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Foreign policy identity crises and uses of the 'West'

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> It is not surprising that the fading of Cold War antagonisms since the middle of the 1980s has put pressure on these countries to adopt a new, meaningful vision of external relations. The process evokes problems of identity and hesitations in establishing new foreign policy lines (Dijkink, 1996, p. 140).

The transatlantic 'community,' or at least its EU European wing, had been heralded as a security success story for quite some time, as an incarnation of a security community in which war was not on the agenda, indeed no longer even thinkable (Adler and Barnett, 1998). In Wendt's (1999) terms, Europe stood for the closest we had gotten to a Kantian culture of anarchy, where relations of enmity had been replaced by amity, and where the security dilemma had been overcome. With the end of the Cold War, such a Kantian culture stood the chance of expanding over the entire continent. But precisely when it seemed least likely, when the dream of many, among them not only peace researchers, had come true, a dynamic towards a more Hobbesian culture of anarchy came to the fore, rearing the head of geopolitics, ugly perhaps, but, for its defenders, bare at last. The end of the Cold War was to be no departure from the allegedly 'normal' international politics. Kant was nowhere in sight, not even in Europe.

The revival of geopolitics took place at both the core and the margins of the (European) 'West'. It happened most prominently in Russia, which has seen a quite remarkable turn-around. Branded during the Cold War by the Soviet authorities as a mistaken theory, if not ideology, geopolitics today has gained prevalence in the analysis of world politics (Tyulin, 1997; Sergounin, 2000), not least through the writings of Alexander Dugin.[1] From Marx to Mackinder. But also

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[1] Dugin, in particular, has attracted the scorn of critics, who liken him to a neo-fascist (see, for example, in Ingram, 2001). See the interpretation of Dugin in Bassin and Aksenov (2006) and Astrov and Morozova (2012).

the smaller countries in the post-Soviet space, usually aspiring to be part of the 'West', have seen a revival. Although the exact status of geopolitical thought in Estonia is still disputed (for an overview, see Aalto, 2000, 2001), the reception of Huntington's *clash of civilizations* has been truly remarkable (Aalto and Berg, 2002; Kuus, 2002, 2012) – and the revival did not stop on the Eastern side of the former Iron Curtain. Quite strikingly, Italy has seen a revival of 'geopolitics' with General (and political advisor) Carlo Jean as its figurehead, as well as the first new journal of geopolitics called *Limes: Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica* (the new Italian equivalent to the French *Hérodote*, but with the national success of *Foreign Affairs/Foreign Policy*) as its main outlet (Lucarelli and Menotti, 2002). Jean's books (1995; 1997) are the most widely read books in international relations written by an Italian. Together with *Limes*, they have accompanied and arguably influenced the geopolitical vocabulary permeating the daily discourses of politicians and newspapers (Antonsich, 1996; Brighi and Petito, 2012).

The present chapter is an outgrowth of my research on the revival of geopolitical thought (Guzzini, 2003, 2012). It has significant implications for the debate about the 'West,' both for the social mechanisms by which it took place and for the implications of having mobilized a geographic imaginary within a context of geopolitical thought (or not, depending on the country). The first section of the chapter claims that the unforeseeable (and uneven) revival of geopolitical thought in Europe should not be understood as 'normal' given the end of the Cold War and its aftermath, but is best understood as an answer to, or an easy fix for, the sense of dis-orientation and foreign policy identity crises which followed 1989. As such, it is closely related to processes of re-identification and to politics of representation which are central to the dwindling self-evidence of 'Uses of the West.' At the same time, such an easy fix provided by a geopolitical imaginary is not innocent. It mobilizes the militarist gaze in realism (however, not to be confused with all realism). This, in turn, can contribute to re-securitizing international politics. As such, it addresses the hypothesis of the general project that such re-securitization can be expected to foster a vision of an exclusionary Fortress West.

But the borders and identity of that 'West' are not given. Having moved the analysis to foreign policy identity discourses, the chapter will, in a second section, deal with the way such discourses can relate to cross-national identifications in general, and the 'West' in particular. It posits four possible relations, according to whether or not there is overlap between national and cross-national identifications, and which of the two, the national or cross-national, has prevalence. If there is no overlap, then there is the situation where the cross-national is either ignored or opposed. When there is overlap, then the cross-national can be appropriated in a discourse where the national is prevalent in foreign policy identity, or, when it is not, the cross-national can become an intrinsic part of constituting the national in the identity discourse for its capacity to stabilize an otherwise imbalanced identity prone to crisis.

1. Geopolitics as an answer to foreign policy identity crises

The revival of geopolitical thought is best understood in the context of foreign policy identity crises, a kind of 'ontological insecurity' (Agnew, 2003, p. 115)[2] that foreign policy elites encountered in Europe after 1989. Relying on Jutta Weldes' (1996; 1999) concept of a security imaginary, my claim is that if discursive understandings of the meaning of 1989 are such as to put into question the pre-existing identity in foreign policy discourse with no evident solution, then we have the necessary context for the development of a geopolitical revival. The thesis then is this: the resurgence of geopolitical thought in Europe after 1989 came at the crossroads of possible foreign policy identity crises – i.e. the anxiety over a new, a newly questioned or acquired self-understanding or role in world affairs – and the spatial logic of geopolitical thought, which is well disposed to provide some quick and allegedly 'natural' fixtures to this anxiety.

1989 meets security imaginaries... [3]

Central to this approach is an intersubjective unit of analysis that catches the interpretive pre-dispositions of the foreign policy expert system. Jutta Weldes has introduced such a unit in her study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. She calls it a 'security imaginary,' which is defined as a 'structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations about the world of international relations are created' (Weldes, 1999, p. 10). In the process of representation and interpretation of world affairs, actors mobilize this reservoir of raw meanings embedded in the collective memory of the expert field, including historical scripts and analogies (what she calls 'articulation'), and the embedded subject-position of a country in the international system ('interpellation').

The use of such a concept, however, does not imply that such an imaginary is homogeneous over time and space, meaning that it does not convey only one way of heeding the lessons of the past or just one particular self-understanding or role recognition of a country in the world. Rather, there are shared features in the way that debates about the past are conducted or in the potential roles of a country in the world that can be conceived of. In the US, the allusion is often made to the divide between interventionists and isolationists who refer to the same historical event with different implication, or indeed value certain events differently than others. But they share a definition of the boundaries, and hence the legitimate contenders, of the debate. Similarly, among the interventionists, there is the debate about foreign policy containment versus engagement – which again pits the two camps against each other. They rely on different lessons of the past: the argument for containment (against an inevitable expansion) being derived from the lessons of World War II, and engagement (avoiding an escalation nobody wanted) from the lessons of World War I. Pitting these two against each other justifies, whether

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[2] For different developments of the concept of ontological security, see: Kinnvall, 2004; Mitzen, 2006; and Steele, 2005, 2007. For a similar approach in terms of identity crisis, see Lupovici, 2012.

[3] This section is excerpted from Guzzini (2012b).

openly or not, that it is those lessons that are authorized to structure the debate.[4]

Hence, a security imaginary is not 'shared' in the sense that it produces just one opinion or that actors are induced to interpret the different scripts the same way. What characterizes a security imaginary is not a ready-made ideational toolkit, making debate unnecessary; on the contrary, the existence of such a tradition is what allows political debate to happen in the first place, since it stakes the boundaries of it, defines its terms, and ensures people refer to the same language when they dispute each others' points. Foreign policy experts will disagree on issues, but within the terms already agreed upon by their sharing a foreign policy field and its imaginary.[5] 'Munich', for instance, has become a potent symbol for almost all foreign policy experts in the West – the presence of this analogy shapes the political debate – but they will disagree on whether or not the analogy applies. Such analogies work as quasi-logical scripts and are mobilized in and through foreign policy debate.

How can we then understand a 'foreign policy identity crisis' or a state of 'ontological anxiety' in such a framework? In order for such a crisis and or such anxiety to occur, there must be a mis-fit between the significance of a certain event and the subject positions or roles which are embedded in a foreign policy imaginary. This means something more than that the event 'contradicts' this identity. For it is perfectly possible for security imaginaries to provide material for interpreting particular events in ways that would fit their predispositions. Whereas conservative scholars on US foreign policy would see in Reagan's arms race one of the main conditions for the shift in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, German peace researchers and détente politicians would see the long-term effects of *Ostpolitik* as the decisive aspect. Since facts are often underdetermined by theory, many interpretations are feasible and no dissonance prompted merely by the event itself need appear.

Hence, for a crisis to occur, interpretations given to the event must be such as to make role conceptions no longer self-evident – in other words, those conceptions need to justify themselves. An identity should come naturally; the moment it needs to consciously justify its assumptions, we can say that a crisis has occurred. Such a definition is weaker than one that would add that such justification should turn out to be impossible. The research puzzle starts with a demand for identity fixing, not with the impossibility of a solution to the identity crisis.

Such a crisis can be prompted in several ways:

(1) *The embedded self-conception or international role of a country's security imaginary is closely connected to the Cold War scenario.* Although such a circumstance does not entail that the self-conception will be profoundly affected by the end of the Cold War, in most cases the foreign policy identity narrative cannot simply go on as though nothing has happened. Only if it appears self-evident that no

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[4] For one of the most elaborate expositions of these two positions, see the spiral model and the deterrence model elaborated in Jervis (1976).

[5] This has obvious similarities to a Bourdieu-inspired understanding of doxa in his 'field' analysis. For an analysis in IR along these lines, see Ashley (1987, 1988, 1989).

substantial change occurred (a new Cold War scenario) will no crisis ensue. However, the degree to which the events of 1989-1991 were received as a major change was sufficient that, at least in the 1990s, one could expect many countries to engage in debates about their place in the world, regardless of how that debate ended. On the level of self-conceptions, this is a scenario that is applicable to neutral states, such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden: What does neutrality mean when the previously opposing camps are no longer there?[6] But it could also be applicable to other states, such as Italy or Turkey, who defined their 'importance' much in terms of the strategic role they could play for the Western Alliance, as well as to France or Germany, who defined their diplomatic role much in relation to the existence of two security blocs in Europe. And it applies to Russia to the extent that it sees itself as a continuation of the Soviet superpower that no longer is.

(2) *Debate over a country's foreign policy identity was suppressed during the Cold War, but this is no longer the case.* This would apply to all countries of the former Warsaw Pact, possibly also including Russia (if Russia is seen as suppressed by the Soviet Union, a line of thought which was of some prominence in the 1990s) and potentially also Italy.

(3) *A country did not exist in its present shape during the Cold War.* This is a relatively heterogeneous category, since it covers countries that basically did not exist during the Cold War decades, such as countries from the former USSR or former Yugoslavia, as well as countries that changed their shape after 1989, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Whereas, in the first case, existing foreign policy imaginaries and identity discourses run into anomalies, in the last two cases (with the exception of Germany), new elites had to look more actively to establish such a tradition in the first place. But, in all these cases, it could be expected that discussions about who 'we' are now in world (or European) affairs would surface, often strongly influenced by concerns of societal identity.

Geopolitical thought is particularly well suited to respond to such an ontological anxiety, since it provides allegedly objective and material criteria for circumscribing the boundaries (and the internal logic) of 'national interest' formulations. Invoking national interest almost inevitably mobilizes justifications in terms wider than the interest of the ruler or the government. Such wider justification can be given by ideologies, as in the case of anti-communism and anti-capitalism during the Cold War, or with reference to the 'nation', for instance. But when yesterday's certitudes have gone missing, national interests have to be anchored anew. In this context, geopolitics in its classical understanding provides 'coordinates' for thinking a country's role in world affairs. Deprived of traditional reference points and with a challenged self-understanding or outside view of its role, spatial logic can quickly fill this ideational void and fix the place of the state

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[6] See for example Joenniemi (1988; 1993) and Kruzel & Haltzel (1989). For an analysis which historically shows how questions of neutrality can become a central part of the self-representation of a country, see Malmborg (2001).

and its national interests within the international system or society. And geopolitics is particularly well suited to such a role, since it relies upon environmental determinism from both physical geography (mobilized often through strategic thinking) and human/cultural geography typical for discourses essentializing a nation.[7]

...mobilizing geopolitical determinism...[8]

Although 1989 signified the end of Cold War security dynamics in Europe, it also provided fertile ground for the development of identity crises, which, in searching for an answer, would find the geopolitical discourse useful in its simplicity and material character. Yet, granted that there has been such a revival in the 1990s, the link to securitization dynamics is not self-evident. Indeed, most defenders of geopolitics today characterize it as profoundly different from earlier geopolitics. According to them, it refers to ideas which are far less pre-disposed to offset or accompany securitization dynamics.

The argument about the different character of present-day 'geopolitics' comes in two main forms. For the first, references to Mackinder and Mahan would be still acceptable, but not to Haushofer. In other words, it argues that geopolitics can be coherently thought without reference to German *Geopolitik*. A second argument in defense of an important difference states that it is generally not 'environmentally determinist.' None of these paths is, however, persuasive.

With regard to the difference to German *Geopolitik*, it can be shown that, although *Geopolitik* is not to be conflated with Nazism (although it had been adopted by the National socialists), the German tradition relies on the same core assumptions as the wider classical geopolitical tradition. Claiming that *Geopolitik* is special for its reference to organicistic explanations is not entirely wrong, but misses the point. What defines the geopolitical tradition is a reliance on the then common versions of Social Darwinism, common well beyond the German tradition. Doing away with the German tradition does not touch the common roots.

Without question, organic metaphors play a great role in German romanticism, but they are hardly unknown elsewhere. Indeed, the use of such metaphors is prominent in the work of Herbert Spencer – the inventor of the phrase 'survival of the fittest' – who had a strong influence on American thinkers in the late 19th century (Hofstadter, 1944)[9]. Similarly, they abound in early French sociology, from

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[7] Yet, although geopolitical thought fulfills that function very fittingly, there is no necessity for national security discourses or foreign policy elites to resort to it. Assuming otherwise would be committing a functional fallacy. Whether geopolitical thought is mobilized to fulfill that function is dependent on a series of process factors: the 'common sense' embedded in the national interest discourse which pre-disposes for it, the institutional structure in which foreign policy thought is developed, and the mobilization of agents in the national political game. For a development of ontological dissonance reduction as a social mechanism, see Guzzini (2012c).

[8] The following is excerpted from Guzzini (2012d).

[9] See also p. 34, where he cites the sales figures of Spencer's volumes between 1860 and 1903 in the US, a staggering 368,755 copies!

Auguste Comte to Émile Durkheim (Hawkins, 1997, pp. 12-13, 52-53), from whom Ratzel is said to have picked them up. At most, then, the claim might mean that German defenders of geopolitics used the organic metaphor more prominently than their counterparts in the UK (Mackinder) or the US (Mahan). But it still remains to be seen whether with that single characteristic such a lineage would necessarily end up with qualitatively different geopolitical theories, that is to say, picking up on a unique feature is not showing that it is significant enough to set the German path apart, except, perhaps, if it were not used as a metaphor, but as an essential explanatory concept. This was not the case here.

Indeed, there is need for caution when interpreting what the German tradition's references to the state as an organism actually meant and implied. The metaphor was famously used in the opening pages of von Rochau's treatise on *Realpolitik*. However, the theme of the relevant passage in that work quickly shifts to an alleged law of the strongest in political life, similar to the law of gravity in the physical world (Rochau, 1972 [1853/69], p. 25), something at best akin to the idea of the reason of state (Haslam, 2002, p. 184). Furthermore, Ratzel himself, the alleged father of geopolitical thought in that organicistic tradition, was very cautious about the use of this analogy. Although one of his short essays is repeatedly quoted for showing its central role in the German tradition (Ratzel, 1896), his early book *Anthropo-Geography* hardly mentions it, and his subsequent major work *Political Geography* contains a clear disclaimer regarding the use of a biological analogy (Ratzel, 1903, pp. 12-13). Accordingly, it seems fair to say that Ratzel's position is ambivalent. On the one hand, his former training in zoology does not lead him to use an organicistic (biological) metaphor that was widely available in those times, but instead enables him to see the limits of such a metaphor more clearly (Hunter, 1986, p. 278). [10] At the same time, Ratzel allows the metaphorical force of the biological analogy to suggest explanations. It provides the necessary 'scientific' grounding for his approach to geography and the political justification for the expansionism and colonialism that he actively supported (Bassin, 1987, pp. 488 and 485)

Yet, as shown in detail elsewhere (Guzzini, 2012d, pp. 24-26), Social Darwinism can be reached via paths other than organicistic metaphors. And since Malthusian, Darwinian, or Spencerian ideas were very common thought in (liberal-) conservative circles at the time (but also in some reformist circles, as Hawkins (1997) shows), it is no surprise to find the argument elsewhere with allegedly acceptable representatives of geopolitics. Much of the first inspiration of geopolitics around the end of the 19th century was captured by Mackinder's celebrated address. Here, I am referring less to his famous discussion of the Heartland or his map, suggestive for generations to come, but rather to his grandiose opening in which he refers to the historic change from a Columbian epoch, where the expansion of Europe (sic) met next to no resistance, to a 'post-

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[10] His actual training in zoology may also explain the fact that he insisted on the insignificance of racial differences ('deceptive garments misleading the superficial observer'). According to him, humankind is fundamentally unitary in its anthropology – and in its destiny, with the increasing fusion of peoples into a common mankind, a fusion he did not condemn (Ratzel, 1882, p. 469, 177).

Columbian age.' in which the world has become a 'closed political system' of worldwide scope: 'Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence' (Mackinder, 1904, p. 422).

Consequently, all it needs is a sense of national mission and conservative understanding of Malthusianism, which teaches that population pressure necessarily leads to scarcity of resources. Since productivity is stable in Malthus, this logically implies the need to expand territory to overcome scarcity. As there are no blank territories left (even for the imperialist mind), such expansion will clash (as it did in Fashoda), producing a struggle for subsistence as the default setting of international politics.

Defenders also use a second type of argument, insisting that present-day geopolitics does not have much to do with any of the classical geopolitical traditions, German or otherwise. In present-day geopolitical thought, there is no assumption concerning any kind of environmental determinism (see, for instance, the work by Cohen, 1963, 1991, 2003). Indeed, the present discussion has moved beyond attempts to determine politics through geography. I have dealt with such arguments in more detail elsewhere (Guzzini, 2012dpp. 36-41). Suffice it to say that this claim relies on a faulty definition of what such determinism implies. Surely any definition of determinism which implies that a theory be monocausal and make clear predictions in behavior can easily be flawed. Rather, all that is needed for the critique of 'environmental determinacy' is to show that the analysis gives explanatory primacy to environmental (natural material/geopolitical) factors. If there is any significance left to the label 'geopolitics', then this is needed.

Otherwise, present-day geopolitics is trapped in a dilemma, somewhat similar to the identity dilemma of realism (Guzzini, 2004b). If it accepts environmental determinism, it needs to justify it, which has been eluded so far. If it pretends not to be environmentally determinist, but allows for a multiplicity of equal explanatory factors, or inflates the definition of geography sufficiently to include everything from historical lessons to state forms, then it is redundant, since it loses both a specific explanatory added value as compared to already existing approaches and, indeed, its geographic identity: Why else call it geopolitics?[11] Due to its coherency and specificity, determinism, understood as explanatory primacy, is part and parcel of the tradition and of present-day geopolitics, even when it slips through the back-door. The use of 'geopolitics' refers to that materialist and structuralist 'necessity' which agents can ignore only at their peril. Indeed, this determinacy is fundamental for its appeal. In Carlo Jean's own words:

> For this lack of neutrality, no geopolitician can, even if unconsciously, evade the temptation of scientism and determinism, whatever his/her theoretical criticisms addressed to these are. This is a constant temptation for all those who, in their

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[11] For a related critique, as applied to Geoffrey Parker's wide definition of geopolitical thought which ends up being unable to discriminate consistently what is part of it (also including world system analysis, for instance), see Østerud (1988, p. 192).

quest for making their political or strategic choices acceptable, elaborate geopolitical theories, hypotheses or scenarios and who look for the consent of the 'Prince' or of public opinion ... Those who brandish a political programmed and cannot enroll 'God' or the 'Idea' under their banner will try to enlist nature or history (on top of justice, humanity, religion, etc.) in order to convince others of their proposals... (Jean, 1995, p. 20, my translation)

Geopolitical determinacy is fundamental not only for its appeal, but also for its effect. Through this latent sense of certitude, geopolitical thought can work in providing a footing to a foreign policy that looks for new self-definition.

...and a militarist gaze on foreign policy

Geopolitical determinacy based on an unavoidable power expansion as the default option is fundamental. But a default option would still leave some room for maneuver, if this default were perhaps not realized in the case at hand. Here, a geopolitical framing adds further determinacy in moving the analysis from the level of observation to the level of action and in assuming that we simply cannot afford to ignore the possible worst case. This is an understandable, if often counterproductive, practical move, but it has quite pernicious implications, both theoretical and practical. It basically claims that whether or not there really is some 'necessary' tendency to power expansion can be considered secondary; we simply assume it, because, to quote former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, there are 'also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know.'[12] On the theoretical level, this ultra-prudential (or ultra-paranoid) statement does not resolve anything: we still do not know whether or not the behavior of states is characterized by a tendency to expand their power, and hence to collide. And, on the practical level, if every state behaves on the general assumption that such a tendency exists, the risk of a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy looms large in the picture.

This move that seeks to rely on worst case thinking is crucial for pointing to a special connection between geopolitics and the more military or strategic wing of realism. For worst-case thinking encourages thinking politics from war. It immediately drags foreign policy into the realm of military planning and quickly tends to reverse Clausewitz's dictum – in other words, it comes to think of politics as a prolongation of war by other means, rather than vice versa, with often deleterious effects for foreign policy in general.[13] With potential war planning as a backdrop, geographic factors, which would at best be generic factors of the analysis, acquire a particular salience. It is almost self-evident that military movement and defense are conditioned, often strongly so, by geography, and that

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[12] Donald Rumsfeld at a press conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, June 6, 2002, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3490. Although this quote has been heavily ridiculed, it is meaningful in terms of worst case thinking pushed to the extreme, where risk has turned into true uncertainty.

[13] This is Raymond Aron's central line of criticism of US foreign policy during the Cold War, many times repeated in Aron (1976).

the domination of space (and the time needed to cover it) is a crucial strategic factor. Accordingly, through the backdoor of military worst-case scenarios, in an equivalent to the 'primacy of foreign policy,' here reduced to the primacy of potential war (as compared to domestic politics and diplomacy), geographic or generally more materialist factors gain priority in the analysis.

It is in this symbiosis of expansionism and worst-case thinking that geopolitics becomes or represents realism's militarist gaze. Any usage of 'geopolitics' will almost immediately mobilize this particular bias of strategic thinking. The bias is particularly well mobilized in times of higher alert or international tensions. In turn, its use, whether intended or not, feeds into an escalation that moves military factors – and everything that can feed into them – to the top of the agenda. Geopolitical discourse is hence 'securitizing' in the words of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver et al., 1998).[14] And what a powerful tool it is. For it is not just abstract argument; it comes with the persuasiveness of the visual, the power of maps, where the world is laid out before one's eyes. Even Carlo Jean, defender of a geopolitical approach but wary about the alleged determinacy of geopolitical argument, notes that 'the temptation of determinism in geopolitics... feeds off the enormous propagandistic value of the geographic map. It presents itself as an objective evaluation of that which is only subjective' (Jean, 1995, p. 19, my translation).

The military bias of geopolitics, putting national security thinking first, also enables the mobilization of the implicit nationalist biases of the geopolitical tradition to 'rally round the flag.' This is visible in discussions about the need for primacy in international affairs. Such a need for primacy is obviously justifiable if power expansionism can be taken for granted, although nobody derives it theoretically any longer.[15]

Hence, openly using geopolitical arguments is not innocent. Whether consciously or not, it is meant to mobilize a vision of the world not just in terms of realism, but, more specifically, with the realists' militaristic gaze. This provides a fertile ground for the re-militarization of foreign policy thinking in Europe and the West at large.

2. Foreign policy identity discourses and 'Uses of the West'

The important issue in this chapter is the social mechanism via which that geopolitical revival has been achieved. To understand the 'Uses of the West,' it matters that it is driven by identity discourses, their crises, and their fixing – from the inside interpretation out – and not in terms of given systemic necessities. The analysis of the 'West' in the post-Cold War era is not just about the effects of the

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[14] Of course, peace research has been aware of the perverse effects of worst-case thinking for a long time now and has been applying a reflexive turn to it: in several cases, worst-case thinking itself produces the very worst case to be avoided. For an overview, see Guzzini (2004a).

[15] For the mobilization of national primacy arguments, see Huntington (1993b); and for a critique, see Jervis (1993).

end of bi-polarity or ideological competition or whatever else may have defined the Cold War. It is about the representational level on which the meaning and contours of the West are negotiated within individual security imaginaries.

This second section will not primarily deal with all the different visions of the West which appeared on the European side of the transatlantic community. Rather, it briefly develops some heuristic paths on the ways the relationship between foreign policy identity discourses and the 'Uses of the West' can be conceptualized. Geopolitical discourses, in the narrower sense as used in this chapter, are intrinsically connected to foreign policy identity and, as a simple corollary or intended implication, to the conception of the 'national interest.' Yet, the 'West' always refers to more than just a national reference. This opens up a series of possible connections between the two phenomena, depending on how such identity discourses incorporate or relate to such supra- or cross-national representations in general, and the 'West' in particular. One can hypothesize four possible relations, according to (1) whether or not there is overlap between those self-representations and cross-national ones and, (2) if there is, which of the two is given prevalence. If there is no overlap, then there is the situation where the cross-national is basically ignored or opposed. When there is overlap, then the cross-national can be appropriated and co-opted in a discourse where the national in the foreign policy identity is prevalent, or, when it is not, the cross-national can become an intrinsic part in constituting the national in the identity discourse for its capacity to stabilize an otherwise imbalanced identity prone to crisis. I will take up these types in turn.

No cross-national identification	Cross-national identification
Ignoring cross-national identity	Co-optation into national foreign policy discourse
Opposing cross-national identity	Cross-national is a prevalent and intrinsic part of constituting the national in the foreign policy identity discourse

Foreign policy identity vs. cross-national identification

A foreign policy identity can be defined independently of a cross- or supranational representation either by fundamentally ignoring or by openly opposing it. Indeed, in that latter case, this very cross-national representation can be seen as one of the major threats to what the country is and should stand for.

There are some foreign policy identity discourses which include accepted positions (majority or minority) that are intrinsically skeptical about a cross-national, let alone supra-national identification. Examples would include the US, where, for instance, the UN, a US brainchild, is in constant and dire need of justification (just imagine what would have happened to the UN if it had ever been responsible for burning as much money as the banking system did recently). Legendary in this respect were positions taken by Jesse Helms, the former

chairman and long-time member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, or, in the last Bush Jr. administration, by the recess-appointed Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, who was also important for the US decision to pull out of the ICC. Such insistence on a 'nationalist' definition of national interest can be inspired by the isolationist tradition in US foreign policy, but increasingly more so by its unilateralist wing.

Such a nationalist vision which defines foreign policy identity explicitly against any cross-national identification can obviously be found elsewhere, too, and also with smaller actors. In Europe, this is most visible in the more nationalist versions of the anti-EU identity discourse, distinguishable from the more anti-neoliberal or anti-bureaucratic or civil society-oriented 'Basis-Demokratie' anti-EU discourse, although they can ingeniously be mixed. In this EU-opposition, the threat is either direct in terms of taking 'power' and sovereignty away from the state, or indirect and more civilizational, when the EU is considered the Trojan Horse for the multiculturalization (as in: cultural decadence) of Europe and, in particular, the respective country. Right-wing populist parties (for a reference discussion of the topic, see Mudde, 2007), some of which had started on a relatively pro-European ticket, such as Lega Nord in Italy, have turned into open and sometimes virulent EU critics. As the examples of the Lega Nord (Diamanti, 1995; Biorcio, 1997) and of Vlaams Belang (Mudde, 2007) show, the 'nationalist' reference can also be sub-national regionalist when it stands for an allegedly most advanced part of the nation. Although not the main force in their countries, many of those parties have recently been coalition partners (e.g. Lega Nord), supporting minority governments of the right (e.g. Dansk Folkeparti), or are prominent in the public debate, so that their views may be in the minority, but by now accepted minority views in the identity discourse of their country (Front National). As such, their influence is wider than their direct effect. A formerly staunch European core state like the Netherlands has seen EU support diminishing steadily.

The implications of such an antagonistic stance against a cross-national identity for the 'West' are, however, not so straightforward. It changes from case to case, in fact also within the case. In the US, it can range from a purely cynical understanding to an all-appropriating one (on the latter mixed case, see below). In a cynical view, the 'West' does not exist, only one's own country; but if it is beneficial for its foreign policy, it can be exploited as an emotional or ideological resource.

In the case of the populist right's influence on foreign policy discourses in Europe, its vision of the West is more complex and can apply to two levels. On the national level, it strives for a hardline anti-immigration policy and for stricter enforcement of the assimilation of immigrant citizens (indeed sometimes denying or stratifying such rights of citizenry); on the all-European level, rather than simply retreating into a 'Fortress Padania,' it presents its own identity as the (last) defender of the true West (the pure white Christian Europe) against the other West (multicultural Europe) (see the different country studies in Schori Liang 2007). The discussion on the possible EU admission of Turkey has mobilized geopolitical arguments on the side of the EU and, within the populist right, a clear exclusion made in the name of defending Europe, almost against itself (Diez 2004; Rumelili 2004, 2007).

The ambiguity of such a 'defense of the West against the West' is not too different from the (in-)famous stances taken by Huntington since the early 1990s. It has not escaped the critical reader of his 'clash of civilization' (Huntington, 1993a) that the target was as much the civilizational 'other' out there as the non-WASP 'other' within. As Ajami (1993, p. 3, fn. 1) writes, the 'West itself is unexamined in Huntington's essay. No fissures run through it. No multiculturalists are heard from. It is orderly within ramparts... He has assumed that his call to unity will be answered, for outside flutter the banners of the Saracens and the Confucians.' However, Huntington leaves many clues. Jeane F. Kirkpatrick (1993) notes the role of civilizational encounters and clashes through immigration (sic) in Western societies in Huntington's argument, hence having a parallel focus of the external and the internal. She also wonders why Latin America would be a civilization on its own, different from the West. Edward Said (2001), writing after 9/11, chides Huntington for reifying 'civilizations' as 'shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history.' It was only normal that, for Huntington, the final defense of the West was to come from within, against the 'Hispanic Challenge' (Huntington, 2004) undermining the Anglo-Saxon definition of what the US, that is the 'real' West, is all about. No wonder Huntington is so popular in some nationalist quarters in Europe.

As a result, foreign policy identity discourses that are constructed in opposition to a cross-national or supra-national representation of identity do not necessarily end up rejecting the latter, but, as the discussion of the 'West' has shown, can also be used to define it both as a threat and as part of the identity: the 'West' is both an external menace and a home. It is as if universal values are most truly realized 'at home,' and therefore allow a particularist appropriation of them. Indeed, it is in the name of that redefined homely 'West' that the cross-national 'West', fallen or diluted, can be opposed.

Foreign policy identity co-opting cross-national identifications

A second relationship between foreign policy identity discourses and cross-national identifications consists in the attempt to appropriate it for the national discourse. This is usually shown in the prefix 'pan-' when applied to nationalist or ethnic ideologies, but it works just as well with any other incorporation of a cross-national identity. Again, a few examples will suffice.

In the more expansionist version of US foreign policy identity, the 'West' does exist but only to the extent that it can be conflated with the US (see also Huntington above). This can be done in an almost imperialist manner, but it can also be of defensive origin, as when James Rubin, former assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Chief Spokesman for the State Department under Clinton, was interviewed on 9/11 in the London BBC studios and declared, struggling for words that would convey the importance of the event, that the attack on the Twin Towers was an attack on 'Western civilization' (some liberals were probably cringing at the thought that money was the core of Western civilization). The taken-for-granted assumption here is that the Western home is not just one's region or state, but self-evidently incorporates a larger stretch of

states.

Such a national appropriation of the 'West' can easily lead to tensions when that 'West' does not speak with one voice, as in the run-up to the last Iraq war. Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's division between New and Old Europe was not only a strategy of 'divide and rule'; it fostered exclusion in terms of Western and 'un-Western' activities as a prolongation of American and un-American ones. Here, in other words, the membership of the West is not culturally or geographically given, but something to be merited within a community (and here: by its leader) and controlled by it.

That Rumsfeld's target was Europe is not fortuitous, since the EU, in its most self-righteous moments, was and is a mirror of such an appropriating identity discourse. The foreign policy identity of the EU cannot, almost by definition, be one which excludes a cross-national identification, such as the 'West.' EU documents spend their time jealously defining the relationship between the EU and the West in such a way as to have the latter appear as the outgrowth of the former – in what appears to others as a kind of human rights and welfare state chauvinism. Consequently, the transatlantic divide can be understood as a struggle between foreign policy identity discourses which tend to conflate themselves with the West (understood as the beacon of civilization). Both aspire to – or simply take for granted that they do – represent the moral and civilizational high ground, as well as being the West's true representative. Were the issue not so fundamental for the countries' self-identification and so crucial in its political implications, one could almost find it awkwardly amusing to watch the transatlantic partners in this beauty contest of 'Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the most Western of us all?' – a merely nominal contest though it is, since each side already has an obvious winner. The struggle is over the power to define what the West is.

A further twist obviously applies when such an incorporating view is cast from the margins of or outside the 'West.' Indeed, such a pan-national discourse can then display a similarly ambivalent pattern. In Tsarist Russia, for instance, national foreign policy discourses oscillated between Russia's attempt to become a full member of the Western vision of 'civilization' and, alternatively, redefining itself as the beacon of civilization against a fallen West, materialist and decadent, as in its attempts to reclaim its place as a 'Third Rome' (Neumann, 1995). The interesting twist is that the central component of what the 'West' stands for, at least in 'Western eyes,' namely being at the height of civilizational development, is dissociated from the West itself. Here, again, although in a different manner, the 'West' is saved from itself, since the common heritage leading to Rome (and true Christendom) does not define Russia outside of the West, but redefines the latter as one path to civilization among others in such a way as to make Russia a natural core of it. Contemporary Russia may or may not be taking up this road once again.

Finally, a position which positively incorporates a cross-national identification can also stand outside of the 'West.' This may then be in clear opposition to it, although not necessarily so. Not being committed to a definitional struggle over the meaning of the West, it would need to define itself either in favor of or against it to a lesser extent.

Cross-national identification stabilizing national identity

Besides ignoring/opposing or co-opting moves, a final relationship between national foreign policy identity discourses and cross-national identifications, such as the 'West,' can be akin to the incorporating relationship, but reversing its sense: a country's discourse does not see the cross-national identification as an outgrowth of itself, but itself as an outgrowth of that cross-national identification. This can, again, work, in a more active or defensive manner.

In the active manner, and applied to the 'West,' a country's self-understanding would see itself as the stalwart or also as a model of the 'West,' which it tries to personify in what it perceives as its most appropriate behavior. Naturally, this is a way to bolster its self-image, similar to the satisfaction derived by more imperialist versions of a country conflating itself with the West. And yet, this position is different in that it is more 'principled': if behavior can be shown not to fulfill the purity of principles, it weighs on the foreign policy identity discourse as an anomaly to be addressed. In contrast, the more imperialist version would see the problem rather in the principles not being as pure as the country itself.

Such a vision of themselves in the West could apply to smaller countries, in particular Canada and some Nordic countries. This shows in their prominent foreign policy profiling in debates about 'Human Security,' the environment, the role of multilateralism, the possible creation of and commitment to security communities, the importance of disarmament and foreign aid, and the active involvement in third-party mediation (Canada, Finland, Norway), but also in their internal visions of being the most advanced and equitable welfare state organization of the respective continent. But it also fits a certain self-representation of the EU, in particular if it wants to see the claim of being a 'normative power' upheld. Similarly, the US can be seen in this way. Here, Rumsfeld's attack on Old Europe can also stand for an internal debate between an Old and New America, where Europe, or rather certain principles and politics applied more in Europe (and Canada), such as national public healthcare, would have a certain pull on, or stand for (liberal) positions within, US politics (see also Garton Ash, 2003).

Besides this more active take, there is also a more defensive one, in which the relationship between foreign policy identity discourse and cross-national identification is still from 'within the West,' but in dire need of confirmation of that matter. Whereas the active version mentioned before would help a country profile itself as the prodigious child of the family, this defensive version looks for confirmation of not having been forgotten as a member of the family in the first place. In fact, the cross-national identification serves here as a reminder of and stabilizing factor in a foreign policy identity discourse that has inherent difficulty finding a balanced self, an accepted role.

Such imbalances can be of different origins. For instance, it can be to do with a historical development that may situate the foreign policy identity further away from the 'West' or at least its perceived core. In Australia, references to the Queen and to Western security alliances have such confirming and surely also strong symbolic significance for Australia anchoring itself with the (changed) perceived

core of the 'West' while being increasingly aware (and often afraid) of being situated so close to Asia, if not being effectively an English-speaking part of it. Here, references to the 'West' are not necessarily in terms of principles or policies, but in terms of common kinship and history (in this it resembles some of Russia's discourse).

In Central and Eastern Europe, Huntington's map of civilizations was so important since it 'objectively' collocated certain parts of Europe with the 'West' and not others – and the map was hated for that very same reason if countries, or parts of them, as in Romania, found themselves on the wrong side of the now civilizational wall. The attempt to find a clear anchoring shows also in the symbolic weight put on 'Central' Europe as opposed to the 'East', but not the 'West', and appeals to a common heritage in terms of statehood (e.g. the Austro-Hungarian Empire: part of the Balkans or Western Ukraine) or religion (e.g. Western Christianity: Hungary, Poland, the Baltic States) or language (e.g. Latin: Romania), whatever suits best. Here also, common heritage and kinship, but more cultural than national, is of primary importance.

But at the same time, there can also be a certain tension in this solution that would make the national foreign policy identity fundamentally dependent on the cross-national identification. That tension can arise when one of the two sides is moving. For instance, at a moment when Europe is moving increasingly into a 'normative power' gear, where EU membership is closely connected to certain human rights practices (at least in principle), Turkey finds itself continuously following a moving goal post for being accepted in the midst of Europe. As the Turkish military's increasing resistance to the EU shows, it may be having second thoughts about whether it is such a good idea to look for this external stabilizer in the first place (e.g. Bilgin, 2012). Indeed, Turkey is a most interesting case. For some, the appeal to a 'common' Europe has been so crucial that it is made almost as if Europe can be divided from a wider trans-Atlantic West.[16] For all its history of European wars and exclusion from 'Europe', the strictly European reference comes more naturally. Inversely, a part of the country, and surely the military past and present (if less) find it easier to construct a common heritage with the more encompassing if less demanding 'West'. This is a pattern that some other CEE countries might see repeated if the accession to (Serbia) or acceptance within the EU (Romania, Bulgaria) seems endlessly postponed. Not to be excluded from the West, despite being shunned by the EU, identity discourses may end up mobilizing and creating representations of the 'West' and its very definition that could become more encompassing and/or geographically more diverse.

Conclusion

The present chapter has aimed to use previous findings on the mechanisms via which a geopolitical revival took place in Europe as a framework for thinking

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[16] Such a vision seems to be shared by Orhan Pamuk in his speech on his acceptance of the Peace Prize at the German Book Trade in 2005 (Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels, 2005), in which the wider West hardly appears.

about the 'uses of the West' after 1989. To understand that revival, the analysis focused on foreign policy identity crises. The end of the Cold War shook the stable system of coordinates that defined many foreign policy roles in Europe. Where the mobilization of such roles out of (national) security imaginaries loses its self-evidence, a certain anxiety ensues, which opens up debate. In such a debate, the geopolitical argument can come in handy for its alleged 'naturalness,' helping foreign policy experts to position themselves and their country in the changed environment.

If this happens, however, the return to geopolitics is not innocent. Despite claims to the contrary that water down its connection to its past or allegedly avoid any environmental determinism, 'geopolitics' mobilizes realism's militaristic and nationalist gaze. With this rhetorical power, it prepares the ground for, and accompanies, a re-militarization of politics. The year 1989 stands for the success of the de-militarization of European security, which, paradoxically for that very reason, ushers in a period of re-militarization.

Yet the effects of such re-militarization of foreign policy thinking on the 'uses of the West' depend on the specific encounter between the national and the cross-national (such as the 'West') in those national identity discourses. The present chapter has suggested four different links between the two, depending on whether or not the cross-national is admitted within the national discourse, and if it is, whether it has gained prevalence or not. As such, cross-national discourses can be ignored or opposed, co-opted or made superior. With these four types, the chapter can only suggest a research agenda on exactly how to investigate the relationship between the discursive attempts to fix a country's self-identification and role recognition, and the 'Uses of the West'.

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