The Future of Peace Operations: Maintaining Momentum

Introduction

This year marks both the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations (UN) and the recent completion of the most comprehensive assessment of UN peace operations since the Brahimi Report (issued in 2000). In June 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) released its report—and put forward more than 100 recommendations—and, in September 2015, the UN secretary-general released his own report, *The Future of UN Peace Operations*, outlining his agenda and “priorities and key actions” to move the panel’s recommendations forward between now and the end of 2016.

To support this agenda for making UN peace operations “fit for purpose,” it will be essential for the UN Secretariat and member states to build and sustain the political momentum for the implementation of the recommendations of the UN secretary-general and of the HIPPO, as well as to build on synergies with the other global reviews—the Peacebuilding Architecture Review, and the Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security.

In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and the International Peace Institute (IPI) organized an expert meeting in Seoul on October 22, 2015. Opening the seminar, Dong-ik Shin, deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, presented the objectives of the seminar as twofold: first, to develop and refine a practical and shared understanding of key aspects of the agenda for improving UN peace operations that the UN secretary-general has put forward (which were discussed in the first four sessions: 1. The Pursuit of Political Settlements; 2. The Protection of Civilians; 3. Tailored and Context-Sensitive Responses; and 4. Global-Regional Partnerships); and second, to start sketching a way forward for building and sustaining the political momentum for implementation (discussed in session 5). The seminar built on a previous discussion of the recommendations of the HIPPO report organized jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and IPI at UN headquarters in July of this year.

Attendees included members of the HIPPO and representatives of UN member states, the UN Secretariat, and the African Union (AU), as well as

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research scholars and academics. The outcome of the expert meeting is meant to inform the organization of a larger international conference of member states in early 2016, in support of ongoing initiatives to build and sustain momentum for change in UN peace operations, particularly the one announced by the Office of the President of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly to hold a high-level thematic debate on the UN, peace, and security on May 10-11, 2016. This report examines the different aspects of reform discussed at the expert meeting, with regards to the shaping of a strategy for implementation, and it puts forward the conclusions that emerged in the course of the discussions.

The Need for a Holistic Approach to Peace Operations

The HIPPO report was well-received by the UN Secretariat, including a large number of UN member states, which is a substantial achievement given political divisions among member states at the UN. Groups of member states or groups within the Secretariat will, however, be tempted to focus on specific recommendations, rather than implementing a much-needed holistic vision for more effective UN peace operations in the future. Such a holistic vision of UN peace operations that emphasizes the primacy of politics at all stages of international engagement and stretches across the whole conflict spectrum with flexible transition phases will require better information and strategic planning to enable the secretary-general to propose field missions tailored to particular contexts.

One should, however, also be conscious of the possible obstacles to the implementation of such a holistic vision. A first obstacle is the inopportune timing of the proposals, coming at the end of the current secretary-general’s term; while the secretary-general has taken some steps, such as embracing the recommendation of a new centralized strategic analysis and planning unit in his office, most of the implementation will be left to his successor. There is thus the danger that momentum might be lost with the leadership change. The second obstacle is the inevitable bureaucratic resistance from within UN departments to a more field-focused Secretariat, including from the Department of Management (DM).

A third obstacle will be funding: while reforms proposed by the HIPPO have the potential of being cost-neutral, this would require a substantial restructuring of current financing and resources to allow for more flexibility to adapt to evolving environments and to enhance the capabilities of peacekeepers. Lastly, troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) are insufficiently involved in consultations with the Security Council when missions are planned. If this practice does not change, and further measures to hold TCCs/PCCs accountable are not put forward, then crucial stakeholders of UN peace operations might resist the implementation of changes necessary for more efficient and sustainable conflict resolution.

In this context, a global dialogue between the UN Secretariat and member states and among member states needs to happen to build a shared understanding and sense of responsibility for implementation of important reforms. To ensure obstacles do not come in the way of implementation, an important priority for the secretary-general remains to pass the priority of the reform efforts to his successor. Member states can and should contribute by continuing the public dialogue over the recommendations and vision of the HIPPO report, including through initiatives like this seminar.

The Pursuit of Political Settlements

Of the essential shifts to UN peace operations called for in the HIPPO report, a key one is that politics must drive the implementation of UN peace operations. However, the pursuit of political settlement is a broad topic, even in the context of UN peace operations, and it is important to identify what needs to be done by whom for this shift to happen.

Conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building are all parts of a continuum with transitions being neither linear nor strictly sequential. The pursuit of political settlement can thus not be seen in isolation from what the UN does before the mission is deployed and after the exit of the mission,
and its success is ultimately dependent on how the UN establishes itself as a credible interlocutor and how well it understands the dynamics on the ground. The most challenging and most important factor in assuring sustainable long-term peace settlements is prevention, but instituting a culture of prevention presents challenges both at the strategic and institutional levels.

OBSTACLES TO PREVENTIVE ACTIONS
At the strategic level, a lack of political will and urgency to address a dispute often exists before an escalation to violent conflict. While massive resources are spent to deal with the effects of violent conflict, only 1.5 percent of the UN Secretariat’s budget is devoted to carrying out activities related to prevention and peacemaking, and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) relies heavily on extra budgetary funding to carry out such activities. Measuring the impact of crisis-averting interventions remains a challenge for the organization, which makes it difficult to take evidence-based decisions on actions of prevention. This is further complicated by the increasing presence of violent extremist groups, who tend to not respond to traditional prevention approaches, and which emphasizes the ever-important need to refocus on this pertinent issue.

At the institutional level, the UN often meets resistance from member states on the basis of the principle of national sovereignty; national solutions to national problems are preferred. Furthermore, at the regional level, neighboring states might also be reluctant to involve the UN in the search for solutions, as they fear this will lead to loss of control by internationalizing the conflict and by potentially giving legitimacy to oppositions. Institutional blocks also exist within the UN, where the Security Council might refuse to discuss an issue because it is not on its agenda, and where rivalries and turf battles across departments might become more important than common goals.

A MORE PROACTIVE UN SECRETARIAT
In moving forward, the UN Secretariat should take on a much more proactive role, based on enhanced knowledge, analysis, and a stronger relationship to field offices. To bring the entire UN system toward prevention work, the organization must act as one—and, to achieve this, the system-wide coherence must be strengthened. It was suggested that the cooperation between DPKO and DPA must be reviewed, and that more senior-level political staff members (who could act as standby high-level envoys) are needed to carry out important prevention work. The concept put forward by the HIPPO report of using “small teams of experts” to support national governments and UN country teams merits due consideration.

GREATER SUPPORT OF MEMBER STATES
On the other side, the Security Council and member states should boost their support to the secretary-general and assure that he has the required political backing and resources, and they should become more ready to accept the good offices of the UN in the resolution of their crises. Conversely, DPA should also be more strategic in generating political support from the Security Council and member states for its work. The role of the Secretariat in pursuing peace settlement is, however, sometimes overemphasized while the ability of member states is overlooked, both as individual states and collectively. It is important to recognize that member states have found innovative ways to support peace processes and operations in the past.

It was suggested that the Security Council should strengthen mechanisms by which it looks at looming crises (such as horizon-scanning meetings), become more field-oriented (with council field visits engaging more in political processes), and revive its military staff committee to make it more relevant in mandate reviews (such as was done last year for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH]). Member states can also form groups of friends and contact groups to provide political support and contribute to implementing mandates of UN missions, as was done in the past. These could also support “compacts” signed with host countries (as suggested by HIPPO). To improve the work of good offices and innovate it, more research is needed to identify best practices from the past on the role of the General Assembly in supporting political processes when the Security Council is deadlocked like it is on some of the most pertinent conflicts today.
THE CRITICAL GOOD OFFICES ROLE OF STATES AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Acting collectively and within their region, states increasingly lead conflict prevention and mediation efforts. The recent example of South Sudan has shown that the UN can do very little politically, if it does not work with regional and subregional organizations. In Africa, where most UN peace operations are deployed, the political leadership of the organization is failing in achieving durable political settlements, while the good offices offered by subregional organizations and the African Union (AU) are on the rise.

The Protection of Civilians

PRIORITYING THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Since 2008, all new UN missions have integrated the need to protect civilians in their mandates. Yet missions are still failing to properly assure the safety of civilians in areas where they operate. Missions are also increasingly deployed to environments where political settlements have not yet been reached; where governments’ capacities to protect their own civilians are weak; and where host governments are sometimes themselves responsible for violations. As missions are currently mandated to carry out long lists of tasks with little direction on what and how to prioritize, they often find themselves in the positions where there is a trade-off between protecting civilians and other mandated tasks. An important shift should therefore happen from merely implementing the protection of civilians (PoC)—to prioritizing it. More flexible mandates with fewer tasks might allow this to occur.

TAILORING PoC MANDATES TO THE CONTEXT

UN peace operations also face difficulties in carrying out their PoC mandates when their design and mandates are not sufficiently tailored to the conditions on the ground but instead follow preexisting templates. For instance, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was deployed widely across the country but with insufficient analytical capacity to tailor its operations to different conditions. It is therefore essential to strengthen analysis in the pre-mandating planning assessment stage and to make PoC a central element of such conflict analysis. Stronger theories of change on how UN missions can better address threats to civilians on the ground should be developed, and TCCs/PCCs should be involved in these discussions (building on the member-states-led process that resulted in the Kigali principles on PoC3), for example, through actively sharing analyses and assessments with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34).

In addition, as recommended in the HIPPO, deeper engagement with local communities can help counter the one-size-fits-all approach that is currently being used for PoC. By identifying the population itself as a political entity, the political strategies of UN peace operations will more naturally focus on prioritizing protection. On the military side, situational awareness can be improved by increasing the use of technology as a strategic enabler, as outlined earlier this year by the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping, whose recommendations were supported by the HIPPO. Improved and updated technology can help detect threats more quickly, and thus help peacekeepers to act more responsibly.

BETTER CAPABILITIES FOR PoC ACROSS THE PEACE OPERATIONS SPECTRUM

The ability of missions to protect civilians continues to be limited by insufficient capabilities, as illustrated in South Sudan when civil war broke out in December 2013 and peacekeepers present found themselves outnumbered by armed youths attacking civilians. The right kind of capabilities should allow peacekeepers to act more effectively, through improved mobility, adequate equipment, and medical evacuation. Pledges made during the recent September 2015 World Leaders’ Summit could help if they are turned into actual contributions to missions. Focus should also go to the critical role of police in assuring physical protection, especially in cases of urban violence, as well as

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to mechanisms of unarmed civilian protection that are available through the civil affairs and human rights sections as well as other advisers (e.g., PoC, women, etc.).

The changing nature of conflict and targeting of civilians in new wars also call for an improved conceptualization of protecting civilians in the different stages of conflict. Protecting civilians is an important conflict prevention mechanism and must therefore be undertaken in all types of peace operations, not just peacekeeping but also peacebuilding ones. It is therefore essential that different programs and agencies involved in activities across the conflict spectrum take on a consistent approach with regards to PoC, instead of competing for the same funding.

The HIPPO report reaffirmed PoC as a core obligation of peacekeeping operations. Yet there are still no clear objective indicators for measuring performance. TCCs and PCCs display different levels of willingness to engage in PoC, often due to hidden national caveats that the HIPPO report denounces. Enhanced cooperation and consultation with contributing member states can help remedy this, along with a transparent system for evaluating and reporting on performance.

Tailored and Context-Sensitive Responses

UN peace operations are today nine times larger and last three times longer than those in the 1990s in increasingly complex environments. Yet the ability of the UN to analyze conflict-specific context into which peacekeepers are deployed has not improved much, and the organization is continuing to deploy into highly dangerous situations on the basis of inadequate threats and risks assessments. Thus, one of the main recommendations of the HIPPO report, also echoed by the secretary-general in his report, is for the organization to tailor its mandates to include more context-sensitive responses. The third discussion of the conference was focused on the challenges of implementing such recommendations.

TWO-STAGE SEQUENCED MANDATING PROCESS

Pressed for time, the UN tends to plan missions at a time when it understands the context the least. The planning for the mission in Mali illustrates some of the challenges in maintaining the primacy of politics, as the organization had limited opportunity to consult authorities when only an interim government was in place. The two-stage mandating process recommended by the HIPPO could help establish a more tailored approach to deployment of UN missions. This recommendation was, in part, put forward by the Brahimi report fifteen years ago, and a debate among the conference participants ensued as to why it had not been implemented. It was stressed from the panel that the initial Brahimi recommendation had only focused on sequencing the deployment of uniformed personnel, which in practice would have meant significant delays in mounting operations. The HIPPO report differs in that it stresses the need for sequencing of all personnel and structures. This practice was piloted in Libya, where the mandate was sequenced to some extent, and in South Sudan, where the mandate of UNMISS was created through a two-stage process. It should become a standard practice, like the HIPPO report argues, to assure missions can be better tailored to realities on the ground.

PRIORITIZING MANDATED TASKS

A challenge in implementing sequenced mandates is that it requires the prioritization of tasks. However, it is difficult to rule out tasks when negotiating a mandate and reaching a common agreement on what the initial purpose of the mission should be. Concentrating scarce political attention on targeting the most pertinent issues can be done through increased and more efficient communication among the Security Council, the UN Secretariat, and TCCs/PCCs—improved triangular communication, as put forward in the recommendations of the reports of the HIPPO and the secretary-general. This is also essential to reach a common understanding of what is realistic for a mission to pursue, based on existing capabilities and how they relate to the operating environment.

STREAMLINING ACTIVITIES OF UN FUNDS AND AGENCIES

Participants also insisted on the need for UN funds and agencies to deliver more coherent and strategic responses on the ground, highlighting that the right financing mechanisms, such as stronger pooled funds called for by the Peacebuilding
Architecture Review, have the potential of bringing people together around a common set of priorities. Inflexible funding structures of UN peace operations are currently presenting many challenges to missions, especially with regards to transitions between different UN instruments. It was also recalled that the HIPPO called on the General Assembly to embrace the recommendations put forward in the 2011 report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to establish a separate account for the funding of special political missions, to assure attention is not solely concentrated on peacekeeping tasks.

Global-Regional Partnerships

One of the common themes that echoed throughout the seminar is that the UN cannot single-handedly address the challenges associated with maintaining peace and security in the twenty-first century, and partnerships with regional and subregional organizations are crucial, in particular the African Union (AU). The African continent indeed remains the main theater for UN operations, with more than 100,000 of the 129,000 peacekeepers deployed currently. In the last ten years, the number of African personnel serving in African-mandated operations has grown from zero to 40,000, while the number of UN peacekeepers coming from Africa has increased from 10,000 to 30,000.

African Union operations to date have, however, been largely reliant on bilateral and European Union support. This has made it difficult for the organization to sustain its peace operations, and it has led to premature transitions to the UN missions in Mali and the Central African Republic. More predictable, flexible, and sustainable funding for peace operations, as recommended by the HIPPO report, should be the basis of a strong strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.

PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARD AN AU-UN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The year 2015 has seen a paradigm shift in the relationship between the AU and the UN. The HIPPO report voiced the need for a strategic partnership between the two organizations, and it is thus an important opportunity to drive forward the momentum needed for change. The AU has been arguing for some time for a move from a one-sided relationship where the UN engages in capacity building for and ad hoc support to the AU, to one of strategic partnership based on comparative advantages. There is thus the possibility for member states to shape a new, more suitable role for the UN in maintaining peace and security in the twenty-first century, as both (i) a partner that responds politically and operationally, as well as (ii) an enabler and facilitator for regional actors.

The position of the AU toward the UN is based on four principles: (1) The primacy of the UN Security Council in carrying the responsibility for maintaining global peace and security, as stipulated by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; (2) all actions of the AU are within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, in support of the objectives of the UN Security Council; (3) the importance of African ownership and agenda-setting with regards to peace and security on the African continent; and (4) partnership should be based on the principles of consultative decision making, burden sharing, and division of labor along the lines of complementarity.

AU AS FIRST RESPONDER TO AFRICAN CRISIS

With the challenge of rapid deployment continuing to plague UN peacekeeping missions, the AU has shown the ability to generate and deploy forces more quickly than the UN. It also is endeavoring to improve its financial flexibility by increasing assessed contributions from its members toward AU peace operations, which includes the adoption of a decision that African countries would increase their financial contributions to AU operations from covering 1 percent to 25 percent of the total costs within the next five years. For the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) alone, this would signify an increase of $189 million, compared to the meager $4 million the African countries are today providing to all peace and security efforts. However, this increase in contributions from African countries will not alone cover the costs of peace operations and of the African Standby Force, which the AU has been setting up through increased coordination with its member states and large training exercises. Therefore, the UN should
think of providing UN-assessed contributions to AU missions approved by the Security Council on a case-by-case basis.

Beyond deploying responsive peace enforcement operations, the AU also has an inherent incentive to respond to crises before they erupt on its continent and has a range of prevention instruments at its disposal that the UN does not have. Since its inception, the AU has been far more interventionist when it comes to governance and internal affairs of sovereign states, in particular when its legal instruments are supplemented by subregional economic communities. A recent example of an organization exercising this liberty is ECOWAS' political intervention in Burkina Faso following the October 2015 coup.

**MEMBER STATES AND GLOBAL-REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS**

The strategic partnership between the AU and the UN should not be solely a discussion between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, but it needs to be a structured dialogue between AU and UN member states at the strategic level. First, member states must clearly decide whether a special arrangement should be developed with the AU, which is currently the only regional organization to which the discussion applies, or whether embracing strategic partnerships with regional organizations constitutes a shift in current practice of interpreting Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Second, in developing the relationship with the AU, member states should not view the AU as a monolithic structure, as it is governed by a complex hierarchy (of member states and bureaucracies). Similarly, the broad spectrum of peace operations must be taken into account when assessing how cooperation should be improved. Lastly, it must be stressed that a stronger UN-AU dialogue on partnerships will not alone be sufficient to address the challenges the continent faces; thus, other subregional organizations should also be associated.

**Conclusion: Maintaining Momentum**

The last session focused on the way forward and challenges for the UN Secretariat and member states in generating and maintaining the momentum needed for UN peace operations reform.

**LEARNING FROM PAST REFORM EFFORTS**

It was stressed that successful change in the UN often happens incrementally over the long term, and the history of UN reforms offer some lessons in this regard. First, it is important to manage expectations on reform, and process matters at least as much as substance. Second, change requires a clearly articulated strategic vision from the secretary-general and buy-in from the UN Secretariat to overcome the challenge of bureaucratic resistance within the UN. Third, a rationale for change with few concrete proposals can be more easily championed by member states. Lastly, longer-term five-to-ten-year plans aligned with General Assembly budget cycles are preferable to short-term rhetorical statements.

**BUILDING A COMPELLING NARRATIVE**

Building and sustaining support for change can be motivated by the collective sense of urgency around the growing disconnect between current UN responses and the increasing complexity of conflicts with various layers connecting with transnational aspects of organized crime and violent extremism. Ensuring that multilateral institutions have the ability to address such challenges and that people have confidence in them is indeed a collective responsibility. However, the cost of reform can create strong countercurrents. It is, therefore, also important to outline the “cost-neutral” and potential savings from a reform of UN peace operations seen as a whole and by comparing them to the financial costs of their alternative (for

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example, the cost of preventing conflicts versus managing conflicts with costly peacekeeping missions).

CREATING CONSENSUS AND SUPPORT OF MEMBER STATES

The General Assembly can play an important role in generating political support and building consensus toward promoting change. This could build on the broad consensus that has already emerged on the fact that the focus should be on implementing both the recommendations from the secretary-general’s report on the Future of UN Peace Operations—over the next fifteen months—and the HIPPO report—beyond the end of the term of the current secretary-general. However, the number of recommendations from the HIPPO report and its uncoordinated overlap with other reviews (Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the Global Study on the Implementation of Resolution 1325) make it challenging to have an overall vision of reform and to prioritize issues.

The High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace, and Security announced by the president of the General Assembly for May 10-11, 2016, could usefully help identify synergies among the different reviews, generate such a vision, and build member-state support for it. This could help build a strong coalition of member states in the General Assembly, made of a diverse group of champions that could lobby for sustaining reform efforts beyond the 71st General Assembly Session.

AVOIDING CHERRY-PICKING

A challenge for member states will be to overcome the appetite to cherry-pick recommendations from the secretary-general and HIPPO reports, as narratives might be easier to articulate for separate initiatives. With 100 recommendations offered in the HIPPO report and more than forty initiatives presented in the implementation report of the secretary-general, prioritizing might seem like an onerous task, but it is necessary to ensure the promotion of a holistic and coordinated approach needed for comprehensive reform and to carry the “HIPPO spirit” forward. Making UN peace operations “fit for purpose” will indeed involve moving many interdependent pieces of the UN peace operations puzzle forward at the same time. Coming up with a more detailed implementation plan, and thus breaking down challenging issues into more manageable bundles of proposals, could be helpful.

GENERATING PUBLIC SUPPORT

Working to generate more public interest and media attention around the continuation of the reform process could play a useful role, and this could be done by linking the findings of the HIPPO report to the current crises that UN peace operations are facing from South Sudan to Libya, and as new ones emerge. This would also require better knowledge and shared understanding of the substance of the post-2015 reform agenda made available to a broader audience. Furthermore, clearer and more independent monitoring and evaluation of the process, in particular through a thematic approach (e.g., the idea of a scorecard), is needed to clarify the responsibilities of member states, as well as to identify possible entry points for action. The process of selection of the next secretary-general could also be an opportunity for more public debate over some of the HIPPO recommendations.

MOVING FORWARD

The conclusion from the conference was thus that member states should apply a longer-term sight in moving forward the vision and spirit of the reform generated by the HIPPO report. Essential to this is not only the increased understanding of common themes across the pillars of the HIPPO report but also of synergies with the Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security. Reform involves many moving pieces, but unless they are moved together by both the UN Secretariat and a diverse group of member states, they will not result in peace operations that are more fit for purpose and deliver greater impact on the ground.

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Agenda

Thursday, October 22, 2015

08:30–08:50  Registration and Coffee

08:50–09:10  Welcome and Introduction

Dong-ik Shin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Keynote Remarks

Ian Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report and former member of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)

09:10–10:25  Session 1: The Pursuit of Political Settlements

How can we better ensure that the search for political solutions drives the design, implementation, and review of peace operations and that the UN Secretariat has reliable resourcing for core prevention and mediation activities (including for establishing additional regional offices)? How can the Security Council and member states in general bring their collective and sustained political leverage to support political strategies, establish compacts with host governments, and keep peace processes on track? How can member states remain engaged and support a holistic and unified approach to high-risk situations to facilitate early preventive action?

Chair

Wang Xuexian, Ambassador, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

Panelists

Tamrat Samuel, Former Deputy Special Representative for Liberia and Nepal
Richard Gowan, Associate Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and Non-Resident Fellow at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation
Young Jin Choi, Professor of the Yonsei University, former Assistant Secretary General for Peace Keeping Operations, former Special Representative of Secretary General for UNOCI, former Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

10:25–10:40  Break

10:40–11:55  Session 2: The Protection of Civilians

How can we ensure the rapid deployment of capable peace operations that can effectively and safely carry out their PoC mandates? What strategies and accountability mechanisms should be devised with realistic expectations? How to turn pledges from the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping into contributions for more effective PoC? What non-military tools and approaches could member states promote and support? How can peace operations empower local communities, and in particular women, to be early peaceful responders to imminent threats to civilians, and thus contribute to a protective environment?
Chair
Joseph Nzabamiwita, Brigadier General, Director General for Policy and Strategy, Ministry of National Defence of Rwanda

Panelists
Aditi Gorur, Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, The Stimson Center
Shinwha Lee, Professor of the Korea University, member of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Peacebuilding Fund, former Special Advisor to the UN “Rwandan Independent Inquiry” appointed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
Dirk Druet, Policy Planning Team, DPET/PBPS, United Nations DPKO/DFS (via VTC)

11:55–1:30 Lunch

1:30–2:45 Session 3: Tailored and Context-Sensitive Responses

How can the secretary-general’s new small centralized analysis and planning capacity (with multidisciplinary planners) be best supported, and how can we ensure that these efforts translate into new ways of designing, deploying, and reviewing “peace operations” tailored to the context? What structures could help reduce inefficiency and support cooperation in planning and deploying peace operations? How can the Security Council strengthen communication with troop-/police-contributing countries, the Secretariat, and local stakeholders to better integrate improved initial and continuous conflict assessment with mission planning? How can member states support sequenced approaches and smoother transitions between different phases of UN missions?

Chair
Daniel Pareja Glass, Director, Special Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay

Panelists
Ian Martin, Executive Director of the Security Council Report and former HIPPO member
Madalene O’Donnell, United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General

2:45–3:00 Break

3:00–4:15 Session 4: Global-Regional Partnerships

How can member states help build a stronger, more inclusive UN-AU peace and security partnership to leverage comparative advantages? To what extent can some of the pledges at the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping help achieve this objective? How should the establishment of standing arrangements be supported? And how can procedures be established that could be applied flexibly when operations are sequenced or operated in parallel to foster better collaboration on conflict prevention and mediation?

Chair
Muana Massaquoi, Military Adviser/Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations

Panelists
Fiona Lortan, Senior Officer-Strategic Issues, Peace and Security Department, AU Commission
Walter Lotze, ZIF, former Adviser to AMISOM Special Representative
4:15–4:30 Break


*Discuss and refine the objectives of an international conference; agree on the contents of a possible outcome declaration to be reviewed and adopted at the end of a 2016 international conference aimed at galvanizing the political will of member states toward the effective implementation of the secretary-general and HIPPO reform agenda.*

**Chair**
Yoo Dae-Jong, Director-General, International Organizations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea

**Panelists**
Madalene O’Donnell, *United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General*
Ian Martin, *Executive Director of the Security Council Report and former HIPPO member*
Arthur Boutellis, *Director of the Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute (IPI)*

5:45–6:00 Closing Remarks

Dong-ik Shin, *Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea*
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