

Strained neighbours: The impact of Afghanistan's transition processes on conflict in Pakistan


This policy brief discusses the impact of the multiple transition processes currently underway in Afghanistan on peace and conflict dynamics in Pakistan. Drawing upon the views of a range of Pakistani civil society actors, it seeks to articulate the role that civil society has played, and can continue to play, in promoting a more peaceful and secure Pakistan. It aims to help guide the strategies and interventions of local civil society actors, with the objective of helping them to maximise their potential contribution to sustainable peace, in the midst of a changing and volatile situation. It also provides recommendations for international donors interested in helping to maximise the potential peacebuilding impact of domestic civilian actors across Pakistan.

Methodology and structure

This analysis has been drawn from a series of three workshops held in Islamabad between May 2014 and September 2015, complemented by a review of relevant literature. Participants were drawn from a cross-section of Pakistani civil society with extensive knowledge of conflict dynamics in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The analysis presented here flows from the views and perceptions of participants, cross-referenced by external resources where appropriate.

The first section provides an overview of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations from a historical perspective. The second section briefly describes the political, security, and economic transitions that Afghanistan is currently going through. The following section examines the implications of these transitions on three critical dimensions of fragility in Pakistan: radicalisation of youth, India-Pakistan relations, and the impact of large numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, including the identification of potential future implications for peace and conflict in the country. A number of

potential entry points for promoting peace are then identified, before analysis of the role that civil society may be able to play in peacebuilding is presented. This policy brief ends with recommendations for civil society and members of the international community.



Afghanistan-Pakistan relations: the historical context and current situation

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been characterised by mutual mistrust, hostility and persistent meddling in each other's affairs since at least 1947, when the new nation of Pakistan inherited the colonial border with Afghanistan, including the disputed Durand Line.¹ All subsequent Afghan governments have refused to accept this boundary, with several claiming significant portions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan Provinces as part of a greater Afghanistan.² Pakistan meanwhile has pursued an interventionist policy towards Afghanistan, primarily driven by the perceived need to secure influence and support in Kabul so as to avoid 'encirclement' by India, and ensure 'strategic depth' for Pakistani forces in the event of an Indian invasion.³ In practice, this has entailed providing support to various Afghan insurgent forces, including the Taliban, who have at various times been seen as supportive of Pakistani strategic interests.⁴ This support has had disastrous results for Afghan people, as well as reinforcing insecurity in Pakistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 saw the first major influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. It has been estimated that by 1988 there were more than 3 million refugees living in Pakistan, many of whom are still there today. The invasion also saw Pakistani support to armed actors in Afghanistan reach new levels. The Pakistani government became the primary conduit for money, arms, and training for Mujahideen fighters, much of which emanated from Western governments.⁵ The Pakistani intelligence services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), with the support of the CIA, largely directed this support towards groups espousing a radical Islamic philosophy, including the nascent Al-Qaeda. This was driven by a belief that such groups would be less susceptible to Indian influence, and more supportive of Pakistani national security objectives.⁶

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, followed closely by the end of the Cold War, led Western nations to largely lose interest in Afghanistan. Much international funding dried up, and the country soon descended into full scale civil war as various factions sought to gain dominance. In 1994 the Taliban emerged as a major force. It has been widely reported that the ISI saw them as pliant and supportive of Pakistani interests, most notably due to their willingness to support training camps for Kashmiri separatists.⁷ In part due to Pakistani support, by 1997 the Taliban had gained control over almost the whole country. Pakistan became the first country to recognise the Taliban government, soon followed by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. The Taliban continued to openly receive significant financial, military, and diplomatic support from Pakistan until at least 2001.

The 9/11 attacks in New York marked a major turning point in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Under intense pressure from the US, Pakistan publically renounced its support to the Taliban regime, and positioned itself as the US' key ally in the region. The government provided diplomatic backing for the US invasion of Afghanistan, and facilitated access and logistical support to Western forces. The ISI took the lead in providing intelligence to US operations in Afghanistan. However, it is widely believed that they also continued to provide logistical, financial, and military assistance to the Taliban.⁸ During the 2000s for example, much of the Taliban leadership and control structures were operating from Pakistani territory, most notably through the so-called Quetta Shura.⁹ The US invasion also saw a new wave of refugees into Pakistan, placing new pressure on Pakistani services and local communities. Unsurprisingly, this period was characterised by extremely poor relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's support for the US intervention, and the Bush administration's reciprocal support for President Musharraf's increasingly unpopular and repressive regime in Islamabad, contributed to increasing levels of dissatisfaction within Pakistan. The period between 2006 and 2010 saw a massive increase in the frequency and severity of attacks on civilian and military targets inside Pakistan by a range of domestic militant groups, collectively referred to as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2007, TTP launched a major offensive against the government, seizing the Swat Valley and imposing their rigid interpretation of Sharia law over the inhabitants. A major conflict ensued, as the army fought to regain control and dislodge TTP leadership from its bases in Swat and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The resulting offensives resulted in more than two million people being displaced from their homes,¹⁰ but has so far failed to prevent TTP from carrying out further attacks across the country.

The following years have seen continued political, social, and economic instability and persistent insecurity. The 2011 killing of Osama Bin-Laden at a compound in Abbottabad was deeply embarrassing for the Pakistani state. This, and the killing of 25 Pakistani soldiers by a NATO airstrike later that year, marked a significant deterioration in relations between the US and Pakistan, and led to the temporary closing down of NATO supply routes into Afghanistan. Sectarian attacks meanwhile have continued to inflame tensions between groups inside Pakistan, while political and military leaders have widely been accused of failing to take serious efforts to tackle the underlying drivers of insecurity in the country.¹¹ This ongoing insecurity has discouraged international investment, contributing to economic stagnation and widespread disillusionment with the political process.¹²

There have, however, been some encouraging signs of political reform and relative stability in the country. 2013 saw the first democratic handover of power in the country's history. Meanwhile, relations with India, while not good, have remained stable since at least 2008.¹³ The Peshawar School attack of December 2014, in which nearly 150 school children were killed by TTP militants, appears to have galvanised public opinion and resulted in a significant shift in the state's rhetoric, including a commitment to target all terror groups without distinction.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the government of Ashraf Ghani in Afghanistan has made efforts to reach out to the Pakistani leadership, while Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's focus on establishing economic stability and public dissatisfaction with the status quo may open space for the development of more constructive relations between the two countries.

Afghanistan's multiple transitions

Afghanistan is in the midst of several major transition processes. The degree to which these are successful is likely to dictate whether Afghanistan will be able to achieve peaceful and sustainable development in the coming years. In the short term, it is likely that the country will suffer from significant instability, while any progress is likely to be uneven and faltering.¹⁵

The **political transition** is arguably the most advanced. In 2014, the country held relatively peaceful presidential elections. Although the outcome was disputed, with the two candidates in the run-off each accusing the other of large-scale vote rigging, a negotiation process with strong international support allowed for a peaceful resolution. In September 2014, Ashraf Ghani, was inaugurated as President, heading up a National Unity Government (NUG), with his main rival Dr Abdullah Abdullah taking on the newly created role of Chief Executive. So far, the NUG has struggled to operate as a cohesive and integrated political team; hardly surprising given the divisive nature of Afghan politics. The key challenges for the NUG include the urgent need to improve the performance and legitimacy of government institutions across the country while making progress on peace talks.¹⁶

In June 2013, international forces officially handed over all responsibility for maintaining security in Afghanistan to local forces, marking the key moment in the **security transition**. Since then, the country has continued to see high levels of insecurity, including an increase in civilian casualties compared to 2014 (which was already the worst year on record for Afghan civilians).¹⁷ The recent battles for control of Kunduz, Ghazni and other regions demonstrate the continued capacity of the Taliban to take territory, including major urban regions.¹⁸ Despite many setbacks, recent years have seen a significant increase in both the capacity of, and public

confidence in, the Afghan armed forces.¹⁹ It will be essential that these forces are able to maintain and build on this if the security transition is to contribute to sustainable, long-term peace.

The **economic transition** is perhaps least well developed. Despite strong economic growth in recent years (slowing significantly in 2014), the country remains heavily dependent on foreign aid. Economic growth and job creation have been largely tied to government expenditure and foreign aid flows. With aid projected to decrease substantially in the coming years, there is a significant risk of increased economic instability, with potentially negative consequences for peace. Maintaining the current levels of spending on security, for example, is likely to require very significant support from international donors for many years to come. Meanwhile, despite years of counter-narcotics interventions, the illicit drugs trade continues to dominate the economy in many parts of the country, providing revenue for insurgent groups and fuelling corruption at every level within the country.²⁰ It is important therefore that significant progress is made in moving towards greater economic self-sufficiency in the coming years.

Implications of transition processes on peace and security in Pakistan: focal areas for analysis

The remainder of this policy brief focuses on three inter-related areas where the Afghan transition processes are likely to have a significant impact on peace and conflict dynamics in Pakistan. These focal areas were identified by civil society participants at a workshop in Islamabad in January 2015. Much of the following analysis flows from further discussions with these participants conducted at a workshop in October 2015. This analysis has been supplemented by relevant literature where this was available. The three focal areas for further analysis identified were:

- radicalisation of youth
- relations between India and Pakistan
- Afghan refugees in Pakistan

Radicalisation of youth

Pakistan has seen a massive increase in the number and severity of violent incidents involving militant sectarian or Islamic-fundamentalist groups²¹ since 2001. These incidents, which include attacks perpetrated by groups such as TTP, as well as military-led operations targeting them, have for example reportedly been responsible for more deaths than any other type of violence in the country since 2005.²² Although concentrated in the areas bordering Afghanistan, no part of the country has been immune to the effects of this violence. The ability of these groups to recruit support from the local population

inside Pakistan, most notably among youth, was identified by participants as being a key challenge to establishing peace in the country.

There is a widespread perception that the state has played a key role in both directly promoting, and indirectly perpetuating, the influence of many of these militant groups. For example, the policy of supporting jihadi groups in Afghanistan from the 1970s onwards has had a direct impact on their prominence and influence today. Likewise, the prevalence of madrasas across the country, especially those espousing a particularly orthodox form of Deobandi Islam, can in significant part be traced back to General Zia's Islamisation policies in the 1980s.²³ These were aimed at winning the favour of religious groups so as to consolidate military rule, while providing a stream of willing recruits for deployment to Kashmir. The tendency of successive governments to either continue or fail to effectively reverse these policies has arguably contributed to the conditions that have allowed 'extremist' groups to become deeply embedded in many communities across Pakistan.

The highly militarised nature of Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategies was also noted as a potential factor contributing to the growth of 'extremist' groups in the country. The military operations in FATA and Swat Valley for example resulted in massive displacement and destruction of livelihoods, with little apparent consideration for the impacts on local people. Meanwhile, reports of extrajudicial killings and the targeting of particular ethnic groups by military units (most notably Pashtun migrants and Afghan refugees) are becoming increasingly common.²⁴ Such reports reinforce the widespread perception of the impunity of military units. The use of drone strikes and the widely publicised reports of civilian casualties also feed into a deep-seated sense of injustice and anti-state feelings.²⁵ Participants felt that these factors were contributing to the attractiveness of extremist narratives in the country, especially for youth.

Measures instigated in the wake of the Peshawar School incident, including the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty and introduction of military courts for civilians accused of terrorist-related offences, may also risk further undermining trust in the state. It would appear that the state is maintaining its practice of differentiating between the so-called 'good' and 'bad' Taliban, for example.²⁶ As a result, many prominent militant groups and their leaders continue to operate freely and openly. Meanwhile, those convicted by the courts (overwhelmingly poor and often from marginalised communities) for non-terrorism related crimes face the death penalty.²⁷ The lack of civilian oversight of military courts meanwhile was noted as a factor that further adds to the widespread perception that the judicial system operates in the interests of the powerful elites, rather than the broader population.

Following from this, participants noted that the inability of the state to provide access to basic services, including access to justice, is a further contributing factor leading to radicalisation. The ability of TTP to impose a rapid, albeit brutal form of justice, has for example been cited as a key factor in allowing it to gain sufficient popular support to take control of the Swat Valley in 2007. Participants also felt that the failure of the state to extend the political, legal, and economic rights enjoyed by the rest of the country to residents of the FATA meanwhile may also be fuelling the perceptions of alienation that have historically fed into militant recruitment there.

The lack of access to quality education has also been highlighted as a key factor contributing to increased patterns of radicalisation. Participants pointed to the very poor quality of state-provided education as being an important factor in making the alternative madrasa system attractive for parents. While it is important to recognise that not all madrasas propagate a violent conception of Islam, a significant number do.²⁸ Participants also pointed to a common perception of biases within the Pakistani national curriculum, which it has been argued presents a narrow conception of Pakistani national identity based almost exclusively on Sunni Islam, and does little to promote religious tolerance.²⁹

Potential implications of transition in Afghanistan on radicalisation of youth in Pakistan

Certain sections of the Pakistani military establishment have historically seen instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to maximise their influence in the country. Given the inherently destabilising impacts of the transition processes (in the short term at least), there remains the possibility that elements within the Pakistani state will seek to maintain or expand this strategy, either by reinvigorating ties with the Taliban or potentially other armed groups. Such a strategy is likely to result in both a deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan, as well as emboldening extremist groups within Pakistan. Without fundamental reform of the core institutions of state in Pakistan, this is likely to result in an increase in the number of Pakistani youth becoming radicalised, with subsequent impacts on peace and security in the country.

Participants also highlighted that a second potential consequence of such action could be the ascendancy of new groups in the region. The Islamic State (IS), for example, is active in several regions of Afghanistan. It is possible that a resurgent Taliban could divert Afghan attention away from tackling the emergent IS threat. Should IS establish a strong following in Afghanistan, participants felt that there was a high likelihood that this would spread to Pakistan. Indeed, there have been reports of IS gaining influence inside Pakistan, notably in the FATA and Sindh province, although these reports are denied by government sources.³⁰ Some commentators have argued that the countries' deep

social ethnic and sectarian cleavages, as well as the recent history of close collaboration with Western powers, make Pakistan a potentially ripe environment for the rapid expansion of IS influence, irrespective of whether they are a significant presence today or not.³¹

India-Pakistan relations

Participants identified the centrality of relations with India on peace and conflict dynamics within Pakistan as the second focal area for further analysis. It was noted that Afghanistan has often been used as a pawn in the turbulent relationship between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan have arguably based their Afghan policies primarily on an assessment of what will limit the influence of the other in Kabul. The success of the current transition processes in Afghanistan therefore will be significantly influenced by the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations. Equally, changes in the Afghan context are also likely to impact on the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations.

Participants highlighted a persistent and deep-seated perception among many Pakistani people that India presents a constant and existential threat to Pakistan. Several argued that this has allowed for the development and entrenchment of a 'military mind set' among key decision-makers in Pakistan,³² with profound implications for how the country is governed. Several commentators meanwhile have argued that Pakistan has become a 'security state'; that is, one where all major policy decisions are viewed through the rubric of how they will impact on Pakistani competition with India.³³ Consequently, anti-Indian rhetoric and narratives have become embedded into almost every aspect of daily Pakistani life. The education system for example is said to promote anti-Indian stereotypes, while the country is frequently described as 'cunning', 'hostile' or 'evil' in state-sanctioned textbooks.³⁴ Sections of the media meanwhile allegedly perpetuate anti-Indian narratives, through uneven and biased reporting.³⁵

The focus on the Indian threat has had self-perpetuating impacts on conflict dynamics in Pakistan. It has for example, been a major factor in allowing the military to maintain, and at times strengthen, its grip on Pakistani politics. The military have been able to position themselves as being above party politics, and see themselves as being the only actor that can ensure the country's national security. Given the perceived gravity of the threat posed by India, however, the writ of national security is seen to extend far beyond traditional defence policy, and into the realms of almost all aspects of domestic policy (including media, education, the economy, and religious freedoms). Any effort to impose greater civilian oversight on military affairs tends to be portrayed as a threat to national security, and is therefore fiercely resisted. This has contributed to a sense of impunity for military actors and has

potentially fed in to increasing levels of corruption within the military.³⁶

Consequently, many commentators have argued that Pakistan's policy towards, and engagement in, Afghanistan have been seen primarily through the lens of managing the perceived threat from India.³⁷ This has taken many forms, including Pakistan's alleged support for the Taliban and other militant groups seen to be least amenable to improving ties with India. Ahmed Rashid, for example, has argued that Pakistan's support for the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, while concurrently providing at least tacit support to anti-state elements within the country, can be seen as evidence of the Pakistani government hedging its bets.³⁸ Others have made the case that by supporting the invasion, the Musharraf regime hoped to gain influence in Washington, while undermining India's burgeoning relationship with the US.³⁹

Potential implications of transition in Afghanistan on Indian-Pakistan relations

The period running up to the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops from Afghanistan has seen a significant increase in violence in Kashmir. There were a total of 200 military violations of the Line of Control (LoC) reported in 2013, an 80 per cent increase on the preceding year.⁴⁰ This has been interpreted by some analysts as the result of an intentional effort by Pakistan to tie down Indian forces and divert attention away from Afghanistan at a critical juncture for the country.⁴¹ Indeed, it is possible that the withdrawal of the majority of Western troops and the decreasing levels of aid into Afghanistan may open up space for increased Indian engagement in the country. Any such increase (or perceived increase) in Indian influence, however, is likely to be resisted by Pakistan, and could potentially encourage a resurgence in covert support for anti-state actors inside Afghanistan by elements within the Pakistani military. It could also embolden the military further as a power broker within Pakistani politics; as the 'guardian of national security' they are likely to benefit most from any increase in the perceived threat posed by India.

A second possibility is that the declining relative influence of Western powers in Afghanistan results in increased Chinese engagement. Such a move is likely to be more welcome in Islamabad than any increase in Indian engagement. Given the scale of planned Chinese investments in Pakistan, and their value as a strategic counter-weight to India, it is possible that Chinese pressure could be more effective in limiting Pakistani support to anti-state elements in Afghanistan than Western efforts have been. However, such a move could also motivate India to take a more belligerent stance in its relations with Pakistan, in order to counter increased Chinese influence in an area that India considers its own backyard.

The decreased relative importance of Afghanistan for Western powers could also impact on relations between Pakistan and the West, especially the US. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan removes Washington's reliance on Pakistan for logistical and intelligence-gathering support. Consequently, Pakistan's bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the US and other Western powers on issues such as alleged covert support to extremist groups, nuclear proliferation or human rights is likely to be diminished. Western investment is unlikely to increase significantly, while political support may be withheld, potentially resulting in further economic and political instability and increased tensions with India (as governments seek to divert attention away from domestic frailties).

Afghan refugees in Pakistan

The complex and politically charged relationship between the presence of large numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the risk of violent conflict was another priority raised by Pakistani civil society participants. Pakistan hosts around 1.5 million registered, and an estimated 1.4 million unregistered, Afghan refugees; the largest number of protracted refugees in any single country.⁴² Many have been in Pakistan for close to 40 years and have inter-married with Pakistanis. Others were born in Pakistan and have never lived anywhere else. In addition, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 people cross the porous border every day, moving in both directions.⁴³

Afghans living in Pakistan have been blamed by sections of the Pakistani media and political establishment for a range of social problems in the country.⁴⁴ For example, in 2014 the Peshawar administration reported that they believed Afghan refugees to be responsible for 80 per cent of criminal and terrorist attacks in the city.⁴⁵ Participants reported however that there is little empirical evidence that this is the case.

The impact of large numbers of Afghan refugees on the provision of basic services has also been cited as an area of concern by donors, NGOs, civil society groups and research participants. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that roughly two-thirds of registered refugees live in host communities, mostly in urban settings.⁴⁶ This places significant pressure on local health, education and other services, in a context in which public sector service provision is already chronically underfunded and poorly managed. Meanwhile, there are perceptions that the presence of cheap labour in many communities may be depressing wages, while increased demand for goods and services may be contributing to inflation.

The demographic shifts brought about by the arrival of Afghan refugees into some communities can also have important political implications. In Balochistan the arrival of many Pashtun Afghans has exacerbated

existing tensions with local people, many of whom fear domination by non-Balochi groups. The large Hazara population in Quetta meanwhile has increasingly been targeted by violent sectarian groups, leading many to flee to other parts of Pakistan (primarily Karachi and Islamabad), where they are in turn often seen as a security threat.⁴⁷

Despite the negative perceptions and rhetoric common across much of the country, cases of violence between refugee and host communities are relatively rare. This may be due to the strong ethnic, cultural, and social links that exist between many Afghan refugee communities (the majority of whom are Pashtun) and local people in the areas in which they have settled.⁴⁸ Participants noted that there may also be economic benefits associated with the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The success of many Afghan businesses in Pakistan, for example, may have helped create jobs and reinvigorate the local economy in many areas.

Potential implications of transition in Afghanistan on Afghan refugees in Pakistan

There is some evidence that the Government of Pakistan is using the transition process as an opportunity to increase their rhetoric around repatriating greater numbers of refugees back to Afghanistan.⁴⁹ While potentially a popular policy in many parts of Pakistan, this could have a negative impact on the local economy in some host communities. Any large-scale repatriation may also have destabilising effects in Afghanistan, which would struggle to absorb significant numbers of returnees. The likely result would be that refugees would simply return to Pakistan.

Any increase in instability in Afghanistan is also likely to precipitate a new flow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. This has the potential to increase tensions in some communities, most notably in Balochistan. An influx of new refugees would increase pressure on basic services, and is likely to increase sectarian tensions and suspicion in some communities.

Entry points for building peace

Civil society participants agreed that the transition processes in Afghanistan have the potential to have a destabilising effect in Pakistan. However, there was also recognition that they could also catalyse greater peace and stability. More than at any time in the recent past, many Pakistani political elites are now accepting that a stable and prosperous Pakistan requires a stable Afghanistan.⁵⁰ If the transition process is able to address some of the underlying drivers of instability in Afghanistan, for example by laying the foundations for a solid, self-sustaining economy, then Pakistan is also likely to benefit. Any improvement in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan also has the potential to have knock-on impacts for Indo-Pakistani relations. If, for example,

Pakistani policy makers are confident that a friendly regime in Kabul will not result in Indian dominance on their western border, then they may be less likely to follow some of the destabilising policies that some have allegedly pursued in the past.

Achieving positive outcomes in Pakistan will however require a significant shift in policy and approach by Pakistani political and military elites. This section outlines some key needs, identified by members of Pakistani civil society, for maximising these potential positive impacts:

Improved civilian oversight of foreign and defence policy:

Pakistan's tendency to employ highly militarised responses to a wide range of security threats (real and perceived) lies at the heart of fragility in the country. Historically, matters related to foreign and defence policy (including counter-terrorism and national security) have been determined by the military, irrespective of whether the government was led by a civilian or military officer. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that militaristic strategies for addressing insecurity have been preferred to more inclusive forms of public policy (that is, military security has been pursued at the cost of human security). When civilian governments have sought to adopt a different approach, they have often failed due to the powerful grip that the military have been able to exert on the political process. The fractured and divisive nature of Pakistani politics meanwhile acts to further empower the military's hold over policy-making, since their support is often essential to ensuring the survival of the government of the day.

This dominance of the military in all spheres of domestic and foreign policy-making, and the lack of civilian oversight of military structures, has limited the opportunities for civilian governments to seek to address many of the long-term, underlying drivers of insecurity identified above. There is a clear need for much stronger democratic accountability in Pakistan, including wide-ranging security sector reform that seeks to strengthen civilian oversight of military actors.

Education and media reform: Participants pointed to a lack of access to high-quality state education as a significant reason why the madrasa system has flourished in Pakistan. The lack of state regulation means that there is little control over what is taught or the quality of education provided. Meanwhile, the national curriculum is seen by many groups as promoting a narrow and exclusionary conception of Pakistani national identity; one that is based exclusively on Islam and underplays the diversity of Pakistani society. Likewise, it is seen by some commentators as blaming almost all social ills on external actors (primarily India, but also the West and Afghans living in Pakistan) and presenting an unbalanced and historically inaccurate account of Pakistani history.⁵¹ The cumulative result is that children are not encouraged to develop critical thinking skills, while stereotypes become deeply

entrenched. This pattern is further exacerbated by a poorly regulated and unbalanced media that tends to reinforce divisions rather than bridging them.

Improved access to basic services: A closely related issue is the need for a significant improvement in the provision of basic services, especially access to justice for local people. This is important for reducing the attraction of extremist narratives, but also in ensuring that both host communities and refugees feel safe and secure, thereby limiting tensions between them. One important area is engaging with, and potentially reforming, alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as village *shuras*, *jirgas* or the *panchayat* system, as being key for improving access to justice at the local level.

Economic development: The need to stimulate equitable and broad-based economic development is a common challenge across the three focal areas discussed in this policy brief. Economic activities, such as cross-border trade, have the potential to build bonds of trust across conflict lines. Lack of jobs and economic opportunities may also be contributing factors to making youth susceptible to narratives of violence. Competition over jobs was seen as a driver of tension between host communities and refugees. The need for more vocational training opportunities and improved infrastructure (roads, power, etc.) at the local level, as well as regulatory reform and anti-corruption measures at the provincial and national levels, were also identified as key peacebuilding needs.

Confidence-building measures: These will be needed to lay the foundations for improved relations between communities, as well as at the intergovernmental level. For example, more frequent civil society exchanges between Pakistan and both India and Afghanistan could help to build confidence and address deeply engrained stereotypes. Likewise, increased cultural and sporting exchanges have the potential to help build mutual understanding in the region. Such people-to-people exchanges, however, are unlikely to have much impact if intergovernmental relations are not improved. This is likely to require some degree of international mediation (something that has so far been resisted by most parties).

Focus on most marginalised communities:

Particular efforts are required to protect the most marginalised and vulnerable communities, not only in Pakistan but also in Afghanistan. Failure to do so is likely to encourage further division within society, and exacerbate the feelings of socio-economic injustice that fuel extremist narratives and contribute to tensions between refugee and host communities. For example, repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan should be voluntary, but returnees also need access to jobs, resources, and security inside Afghanistan in order to make any repatriation process sustainable.

Potential role of Pakistani civil society organisations in conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Pakistan has a vibrant and active civil society. Historically, they have taken on a variety of roles, and when mobilised have been able to affect significant change in the ways in which the state is governed and society operates. However, civil society is a broad category, encompassing a vast number of interest groups, political perspectives, and ideological underpinnings. In order to assess the degree to which civil society could be mobilised to affect positive change across the priority areas identified above, it is necessary to differentiate between different components of civil society, and investigate what they are already doing, what their potential additional contribution to peacebuilding in Pakistan could be, and what barriers they face in fulfilling that peacebuilding potential. Participants in the research identified the following key civil society actors:⁵²

- political parties
- media
- religious groups
- INGOs, NGOs and CBOs
- business associations
- academia and research institutes

Political parties: Civilian politics in Pakistan has been dominated by two political parties since the 1970s: the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML).⁵³ A range of other parties have also exerted a greater or lesser degree of influence over the political process at any given time. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan is the third-largest party in the country, and forms the government in KP Province, while other parties such as Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazul Rehman) (JUI(F)) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) (PML (F)) also wield considerable influence in certain parts of the country.

Political parties have significant opportunities to contribute towards peacebuilding by raising key issues within provincial and national legislatures. Education policy, for example, is devolved to the provincial level, meaning that state assemblies have significant potential to influence the quality of education and address perceived biases within the curriculum. Likewise, several political parties have the capacity to mobilise large groups of people to protest against perceived injustices or raise the profile of peace-related issues. The political parties also act as the primary conduit between local people and political decision-making processes. Crucially, as potential future governments, they are also the group that will be responsible for demanding a greater level of civilian oversight over the military and improved accountability in political decision-making.

However, there are profound barriers that prevent Pakistan's political parties from more actively contributing to peace in the country. Few mainstream parties are considered genuinely representative of a broad population base. Most are dominated by a certain ethnic or geographical base, or are seen as the vehicles for the entrenching of power by feudal landlords or elite families. Perceptions of corruption and self-interested policy-making are widespread. Political competition, meanwhile, has been extremely fractious, with a 'winner-takes-all' mentality leading to a propensity for leaders to aggressively pursue vendettas against all perceived rivals.⁵⁴ Parties have frequently aligned themselves with either the military or militant groups (or both) in order to maintain or establish a grip on power.⁵⁵ Such manoeuvres ultimately undermine the potential for most political parties to take meaningful action to redress the balance of power between military and civilian stakeholders, by ensuring that politicians remain reliant on armed groups for their own survival when in government.

Media: For most of Pakistan's history, the media has been tightly controlled and acted primarily as a tool for promoting state-controlled propaganda.⁵⁶ However, reform in 2002 was followed by a huge expansion in the accessibility and diversity of different forms of media. For example, in 2000 there were only three television channels readily available in Pakistan; by 2013 this had grown to 89, mostly privately run stations. Mobile phone penetration meanwhile has also grown from 22 per cent of the population in 2005 to almost 70 per cent by 2012.⁵⁷

The media could play a greater role in promoting peace than is currently the case. For example, the media has an important role to play in shaping popular opinion and perceptions in the country. Local and national television, radio and print media could help to counter stereotypes and divisive narratives (including anti-Indian, anti-refugee or jihadi view points), both through the news and entertainment media (soap operas, light entertainment shows etc.). This would require a greater focus on presenting the viewpoints of diverse communities and perspectives in an impartial manner than is currently the case. The media also has an important watchdog role; by holding powerful actors to account, it has the potential to positively contribute to more responsive governance.

Social media in Pakistan holds peacebuilding potential but also faces some challenges. Internet connectivity remains low, but is growing significantly.⁵⁸ Online reporting and social networks are the least restricted forms of media in the country. Many issues that are not reported on TV, for example, are widely discussed on social media.⁵⁹ Some activists in Balochistan have also used social media to engage directly with international operators, thereby raising the international awareness and profile of human rights abuses, which are largely

under-reported domestically.⁶⁰ However, social media can also be used to spread violent ideologies. Some commentators have argued that by empowering new political actors with the potential to amplify their voices through new media, the media environment is likely to become both more diverse, but also more divisive.⁶¹

A number of barriers currently prevent the media from maximising its potential peacebuilding role. Media freedom remains highly constrained.⁶² Attacks on journalists have become more common in recent years, including several high-profile assassination attempts by militant groups.⁶³ Legal restrictions on what journalists can and cannot report on, coupled with the inability of journalists to independently access certain parts of the country (including the FATA and parts of Balochistan), have constrained the ability of the media to effectively play its watchdog role. There have also been reports of private, political, and military actors seeking to exert control over media content, including paying for favourable press coverage.⁶⁴ Media regulation bodies meanwhile have become highly politicised and been accused of employing heavy-handed tactics to suppress criticisms of influential actors, including the ISI and politicians.

Religious groups: Religious leaders and networks are hugely influential at the local, provincial and national levels. Approximately 97 per cent of Pakistan's population is Muslim (mostly Sunni but with a significant Shia minority). Islam is enshrined as the official religion in the Constitution and the legal system is modelled on Islamic law. High-profile clerics exert influence across geographical, social, economic, and ethnic lines in a way that few others can. Religious parties are influential at the national and provincial levels. They have often been co-opted by (or have cooperated with) military and other political leaders to bolster legitimacy and support. At the local level, mullahs and imams play a major role in shaping local attitudes and promoting values.⁶⁵

The actual and potential impact of religious leaders on addressing the peacebuilding challenges identified above is therefore immense. Clergy in Pakistan have been involved in a wide range of peacebuilding initiatives for many years. Many religious leaders have also been the targets of violence in recent years.

Religious leaders are able to impact on conflict dynamics through the management and control of madrasas. Many madrasas have been linked with militant groups, and reform of the teaching methods and curricula could have a significant impact on patterns of violence. It is, however, important to recognise that in some contexts, madrasas are the only source of education for local people, while the quality provided is sometimes on a par with (or better than) that provided by many state schools.

INGOs, NGOs and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs): Pakistan has a vibrant NGO

and CBO community.⁶⁶ The 1980s saw a large increase in the number of NGOs beginning to operate in the country, in part due to the influx of donor funds that sought to shore up Pakistani support for Western intervention in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. This pattern was repeated following the 9/11 attacks. Repeated humanitarian emergencies stemming from conflict and natural hazards have also contributed to the continued growth of CBOs and NGOs in the country. By some estimates there are now over 100,000 NGOs and CBOs operating in Pakistan, up from roughly 12,000 in 2001.⁶⁷

The peacebuilding potential for the NGO and CBO sector in Pakistan is great. Some organisations already have an explicit focus on peacebuilding, primarily at the grassroots level. Such organisations can play an important role in facilitating people-to-people contacts and bridging divides across conflicting groups (for example, across sectarian divisions or working with Afghan refugees and host communities). The majority of CBOs and NGOs, however, are focused on other humanitarian and development sectors, many of which are deeply entwined with the conflict dynamics identified above. For example, estimates from 2001 indicate that almost half of civil society organisations (CSOs) are involved in education, while about 17 per cent focus on civil rights and advocacy.⁶⁸ Others are focused on promoting skills development and economic development, or promoting improvements in local level governance. Taken together, these organisations have the potential to make a very significant contribution to peacebuilding in the country, so long as they operate in a conflict-sensitive manner.

INGO, NGO and CBO staff face a number of significant barriers that inhibit their ability to maximise their peacebuilding potential. Security challenges and government-imposed travel restrictions make it difficult for many to access communities most at need. Changes in the NGO registration processes have also resulted in a greater level of uncertainty for both domestic and international organisations in the country. Finally, some CBOs and NGOs are closely associated with political actors, including non-state armed groups.

Business associations: Chambers of Commerce and other business associations are potentially influential peacebuilding actors. They can contribute to economic growth, job creation, and improved service delivery, all of which are important for addressing widespread perceptions of socio-economic injustice. Furthermore, making economic cooperation between groups across conflict lines mutually beneficial may help to remove incentives for conflict and help build trust between groups.

Business leaders and members of these associations also have a greater potential to influence political and military leaders than many other groups. Associations of former military or civil service workers, for example,

are often well-connected with current decision-makers, and can have detailed understanding of the internal workings of some of Pakistan's more opaque civilian and military structures, making them potentially useful partners for affecting change.

Being well-connected can also be a barrier to improved peacebuilding impact. Participants, for example, argued that many ex-military and former government workers continue to benefit from their associations with current ruling groups (through consultancies, chairmanships of state-owned companies etc.) Meanwhile, political and military leaders often also have extensive business interests, either directly or through family links. Many business leaders therefore may benefit from the status quo, creating a powerful disincentive to advocate for change.

Academia and research institutes: Academic institutions, policy researchers, and think tanks have an important role in influencing both government policy and that of important international actors (including donors, regional actors and multilateral organisations). In the Pakistani context, this may be particularly important, since government data collection and analysis capabilities are poorly developed.⁶⁹ These actors also have an important role to play in shaping public opinion, primarily by disseminating knowledge through media outlets. There is a need to deepen the evidence and understanding of conflict drivers and effective peacebuilding responses in order to make policy influencing more effective. However, a solid evidence base is rarely sufficient to effect significant policy change, especially in a highly politicised context such as Pakistan. It is important therefore that evidence is accompanied by effective advocacy, targeting key actors at different levels, and informed by a nuanced understanding of political dynamics. This will likely necessitate closer working between researchers, NGOs, the media, and other sections of Pakistani civil society.

Recommendations

Despite the inter-related nature of peace and conflict dynamics in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is important to recognise that the transition processes in Afghanistan will not in themselves lead to an increase in conflict in Pakistan. Rather, instability on one side of the border is highly likely to exacerbate underlying conflict drivers in the other. Equally, the degree to which the transition processes in Afghanistan are successful will also be to a significant extent shaped by the actions of Pakistan as well as other international actors. Any efforts therefore to minimise the potential negative impacts of transition in Afghanistan on peace and conflict dynamics in Pakistan will be reliant on the ability of domestic and international actors to resolve and mitigate the underlying conflict drivers inside Pakistan.

Civil society actors, despite the many challenges and barriers they face, have an important role to play in addressing these factors. Maximising the potential positive impacts of these actors on peacebuilding in the coming years will, however, require long-term political, technical, and economic support, both from within the country and from external actors, including international donors and agencies. This section outlines some high-level recommendations for Pakistani civil society actors and international partners currently engaged in Pakistan.

Pakistani civil society actors

Political parties in Pakistan should:

- Move away from the 'winner-takes-all' mentality of Pakistani elite politics by seeking to develop a more consensus-based approach, with the aim of presenting a united front able to redefine the role of the military within Pakistani politics and deepen the perceived legitimacy of political actors across broader Pakistani society.
- Promote reform within parties to better model democratic principles. They should seek to break patterns of dominance that have seen decision-making and leadership positions dominated by tiny cadres of political elites, in favour of more pluralistic decision-making processes.
- Commit to wide-ranging review and reform of the state's counter-radicalisation and security policies. This should include a strong emphasis on adopting a developmental human security approach to addressing underlying drivers of insecurity, rather than relying on militaristic solutions. Equally parties should avoid aligning themselves, either publically or informally, with non-state armed groups in order to pursue their political agendas.
- Work together to promote comprehensive reform of the education system (including improved access for most marginalised communities, curriculum reform, and extending government oversight to the madrasa system), improve access to justice and lay out a process and timeline for implementing FATA reform.

Pakistani media organisations should:

- Work with government, other parts of civil society and international actors to design and implement a reform process that will empower them to play a more powerful watchdog role. This should include reviewing restrictions on journalists' freedom of speech and movement, and reforming media oversight bodies, including Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). Media bodies should also take effective steps to stamp out corruption within the sector in order to safeguard independence from political influence.
- Seek to counter divisive and extremist narratives and avoid reinforcing exclusionary stereotypes.

The best way to do this is by ensuring that a diverse range of viewpoints and perspectives are represented in mainstream media, with (as far as possible) impartial reporting. Media organisations can, for example, commission programming that celebrates the country's diversity, and help foster a sense of national unity.

- Help counter online 'hate speech', for example by working with government (and others) to develop internet specific legislation aimed at limiting online content that seeks to enflame divisions in society. Such legislation should draw upon international best practice, and seek to strike the right balance between protecting freedom of expression and promoting public safety.
- Work with government, donors and NGOs to promote digital literacy and access to the internet across the country, so as to diversify the range of online voices, while strengthening pro-peace media initiatives.
- Collaborate with the open data community to develop skillsets in 'data journalism' aimed at equipping media with the means to pursue investigative journalism and reporting based on evidence.
- Collaborate with and view the development of citizen journalism and blogging as an important and legitimate aspect of the media ecosystem of Pakistan. This provides the means to enhance the voices and perspectives of marginalised communities, including those from within refugee populations, to an extent not previously possible.

Pakistani CBOs and NGOs operating in the country should:

- Where feasible and safe to do so, advocate for political reform and a greater say in the decisions that affect their lives. This might include advocating on issues related to civilian oversight of the military, and the re-assertion of civilian lead on issues related to foreign and defence policy.
- Assess the degree to which their activities have the potential to contribute to long-term sustainable peace (or exacerbate conflict drivers), and seek to maximise any positive impacts on peace for local people.
- Work with government to re-double efforts to improve access to and quality of basic services, including education and access to justice, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable and marginalised communities. Organisations should seek to complement state provision of services and contribute to more accountable and responsive governance. When working in areas with large numbers of Afghan refugees, organisations should seek to work with both refugee and host communities, and be aware of the potential to exacerbate tensions between these groups.

- Increase their level of engagement with alternative, non-state dispute-resolution mechanisms, with the aim of increasing access to justice for marginalised communities. Activities could focus on promoting reform of local institutions, capacity building for alternative dispute resolution systems (such as *jirgas* and *panchayats*), or advocacy to encourage greater integration of traditional systems with state systems.
- Identify confidence-building measures, with the aim of promoting greater people-to-people contact for civil society, business and government actors across borders, as well as improving relations and tackling stereotypes and misconceptions between communities in Pakistan.

Business associations should:

- Advocate for government to put in place policies and initiatives that encourage or facilitate increased regional economic integration. For example, by promoting cross-border trade between Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan, improving economic infrastructure to facilitate trade and implementing anti-corruption initiatives across the region.
- Seek opportunities to promote increased job creation in marginalised communities, including with refugees. This should include identifying skill shortages in vulnerable communities that may be holding back potential economic activity, and working with government and NGOs to develop vocational training opportunities linked to potential areas of growth and job creation.

Research institutions should:

- Work with broad range of civil society actors to identify research needs relating to drivers of conflict, and opportunities to contribute to peace, and use this to deepen the evidence base relating to drivers of peace in Pakistan. Such collaboration can help to add expertise, authority and legitimacy to other civil society calls for political reform.

Religious groups should:

- Continue to contribute to the countering of violent narratives, by promoting a tolerant and inclusive vision of Islam. Religious leaders can also play an important role in convening inter-faith and inter-sect initiatives and dialogue processes.

The international community

Members of the international community engaging in Pakistan should:

- Develop coordinated and coherent cross-government and intergovernmental diplomatic,

development, and security policies that focus on promoting greater civilian oversight of Pakistani institutions of state, specifically related to foreign, defence, and counter-radicalisation policies. This may include stepping up diplomatic efforts to discourage Pakistani government and military tolerance of 'good' Taliban, and ending the perceived ability of certain militant groups and their leaders to operate freely in parts of Pakistan.

- Work with Pakistan government and key decision-makers to identify underlying drivers of insecurity in the country, and design non-militaristic response strategies that seek to address the long-term, developmental factors that make youth vulnerable to radicalisation. These might include reform of the education system (including curriculum reform), governance reform in FATA, improved access to basic services (including access to functioning, responsive and just formal justice systems) and lack of access to jobs.
- Ensure that the design and implementation of humanitarian and development programmes are informed by an awareness of the potential impact on peace and conflict dynamics. These programmes should seek to avoid exacerbating underlying conflict drivers, and wherever possible take intentional steps to maximise their potential positive impacts on peace.
- Work with local and international media organisations to promote reform of the media sector, and promote opportunities for more pluralistic media that reflects the diversity of Pakistani society. Donors could also promote digital literacy and access to the internet across the country, so as to diversify the range of online voices, while strengthening pro-peace media initiatives.
- Work with the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to embark on open dialogue aimed at resolving long-standing disputes and building the confidence needed to put in place the foundations for more collaborative approach to managing regional issues. Particular efforts should be made to promote greater economic integration and cross-border trade, perhaps starting with small-scale initiatives aimed at building trust between cross-border communities.
- Provide support to civil society-led initiatives in each of the above areas, and encourage collaborative working across different sectors and components of civil society, with the aim of maximising the potential peacebuilding opportunities. Support should also be made available to such organisations to build capacity in integrating conflict sensitivity across their programmes.

About Saferworld

Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe in a world where everyone can lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from fear and insecurity.

We are a not-for-profit organisation with programmes in nearly 20 countries and territories across Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe.

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¹ International Crisis Group (2014) 'Resetting Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan', *Asia Report* No. 262, 28 October.

² USIP (2014) 'Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan', *Peaceworks* No. 93.

³ The doctrine of 'strategic depth' dictates that Pakistani forces need to be able to rely on a friendly regime in Afghanistan willing to provide sanctuary and support to Pakistani forces should they be forced to move westward by an Indian invasion. See Alam S (2010), 'Army Chief Gen Kayani: Afghanistan as a 'Strategic Depth'', Centre for Land and Warfare Studies, article #324, 19 February, accessed at: <http://www.claws.in/324/army-chief-gen-kayani-afghanistan-as-a-%E2%80%98strategic-depth-dr-shah-alam.html#sthash.Lrfyidln.dpuf>

⁴ E.g. see Human Rights Watch (2001), 'Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War in Afghanistan'.

⁵ Official papers released by the UK Cabinet Office in 2010 for example detail discussions about British and other Western nations' covert support to mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan. See *Guardian* (2010) *UK discussed plans to help mujahideen weeks after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan*, 30 December, accessed at <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/dec/30/uk-mujahideen-afghanistan-soviet-invasion>.

⁶ For a detailed description of the CIA pipeline and the ISI distribution system during the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, see Rupert J (1989), 'Afghanistan's Slide Toward Civil War', *World Policy Journal*, XI (4) pp 759, 781. See also Rubin B (2002), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, (Yale University Press), pp 196-201; Yousaf M, Adkin M (1992), *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story* (London: Mark Cooper), p 4; Lundberg K (1999), 'Politics of a Covert Action: The U.S., the Mujahedin, and the Stinger Missile', Harvard Intelligence and Policy Project, C15-99-1546.0, Kennedy School of Government Case Program; and Kuperman A (1999), 'The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan', *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (2), pp 219-63.

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¹² International Alert (2014) 'Exploring the potential of the private sector to contribute to peacebuilding in Pakistan', International Alert, London.

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¹⁴ *Op cit* ICG (2015).

¹⁵ Saferworld (2015), 'Afghanistan's Transition: Challenges and Opportunities for Peace'. Saferworld, London.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ UNAMA (2015), 'Afghanistan Annual Report 2014: Protection of civilians in armed conflict', Kabul, Afghanistan, February.

¹⁸ Rashid A (2015), 'Can Afghanistan Hold On?', *The New York Review of Books*, October 19. <http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/oct/19/can-afghanistan-hold-on-taliban/>

¹⁹ Asia Foundation (2014) 'Afghanistan in 2014: A survey of the Afghan people'.

²⁰ Katzman K (2015), 'Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy', Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, October.

²¹ The complexity of, and close collaboration between, different groups engaged in violence in Pakistan make it difficult to draw clear distinctions between different typologies of violence. E.g. criminal, sectarian and separatist groups are all deeply inter-related, with overlapping ideologies and objectives. Nonetheless, there is a clear pattern of fundamentalist or extreme interpretations of Islam being used to motivate combatants and justify the use of violence in Pakistan.

²² USIP (2014).

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Op cit* International Crisis Group (2015)'.
²⁵ New American Foundation (2013), 'Drone Wars: Pakistan Analysis'.

²⁶ *Op cit* International Crisis Group (2015).

²⁷ According to the International Crisis Group, only a tiny fraction of prisoners on death row have been convicted for terrorist-related crimes. *Op cit* International Crisis Group (2015).

²⁸ The Interior Minister was recently quoted as saying that "90 per cent of madrasas have no connection to terrorism", implying that as many as 10 per cent of madrasas may have some link to extremist groups. This is a worrying statistic in a country with up to 33,000 such schools. Quoted in *op cit* International Crisis Group (2015).

²⁹ The United States Institute for Peace for example has argued that "Pakistan's official education system does not equip students to counter the prevailing, problematic narratives in society and the media in any way. Instead it both creates and propagates them". USIP (2015), 'Education and Attitudes in Pakistan Understanding Perceptions of Terrorism', USIP Special Report 356, p 1). The International Crisis Group meanwhile has reported that Pakistan currently adopts "a deeply-flawed national curriculum that promotes xenophobia and religious intolerance, clearly violating Pakistan's international obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which it has ratified", ICG (2014), 'Education Reform in Pakistan', *Asia Report* No. 257, 23 June. For a further, detailed critique of Pakistan's national curriculum and broader education system from a peacebuilding perspective, see CRSS (2008), 'Curriculum of Hate', CRSS and Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Islamabad.

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³⁸ *Op cit* Rashid A (2009).

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⁴⁴ An International Crisis Group report cites a Pakistani social sciences text book that clearly attributes the presence of Afghan refugees with "an increase of social problems, such as crime and drug smuggling". International Crisis Group (2014) 'Resetting Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan', *Crisis Group Asia Report*, No. 262, 28 October, p 21.

⁴⁵ Dawn (2014), 'Plan to confine Afghans to specific areas of the city', 4 February, accessed at

<http://www.dawn.com/news/1084858>

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⁴⁷ *Op cit* International Crisis Group (2014).

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⁴⁹ Bohr A, Price G (2015), 'Regional Implication of Afghanistan's Transitions: Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan', Chatham House, London.

⁵⁰ Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif has reportedly made significant recent efforts to improve relations with Afghanistan, including meeting with President Ghani in the margins of the Paris Climate Conference. E.g. see NDTV (2015) 'Pakistan wants cordial ties with Afghanistan, says PM Nawaz Sharif', November 30, accessed at <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-wants-cordial-ties-with-afghanistan-says-pm-nawaz-sharif-1249392>, and Express Tribune (2015) 'Stable Afghanistan vital for regional growth: PM', August 26, accessed at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/944924/stable-afghanistan-vital-for-regional-growth-pm/>.

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⁵² The categories were identified by participants at a workshop in Islamabad in September 2015.

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