**SAFERWORLD**

PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT. BUILDING SAFER LIVES

Towards a more effective early warning system in the Horn of Africa

Learning lessons and seizing opportunities

July 2015

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Acknowledgements

About the project

'Capacities for Peace' is a global project undertaken by Saferworld and Conciliation Resources funded by the EU under the Instrument for Stability. The project involves working with local actors to enhance the effectiveness of local analysis, early warning and early action in 32 countries around the world.

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this are the sole responsibility of Saferworld and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

Contents

Executive summary

THE CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM (CEWARN) is an early warning mechanism established in 2002 by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It has acted as an important platform for regional cooperation on conflict prevention and mitigation through data-based early warning and response in the Horn of Africa region. In each country, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs), CEWARN national level structures, have played a key role in the actual development of early warning and response on the ground. While its original mandate was focusing on pastoralist conflicts, CEWARN has evolved differently across the region, allowing the different CEWERUs to adapt to different contexts and address different issues.

Taking stock of these developments and of the changing conflict dynamics at regional level and within each country, IGAD Member States have since requested to expand CEWARN's original mandate focusing on pastoralist conflicts. This report, drawing on research and the Capacities for Peace project activities which brought together stakeholders from the whole region in a process of reflection and exchange of best practices, seeks to highlight the lessons and opportunities for improving CEWARN's functionality as it implements and reviews its new strategy for 2012–2019.

Challenges identified to CEWARN and CEWERUs effectiveness relate to sustaining resources for the different bodies and actors involved in the operationalisation of early warning and response, setting up adequate data collection processes, translating early warning into rapid response, and promoting the role that women can play throughout the mechanism structures. Civil society organisations have played a critical role in supporting early warning and response, through capacity building of different stake-holders, provision of funding, as an entry point into communities or for the facilitation and coordination of contacts and processes in their own country but also cross-border. Harnessing their potential to contribute to early warning and response is key to ensure these mechanisms can effectively prevent conflicts and build peace in the region. Just as CEWARN is reviewing the implementation of its new strategy, this report suggests a number of recommendations and ways forward for Horn of Africa and international policymakers, donors, and practitioners to consider and act upon in order to improve the effectiveness of the CEWARN to respond to current and upcoming challenges in the region, such as:

■ Sustaining resources for and adopting the appropriate policy frameworks allowing CEWERUs to maximise their potential to act as central early warning and response structures in the region.

■ Establishing more systematised processes for the collection and analysis of information, as well as provision of responses which rely less on individuals' goodwill or subjectivity.

■ Harnessing the positive contributions of civil society organisations and promoting the role that woman need to play in early warning and response processes.

Introduction

CAPACITIES FOR PEACE (C4P) is a European Union (EU)-funded project undertaken by Saferworld and Conciliation Resources which aims to build capacities of local actors in early warning and early action in 32 conflict-affected contexts across the world. In the Horn of Africa region, the C4P project aimed to improve civil society engagement in regional conflict early warning and early response (EWER) mechanisms, including IGAD's CEWARN. The project supported regional lesson learning for civil society organisations (CSOs) and government staff across six IGAD countries (Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia), though an emphasis was placed on the Kenya-Uganda border area of the Karamoja cluster, termed the Lower Karamoja sub-cluster.[1] This site is at the boundary of Turkana and West Pokot in Kenya and Moroto District in Uganda where violent conflicts have been experienced and where a number of peacebuilding interventions have been undertaken. Following an initial conflict analysis, the project has aimed to strengthen the capacities of CSOs and security agencies to undertake early warning, conflict analysis and timely responses. It has also sought to engage at the regional level with CEWARN, National Research Institutes (NRIs) and the CEWERUs in each country.

This report draws on the C4P activities, exchanges and research, and explores a number of issues relating to EWER. It begins by giving an overview of the methodology used for the study, which is followed by an introduction to EWER in the region, focusing on the CEWARN. The main body of the document then draws out the key lessons from the project on: strengthening structures for EWER; bridging the gap between early warning and early response; the role of civil society in EWER; and the gender considerations in EWER. Examples from across the region are used to illustrate the lessons learnt. The study finishes with conclusions and a series of key recommendations for further discussion.

Methodology

The methodology for this paper combines the review of existing project documentation and external documentation with a series of key informant interviews (KIIs), which collectively were analysed by an external consultant.

The project documentation included a conflict analysis of the Karamoja region[2] and reports on workshops (on EWER mechanisms, gender and traditional EWER mechanisms) that have been held as part of the C4P project. These workshops were held in Kenya and Uganda and involved CEWARN field monitors, CEWERU representatives, government and security officials, women leaders, elders, youth and

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1 Lower Karamoja sub-cluster includes Uganda (Moroto District), and Kenya (Pokot North, Loima and Turkana South).
2 Saferworld (2014) 'Conflict Analysis in the Karamoja' (unpublished).

other civil society representatives. A limited selection of relevant external documentation such as strategies and evaluations relating to CEWARN were also analysed.

The review of documentation was complemented by 15 KIIs conducted by Saferworld with: staff from national CEWERUs, the CEWARN Secretariat and NRIs; civil society; as well as representatives from donors with an interest in EWER. The Lower Karamoja sub-cluster was a key focus area throughout the implementation of the project. A consultant worked with Saferworld staff in a workshop to validate findings and agree key lessons and recommendations emanating from the analysis.

The study has focused on five key research questions:

- What are effective structures for EWER across the Horn of Africa region?
- How can the collection and analysis of early warning data be improved?
- How to bridge the gap between early warning and effective early response?
- What role should civil society play in EWER at the regional, national and local levels?
- What are the key gender considerations that need to be taken into account in EWER?

While efforts were made to conduct interviews with key informants across the region, there were challenges in obtaining adequate responses to KIIs from actors in Sudan and South Sudan that limited the feedback from stakeholders in these areas. However, representatives from these countries did participate in the project's workshops and the reports from these events were consequently the main sources of analysis for these countries. The report is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of lessons learnt, rather it is hoped it will prompt further research and discussion into the important issues it raises.

Evolution of early warning and early response in the Horn of Africa

CEWARN was developed as part of the introduction of a conflict prevention and resolution mandate for IGAD. The IGAD Council of Ministers endorsed the CEWARN Protocol in 2002,[3] which paved the way for a pilot phase for CEWARN between 2002 and 2006, including the establishment of a secretariat office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. During this period the primary aim was to establish and operationalise the CEWARN mechanism with a specific focus on early warning of cross-border pastoralist conflict. The initial pilot area was the Karamoja cluster (the Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan borders), with the mechanism expanding its focus to encompass the Somali cluster (the Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia borders) two years later.

In 2006 the decision was taken to expand the mechanism to cover all IGAD Member States. This was set out in the 2006–11 CEWARN strategy which focused on developing the regional institutional structure and operational capacity for EWER. This was followed by the current strategy which runs from 2012–19.[4] This strategy was developed through an in-depth process of consultation in Member States, involving two months of field work and including discussions with more than 5,000 people. The current strategy aims to enhance capabilities and put into use structures and capacities for EWER developed during the previous strategy (see Box 1 for a summary of the 2012–19 strategy).

The 2012–19 strategy sees a shift in focus to cover a broader range of thematic issues and geographical areas – strengthening capabilities to enhance decision-making at different levels in line with this expansion – and emphasises the learning role of CEWARN alongside the need to develop the funding strategy to operationalise the plan.

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3 The 2002 Protocol defines the functions of CEWARN as including: promoting the exchange of information and collaboration among Member States on early warning and response; gathering, verifying, processing, and analysing information about conflicts in the region; and communicating all such information and analysis to decisionmakers of IGAD policy organs and national governments of Member States.
4 CEWARN '2012–2019 Strategic Framework'.

Box 1: CEWARN Strategic Framework 2012–19 Summary

CEWARN 2012–19 Strategic Outcomes

1. Utilisation of CEWARN's decision-support tools in policy formulation and development.
2. Entrenching of early warning and early response in local, national and regional governance.
3. 'Franchising' of the CEWARN values, standards and benchmarks by global, regional and national institutions.
4. Communities, citizens, private enterprises, and officials in CEWARN's areas of operation are collectively engaged in upholding human security.
5. Sustaining preventive response initiatives – particularly cross-border ones – that combine local and national ownership, and utilising them to influence scaling and best practices.
6. Expansion in the monitoring and mapping of conflict and violence systems (typologies and geographic coverage).
7. Adequate financial and human resources to implement the strategy.

The critical imperatives for achievement of these outcomes are:

1. The ability to gather credible and sufficient data to turn into high quality analysis.
2. The skills to map and analyse violent conflict risks and responses from a complex systems perspective.
3. The ability to serve the appropriate decisionmakers with robust risk and contingency assessments in a timely fashion.
4. The capability to effectively grow and evolve the mechanism in line with the needs of preventing violent conflict and enabling successful response.
5. The competence to support on-the-ground projects that reduce risks of violent conflict or mitigate it, and promote scaling for widespread effect.
6. The use of an in-built learning mechanism that refreshes and reorients strategy and operations.
7. Outstanding facilitative and collaborative capabilities on the local, national and regional levels.
8. Clarity on standards and benchmarks driving partnerships.
9. An engaged network of peace champions.
10. A resilient/flexible financial position.

The CEWARN mechanism is localised at country level through national CEWERUs. Appendix 1 illustrates the structure. Each CEWERU unit consists of a steering committee, focal point, and local committees. The steering committee includes security personnel, members of parliament (MPs), and civil society representatives. The role of the steering committee is to collect, review, and analyse information on EWER, liaise with grassroots civil society, and formulate response strategies. It reports to the CEWERU. The NRIs are contracted by CEWARN to assist with setting up and managing information collection networks, analysis, and support in coordinating the work of the CEWERUs. At the local level, peace committees consist of governmental and non-governmental representatives and their functions include: establishing modes of collecting and sharing information; creating partnerships in peacebuilding activities; and awareness raising. Also at the local level, the structures rely on field monitors who collect and report open source information against an agreed set of indicators in their areas of reporting, and often work closely with the peace committees.[5]

CEWARN and the CEWERUs were found to be the primary mechanisms for conflict EWER in the region. An East Africa Community early warning system is being developed but it is not yet operational and is likely to make use of the CEWERU structures and mechanisms for data collection. Other early warning mechanisms also exist relating to drought, food security, and land issues in the region.

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5 See Appendix 1: CEWARN organigram.

Lessons learnt

Analysis of the project documentation, KIIs and external documentation by the consultant and Saferworld staff led to a series of key findings and from these a series of lessons are identified relating to each of the five discussion areas. The rest of this report looks at those lessons, with an explanation of key findings under each chapter.

1

Strengthening structures for early warning and early response

THE RESEARCH REVEALED THAT THE CEWARN MECHANISM has been operation-alised to varying degrees across the region. It is most clearly established in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda and is beginning to be more active in South Sudan and Somalia.

Institutionalisation and resourcing of the CEWERU at the country level is key to sustained support for cross-border conflict management.

Interviewees highlighted that the extent of government commitment to the CEWERU model varies across the region and has affected the level of resources that governments are committing to the initiative within each country. Some countries have resourced their CEWERUs locally with staff and financial resources and in other cases this has been left to the regional CEWARN Secretariat, which provides resources through the NRIs. The success of a CEWERU appears to be partially related to the location of the CEWERU and its access to higher levels of government.

In some cases difficulties with the NRIs led to countries increasing their own analytical capacities within the CEWERU. This has been the case in Kenya and some of those interviewed contend that this internal analytical capacity is a positive addition to the CEWERU structure. Across the region, to varying degrees, CEWERU structures have been established, field monitors recruited and deployed, and local peace committees strengthened. Some countries have started to expand the system beyond the border regions to cover conflict-affected areas in the interior; for example, Kenya has deployed Peace Monitors to parts of the country outside of the CEWARN identified clusters.

CEWERUs play important roles in supporting community peace agreements, ranging from facilitating local peace talks to recognising the agreements reached. For example, while the Lokriama Peace Accord between Turkana and Karamojong in the Karamoja Cluster predates the CEWARN Protocol, CEWARN and the CEWERUs have supported the commemoration of the Accord, for example, by assisting community members from different countries to participate in commemoration events. Furthermore, peace committees have been part of the Modogashe Declaration in the Somali cluster of Kenya, and the Dillo Dukana Teltelle Peace Dialogue, which brought together

communities of southern Ethiopia and Gabra of northern Kenya. The latter was followed by the Maikona Declaration that adopted the resolutions of Dillo Dukana.

Cross-border civil society networks have worked effectively to support CEWERU efforts in some areas, between CSOs in Karamoja, for example. In some cases the national CEWERUs are working together across common borders without relying on the CEWARN Secretariat, demonstrating that the system is being 'domesticated' and becoming self-sustaining; however, it requires commitment to sustain this momentum.

In Karamoja, which has long been a CEWARN focus region, there is evidence of traditional mechanisms sustaining early warning in the face of dwindling funding. Reliable and adequate funding is necessary to sustain the system but it is also positive to see that despite the lack of funding, cooperation is still functioning to some extent. At times communities have mobilised their own resources to hold meetings, which have led to initiatives to recover stolen livestock and to de-escalate tensions and reduce the likelihood of possible revenge attacks.

Sustaining and expanding the system requires funding. In particular, field monitors have been an important resource in the collection of early warning data. However, they need remuneration for their work, the resources to operate, and continuous capacity building to be effective.

Across the region field monitors are not currently being paid and indeed have not been paid for a number of years. In some places the field monitors are still operating as volunteers. In other cases, however, their need to make their own living means that they are not able to fulfil their duties as a field monitor and as such cannot be relied upon as the front line of the data chain on early warning. Overall this is resulting in a lack of consistency in the functioning of structures and in data collection across the region.

Where field monitors do exist their number and geographical spread has been inadequate for the work that is needed. This is especially the case in the context of the new CEWARN strategy for 2012–19 that has expanded both the thematic and geographical coverage of the mechanism. This has largely prevented data collection on the new themes of the strategy. This strain on the capacity of field monitors, exacerbated by the expanding focus of the mechanism, seems to be part of the rationale for the move to increase the role of CSOs in early warning data collection.

The capacity of field monitors is a challenge both in terms of the physical resources at their disposal to do their jobs effectively – such as access to transport and methods of communication – and of the need to enhance their technical capacity.

Some interviewees highlighted a lack of neutrality among field monitors, which affects the type and quality of information generated. There were also challenges around verifying information collected and the time taken to do this. These challenges could remain whether a field monitor or CSO monitoring model is adopted. What is needed are ways to verify information.

The CEWARN mechanism at present is largely dependent on the role and capacity of individual CEWERUs, yet the regional role of CEWARN is still relevant as an overarching structure.

There was general agreement that CEWARN itself had less influence at the forefront of EWER activity in the region, which was largely dependent on the CEWERUs. This may in part be due to changes in leadership and funding issues. However, it was felt that CEWARN still has a key role to play in terms of highlighting regional issues, monitoring the work of the CEWERUs, and bringing together different states and stakeholders which may not happen solely through bilateral relationships. The current CEWARN strategy prioritises the implementation of a lesson learning approach but

there is little evidence that this is taking place in practice. For example, documentation on CEWARN's website is out of date and there is little documentation of lessons learnt from across the region. This is a lost opportunity and should be addressed.

Cross-border relationships between peace committees and civil society are an important resource in EWER at the borders but these remain *ad hoc*. CEWARN could play a greater role in maximising the impact of these initiatives and mobilising political actors at higher levels.

There are many positive examples of peace committees working together across borders and in doing so preventing the escalation of conflicts. On the Kenya-Uganda border peace committees liaise with each other to negotiate access to pasture and also for livestock recovery. Between Kenya and Uganda, and Kenya and Ethiopia, cross-border commissions operate on immigration, security and education but there are challenges in getting information for action to the right people. There is, however, a feeling that much of this cooperation is *ad hoc* and relies on individuals. There is consequently a need for more structured approaches to deal with cross-border conflicts, and for buy-in from individual political actors in the member countries in order to address the sovereignty issues that can arise.

CEWARN could play a more focused role in highlighting the policy and programme interventions needed to address the structural drivers of conflict. National governments have a vital role to play in the oversight of security measures at borders but CEWARN can facilitate linkages between this security sector engagement and community level initiatives, especially where cross-border communication is needed. For example, on the Ugandan side of Karamoja, disarmament has been quite successful. However, to have a sustainable impact linkages to programmes that look at the longer term drivers of conflict are needed to ensure communities do not rearm. Balanced disarmament on the Kenya side is also essential. CEWARN can support such lesson learning and policy advocacy to improve cross-border cohesion and effectiveness.

The expansion of themes and geographic areas in the new CEWARN strategy is clear progress. However, in reality capacity and resource constraints mean it is necessary for countries to view the list as a menu of possibilities.

The 2012–19 CEWARN strategy included an expansion of the geographic and thematic coverage. While the research process found an appreciation that the issues included in the strategy had been generated from wide and grassroots consultations across the region, there was scepticism regarding the capacity of the system to be able to effectively cover all of these issues. At present, the CEWERUs are largely dependent on 'borrowed' resources, such as secondments of staff into the CEWERU from other government ministries and from other organisations like United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, some interviewees saw the new strategy as a frame-work that provides a menu to allow countries to focus on the issues of priority to them; rather than a CEWARN-defined list that would force all countries to act in the same manner regardless of their individual needs.

There will also be challenges for CEWARN in maintaining levels of political will on sensitive issues, such as conflicts related to extractives. In addition, pastoralist conflict has not yet been effectively dealt with and the nature of this conflict is evolving (for instance through the increasing commercialisation of cattle theft). In such a context there are obvious challenges to the introduction of a wide range of new issues.

The finalisation and approval of national peace policies is an important step in facilitating funding for this work. Better documentation (by CEWARN and CEWERUs) of lessons learnt and best practice will make attracting external funds easier.

The CEWARN strategy remains heavily dependent on donor funding. National governments are not contributing sufficiently to their own CEWERUs or the CEWARN mechanism. Some countries (namely Kenya and Uganda) have progressed in the development of national peace policies. Once approved these should provide a framework for improved national resourcing of CEWERUs as they will outline clear national priorities, and clarify roles and responsibilities.

In Uganda, the process was spearheaded by the Office of the Prime Minister but the process of developing the national peace policy is being driven by civil society (through the national peace platform task force) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). There is still a debate regarding whether the policy should be housed within the Ministry of Defence, Justice or Internal Affairs, and political will across the government is limited. In Kenya the national peace policy has been developed into a sessional paper and put before parliament.

To date CEWARN has been heavily reliant on donor funds. It is likely that external funds will continue to be provided considering the context of the region (in terms of security priorities for donor nations) and these will be easier to attract if CEWARN and national CEWERUs improve their lesson learning and documentation and communication of impact.

2

Early warning data

CEWARN'S THEORY OF CHANGE[6] is based on the assumption that its objectives can be achieved through the provision of information and analysis relating to peace and security, to the right individuals and institutions, in a timely manner. Early warning data needs to be multifaceted, gathered from state and non-state sources, and where possible, systematically verified. As highlighted by interviewees, to function effectively the system also needs to feed back its findings to communities to ensure that it is not simply an extractive process.

Across the system there was found to be a need for continuous improvements in early warning data collection and analysis. Below, the analysis on early warning data has been divided into four key lessons.

The implementation of the current CEWARN strategy lacks clarity in roles and responsibilities, and inadequate resourcing is resulting in gaps in the consistent collection of good quality data.

There are plans to move the primary role of data collection away from field monitors and more towards CSOs. This has not yet happened (with the exception of some limited attempts in South Sudan) and there was great debate in this research among interviewees and workshop participants regarding this change in strategy. Most of those interviewed championed the role of field monitors and expressed dissatisfaction that funding for them had been stopped, and that in many cases this role had not been funded for years (in the case of Somalia it has never been). The field monitors were often still working on a voluntary basis but with such limited resourcing, comprehensive data collection cannot be assumed. Some argue that the range of issues that CEWARN is now aiming to cover demands a broader network of monitors and a better data collection model that involves many CSOs and more than one NRI.

Interviewees raised questions about how CSOs could be selected for this role and about how to ensure their impartiality and accountability. There were also questions around capacity and resourcing of this work. Nonetheless interviewees did see an important role for CSOs in the process.[7]

While the focus to date has been on field monitors collecting data locally against the CEWARN indicators, in most cases CSOs and various other non-state actors have been engaged in collecting and sharing information to compliment the role of field monitors. In some countries, such as Uganda, the security sector has always been

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6 That "high quality, credible information and analysis on violent threats and appropriate responses, delivered in timely fashion to the right individuals and institutions, will lead to quality decisions that increase peace and security in the IGAD region" – CEWARN '2012–2019 Strategic Framework', p 9.
7 This is discussed in chapter 4, on 'The role of civil society in early warning and early response'.

closely involved in the process of data collection and a disciplined flow of information exists within individual security sector agencies. However, challenges remain in communication between, for example, the army and police. In other countries security agencies are becoming more open to working with communities and CSOs in responding to early warning information. In addition the involvement of CSOs and communities can help increase accountability among the security agencies. For example, Saferworld's community security work in South Sudan helps to build partnerships between communities and security providers as a valuable EWER mechanism.

Technology has an important role to play in enhancing early warning systems. Partnerships with the private sector have a potential part to play here.

Technology can help ensure those collecting, monitoring, and analysing data are consistent and it can be used to improve systems for aggregating and analysing data. CEWARN has provided ICT infrastructure including phones, faxes, and radios. However, the utility of this equipment is impeded by the lack of infrastructure in many of the border areas, for instance the absence of phone masts, and by the failure to maintain equipment or supply monitors with airtime. United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity and Peace (SAFE) programme, a conflict early warning system operating in Uganda, is using short message service lines to collect data (see Box 2).

Kenya has been a leader in innovation and the use of ICT in early warning. In Kenya crowd sourcing tools, such as USHAHIDI[8] and SMS 108[9] have been used to collect early warning data around election times. Consequently, there has been some experience in utilising networks beyond field monitors to gather early warning data. There is the need for further analysis to explore the effectiveness of these tools and how they can link with the CEWARN structures, to see if they could be useful examples from which to draw for ongoing early warning work.

CEWARN is increasing the use of crowd sourcing by SMS to augment data collected by CSOs. In rural areas where there is not the population density to crowd source with accuracy, CEWARN is exploring developing relationships with sector specific non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – who may host field monitors – as part of the data collection network and with identified individuals.

In general ICT has an important role to play in early warning but research shows that it needs to be integrated into a broader framework, involving a range of actors including civil society, if its benefit is to be fully exploited.[10] The private sector also has a role to play in early warning and this could be further explored. In Kenya mobile telephone service providers Safaricom and Airtel have supported the SMS platform and reports indicate that they are willing to continue to be part of the system. Safaricom set up the free SMS 108 number which was used during the last elections.

Box 2: Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Equity and Peace (SAFE)

SAFE is a USAID-funded programme in Uganda that conducts monthly conflict assessments to better understand and respond to conflict patterns and trends as they develop throughout Uganda. SAFE has trained an extensive network of 304 Conflict Monitors based in Bukedi, Kigezi, West Nile, Karamoja, Lango and Ankole sub-regions. They report conflict incidents by text message to a toll free SMS line. Currently only the Conflict Monitors have access to this line. Monitors are also able to report anonymously so that they are able to report on conflicts that they are party to. USAID SAFE staff will then verify a reported incident with at least three other sources in that area.

[USAID SAFE (2015) 'Uganda: Conflict Scan report', February]

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8 USHAHIDI means 'testimony' in Swahili. It was developed to map reports of violence and peace efforts in Kenya after the post-election fall out in 2008. The initiative has grown into a global non-profit technology company.

9 A crowd sourcing SMS line developed to receive information from the public around the 2013 elections.

10 Musila, G. M. (2013), 'Early Warning and the Role of New Technologies in Kenya'. In Mancini, F. (eds.), *New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict*, (UNDP, USAID, IPI), p 55.

Enhancing horizontal information sharing and more local analysis of information, as part of a system which has inbuilt mechanisms for verification, can strengthen early warning.

While data is generally collected at the local levels the CEWARN system focused on sending this information to the national or regional level for analysis. However, many CEWERUs are now trying to decentralise this system and enhance horizontal information sharing alongside vertical channels. This demands effective coordination and linking data collection and analysis into policy formulation.

The research highlighted that there is a great deal of useful data and analysis held outside the system with CSOs. This was specifically mentioned in South Sudan where the CEWERU is newer and could benefit from the wealth of information that is held by some CSOs that have a longer history of gathering early warning information and responding to local conflicts. By developing national level analytical systems information currently held outside of the system could potentially be better absorbed, stored and used locally. The current strategy looks at having more than one NRI per country. While the interviews highlighted a fair amount of resistance to this, there was some recognition of the potential value in having a network of NRIs that CEWERUs would be able to draw upon as a resource, as opposed to centralising this role in one organisation.

Multiple sources of early warning information can lead to competition between different actors and it was not always clear that data is being shared, verified, and channelled effectively to inform responses.

The expansion of themes within the CEWARN strategy also raised questions about the handling of sensitive data. Part of the rationale for the initial focus of CEWARN on pastoralist conflict was that it was relatively uncontroversial. However, participants in this project raised concerns that themes such as violent extremism may involve information that will be less easy for states to share.

Data analysis needs to be decentralised to CEWERUs, and in some cases, to smaller geographic entities. CEWARN can play an important role in the monitoring and oversight of the systems.

Currently the systems for analysing data appear to be concentrated at CEWARN level and there were many calls for decentralising this role to CEWERUs. In some cases CEWERUs have taken the initiative to develop their own systems but it would make sense not to duplicate but rather to share systems that are effective and learn lessons on these across the region.

There remains a lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities for communicating the information that the system generates, which is accentuated by gaps in staffing (particularly the lack of field monitors and country coordinators in some countries). The current strategy also explores bringing additional NRIs on board. While this could have important implications for double checking data and improving the quality of analysis generated, there are funding implications and monitoring challenges for ensuring oversight of their work. It is recognised that CEWARN could play a more active role in the monitoring and oversight of data analysis.

There were also questions raised concerning how realistic it is to have a unified set of indicators for such diverse issues across a broad geographic area. Linked to this were concerns about the number of indicators and the capacity to analyse data generated from such a range of indicators. Across the region the role and capacity of NRIs varies, as do the models they are using for analysis, and there is currently no consensus on what the best model for analysis is.

3

Early response

RESPONSE CAN BE BROADLY DIVIDED INTO THREE LEVELS – immediate, medium term, and long term. The immediate is the focus of this section and what we are calling 'early response'. The data that CEWARN collects is a useful source of information to identify patterns and causes of conflict that can then be used in designing medium to long-term programmes that look at the structural drivers of conflict.

The success of rapid response is dependent on the level of motivation, commitment, and local resource mobilisation.

Local commitment and action is often more important than any external funds provided. If addressed quickly local disputes can be prevented from escalating into conflict. This may not cost much but does require a local and rapid response which may involve the use of traditional conflict resolution techniques. External resources often are needed when a situation is already escalating and needs to be contained. An example from the Kenya-Somali border highlights how local peace committees are key actors in local response. Two Somali-Kenyan teachers were taken by Al Shabaab in Somalia. Kenyan newspapers quickly published stories of the kidnapping on Kenyan soil and in response a spokesperson from the Kenyan Ministry of Defence issued an ultimatum to Al Shabaab. In Mandera, however, the District Commissioner asked the Mandera Peace Committee to coordinate with the corresponding peace committee in Somalia, who then communicated with Al Shabaab, and secured the teachers' release without any government involvement.[11]

The longstanding Lokriama Peace Accord is an example of a successful community-initiated response which predates the CEWARN Protocol. It was signed in 1973 following a conflict between the Matheniko and Ngikamatak-Turkana communities on the Uganda-Kenya border that escalated into an encounter where hundreds of lives were lost. This led to a peace initiative instigated by four young community members. The Peace Accord has continued to play a critical role in minimising raids by the Matheniko and Turkana communities and is celebrated annually.[12]

This capacity for local response is often not appreciated and response could be better informed by local level information with local actors leading and managing response. Local structures need to be strengthened and stakeholders need to work together more effectively, including communities, CSOs, and different levels of government. Box 3 describes how a range of local and national stakeholders have worked together to address a conflict. In countries with devolved structures these structures can be better used to support local response. For example, Turkana County in Kenya with

11 Interview with Somali NRI.
12 Peace II Program (2012) 'Imagine Karimoja! An Appreciative Enquiry into Resources for Peace'.

the relative autonomy provided by the devolution process has appointed a Peace Ambassador to lead and champion this work. The private sector often loses out because of conflict and may be willing to contribute resources to prevent or mitigate conflict. In some cases where the private sector is a participant in the conflict, such as the commercialisation of cattle raiding, land-related conflict, mineral exploration or hydro development schemes, their involvement is also required.

> ### Box 3: The Marsabit Peace Restoration Committee, Kenya (The Kaparo Council of Elders)
>
> An eruption in conflict between the Gabra and Borana communities in late 2013 and early 2014 led to the need for peacebuilding efforts. President Uhuru Kenyatta appointed Hon. Francis Ole Kaparo and Senator Mohamed Yusuf Haji as Mediators in the Marsabit conflict with a view to finding a lasting, just and equitable solution to the conflict. These leaders selected a committee of 35 elders which has played a significant role in negotiating and facilitating the return of stolen livestock from both the Gabra and Borana communities at the height of the conflict. The committee was responsible for the return of 113 camels to the Gabra and 76 cattle to the Borana community. In addition it has facilitated the payment of government compensation to all those (more than 1,000 people) affected by the conflict.
>
> The Kenyan CEWERU supported the elders' meetings and assisted the elders to develop the peace agreement that was presented to the President. The CEWERU has continually engaged with the Marsabit County Government who are working closely with the peace committee to sustain the peace process.
>
> (Source: Interview with Kenyan CEWERU)

At present early response is very dependent on individuals and the system is struggling when the right people are not in place, or in the communication loop, to trigger response.

Response is a field filled with many different players often working at different levels. Discussions with stakeholders involved in the CEWERUs and CSOs often revealed that where response can happen locally the result is more rapid and often more effective. For example, in Uganda resident district commissioners, the district security committees, the anti-stock theft units, as well as the military are functioning quite effectively to coordinate and execute response, although much of it is military-based. By contrast, CSOs and CEWERUs provide more of a 'civilian' response, such as mediation.

Response has often depended on specific individuals and their capacity to analyse early warning data and to formulate appropriate responses. However, if the system is to be effective it needs to be more structured and not rely so heavily on individuals. It should ensure that analytical capacities are built in and decisionmakers with the necessary influence are involved in the data chain and at the right level.

The effectiveness of the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) in supporting early response could be improved through speeding up dispersal, ensuring greater relevance and equity of grants distributed, and decentralising the management of the fund.

The RRF was created in 2009 as a multi-donor basket fund to provide CEWARN with the capacity to urgently respond to violent conflicts, as well as to catalyse a response process that complements long-term development interventions for pastoral communities in the CEWARN cross-border reporting areas.[13] The scope of the RRF was to fund two types of intervention: the first focused on local level conflict prevention, management, and resolution initiatives proposed to local peace committees; and the second focused on capacity building at all levels from the local to the national. Projects costing less than US$10,000 can be funded quickly with only the approval

13 Rapid Response Fund (2013), 'Rapid Response Fund Handbook – 1, Rules and Procedures of the CEWARN Rapid Response Fund', August.

of the CEWARN Director. Proposals for $10,000 to $50,000 must be approved by a Steering Committee chaired by the CEWARN Director and including representatives from IGAD's Peace and Security Department, Partners in Development and CSOs (appointed by the Technical Committee on Early Warning and Response), as well as two CEWERU Heads. Projects are funded for a maximum period of 12 months.

The Fund was evaluated in 2011 and the impacts were found to include a reduction in violence in the Somali and Karamoja cluster. It also found that RRF-funded projects had improved relations between the pastoral communities in both clusters, for example, in the Karamoja Cluster between the Turkana, Matheniko and Jie, and in the Somali Cluster between the Borana and Gabra.[14]

During the research for this report, interviewees raised questions centred on the speed of disbursement, length of grants, appropriateness and equity of response, and where the fund should be housed.

Speed of disbursement. There were many cases noted of delays in receiving funds often rendering the planned project useless. Approval for the RRF level II still takes place in Addis Ababa for proposals from across the region with money then disbursed by country NRIs. The many layers to the decision-making process inevitably slow down response times.

Appropriateness of response. The RRF provides short-term grants with the understanding that such initiatives should complement longer-term processes. However there are not always funding mechanisms for longer-term work to build on and consolidate the initial response.

Equity of response. Some respondents felt that disbursements of the fund had not been equitably spread across the region, with some countries (notably Kenya and Ethiopia) receiving the bulk of grants. However, other interviewees argued that needs are not equally spread between countries and that funding should be prioritised by need. There are also issues around having channels for disbursement, management, and monitoring of the fund which have not been put in place in contexts like Somalia and South Sudan, preventing grants being disbursed to these places. Greater transparency in decision-making regarding the allocation of funds would help address many concerns on these issues.

Housing of the funds. There were suggestions that the funds should be managed by the local peace committees to shorten the response gap or that the CEWERUs should manage the RRF. While it could be beneficial for local peace committees to have access to funding locally there will be challenges to ensuring that they manage funds effectively and transparently. The CEWERUs (and potentially NRIs) would have an important role to play here.

Box 4 contains an excerpt from the most recent evaluation of the RRF in 2011.

Box 4: Conclusions 2011 RRF evaluation

The 2011 evaluation of the RRF highlighted the significant contribution made by the RRF towards peacebuilding and tackling conflict in the Somali, Karamoja, and Dikhil clusters. Some of its achievements and impacts include:

  i) Changing the mind-sets and approaches of administrators and customary elders.
 ii) Changing attitudes and relations between the key actors in conflict and the stakeholders in peace.
iii) Initiating more rapid and timely response of these actors to conflict and security incidents.
iv) Facilitating peaceful solutions to certain types of disputes (land, blood feud, etc.)
 v) Building the capacities of CEWERUs, NRIs, Local Peace Committees (LPCs) and other key stakeholders.

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14   Kassa, G (2011), *Final Evaluation Report of the Rapid Response Fund of CEWARN*, CEWARN, Nairobi.

The evaluation concluded that peace initiatives had been most successful in achieving their objectives when the following factors were in place:

i) Commitment and dedication of key actors – leaders of Customary Institutions, members of LPCs and administrations, local community based organisations.

ii) Community owned and led process supported by government institutions and local community-based organisations – without this joint approach, peace efforts may be of limited effectiveness or sustainability.

iii) Acceptance of customary practices and laws – for example, the payment of blood money in compensation for loss of life instead of imprisonment – and where possible enforcing customary agreements reached.

Routine government cross-border collaboration can contribute to the success of early response.

Bilateral links between neighbouring countries with regular opportunities for dialogue can help in the design of effective response and in ensuring the success of activities. For example, the current situation on either side of the Kenya-Ethiopia border around Mandera in the Somali cluster cannot be resolved only by local means. Where such deep-rooted resource-based and political drivers of conflict exist inter-CEWERU cooperation is required between the two countries. CEWARN could play a more concerted role in facilitating such cooperation.

Celebrating and reaffirming peace agreements is an important strategy in monitoring conflict-prone areas and in ensuring early response.

Consolidating existing peace agreements through regular intercommunal celebration and reaffirming of the agreements is an early response in itself. Through such forums communities are reminded of their histories, they visit one another and have an opportunity to reaffirm peace agreements. The forums can also be used to raise concerns regarding emerging warning indicators of tension and to respond rapidly to any incidences of concern. It is important that women, youth, traditional leaders and modern governmental institutions play a role in such events. The celebrations of the Morua Nayece agreement is such an event and has expanded from the Turkana in Kenya and the Jie in Uganda to also include the Toposa in South Sudan and Nyangatom in Ethiopia.

4

The role of civil society in early warning and early response

THE ROLE AND CAPACITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY and the freedom it has to operate varies significantly across the region. In Ethiopia, there are restrictions on civil society engagement on conflict, security, and peacebuilding issues; although there is a small number of NGOs who have been exempted from these restrictions and meet regularly with the government. This is in contrast to Kenya and Uganda where CSOs have a long history of work on peace, and Somalia and South Sudan where local government has not been consistently present necessitating the role of civil society in this field.

Civil society has played a key role in supporting the CEWARN system, in terms of building the capacity of different stakeholders, providing funding, facilitation, research, and monitoring, and as an entry point into communities.

Capacity building. CSOs have built the capacity of peace committees, local government, elders, women and youth. They have played a role in sensitising security forces to do less harm and to engage constructively with communities, such as through community policing groups.

Funding or channels for funding. This research highlighted that one of the reasons for the CEWARN model including a NRI was that donors were more comfortable channelling money through NGOs rather than government. There are also numerous examples of NGOs (those specialising in conflict and more generalised humanitarian NGOs) funding local peace initiatives.

Facilitation, logistics, and advocacy for local peace processes. CSOs have played an important role in facilitating community dialogues and peace agreements.

Accountability. Civil society has a role in safeguarding checks and balances by offering constructive criticism and ensuring accountability on the part of state actors. This is in part facilitated by their presence on the ground and their understanding of communities and local dynamics.

Entry point into communities. The research highlighted that civil society is often closer to the communities than state actors and has a strong analysis of the context. This means they are well-placed to assist the government in designing appropriate responses and

identifying the right people in the community to work with. For example, this was the case in northern Uganda in areas affected by the conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army. CSO involvement in response can ensure response is embedded in communities.

Research. CSOs have proved to be useful in research, often attracting the skills and funding to do this. The findings from such research have helped inform analysis and guide response initiatives.

Participation in CEWERU sub-committees. Civil society representatives have been members of CEWERU sub-committees that have been established at country level, for instance in the Conflict Analysis Group in Kenya. In this instance, this also appears to be a mechanism for injecting funding as well as technical support into the CEWERU but this partnership is only currently happening in Kenya.

Cross-border cooperation. There are instances of effective cross-border collaboration between CSOs, and between peace committees and local government. While this is occurring in places, a concern is that this is often only happening where funding is available. An example of effective cross-border cooperation is in Karamoja, where participants reported that the Uganda Military Liaison Officer has positive working relationships with both security agencies and CSOs on the Kenya side. Most respondents stated that he is in constant communication with CEWARN Kenya field monitors and NGOs in Kenya whose meetings he attends when there are matters of cross-border security. In addition, in Uganda the work of NGOs is coordinated by the Regional District Commissioner. Cross-border EWER needs to take into account these dynamics that combine diverse, or even competing, approaches by government to the problems in the cross-border areas of Karamoja.

Traditional methods for understanding and responding to conflict have a role to play in EWER.

Across the region there is a wealth of traditional methods for informing early warning and for responding to conflicts. However, these are often being ignored in EWER programming. Traditional agreements play a central role in peacebuilding – such as the Modogashe declaration in Kenya (a customary law harmonisation process) and the MoruaNayace in Karamoja – but modern early warning tools that draw upon traditional systems are rarer. While there are limits to some of these methods they can play a role in preventing conflict. For example, in Pokot a traditional belt is worn for the blessing of warriors and it can be taken off to discourage conflict. There is still a great deal to be understood about the role of spiritual leaders and the way different communities communicate and relate to each other. Emphasis has been directed towards understanding conflicts but less to exploring indigenous systems and under-standing why traditional agreements are holding or have fallen apart.

CEWERU Monitors do work with spiritual leaders and traditional elders frequently sit on peace committees but their role is often not recognised. In some contexts, such as Somalia, peace committee structures engage with local councils of elders.

There have been challenges to the involvement of CSOs in EWER particularly regarding their dependence on external resources, impartiality, and collaboration.

The research highlighted the challenge in sustaining CSO initiatives as they were often tied to funding. Linked to this is the fact that in locations where civil society may be most needed, such as in a volatile border region, they may not be present in part due to funding but also due to the challenges of working in such locations. Part of the rationale for the establishment of peace committee networks was to reach these more remote locations.

There is an issue among CSOs around legitimacy and maintaining an independent role around conflict issues as they can often be linked to one particular clan/ethnic group.

As a result it is difficult to rely on any one CSO. This is also a factor that should be taken in to account if the CEWARN strategy's objective, on moving monitoring functions from field monitors to CSOs, is operationalised. There will be a need to routinely assess and monitor CSOs' impartiality and effectiveness, to strengthen their networks and collaboration.

The mistrust that also exists between communities needs to be addressed. Participants suggested the need to reclaim the role of elders and retain trust between people and civil society. SIKOM, a network of local organisations in West Pokot, was identified as a key catalyst in coordinating and synergising the peace efforts being made by an inclusive team that brings together the Council of Elders, Action Aid, World Vision, Red Cross, politicians, women leaders, and youth leaders.

Some interviewees noted poor coordination among CSOs themselves, and also between CSOs and other actors involved in EWER, especially regarding the failure to share information on initiatives which was contributing to the duplication of efforts. Competing interests also impede cooperation. This can be true for state actors and is not restricted to CSOs. In spite of the challenges a number of CSOs have retained a very objective and impartial approach to peace and development work. These institutions which enjoy legitimacy and respect from the communities could function as vanguards of a revamped early warning system and could play a role in ensuring accountability more widely among CSOs in the area.

5

Gender and early warning and early response

While gender is prioritised in CEWARN's current strategy, little progress has been made towards bringing a gender perspective to the protocol and indicators and ensuring women's more equal participation in the various structures of the CEWARN mechanism. Addressing these challenges requires commitment (at all levels) and creativity.

CEWARN's 2012–19 strategic framework recognises that previously gender had not been sufficiently and systematically prioritised; therefore, the current strategy prioritises the integration of gender in early warning and response research, analysis, and operation.

However, it does not appear that a great deal of progress has been made in this regard to date. Interviewees highlighted that CEWARN's indicators have still not been made gender-specific and there are no indicators on sexual and gender based violence or on how conflict affects men and women differently. In Kenya, the data collection tool has been made gender-specific and captures information on men and women but the analysis of the data has not yet been disaggregated and gender specific responses are yet to be developed. In Uganda, there have been attempts to formulate gender-specific indicators but this is very much based on the commitment of individuals working on early warning and is not systematically applied. Quotas exist in some instances to promote women's involvement in peace committees and in the role of field monitors but they are not being met. There is a gender imbalance with a low number of female field monitors. The gender of field monitors was also seen by some to influence the type of early warning information collected. For example, while a female field monitor was previously operating in Mandera, Kenya, a larger amount of data on gender-related incidents was collected, and it was noted that this declined after she left.

The issue of meaningful participation of women still needs significantly more attention, with programmes to promote the role and capacity of women and their organisations a necessary prerequisite for effective gender balance in this work, alongside the slow process of transforming attitudes. To date the research found only one out of 52 RRF-funded projects focused on empowering women. Creativity is needed to address the gender gap and strategies need to be tailored to individual contexts, given that in many contexts women's participation is still bound by cultural taboos around gender

(e.g. occupying leadership positions, speaking in mixed groups) and assumptions about their priorities (e.g. domestic issues).

There are positive examples from across the region of encouraging women's participation that can be built upon.

In **Ethiopia** the NRI is creating youth and women's networks to work with local peace committees and provide a forum for their voice.

In **Uganda** women's groups have led efforts to ensure women understand peace pacts (Lokriama and Moru A Nayece) and can monitor their resolutions. In the Karimojong/ Teso conflict over land, women were put at the heart of the conflict resolution process; as they had primary responsibility for agriculture production, they were the actors most affected by the conflict. Traditionally women have been left out of conflict resolution processes leading to the neglect of certain aspects of the conflict.

In **Kenya** the CEWERU is conducting gender analysis and working with national women's groups to ensure early warning data can be used to inform responses that suit men and women. It is also trying to influence county development plans to include gender considerations in elements of peacebuilding and conflict management, as well as initiatives that focus on gender issues and gender roles in early warning and response.

At the **Somali Kenya border** women for peace groups in Mandera and Wajir have played a key role in establishing peace committees. There are also examples of women securing the return of youth from Al Shabaab in Somalia through women's networks.

These initiatives are positive but they are small in number and scope and need to be built upon, expanded and deepened if they are to begin to promote a meaningful role for women in EWER and to transform dominant attitudes. Women's role in perpetuating conflict also needs to be better understood, for example in keeping guns and blessing raids in Karamoja. In the same context men's identity and concept of masculinity is increasingly tied to ownership of guns and cattle; this is driven by cultural factors such as the association between gun ownership and the ability to protect a wife becoming a prerequisite for marriage. It is important that this type of gendered analysis is not lost as the thematic scope of CEWARN expands.

CEWARN has a role to play in quality control and monitoring of individual CEWERUs' progress in bringing a gender perspective to EWER.

While gender is prioritised in the current CEWARN strategy there remains a great deal of work to be done on: making indicators and strategies gender-specific; ensuring that women are adequately represented in EWER structures; fully analysing the impact of initiatives on men and women; and ensuring that their different needs and objectives are catered for. Genuine efforts need to be made through working with men and women to promote the role of women in EWER as field monitors (where these roles will continue), as active representatives on peace committees and through the more equal and active participation of women and their organisations. This goes up to the structure of CEWARN where a gender balance needs to be aimed for. Women leadership (local government staff, MPs, women's groups etc.) can be engaged to assist in promoting the role of women.

Conclusions and key recommendations

THIS RESEARCH HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE of the CEWARN/CEWERU system. There is recognition due for how far CEWARN has come since 2002 when there was no mechanism for conflict early warning in place at regional or national levels. CEWERUs are now operational in Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Sudan and are collecting early warning information and in different ways are working across borders and responding to conflicts. This is a significant achievement in the context of the Horn of Africa. The mechanism has evolved differently across the region, which is valid and highlights that there is flexibility.

The challenge now is to increase the effectiveness of the mechanism and the key underlying questions to this task are as follows:

■ Who resources it and how?
■ What are the most sustainable and effective data collection networks?
■ How can better sharing and use of early warning information in early response be ensured?
■ How to implement appropriate responses earlier?

Running throughout these challenges is the need to better promote gender equality and an effective role for women in the decision-making structures of the mechanism. This document has provided some options for addressing these questions based on experiences collected through this project.

It must be appreciated that this is a complex task, considering the diversity of the region, the deep drivers of conflict that exist and the complexity of issues that are constantly evolving. There is a need to continue to invest in institutionalising the mechanism and member states need to take more responsibility for resourcing this.

The recommendations below draw upon the lessons learned.

Key recommendations

Structure

1. IGAD Member States need to financially resource this initiative if it is to be effective. A plan should be developed to look at a gradual annual increase in contributions both to national CEWERUs and to CEWARN. In some countries with devolved resources state/county government may also contribute. In addition external donor contributions to the mechanism will still be necessary.

2. CEWARN can play a greater role in supporting relationships, evidence-based lesson learning, and coordinated policy-making between CEWERUs.

3. The expansion of issues and geography in the current strategy should be seen as providing a menu of options for CEWERUs to choose from when developing their own strategies, with national conflict and security priorities, and capacity and resource limitations in mind.

4. Parts of the system could benefit from decentralisation. Data analysis may be better conducted at CEWERU level and in some contexts could be further decentralised to local entities.

5. Countries should prioritise the development, or finalisation, of national peace policies as this will provide a framework for EWER and enable resourcing. CEWARN can advise on the development of these policies and play a role in advocating across government for their approval.

Early warning

6. Early warning data needs to be collected as part of a systematic, quality controlled, and multifaceted system. State and non-state agencies should readily exchange and verify information at different levels, and data collection needs to be effectively resourced with local communities involved in data collection and verification. The use of methods such as crowd sourcing should be further explored in areas with sufficient population density with attention given to verification of information.

7. Lessons need to be generated and more pilots carried out on the potential role for technology in EWER data collection. The role of the private sector should be further explored.

8. Clarity is needed on whether to keep the system of field monitors or adapt to a civil society based monitoring system. The preferred system needs to be operationalised – to avoid gaps in the data chain – resourced and effectively monitored.

Early response

9. An effective early response system should not depend too heavily on individuals but should be systematised. It should build on local information and involve state and non-state actors and include the celebration of peace agreements.

10. Rapid response funding needs to be timely, relevant, and have some level of transparency around responding to need. To achieve this, its decentralisation, at a minimum to the national level, is required.

Civil society

11. Civil society has an important role to play in EWER. To date this has mainly involved filling gaps but it has the potential to play a more defined role in the system. To overcome concerns about impartiality, and to promote collaboration, CEWERUs should ensure civil society participation and encourage the role of civil society as part of networks for peace.

12. Traditional mechanisms have a role to play in EWER and more research is needed to understand these better, build on their strengths and learn from their failures.

Gender

13. The prioritisation of gender needs to be rapidly escalated and creative strategies developed and resourced to promote the role of women in EWER. This includes making strategies and indicators gender-specific, monitoring the role of women, and developing programmes to ensure women can actively and effectively participate in EWER structures so that their involvement is not just about meeting quotas.

APPENDIX 1: CEWARN organigram

Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe in a world where everyone can lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from fear and insecurity.

We are a not-for-profit organisation with programmes in nearly 20 countries and territories across Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe.

COVER PHOTO: Fredrick, a Kikuyu community elder, greets a Somali man in Isiolo's cattle market. The market has been the scene of inter-communal violence in the past. Saferworld's partner, Isiolo Peace Link, worked with communities using the market to sell their livestock to address grievances between them ahead of the elections in 2013. © SAFERWORLD/ABRAHAM ALI

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