Officer agreed to be interviewed but not to be cited by name.



The main threats that the West is likely to face from Africa are failed states, terrorism, organized crime and trafficking, piracy, and pandemics. A comprehensive, long-term methodology to dealing with these threats is particularly important in the African environment. The EU is well-equipped to do a comprehensive approach because it has the measures in pocket, in addition to the military tool, as we've seen particularly in the Horn of Africa.⁶⁸ Although the idea of a comprehensive approach to security problems remains largely unproven, it has gained considerable support among leaders based on experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere. The EU's tools include military capabilities that have proven to be applicable, to include in a preventative BPC-centered strategy. Senior security and defense officials in France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands recently made it clear that they will champion the EU having the lead in the security realm when it comes to a comprehensive approach.⁶⁹ Similarly, smaller European countries without the historical links to Africa have largely gone along with CSDP involvement in Africa and expect it to grow, even if their interests are not directly involved.⁷⁰ The participation of Estonian and Czech troops in the EU mission in CAR in 2014 is a good example of this.

At the organizational level, the EU has some advantages due to the fact that the AU is, in many ways, modeled after the EU, although the similarities should not be overstated, as the environment and foundations of the two are radically different. Nevertheless, the structural convergences between the EU and the AU have contributed to the EU becoming the AU's "main partner on peace and security matters, even more so than the UN."⁷¹ With an EU-in-the-lead approach, the coordination of BPC efforts would be somewhat facilitated by the fact that there would be less risk of African countries and multinational organizations (such as the AU) playing one organization

off the other, shopping around for donors. At the same time, it would improve unity of message, as the AU currently faces "confusing messages and uncoordinated lines of action" coming from NATO and the EU.⁷²

NATO should fully support the EU taking the leading role in multilateral engagement with African partners. In this case, the Alliance should not develop civilian capacities but rely on other organizations, to include the EU. The different Allies have very divergent views about cooperative security and how to use it. Some want a very focused approach in risky areas; others want to pursue it only with established partners. Some Allies, meanwhile, believe that BPC should be primarily an EU function.⁷³ These divergences highlight that the Alliance is not the same thing to each of the 28 members, and pursuing partnerships in Africa does not immediately draw a consensus response from the Allies.

High-intensity conflict scenarios may still arise in Africa that surpass the capabilities of the EU. An operation with boots on the ground to counter Boko Haram in Nigeria or the so-called Islamic State in Libya, for example, would clearly exceed the scope of operations envisioned under the EU umbrella. Therefore, NATO must develop and maintain a dialogue with selected African partners to avoid strategic surprise and to develop a nuanced understanding of the environment, while also establishing open lines of communication that can be essential in a time of crisis. The lack of such a path for dialogue during the 2011 Libya crisis damaged NATO's reputation in the region, while the AU-EU partnership was not significantly affected, as high-level political exchanges continued despite a lack of agreement on the Libya issue.⁷⁴

To ensure such dialogue, NATO should refocus and remain its Addis Ababa liaison office in the AU to conduct political liaison.⁷⁵ The Alliance should continue the

⁶⁸ Dutch Defense Staff briefing to NATO Defense College, Amsterdam, October 2, 2014. Briefing conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁶⁹ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (October 2, 2014), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (October 6, 2014), British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (October 7, 2014), and Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 15, 2014) briefings to NATO Defense College in the respective capitals. Briefings conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Mehari Taddele Maru, "Resetting' AU-NATO relations: from ad hoc military-technical cooperation to strategic partnership," *NATO Defense College Research Paper*, No. 102 (June 2014), 8.

⁷² Schaefer, "NATO and the EU as AU Partners for Peace and Security in Africa: Prospects for Coordinated and Mutually Reinforcing Approaches," 234.

⁷³ Interview with NATO official, Rome, December 1, 2014. Official agreed to be interviewed but not to be cited by name.

⁷⁴ Akinterinwa, "AU-NATO Collaboration: Defining the Issues from an African Perspective," 53.

⁷⁵ The Senior Military Liaison Office in Addis Ababa is permanently manned with two Field Grade officers. In addition, some Subject Matter Experts augment the office based on certain projects. NATO and the AU signed a technical agreement in May 2014 to formalize the establishment of the SMLO, but as of the writing of this paper, the host nation Ethiopian government has not yet approved some aspects of the diplomatic privileges prescribed in the document.



practice of inviting senior AU leaders to the headquarters in Brussels. However, that is not sufficient. Because African problems are often very regional in nature, the AU will always struggle with legitimately representing an African point-of-view.⁷⁶ Therefore, NATO should seek to include the African RECs and RMs⁷⁷ in conferences and discussions. The NATO staff has been working to improve its partnership with the African Union, with meetings to that end as recently as November 2014. Inasmuch as such seminars improve political dialogue between NATO and Africa, they are laudable, but NATO should not pursue partnerships with African organizations and countries that go beyond political dialogue.

NATO should not strive to deepen the practical cooperation activities with African partners, thereby using valuable staff time and energy for both NATO and the selected African partner. As a former NATO senior leader highlighted, maintaining partnerships can put a strain on the staff.⁷⁸ He was referring to the NATO staff, but the observation could similarly apply to the AU, which is already challenged with staff capacity issues. The EU is capable of developing such partnerships, and NATO can reap the benefits.

Counterpoints to an EU-in-the-Lead Approach

Two likely criticisms of following an EU-in-the-lead approach to Western multilateral engagement in the security and defense arena in Africa are the fear of NATO being eclipsed and the lack of capacity of the EU. Since the inception of the CSDP, though, NATO has encouraged the EU in its endeavor, and the Alliance's leaders confirmed this again at the Wales summit, stating that they "welcome the EU member states' decisions to strengthen European defence and crisis management."⁷⁹ Different Allies have different views on the Alliance's strategic priorities, and these differences were only amplified in 2014 with spikes in illegal immigrants worrying the southern

European Allies and Russian aggression capturing the attention of the eastern Allies. Further moves for deeper NATO engagement in Africa would likely only exacerbate these fissures.

Some American leaders who have little experience working with the EU or who place little trust in the organization are also likely to have concerns about NATO being eclipsed. However, the Clinton administration encouraged the development of a European security and defense identity, and subsequent administrations have reaffirmed that position, provided that it does not duplicate NATO. It is in the United States' interests to embrace the CSDP and support it.⁸⁰ NATO will remain the primary institution in which European countries can discuss security issues with the Americans.⁸¹ Stronger contribution to Euro-Atlantic security by European countries and by the EU itself can favor confidence and mutual respect between the United States and the European Allies,⁸² and Africa is a region where the EU can use its comparative advantage to make such a contribution. As President Obama stated in his 2014 West Point commencement address, the United States should strive to work with and through its partners around the world in an upstream approach to security,⁸³ and the EU can be a particularly good partner in this region.

France has demonstrated a clear willingness to take a leadership role in much of Africa, bringing its fellow EU members along whenever possible. The United States has actively supported France's operations in the Sahel with air refueling, air transport and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. When France attempts to multi-lateralize its operations via the EU as explained in previous pages, American support should continue. The United States can even contribute forces to such EU missions, as the necessary protocols have been set in place, and the United States has already contributed civilian experts to EU CSDP missions.⁸⁴

⁷⁶ Briefing to NATO Defense College by African academic with expertise in the African Union, September 26, 2014. Briefing conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁷⁷ The Regional Economic Communities include the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Southern African Development Community, the East African Standby Force, and the North African Regional Capability. Other possible groupings to consider including would be the East African Community, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, and the African Maghreb Union.

⁷⁸ Briefing by recently retired senior NATO official to NATO Defense College, Rome, October 17, 2014. Briefing conducted under Chatham House Rules.

⁷⁹ North Atlantic Council, "Wales Summit Declaration," paragraph 103.

⁸⁰ Bjoern H. Seibert, *Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), ix.

⁸¹ Payne, "The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO," 3.

⁸² Jean-François Morel, « Les relations UE-Otan : une vision européenne », *Défense Nationale*, May 2004, pp. 135-144., p 144

⁸³ Obama, "Commencement Address at West Point."

⁸⁴ "Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the participation of the United States of America in European Union



The United States should not abstain from bilateral engagement in Africa. Such activity should and certainly will continue. However, Africa remains largely an economy of force effort for the U.S. Department of Defense, and guidance to the AFRICOM staff to work with European partners reflects American willingness to emphasize a multilateral approach.⁸⁵ AFRICOM's lines of effort have included countering violent extremist organizations, strengthening defense institutions, maritime security, countering illicit trafficking, and peacekeeping/crisis response. All of these closely correspond to EU objectives and actions in Africa, so AFRICOM should strive to find synergies with the EU Military Staff.

As for EU capacity, it's necessary to remember that the European Allies can use their forces under an EU flag as easily as they can under a NATO or national flag. The EU's own planning and command and control capabilities have improved considerably over the past decade, and even the current Berlin Plus arrangements allow for the use of some NATO C2 structures for EU operations. Once again, NATO and the EU should re-examine the Berlin Plus agreements to determine if the problems lie in the agreements themselves or only in the context in which they were first used in 2004. In addition, or as an interim step, the two organizations should develop a parallel sharing agreement for capacity building, allowing the EU's use of additional NATO assets such as the NATO Defense College, the NATO School Oberammergau, NATO Centers of Excellence, and other NATO training centers. The EU should also wrap its capacity-building efforts under the CSDP umbrella to facilitate a mutually supporting use of resources and staff coordination between the Commission and the EEAS in this area.

The final challenge to address is political will. Within the EU, the member countries often have divergent interests, and even those with long Africa histories such as the United Kingdom and France sometimes have different interests on the continent. Decision-making in a consensus environment is never easy, and officials in both NATO and the EU have the perception that it's so challenging in their own structures that it must certainly be easier in their sister organizations.⁸⁶ The Closer Cooperation authorized in the EU's Amsterdam Treaty allows some member countries to move forward on a project within the framework of the Union without requiring the participation of all members. This can be a valuable tool for future EU activity in Africa.

Conclusion

As one observer noted, paradoxically, relations between NATO and the EU might work smoother in the context of dealing with third parties precisely because they are not hamstrung by politically-charged institutional issues—for example unresolved problems involving Turkey and Cyprus.⁸⁷

EU and NATO leaders should attempt to put this enhanced cooperation between the two organizations in place in Africa, and the progress there may eventually lead to better cooperation in other regions and subject areas, as well. It is essential not to underestimate the organizational challenges posed by the dispute over Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, but the fact that both EU and NATO officials wish to move past this stalemate could allow creative work-arounds. Cooperation with regards to African strategies and actions would be a prime candidate with which to start.

crisis management operations," signed May 17, 2011, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=8961> (accessed January 19, 2015).

⁸⁵ Kevin Charlton, AFRICOM staff officer, interview by author, Stuttgart, February 12, 2015.

⁸⁶ Interviews with EU External Action Service official and a senior US officer serving at the NATO HQ, Brussels, February 10-11, 2015. Currently-serving EU and NATO officials agreed to be interviewed but not to be cited by name.

⁸⁷ Leo Michel, "NATO and the EU: Achieving Unity of Effort in a Comprehensive Approach," *The Atlantic Council*, September 21, 2010, <http://www.equilibri.net/nuevo/articulo/nato-and-eu-achieving-unity-effort-comprehensive-approach> (accessed January 20, 2015).