SECURITY COOPERATION & ASSISTANCE: Rethinking the Return on Investment

By Dr. Dafna H. Rand and Dr. Stephen Tankel
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Cover Image: U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class John Haidu, left, assigned to the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit based in Phenix City, Ala., listens as Afghan National Army soldiers explain why their target grouping is off and how to correct it during a basic rifle marksmanship instructor course at Kabul Military Training Center in Kabul, Afghanistan, Nov. 6, 2010. After the ten-day course the soldiers will be able to instruct ANA trainees in basic marksmanship.

Credit: Staff Sgt. Joseph Swafford/U.S. Air Force
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PART I: INTRODUCTION

U.S. security assistance to and cooperation with foreign military and security services has been a vital component of American statecraft for decades. The United States deployed assistance and cooperation to forge or reaffirm alliances and partnerships with a range of states worldwide during the Cold War. This investment was critical for building the web of U.S. alliances that endures across Europe and Asia as well as the military and civilian institutional capacity of many countries in these regions and beyond. During the Cold War, decisions about security assistance and cooperation were often made through the prism of the Soviet threat. Since the end of the Cold War and particularly since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has increasingly relied on security assistance as both an inducement to promote cooperation globally and an instrument to build the capacity of local partners to fight shared threats from non-state actors.¹

In particular, since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government created a spate of new authorities for security assistance and cooperation. Many of these tools, largely administered by the Department of Defense (DoD), were designed to support the war effort in Afghanistan and Iraq or enable U.S. partners elsewhere in the Middle East and South Asia to confront emerging threats such as terrorism. Although U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011 and are in the process of drawing down from Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers’ reliance on security assistance and cooperation as a tool of U.S. strategy in this region and beyond is likely to persist. After 14 years of war, it has become clear that large-footprint deployments of U.S. military forces to unstable and failing states are unsustainable. In search of an alternative, the Obama administration has championed augmenting the capacity of U.S. partners to respond to mutual threats as the best substitute for such massive U.S. deployments and as a necessary complement to U.S. military operations.² The next administration, regardless of its political persuasion, is likely to continue to deploy a range of programs under the rubric of security assistance and cooperation to advance central U.S. national security goals, including countering the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Yet, despite its strategic centrality and large price tag, the use of security assistance and cooperation to elicit partners’ support and build their capacity remains poorly understood. Indeed, the term building partner capacity (BPC) has become a catchall for a wide array of programs, only some of which actually pertain to enhancing the capabilities and capacity of a partner’s military and civilian institutions. As U.S. policymakers double down on security assistance and cooperation, they must wrestle with the key questions: What does the United States intend to achieve when it deploys security assistance and cooperation? And how can the United States attain a return on this vast investment?

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After defining the constitutive elements of security assistance and cooperation, this report explains the specific, and most commonly cited, intended objectives of these efforts. These are: increasing
the capacity and capabilities of partners, seeking influence and military access, and professionalizing partner forces. The report then lays out eight strategic and structural challenges with current U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts, before proposing recommendations for how to move forward with necessary reforms.3

As this report argues, many security assistance and cooperation interventions fail to accomplish U.S. objectives as a result of both strategic and structural deficiencies. Strategically, the specific goals of security assistance and cooperation are often inadequately articulated. In other cases, disparate objectives are not prioritized and in some cases may actually conflict with one another. This is most evident in terms of the tension between short-term and long-term objectives. For example, security-centric interventions that may help partners with tactical wins may not be advancing long-term U.S. goals for these very same states, whether promoting better governance or enhancing accountability and rule of law. Security assistance and cooperation is also too often provided on the basis of faulty assumptions about its utility and impact and with too little attention paid to the recipient nation’s political environment, including the underlying factors shaping the construct and conduct of local security forces. Yet these political factors often determine whether partner security forces have the right combination of will and capability to act effectively.

These strategic deficiencies often result to some degree from the proclivity to view security assistance and cooperation as a quick fix or panacea when other U.S. policy options are limited or unappealing. Finally, there is an inherent difficulty in developing viable metrics for assessing the utility of security assistance and cooperation. The failure to adequately assess efficacy contributes to the potential for overreliance on security assistance and cooperation as a tool of statecraft. Meanwhile, without standard metrics for how security cooperation and assistance programs achieve intended U.S. national security goals, there is a propensity to allow relationship maintenance with foreign partners to become an end in itself, as opposed to a means to achieve various U.S. national security objectives.

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The strategic deficiencies are reinforced by structural deficiencies. Structurally, the glut of new authorities, occasional confusion about their purpose, and lack of predictability contribute to poor synchronization across the interagency. These factors also fuel the propensity to deploy security assistance and cooperation based on which authorities are available or most flexible, as opposed to choosing the right program for the problem and implementing it in a more systematic manner. Even before the creation of the new authorities, DoD already had more personnel and resources than the State Department dedicated to the administration of security assistance. The fact that many new authorities are Title 10 – meaning they fall under the auspices of DoD – rather than Title 22, which would put them under the State Department’s control, exacerbates these challenges. As a result, many
programs are deployed to meet DoD requirements, as opposed to implemented in a way that furthers broader foreign policy objectives. Collectively, these structural deficiencies reduce the efficacy of security assistance and cooperation. Figure 1 reflects the growth of new, mostly Title 10, security assistance authorities over the past fifteen years.

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The Obama administration tried to address these structural deficiencies in 2013 when it issued Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23) to the national security agencies, instructing them to improve, streamline, and better organize all U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts. Yet implementation of this guidance remains in its earliest stages, and many questions persist.4

Despite the unresolved questions, security assistance and cooperation will remain a critical lever of U.S. statecraft to achieve national security goals. This is particularly true in the counterterrorism domain, where security assistance and cooperation has become an appealing tool for policymakers since September 11, 2001. The tectonic shifts taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the Arab Spring are likely to reinforce this dynamic.

Although this report draws most of its examples from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, it is intended to inform the broader debate about how the United States can deploy security cooperation and assistance most effectively.5 These tumultuous regions are the latest, though certainly not the only, regions where the efficacy of U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs is vital. Getting this right in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia will not only directly enhance U.S. national security interests; it can help streamline and inform similar efforts in other regions.

Security assistance and cooperation in the Middle East and South Asia is particularly challenging given the increasing number of fragile and failing states. In addition, the United States works with a range of security partners, in terms of capacity and will to fight threats such as terrorism.
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PART II: DEFINING SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION

Security assistance and cooperation activities encompass a range of different U.S. efforts in disparate countries. These activities differ in terms of how they are deployed and why, what types of local partners participate, how they are authorized legally and legislatively, their geographic scope, who is responsible for their budgets and implementation, and their relative importance to critical U.S. national security goals. Over the past decade, Congress has approved myriad new authorities, such as Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (Section 2282) and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), without a consonant overall reorganization or strategy regarding how to deploy the growing toolkit. As a result, there is some confusion about the purposes and types of programs that exist.

- Security assistance refers to programs through which the United States provides defense articles, military training, defense institution-building efforts, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of U.S. policies and objectives. Security assistance programs include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Global Peace Operations Initiative, and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. The State Department has overall responsibility for many of these programs, including FMF, FMS, and IMET, but they are primarily implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at DoD. DoD has responsibility for other security assistance programs.

- Security cooperation encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (Access is the U.S. military’s term for the willingness of a host nation to allow U.S. forces on its ground and in its airspace.) Security cooperation includes DoD-administered security assistance. Additional security cooperation programs include joint military exercises such as Operation Bright Star, normally held every two years with Egypt; training, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation programs; defense institution-building; defense and military contacts; information-sharing and intelligence cooperation; and logistics support. Security cooperation programs are budgeted and implemented directly by DoD.

- Security sector assistance, as defined by Presidential Policy Directive 23, refers to policies, programs, and activities used to engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector – both civilian and military institutions. PPD 23 outlined the need for a coordinated effort synchronizing programs across U.S. government agencies – including State, DoD, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – to help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and the effectiveness of civilian and military institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for the civilian population. Many of these programs are significant; for example, the Obama administration included over $2.1 billion in its Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget request for two foreign assistance funds that primarily work with civilian security institutions: the international narcotics control and law enforcement (INCLE) and the nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related (NADR) funds. To avoid confusion, unless referring to it specifically, this report nests security sector assistance within the broader rubric of security assistance and cooperation.)
PART III: THE GOALS OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION EFFORTS

U.S. civilian policymakers and military officials use the entire set of security assistance and cooperation programs outlined above to achieve a number of distinct national security objectives. Identifying – and disaggregating – these distinct objectives is a critical first step toward improving the United States’ strategic use of security assistance and cooperation. The following objectives are not exhaustive, but they do cover the most commonly intended policy goals of this lever of statecraft:

Building Partners’ Military Capacity and Increasing Their Interoperability With the U.S. Military

The U.S. government uses security assistance and cooperation to build its partners’ capacity to confront security threats to their states or regions and to enhance these partners’ ability to contribute to international missions. This national security objective is hardly new. Indeed, the United States spent billions during the Cold War to augment the capacity and capabilities of countries in Europe, Southeast Asia, and South America. Yet the term BPC has gained currency since the middle of the last decade. It is now in vogue as shorthand for investments and efforts to build the Afghan and Iraqi militaries and to train and equip other partner militaries that are cooperating or might cooperate with the United States on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

Historically, FMF and FMS have been the primary tools used by the United States to enhance the military capacity of partners’ armed forces. These programs, which still constitute the most expensive elements of security assistance, focus overwhelmingly on the provision of military hardware – either through loan or sale. Traditionally, the weapons and equipment provided through FMF and FMS have been designed to address U.S. partners’ conventional threats. Because U.S. partners often have a large say in the components of their FMF and FMS packages, the hardware provided or sold has often reflected partners’ perception of their own conventional threats and their desire for prestigious American-made weapon systems. In certain cases, particularly with the FMF packages to many MENA states, even as recipient states now face greater unconventional threats, the provision of military hardware packages tailored for conventional warfare persists.

The U.S. government uses security assistance and cooperation to build its partners’ capacity to confront security threats to their states or regions and to enhance these partners’ ability to contribute to international missions.

Many of the new authorities created after September 11, 2001, were intended to provide operational support to coalition partners in Afghanistan and Iraq or to build or rebuild the militaries in these countries. Congress and the executive branch have also designed new ways to build partnership capacity to address emerging non-state threats such as terrorism, including the Section 2282 (previously Section 1206) and GSCF programs. DoD administers most new programs, a number of which focus mainly on training and equipping (T&E) partner militaries to enhance their capabilities. In some cases, security cooperation and assistance has expanded to include a “train, advise, and assist” mission in which the U.S. military also provides enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
The use of new authorities to train and equip partner militaries to enhance their capability to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations reflects three realities, learned in part through the challenges of 14 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. First, U.S. policymakers are likely to remain reluctant to deploy troops to every country where violent extremist movements threaten U.S. interests. Second, not all violent extremist movements pose an equivalent threat to the United States. Third, a large-footprint U.S. military presence can be counterproductive, as it may contribute to the radicalization of new militants and generate more anti-Americanism.

Some of these new authorities, such as Section 2282, were created to address “urgent and emergent threats” by allowing the United States, especially DoD, to determine a partner’s needs and rapidly provide training and equipment to meet them. This approach was supposed to differ from the FMF process, which is largely driven by hardware requests from partners. There is a danger, however, in limiting host country involvement in decisions about assistance and cooperation, since this can lead the United States to impose security responses that are poorly suited to local conditions or suffer from lack of local buy-in.

Building partnership capacity is often, though not always, tied to increasing the interoperability of partner forces with American forces, a necessity for building functional U.S.-led military coalitions. Interoperability also enables joint operations that
can be conducted in peacetime as well, such as joint efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In addition, interoperability increases partners’ dependence on the United States, helping to ensure that they will not go shopping elsewhere for new weapons. Interoperability requires that partners not only have compatible hardware, but also that they and the United States have shared or compatible techniques, tactics, and procedures. Thus, security cooperation, including joint military exercises, plays a key role in promoting interoperability.

Finally, U.S. policymakers recognize two important realities when it comes to achieving this primary objective of security assistance and cooperation. First, although rapid infusions of assistance and cooperation can be useful in certain instances and may help partners win short-term battles, building partnership capacity requires years of investment. Second, building capacity in the military sphere is a necessary but not a sufficient means of enabling U.S. partners to counter many of the unconventional threats that have demanded U.S. policymakers’ attention at least since September 11, 2001. Weak governance, porous borders, and ineffective law enforcement and judicial systems typically plague countries confronting violent non-state actors. A country’s broader political and economic conditions, including the absence of fair, accountable institutions in the security sector, are often a source of radicalization in the first place. The 2014 defeat of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) by ISIS is the most recent reminder of the limits of U.S. security assistance when the broader political and sectarian challenges undermine the capabilities and will of partner security forces.

U.S. policymakers building the military capacity of partner forces are beginning to understand that institutional reform and civilian capacity building need to complement their efforts. Some smaller DoD programs, such as the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI), are intended to build the capabilities and capacity of civilian defense institutions in partner countries. The State Department administers assistance focused on law enforcement and rule of law and works with the Department of Justice on programs designed to enhance judicial capabilities and capacity. As discussed, PPD 23 is intended to coordinate and streamline these efforts and others by agencies including the Department of Treasury and USAID to ensure a more holistic approach. Still, PPD 23 focuses only on security sector assistance and does not cover the entirety of the U.S. governance agenda, which is the broader responsibility of the Department of State and USAID. Meanwhile,
whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere, the U.S. government has found it difficult to promote accountable governance and to foster the rule of law. Numerous types of civilian institution-building programs have been piloted alongside kinetic efforts in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and elsewhere during peacetime, in countries such as Jordan and Morocco. At times, however, this broader U.S. foreign policy objective seems to conflict with shorter-term objectives pursued through the provision of security assistance and cooperation.

Access and Influence

A second objective of security assistance and cooperation is to build or maintain diplomatic and military relationships in order to secure access and cultivate influence. Although access and influence differ in nature, they are often related and sometimes pursued in concert. Efforts to build and maintain relationships for these purposes have traditionally entailed the financing or sale of expensive conventional weapons systems via FMF and FMS programs. The combatant commands (COCOMs) have begun to use some of the new capacity-building authorities created since September 11, 2001, to cultivate influence and possibly enable future access in a manner similar to the traditional FMF/FMS programs. Military hardware that improves counterterrorism capabilities may also yield access and influence.

Access involves a partner state’s willingness to offer the U.S. military basing rights, overflight and transit agreements, and permission for U.S. forces to operate in the host nation. Sometimes, the U.S. military seeks access to run day-to-day operations in a given country or region. Other times, U.S. planners seek access as a prospective hedge – that is, for possible future contingencies and war planning. The U.S. military also greatly values access because it often affords U.S. military and civilian personnel increased visibility of a partner government’s and national security infrastructure’s calculations and behavior.

Using security assistance and cooperation to secure access is nothing new. For example, many U.S. defense policymakers tie the tangible access that the Egyptian government and armed forces offer the United States – ensured preferential treatment for U.S. military and commercial traffic through the Suez Canal, U.S. military overflight rights over Egyptian airspace, and basing rights – to the United States’ 30-plus years of investment in the Egyptian armed forces through the Egyptian FMF program. Similarly, Bahrain has benefited from U.S. security assistance and cooperation, but it is hard to argue that this assistance “buys” Bahraini willingness to host the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, which is responsible for naval forces in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean. Given Bahrain’s location and small size, the U.S. military presence is, broadly speaking, in the country’s direct national security interest.

U.S. counterterrorism efforts post-September 11, 2001, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq created new access needs. For example, the United States has provided more than $13 billion in security assistance and Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to Pakistan to secure transit corridors into Afghanistan. Security assistance also helped facilitate the construction of the Northern Distribution Network, which connected Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. After September 11, 2001, the United States also used security assistance to enable U.S. forces to operate in various host nations, such as Yemen and Pakistan.

Influence is more nebulous, often difficult to measure, and can take various forms. First, security assistance and cooperation can help the United States build relationships. Research suggests that where relationship-building is the goal, the use of security assistance and cooperation can have a positive effect. Related to relationship-building, U.S. officials seek to influence military partners to buy U.S.-manufactured defense equipment. This serves
a domestic economic function and a geostrategic one as well. In addition to supporting U.S. defense industry jobs and therefore U.S. economic growth, once foreign partners begin buying U.S.-made defense equipment, they become more reliant on U.S. trainers and support systems. Geopolitically, this may make it less likely that partners will seek the patronage and security cooperation and assistance of U.S. competitors such as Russia and China.

Second, U.S. policymakers consider security assistance and cooperation as a way to reassure crucial allies and partners of U.S. security guarantees and commitments. The $75 billion in new FMS programs to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states from 2007–2013 is associated with U.S. efforts to reassure these partners of U.S. security commitments, among other goals. Moreover, days after the news that the six world powers known collectively as P5+1 had reached an interim agreement with Iran (the Joint Plan of Action, in November 2013), then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced over $11 billion in new FMS to the Persian Gulf states, including “high-end capabilities, including F-15s, F-16s, and advanced munitions, such as standoff weapons.” Likewise, security assistance and cooperation provided to allies and partners can be used to deter shared adversaries, but this forces U.S. policymakers to wrestle with how to calibrate such offerings without inflaming tensions and creating the potential for regional escalation.

Third, the United States uses security assistance and cooperation to shape a partner’s behavior. In the Middle East, for example, the origins of the largest FMF packages, to Egypt and Israel, are linked to the “payoff for peace,” that is, the post-1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty arrangement in which the United States committed to both countries’ security after they signed the treaty. When it comes to Egypt, many U.S. officials consider the large FMF package (currently about $1.3 billion every fiscal year) directly influential in sustaining the Egyptian-Israeli peace over three decades and in shaping Cairo’s lead role in the region supporting the U.S. approach to the Middle East peace process. (Over time, the incentivizing function of the aid may have become less urgent; today, Israeli-Egyptian cooperation exists without U.S. inducements, and the two countries’ threat perception overlaps significantly.) U.S. FMF is often cited as an instrument of influence that has facilitated U.S.-Egyptian counterterrorism cooperation as well.

Since September 11, 2001, U.S. officials have also attempted to use security assistance and cooperation to urge local partners to take concrete counterterrorism actions, adapt their militaries to focus on nonconventional threats, and undertake military reforms necessary to reduce some of the risk factors that can create conditions for violent non-state actors to flourish. In addition to shaping partners’ behavior, these efforts since September 11, 2001, have been intended to influence foreign partners’ threat perceptions. Specifically, U.S. policymakers hope to influence their partners to arrive at the same diagnostics of regional threats, and then to agree upon similar solutions or responses.
Professionalization of Partner Forces

Improving the professional conduct and standards of partner militaries represents yet a third publicly articulated goal of U.S. security cooperation and assistance programs. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has been the primary instrument designed to train and professionalize military partners, although DoD also administers more limited training programs such as the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and runs educational programs through its Regional Centers for Security Studies. Since its inception, IMET has sought to encourage relationship-building with partner security forces, but policymakers also consider IMET a mechanism to promote professionalization among U.S.-trained forces, specifically to raise these forces’ standards in terms of conduct, respect for universal norms and rights, and protection of civilian-military boundaries. On the civilian side, the Departments of State and Justice have also developed programs to strengthen partners’ criminal justice sectors by training police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials, among others.

Helping to professionalize partner militaries is not only important in its own right; it can also create conditions for a closer military-military relationship between a partner and the United States. This is particularly true because, since 1998, two amendments to State and DoD authorization bills, “the Leahy Laws,” preclude foreign assistance (State Leahy) or training, equipment, or other assistance (DoD Leahy) to any unit of a foreign security force if credible information exists that this unit has committed a gross violation of human rights (GVHR). The U.S. military believes, moreover, that professional units make better military partners because they represent the will of their people. More professional partners also make better peacekeepers and members of regional military coalitions.

Yet despite the importance of building professional, rights-respecting U.S. partner forces, currently there is no strategic U.S. approach regarding the “professionalization” goals of U.S. security assistance, which include: urging a partner military or security force to integrate diverse religious, ethnic, and regional communities; promoting standards and norms regarding civil-military relations; encouraging partner forces to fight corruption and to protect minority rights; and, over time, supporting the capabilities of civilian security institutions in a way that improves governance practices writ large. The 2014 rout of the Iraqi security forces by ISIS suggests that no matter how much hardware the United States provides, these professionalization factors can determine whether partner militaries are capable and willing to fight joint threats. In short, U.S. policymakers articulate and expect professionalization outcomes of U.S. security assistance and training but efforts to achieve this goal remains underdeveloped.
PART IV: SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION IN PRACTICE

Over the past few years, as the number of security assistance and cooperation programs has grown, Congress has expressed concern about what it believes is the executive branch’s failure to implement these programs in a strategic, rather than ad hoc, manner. Members of Congress have repeatedly asked the Government Accountability Office to study individual programs and country outcomes. Clearly identifying the goals of a particular security assistance and cooperation initiative, the time frame for achieving them, and agreed-upon metrics and methods for evaluating outcomes is essential for improving the efficacy of these programs in support of broader national security policy. To assist this effort, we identify eight challenges that policymakers must confront in order to employ security assistance and cooperation in the most strategic and effective manner to support overarching U.S. foreign policy goals.

Challenge 1: Prioritize Objectives

When security assistance and cooperation programs are employed, it is often unclear which of the above objectives policymakers intend to achieve and on what time horizon. In some cases, U.S. policymakers are pursuing two or more objectives in tandem. Sometimes objectives are complementary. In cases where they are not, failing to prioritize objectives makes it very difficult to achieve all of them and may reduce the likelihood of achieving any. In other cases, policymakers or practitioners insufficiently define the purpose. For example, BPC objectives are routinely defined in terms of inputs, not outputs. Even in cases where outputs are identified, it is common for the output to be “increase or enhance X capability” rather than an identified objective that enhancing X capability is intended to achieve. It is also common for security assistance and cooperation to be used simply to advance or maintain a positive bilateral relationship. For example, U.S. civilian and military diplomats concerned about the hold on U.S. FMS items to Bahrain instituted by the United States after the Arab Spring protests of 2013 argued against this conditional aid to move the behavior of the government in Manama on the grounds that the U.S.-Bahraini security relationship constituted a key U.S. national security objective in and of itself.

Of course, keeping U.S. partners happy and reassured is an important goal, but it can also lead to situations in which security assistance or cooperation becomes an entitlement, thereby reducing U.S. influence. Most national security policymakers would agree that U.S. military or civilian ties with a given partner should intend to achieve or further a discrete objective or set of objectives. Often the relationship itself becomes the end, not the means. Policymakers can avoid this trap by articulating clearly and prioritizing the short- and long-term objectives they seek to achieve.

SECURITY AND COOPERATION KEY CHALLENGES:

1. Prioritize Objectives
2. Scope the Mutual Threat
3. Balance Short- and Long-Term Objectives
4. Assess Leverage
5. Understand the Impact and Effects of Conditionality
6. Manage and Avoid the “Lock-In” Problem
7. Ensure Better Interagency Balance
8. Measure Outcomes
Figure 1 details the myriad new authorities – many of them administered by DoD – where goals may differ from those established by the State Department. The addition of new authorities has added to the challenge of choosing the right instrument to achieve a specific objective and ensuring that key objectives do not conflict. Because of the numerous authorities on offer, policymakers and practitioners also sometimes use authorities that are available rather than those that are appropriate. In some instances, this can lead to shopping projects around in search of funding. In other cases, the challenge of navigating the complicated patchwork of authorities and programs leads policymakers or practitioners to knit together numerous different authorities to accomplish a single task. This requires bringing together multiple proposals, program managers, metrics, and timelines, thereby undermining strategic cohesion and turning the entire enterprise into a massive paperwork drill. Uncertainty about how much Congress will appropriate for different authorizations on a year-to-year basis and what limitations lawmakers will place on how that money is spent compounds the problem, since policymakers and practitioners may look to use funded authorities for certain purposes even if they are not the right tool for the job. The objective becomes to secure security assistance and cooperation funding without clearly strategizing how the funding will achieve the desired, and prioritized, U.S. national security objectives.

Challenge 2: Scope the Mutual Threat

Research has shown that whether the United States is working with ideal or suboptimal partners, the efficacy of security assistance and cooperation intended to build partner capacity increases dramatically when U.S. and partner objectives for how that BPC will be used are in alignment. In short, sharing a similar threat perception matters. For example, in Lebanon, after Syria withdrew its forces in spring 2005, there was a sudden opportunity to support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as it combated and dismantled jihadist networks. In 2007, the United States dramatically increased its Section 1206 (now 2282) assistance to Lebanon – from $10.5 million in 2006 to $30 million – in response to the rise of Fatah al-Islam, eventually helping the LAF to degrade the group significantly. Unfortunately, examples like the case in Lebanon are too often the exception, not the rule, as the United States and its partners often do not see eye-to-eye on security threats. In the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, for example, the United States is often most concerned about al Qaeda and ISIS in relation to other threats. U.S. partners may also share U.S. concerns but do not necessarily rank the threat as highly. The Saleh regime that led Yemen until 2011, for example, was generally more concerned about regime endurance than about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Today, Pakistan shares U.S. concerns about the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but remains more worried about
the conventional threat from India and has evinced minimal concern about al Qaeda. In short, leaders of partner states often perceive a range of security threats, only some or one of which the United States shares. Thus, U.S. policymakers must wrestle with questions about whether, when, and how they should help host nations confront other perceived security challenges in order to maintain the requisite level of support to continue cooperation on threats critical to the United States.

U.S. policymakers are right to seek to scope their objectives narrowly in order to avoid entanglements by training and equipping foreign military services to confront threats that do not directly affect U.S. vital or critical national interests. This is especially true when U.S. officials assess that investments may be squandered, misused, or, worse, deployed internally to deal with “threats” that actually constitute political opposition and peaceful dissent. In reality, however, it is often difficult to control how equipment is deployed once it has been given to a partner force. In some cases, Congress mandates end-use monitoring (EUM) restrictions for military assistance. Such restrictions are often difficult to enforce, however, and the United States cuts off further weapon systems only after a partner has violated the expected end uses for the equipment. Even then, U.S. officials may seek waivers or another “work-around.” Sometimes this is done because they believe EUM restrictions will hamper a partner’s capability to combat a shared threat. In other instances, U.S. officials fear that, absent monitoring, they will lose their visibility into a partner’s weapon systems deployment.

Challenge 3: Balance Short- and Long-Term Objectives

Policymakers struggle to balance the short- and long-term objectives when employing security assistance and cooperation. Focusing on improving a recipient nation’s military capabilities may unintentionally hamper U.S. efforts to promote accountable institutions and governance. This latter objective is a longer-term, broader U.S. foreign policy goal, though not necessarily a more tailored objective of any particular security assistance and cooperation program. Improvements in governance, accountability, institution-building, and rule of law are not only more abstract, but they take much longer to achieve. Moreover, fearful of upsetting the bilateral relationships, U.S. diplomats may be reluctant to urge and encourage the painful domestic reforms necessary to achieve longer-term governance goals, since U.S. partners are often reluctant to undertake them. Meanwhile, civilian defense officials and the military focus overwhelmingly on shorter-term, security-centric objectives that are generally more concrete and easier to observe.

Yet ignoring long-term challenges can prolong the existence of the very security challenges and sources of instability that security assistance and cooperation is intended to confront in the first place. For example, research has shown that institutional inclusiveness that comes from a strong rule of law provides outlets besides political violence for venting grievances. Thus, building a strong, capable, independent judiciary, for example, can reduce terrorism. Additional research has illustrated that terrorist attacks are more frequently directed at states with large, technologically sophisticated militaries than at countries with higher bureaucratic and administrative capacity. In other words, military capacity is positively associated with the frequency of terrorist attacks, while higher bureaucratic and administrative capacity is negatively associated with them. This suggests
that, at the least, strengthening security forces at the expense of a focus on building strong, accountable civilian institutions can perpetuate the type of environment in which violent extremist organizations thrive and actually exacerbate, over time, the threat to the United States and its partners.

Tradeoffs between short- and long-term goals become particularly complicated in cases where civil-military relations are already imbalanced, as is the case in many Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian countries. In these cases the overwhelming assistance offered through U.S. military channels can have the unintended consequences of shoring up military forces and institutions, thereby enabling challenges to the civilian authorities. For example, in countries such as Egypt and Pakistan, U.S. assistance to the military units has hampered efforts to promote governance, democratization, and the development of functional civilian institutions.

The case of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) offers a recent, critical example of the potential for instability when security assistance and cooperation are provided to security partners that may be susceptible to unprofessional behavior. From 2004 to 2014, U.S. FMS and FMF programs totaled nearly $25 billion; this security assistance directly, and urgently, intended to build the capacity of the ISF. As the 2011 deadline for the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq neared, the mission became more critical, as the goal was to ensure that these forces could replace U.S. combat troops and lead counterterrorism operations across the country. Yet the enormous investment in security cooperation and assistance proved inadequate, in large part because of the highly sectarian and politicized rule by President Nouri al-Maliki. In a few short years, he oversaw the systematic degradation of the ISF by encouraging cronyism and sectarianism and by opening up the leadership and many ISF units to Iranian influence and manipulation.
As part of its efforts to counter ISIS, since 2014 the United States has been engaged in a new and even more difficult endeavor: building new, multisec- 
tarian ISF units in the hopes that these forces will prove more effective and durable in their counter-
terrorism abilities. The current U.S. and coalition effort to rebuild the ISF into a credible, professional 
force has been undermined by the de-legitimization of this Iraqi institution over the past several 
years, particularly in the minds of many Sunni Arab Iraqis living in Anbar, Nineveh, and other 
provinces where ISIS has gained significant terri-
tory. The United States, as it undertakes this new round of security assistance and training efforts in 
Iraq, will continue to grapple with how to promote professional behavior, a national ethos, and the will 
to fight among the ISF.

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when security assistance and cooperation are provided to security partners that may be susceptible to 
unprofessional behavior.

Challenge 4: Assess Leverage

Members of Congress are increasingly asking why security assistance and cooperation do not offer 
the U.S. government greater leverage in shifting partners’ decisionmaking. Given the large sums 
of money involved, the expectation that assistance and cooperation could be a lever to affect partner 
behavior makes sense. Yet when the United States and a partner nation do not share the same per-
spective on a core threat perception or agree on why the partner is experiencing domestic instabil-
ity, as has occurred in Egypt and Yemen since the Arab Spring, it is very rare that any reasonable 
amount of assistance will change the partner’s calculus. State actors rarely act against their own 
perceived core interests simply because a patron tells them to, especially when these core interests 
relate to threats they consider existential or to their domestic political affairs. In short, even the best 
U.S. partners rarely do favors. This is an important reality given the sometimes overoptimistic assess-
ment of assistance and cooperation as a down payment on future U.S. influence.

The use of security assistance and cooperation for leverage is further undermined by the fact that longtime recipients, as well as U.S. officials interested in relationship-building, may begin to consider it an entitlement. Once this occurs, it becomes even more difficult to persuade recipients to accept different types of assistance and coop-
eration or to condition its provision on certain behavior. For example, U.S. economic and security 
assistance to Egypt since 1979 has totaled about $64 billion, with approximately $40 billion appro-
priated for security assistance and $24 billion for economic assistance. This includes $1.3 billion in 
security assistance and $245 million in economic assistance each year from FY2009 – FY2014. 
Because the FMF to Egypt (and the economic support funds as well) are associated with the 
Egypt-Israel peace treaty, Cairo considers U.S. FMF (as well as the economic assistance in the 
form of economic support funds) an entitlement. The Egyptian government bristles at attempts to 
condition funding on better governance. Moreover, U.S. officials have found it challenging to per-
suade their Egyptian counterparts to accept an adapted and modified FMF package that better 
reflects the changing threats to both Egypt and the United States from violent extremist organi-
zations in the region. Egypt needs to improve its counterterrorism and border security capabilities.
and thus would benefit from equipment geared toward activities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Yet Cairo has continued to seek fighter jets, battle tanks, and other weapons systems more suited to conventional combat, even though Egypt does not currently face any major conventional threats.

Although Egypt and Israel are unique cases because of the origins of their FMF packages, the entitlement problem can emerge elsewhere, as recipient countries begin to treat security assistance as an entitlement or reward. For instance, the United States created the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) to reimburse countries for their contributions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because it is technically a reimbursement, CSF money is not traditional security assistance, but it is nevertheless intended to serve as a lever to influence behavior. Pakistan has received approximately $13 billion in CSF reimbursements, an amount that constitutes the overwhelming share of funds appropriated since 2002. Until 2008, this money was generally provided with little to no oversight in terms of the actions it was intended to reimburse. Instead, CSF was essentially a payoff to keep the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) open. A more rigorous review process has since been created, but this has not stopped Pakistan from treating CSF money as an entitlement even given the decreased need for GLOCs as U.S. forces have drawn down in Afghanistan. At the time of writing, CSF reimbursements were theoretically used to pay for Pakistani military efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that support the U.S.-led counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. In reality, Pakistani military operations target the TTP, which poses a primarily internal threat, and have avoided groups such as the Haqqani network that fight against U.S. forces. Despite billions in CSF reimbursements, Washington has had little success changing Islamabad’s calculus regarding its support for various militant groups like the Haqqani network, which are directly undermining U.S. interests in the region. Traditional security assistance, to the tune of $7.6 billion since 2002, has also had a negligible impact on Pakistan’s calculus.

It is true that the presence of Pakistani military forces in the FATA curtails freedom of movement for al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, but there is little evidence to suggest that Pakistan would recall these forces if CSF stopped or U.S. security assistance was more narrowly focused on equipment only useful for counterterrorism (as opposed to dual-use weapons systems). Pakistani officials have successfully positioned CSF reimbursements as well as traditional assistance, albeit not to the same degree, as a litmus test for the relationship, leaving U.S. policymakers to worry that curtailing reimbursements or assistance could make Pakistan an even less cooperative counterterrorism partner. Indeed, although Congress has conditioned CSF reimbursements on Pakistani behavior, including a cessation of support for insurgents fighting in Afghanistan, successive secretaries of defense have signed a national security waiver to dispense reimbursements even though such conditions have not been met.

**Challenge 5: Understand the Impact and Effects of Conditionality**

Concerns that the United States is not getting enough of a bang for its buck have contributed to debates about conditioning assistance and cooperation on recipients’ behavior. In some cases, providing such assistance and cooperation – or threatening to withhold it – can have short-term, transactional effects but typically will not change a partner’s fundamental strategic outlook. U.S. government officials across administrations have worried about damaging bilateral relations by using security assistance tools conditionally. The recent growth of authorities administered by the Department of Defense and shift toward greater
military diplomacy by the combatant commands further complicates this issue, since both civilian and military officials may be reluctant to withhold assistance for fear of damaging a military-military relationship.44

Differences over whether and how to condition assistance and cooperation have become particularly pronounced after the Arab Spring, even though debates about conditionality have been ongoing for decades. (For example, in the early 2000s, Congress debated whether to condition FMF to Egypt on reforms made by President Hosni Mubarak to allow freer elections and to improve Egypt’s human rights standards.45) But the issue of conditionality has come to the fore particularly since the Arab Spring revolts of 2011. Egypt in particular has been a contentious case: In October 2013, the Obama administration placed executive holds on the delivery of Apache helicopters, F-16 aircraft, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 tank kits to Egypt. The holds signaled U.S. displeasure with the events of July 2013, when the Egyptian army had tacitly supported the bloody crackdown against protesters in which over 800 Egyptians were killed. The holds were also described at the time as a means of prodding the new Egyptian government under former army General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to move toward a more inclusive, democratically elected civilian government that allowed for “fundamental freedoms” and discouraged the use of violence to quell internal opposition.46 The Egyptian government reacted angrily after the White House announced these FMF holds and proceeded to lobby the Obama administration, along with some of its regional allies, to resume in full its annual FMF package.47 After releasing the Apaches to Egypt in 2014, in late March 2015 the White House decided to release all of the held assistance, apparently because Egyptian support for the anti-ISIS coalition (including, of course, access for U.S. military personnel) convinced policymakers that a return to the status quo FMF relationship was a priority.48

The United States also withheld all FMS to Bahrain in 2011 after the government under King Hamad al-Khalifa violently responded to the peaceful demonstrations that year. The United States released the sale of all but a few weapon systems in 2012, however. Senior policymakers explained that the remaining holds on FMS items included a number of discrete categories of weapons, including those that could be used against peaceful protesters. Speaking to Congress and outside advocacy groups concerned about the Bahraini domestic situation, the White House and State Department described the arms sales hold as a diplomatic lever, a way to encourage political reform and implementation of the recommendations offered by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report in November 2011.49
In late June 2015, the Obama administration ended this conditionality experiment, announcing its decision to allow all arms sales to Bahrain. Nonetheless, debate about the Bahraini case study will continue. In particular, future discussions of conditionality will consider whether and how the United States’ decision to refrain from selling a few remaining FMS items to Bahrain for three years hindered or helped efforts by the U.S. government to promote political reform and reconciliation in Bahrain during this time. (Across the U.S. interagency, both civilian and military officials have arrived at a general consensus that political reform and reconciliation between the Sunni-dominant government and the Shiite majority population and political opposition will advance U.S. policy goals in Bahrain and improve security and stability there.)

Critics of conditionality within the United States government often argue that it has rarely directly changed the domestic decisionmaking of U.S. allies. However, advocates of conditionality within the U.S. government have argued that withholding assistance and cooperation is not always about direct effect; in fact, withholding items to partner governments that they could use to support internal repression signals the broader range of goals and objectives constitutive of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. values and the role of international norms. There is a signaling function of conditionality, since the United States can use it to send a message of discontent to the local governments in question and, more importantly, to their publics.

Therefore, while many within and outside of the U.S. government are debating the relative impact of the recent Bahrain and Egypt conditionality exercises, the larger discussion will continue about the purpose of conditionality. Up for debate is how U.S. policymakers use it, either proactively or retroactively, and how specifically the United States must tie the specific punishment to the desired change of behavior in a partner state. Such discussion must also account for concerns among some that conditioning assistance could deleteriously affect other U.S. objectives in the recipient country or its region. However, because it is nearly impossible to prove that partners have “punished” the United States by reducing cooperation in one area as a direct result of dissatisfaction with U.S. policy in another area, the concern about tradeoffs will remain largely speculative.

**Challenge 6: Manage and Avoid the “Lock-In” Problem**

Israel and Egypt are unique cases in the sense that their FMF packages are associated with U.S. assistance commitments made (though not legally codified) in the aftermath of the 1979 peace treaty. Moreover, these two FMF packages were designed to be appropriated and authorized by the U.S. Congress in sync, to ensure that the ratio of U.S. aid to the two countries remained relatively constant over time. Beyond these two countries, however, most other FMF packages are supposed to be of limited duration rather than provided in perpetuity. Nonetheless, recipient countries, particularly those receiving large amounts of security assistance, grow accustomed to annual rates of U.S. aid, thus increasing the pressure to “lock in” both the amount and types of assistance packages. This lock-in problem limits the options for
policymakers, who may want to adjust assistance packages in particular to reflect changing U.S. strategic goals, to account for shifts in recipient partners’ behavior, or to take into account fluid regional threats.

Part of the lock-in problem stems from the fact that U.S. civilian and military officials responsible for developing requests for FMF typically do so at least two to three years before its delivery. Congressional earmarking of FMF exacerbates the problem, since it further erodes the flexibility to adjust packages in line with emerging partner needs. Some of the new programs authorized by Congress since September 11, 2001, are theoretically designed to offer more flexible, fast-moving options as compared with FMF, but even authorities such as Section 2282 that are intended to be more flexible are increasingly being administered along longer timelines. DoD administers most of the new authorities and does so with defense-related objectives in mind. As a result, these authorities do not necessarily provide policymakers more flexibility to pursue broader foreign policy objectives or to adjust U.S. assistance and cooperation with changing bilateral diplomatic conversations about threat perceptions. The bottom line is that U.S. policymakers do not have the ability to mix consistent, traditional programs such as FMF with more flexible and adjustable types of programs.

The path dependence of most FMF and FMS programs takes on a more practical challenge as well: Most of the U.S. FMF comes back to the U.S. domestic defense industry in the form of contracts. (The FMS is a U.S. government-authorized sale from a U.S. defense company to the recipient country’s government.) Because the U.S. defense industry is a major job creator and therefore has an important voice on Capitol Hill and with executive branch policymakers, it represents another stakeholder in Washington often championing the continuation of the status quo for large U.S. security cooperation and assistance investments. When big-ticket FMF or FMS packages generate many jobs within the United States, the lock-in pressures intensify.52

Challenge 7: Ensure Better Interagency Balance

There are two imbalances built into the security assistance and cooperation process: one between State and DoD and a second between officials based in Washington and personnel operating in the field.

First, virtually all the new authorities fall under DoD auspices. Thus, they are not part of a coordinated program and are used primarily to meet DoD operational goals rather than broader foreign policy requirements. Second, in addition to the disparity in legislated authorities, there is an imbalance between the DoD and State bureaucracies in terms of resources dedicated to security assistance and cooperation programs. DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review puts a major focus on security cooperation. Almost every piece of strategic guidance that has come out publicly from the Pentagon and Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past five years has highlighted the importance of using security cooperation and assistance to build partnerships and partner capacity. Conversely, although the State Department and other civilian agencies have procedures in place for overseeing Title 22 authorities such as FMF, IMET, and FMS, they are only beginning to develop a strategic focus on security assistance. The newly established Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) – released in 2010 and again in 2015 – emphasized the role of security sector reform as an area of increasing importance, but the recommendations provided for elevating this area strategically, across broader diplomatic and programmatic efforts, have not been fully implemented.53 Although State notifies Congress of major FMS sales and oversees the FMF and IMET programs, which are among the largest parts of its
Foreign Assistance Budget, the Department has not focused its training for foreign service officers (FSOs) on the details of administering security cooperation and assistance.\textsuperscript{54}

The DoD-State divide exists not only in Washington, but also in the field, where some of the most important decisionmaking occurs regarding the scope and type of security assistance and cooperation. The COCOMs have large planning staffs responsible for mapping out security cooperation programs in each country in their respective area of operation. The number of civilian and military personnel reporting to the senior Defense official and through Pentagon channels in a given embassy typically dwarfs the number of civilian foreign service officers who contribute to discussions on security assistance and cooperation. The imbalance affects how and what types of security assistance and cooperation are implemented, and who gets it. Thus, DoD security cooperation offices (SCOs) are generally responsible for planning out not only Title 10 (Defense-related) programs, but also State assistance proposals, such as FMF and IMET. In countries where security conditions are deteriorating and security concerns remain high – that is, the very countries where security assistance and cooperation are often most urgent – the imbalance can be even more acute.

Finally, in addition to the State-DoD divide, there are often disconnects between Washington-based policymakers who seek or authorize security assistance and cooperation and personnel in the field who oversee its distribution and implementation. The latter are often most in tune with a partner’s needs and calculus. At the same time, however, diplomats and senior military officials serving in the field are often intent on building relationships in order to secure access and influence. Those in the field also may be inclined to focus more on accomplishing short-term tasks, since their time in country typically lasts no more than two to three years. Policymakers and practitioners in Washington, especially at State, are more prone to take a longer view. Diplomats and personnel – both civilian and military – working in the field directed to disburse assistance and implement security cooperation programs know they will be assessed on their success at the operational level. This creates an incentive to focus on process without elevating the discussion of effectiveness to the higher strategic levels.

**Challenge 8: Measure Outcomes**

Measuring the success of security assistance and cooperation in achieving the desired U.S. national objectives is a notoriously difficult enterprise, not least because it is hard to parse the direct or indirect effect of each constitutive U.S. intervention on the changes in a partner country. The bottom line on measurement is that the U.S. government has never done any systematic evaluation of whether security assistance and cooperation efforts are being used effectively to achieve clearly distinguished objectives. Of course, there are certain cases that are frequently and confidently cited as successes: In Colombia, for example, it is highly probable that there was a direct causal link between U.S. security assistance focused on training, professionalization, human rights remediation, and improvements to the capacity of critical government security units, which in turn helped the national leadership in its counterterrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{55}

In general, however, in the absence of systematic and agreed-upon standards for measurement, implementers and COCOM officials can typically only offer good news – often in the form of positive anecdotes of discrete partner forces’ tactical successes.

Assessing whether a partner’s operational capabilities have improved over time should be among the easier goals to measure, but even this measurement process becomes problematic in practice. For instance, it is hard to know exactly whether a partner military’s deficits on the battlefield reflect
inadequacies of U.S. training and assistance or stem from a range of endogenous factors. Military exercises conducted jointly with U.S. partners are frequently used to test partner capabilities, but often partners’ militaries cannot perform as adequately without the American trainers’ presence coordinating the exercise. In other words, the limited measurements in place to test partners’ capabilities remain skewed toward positive results.

Regarding professionalization, there is minimal oversight to hold either partners or U.S. trainers accountable, over time, for improvement in terms of professional conduct, greater adherence to international norms in war and peacetime, recruitment of forces that reflect the nation’s diverse ethnic or religious groups, and progress toward respecting civil-military boundaries. In other words, not much effort is being made at present to ask or assess how the interactions, trainings, and assistance offered by the United States are effectively shaping a foreign partner military’s culture and behavior. The U.S. government has a negative litmus test in the form of the Leahy Laws – that is, bad behavior is identified and punished – but no adequate benchmarks to measure progress or catalog failures as partner forces and even units make progress positively over time.

Finally, measuring influence or the state of bilateral or military-military relations is especially difficult. Assessments about whether a relationship is flagging or improving, for example, are anecdotal at best. Judgments about whether a positive relationship actually translates into tangible gains for U.S. national security interests or the role of security assistance and cooperation in enabling said gains are even fuzzier. Yet these assessments, which are most difficult to make, are often the most critical, since the quality of a bilateral and military-military relationship affects calculations about U.S. partners’ reliability. If the United States believes that access could be threatened, there are serious contingency and planning repercussions. In the absence of real metrics, the inclination is often to view more interventions and assistance as better. At best, an over commitment of security assistance and cooperation has a benign effect on the recipient, even if it burdens the U.S. taxpayers, with little return on the investment. At worst, this approach can overwhelm a recipient with low absorption capacity or distort its incentive structure, thereby actually reducing U.S. influence. Greater measurement and refinement of how to judge the strength of bilateral and military-military relationships, and the consequent levels of access and influence that derive from these relationships, can help ensure that security assistance and cooperation are used more effectively to secure U.S. objectives.

The bottom line on measurement is that the U.S. government has never done any systematic evaluation of whether security assistance and cooperation efforts are being used effectively to achieve clearly distinguished objectives.
PART V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no singular solution to these challenges. Moreover, some problems can only be identified and managed, rather than solved. This report has attempted to begin the conversation by clearly identifying the goals and the challenges that are inherent in U.S. security cooperation and assistance efforts. Given that policymakers are likely to continue increasing their investment in and use of a range of assistance and cooperation tools, the following recommendations are intended to inform deliberations about how to use these important tool of U.S. statecraft more effectively.

1. Consolidate, rationalize, and rebalance the many security assistance and cooperation authorities. With a glut of new authorities, policymakers have begun using them in a piecemeal and disconnected fashion. In addition to the imbalance and lack of coordination between State and DoD authorities, the connection between Title 10 and Title 22 authorities has been lost, and State’s position as the lead agency in determining the strategy and direction of security assistance has been diluted. DoD and State should develop a coordinated reform proposal that consolidates DoD’s glut of new and overlapping authorities and transfers the appropriate authorities to State, even if administration remains under DoD’s purview in certain cases. Consolidation should also ensure that the provision of assistance and cooperation can be done through regional budgetary funds and to consortia of partners. Finally, the proposals should be presented to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Congress should commission a study by the Congressional Research Service, GAO, or an independent commission to produce new proposals and hold hearings on these proposals to solicit insight and recommendations. The collective findings should inform new legislation codifying the necessary reforms to the post-September 11, 2001, authorities.

2. Undertake regional reviews of security assistance and cooperation programs. Because some of the objectives of security assistance and cooperation will always conflict and there will continue to be debates about how to scope U.S. objectives, it is incumbent on policymakers to candidly prioritize goals, delineate where they are willing to accept risks, and plan ahead to mitigate anticipated consequences associated with these risks. This is best done through

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY

1. Consolidate, rationalize, and rebalance the many security assistance and cooperation authorities.
2. Undertake regional reviews of security assistance and cooperation programs.
3. Increase the use of regionally-appropriated funds for assistance and cooperation where appropriate.
4. Improve interagency coordination and enhance State’s capacity to manage security assistance programs.
5. Focus on specific implementation goals for the PPD 23 to connect military and non-military goals.
6. Revise IMET and focus more on professionalizing military and civilian security institutions.
7. Invest in a consistent policy for promoting accountability among U.S. security partners.
8. Invest early and focus more on “headware” than “hardware” for military BPC.
9. Use positive conditionality proactively.
10. Develop a systematic, interagency method of tracking outcomes.
a regional framework. The National Security Council should direct representatives from the regional bureaus at State and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at DoD to work together to produce joint reviews of U.S. security assistance and cooperation in their respective regions. Each review should prioritize U.S. interests and objectives in the relevant region, provide relevant updates on the regional environment, and delineate how assistance and cooperation are being deployed to realize U.S. objectives. Reviews should also identify where objectives conflict as well as where U.S. policymakers are taking clear risks as they weigh and make trade-offs among U.S. foreign policy priorities. Policymakers need to discuss ways in which to mitigate these risks. These reviews should clearly delineate short- and long-term goals and identify where these are complementary or in conflict. In the event of potential conflicts or moral hazard, reviews must make a clear case for why they are prioritizing either short- or long-term objectives. Over time these reviews should take into account new methods of measuring outcomes. These reviews should inform and be informed by an ongoing effort by embassy-based diplomats, defense attachés and Office of Security Cooperation chiefs to coordinate their security assistance and cooperation plans in the field in order to identify areas for potential cooperation and conflict. State should have ultimate responsibility for coordinating and producing the final product for the National Security Council (NSC). Finally, the president should establish a commission composed of outside experts and former officials to assess and provide feedback periodically on these regional reviews and to offer external, objective views on these documents.

3. **Increase the use of regionally-appropriated funds for assistance and cooperation where appropriate.** The overwhelming amount of security assistance and cooperation is still provided bilaterally to individual countries despite the admonition in PPD 23 that these efforts must be linked to a broader regional approach, including cross-border program coordination, support for regional organizations, and facilitation of linkages among partner countries. Seeking regionally-appropriated funds would advance this cause and could have the ancillary benefit of reducing the entitlement problem. Not all regional security organizations are similarly equipped to receive U.S. assistance. In the Middle East, for example, subregional institutions are weak and so regional assistance to organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council will need to be calibrated accordingly.

4. **Improve interagency coordination and enhance State’s capacity to manage security assistance programs.** In addition to the other steps recommended to improve the integration of security assistance and cooperation, better awareness and coordination among different agencies is necessary. A new mechanism should be created to allow foreign and civil service officers from the country desks at State and personnel from DSCA and the Defense Technology Security Administration at DoD to serve in six–twelve-month rotations at the other’s agency. These rotations will help the State Department to build a cadre of diplomats and civil servants with a deeper understanding of the mechanics of security assistance and cooperation.

To augment its capacity to manage or contribute to the management of security assistance, the State Department will also need to hire more people and reform its personnel management practices. More FSOs should be trained to oversee security assistance programs and incentivized to choose this as a career track.57
Increasing the number of FSOs with the financial, legal, legislative, and programmatic skills to work on the details of security assistance would help correct the imbalance between State and DoD that is particularly pervasive in the field.

5. **Focus on specific implementation goals for the PPD 23 to connect military and non-military goals.** The State Department should lead an interagency process on implementation of civilian capacity-building with bureaus and agencies ranging from DOJ to the Department of Commerce. The goal should be to organize the civilian efforts toward building accountable government, de-radicalization, strong and accountable institutions, and rule-of-law development, and to connect these efforts with military capacity-building programs. The Security Governance Initiative begun by the Obama administration as part of its PPD 23 implementation may be a model worth developing further.

6. **Revise IMET and focus more on professionalizing military and civilian security institutions.** IMET can be useful in cases where the participants’ own military leadership is committed to reform, but it has become primarily an instrument for building and maintaining military-military relations. There is also a risk that military elites in partner states increasingly view IMET as a box to be checked. A serious revision to the IMET program should be linked to the PPD 23 implementation and the 2015 National Security Strategy (which notes the importance of governance and institution-building among security partners) and funded accordingly. Additionally, while State tracks and communicates with all former IMET participants, more can be done to conduct military diplomacy and programs with IMET graduates. State and DoD might consider looking to external experts in the academic and/or business community to develop tools for assessing progress of IMET participants over time. IMET is also only one piece of the professionalization puzzle. The United States should also invest in expanding the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative and Ministry of Defense Advisors program to generate top-down, bureaucracy wide reform in partners’ defense establishments. The United States should consider placing responsibility for these programs at the State Department, with DoD charged with administering them.

7. **Invest in a consistent policy for promoting accountability among U.S. security partners.** Today, U.S. personnel, particularly embassy staff, spend a significant portion of their resources and time vetting units and finding units ineligible for assistance per the Leahy Laws. These efforts are labor intensive, but the laws provide an opportunity to address the larger policy goal of promoting accountability within partner security forces. This is because remediating units found ineligible under Leahy vetting represents a critically important component of the State and DoD versions of the Leahy Laws. It is also important to train local U.S. civilian and military officials to convey to partners why certain training, equipment, or other assistance cannot be provided and what types of judicial actions and accountability for past violations would be required for the resumption of assistance. In short, given the rise in military diplomacy, both civilian personnel and military personnel must be prepared to a) proactively encourage strong human rights standards and accountability among partner forces and b) specifically develop and execute remediation policies that are fair, achievable, and generally can be applied to most military units found ineligible for training and assistance due to Leahy vetting.58

8. **Invest early and focus more on “headware” than “hardware” for military BPC.**59 Where the established priority is BPC, rather than influence or access, U.S. officials should dispense assistance
It is critical in each instance to be clear about the objective, i.e., whether it is truly to build capacity or if the aim is to secure access or influence.

Based on what partners need and can absorb. Needs often include leadership; basic skills training, including logistics; and help with planning or writing doctrine. In some cases, the U.S. government’s assessment of “needs” will diverge significantly from the weapons systems currently provided and the “wants” of the local government. Identifying willing or potentially necessary partners and investing early – i.e., before a crisis – provides military trainers with space to take a firmer line with partner forces. This approach requires civilian and military leaders to clearly communicate to the men and women charged with executing the mission that the purpose is primarily to build partner capacity, not influence. This approach is not without risk, since some would-be partners may seek assistance from other countries. Thus, it is critical in each instance to be clear about the objective, i.e., whether it is truly to build capacity or if the aim is to secure access or influence. The personnel charged with BPC missions are typically judged based on how much equipment they move and how quickly. Therefore, new professional metrics should be developed and applied to encourage and judge personnel in the field on how well they pursue the agreed upon objectives and outcomes of the security assistance and cooperation mission.

9. Use positive conditionality proactively.

Policymakers will continue to struggle to use conditionality to exact the appropriate impact or leverage; conditionality will be particularly challenging when it comes to security assistance and cooperation packages that are considered national entitlements, or symbols of the overall bilateral security relationships. Instead, U.S. policymakers could conceive of upfront, positive conditionality that creates a road map with partners on the receiving end of these programs. For instance, recipient countries should write out memorandums of understanding (MOUs) in conjunction with U.S. officials in order to explain and articulate the shared goals of U.S. assistance and training in their countries. (This process would follow the practice undertaken by many USAID missions, which write out MOUs with local government partners.) Road maps are more likely to be effective with some authorities, such as FMF, that are appropriated on an annual basis. Another version of positive conditionality is a grant-like program, perhaps modeled on programs administered by the Millennium Challenge Corp., where partner nations identify what they want, make a case for it, and discuss what they would do with a certain type of security assistance or cooperation package.

10. Develop a systematic, interagency method of tracking outcomes.

There are unique challenges involved in measuring the utility of security assistance and cooperation given the various purposes for which it is deployed. It is nevertheless essential to develop a mechanism for after-action reporting that is guided by a set of principles and questions designed to assess efficacy. The regional reviews discussed above provide a mechanism for tracking intended goals and final outcomes of security assistance and cooperation efforts, but these must be informed by a general set of metrics. The NSC should oversee an interagency effort to develop these metrics that draws upon other methods currently used to measure U.S. foreign assistance, such as metrics used by USAID for economic support funds and by the Millennium Challenge Corp.
PART VI: CONCLUSION

Security assistance and cooperation were critical instruments of U.S. foreign and defense policy long before “building partner capacity” came in vogue. U.S. policymakers’ post-September 11, 2001, interest in using assistance and cooperation to incentivize and enable local partners has contributed to the creation of a slew of new authorities and programs. As this report has illustrated, more is not necessarily better. That goes for the number of authorities and the level of assistance or cooperation provided to U.S. partners. The spate of new authorities has exacerbated both imbalances within the interagency and conflicts among the objectives that assistance and cooperation is deployed to achieve. Competing priorities are most apparent when it comes to the tension between short-term and long-term objectives. It is also the case that assistance and cooperation is too often provided on the basis of faulty assumptions and without proper follow-up to assess the efficacy of these programs. These and other strategic and structural deficiencies not only reduce the efficacy of security assistance and cooperation. They can also subvert U.S. national security interests.

To enable policymakers to wield assistance and cooperation more effectively, the executive and legislative branches must work together to rationalize existing authorities. Because some objectives will always conflict to a certain degree, it is also incumbent on policymakers to create mechanisms to ensure candid prioritization and risk mitigation. This is best done through a NSC-coordinated regional framework that brings together key stakeholders throughout the interagency, but with the State Department, which is responsible for U.S. foreign policy, in the lead. U.S. policymakers must also be willing to use positive conditionality and insist on needs-based capacity building where appropriate. These reforms, while helpful, will fail unless structural inequities within the interagency are also addressed. Future administrations – like the current and past administrations – will rely heavily on security assistance and cooperation. Policymakers must act now in order to improve the efficacy of this instrument, ensuring a return on the investment to advance American interests.
ENDNOTES


3. Future Center for a New American Security research will focus in detail on these particular challenges and recommendations, particularly how the United States can best improve the professional conduct of its partner forces.


5. Moreover, it is important to note that diplomats and civilian defense officials working in security cooperation offices and U.S. military personnel deployed overseas all contribute substantially to the process of providing security cooperation and assistance. Thus, this report is not intended to be solely Washington-centric in terms of its analysis and recommendations.

6. These forces can be either permanently or rotationally deployed.

7. INCLE funding in particular is the main foreign assistance mechanism for security sector reform efforts undertaken with partners’ civilian institutions. The Department of State requested $396 million in INCLE funding for FY2015. U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2015 (March 4, 2014), 150, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222898.pdf.


9. The Obama administration requested nearly $6.5 billion total for FMF programs in the FY2016 Budget, according to the Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance Summary Tables, Fiscal Year 2016.


11. Because Section 2282 is implemented through DSCA, using the same processes used for FMF, in practice this means that the same timelines typically apply. In short, even though the new authorities were intended to allow for “urgent and emergent” situations where flexible assistance needed to be deployed, in practice this element of Section 2282 has yet to expedite the timelines from decision to implementation of assistance on the ground.

12. For example, the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative aims to generate top-down, bureaucracy wide improvement in defense establishments by providing experts who work with partner nations to assess and address organizational weaknesses. DoD is also working on expanding its Ministry of Defense Advisors program, which was designed to promote ministerial core competencies in the Afghan Ministry of Defense, to other countries.


16. Author interview with former DoD officials, June 2015. According to one of those officials, the F-15s in particular were delivered to Saudi Arabia by U.S. policymakers and “message[d] as a means of pushing back against Iran.” See also “Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the Manama Dialogue” (Manama, Bahrain, December 7, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5336.

17. One recent example involves the U.S. provision of aircraft carriers to Saudi Arabia, many of which are being deployed in support of the Saudi intervention in Yemen. While in this case the FMS program may be aimed at reassuring a regional ally of U.S. support, particularly in light of ongoing U.S. negotiations with that ally’s chief competitor, Iran, the militarization of the Saudi-U.S. relationship has enabled Riyadh’s recent military intervention.

18. A 2013 RAND study found that BPC inputs can help with relationship-building, but actual capacity-building may suffer as a result. Paul et al., “What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?”


20. For example, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew J. Shapiro referred directly to the use of security assistance
and cooperation, particularly in the context of FMF, as an essential tool to promote U.S. values. Shapiro, speaking to a CNAS conference in September 2011, stated that “... U.S. security assistance also often provides critical training that helps professionalize partner militaries and teaches them about core U.S. values like respect for human rights and civilian control of the military.” Andrew J. Shapiro, “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance in Addressing Today’s Challenges and Building New Partnerships,” (Center for a New American Security, Washington, September 27, 2011), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm.

21. U.S. foreign assistance is prohibited in these cases until the partner nation “takes effective steps to bring the perpetrators of the violations to justice” (State Leahy Law) or “takes the necessary corrective steps” (Defense Leahy Law). Support for remediation efforts for foreign military and security services is granted under Subsection (c) of 22 U.S.C. § 2378d, “Limitation on assistance to security forces.”


23. In a 2013 report, GAO found that in building partnership capacity, DoD needed to set clearer goals and define its terminology “to help stakeholders understand what partnership capacity programs seek to accomplish and how they fit in with broad national security interests.” In a 2012 review of security force assistance, GAO found that the lack of a common understanding of this term within DoD resulted in different interpretations of what types of activities are included and presented challenges in planning activities and forecasting needs for force capabilities. GAO recommended DoD take steps to clarify its intent and then determine what additional actions are required to plan for and conduct security force assistance. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation, GAO-13-335T (February 14, 2013); and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security Assistance: DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management, GAO-13-84 (November 2012).

24. In some cases, there is significant interagency disagreement on the hierarchy of objectives, particularly as attached to programs led by different institutions – for example, COCOMs may have one set of priorities for a certain program (e.g., operational, access, interoperability, intelligence) while State regional bureaus can have another (e.g., influence, foreign policy links, relationship-building).

25. Matching BPC inputs to the appropriate absorption capacity distinct to each U.S. partner is also critical. Paul et al., “What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?”


29. To the degree defense officials and the military worry about a short- or long-term disconnect, it is in terms of whether to provide assistance and cooperation geared toward immediate threats or potential future ones.


37. See, for example, Duncan L. Clarke, “US Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?” The Middle East Journal, 51 no. 2 (Spring 1997), 200–214.


41. Pakistan is the only recipient nation that has never contributed troops to the two coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan.


50. Author interviews with senior defense officials, February 2015, Center for a New American Security.

51. See Figure 1.


53. According to the 2010 QDDR, “Governments mired in conflict and crisis are often unable to protect their own citizens from violence, crime, and corruption. Where instability creates transnational threats, the United States must be ready to assist — in particular by helping our partner countries build effective and accountable security and justice institutions. We are modernizing our ability to provide this kind of assistance.” U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010), xv, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153342.pdf. In discussing efforts to mitigate conflict and prevent violent extremism, the 2015 QDDR highlights strengthening partners’ security sectors as a priority: “Security assistance to military and law enforcement bodies is an important tool in the Department’s efforts to increase stability in conflict-affected countries. Through financial assistance, training, and the provision of equipment, we enable our partners to safeguard their people, support peacekeeping, and defend against and pursue violent extremists.” U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Enduring Leadership in a Dynamic Under New American Security.


57. This recommendation was made in a Stimson Center study in 2008 but has yet to be implemented. The study focused on human capital improvements necessary to build U.S. foreign affairs. Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, Richard Nygard, et al., *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* (Stimson Center, October 2008), http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf.


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Production Notes

Paper recycling is reprocessing waste paper fibers back into a usable paper product.

Soy ink is a helpful component in paper recycling. It helps in this process because the soy ink can be removed more easily than regular ink and can be taken out of paper during the de-inking process of recycling. This allows the recycled paper to have less damage to its paper fibers and have a brighter appearance. The waste that is left from the soy ink during the de-inking process is not hazardous and it can be treated easily through the development of modern processes.