



# MEXICO PEACE INDEX

---

2016

**MAPPING THE EVOLUTION  
OF PEACE AND ITS DRIVERS**

**INSTITUTE FOR  
ECONOMICS  
& PEACE**

---

**INSTITUTE FOR**

---

**ECONOMICS**

---

**& PEACE**

---

## **Quantifying Peace and its Benefits**

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

IEP has offices in Sydney, New York, Brussels and Mexico City. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

**For more information visit [www.economicsandpeace.org](http://www.economicsandpeace.org)**

## CONTENTS

	<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<b>02</b>
	<b>HIGHLIGHTS</b>	<b>04</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>RESULTS AND FINDINGS</b>	<b>06</b>
	2016 Mexico Peace Index Ranking	06
	Most and Least Peaceful States	14
	Trends in Peacefulness: From the Height of the Drug War to 2015	19
	Mexico's Peace Gap: A Look at the Distribution of Peace	25
	State Changes in Peacefulness from 2011 to 2015	27
	Verifying Mexico's Official Crime Data	40
	Understanding Disappearances	44
	An Overview of Justice Reforms	48
<b>2</b>	<b>POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO</b>	<b>49</b>
	About Positive Peace	51
	Understanding Positive Peace in Mexico	53
	The Mexico Positive Peace Index	56
	The Pillars of Positive Peace in Mexico	59
<b>3</b>	<b>ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO</b>	<b>63</b>
	Key Findings	64
	The Economic Impact of Violence, 2003-2015	67
	Economic Value of Peace	72
<b>4</b>	<b>EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS</b>	<b>78</b>
	<i>Ethical journalism in violent times</i> by Adrián Lopez (Editorial Director, Noroeste)	78
	<i>Good practices to develop the New Criminal Justice System in Mexico to its full potential</i> by Guillermo Raúl Zepeda Lecuona (Research Professor, ITESO) and Paola Guadalupe Jiménez Rodríguez (Evaluation Coordinator, Jurimetría)	82
	<i>"Mando Único" and police development</i> by María Elena Morera Mitre (President) and Juan Pablo Arango Orozco (Researcher, Causa en Común)	86
	<i>A map towards building peace at the local level</i> by Francisco Rivas, Director General, (Observatorio Nacional Ciudadanot) and Juan Pablo Arango Orozco (Researcher, Causa en Común)	89
	<i>Non-Discrimination of indigenous people in Mexico: A component of positive peace</i> by Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Senior Fellow (Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University)	91
<b>5</b>	<b>METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>94</b>
	2016 Mexico Peace Index Methodology	94
	2016 Mexico Positive Peace Index Methodology	99
	Methodology for the Economic Impact of Violence	105
	<b>APPENDICES</b>	<b>108</b>
	Appendix A: MPI Full Results	108
	Appendix B: MPI and Positive Peace Indicator Correlations	109
	<b>END NOTES</b>	<b>111</b>
	<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>114</b>



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

The Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico from 2003 to 2015, with new results for 2015. This report aims to deepen the understanding of the trends, patterns and drivers of peace in Mexico, while highlighting the important economic benefits that will flow from a more peaceful society.

The MPI is based on the work of the Global Peace Index, the leading measure of global peacefulness that has been produced by IEP every year since 2007. It is part of a series of national peace indices, which includes the United States Peace Index and the United Kingdom Peace Index.

In 2015, Mexico's peace improved by 0.3 percent, which is the smallest improvement in peace in the last five years. The improvement is largely attributed to a 10 percent decline in the violent crime rate and an eight percent decline in the rate of organized crime related offenses. However, this was offset by deteriorations in detention without sentencing, weapons crime and the homicide rate. The latter increased by six percent. Furthermore, the gap between the most and least peaceful states widened slightly in 2015, reversing the trend observed in six of the seven prior years.

An area of concern is the trend towards increased impunity, which deteriorated dramatically from 2007 onwards. In 2007, there were four convictions for every five cases of homicide, but by 2013 there was only one conviction for every five cases. This, combined with the increases in detention without sentencing, points to an overstretched judicial system, as is further supported by statistics on the over-crowding of prisons. It also highlights the challenges facing the justice system, whose 2015 federal expenditure was 78 billion pesos, below the 2012 level of expenditure.

The longer term trends indicate a marked improvement in peacefulness since 2011, the year in which violence peaked in Mexico. The country has improved its peacefulness by 13 percent since that time. Violent crime, homicides and organized crime have all fallen by nearly 30 percent. These improvements mean that twenty-five out of the 32 states in Mexico have become more peaceful since 2011, including four of the five states that ranked at the bottom in that year. These improvements in peace have resulted in roughly 85 percent of

Mexicans living in a state that is more peaceful today than it was in 2011.

The rate of organized crime related offenses started to improve from 2010 onwards. In that year, 25 states improved their *organized crime* scores. These improvements preceded the reductions in homicides and violent crime that came two years later. In 2012, 21 states recorded improvements in their violent crime levels, while 19 states recorded a decrease in their homicide rates. These results would indicate that improvements in levels of organized crime levels may be a precursor of changes in other forms of violence.

This report presents a cautiously optimistic picture for the future of peace in Mexico. However, efforts need to be strengthened to counteract the slowdown in the improvements in peace that occurred in 2015. It is too early to determine if this is a reversal of the trend of improving peacefulness or a brief deviation from the underlying trend.

The five states with the largest improvements in their MPI scores over the past five years are Nayarit, Durango, Nuevo León, Chihuahua and Baja California. These were five of the seven least peaceful states in 2011, reflecting that the largest improvements have been recorded in the states most affected by violence. Nayarit ranked as the least peaceful state in Mexico five years ago. Today it ranks 19th out of 32.

The five states with the largest deteriorations since 2011 are Baja California Sur, Zacatecas, Oaxaca, Querétaro and Guanajuato, reflecting shifts among organized crime groups and highlighting that not all parts of Mexico are improving.

---

The largest deterioration occurred in Baja California Sur, which has diverged from the national trend. The state's homicide rate more than tripled, from 5.7 in 2011 to 19.8 in 2015. The rate of weapons crime also increased sevenfold.

There is a moderate, statistically significant relationship between improvements in peace and the levels of Positive Peace. The Mexican states that have higher levels of Positive Peace tended to experience larger reductions in violence between 2011 and 2015. Nuevo León, which ranks first in Positive Peace, had the third largest improvement.

Improvements in peacefulness have generated an economic benefit of 802 billion pesos (US\$50 billion) in Mexico for the four years since 2011. This is a 38 percent reduction in the economic impact of violence and is nearly one and a half times the size of a single year of Mexico's agricultural production.

In 2015, the economic impact of violence improved by four percent, at 76 billion pesos (US\$4.8 billion). The decrease in violent crime in 2015 had the largest impact, representing 96 billion pesos, but was offset by the increased costs associated with higher homicide rates.

The economic impact of violence, including the opportunity cost, stands at 2.12 trillion pesos (US\$134 billion) in 2015, equivalent to 13 percent of Mexico's GDP. This corresponds to 17,525 pesos per person, roughly equal to two months of wages for the average Mexican worker.

Government expenditure on violence containment has been rising. Since the start of the escalation of violence in 2007, government expenditure on violence containment has grown at an average rate of 12 percent per annum. This rate outpaces the average growth in overall government spending, which increased by nine percent in the same period. It also outpaced the seven percent increase in education spending, while investments in economic development and health had similar average growth rates to violence containment. Given the country's weaknesses in some of the domains of Positive Peace, the investments in the latter two are welcome, as a strong business environment and a robust health system are important elements of Positive Peace. Further investment in the other areas of Positive Peace would improve the overall resilience of Mexican society to violence.

There are at least three dynamics that impact the reliability of official crime statistics.

Most crime in Mexico goes unreported. Mexico's statistical agency estimates that 92.8 percent of all crimes in 2014 were not reported to authorities. IEP therefore adjusts official statistics to account for underreporting in MPI scores.

Reporting of crimes by the police is inaccurate. By comparing the homicide numbers recorded by the police to death certificates from hospitals it is estimated that homicide victims have been undercounted by more than 20 percent in 11 states. Notably, Veracruz, which ranks third for overall peacefulness in the MPI, has the largest discrepancy.

There is a need to enhance data collection and analysis. Both the accuracy of data and breadth of data could be improved. This would enable improvements in both official and unofficial analysis and is especially relevant in states where official statistics show low crime rates that contrast with other data sources and public surveys on crime.

Further, official statistics do not include the more than 26,000 people in Mexico who have been missing since 2007. This report includes an in-depth analysis on disappearances in Mexico. The majority of these people are either youth and/or male, often working class men with families. However some states face a higher proportion of missing women. The different activities of organized crime groups appear to impact the gender ratios. Independent research would suggest that approximately nine percent of known disappearances are related to elements of the government or groups working in collusion with the government.

Given these issues, the country has invested significant effort in reforms to the police, judicial and penal systems. The data on the implementation and effects of reforms remains nascent, therefore limiting the scope for quantitative analysis. But as the 2016 deadline for the implementation of the New Criminal Justice System (*Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal*, NSJP) approaches, IEP has included a discussion on the nature of the reforms.

The focus of this report is to present data and research on the patterns, trends, causes and benefits of peace in Mexico. It aims to inform a strategic discussion among policymakers, researchers, business leaders and the general public. This report is organized in five sections presenting the results and findings of the 2016 MPI, including an analysis of trends from 2011 to 2015; Positive Peace in Mexico; the economic value of peace in Mexico; essay contributions from experts in Mexican civil society; and a detailed description of the MPI methodology.

## KEY FINDINGS

### STATE OF PEACE

- Peace in Mexico improved by 0.3 percent, representing the smallest improvement in the last five years.
- The largest indicator improvement was in the violent crime rate, which fell by 9.5 percent.
- The most peaceful state in Mexico is Hidalgo, followed by Yucatán, Veracruz, Tlaxcala, and San Luis Potosí.
- Guerrero remains the least peaceful state, followed by Sinaloa, Morelos, Baja California and Baja California Sur.
- In 2015, individual indicators of peacefulness showed diverging trends, with two indicators improving while four indicators deteriorated.
- The rate of organized crime-related offenses improved by 7.9 percent while the violent crime rate improved by 9.5 percent.
- The homicide rate deteriorated for the first time in five years, rising 6.3 percent from 2014 to 2015.
- Both the rate of weapons crime and detention without a sentence rose by 7 percent.
- Approximately 90 percent of extortions and 83 percent of rapes in Mexico were not reported to authorities.

### TRENDS IN PEACE

- Mexico is now 13.5 percent more peaceful than it was in 2011, at the height of the drug war.
- Peace improved in 25 of the 32 states in the last five years, impacting 85 percent of Mexicans who now live in a state that is more peaceful than in 2011.
- The level of peace in 2015 was 16 percent lower than the level recorded in 2003, reflecting the country's potential for further gains.
- Since 2011, the violent crime, organized crime and homicide rates have all fallen by nearly 30 percent.
- States that ranked poorly in 2011 have shown the largest improvements, especially Nayarit, Durango and Baja California.
- Nayarit, which ranked 32nd in 2011, has shown the largest improvement in its MPI score over the last five years and is now ranked 19th.
- Nayarit, Durango, Chihuahua, Nuevo León and Baja California have experienced the largest improvements in the last five years.
- Baja California Sur, Zacatecas, Oaxaca, Querétaro and Guanajuato have had the largest deteriorations in peacefulness over the last five years.
- Over 26,000 people are currently known to be missing in Mexico since 2007, according to the national registry for missing persons.

## ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

- The economic impact of violence was 2.12 trillion pesos in 2015 (US\$134 billion), equivalent to 13 percent of Mexico's GDP or 17,525 pesos (US\$1,105) per Mexican citizen.
- In 2015 there was a four percent improvement in the economic impact of violence, which resulted in a 76 billion pesos (US\$4.8 billion) peace dividend.
- In 2015, the cost of homicide increased by 31 billion pesos and is now 727 billion pesos (US\$45.9 billion).
- Mexico's peace dividend was 802 billion pesos (US\$50 billion) between 2011 and 2015.
- The total peace dividend of 802 billion pesos is nearly one and a half times the size of a single year of Mexico's agricultural production. IEP estimates that Mexico could realize an economic benefit of an additional 5.66 trillion pesos (US\$357 billion) in the next five years if the country continues to improve in peacefulness at a similar rate to the last five years.
- The total economic impact of violence is 38 percent lower in 2015 than it was in 2011.
- Military expenditure is the fastest growing category of violence containment spending, increasing from 0.2 percent of GDP in 2003 to 0.6 percent of GDP in 2015.

## POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

- Mexico has the second largest Positive Peace surplus in the world. Compared to other countries with similar levels of violence, it performs particularly well in *high levels of human capital, acceptance of the rights of others and good relations with neighbors*.
- States with higher levels of Positive Peace have recovered more quickly over the last five years than states with lower levels of Positive Peace.
- Corruption and governance are closely linked to levels of violence. States with the highest levels of violence also have the highest levels of perceptions of corruption, particularly among the police.



SECTION 1

# RESULTS & FINDINGS

**Vision of Humanity**  
visionofhumanity.org

Explore the data on the interactive Mexico Peace Index map: see how peace changes over time, compare levels of peace between states and discover how the states fare according to each indicator of peace.




2016

# MEXICO PEACE INDEX

A SNAPSHOT OF THE STATE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

MOST PEACEFUL  LEAST PEACEFUL



RANK	STATE	SCORE
1	Hidalgo	1.758
2	Yucatán	1.858
3	Veracruz	1.872
4	Tlaxcala	1.981
5	San Luis Potosí	2.026
6	Chiapas	2.027
7	Aguascalientes	2.061
8	Querétaro	2.075
9	Campeche	2.145
10	Coahuila	2.171
11	Puebla	2.241
12	Tabasco	2.259
13	Michoacán	2.371
14	México	2.403
15	Jalisco	2.429
16	Oaxaca	2.452

RANK	STATE	SCORE
17	Distrito Federal	2.529
18	Zacatecas	2.55
19	Nayarit	2.592
20	Sonora	2.607
21	Durango	2.641
22	Quintana Roo	2.691
23	Guanajuato	2.695
24	Nuevo León	2.699
25	Tamaulipas	2.736
26	Chihuahua	2.824
27	Colima	2.836
28	Baja California Sur	3.037
29	Baja California	3.057
30	Morelos	3.123
31	Sinaloa	3.41
32	Guerrero	3.859

## 2016 MEXICO PEACE INDEX INDICATOR SCORES

Table 1 below presents the full results of the 2016 Mexico Peace Index (MPI). As Mexico's overall peacefulness has been improving, the states show significant variations in scores and across indicators. In 2015, the gap between the most and least peaceful states widened slightly, after having narrowed for six of the last seven years. The eastern states continue to be the most peaceful but peacefulness is becoming less regionally concentrated as states on the US-Mexico border continue to improve.

Campeche is an example of the different challenges states can experience with their indicators, as it has the highest variance among its scores. Campeche has low levels of crime but scores poorly on *detention without a sentence* and *police funding*.

MPI indicators are scored from 1 to 5, where 1 represents the most peaceful score and 5 represents the least peaceful score.

**TABLE 1** 2016 MEXICO PEACE INDEX INDICATOR SCORES

There is a wide range in levels of peacefulness across both indicators and states in Mexico. A lower score indicates a better level of peacefulness.

MPI RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE	HOMICIDE	VIOLENT CRIME	WEAPONS CRIME	DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE	POLICE FUNDING	ORGANIZED CRIME	JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY
1	Hidalgo	1.758	1.266	1.921	1.211	1.748	2.504	1.000	3.889
2	Yucatán	1.858	1.033	1.526	1.218	1.916	3.106	1.217	5.000
3	Veracruz	1.872	1.451	1.462	1.445	2.144	1.610	1.000	5.000
4	Tlaxcala	1.981	1.225	1.791	1.228	1.642	4.431	1.000	5.000
5	San Luis Potosí	2.026	1.601	1.349	1.388	3.009	2.905	1.051	5.000
6	Chiapas	2.027	1.726	1.322	1.344	3.502	2.161	1.204	4.780
7	Aguascalientes	2.061	1.128	3.602	1.243	1.165	3.541	1.192	3.790
8	Querétaro	2.075	1.479	2.911	1.221	1.216	2.736	1.000	4.798
9	Campeche	2.145	1.376	1.015	1.089	5.000	5.000	1.201	5.000
10	Coahuila	2.171	1.781	2.357	1.655	1.568	2.676	1.000	5.000
11	Puebla	2.241	1.569	2.364	1.929	1.866	1.709	1.708	5.000
12	Tabasco	2.259	1.713	3.887	1.059	1.480	2.803	2.095	3.056
13	Michoacán	2.371	2.348	1.929	2.309	2.216	2.138	1.100	5.000
14	México	2.403	1.982	3.194	2.194	1.460	1.214	1.301	5.000
15	Jalisco	2.429	1.984	2.226	2.301	2.501	1.528	2.357	4.272
16	Oaxaca	2.452	2.571	1.976	2.534	2.118	2.213	1.000	5.000
17	Distrito Federal	2.529	1.740	4.336	3.120	1.073	1.900	2.123	2.490
18	Zacatecas	2.550	2.171	2.417	2.438	1.137	3.094	1.862	5.000
19	Nayarit	2.592	1.365	1.153	1.393	5.000	4.615	3.580	5.000
20	Sonora	2.607	2.498	1.618	2.090	4.831	3.780	1.225	5.000
21	Durango	2.641	2.113	2.555	2.637	2.881	3.881	1.220	5.000
22	Quintana Roo	2.691	2.226	3.545	1.311	2.361	4.089	1.751	5.000
23	Guanajuato	2.695	2.230	3.652	3.481	1.014	1.674	1.000	4.946
24	Nuevo León	2.699	1.678	2.054	2.719	1.308	2.056	3.889	5.000
25	Tamaulipas	2.736	2.234	2.794	1.775	1.455	2.878	3.095	5.000
26	Chihuahua	2.824	3.287	2.030	3.406	2.392	2.607	1.000	5.000
27	Colima	2.836	2.666	1.609	2.924	5.000	5.000	1.024	5.000
28	Baja California Sur	3.037	2.678	3.479	2.502	2.162	5.000	2.388	4.182
29	Baja California	3.057	3.004	3.806	2.425	1.925	3.276	1.896	5.000
30	Morelos	3.123	3.094	4.334	1.995	1.069	3.420	2.302	5.000
31	Sinaloa	3.410	4.001	2.059	5.000	2.291	2.695	1.858	5.000
32	Guerrero	3.859	5.000	2.637	5.000	1.575	2.415	2.827	5.000

# METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE

The MPI is based on the work of the Global Peace Index, a leading global measure of peacefulness that has been produced by IEP annually since 2007. The MPI follows a similar methodology to the United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI) and the United States Peace Index (USPI), also produced by IEP, and measures negative peace, defined as the absence of violence or fear of violence. This is the third iteration of the MPI and includes a time series from 2003 to 2015.

The measures in the MPI have been selected to cover a number of elements of peacefulness. Other than measures of violent crimes, the MPI also measures the resources that are used to counter criminality through the implementation of high rates

of incarceration and high numbers of police. The most peaceful states will have low levels of crime combined with lower levels of policing and incarceration. However, certain levels of policing and incarceration contribute to preventing crime. MPI indicators are designed to account for this while also reflecting that large investments in incarceration and policing are indicative of a low level of peacefulness.

The MPI measures peacefulness at the state level in Mexico. A key reason for choosing this unit of analysis is that Mexico's state governments have a certain amount of latitude in their governance structures, such that policy responses to violence may differ significantly from state to state.

## The MPI is composed of the following seven indicators:

### Homicide

The number of homicides per 100,000 people, measured as the number of cases that were investigated by the state prosecution authorities.

Source: Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security/ *Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP)

### Weapons Crime

The number of crimes committed with a firearm per 100,000 people. Includes intentional and negligent homicides and assaults committed with a firearm.

Source: SESNSP

### Justice System Efficiency

The ratio of registered intentional homicide cases to successful homicide prosecutions.

Source: Homicide convictions from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography / *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía* (INEGI) and the number of homicides cases from SESNSP

### Violent Crime

The number of homicides per 100,000 people, measured as the number of cases that were investigated by the state prosecution authorities.

Source: SESNSP

### Detention without a Sentence

The number of people in prison without a sentence proportional to level of violent crime.

Source: Secretariat of Public Security / *Secretaría de Seguridad Pública* (2006-2012) and the National Security Commission / *Comisión Nacional de Seguridad* (CNG) (2013-2015), data provided by Guillermo Zepeda and Paola Jiménez, *Jurimetría*.

### Police Funding

The federal government subsidies for state security from the Public Security Contribution Fund / *Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública* (FASP) per 100,000 people, in current Mexican pesos.

Source: Secretariat of Public Finance and Credit / *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* (SHCP)

### Organized Crime

The number of extortions, drug-trade related crimes and kidnappings per 100,000 people. Extortion and kidnapping rates are adjusted for underreporting. Drug-trade related crimes include production, transport, trafficking, trade, supply or possession of drugs or other "crimes against public health," as they are termed in Mexican law.

Source: SESNSP

Each of the indicators is scored between 1 and 5, with 1 being the most peaceful score and 5 the least peaceful. These scores are calculated for each year covered by the study. After the score for each indicator has been calculated, weights are applied to each indicator to arrive at the final MPI score. Refer to table 16 in the full methodology for the weights.

Two of the indicators — *violent crime* and *organized crime* — are adjusted for underreporting. In 2014, 92.8 percent of crimes in Mexico did not make it into the official statistics because they were either not reported to the authorities or because no investigation was opened.<sup>1</sup> IEP uses INEGI's National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security / *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública* (ENVIPE) to calculate underreporting rates for each state and adjusts the official statistics for rape, robbery, assault, extortion and kidnapping to better reflect actual rates of violence. This approach helps to counter balance the high rates of underreporting, known in Mexico as the *cifra negra*.

The 2016 MPI includes a new indicator to reflect the appropriate use of incarceration in Mexican states. Previous iterations of the MPI used the number of people sentenced to prison per 100,000 inhabitants to measure *incarceration*. The updated indicator instead uses the number of people in prison without a sentence relative to the level of violent crime and is referred to as *detention without a sentence*. The ratio of detention without a sentence to violent crime has been calculated for the full time series.

For a full explanation of the methodology, including the difference in these two variables, refer to section 5 on page 94.

## Mexico Peace Index Expert Panel

---

An Expert Panel was established to provide independent advice and technical guidance to IEP researchers in developing the index methodology. The Panel is composed of experts from independent, nonpartisan civil society and academic organizations. For the 2016 MPI it included:

- **Carlos J. Vilalta Perdomo**  
Professor, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. (CIDE)
- **Edgar Guerrero Centeno**  
Deputy Director General of Government Information Policies and National Government Censuses, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI)
- **Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona**  
Director, Jurimetría, Iniciativas para el Estado de Derecho, A.C.
- **Leonel Fernández Novelo**  
Local Observatories Coordinator, Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano
- **Juan Pablo Arango Orozco**  
Researcher, Causa en Común
- **Alberto Díaz-Cayeros**  
Senior Fellow, Center for Democracy Development and Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli, Institute of International Affairs, Stanford University
- **Luis Mauricio Torres Alcocer**  
Researcher, Instituto Mexicano de Competitividad (IMCO)
- **Jonathan Furszyfer del Río**  
Director of Security, México Evalúa

# PEACE IN MEXICO


## 2015

Peacefulness improved in Mexico in 2015, but only slightly, at 0.3 percent. The country made progress in the *violent crime* and *organized crime* indicators. However, *police funding*, *detention without a sentence*, *homicide* and *weapons crime* deteriorated from 2014 to 2015 and the score for *justice system efficiency* remained the same.


**FIGURE 1**

TREND AND YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES IN PEACE, 2003–2015

Peacefulness deteriorated quickly from 2007 to 2010 before improving from 2011 to 2014; however, the pace of improvement has slowed in 2015.



**YEAR-ON-YEAR % CHANGE**




Source: Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública

From 2014 to 2015, Mexico's peacefulness did not improve at the same rate as the previous four years. While peacefulness was gaining momentum until 2014, it has plateaued in the last year. Figure 1 highlights the trend in peacefulness and year-on-year changes from 2003 to 2015. Deteriorations in peacefulness typically happen more quickly than improvements, as has been the case in Mexico.



**FIGURE 2** PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN INDICATOR SCORES, 2014-2015

The improvements in *violent crime* and *organized crime* drove the slight improvement in peacefulness, offsetting deteriorations in other indicators.



Source: IEP


The scores for *violent crime* and *organized crime* improved in 2015 by 6.9 and 5.6 percent respectively, as shown in figure 2. The improvement in violent crime was driven by an 8.7 percent decline in the assault rate per 100,000 people and a nearly 10 percent decline in the rate of robberies. The rate of rape declined as well, to 4.5 percent. In contrast, the three crimes that make up the *organized crime* indicator showed diverging trends. The rate of extortions declined 8.5 percent and the kidnapping rate fell 27 percent last year, while the rate of drug-trade related crimes increased 11.5 percent in 2015.

The *justice system efficiency* indicator remained the same in 2015, with a score of 5 out of 5. Both the level of *police funding* and *detention without a sentence* deteriorated in the last year. The score for *police funding* deteriorated by 2.5 percent, as it has, roughly, for each of the last five years. The national *detention without a sentence* score deteriorated by almost four percent — a smaller deterioration than in the previous two years.

“ Mexico’s homicide rate rose in 2015, for the first time in four years, increasing 6.3 percent to nearly 14 per 100,000 people.

**FIGURE 3** TREND AND YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES IN THE HOMICIDE RATE, 2003-2015

Mexico's homicide rate rose for the first time in four years, increasing 6.3 percent from 2014 to 2015.



Source: Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública

Mexico's homicide rate rose in 2015, for the first time in four years, increasing 6.3 percent to nearly 14 per 100,000 people. While the homicide rate is now nearly 30 percent lower than at its peak in 2011, it is still high. Complicating the level of homicides is the number of missing persons, with over 26,000 people reported missing since 2007. High homicide rates throughout the country continue to pose a public policy challenge and hinder development, as the economic impact of homicide alone reached 727 billion pesos, or 4.5 percent of Mexico's GDP, in 2015. Figure 3 shows the trend and the year-on-year change in the homicide rate from 2003 to 2015.

The following pages unpack each indicator of peacefulness and aim to explore how, why and where Mexico has begun to become more peaceful. The MPI measures the levels of negative peace in Mexican states, which IEP defines as the absence of violence or the fear of violence. However, Mexico also faces the challenge of improving its levels of Positive Peace. Together, well-developed positive and negative peace make up a complete, holistic picture of the state of peace. This section provides the complete results of the MPI — Mexico's negative peace index — and draws on some aspects of Positive Peace to better understand trends and developments in the MPI.



**POSITIVE PEACE**

... is the attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies



**NEGATIVE PEACE**

... is the absence of violence or fear of violence

# MOST AND LEAST PEACEFUL STATES

## THE FIVE MOST PEACEFUL STATES

**TABLE 2** FIVE MOST PEACEFUL STATES, INDICATOR SCORES AND RANKS, 2016 MPI

MPI RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE	HOMICIDE		VIOLENT CRIME		WEAPONS CRIME		DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE		POLICE FUNDING		ORGANIZED CRIME		JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY	
			SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK
1	Hidalgo	1.758	1.27	4	1.92	10	1.21	3	1.75	14	2.50	12	1.00	4	3.89	4
2	Yucatán	1.858	1.03	1	1.53	6	1.22	4	1.92	16	3.11	21	1.22	15	5.00	10
3	Veracruz	1.872	1.45	7	1.46	5	1.44	12	2.14	19	1.61	3	1.00	8	5.00	10
4	Tlaxcala	1.981	1.23	3	1.79	9	1.23	6	1.64	13	4.43	28	1.00	7	5.00	10
5	San Luis Potosí	2.026	1.60	10	1.35	4	1.39	10	3.01	27	2.90	19	1.05	10	5.00	10

Note: In 2015, 23 states score a 5 out of 5 for *Justice System Efficiency*, resulting in an equal rank of 10th place.

## 1 HIDALGO



Hidalgo ranks as Mexico's most peaceful state in the MPI. A mid-size state in central Mexico, it has consistently showed strong scores in peacefulness since 2003, usually ranking among the top five. However, it is important to note that Hidalgo has the fourth largest data discrepancy, as measured by the ratio of law enforcement-counted homicide victims to homicide victims identified by a coroner. For more on data discrepancies, see page 40.

From 2014 to 2015, Hidalgo improved slightly in its overall peacefulness, by two percent. While the state's score for *police funding* continued to deteriorate, Hidalgo recorded improvements in four indicators: *homicide*, *violent crime*, *weapons crime* and *organized crime*.

Hidalgo has consistently reported low rates of homicide, organized crime and weapons crime. The state also does relatively well in managing its levels of pre-trial detention,

although the ratio of people in prison without a sentence to the level of violent crime has increased in recent years. However, while *detention without a sentence* has deteriorated since 2010, Hidalgo did register a 12 percent improvement in the last year.

Hidalgo does lag in Positive Peace, ranking 25 out of the 32 states. The state performs well in *acceptance of the rights of others* and *good relations with neighbors* but performs poorly in *well-functioning government* and *sound business environment*. This disparity suggests that future high levels of peace relative to the other states may not continue. In order to continue to improve its levels of resilience to violence, Hidalgo will need to improve its functioning of government, the business environment and levels of human capital.



## 2 YUCATÁN

Yucatán, Mexico's second most peaceful state, has the lowest homicide rate in the country, as has been the case for every year since 2008. Despite a slight increase in 2015, Yucatán's homicide rate remains five percent lower in 2015 than it was in 2011. The state also performs well in *violent crime* and *weapons crime*, ranking sixth and fourth on those indicators respectively.

Yucatán is the home state of Merida, the city for which the bilateral Merida Initiative against drug trafficking is named. Nonetheless, the data suggests that Yucatán has remained relatively sheltered from high levels of violence during the worst years of the drug war. However, the rate of organized crime related offenses increased 36 percent from 2014 to 2015, largely driven by an increase in extortions.

The state scores disproportionately poorly on *police funding* and *detention without a sentence*, suggesting room for reallocation in government resources. In 2015, violence containment costs represented nine percent of the state's GDP. Rates of organized crime and homicide have risen slightly in the past year, in line with the national trend.

Yucatán scores well in Positive Peace, ranking fifth overall and first in *well-functioning government* and *sound business environment*. Conversely, Yucatan's weakest aspects of Positive Peace are *good relations with neighbors* and *equitable distribution of resources*.

## 3 VERACRUZ

Veracruz ranks as Mexico's third most peaceful state in 2015. Similarly to Hidalgo, Veracruz has reported relatively low rates of homicide, violent crime, organized crime and weapons crime since 2003.

In 2015, Veracruz registered a significant improvement in the *organized crime* indicator, with the rate of organized crime related offenses falling 43 percent from 2014. Violent crime improved slightly in 2015 as well.

Veracruz's consistent high performance compared to public perception raises questions about the reliability of the data that the state reports to federal agencies. In 2014, Veracruz had the largest discrepancy between the number of homicide victims counted by law enforcement and the number counted by death certificates. Furthermore, Veracruz ranks 15th in *low levels of corruption* and 29th in Positive Peace overall. And while ENVIPE shows a 15 percent reduction in victimization in Veracruz from

2013 to 2014, 80 percent of residents reported feeling insecure in their state in 2015. In contrast, 33 percent of residents said the same in Yucatán, while perceptions of insecurity were at 87 percent in Mexico's least peaceful state, Guerrero. For a more detailed discussion on the official crime statistics in Veracruz and throughout Mexico, refer to page 40.

Veracruz was home to one of the first self-defense groups in Mexico; in 2011, a group of citizens calling themselves the *Mata Zetas* ("Zeta Killers" in English) armed themselves in retaliation against the *Los Zetas* cartel and claimed responsibility for at least 35 deaths that year.<sup>2</sup> The US and Mexican governments now consider the group itself a cartel that is operating in concert with the more well-known organization *Cartel de Jalisco Nuevo Generacion* in seven Mexican states.<sup>3</sup>

## 4 TLAXCALA



Tlaxcala, Mexico's fourth most peaceful state, also performs consistently well on *well-functioning government*, although *organized crime* is its best scoring indicator in 2015. Tlaxcala's rate of organized crime related offenses was 92 percent lower in 2015 than in 2011, despite some significant variations over that period. Based on official statistics, that rate fell 96 percent from 2013 to 2014, representing the largest improvement in *organized crime* for any state that year.

Overall, Tlaxcala was one of few states to improve in peacefulness from 2005 to 2007, diverging from the national trend, and has continued to outperform the national average every year since 2006. However, Tlaxcala faces a rising rate of weapons crime,

with the 2015 rate showing a 68 percent increase over its 2011 level. Similarly to Yucatán, Tlaxcala stands to benefit from increased investments in Positive Peace, as its weakest indicator scores reflect inefficiencies in government security structures. The state ranks 20 out of 32 on *well-functioning government*.

Tlaxcala ranks 21st in Positive Peace overall. Its best performing domains are *equitable distribution of resources* and *free flow of information*. Tlaxcala has significant room to improve in *well-functioning government*, *sound business environment* and *acceptance of the rights of others*.

## 5 SAN LUIS POTOSÍ



San Luis Potosí sits just north of Hidalgo and Veracruz, two of the five most peaceful states. Violence in Mexico is influenced by geography<sup>4</sup> and law-enforcement and military efforts to interrupt drug trafficking in recent years have limited access to the Gulf of Mexico and trafficking routes in the Caribbean. Organized crime activity has moved west, taking advantage of poppy production in Guerrero and the Lázaro Cárdenas port on the Pacific coast of Michoacán. These changes have contributed to decreases in violence in the eastern part of the country.

In this context, San Luis Potosí has realized significant improvements in levels of *well-functioning government*, *violent crime*, *organized crime* and *weapons crime* since 2011. The state's organized crime and violent crime rates are down 70 and 77

percent respectively. The only increase in the components of these indicators is in the rate of narcotics crimes, which includes the production, transport, trafficking, trade, supply, or possession of drugs. This increase in narcotics crimes may be a leading indicator of a resurgence in cartel activity, suggesting that action is needed to prevent a deterioration in future peacefulness.

San Luis Potosí ranks 18th in Positive Peace. The state performs relatively well in *acceptance of the rights of others*, ranking third. San Luis Potosí has weaknesses in *equitable distribution of resources*, *high levels of human capital* and *sound business environment*.



## THE FIVE LEAST PEACEFUL STATES

**TABLE 3** FIVE LEAST PEACEFUL STATES, INDICATOR SCORES AND RANKS, 2016 MPI

MPI RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE	HOMICIDE		VIOLENT CRIME		WEAPONS CRIME		DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE		POLICE FUNDING		ORGANIZED CRIME		JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY	
			SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK
32	Guerrero	3.86	5.00	32	2.64	21	5.00	31	1.57	12	2.41	11	2.83	29	5.00	10
31	Sinaloa	3.41	4.00	31	2.06	15	5.00	32	2.29	22	2.70	15	1.86	21	5.00	10
30	Morelos	3.12	3.09	29	4.33	31	2.00	16	1.07	2	3.42	23	2.30	26	5.00	10
29	Baja California	3.06	3.00	28	3.81	29	2.42	21	1.92	17	3.28	22	1.90	23	5.00	10
28	Baja California Sur	3.04	2.68	27	3.48	25	2.50	23	2.16	20	5.00	30	2.39	28	4.18	5

Note: In 2015, 23 states score a 5 out of 5 for *Justice System Efficiency*, resulting in an equal rank of 10th place.

### 32 GUERRERO

Guerrero is once again the least peaceful state in the country. In 2015, Guerrero had the highest homicide rate in the country, at 54.5 homicides per 100,000 people. This represents an improvement over the state's 2012 peak of 66, but the 2015 rate remains more than three times higher than 2004. Guerrero also ranks poorly for *weapons crime*, ranking 31 out of the 32 states, and the rate of crimes committed with a weapon doubled in 2015.

The state ranks more moderately on *detention without a sentence*, at 12 of 32. This rate recorded a very slight improvement in 2015 of one percent, although it showed a five percent improvement the year prior.

Guerrero recorded a 10 percent improvement in organized crime in 2015. While the recent decline in the rate of extortions, kidnappings and drug-trade related crimes may represent progress, the fact that the homicide rate has been increasing could indicate a shift toward more serious forms of violence.

Guerrero not only ranks last in the MPI and has the highest homicide rate, it also has the weakest level of Positive Peace of any state in Mexico. Guerrero lags in a number of development indicators, resulting in poor performance in the *equitable distribution of resources, sounds business environment* and *high levels of human capital* domains.



### 31 SINALOA

Sinaloa follows Guerrero closely as the second least peaceful state in Mexico, and has the second worst rates for both homicides and crimes committed with a firearm. The only indicator on which Sinaloa scores better than the national average is *violent crime*, having registered a steady decline in the number of robberies, rapes and assaults per 100,000 people every year since 2011. The violent crime rate has steadily dropped and is now 41 percent lower than its 2011 peak. However, the rate of organized crime related offenses rose in 2015 and the homicide rate recorded a slight uptick.

Sinaloa shows a deteriorating trend in *detention without a sentence* and is one of the five states with the largest increase in this ratio. While violent crime and homicide have declined since

2011, Sinaloa has increased its levels of detention for individuals who have not been sentenced. The state has also not improved in *police funding* since 2011.

Sinaloa ranks sixth in Positive Peace, indicating that it has a relative advantage in terms of the attitudes, institutions and structures needed to progress in peacefulness. The state performs particularly well in *low levels of corruption*, ranking second. But it comes in 25th for *free flow of information* and 17th in *high levels of human capital*. IEP's systems analysis of Positive Peace finds that there is a strong relationship between corruption and human capital at the global level and that a weakness in either domain can represent a risk for the system as a whole.



## 30 MORELOS



Morelos has seen its peace score fluctuate over the years but has ranked among the bottom ten states since 2008. The state's homicide rate rose sharply from 2008 to 2010, increasing from eight to 31 homicides per 100,000 people, and peaking at 47 in 2012. It has fallen since then, down to 24 in 2015, but remains high. The organized crime rate has fluctuated significantly between 2003 and 2015, suggesting dramatic variations in either organized crime related activity or reporting.

But despite being among Mexico's least peaceful states, Morelos has improved in four of its seven MPI indicators since 2011 and does have one standout indicator score, ranking second in *detention without a sentence*. Morelos has a relatively low number of unsentenced prisoners relative to the level of violence in the state.

Morelos' score on this indicator is likely to be influenced by two factors. One on hand, in 2015, prison populations in Morelos reached 181 percent of official prison capacity. There is no consistent relationship between peacefulness and prison

overpopulation across Mexican states but it is possible that overpopulation may act as a deterrent to incarceration in select cases. On the other hand, Morelos was one of the first states in Mexico to begin implementation of the national justice reforms and has led the country with the first pre-trial services program for youth in Mexico. Pre-trial services look at alternatives to detention for low-risk suspects and are designed to help alleviate unnecessary detention, prison overcrowding, and the risks associated with incarceration, such as job loss, negative health impacts and recruitment into organized crime.<sup>6</sup>

Morelos ranks 24th in Positive Peace, showing its weaknesses in both its actual peace and Positive Peace. Morelos has shown a relatively small improvement in its MPI score since 2011, reflecting that high levels of Positive Peace support larger improvements in actual peace. The state does well in *well-functioning government* and *low levels of corruption* but needs to improve in the six other Positive Peace domains in order to develop a highly peaceful system.

## 29 BAJA CALIFORNIA



Like Morelos, Baja California's low level of peacefulness is largely driven by a high level of violent crime. The state recorded the fourth highest violent crime rate in Mexico in 2015.

Furthermore, the state's homicide rate rose faster than the national rate, increasing 12 percent, and the rate of crimes committed with a firearm is up 40 percent since 2014. Overall, Baja California has made slow progress in improving its peacefulness since 2011.

Baja California has reduced the rate of organized crime related offenses. The rate in 2013 was 66 percent lower than in 2011 and, despite a slight uptick in 2014, has continued to decline in line with the national trend.

If Baja California makes similar reductions in homicides, violent crime and weapons crime, it will see significant improvements in peacefulness.

The state ranks 13th in Positive Peace, giving it a relatively strong base from which to make progress. Baja California's Positive Peace strengths are in *equitable distribution of resources* and *high levels of human capital*. But it has weaknesses in *well-functioning government*, *sound business environment* and *low levels of corruption*.

## 28 BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR



In 2015, Baja California Sur was the fifth least peaceful state in Mexico. It also recorded the largest deterioration in MPI score for any state in the past five years. The state's homicide rate doubled from 2014 to 2015 and the rate of crimes committed with a firearm increased sevenfold. In 2015, Baja California Sur had the highest per capita rate of police funding and the fifth highest rate of organized crime.

Baja California Sur shows a diverging trend from the rest of Mexico. While most of the country continued to become more peaceful in 2015, the overall MPI score in Baja California Sur deteriorated 16 percent. The nationwide rate of organized crime related offenses improved in 2015, but deteriorated in Baja

California Sur by 18 percent. Furthermore, the rate of crimes committed with a firearm tripled in a single year.

Baja California Sur has had larger fluctuations in peacefulness than the rest of Mexico, suggesting a situation of instability. The state ranks 23rd in Positive Peace and as such has weaknesses in the attitudes, institutions and structures that underpin peacefulness. It ranks 25th in *well-functioning government* and 31 out of 32 in *acceptance of the rights of others*. For a more detailed discussion of Baja California Sur's challenges in peacefulness and its deterioration in recent years see the analysis of states with the largest deteriorations, on page 35.

# TRENDS IN PEACEFULNESS

FROM THE HEIGHT OF THE DRUG WAR TO 2015

The 2016 MPI finds that peacefulness in Mexico improved 13.5 percent from 2011 to 2015. This period of recovery follows six consecutive years of deteriorations in peace. Levels of violence remain high, the country ranks 144 out of 162 in the Global Peace Index produced by IEP and the country's homicide rate was approximately 14 per 100,000 people in 2015.

In 2003, the first year of the MPI, Mexico's homicide rate was approaching historic lows, having fallen steadily since the early 1990s. Life expectancy and per capita income were on the rise, the quality of democracy improved in the 2000 presidential election and, based on the MPI, Mexico reached its most peaceful year in 2004. But at the same time, several organized crime groups had built a large narcotics trade, moving marijuana, cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines over land and sea into the United States. Drug sales

brought US dollars and easily accessible guns from just north of the border.<sup>7</sup>


Drug-trafficking organizations reportedly purchased their plazas, or preferential access to smuggling territory, by bribing local officials.<sup>8</sup> As democracy improved around the country, changes in political parties and efforts for reform increased tension with organized crime groups, leading to escalations in violence between different groups or between the cartels and law enforcement.

In December 2006, President-elect Felipe Calderón traveled to his home state of Michoacán and publically promised to end the drug-trade that had entrenched violence and corruption throughout the country. Peace had been deteriorating for two years. Michoacán was the 14th least peaceful state in Mexico that year and ranked 20th of 32 in terms of its homicide rate. President Calderón deployed the Mexican armed forces to the streets of Mexican cities and towns to fight the cartels and capture their leaders.

The deployment of troops to the streets of Michoacán, Chihuahua and other high-crime areas of Mexico resulted in a dramatic escalation of violence across the country as the cartels fought the government and each other. Over the next four years, the level of peace in Mexico deteriorated 23 percent and the homicide rate nearly doubled. Ciudad Juárez, a city of roughly 1.3 million people in Chihuahua, near Mexico's border with the US, became known as the most violent city in the world. The homicide rate in Ciudad Juárez was 148 per 100,000 people in 2011 and, that year, Chihuahua was the sixth least peaceful state in Mexico.<sup>9</sup> By 2011, Chihuahua was the sixth least peaceful state in Mexico.

**FIGURE 4** PEACE IN MEXICO, 2003-2015

Mexico improved in overall peacefulness for the fifth year in a row, recording a 13.5 percent improvement from 2011 to 2015.



Source: IEP


In 2012, peacefulness began to improve after five years of violent conflict between several organized crime groups and multiple Mexican police agencies and armed forces and their allies the US military, border patrol and Drug Enforcement Agency. The national homicide rate peaked in 2011 at 19.7 deaths per 100,000 people, as did the rate of violent crime and crimes committed with a firearm.

Today, Mexico is 13.5 percent more peaceful than in 2011, with a gradual improvement in peacefulness occurring every year for the past five years. Figure 4 shows the level of peace from 2003 to 2015.

This section of the report presents the trends in peace and indicators of peacefulness in Mexico from 2011, Mexico's least peaceful year, to 2015. IEP investigated this period of improving peacefulness because it represents a turning point for the country. Each year, Mexico has made improvements in some aspect of peacefulness. But peacebuilding is not a linear process. It requires building a strong, holistic social system. There are multiple factors to consider and inevitable setbacks along the way. It is important to monitor progress in each

**FIGURE 5** PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN MPI SCORES, 2011-2015

Most of the country — 25 out of 32 Mexican states — has improved in overall MPI score since 2011. A negative change indicates an improvement in peacefulness.



**RANKED BY GREATEST IMPROVEMENT**

RANK	STATE	SCORE
1	Nayarit	-1.379
2	Durango	-1.308
3	Nuevo León	-0.971
4	Chihuahua	-0.938
5	Baja California	-0.776
6	San Luis Potosí	-0.713
7	Distrito Federal	-0.698
8	Coahuila	-0.635
9	Aguascalientes	-0.507
10	Sinaloa	-0.485
11	Campeche	-0.464

RANK	STATE	SCORE
12	Jalisco	-0.432
13	Tamaulipas	-0.351
14	Quintana Roo	-0.345
15	Morelos	-0.29
16	Veracruz	-0.267
17	Sonora	-0.197
18	Tlaxcala	-0.187
19	Michoacán	-0.172
20	México	-0.153
21	Yucatán	-0.086
22	Chiapas	-0.042

RANK	STATE	SCORE
23	Tabasco	-0.024
24	Puebla	-0.015
25	Hidalgo	-0.002
26	Guerrero	0.032
27	Colima	0.124
28	Guanajuato	0.177
29	Querétaro	0.205
30	Oaxaca	0.281
31	Zacatecas	0.397
32	Baja California Sur	0.778

indicator and year, but single changes can be less informative than the overall trend. The cumulative gains over this period represent an emerging success story in peace and a source of cautious optimism for Mexico.

By and large, while the country still ranks 144 out of 162 in the Global Peace Index and has not yet returned to the level of peace it enjoyed in 2004, Mexicans in 25 of 32 states have seen an improvement in their level of peacefulness since 2011, covering approximately 85 percent of the population of Mexico. The map in figure 5 shows the states that have made the largest improvements and the few that have deteriorated over this period.

Many Mexicans still perceive their country to be a rather *unpeaceful* place, with 73.2 percent reporting a sense of insecurity in 2015.<sup>10</sup> Although progress has been made, Mexico still suffers from high levels of violence when compared to the rest of the world. However, the 2016 MPI finds that Mexico is gradually becoming more peaceful, and has made some specific and significant improvements in the last five

years. Furthermore, Mexico's levels of Positive Peace exceed its level of negative peace, highlighting Mexico's potential to further improve.

### IMPROVEMENTS IN PEACE SINCE 2011

Five of the seven MPI indicators and the national MPI score have all improved since 2011. Although the improvement in the MPI score in the last year was only 0.3 percent, Mexico remains 13.5 percent more peaceful today than it was in 2011. Scores for *violent crime*, *organized crime* and *homicide* have all improved by at least 20 percent since then. Roughly 85 percent of Mexicans live in one of the 25 states that are more peaceful today than in 2011. Across the country, a variety of efforts have been implemented to reduce violent crime, from investments in national policing, to human development in Chihuahua, to civil society action in Nuevo León.<sup>11</sup>


However, the *detention without a sentence* indicator, which is adjusted to reflect

unsentenced detention relative to the level of violent crime, has deteriorated 43 percent since 2011. Figure 6 shows the improvements and deteriorations in each MPI indicator and the overall score from 2011 to 2015.

There have been substantial improvements in both *violent crime* and *homicides* since 2011. The fall in the rate of organized crime related offenses preceded these declines, showing its first improvement in 2010. In that year 25 states improved their *organized crime* scores. In 2012, 21 states recorded an improvement in *violent crime*, while 19 states recorded an improvement in *homicides*. Figure 7 (overleaf) shows the scores for *organized crime*, *homicide*, and *violent crime* from 2003 to 2015.

**FIGURE 6** PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN INDICATOR SCORES, 2011-2015

Most measures of peacefulness have recorded gains since 2011 but *detention without a sentence* has substantially deteriorated.



Source: IEP



Scores for violent crime, organized crime and homicide have all improved by at least 20 percent since 2011.



By 2011, the cost of violence had peaked, claiming at least 22,852 lives in that year and directly affecting the economy, with the economic impact reaching 2.92 trillion pesos. At that time, Mexico still faced a high rate of violent crime — 8,334 robberies, rapes and assaults per 100,000 people. The following four years saw a sustained improvement in peacefulness, especially homicides and violent crime.


The deployment of the Mexican armed forces to combat crime coincided with a period of increasing instability and violence. Military spending has maintained an upward trend since 2007 and will probably continue increasing to 2018. In 2015, military spending represented 0.6 percent of GDP, which is a similar percentage to many European states. The Peña Nieto administration published a six-year plan (2013 to 2018) for the National Defense Sector that includes maintaining the 2012 level of military operations, increasing the annual number of hours spent patrolling Mexico’s airspace and the manufacturing of new weapons.<sup>12</sup>

Increases in the number of weapons in Mexico should be considered in the context of the trend in weapons crime, depicted in figure 8. The *weapons crime* indicator in the MPI serves as a proxy for gun availability and use in Mexico, measured as the rate of homicides and assaults committed with a firearm per 100,000 people. The weapons crime rate increased rapidly during the escalation of the drug war, rising by nearly 54 percent from 2008 to 2009. In 2011, the rate began to decline, but rose again in 2015.

Several factors contribute to a high rate of crimes committed with a firearm in Mexico. Legal gun ownership among civilians is very limited but estimates put the total number of registered and unregistered weapons at about 15 firearms per 100 people.<sup>13</sup> Organized crime groups access firearms in the course of illegal trade across the US border.<sup>14</sup> It is estimated that approximately 250,000 firearms were brought into Mexico from the US each year from 2010 to 2012.<sup>15</sup> There is also a history of military defection and corruption among Mexican authorities, including the founders of *Los Zetas*.<sup>16</sup>

**FIGURE 7** ORGANIZED CRIME, HOMICIDE AND VIOLENT CRIME, 2003–2015


Organized crime was the first of these three to improve, beginning in 2010 and followed by violent crime and homicide from 2011 to 2014.




Source: IEP

**FIGURE 8** TREND AND YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE IN WEAPONS CRIME (HOMICIDES AND ASSAULTS), 2003–2015

The rate of crimes committed with a firearm improved substantially from 2011 to 2014, but increased in 2015.



**YEAR ON YEAR % CHANGE**



Source: Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública


High levels of corruption within the police and judiciary have been a long standing enabler for organized crime. As a result, police reform has been a major component of public policy efforts in recent years. Mexico's commitment to reform its law enforcement, judicial and penal systems represents a crucial step toward improving peacefulness. IEP research consistently finds that *low levels of corruption* and *well-functioning government* are among the critical factors of Positive Peace. A well-functioning government is characterized by an effective judiciary and a high level of transparency and accountability.<sup>17</sup> While crime has subsided in the past five years, Mexico still faces major institutional challenges.

Figure 9 further demonstrates the challenges facing Mexico's law enforcement systems. It shows the ratio of homicide victims to homicide investigations. The MPI indicator for *homicide* uses the number of investigations into intentional homicides opened each year, as reported by state law enforcement agencies to the federal public security secretariat (SESNSP). Data is also available a year later for the

**FIGURE 9**

**RATIO OF HOMICIDE CASES TO VICTIMS OF HOMICIDE, 2003–2014**


Since 2009, Mexico's law enforcement systems have not kept pace with the high homicide rate. There have been roughly eight investigations for every 10 homicides.



Source: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública and Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía

**FIGURE 10** PERSONS DETAINED WITHOUT A SENTENCE, 2006–2015

The number of people detained without a sentence in the 10 states listed made up 60 percent of Mexico's unsentenced prisoners in 2015.



Source: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública and Comisión Nacional de Seguridad

number of deaths by homicide based on death certificates, as published by INEGI. Figure 9 compares the number of investigations to the number of deaths. Since 2009, there have been roughly eight investigations opened for every 10 victims of homicide. This may result from one investigation including more than one victim, but in 2014, national health statistics reported 2,345 more victims than law enforcement did.<sup>18</sup>

“ In 2007, four out of five homicides recorded a conviction. By 2013, the ratio of convictions to cases was only one in five.

As with law enforcement, Mexico’s justice system has not been able to contend with a dramatic rise in crime. In 2008, Congress passed a wide-ranging bill for nationwide reform of the justice system; however, implementation of the reforms has been slow and varies from state to state. Figure 10 highlights the rising number of people who were detained without a sentence from 2006 to 2015. In 2015, 60 percent of those people were in just 10 states.


The high number of incarcerations without a trial is related to pre-trial detention, which is intended to keep criminals from fleeing and members of the cartels off the streets. Mexico’s constitution reserves the practice for those accused of the most serious crimes. The number of serious crimes has been declining but the ratio of unsentenced detention has not.

There are risks associated with increased incarceration. Criminal networks proliferate inside prisons<sup>19</sup> and increases in the number of people incarcerated carry the potential for increases in the number of people exposed to and recruited by organized crime groups. While a certain amount of pre-trial detention is necessary, excess incarceration may increase the risk of crime and violence in the future.<sup>20</sup>

Figure 11 highlights the trends in the *justice system efficiency* and *detention without a sentence* indicators. Levels of impunity increased dramatically from 2007 onwards. In 2007, four out of five homicides recorded a conviction. By 2013, the ratio of convictions to cases was only one in five. The combination of the high rates of impunity and unsentenced detention point to an overstretched judicial system, as is supported by statistics on prison overpopulation. In 2013, Mexico’s prisons stood at 124.3 percent of their capacity, with some states recording much higher rates. The justice system reforms are expected to reduce excessive use of pre-trial detention and have already done so in some states. Page 48 of this report reviews the progress and challenges Mexico is facing in implementing justice reform.

**FIGURE 11**  
DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE AND JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY, 2003 – 2015

While peacefulness has been improving in recent years, Mexico’s justice and penal systems remain overstretched.



Source: IEP, Secretaría de Seguridad Pública and Comisión Nacional de Seguridad

# MEXICO'S PEACE GAP

A LOOK AT THE DISTRIBUTION OF PEACE

The gap between the most and the least peaceful states each year has fluctuated over time, reaching its widest point in 2008, as seen in figure 12.


Hidalgo was the most peaceful state in both 2011 and 2015. Hidalgo's level of peacefulness has fluctuated slightly since 2011, largely driven by fluctuations in *violent crime*, but a deterioration in *detention without a sentence* means that Hidalgo's overall score was only 0.1 percent better in 2015 than 2011. While Hidalgo has maintained a consistent level of peacefulness relative to the rest of Mexico, places like San Luis Potosí and Aguascalientes have made significant gains to rise into the ten most peaceful states. San Luis Potosí ranked 18th in 2011 and fifth in 2015, based on a 26 percent improvement in its overall score. Aguascalientes moved up from 15th to seventh with an improvement in its score of nearly 20 percent.

In contrast, Nayarit, the least peaceful state in 2011, has had the largest improvement. Nayarit ranked 32nd in 2011 and 19th in 2015. Guerrero, which ranks last in 2015, is one of only seven states to have deteriorated over the five-year period. Sinaloa, which ranks 31 in 2015, did improve by 12.5 percent but as it came from such a low base it still lags behind most of Mexico.

Figure 12 shows that the difference in scores between the most and least peaceful states is smaller in 2015 than in 2011. Figure 13 (overleaf) indicates that most Mexicans experienced an improvement in their levels of peacefulness in 2015 when compared to 2011. The size of the bubbles in the figure indicate the relative population of each state. Some of the most populated states have made significant gains over the period.

**FIGURE 12** TREND IN PEACEFULNESS, MOST AND LEAST PEACEFUL STATES, 2003-2015

The gap between the most and least peaceful states in Mexico widened in 2015, after narrowing for six of the prior seven years.




Source: IEP

“

The total range of scores between the most and least peaceful states narrowed by five percent from 2011 to 2015. If the two least peaceful states in 2015 are not included in the calculation, the gap narrows by 38 percent.

**FIGURE 13** MOVEMENTS IN PEACE BY POPULATION SIZE, 2011 – 2015

Roughly 85 percent of Mexicans experienced an improvement in peacefulness in 2015 compared to 2011. The spread between the most and least peaceful states has narrowed since 2011, representing improvements in the least peaceful states, rather than a deterioration in the most peaceful.



Source: IEP

The total range of scores between the most and least peaceful states narrowed by five percent from 2011 to 2015. However, if Sinaloa and Guerrero — the two least peaceful states in 2015 — are not included in the calculation, the gap narrows by 38 percent. On the one hand, these results signal cause for concern in Sinaloa and Guerrero, as they are falling behind Mexico’s progress. On the other hand, the fact that many states are catching up may be cause for optimism across the country.

Overall, 84.7 percent of Mexicans live in a state that improved in peacefulness from 2011 to 2015, with significant gains among some of the most populated states. The state of México, the largest state by population in 2015, improved its score by six percent in the last five years. Distrito Federal is second in terms of population and achieved a 21.6 percent improvement over the same period. Similarly, Veracruz and Jalisco improved by 12.5 and 15 percent respectively. These four states are home to 41.7 million people, or 34 percent of the total population. Yet Puebla and Guanajuato, together home to ten percent of the population, did not improve; Puebla had no change while Guanajuato deteriorated by seven percent.

“ 84.7 percent of Mexicans live in a state that improved in peacefulness from 2011 to 2015. Distrito Federal achieved a 21.6 percent improvement over the period.

# RISERS & FALLERS

The following section details state-by-state progress and the specific dynamics in the states that have shown the largest improvements and deteriorations in MPI scores in the last five years. Table 4 gives the change in overall score for each state from 2011 to 2015, as well as the trend in peacefulness over the period.

**TABLE 4** CHANGES IN PEACEFULNESS FROM 2011 TO 2015

Twenty-five out of 32 states in Mexico have become more peaceful since 2011, including four of the five least peaceful states in 2011. Nayarit, which ranked last in 2011, has shown the largest improvement of any state over the last five years. A negative change in score indicates an increase in peacefulness.


RANK BY CHANGE IN SCORE	STATE	DIFFERENCE IN SCORE, 2011-2015	TREND IN PEACE, 2003-2015
1	Nayarit	-1.379	
2	Durango	-1.308	
3	Nuevo León	-0.971	
4	Chihuahua	-0.938	
5	Baja California	-0.776	
6	San Luis Potosí	-0.713	
7	Distrito Federal	-0.698	
8	Coahuila	-0.635	
9	Aguascalientes	-0.507	
10	Sinaloa	-0.485	
11	Campeche	-0.464	
12	Jalisco	-0.432	
13	Tamaulipas	-0.351	
14	Quintana Roo	-0.345	
15	Morelos	-0.29	
16	Veracruz	-0.267	
17	Sonora	-0.197	
18	Tlaxcala	-0.187	
19	Michoacán	-0.172	
20	México	-0.153	
21	Yucatán	-0.086	
22	Chiapas	-0.042	
23	Tabasco	-0.024	
24	Puebla	-0.015	
25	Guerrero	0.032	
26	Colima	0.124	
27	Guanajuato	0.177	
28	Querétaro	0.205	
29	Oaxaca	0.281	
30	Hidalgo	0.349	
31	Zacatecas	0.397	
32	Baja California Sur	0.778	



Twenty-five out of 32 states in Mexico have become more peaceful since 2011, including four of the five least peaceful states in 2011. Nayarit, which ranked last in 2011, has shown the largest improvement of any state over the last five years. Furthermore, 29 states have improved in *violent crime*, 21 in *organized crime* and 20 in *homicide*. Figure 14 details the number of states that have improved, deteriorated or maintained their score for each of the indicators.

**FIGURE 14** NUMBER OF STATES THAT IMPROVED OR DETERIORATED BY INDICATOR, 2011-2015

Most states in Mexico improved in peacefulness from 2011 to 2015, especially in violent crime.



Source: IEP

## FIVE LARGEST IMPROVERS IN PEACE 2011-2015

**TABLE 5** FIVE LARGEST RISERS IN PEACE, 2011 TO 2015

A negative change indicates an improvement.

RANK		STATE	CHANGE IN SCORE 2011-15
2015	2011		
19	32	NAYARIT	-1.379
21	31	DURANGO	-1.308
24	26	NUEVO LEÓN	-0.971
26	27	CHIHUAHUA	-0.938
29	29	BAJA CALIFORNIA	-0.776

Nayarit, Durango, Nuevo León, Chihuahua and Baja California have had the greatest improvement in MPI score since 2011.<sup>21</sup> These improvements represent a substantial achievement, as these states made up five of the seven least peaceful states in Mexico in 2011. This section details the drivers of improvements in peacefulness in these five states and the challenges they face going forward. Table 5 lists the five largest improvements in score between 2011 and 2015.

### INDICATOR LEGEND



HOMICIDE



WEAPONS CRIME



POLICE FUNDING



VIOLENT CRIME





ORGANIZED CRIME



JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY




DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE




### PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



# 1. NAYARIT




Since 2011, Nayarit has made substantial improvements in decreasing the levels of violence, rising 13 places from 32nd in 2011 to 19th in 2015. This improvement in peacefulness has been underpinned by substantial declines in the homicide and weapons crime rates, falling 86 percent and 87 percent respectively. Similarly, since the peak of the drug war in 2011, the rate of violent crime has declined by 41 percent.


Prior to 2011, Nayarit experienced a high rate of homicides associated with organized crime groups, including multiple-homicide events. The state is also home to areas conducive to poppy production.<sup>22</sup> The rate of organized crime related offenses declined by 11 percent, including a 50 percent reduction in the number of recorded narcotics crimes.

While Nayarit has experienced substantial progress in peacefulness, there is one area in which the state has deteriorated significantly. The rate of people detained without a sentence has increased 230 percent since 2011, from 930 to 1,926 people.


Nayarit ranks 11th in Positive Peace in Mexico, indicating it has the attitudes, institutions and structures to potentially improve even more in the future, especially with the continued implementation of widespread justice reforms. In particular, Nayarit performs well on the good relations with neighbors and well-functioning government domains.



## 2. DURANGO



### POSITIVE PEACE SCORES




**Durango has also made substantial progress since 2011, moving up ten places to 21st in 2015.**

The improvement has been wide-spread, with advancements in most of the indicators, particularly *homicide*, *weapons crime* and *organized crime*. These gains are reflected in the significant drop in the number of kidnappings and narcotics crimes, which declined by 93 percent and 66 percent respectively.


While most indicators in Durango have shown sizeable improvement, the score for *detention without a sentence* deteriorated by 118 percent. Moreover, Durango's poor performance on both *detention without a sentence* and *justice system efficiency* highlight that improvements to justice and penal systems would result in further improvements in peace.

### PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)


**The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence.** This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



Durango's Positive Peace scores rank it 14th in 2015, suggesting the state has scope for further improvements in the coming years. Durango scores particularly well in the *low level of corruption* and *well-functioning government* indicators, relative to the rest of Mexico, two important characteristics needed for Durango to be successful in the full implementation of the justice reforms. Durango can benefit by investing in a *sound business environment* and improving its human capital. In 2015, the governors of Durango, Coahuila and Hidalgo signed a joint agreement for their technical universities to implement educational programming for peacebuilding.<sup>23</sup>




### POSITIVE PEACE SCORES




### PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.




## 3. NUEVO LEÓN




Nuevo León has made solid progress in its level of peacefulness since 2011, underpinned by substantial improvements in the rates of homicide, violent crime and weapons crime, which decreased by 78 percent, 59 percent and 50 percent respectively. Overall, Nuevo León improved by two places to 24th. Its change in overall score was 25 percent — the third largest improvement in the MPI from 2011 to 2015.

However, Nuevo León has also experienced a 220 percent rise in the rate of organized crime related offenses. The number of extortions in Nuevo León increased eight times over from 2011 to 2015. Nuevo León may be facing challenges to further improvements due to its proximity to the US border and higher levels of organized crime related violence in neighboring states. However, in 2014, the state was one of five to see the largest decrease in organized crime related homicides, both in absolute and percentage terms.<sup>24</sup>

Examining Nuevo León's Positive Peace provides a contrasting picture. Nuevo León ranks first in Positive Peace, a notable disparity with its rank of 24 in negative peace. The state performs well in most characteristics, particularly in the equitable distribution of resources and low levels of corruption. The state's Positive Peace surplus likely contributed to its improvement and signals the potential for further progress in peacefulness.




### POSITIVE PEACE SCORES




### PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



## 4. CHIHUAHUA



Chihuahua has seen considerable improvements in its peacefulness since the peak of violence in 2011. A 70 percent reduction in homicides has been one of the main contributors to this improvement, from a high of 87 per 100,000 in 2011 to 27 in 2015. Much of this decrease has been concentrated in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua's largest city, where the homicide rate fell from 148 per 100,000 to 31 in 2014.<sup>25</sup> The fall in homicide is likely linked to substantial progress in curtailing organized crime. The rate of organized crime related offenses improved by 87 percent in the last five years. In particular, the number of kidnappings and extortions have both decreased by 95 percent. Chihuahua's progress is particularly notable given its location on the US border and its history as a major narcotics distribution hub.

Chihuahua's Positive Peace scores are mixed. Although the state scores relatively well on the equitable distribution of resources and in good relations with neighbors, Chihuahua falls behind in a number of other indicators, with poor performance in sound business environment and well-functioning government. The progress made in curbing organized crime inspires confidence in the ability of Chihuahua to make further advances in peacefulness.

**Peace Dividend, 2011-2015:**


PER CAPITA  
**29,474 PESOS**

TOTAL  
**109,351 MILLION PESOS**




## CHANGE IN PEACE SINCE 2011

Overall improvement  
**20%**




## POSITIVE PEACE SCORES




## PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



## 5. BAJA CALIFORNIA



Baja California has improved in three out of seven indicators of peacefulness since 2011, mainly driven by a decline in drug-trade related violence.

The rate of organized crime related offenses has fallen by 78 percent in the last five years. In particular, the number of kidnappings has fallen by 80 percent.

However, Baja California experienced a 13 percent rise in its homicide rate from 2011 to 2015. It had been falling up until 2015 when it reversed trend with a rise of 31 percent. Homicides have been rising in Tijuana, Baja California's largest city and an industrial and financial hub of Mexico.<sup>26</sup> Homicides had the largest economic impact on Baja California of any type of violence, at 32 billion pesos in 2015.

Challenges in Baja California's judicial system further complicate the picture. The proportion of people detained without a sentence relative to the level of violence has increased by 23 percent since the peak of the drug war in 2011. The state was one of the first to implement the nationwide justice reforms but as of June 2015 the implementation process had not begun at the municipal level in Tijuana.<sup>27</sup>

Baja California's Positive Peace scores reveal that the state is well-placed to build on its progress, as it scores especially well in *high levels of human capital* and *equitable distribution of resources*. The state has made significant gains, yet it faces risks if violence continues to escalate in Tijuana and other cities.

**Peace Dividend, 2011-2015:**  
PER CAPITA  
**3,855 PESOS**  
TOTAL  
**13,432 MILLION PESOS**



# FIVE LARGEST DETERIORATIONS IN PEACE 2011-2015

**TABLE 6** FIVE LARGEST FALLERS  
IN PEACE, 2011 TO 2015

An increase in score indicates  
a deterioration.

RANK		STATE	CHANGE IN SCORE 2011-15
2015	2011		
28	10	<b>BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR</b>	0.778
18	6	<b>ZACATECAS</b>	0.397
16	8	<b>OAXACA</b>	-0.971
8	2	<b>QUERÉTARO</b>	-0.938
23	12	<b>GUANAJUATO</b>	-0.776

## Only seven states in Mexico have deteriorated in peacefulness since 2011.

Of these seven, the five that have seen the largest deteriorations are Baja California Sur, Zacatecas, Oaxaca, Querétaro and Guanajuato. This section examines the indicators driving the deteriorations in peacefulness and the problems these states are likely to face going forward.

### INDICATOR LEGEND



**HOMICIDE**



**WEAPONS  
CRIME**



**POLICE  
FUNDING**



**VIOLENT  
CRIME**





**ORGANIZED  
CRIME**



**JUSTICE  
SYSTEM  
EFFICIENCY**




**DETENTION WITHOUT  
A SENTENCE**




**PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)**

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



**1. BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR**



**Baja California Sur has experienced the largest deterioration in peacefulness of any Mexican state since 2011, diverging from the overall national trend.** Since 2011, Baja California Sur has recorded substantial deteriorations in every indicator except *violent crime* and *police funding*. The state's homicide rate more than tripled, from 5.7 in 2011 to 19.8 in 2015, and the rate of weapons crime increased seven times over.

Much of this deterioration has occurred in the last year, driven by an increase in clashes between the Sinaloa Cartel and a newly formed alliance between *Los Zetas* and the Beltran Leyva Organization.<sup>28</sup> Some reports also indicate fighting between internal factions of the Sinaloa Cartel. Authorities reportedly told the Associated Press that the capture by police of the cartel's leader, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán, contributed to a power vacuum and resurgence in violence.<sup>29</sup> The homicide rate more than doubled in 2015, along with significant rises in organized crime related offenses. The increase in violence led the state's governor to seek help from the US State Department to combat the threat of further violence.<sup>30</sup>


Baja California Sur ranks 23rd in Positive Peace, suggesting the state is weak in the attitudes, institutions and structures needed to recover from this violence. Baja California Sur scores particularly well in *equitable distribution of resources* and *high levels of human capital* but its *well-functioning government* and *acceptance of the rights of others* scores are weaker.

## 2. ZACATECAS




Zacatecas has experienced significant deteriorations in its levels of peacefulness since 2011 and this trend has accelerated within the last year. Both the homicide rate and the rate of weapons crimes doubled from 2014 to 2015. Violence has stemmed partly from territorial clashes between the Los Zetas and Gulf cartels, with several clashes in the last year.<sup>31</sup> Compounding these events have been the actions of criminal opportunists, who have taken advantage of the general fear and collapse of law and order across the state.<sup>32</sup> As a result, Zacatecas has fallen substantially in the MPI, from sixth in 2011 to 18th in 2015. In 2014 alone, Zacatecas dropped seven places.

Zacatecas' Positive Peace score stands in stark contrast to the current security situation. Zacatecas ranks eighth in Positive Peace overall and for *well-functioning government*. Zacatecas scores highly on most domains and ranks first in *low levels of corruption*. Levels of corruption have a strong relationship with peacefulness worldwide.<sup>33</sup> The state exhibits relatively strong institutional capacity to recover from recent violence.




### POSITIVE PEACE SCORES


● Zacatecas  
 ○ National average




### PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.






### POSITIVE PEACE SCORES




### PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



## 3. OAXACA



**Violence in Oaxaca has steadily increased from 2011 to 2015.** Oaxaca has historically been a relatively peaceful state but this peacefulness has been deteriorating in the last several years. The state dropped from eighth in 2011 to 16th in 2015.



Five out of seven indicators have deteriorated in Oaxaca since 2011. The homicide rate increased 13 percent, despite a dip in 2012. The rate of weapons crime shows a particularly severe deterioration, from less than one per 100,000 people in 2011 to nearly 15 in 2015. However, the low reported rates in 2011, 2012 and 2013 — between 0 and 1.6 — raise questions about the official data; the average reported rate from 2003 to 2015 was 7.8. The rate of unsentenced detention also deteriorated, by 41 percent, and the violent crime rate increased 13 percent.

Oaxaca ranks second to last in Positive Peace, explaining, in part, its deterioration in negative peace. Geography likely plays a role as well, but IEP finds at the global level that countries with higher levels of negative peace than Positive Peace are at a higher risk of increases in violence. This risk results from a positive peace deficit, whereby states and countries lack the attitudes, institutions and structures needed to maintain high levels of peacefulness.<sup>34</sup> Oaxaca scores poorly in all of the domains, and particularly in the equitable distribution of resources.

#### Peace Dividend, 2011-2015:


PER CAPITA **920 PESOS**

TOTAL **3,691 MILLION PESOS**




### PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This page gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



## 4. QUERÉTARO



Querétaro remains one of Mexico's more peaceful states, but its overall MPI score declined by 11 percent from 2011 to 2015. Querétaro had the eighth lowest homicide rate in 2015, at 6.9 cases per 100,000 people but the homicide rate was 33 percent higher in 2015 than in 2011. Furthermore, the rate of crimes committed with a firearm rose from 0.4 per 100,000 people to 3.1. As a result, Querétaro fell six places, from second in 2011 to eighth in 2015. While the rate of organized crime related offenses fell by 42 percent over the five year period, it did register a slight increase from 7.3 to 8.8 per 100,000 people in the last year.


Querétaro is ranked 10th in Positive Peace, receiving high scores for most domains. The state continues to enjoy a perception of safety from international investors, making it attractive for foreign direct investment (FDI), with the capital city Santiago De Querétaro topping all other cities globally by posting a 233 percent increase in FDI in 2014.<sup>35</sup> The state's performance in *sound business environment*, as well as the other domains of Positive Peace, are indicative of the capacity to rebound from these relatively modest deteriorations in peacefulness.

**Peace Dividend, 2011-2015:**

PER CAPITA  
**-1,630 PESOS**


TOTAL  
**-3,267 MILLION PESOS**

## CHANGE IN PEACE SINCE 2011




## POSITIVE PEACE SCORES

### MPPI overall score




## PEACE DIVIDEND, 2011-2015 (MILLIONS OF PESOS)

The peace dividend is the economic benefit that comes from reducing violence. This chart gives the gain or loss for each type of violence from 2011 to 2015. The state's total further includes national spending categories, such as the military.



## 5. GUANAJUATO



Guanajuato has become slightly less peaceful, with a seven percent deterioration in its overall score from 2011 to 2015. The rate of crimes committed with a firearm — the indicator with the largest deterioration — rose from 1.9 to 3.5 per 100,000 people. At the same time, the homicide rate rose by 39 percent and is now just above the national rate at 15 cases per 100,000 people.

Underpinning these rises in violence has been the emergence of fighting between The New Generation Jalisco cartel and the *La Resistencia* organization, as well the continued turf war between *Los Zetas* and the Knights Templar cartels.<sup>36</sup> This violence has resulted in a drop of 11 places, from 12th in 2011 to 23rd in 2015.

Guanajuato ranks 15th in Positive Peace, with mixed performance across the Positive Peace domains. While it scores very well in *low levels of corruption*, it struggles in *sound business environment*. In addition, the state has been suffering from poor water quality and erosion issues,<sup>37</sup> further hampering Guanajuato's Positive Peace environment.

Guanajuato ranks 15th in Positive Peace, with mixed performance across the Positive Peace domains. While it scores very well in *low levels of corruption*, it struggles in *sound business environment*. In addition, the state has been suffering from poor water quality and erosion issues,<sup>37</sup> further hampering Guanajuato's Positive Peace environment.



# Verifying Mexico's Official Crime Data

The quality of official crime data in Mexico varies by state, making it difficult to harmonize measures of violence. Recognizing this, the MPI adjusts for underreporting using data from Mexico's victimization survey. But underreporting is only one of the dynamics that effects the accuracy of official statistics. Further improvements in the collection of crime data would enable more accurate analyses by the government, IEP and other institutions in understanding the extent and causes of violence in Mexico.

## KEY FINDINGS

- There are 11 states where law enforcement offices undercounted homicides by more than 20 percent, including the two largest states by population, México and Distrito Federal.
- Veracruz, Zacatecas and Puebla had the largest discrepancies.
- Approximately 90 percent of extortions and 83 percent of rapes in Mexico are not reported to authorities.
- The lowest underreporting rate estimated in the MPI is for kidnapping, at 68 percent.
- Sixty percent of victims who did not report a crime to the authorities said it was due to the performance of government agencies.

Mexico has a federal system of government, which means states have some level of autonomy in the gathering, coding and reporting of crime data. Corruption is also an issue in Mexico and its extent varies from state to state. These factors mean that the reliability of state government crime data can differ. IEP has attempted to identify states for which the accuracy of official crime data may be a point of concern. To do so, IEP has examined homicide data from two different datasets in 2014, the most recent year available, comparing the rates reported by police departments and recorded on death certificates.

Homicide data tends to be the most accurate type of crime data because it is associated with a body. There are several sources of homicide data in Mexico. The homicide dataset published by INEGI uses medical data from death certificates to determine whether an incident is classed as a homicide or not. SESNSP data, which is used by IEP in the MPI, looks at the number of open police investigations into homicides that began during the measurement period.

*"The number of victims being investigated in Veracruz represented only 63.9 percent of the homicide victims recorded by death certificates in 2014."*

SESNSP also published the number of victims of homicide, along with the number of open investigations, for the first time in 2014.<sup>38</sup> Comparing these datasets gives some idea of which states have the largest discrepancies in their official crime data, which in turn provides insight into the accuracy of official crime statistics. As such, IEP compared the victim counts from the following two sources:

- **Homicide victims as reported by the Executive Secretariat of the National System for Public Security (SESNSP)**, which are homicides reported in the field by law enforcement.
- **Homicide victims as reported by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI)**, which are homicides counted from certificates of death.

**BOX 1 IMPROVEMENTS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA IN MEXICO**

Prior to 2014, Mexico’s Executive Secretariat for Public Security published the count of each type of crime based on the number of investigations that had been opened by law enforcement. This type of reporting is necessary but does not provide the complete picture.

One investigation can include more than one victim, which means that the number of investigations alone does not always indicate the number of victims. Multiple homicides from a single incident are frequent in Mexico in connection with organized crime. As of March 2014, SESNSP is required by law to publish victim counts for the investigations into homicide, kidnapping and extortion.

Data availability remains an issue in Mexico, especially for historic statistics. However, this new requirement represents one of several recent advancements in transparency.


Mexican states have varying discrepancies in the numbers of homicides counted by these different datasets. In a perfect situation, the number of homicide victims identified by law enforcement would be the same as the number of homicide victims identified by medical professionals. In 2014, every Mexican state had at least a small discrepancy between these sources. Some amount of discrepancy may be reasonable, as some of the cases investigated by law enforcement may turn out to not have been homicides upon review by a coroner; however, a greater number of homicide victims identified by medical professionals than by law enforcement raises concerns about the veracity of data provided by law enforcement agencies. Figure 15 shows the ratio of the two datasets for each state.

Table 7 (overleaf) provides the details of homicide data in 2014 for each state. Notably, Veracruz ranks third for overall peacefulness in the MPI but has the largest discrepancy in the reported homicide ratio. The number of victims being investigated in Veracruz represented only 63.9 percent of the homicide victims recorded by death certificates in 2014. Conversely, Quintana Roo and Michoacán have many more homicide victims under investigation than reported on death certificates. By absolute size of the discrepancy in either direction, Quintana Roo ranks 10th.

In the two most populous states, Mexico and Distrito Federal, the law enforcement victim count represents

**FIGURE 15**  
RATIO OF HOMICIDE VICTIM COUNTS BY STATE, 2014

Veracruz, Zacatecas, Puebla, Hidalgo and Nayarit have the largest discrepancies. A ratio of 1 indicates parity, where the number of victims counted by death certificates matches the number counted by law enforcement.



Source: IEP Calculations

79 and 74 percent of death certificates respectively. In total, law enforcement agencies in 11 states undercounted homicides by more than 20 percent. These discrepancies raise concerns that the law enforcement agencies may not be investigating all cases and that official statistics are underreporting the level of crime within their jurisdictions.

The differences in homicide data demonstrates the discrepancies that can arise between official crime data and the actual number of crimes committed. Across Mexico, discrepancies arise for at least three main reasons:

**TABLE 7** HOMICIDE DATA AND DISCREPANCIES BY STATE, 2014

STATE	SENSP INVESTIGATIONS	SENSP VICTIMS	INEGI VICTIMS	DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INEGI VICTIMS AND SENSP VICTIMS	SENSP VICTIMS AS % OF INEGI VICTIMS	MPI RANK
Veracruz	487	569	890	321	63.9%	3
Zacatecas	114	128	200	72	64.0%	18
Puebla	338	367	558	191	65.8%	11
Hidalgo	141	148	209	61	70.8%	1
Nayarit	110	115	162	47	71.0%	19
Tlaxcala	61	66	89	23	74.2%	4
Distrito Federal	749	814	1,097	283	74.2%	17
Chihuahua	1,086	1,290	1,692	402	76.2%	26
Tabasco	168	178	233	55	76.4%	12
Colima	99	110	140	30	78.6%	27
México	1,994	2,278	2,879	601	79.1%	14
Sonora	568	568	656	88	86.6%	20
Campeche	65	67	77	10	87.0%	9
Sinaloa	986	986	1,129	143	87.3%	31
Yucatán	42	42	48	6	87.5%	2
Guerrero	1,514	1,514	1,719	205	88.1%	32
Nuevo León	490	490	553	63	88.6%	24
Chiapas	409	413	456	43	90.6%	6
San Luis Potosí	229	246	267	21	92.1%	5
Baja California Sur	70	84	91	7	92.3%	28
Aguascalientes	42	44	46	2	95.7%	7
Guanajuato	709	778	800	22	97.3%	23
Jalisco	900	1,025	1,038	13	98.7%	15
Oaxaca	640	709	716	7	99.0%	16
Querétaro	103	103	104	1	99.0%	8
Coahuila	390	449	440	-9	102.0%	10
Morelos	416	452	441	-11	102.5%	30
Durango	315	315	299	-16	105.4%	21
Tamaulipas	628	947	878	-69	107.9%	25
Baja California	714	764	708	-56	107.9%	29
Michoacán	904	1,085	931	-154	116.5%	13
Quintana Roo	172	180	123	-57	146.3%	22

Mexico has implemented a number of reforms to law enforcement and justice agencies to address capacity issues, although it remains too early to assess the effectiveness of these efforts. For an overview of the reforms to the justice system see page 48.

*Approximately 63 percent of people who did not report a crime said it was for a reason relating to the performance of government agencies.*

Corruption has been a longstanding problem in Mexico. *Low levels of corruption* are crucial for a well-functioning society, both in Mexico and worldwide. The Positive Peace section of this report includes a detailed discussion of corruption in Mexico on page 60. Figure 16 highlights the level of perceived corruption for three of the agencies responsible for addressing, investigating and recording crimes.

INEGI, Mexico's national statistical agency, estimates that approximately 93 percent of all crimes are not reported to the authorities. IEP finds that the violent crimes used in the MPI have slightly better reporting rates than some other crimes but they remain high. Figure 17 shows the underreporting rates for robbery, assault, rape, kidnapping and extortion, the violent crimes used in the MPI, for 2014.

In the MPI, each of the crimes in figure 17 has been adjusted to reflect the rate of underreporting. In this way, the MPI measurements better reflect the levels of peacefulness than official crime statistics. However, the very low rate of overall reporting creates a challenge for law enforcement and policy making. Table 8 lists the reasons victims gave for not reporting crimes to the authorities in 2014.<sup>39</sup> Approximately 63 percent of people who did not report a crime said it was for a reason relating to the performance of government agencies.

- **Lack of capacity in law enforcement and the justice system** to address and process the high levels of crime Mexico has faced in recent years.
- **Corruption in government agencies** that results in crimes not being recorded.
- **Underreporting of crime** to the police and the Public Ministry responsible for initiating investigations.

**TABLE 8**


REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING CRIME TO THE AUTHORITIES, 2014

REASON FOR NOT REPORTING A CRIME	% OF ALL VICTIMS	REASONS BY SEX OF THE VICTIM		
		% of male	% of female	
<b>Reasons attributable to the authorities</b>  19 million victims 63%	It would be a waste of time	32.2	33.9	30.5
	Lack of trust in authorities	16.8	18.1	15.7
	Long and difficult procedures	7.2	7.5	6.9
	Hostile attitude from authorities	6.2	7.2	5.3
	Fear of extortion	0.7	0.6	0.7
<b>Reasons not attributable to the authorities</b>  11 million victims 37%	Low relevance of the crime	10.6	11.7	9.7
	Lack of proof	9.5	7.9	11
	Other causes	8.6	7.4	9.7
	Fear of the aggressor	7.8	5.5	10
	Not specified	0.5	0.3	0.7

“ Mexico has implemented a number of reforms to law enforcement and justice agencies to address these issues.

**FIGURE 16** PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, 2014


Approximately 65 percent of respondents perceive the municipal police, who are responsible for responding to local crimes, to be corrupt. Roughly 59 percent of respondents think the public ministry, which is responsible for opening investigations into crimes, is corrupt.



**FIGURE 17**

UNDERREPORTING RATES BY CRIME, 2014

Approximately 90 percent of extortions and 83 percent of rapes in Mexico are not reported to authorities. The lowest underreporting rate estimated in the MPI is for kidnapping, at 68 percent.



Source: Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública

# Understanding disappearances

Official statistics do not include the more than 26,000 people in Mexico who are known to have gone missing between 2007 and 2015 and whose whereabouts remain unknown – in other words, those who have disappeared. Given the high number of disappearances and the number of mass graves, many of these disappearances likely result in death. The majority of these people are either youths and/or male, often working class men with families. However, some states have a disproportionately high number of missing women.

## KEY FINDINGS

- Over 26,000 people are currently known to be missing in Mexico since 2007, according to the national registry for missing persons.
- Over 2,000 cases of disappearances in Mexico are believed to involve state authorities, which are termed enforced disappearances under international law.
- Data on disappearances is inconsistent, hard to access and problematic to use, making a clear measurement of and response to the scope of the problem difficult.
- Based on the data that is available on people currently known to be missing since 2007, roughly 60 percent are men of working age.
- Differences in the activities of organized crime groups may affect who is likely to go missing. Higher rates of drug-trade related crimes are associated with a higher number of missing boys and men.
- The Mexican government has made efforts to address the problem of disappearances but progress has been slow and cases continue to arise.

## › What is a disappearance in Mexico and how is it measured?

In general, the term disappearance is used when a person goes missing for unknown reasons but there is good reason to believe violence was involved. People who have disappeared may be taken by organized crime groups or government actors and are often never found, either because they have been illegally imprisoned, killed or both. Estimates for the number of people who have disappeared in Mexico vary significantly for several reasons.

Firstly, estimates can include several different types of events. When a person disappears in Mexico, it can be the result of different types of violence: enforced disappearances, kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, organized crime related violence and/or the use of mass graves. Alternately, some people may decide to simply start a new life without telling family or friends.

Secondly, the definitions and charges for kidnapping, disappearance and enforced disappearance are inconsistent. Variations in definitions across time and geography make accurate estimates and trend comparisons very difficult to obtain. Disappearance is not specifically criminalized in many Mexican states, meaning that individuals responsible for disappearances may be charged with kidnapping or other lesser crimes, especially if a charge of homicide cannot be substantiated.

Thirdly, kidnapping and disappearances have high rates of underreporting in Mexico. The measurement of kidnapping in the *organized crime* indicator in the MPI adjusts for this by estimating the underreporting rate of kidnapping from Mexico's victimization survey. The actual number of people who have been kidnapped or disappeared in Mexico remains unknown. Many disappearances are not reported.



## BOX 2 DEFINITIONS OF DISAPPEARANCE AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

Reporting on the number of people who have disappeared in Mexico, especially since the start of the drug war, may refer to two types of 'deprivation of liberty', as it is known in Mexican law. The definitions to the right are summaries of the general use of these terms.

CRIME	DEFINITION	SOURCE
<b>Disappearances</b>	Typically refers to people who were taken involuntarily by unknown means.	Estimates and definitions vary.
<b>Enforced Disappearances</b>	The arrest, detention, abduction or deprivation of liberty by people or groups acting on behalf of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge their fate or their whereabouts.	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

As such, the numbers presented here are likely to be underestimations. This section summarizes the existing data on the number of people who have disappeared in Mexico in recent years. No one data source should be taken as the single point of truth. Rather, each figure should be taken in the context of overall assessments of peacefulness in Mexico and Mexican states. IEP has highlighted some of the patterns in the numbers to support improvements in investigations and mitigation of this violent crime.

### › Disappearances data

As of December 2015, at least 26,000 people disappeared in Mexico since 2007 and remain missing.

The National Registry of Missing and Disappeared Persons (RNPED) publishes data on the number of known missing persons based on the date they were last seen. Of the approximately 26,000 people who went missing after 2007, were reported missing and were still missing as of December 2015:

- › Roughly 90 percent were of Mexican nationality and 10 percent foreigners, likely migrants and some tourists.
- › Most were likely males of working age, with approximately 60 percent recorded as male and between 15 and 65 years old.
- › Most were likely to have been seen in:
 

<b>Tamaulipas</b>	— 5,478 missing
<b>México</b>	— 2,619 missing
<b>Nuevo León</b>	— 2,207 missing
<b>Jalisco</b>	— 2,107 missing
<b>Sinaloa</b>	— 1,724 missing

It is important to note that these are estimates for the numbers of people reported missing and still missing. They are likely to be conservative figures.

Mexico's national victimization survey suggests that around one per cent of Mexican households had someone go missing in 2014. Veracruz, Guerrero, Tamaulipas, Michoacán and the state of México had the greatest number of respondents stating that a member of their household had gone missing in 2014. Relative to the population sizes of these states, Baja California Sur, Morelos, Durango, Tamaulipas and Querétaro are poor performers. NGO and media interviews with the families of those who have disappeared have documented that the fear of reprisal or persecution from either the aggressor, the authorities or the community around them are the most common reasons for not reporting a person missing.<sup>40</sup>


The activities of organized crime groups appear to affect who is more likely to disappear, based on the characteristics of known disappearances in the national registry. Higher rates of drug-trade related crimes are associated with a higher number of missing persons, based on the number of known missing persons in each state. It is important to note that the factors that influence disappearances are likely to also influence the reporting of disappearances, and as such the statistics should be considered in context.

*The fear of reprisal or persecution from either the aggressor, the authorities or the community are the most common reasons for not reporting a person missing.*



**FIGURE 18** MALES MISSING AS OF 2014 VS LEVEL OF NARCOTICS CRIMES

In states where there have been high numbers of narcotics crimes, there have also been high numbers of men and boys disappearing.



Source: IEP Calculations

**Note:** The crimes included in the measure of narcotics crimes are listed in the methodology section on page 94. A Spearman's rank correlation was used to test correlations between the relative level of missing persons and organized crime activities because population-based rates of disappearance remain unreliable given the data challenges. The tests included states with more than ten persons reported missing and still missing because it is assumed that the reliability of the totals diminishes as the value diminishes.

Figure 18 shows the strong correlation, at  $r = 0.78$ , between a state's level of narcotics crimes and the number of males who disappeared in 2014 and were still missing as of October 2015. The relationship between narcotics crimes and the number of females who disappeared was less strong, but still statistically significant at  $r = 0.55$ .

The same test showed that extortion appears to have some relationship to the numbers of females disappearing. The relationship between the level of extortion and the number of missing females was  $r = 0.41$ , while the relationship with males is  $r = 0.36$ . These findings suggest that the different means by which organized crime groups seek revenue may influence who is likely to go missing.

“

*There is a strong correlation between a state's level of narcotics crimes and the number of males who disappeared in 2014. Extortion appears to have some relationship to the numbers of females disappearing.*

### › Are disappearances in Mexico increasing?

The data that is available on disappearances in Mexico is inconclusive and does not clearly indicate whether the rate of disappearance has risen. IEP's preliminary estimates show a slight increase, between one and six percent. This may be due to an increase in reporting, rather than or in addition to an increase in disappearances.

Based on 2014 and 2015 releases of statistics by the national registry, several news sources reported that 2014 was the worst year for disappearances since the escalation in violence that began in 2007. However, the national registry only reports the number of people still missing at any given time; it does not report the total number of people who went missing in each year. The various estimates suggest that between 4,100 and 4,600 people in total have gone missing each year between 2007 and 2014. But more to the point, as each data update is released, the average annual number rises slightly. This suggests that, in fact, more people are disappearing in recent years, causing the increase in the average annual number.

## › Enforced disappearances in Mexico

Enforced disappearances are the arrest, detention, abduction or deprivation of liberty by people or groups acting on behalf of the state, often in the form of arbitrary detention and/or collaboration between government officials and organized crime groups. Impunity and corruption in Mexico are severe and non-governmental organizations have repeatedly documented the involvement of government officials in disappearances in Mexico.

The highest reported number of cases with suspected state actor involvement is 2,443, reported by Mexico's National Human Rights Commission (CNDH).<sup>41</sup> If this estimate is accurate, enforced disappearances represent nine percent of the total number of people currently registered missing.

It is difficult to know how realistic this estimate is because, by nature, enforced disappearances are associated with a lack of transparency. In some cases, government agencies in Mexico have investigated other agencies and tried to hold government representatives accountable for involvement in cases of disappearances. Recent reported cases of enforced disappearances have implicated Mexico's navy, local police and federal police and have involved complicity with organized criminal groups. There have been recent resignations and arrests of officials and in some cases officials who were investigating cases have fled the country for their safety.

---

## › The government response to the issue of disappearances

Over the past few years, several serious cases of disappearances have caught the attention of Mexican and international media. In September 2014, 43 students disappeared in Iguala, Guerrero, Mexico's least peaceful state. This case involved state actors, failed investigations and cover-ups. In addition to the events in Iguala, high-profile cases include three Americans who disappeared in Tamaulipas in late 2014, two Australians who went missing and were found dead in Sinaloa in late 2015, and five young people who recently disappeared in Tierra Blanca, Veracruz, last seen with police.

The response to disappearances, both internationally and in Mexico, has become more urgent over the last few years. Accordingly, NGOs and governments alike have been putting forward potential solutions. Key reforms instigated by the Mexican government include:

**2012** The roll-out of an "Amber Alert" system, established originally by the Calderón administration in May. The system coordinates sharing of information between the state, national and international authorities.

**2013** An office was created in the Interior Ministry with the mandate to provide support to victims of crime including victims of disappearances and their families.

**2013** The Federal Prosecutor's Office (PGR) established an office dedicated to the investigation of disappearances and the search for the missing.

**2013** The PGR signed an agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross to establish a database with standardized information for the identification of unknown remains.

**2014** The Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security began publishing victim counts for cases of homicide, kidnapping and extortions. Previously, the agency had only published the number of open investigations and not the number of victims per case.<sup>42</sup>

**2015** The draft General Law to Prevent and Punish the Crime of Disappearance was tabled in Congress.

**2016** Senate set to debate the General Law.

Several of the government's initiatives have been criticized for a lack of realistic funding and inadequate coordination between levels of government. Further amendments to the draft General Law are scheduled to be discussed in the Senate in 2016.

Local organizations are being supported by international NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to assist in locating missing people. These groups also offer support to victims and their families and some partner with other Central American groups operating in similar circumstances. Collaborative peacebuilding efforts can strengthen ties and resilience throughout society, consistent with a systems approach to peace.

# An Overview of Mexico's Justice Reforms

Mexico has invested significant effort into police, judicial and penal system reforms. The data on the implementation and effectiveness of these reforms remains nascent, therefore limiting the scope for quantitative analysis. The deadline for the implementation of the New Criminal Justice System (NSJP) is upcoming, in June 2016.

In mid-2008, the Mexican congress approved a series of reforms to the country's criminal justice system. Since then, Mexican officials headed by the Coordinating Council for the Implementation of the Criminal Justice System (CCISJP) have gradually worked to implement these reforms, with a nation-wide deadline set for 18 June, 2016. The goal is to establish a set of structures that moves away from Mexico's traditional mixed inquisitorial model to one more consistent with adversarial models used in the US, Canada, Australia and the UK.

Mexico's justice system has faced biases and inefficiencies. The defense has limited opportunity to challenge the prosecution's evidence, sometimes leaving the judge with an incomplete picture of the circumstances.<sup>43</sup> The presentation of written evidence can be cumbersome, with judges sometimes taking years to review the available arguments. This has led to lengthy delays in the administration of justice throughout Mexico. The use of mandatory, pre-trial detention for those charged with certain crimes means that 50 percent of prison inmates in 2013 had not been sentenced.<sup>44</sup>

These reforms have two main elements. Firstly, they require oral trials in which both prosecutors and defense attorneys present arguments before judges. Secondly, the reforms introduce alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation and restitution. This is particularly beneficial in business disputes, family law and other areas of dispute.

In terms of due process, the most relevant changes that the NSJP sought to introduce and make operational in an everyday context were:

- Establish the presumption of innocence among accused parties
- Place the burden of proof on the prosecution
- Guarantee the right to a professional licensed public defender if the accused cannot afford an attorney
- Prohibit torture, intimidation and incommunicado detention.<sup>45</sup>

All of these features of the NSJP should allow for significant improvements in both the functioning and fairness of Mexico's judicial system.<sup>46</sup>

Prior to 2014, implementation of the new judicial system was disjointed and delayed, including the approval of a new federal code of criminal procedure and the allocation of financial resources to state judiciaries. Surveys conducted in 2013 revealed that only 11 percent of Mexicans and 30 percent of attorneys were aware of the impending reforms.<sup>47</sup> In recent years, however, the Peña Nieto administration has stepped up efforts to ensure that these reform initiatives meet the June 2016 deadline. Chief among these actions has been to double the categorical grants to Mexican states for both 2014 and 2015 by the federal Ministry of the Interior's Technical Secretariat (SETEC). In addition to these increased state subsidies, the Mexican Congress was able to agree upon a Unified Code of Criminal Procedure that in effect standardizes judicial procedures across states, ensuring clarity.

The transition to this new set of judicial structures has been slow in many states for two factors. The first was state and local elections that provided significant political distractions. Secondly, skepticism over the need for reform has arisen because of the rise in violence in several of the states that had adopted the reforms — particularly Baja California, Morelos, and Nuevo León<sup>48</sup>. Since late 2012, these fears have been mostly allayed, with the majority of states moving forward with full implementation. As of June 2015, all states, excluding Sonora, had approved and begun implementation of new judicial reforms.

In 2013, 630 of the roughly 2,400 municipalities in Mexico were fully operational with the reforms. By June 2015, this number had more than doubled, covering 57 percent of municipalities, which covers 62 percent of the population of Mexico.<sup>49</sup> While this represents encouraging progress in a short space of time there remain sizeable challenges if the 2016 deadline is to be met.

# POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

---

This section provides an analysis of Positive Peace, which is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies*. Through understanding what creates peaceful societies it is then possible to better understand the dynamics of peace within Mexico.

Positive Peace not only creates peaceful societies, it also also creates an optimum environment to support high levels of development. Positive Peace is statistically associated with many other important aspects of development, such as stronger business environments, better performance on measures of well-being and gender equality, and better ecological management.

## KEY FINDINGS

- Mexico has the second largest Positive Peace surplus in the world. Compared to other countries with similar levels of violence, it performs particularly well on *high levels of human capital, acceptance of the rights of others and good relations with neighbors*.
- It performs poorly in measures of corruption and *well-functioning government*.
- Mexico's Positive Peace surplus suggests that the country can recover from the decline in peacefulness that has occurred over the last decade.
- At the subnational level, states with higher levels of Positive Peace have recovered more quickly over the last five years.
- The correlation between levels of violence and Positive Peace in Mexican states was stronger in 2003, before the sharp increases in violence.
- No Mexican state performs well on every single measure of Positive Peace. Conversely, even the states with the lowest levels of Positive Peace perform reasonably well in at least one domain.
- States with the highest levels of violence also have the highest levels of perceptions of corruption, particularly among the police.

Positive Peace is one of the two types of peace covered in this report. Its counterpart, negative peace is defined as the absence of violence or the fear of violence and has been used to create the MPI. To develop a holistic understanding of peace in Mexico, both positive and negative peace need to be taken into account.

Positive Peace can be measured by identifying the factors that have the strongest statistical relationship with the presence or absence of violence. At the national level, the *Positive Peace Index* is derived from the factors that correlated most strongly with the *Global Peace Index*. There are eight key pillars or domains, as outlined on page 52. These eight pillars were used as the basis for creating an index of Positive Peace at the subnational level for Mexico: the Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI).


Nationally, Mexico has one the largest mismatches between its levels of actual peace, as measured through the GPI, and Positive Peace of any country in the world. Mexico has very high levels of violence compared to countries with similar levels of Positive Peace. The term Positive Peace surplus is used to describe this situation, where the Positive Peace scores are higher than the actual peace scores. This finding suggests that Mexico has the necessary structures and resources to reduce its levels of violence in the future. Analysis at the subnational level supports this finding: those states with higher levels of Positive Peace have recorded larger improvements in peacefulness since violence peaked in 2011.

# ABOUT POSITIVE PEACE

IEP's Positive Peace framework is a comprehensive taxonomy that describes the attitudes, institutions and structures associated with peaceful societies. Viewing violence in Mexico through the lens of Positive Peace allows for a better understanding of the structural factors that are needed to build higher levels of peace.

**FIGURE 19** THE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PEACE

The pillars of Positive Peace describe the attitudes, institutions and structures that underpin peaceful societies.



The eight pillars of Positive Peace (also referred to as domains) were derived by IEP from a rigorous assessment comparing over 4,700 variables with the internal peace measure of the Global Peace Index. As such, they represent a uniquely holistic study based on empirical techniques, to arrive at a framework for describing the aspects of Positive Peace.

Positive Peace can also be used to assess how supportive the underlying conditions are towards development, as they are positively associated with many desirable development outcomes, such as stronger economic performance, better measures of inclusion, including gender equality, and better performance on ecological sustainability. Therefore, Positive Peace describes an optimal framework under which human potential can flourish. Positive Peace provides a benchmark against which to measure the performance of the country's overall resilience and the broader aspects of its social

development. The stronger a country's Positive Peace, the more likely it is to recover from major shocks and be resilient against internal and external stresses.

Based on the Positive Peace framework, IEP developed a Positive Peace Index (PPI) that measures the strength of the attitudes, institutions and structures of the 162 countries covered by the GPI. The PPI is composed of 24 indicators, using three indicators to measure each of the eight Pillars of Positive Peace. For a full understanding of Positive Peace please refer to the Positive Peace Report, available at [www.economicsandpeace.org](http://www.economicsandpeace.org).

Comparing Positive Peace between countries is useful in understanding country differences and to help inform policy decisions. However, all states and districts within any national jurisdiction are not the same. Therefore developing sub-national measures of Positive Peace allows for a more nuanced understanding and for the better tailoring of policy measures. The Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) has been developed to help with answering the following questions:

- Which pillars are most important when analyzing violence and conflict within Mexican states?
- Which Mexican states perform strongly or poorly in Positive Peace?
- What are the strengths of each state that could be leveraged to counter conflict and violence and improve development?

The MPPI covers the 32 states of Mexico using indicators from surveys, national statistics and census data and studies conducted by international organizations and academic institutions.

It should be noted that there are differences between the global Positive Peace Index and the Mexican version, largely due to the lack of available data. Perceptions data is more widely available at the state level than other types of indicators. Given this, the Mexico Positive Peace Index relies on perceptions data as proxy indicators and uses a greater number of them than the global index.



## POSITIVE PEACE DOMAINS



### Well-Functioning Government

A well-functioning government delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law.



### Sound Business Environment

The strength of economic conditions, as well as the formal institutions, that support the operation of the private sector determine the soundness of the business environment. Business competitiveness and economic productivity are both associated with the most peaceful countries, as is the presence of regulatory systems that are conducive to business operation.



### Equitable Distribution of Resources

Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources like education and health, as well as, although to a lesser extent, equity in income distribution.



### Acceptance of the Rights of Others

A country's formal laws which guarantee basic human rights and freedoms and the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviours of citizens serve as proxies for the level of tolerance between different ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socio-economic groups within the country. Similarly, gender equality, worker's rights and freedom of speech are important components of societies that uphold acceptance of the rights of others.



### Good Relations with Neighbors

Having peaceful relations with other countries is as important as good relations between groups within a country. Countries with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend to be more politically stable, have better functioning governments, are regionally integrated and have lower levels of organised internal conflict. This factor is also beneficial for business and supports foreign direct investment, tourism and human capital inflows.



### Free Flow of Information

Peaceful countries tend to have free and independent media that disseminates information in a way that leads to greater openness and helps individuals and civil society work together. This is reflected in the extent to which citizens can gain access to information, whether the media is free and independent and how well-informed citizens are. This leads to better decision-making and more rational responses in times of crisis.



### High Levels of Human Capital

A skilled human capital base – reflected in the extent to which societies educate citizens and promote the development of knowledge – improves economic productivity, care for the young, enables political participation and increases social capital. Education is a fundamental building block through which societies can build resilience and develop mechanisms to learn and adapt.



### Low Levels of Corruption

In societies with high corruption, resources are inefficiently allocated, often leading to a lack of funding for essential services. The resulting inequities can lead to civil unrest and in extreme situations can be the catalyst for more serious violence. Low corruption, by contrast, can enhance confidence and trust in institutions.


The methodology and indicators informing the MPPI are detailed on page 99. To read more about the global framework, download the 2015 Positive Peace Report from [www.economicsandpeace.org](http://www.economicsandpeace.org).

# UNDERSTANDING POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

Mexico is ranked 65th on the 2015 Positive Peace Index, much higher than its 2015 Global Peace Index rank of 144th. It fares well across the entire spectrum of Positive Peace domains, with better scores than the global average for the index as a whole and for four of the eight Positive Peace domains.

**FIGURE 20** MEXICO COMPARED TO THE GLOBAL AVERAGE ON THE POSITIVE PEACE INDEX, 2015

Mexico scores better than the global average overall and on four of the eight Positive Peace domains.



Source: IEP

“

There was a direct link between the increase in violence in Mexico and the decrease in some of the domains within Positive Peace, as criminal organizations were able to intimidate government officials and bribe municipal and state police, leading to an increase in corruption, while journalists who attempted to report on the violence were targeted for attacks and assassination.

Mexico performs better than the global average for *sound business environment, good relations with neighbors<sup>1</sup>, equitable distributions of resources and acceptance of the rights of others*. The country scores more poorly than the global average on *free flow of information, high levels of human capital and well-functioning government* as shown in figure 20.

However, while Mexico does have relatively high levels of Positive Peace, the increase in violence caused by the drug war was a shock to its governance institutions and its measures of *low*

levels of corruption, well-functioning government and free flow of information have all slipped since 2005. As shown in figure 21, free flow of information has fluctuated over the period but still remains at worse levels than in 2005.

The overall Positive Peace score for Mexico improved by about one percent from 2005 to 2015, compared to the global average which improved by 1.7 percent. Figure 21 shows the changes in the individual domains of Positive Peace. Mexico's well-functioning government, low levels of corruption and free flow of information domains deteriorated by just under five percent, even as its scores on acceptance of the rights of others and equitable distribution of resources improved by just over five percent.

There was a direct link between the increase in violence in Mexico and the decrease in some of the domains within Positive Peace, as criminal organizations were able to

intimidate government officials and bribe municipal and state police, leading to an increase in corruption, while journalists who attempted to report on the violence were targeted for attacks and assassination. Confidence in Mexico's institutions fell to such low levels that by 2012, more than 70 percent of Mexican citizens felt that their municipal police were corrupt and over 60 percent thought that the state police were corrupt.


In spite of this deterioration in some Positive Peace domains, Mexico still scores well as a country. At the global level, it is unusual to see a country with high levels of violence perform well on the Positive Peace Index, as GPI and PPI scores tend to converge in the long run. Mexico is therefore an exception.

Countries with low levels of Positive Peace but high levels of actual peace are more susceptible to falling into violence and conflict. Conversely, countries with high levels of Positive Peace but low levels of actual peace, such as Mexico, are better placed

“ Confidence in Mexico's institutions fell to such low levels that by 2012, more than 70 percent of Mexican citizens felt that their municipal police were corrupt and over 60 percent thought that the state police were corrupt.

**FIGURE 21** MEXICO'S POSITIVE PEACE DOMAIN SCORE CHANGES FROM 2005 TO 2015

Free flow of information, well-functioning government, and low levels of corruption all deteriorated in Mexico over the last decade. Mexico's overall Positive Peace score improved one percent from 2005 and 2015.



Source: IEP


to recover from violence and conflict. The term Positive Peace surplus is used to describe these types of countries.

Mexico had the second largest Positive Peace surplus of any nation in 2015, as shown in figure 22. The Positive Peace surplus is calculated by looking at the difference between a country's internal GPI score and its PPI score, as seen in the scatterplot on the left-hand side of figure 22. Countries that fall above the dotted line have higher levels of actual violence than their level of Positive Peace would indicate. In 2015, only Israel had a larger Positive Peace surplus than Mexico. This suggests that Mexico has most of the attitudes, institutions

and structures necessary to help combat violence and increase peacefulness over the long run, although governance will have to improve, particularly in relation to corruption.

**FIGURE 22** THE POSITIVE PEACE SURPLUS IN MEXICO

Mexico has the second largest Positive Peace surplus of any country.



Source: IEP

**BOX 3** PEACE IN NUEVO LEÓN

The state of Nuevo León offers an example of the resilience that Positive Peace can provide. It has been significantly affected by the increases in violence in Mexico in the last decade. In 2011, at the height of the violence, Nuevo León ranked 26th in the MPI, having fallen from number four in 2004, Mexico's most peaceful year. The state's rates of homicide and organized crime as well as its overall level of peacefulness deteriorated faster than the national average.

Today, Nuevo León is one of the states leading the country in improvements in peacefulness. It ranks first in Positive Peace and has shown the third largest improvement in its MPI score of any state in the last five years. In 2015, IEP published an in-depth analysis of the drivers and dynamics of peacefulness in the state of Nuevo León. To learn more about peace in Nuevo León, including analysis on some of the state's largest municipalities and targeted efforts to improve Positive Peace, see *Informe Nuevo León*, available at: [www.economicsandpeace.org](http://www.economicsandpeace.org).



# 2015 MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

The Mexico Positive Peace Index is based on the methodology of the global Positive Peace Index. The global Positive Peace Index is empirically derived by selecting indicators that had the strongest correlation with the internal peace measure of the Global Peace Index. The MPPI uses the same domains as the PPI and the indicators used are representative of these domains, based on available data at the state level.

In total, 62 indicators were selected to construct the MPPI, as compared to 24 for the PPI. A full list of the 62 indicators and a more detailed discussion of the methodology can be found on page 99.

The MPPI highlights existing differences in the attitudes, institutions and structures between Mexican states. This provides important insight into the ability of the states of Mexico to build peace in the long term and highlights present institutional strengths and weaknesses.

**FIGURE 23** POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

Poorer states in the southern region of the country have lower levels of Positive Peace, while wealthier states closer to the US border have higher levels of Positive Peace. Nuevo León has the highest level of Positive Peace. Guerrero ranks last, both in positive and negative Peace in Mexico.











Figure 23 highlights the geographical distribution of Positive Peace across the 32 Mexican states. Many of the poorer states in the southern region of the country have lower levels of Positive Peace, while wealthier states that are closer to the US border have higher levels of Positive Peace.

Table 9 gives the scores for each of the Positive Peace domains for all 32 Mexican states. From analyzing the table, it can be observed that no individual state has a completely strong system. That is, no state scores highly on all eight domains of Positive Peace.

The overall state score is calculated by averaging the scores for each domain. In order to have a score of 1, the most peaceful score possible, a state would need to perform at the highest level possible within each domain. No state is strong in all domains.

**TABLE 9** POSITIVE PEACE SCORES BY STATE AND DOMAIN, 2015

No state performs well on every single pillar of Positive Peace.


STATE	OVERALL SCORE								
Nuevo León	2.246	2.019	2.536	1.551	2.103	2.263	3.355	2.579	1.561
Coahuila	2.288	2.127	3.166	1.721	2.495	2.086	2.712	2.413	1.584
Aguascalientes	2.349	1.784	3.023	2.211	2.482	2.177	3.253	2.200	1.661
Sonora	2.350	1.779	2.573	1.936	2.436	2.525	2.766	2.627	2.159
Yucatán	2.441	1.493	2.508	1.949	2.801	2.217	2.640	2.983	2.936
Sinaloa	2.462	1.808	2.883	1.493	2.729	3.001	2.985	2.433	2.364
Colima	2.482	2.721	2.942	2.073	2.356	2.215	3.055	2.659	1.839
Zacatecas	2.490	2.145	3.541	1.443	2.923	2.087	3.135	2.186	2.460
Tamaulipas	2.544	2.480	2.851	1.655	2.621	3.218	2.881	2.581	2.065
Querétaro	2.592	2.519	3.396	2.083	2.502	2.529	2.723	2.586	2.397
Nayarit	2.593	1.999	3.307	2.596	2.895	2.636	2.905	2.002	2.408
Jalisco	2.615	2.595	3.599	2.468	2.525	2.501	3.232	2.091	1.911
Baja California	2.637	2.860	3.401	3.006	1.958	2.527	3.044	2.544	1.755
Durango	2.641	2.215	3.354	1.669	3.282	2.707	3.049	2.262	2.589
Guanajuato	2.648	2.456	3.283	1.823	3.021	2.481	3.161	2.309	2.651
Distrito Federal	2.690	4.097	3.519	4.123	1.258	1.804	2.348	3.074	1.298
Quintana Roo	2.762	2.737	2.870	3.289	2.336	2.872	2.943	2.656	2.395
San Luis Potosí	2.771	2.914	3.272	2.273	2.957	2.511	2.478	2.474	3.293
Campeche	2.785	2.269	2.641	2.693	2.859	2.693	3.194	2.852	3.076
Chihuahua	2.843	3.490	3.564	2.736	2.460	3.190	2.733	2.606	1.964
Tlaxcala	2.886	2.915	3.840	2.590	2.386	2.305	3.908	2.813	2.331
México	2.910	3.555	3.574	3.306	2.194	2.630	2.972	2.831	2.220
Baja California Sur	2.914	3.333	3.356	2.536	2.093	2.572	3.808	3.374	2.241
Morelos	2.989	3.717	4.102	3.114	2.207	2.482	3.050	2.771	2.471
Hidalgo	3.030	3.403	3.864	2.906	3.165	2.657	2.582	2.587	3.076
Puebla	3.061	2.950	3.486	2.769	3.140	2.852	2.924	2.975	3.388
Tabasco	3.106	3.683	3.121	3.003	2.925	2.487	3.539	3.073	3.015
Michoacán	3.136	3.455	3.573	2.575	3.564	3.143	3.304	2.570	2.907
Veracruz	3.208	3.073	3.537	2.422	3.605	3.220	3.365	2.818	3.627
Chiapas	3.269	2.602	3.278	2.185	4.622	3.202	3.528	2.294	4.443
Oaxaca	3.509	3.261	3.863	3.279	4.128	3.516	2.350	3.022	4.656
Guerrero	3.570	3.115	3.480	2.841	4.668	3.706	3.044	2.990	4.717



Positive Peace in Mexico was strongly correlated with the MPI in 2003, prior to the escalation in violence. The damaging impact of the rapid upturn in violence and the nature of the organized crime operations can be seen through the deteriorations in the strength of the correlations. The current relationship between violence and many of the domains of Positive Peace is atypical. Many of the drug cartels are based in the states that provide the best transport routes for their drug businesses. These states are either situated near the US border or the coasts and are often among the wealthiest states. Figure 24 shows the relationship between MPI and MPPI scores in 2003 and in 2015.

**FIGURE 24** CORRELATION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PEACE IN MEXICO, 2003 AND 2015

Positive Peace scores correlate with levels of negative peace in 2003, but the correlation deteriorates by 2015 because of the distortive nature of the violence Mexico faces.



Source: IEP


## IMPROVEMENTS IN PEACEFULNESS

Since violence peaked in Mexico in 2011, most states have seen improvements in their peacefulness. Those improvements have been consistently larger in states with higher levels of Positive Peace, highlighting the resilience that is associated with Positive Peace, as shown in figure 25. In Mexico, states that have stronger attitudes, institutions and structures have an increased capacity to deal with the consequences of organized crime groups and other forms of violence. This is seen in figure 25, which shows that the six states that have the highest Positive Peace scores are also among the states with the largest improvements in the last five years.

Having a strong institutional structure aids in the response to shocks like escalations in cartel violence. While most of Mexico experienced a deterioration in peacefulness during the worst drug war years, states with strong levels of Positive Peace tend to show large improvements. Nuevo León, the state with the strongest Positive Peace score, improved in MPI score by 26 percent from 2011 to 2015. This is the third largest improvement in Mexico. The states with the second and third strongest scores in Positive Peace, Coahuila and Aguascalientes, both saw their MPI scores improve by 23 and 20 percent respectively. Further, Nuevo León and Colima were two of the states with the largest Positive Peace surpluses and had the largest percentage decreases in organized crime style homicides from 2013 to 2014, with Nuevo León decreasing 68 percent and Colima decreasing 66 percent.<sup>2</sup>

**FIGURE 25** 2015 POSITIVE PEACE VS CHANGE IN MPI SCORE, 2011 TO 2015

States that have improved in peace since 2011 generally have higher levels of Positive Peace.



Source: IEP


# THE PILLARS OF PEACE IN MEXICO

The greatest challenge to improving peacefulness in Mexico is the activity of organized crime groups. Unlike most other forms of violence, cartel-driven violence does not correlate with typical Positive Peace measures at the state level. This is in part explained by the particulars of organized crime activity. Drug cartels follow the best distribution points and locations for their operations, which have generally been along the coasts or the US border and tend to be wealthier states. Nonetheless, there are some specific relationships between certain types of violence, such as violent crime, and various domains of Positive Peace.

As previously shown in figure 21 on page 54, perceptions of corruption in Mexico deteriorated nationally from 2007 onwards, along with measures of governance and press freedoms. Crucially, however, the states with the largest improvements in peace have maintained relatively high scores on these Positive Peace domains. The states with the best performances in Positive Peace and the largest improvements in peace in the last five years all performed well in *low levels of corruption, free flow of information, and well-functioning government.*

**FIGURE 26** VIOLENT CRIME AND WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT, BANDED SCORES, 2015

In general, states with better performing governments also have lower rates of violent crime.



Source: IEP

## WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT

A well-functioning government delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law. In the context of Mexico, which has high levels of violence, the ability of the government to function effectively is an essential component of developing resilience and countering violence.

*Violent crime* correlates with *well-functioning government*, which measures confidence in the activity of the government and its various bodies, with a correlation of 0.41. In states where high-quality public services are delivered and citizens have confidence in their governments, violent crime is relatively lower, as seen in figure 26.

A number of measures in the MPI do not significantly correlate with *well-functioning government*. Indicators of note are *detention without a sentence, justice system efficiency,*

police funding and to a lesser extent organized crime. This may be partly explained by the fact that states that have both higher crime rates and well-functioning governments tend to put more resources into police funding and the criminal justice system than poorer performing governments. The presence of organized crime groups can also affect governments' efficiencies as they create more opportunities for corruption and hence a less efficient justice system. These factors complicate the relationship between well-functioning government and overall peacefulness, but, nonetheless, better performance in this domain of Positive Peace has a statistically significant relationship with lower levels of violent crime.

## LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION

Corruption in Mexico is a longstanding problem. There has been a problematic relationship between organized crime, government operations and law enforcement in Mexico since at least the 1990s. Mexico has the lowest ranking on the *Corruption Perceptions Index* of any OECD country.

High levels of corruption are correlated with violence at the state level. In particular, states with lower instances of police officers asking for bribes have lower levels of violent crime.<sup>3</sup> This relationship is also found with other measures of corruption. Perceived corruption among the Public Ministry, Federal Attorney General, federal police and judiciary all correlate with violent crime, robbery and justice system efficiency. Figure 27 highlights the relationship between violent crime and police bribery.

Table 10 shows the ten states with the highest percentage of survey respondents who perceived corruption in the following government agencies:


[Judges](#)
[Federal Police](#)
[State Police](#)

Distrito Federal ranks at the bottom in all three categories. Six states rank amongst the worst 10 in all three categories and two states rank in the worst 10 for two categories. Perceptions of corruption are highest at the municipal level, followed by state police, with federal police being the most trusted. Federal police in Mexico have been involved in addressing crime in Mexican states, partially because of challenges in state and municipal capabilities.<sup>4</sup> The high levels of corruption across Mexican states highlight the issues facing Mexican governments.

**FIGURE 27**

VIOLENT CRIME AND PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE REPORTING THAT A POLICE OFFICER ASKED FOR A BRIBE, 2014

The states with the lowest levels of police bribery have lower levels of violent crime.



Source: IEP

**TABLE 10** TOP TEN STATES BY PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION, POLICE AND JUDICIARY, 2015

RANK	STATE	JUDGES	RANK	STATE	FEDERAL POLICE	RANK	STATE	STATE POLICE
1	Distrito Federal	79.4	1	Distrito Federal	68.6	1	Distrito Federal	86.7
2	Hidalgo	75.9	2	Tlaxcala	65.5	2	Estado de México	77.7
3	Tlaxcala	75.2	3	Puebla	65.2	3	Campeche	71.8
4	Jalisco	75.1	4	Hidalgo	64.4	4	Tabasco	68.5
5	Oaxaca	75	5	Campeche	63.7	5	Morelos	66.9
6	Estado de México	73.6	6	Oaxaca	61.9	6	Hidalgo	66.5
7	Guerrero	70.2	7	Chihuahua	61.5	7	Michoacán de Ocampo	66.4
8	Campeche	68.7	8	Querétaro	59.8	8	Tlaxcala	66.1
9	Morelos	68.2	9	Morelos	59.5	9	Oaxaca	65
10	Puebla	67	10	Quintana Roo	59.2	10	Baja California	63.9

Source: Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública

There is a statistically significant relationship between homicide rates and *free flow of information*. The *free flow of information* domain is a measure of access to information, persecution of journalists and trust in the media. State scores for *free flow of information* significantly correlate with measures of peacefulness. A free and independent media disseminates information in a way that leads to greater openness and strengthens peacefulness in a country. It also leads to better decision-making and more rational responses in times of crisis. In the context of a crisis like a drug war, a free and independent media is fundamental to ensuring full public debate. The high number of journalists killed in Mexico has an inhibiting effect on the dissemination of information and the freedom of the press.

States with lower homicide rates tend to have more media freedom. This in part reflects the fact that journalists have been the target of organized crime in Mexico for many years and more journalists are targeted in the more violent states.

Targeting of journalists for kidnapping and murder has meant there is an environment of fear and self-censorship in the Mexican media. The intimidation of journalists by organized crime groups have sometimes not been adequately dealt with by the criminal justice system.<sup>5</sup> In 2015, 64 journalists were killed in incidents directly related to their work.<sup>6</sup> Figure 29 shows that between 58 and 88 journalists have been killed in Mexico each year since 2007.


The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) publishes data regarding journalists who were killed, according to the topics that the journalists covered. Data was available for 35 journalists detailing the type of news stories they covered. Twenty-nine of 35 journalists who were killed covered crime, corruption or both.

“ Twenty-nine of 35 journalists who were killed covered crime, corruption or both.

Using the free flow of information as an example highlights the interactions between the different domains of Positive Peace and the systemic nature of Positive Peace. Consider the interactions between just three domains: *free flow of information*, *well-functioning government* and *low levels of corruption*. When considering these three domains in Mexico it is very hard to disentangle the influences between them. Government is not a homogeneous entity and different facets of it behave differently. One facet may be fighting corruption, while another facet maybe engaging in or enabling it. *Free flow of information* can bring accountability, which affects the actions of government; however, government action and corruption can impinge on *free flow of information*. Causality

**FIGURE 28** 2015 HOMICIDE RATE VS FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION


*Free flow of information* correlates with the homicide rate. This relationship occurred even before the sharp increases in violence.



Source: IEP

**FIGURE 29** NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS KILLED IN MEXICO, 2003 – 2015


Between 58 and 88 journalists have been killed in incidents related to their work every year since the start of the drug war.



Source: Reporters without Borders

**FIGURE 30** JOURNALISTS KILLED IN MEXICO BY TOPIC COVERED, 1994 TO JANUARY 2016

Twenty-nine of 35 journalists who were killed covered crime, corruption or both.



Source: Committee to Protect Journalists

can run in either direction depending on individual circumstances. Therefore focusing on the system as a whole is the best method of improving many aspects of society.

By strengthening the pillars of Positive Peace, solid feedback loops can be created, whereby virtuous and self-reinforcing cycles of peace are created and perpetuated. In the case of *free flow of information*, violence against journalists makes it very difficult for journalists to provide information, thus limiting the ability of citizens and decision-makers to use that information to increase peacefulness. A systems approach suggests then that *free flow of information* needs to be improved by, among other things, improving the rule of law, lowering corruption and improving employment.

# THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

---



## KEY FINDINGS

- The total economic impact of violence in Mexico was 2.12 trillion pesos (US\$134 billion) in 2015, 13 percent of Mexican GDP.
- This amount is equivalent to 17,525 pesos (US\$1,105) per Mexican citizen, approximately two months wages for an average Mexican worker.<sup>1</sup>
- In 2015 the economic impact of violence decreased by four percent compared to the previous year. This equated to a peace dividend of 76 billion pesos.
- The increase in the number of homicides in 2015 negatively impacted the Mexican economy by 31 billion pesos.
- The total economic impact of violence was 38 percent lower in 2015 than 2011.
- The Mexican federal government spent 220 billion pesos or 1,818 pesos per Mexican citizen on violence containment in 2015.
- Federal government spending on violence containment has more than doubled since 2003.
- Military expenditure is the fastest growing category of violence containment spending, increasing from 0.3 percent of GDP in 2003 to 0.6 percent of GDP in 2015.
- The Mexican government's spending on violence containment increased 12 percent compared to overall government spending growth of nine percent. Health and economic development expenditures grew at 11 and 10 percent respectively.
- Approximately 60 percent of business survey respondents reported that insecurity and crime were the primary concerns for their businesses in 2013.

**The total economic impact of violence in Mexico was 2.12 trillion pesos (US\$134 billion) in 2015, equivalent to 13 percent of Mexican GDP or 17,525 pesos (US\$1,105) per person in Mexico. These figures are considered conservative as there are items where reliable data was unavailable and have therefore not been included.**

In order to identify the economic benefits that come from improvements in peacefulness, the MPI report measures what is termed the *total economic impact of violence*. This is defined as expenditures related to containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence. This figure includes the direct and indirect costs of violence, as well as a multiplier effect. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided. The economic values presented here are in 2014 constant pesos.

The economic impact of violence had increased since 2007, peaking in 2011, the least peaceful year in Mexico in the last decade. But with improved peacefulness comes positive news, and the most recent trends indicate that the economic impact of violence dropped by 38 percent since 2011.

In 2015 there was a decrease in violent crimes, other than homicide, that was responsible for most of the savings. This resulted in a reduction in the economic impact of violence by 96 billion pesos. However, this improvement was partly offset by an increase in homicides of 6.3 percent. The additional economic impact of the increase in homicides was 31 billion pesos.

The Mexican government's expenditure on violence containment has steadily increased since 2003. In 2015, in constant currency, it spent 220 billion pesos or 1,818 pesos per person on keeping people safer. This expenditure is equivalent to 1.36 percent of Mexico's 2015 GDP. Military expenditure has experienced the largest rise since 2003, increasing three times from 34 to 98 billion pesos and now represents 0.6 percent of GDP. Spending on domestic security has also increased by 2.5 times compared to its 2003 level, from 18 to 44 billion pesos and represents 0.27 percent of GDP.

# METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE

## This analysis presents conservative estimates for the economic impact of violence in Mexico.

The estimation only includes elements of violence where reliable data could be obtained. The items listed below were included in the cost of violence in the 2016 MPI:

1. **Homicide**
2. **Violent crime**, which includes assault, rape and robbery
3. **Organized crime**, which includes extortion and kidnapping
4. **Indirect costs of incarceration**
5. **Firearms**
6. **Fear of insecurity**
7. **Private security expenditures**
8. **Federal spending on violent containment**, which includes the military, domestic security and the justice system.

**The analysis incorporates federal-level public spending on the military because Mexico's military has been extensively involved in fighting the organized criminal groups and is deployed to pursue domestic security goals.<sup>1</sup>**

Some of the items not counted in the economic impact of violence include:

- State-level public spending on security
- The cost of domestic violence
- The cost of violence to businesses
- Insurance premiums
- Household out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
- The cost of drug-trade related crimes, such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs.

## IEP's estimate of the total economic impact of violence includes three components:

1. **Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, the perpetrator and the government. These include direct expenditures such as the cost of policing.
  2. **Indirect costs** accruing after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma, medical costs and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost future income.
  3. **The multiplier effect** represents the flow-on effects of direct costs, such as the additional economic benefits that would come from investments in business development or education instead of containing or dealing with the consequences of violence.
- The term **cost of violence containment** is used to explain the combined effect of direct and indirect costs.
  - When a country avoids the economic impact of violence, it realizes a **peace dividend**. Mexico had a peace dividend of 802 billion pesos from the 13.5 percent improvement in peacefulness from 2011 to 2015.

These items were not included for two reasons. Firstly, some items have been captured elsewhere in the model. For example, the costs associated with drug-trade related crimes are included in the costs of domestic security, such as law enforcement, incarceration and the justice system. Secondly, reliable data could not be sourced at a state level for the entire study period of 2003 to 2015 for many categories, such as household and business expenditures.

This study uses a unit cost approach to cost the incidence of violence. Unit costs are applied to the number of crimes committed. These crimes include homicide, assault, rape, robbery, extortion, kidnapping and fear of insecurity. The unit costs estimate the direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) costs of each crime. Direct unit costs include losses to the victim and perpetrator, and exclude costs incurred by law enforcement and health care systems, as these are captured elsewhere in the model. Indirect unit costs include the physical and psychological trauma, and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost life-time wages for homicide victims.

The term cost of violence containment is used to explain the combined effect of direct and indirect costs, while the economic impact of violence includes direct costs, indirect costs and the peace multiplier. The concept of peace multiplier is related to the economic benefits that would have been generated if all the direct costs were used in more productive alternatives. Refer to box 4 for more detail on the peace multiplier.

The cost estimates provided in this report are in constant 2014 pesos, which facilitates the comparison of the estimates overtime. The year 2014 is the base year and was chosen as it is the most recent year for which inflation data was available when the study was done.

For more details on the methodology for estimating the economic impact of violence, please refer to the full methodology section on page 105.

# THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE 2003-2015

IEP analysis finds that the total economic impact of violence in 2015 reached 2.12 trillion pesos (US\$134 billion), which is equivalent to 13 percent of Mexico's 2015 GDP. To put this figure into perspective, the economic impact of violence per person was 17,525 pesos. This value is approximately equal to two months of wages for an average Mexican worker.<sup>2</sup>

Mexico's improvements in peace resulted in an overall peace dividend of 76 billion pesos in 2015. This is the net effect of the reductions in violence from 2014 to 2015. Some cost items grew in 2015, such as homicide and government spending, while others declined, such as violent crime and organized crime related offenses.

The total economic impact of violence peaked in 2011 at 2.92 trillion pesos, equivalent to 19 percent of Mexican GDP. Importantly, since 2011, the economic impact of violence has dropped by 38 percent or 802 billion pesos. The value of this improvement is approximately equal to the total oil revenue of Mexico in 2015, which was 830 billion pesos.<sup>3</sup> Figure 31 illustrates the economic impact of violence for the period of 2003 to 2015 in constant 2014 pesos.

From 2007 to 2011, the total economic impact of violence increased by 33 percent. However, since 2011, it has declined by 38 percent. The highest annual increase in the economic impact of violence happened in 2010, when it increased by nine percent from 2.49 to 2.71 trillion pesos. Conversely, the largest annual decline in the economic impact of violence occurred during the period of 2012 to 2013, when it dropped by 13 percent from 2.70 to 2.37 trillion pesos.


Table 11 details the direct and indirect costs of violence, including the multiplier, by category for the entire time series. Most costs peaked between 2009 and 2012, at the height of violence in Mexico.

“ Since 2011, the economic impact of violence has dropped by 38 percent or 802 billion pesos.

**FIGURE 31**

TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IN MEXICO, 2003–2015

The total economic impact of violence has decreased by 38 percent since 2011.



Source: IEP

**TABLE 11** ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE 2003-2015, CONSTANT 2014 PESOS (BILLIONS)\*

\*The figure for government spending includes the peace multiplier, representing the full economic impact of this spending. Actual government spending was 220 billion pesos in 2015.


INDICATOR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Homicide	702.2	625.8	598.3	635.3	539.7	687.4	809.2	1021.1	1147.7	1042.4	825.7	696.1	727.4
Violent Crime	1238.8	1184.9	1166.7	1211.8	1281	1280.9	1247	1237.3	1255	1126.4	1027.1	941.7	845.2
Organized Crime	5.7	6.6	7.3	8	7.4	11.9	14.3	13.2	11.2	15.2	16	11.6	10
Firearms	6.4	6.1	6.1	6.6	18.9	17.5	16.8	16.3	16.1	18.8	17	16	16.5
Fear	49.1	48	48.5	48.8	49.3	49.6	48.7	49.1	56.4	52.6	54.3	55.1	54.1
Incarceration	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7
Private Security	20.1	20.3	20.5	20.7	20.8	21	21.2	22.1	22.4	23	23.3	23.5	24.5
Government Spending	182	186.2	197.4	214.6	261.1	286.6	328.4	352.5	411.4	421.6	404.8	450.1	440.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,206.11</b>	<b>2,079.65</b>	<b>2,046.86</b>	<b>2,148.03</b>	<b>2,180.41</b>	<b>2,357.23</b>	<b>2,487.94</b>	<b>2,713.93</b>	<b>2,922.70</b>	<b>2,702.39</b>	<b>2,370.68</b>	<b>2,196.76</b>	<b>2,120.60</b>

Total spending on the military, domestic security and the justice system has been steadily increasing since 2003. Spending on the military has tripled in constant currency terms since 2003 in response to the rise in organized crime. Additionally, domestic security has increased by two and a half times and spending on the justice system has doubled.

Perceptions of insecurity at the state level increased from 2007 to 2011. During this period the economic impact of the fear of violence increased from 49 billion pesos to 54 billion pesos. Table 11 provides the cost of fear from 2003 to 2015. Fear of violence can have adverse economic and social effects, such as inhibiting business transactions, lowering well-being, decreasing the level of trust in society and decreasing social activities.<sup>4</sup>

**FIGURE 32** TREND IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE BY CATEGORY, 2003-2015 (2003 = 100)

Military spending is the fastest growing category of violence containment spending since 2003, increasing almost 200 percent over the 13 year period.



Source: IEP

# BREAKDOWN OF THE TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

The breakdown of the economic impact of violence for 2015 shows that violent crime is the most costly crime category, followed by homicide. The combined cost of violent crime and homicide made up 84 percent of the economic impact of violence in Mexico in 2015. Figure 33 illustrates costs by their various components.

The homicide rate in Mexico increased by 6.3 percent in 2015. This resulted in an additional economic impact of 31 billion pesos, increasing the total annual cost of homicide from 696 to 727 billion pesos.

In contrast to homicides, the economic impact of violent crime on the Mexican economy dropped by 96 billion pesos during 2015. This was on the back of a 9.5 percent reduction in the violent crime rate.

When looking at the longer term trend from 2011 to 2015, the cost of violent crime dropped from 1,255 billion pesos in 2011 to 845 billion pesos in 2015, resulting in a reduction of 410 billion pesos.


The costs associated with organized crime related offenses improved for each of the last three years to 2015, with the cost of this group of crimes falling by 53 percent. This trend reflects Mexico's success in lowering the activity of the cartels.

The total economic impact of extortions and kidnapping on the Mexican economy was 10 billion pesos in 2015. This does not account for the very large economic impact of organized crime, such as deferred investment and consumption and the potential flight of capital. It is important to note that the cost of organized crimes in this model does not include drug-trade related economic activity such as production, transport, trade, supply or possession of drugs.

The costs associated with the drug trade are captured in other categories. For instance, when organized crime groups, who are closely associated with the drug trade, kidnap or extort, the costs are captured in kidnapping and extortion statistics. Also, violent assault resulting from drug-trade related organized crime incidents are captured in violent crime. Additionally, no reliable data could be sourced on the net costs of drug-trade related crimes such as production, transport, trade, supply and possession of drugs.

**FIGURE 33** BREAKDOWN OF THE TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE, 2015

Violent crime represents the largest component of the total economic impact of violence in 2015 at 45 per cent of the total.




Source: IEP

“ In contrast to homicides, the economic impact of violent crime on the Mexican economy dropped by 96 billion pesos during 2015. This was on the back of a 9.5 percent reduction in the violent crime rate.



**FIGURE 34** PROPORTION OF HOMICIDES RELATED TO ORGANIZED CRIME, 2014

Approximately half of homicide-related costs stem from organized crime related homicides.



Source: Milenio

A category in which it is possible to estimate the impact of organized criminal groups is that of homicide; many homicides are related to the drug-trade. Using data from Milenio, it is estimated that organized crime related homicides are 51 percent of total homicides in 2014.<sup>5</sup> Figure 34 illustrates the proportion of homicides by organized crime groups, as estimated by Milenio.

“ Organized crime related homicides were 51 percent of total homicides in 2014, demonstrating the impact of organized crime groups on the economy.

## GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

In 2015, the Mexican government spent 220 billion pesos or 1.36 percent of GDP on violence containment. This is equal to 1,818 pesos per Mexican citizen. Government spending on violence containment includes spending on the military, domestic security and the justice system, and makes up 14 percent of the violence containment costs in 2015.

Total federal government expenditure on violence containment increased on average by 14 percent per year from 2007 to 2011. After 2011, the rate of increase slowed, increasing by only 2 percent to 2015. In response to the falling crime rates from 2012 onwards, the government appears to have slowed the rate of increase in spending.

During the 13-year period from 2003 to 2014, government spending had been steadily increasing, until 2015 when it fell by two percent. The largest decline in government spending was in the justice system, which fell by 11 percent in 2015. Given the increasing strain on both the court and prison system in Mexico, this reduction may not be helpful.

Spending on the military has increased by 189 percent in constant currency terms since 2003. Additionally, domestic security has increased 149 percent, while spending on the justice system has doubled. This increase in spending highlights the additional resources that have been applied to fighting organized crime groups.

For Mexico to further lower levels of crime, economic and social development related initiatives need to be undertaken. Creating the appropriate environment, known as Positive Peace, would result in the long term ability of Mexico to reduce violence containment expenditure further and provide the funds for other essential government programs, such as a more robust health system, business development or education. A proportion of the savings from the reductions in violence needs to be

**TABLE 12**

GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT, CONSTANT 2014 PESOS (BILLIONS)

INDICATOR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Domestic Security	17.8	18.6	20.1	22.2	25	28.6	38.2	40	48.3	48.9	42.8	47.8	44.2
Military	34	33.3	34.3	36.1	54.3	59.3	66.7	73.8	86.4	80.5	82.2	90.7	98
Justice System	39.3	41.2	44.3	49	51.2	55.4	59.3	62.5	71	81.4	77.5	86.5	77.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93.1</b>	<b>98.7</b>	<b>107.3</b>	<b>130.5</b>	<b>143.3</b>	<b>164.2</b>	<b>176.2</b>	<b>205.7</b>	<b>210.8</b>	<b>202.4</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>220.6</b>

“ Military expenditure has had the largest increase since 2003, nearly tripling from 34 to 98 billion pesos.

directed into these programs, otherwise advancements that have been made will stall and the high rates of government expenditure on the military and policing will be required to maintain the current levels of peace.

On average, government spending on violence containment grew 12 percent annually from 2008 to 2015. During the same period, overall government expenditure had an average annual growth of nine percent. Therefore, spending on violence containment has grown faster than overall government expenditure. Similarly, government spending on education had an average growth of seven percent per year while spending on health and economic

development grew at 11 and 10 percent respectively.<sup>6</sup> Figure 35 illustrates government spending from 2003 to 2015.


Military expenditure has had the largest increase since 2003, nearly tripling from 34 to 98 billion pesos. Although this may seem like a large increase and places it among 10 largest percentage increases in the world in military spending as a percentage of GDP, at 0.6 percent it is still low compared to other Latin American countries.

This reflects the redirection of the Mexican military to maintaining internal security. Federal spending on domestic security also increased by two and a half times over its 2003 level, from 18 to 44 billion pesos, although it has fallen in 2015.

**FIGURE 35**

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

Federal spending on violence containment has more than doubled since 2003.



Source: Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público

# ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE

To understand the method used to calculate the economic impact of violence, four concepts need to be explained:

- **Direct costs** include direct expenditure borne by the victim, their families, business and government. Examples of this would be medical costs, security, policing and the military budget.
- **Indirect costs** include the lost productivity that would have otherwise occurred if the violence had not happened. This includes lost earnings and the physiological effects that affect productivity.
- **The cost of violence containment** refers to both the direct and indirect costs associated with preventing or dealing with the consequences of violence.
- **The economic impact of violence** refers to the cost of violence containment plus the peace multiplier. The rationale for the multiplier is explained further in the study.

The indirect costs of violence are relatively high compared to direct costs. For example, the indirect cost of homicide is seven times the direct cost and the indirect cost of rape is five times larger. The method used in this report for indirect costs is to accrue them in the year in which the crime occurs. For example, the lost life-time earnings of a homicide victim would be included in the indirect costs in the year in which the homicide happened. Table 13 lists the economic and social development effects of violence.<sup>7</sup>

To estimate the indirect costs component of the economic impact of violence, it is important to calculate the lost opportunity cost from the crime. For example, if a murder is avoided, medical and funeral costs would have flowed to alternative economic activities. Similarly, society would avoid the imprisonment and judicial costs of bringing the perpetrator to justice. Additionally, society will gain from the income that the victim and perpetrator would have contributed to the overall economy. To account for all such costs, IEP assumes that for each peso spent on violence containment, the economy loses an additional pesos of economic activity. For more detail on the peace multiplier refer to box 4.

**TABLE 13** ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE	SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE
Decreased labor market participation	Intergenerational transmission of violence
Reduced productivity on the job	Erosion of social capital and social fabric
Lower earnings	Reduced quality of life
Decreased investment and saving	Decline in the credibility of the state
Distortion of government resource allocation	Reduced participation in the democratic process
Flight of human and financial capital	

Source: Heinemann and Verner, 2006

## BOX 4 THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept that describes the extent to which additional expenditure has flow-on impacts on the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into the economy this will lead to more spending, which will, in turn, create employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is the reason behind the 'multiplier effect' and why a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence. Because of this decrease in violence there is likely to be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy as both private and public spending is diverted towards more productive areas, such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

In another example, when a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, could be spent elsewhere. The economy also loses the lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits from greater peace can therefore be

significant. This was also noted by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) who argued that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. More generally there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives faced by business. For instance, analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that with higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence it is likely that we might expect lower levels of employment and economic productivity over the long-term, as the incentives discourage new employment creation and longer-term investment.<sup>8</sup>

This study uses a multiplier of two, signifying that for every peso saved on violence containment there will be an additional peso of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.<sup>9</sup>

**TABLE 14** THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

(CONSTANT 2014 PESOS, BILLIONS)

INDICATOR	DIRECT COST	INDIRECT COST	MULTIPLIER EFFECT	TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
Homicide	63.1	601.2	126.3	727.4
Violent Crime	76.8	691.6	153.6	845.2
Organized Crime	1	7.9	2.1	10
Domestic Security	44.2	-	88.4	88.4
Military	98	-	196.1	196.1
Justice System	77.9	-	155.7	155.7
Fear	27.1	-	54.1	54.1
Firearms	8.3	-	16.5	16.5
Private Security	12.2	-	24.5	24.5
Incarceration		2.7	-	2.7
<b>TOTAL (\$)</b>	<b>408.6</b>	<b>1,303.3</b>	<b>817.3</b>	<b>2,120.6</b>
<b>% OF GDP</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>13.1%</b>

Table 14 provides more detail on the direct and indirect costs of violence containment. To estimate the total economic impact of violence, IEP applies a multiplier of two to the direct costs of violence containment but not to the indirect costs of violence. Therefore, the total economic impact of violence is the direct cost of violence, the indirect cost and the multiplier effect, which reflects the economic and social opportunity cost of violence.

# PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

State-level MPI scores and the per capita economic impact of violence have a strong correlation ( $r=0.87$ ). This indicates that the least peaceful states spend more per person on violence containment, which would be expected. This higher spending on violence containment takes resources away from economic and social development in states with higher levels of violence.

Figure 36 highlights the correlation between MPI scores and the economic impact of violence per person in pesos.

There are large differences in the per capita economic impact of violence between the most and least peaceful states. The per person burden of violence containment is four times higher in Guerrero (36,033 pesos per person) compared to Hidalgo (11,870 pesos per person).


Table 15 shows the MPI score and the per capita economic impact of violence for Mexican states in 2015. Guerrero ranks last in both the MPI and Positive Peace, and has the highest per capita economic impact of violence.

**TABLE 15**  
PER CAPITA ECONOMIC  
IMPACT OF VIOLENCE, 2015  
(CONSTANT 2014 PESOS, BILLIONS)

STATE	STATE MPI SCORE	PER PERSON ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE
Guerrero	3.86	36,033
Baja California Sur	3.04	30,160
Morelos	3.12	29,178
Colima	2.84	29,003
Baja California	3.06	27,791
Quintana Roo	2.69	26,259
Sinaloa	3.41	25,947
Tamaulipas	2.74	21,297
Chihuahua	2.82	20,792
Guanajuato	2.70	20,672
Zacatecas	2.55	19,478
Durango	2.64	19,451
Tabasco	2.26	19,108
México	2.40	18,597
Distrito Federal	2.53	18,511
Aguascalientes	2.06	18,493
Coahuila	2.17	17,346
Oaxaca	2.45	17,227
Sonora	2.61	16,742
Querétaro	2.08	15,543
Michoacán	2.37	15,083
Jalisco	2.43	14,563
Nuevo León	2.70	13,980
Puebla	2.24	13,451
Campeche	2.15	12,929
Tlaxcala	1.98	12,825
Nayarit	2.59	12,561
Hidalgo	1.76	11,870
San Luis Potosí	2.03	11,324
Yucatán	1.86	11,050
Chiapas	2.03	9,695
Veracruz	1.87	8,485

**FIGURE 36** PER CAPITA IMPACT OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT, 2015

States with lower levels of peace tend to spend more per person on violence containment.



Source: IEP

# FUTURE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

## TWO SCENARIOS

The two models presented in this section are aimed at highlighting the potential different economic outcomes that could occur depending on how effectively the government manages the nation's violence. The disparity between the two models is stark, with the difference being 2 trillion pesos per annum by 2020.

Changes in the economic impact of violence mirrors changes in the MPI score, showing two important trends.

First, the level of violence and its related economic impact has increased. This increase began in 2007 and peaked in 2011. Violence and its economic impact then began to decline from 2011 onwards and had decreased every year since.

Second, government spending on violence containment continued to increase until 2015 when it showed a small decline. Therefore, IEP presents two forecasting scenarios that could lead to two very different outcomes.

The first scenario presents an optimistic outlook, assuming that the level of violence will follow the declining trend seen after 2011. With this assumption, the economic impact of violence over the next five years will be 7 trillion pesos. Based on this scenario, the economic impact of violence on the Mexican economy will be less than a trillion pesos a year in 2020.


The second scenario assumes that the level of violence and its economic impact gradually increases back to the levels experienced during the height of the violence. Based on this scenario, during the next five years, from 2016 to 2020, the economic impact of violence on the Mexican economy will be 12.66 trillion pesos, or 2.5 trillion pesos annually. Figure 37 illustrates the two forecasting scenarios.

In summary, if Mexico continues to become more peaceful at the same rate as it has over the last five years, 5.66 trillion pesos of additional economic activity will be generated compared to the second scenario. This saving is over 1 trillion pesos per year or 5 percent of GDP per year.

It is important to state that IEP uses a simple linear forecasting methodology. While a more comprehensive forecasting model will take into account internal and external factors which influences violence, the choice of the forecasting model is primarily aimed at highlighting the considerable economic benefits from improvements in peace.

**FIGURE 37** ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE, 2003-2015, 2016-2020 FORECAST

Mexico is expected to save 5.66 trillion pesos if the level of peacefulness continues to improve at the same rate over the next five years.



Source: IEP



# COST OF CRIME TO BUSINESS

Although the cost of crime to business has not been accounted for as a single category in the model due to the inability to estimate costs over the 13 years of the study, National Survey of Business Victimization (ENVE) analysis estimated the total burden of crime on business to be 159 billion pesos, or one percent of Mexican GDP, in 2013.<sup>10</sup> The analysis presented in this section does not take into account the lost opportunity costs associated with business investments that did not happen because of violence, or the cost of the time business employees spent dealing with violence. Two thirds of the cost is from criminal acts, such as robberies, theft, extortion and kidnapping. One third of the cost arises because businesses need to take protective measures, including purchasing locks, changing doors and windows, and installing alarms and surveillance systems. The cost of violence to business

is not a separate category in the total violence containment cost model primarily to avoid double counting issues. The crime statistics used to estimate violence containment costs separately include the crimes that affect businesses. This analysis is based on the ENVE survey undertaken in 2011 and 2013.

At the state level, as expected, the cost of violence to business has a strong direct correlation with the economic impact of violence. Figure 36 shows the relationship between overall violence containment costs and the cost of crime to businesses. The cost of violence also has a strong correlation with state level GDP, indicating that the types of crime that affect businesses in Mexico, such as extortion, take place in states with higher levels of production.


The cost of crime to business fell between 2011 and 2013. In 2013, 34 percent of businesses were victims of crime, compared to 37 percent in 2013. This suggests that the improvement in peacefulness has a direct and positive effect on the reduction in crimes against business.

Victimization by size of business showed improvements in all categories from 2011 to 2013. The improvements ranged from three to nine percentage points. The largest improvement occurred for small businesses, with a nine percentage points decline.

In Mexico, the respondents of the business victimization survey identified insecurity and crime as their most pressing concern. Considering the 2.1 trillion peso cost of violence containment in 2015, higher levels of violence will have severe adverse implications for businesses.

**FIGURE 38** ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE VS COST OF CRIME TO BUSINESS, 2013


In states that are less peaceful as measured by the MPI, the cost of crime to businesses is greater.



Source: IEP, ENVE

**FIGURE 39** TYPE OF ECONOMIC IMPACT TO BUSINESS, 2013


Two thirds of the cost of violence to business arises from economic losses that are caused by crime.



Source: ENVE

**FIGURE 40** PRIMARY CONCERNS OF BUSINESSES, 2011 AND 2013


'Insecurity and crime' was the primary concern of most Mexican businesses in 2011 and in 2013.



Source: ENVE

**FIGURE 41** RATE OF VICTIMIZATION BY BUSINESS SIZE


Large and medium sized businesses report the highest rates of victimization.



Source: ENVE

**FIGURE 42** RATE OF BUSINESS VICTIMIZATION, 2011 AND 2013

The rate of victimization of businesses declined by three percentage points between 2011 and 2013.



# EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

---

## PERIODISMO ÉTICO EN TIEMPOS VIOLENTOS ETHICAL JOURNALISM IN VIOLENT TIMES

---

Adrián Lopez, Editorial Director, Noroeste

**NOROESTE**

In this essay, Adrian Lopez, the Editorial Director of Noroeste, a regional newspaper in circulation in the state of Sinaloa for more than 40 years, describes the levels of violence in a state plagued by drug trafficking and homicides. His team, Lopez writes, reports on an average of three homicides each day. More alarming is that the stories of these deaths only receive public attention if there are new or particularly barbaric techniques employed, such as torture or decapitation. Lopez claims the frequency of violent crime and an unrelenting news cycle have created a readership indifferent to violence. The author argues that in this context, the media has an ethical duty, beyond journalism, to analyze the stories and dare to propose a different treatment of the information. His publication, has adjusted its procedures and rules around the reporting of news of violence, including that the names of victims and alleged perpetrators are never published in the interests of safety. Most importantly, Noroeste refuses to be a messenger of organized crime and does not publish news that will intimidate any party. In doing so, Lopez hopes to contribute to a new paradigm of journalism, in which a media outlet can actively participate in freedom of expression while also being an agent for change.

*“El análisis epistemológico de esas categorías elementales del discurso dominante sobre el tráfico de drogas no trasciende el ámbito académico. El discurso oficial y los medios que lo reproducen son impermeables a las observaciones críticas de los investigadores...”* – LUIS ASTORGA

Vivo en una tierra marcada por la muerte. Literalmente. En Sinaloa, un estado etiquetado como la cuna del narcotráfico en México, el índice de homicidio doloso es el indicador que resume nuestra realidad violenta.

Llevamos más de 40 años estancados como una de las regiones más peligrosas del planeta. Mientras que otros estados de México van y vienen en la tabla de posiciones de los indicadores más relevantes en materia de seguridad, Sinaloa no ha abandonado los últimos lugares en décadas.

Desde el lanzamiento de la Operación Cóndor contra los grandes capos del narcotráfico en 1973, los sinaloenses hemos sido testigos mudos y hasta cómplices de un proceso de apropiación social por el crimen organizado hasta niveles de conformación de una auténtica cultura mafiosa.

Una cultura con todas sus letras y no una sub-cultura. Como insisten en minimizar las autoridades empecinadas en la negación de lo evidente: que a ojos del mundo Sinaloa es el sinónimo del narco.

Trabajo en Noroeste, un medio de comunicación regional con 43 años de antigüedad que todos los días retrata esa realidad. Nuestro equipo la reporta, la fotografía, la filma y la publica a través de nuestras diversas plataformas impresas y digitales. Decir lo que sucede es nuestra obligación profesional más mínima.

Desde el oficio periodístico, el canon clásico podría responder que hacemos lo que nos toca y que con eso cumplimos nuestro deber. Discrepo. No hacemos lo suficiente.

Ese mismo canon establece que el periodismo existe para hacer mejor el mundo. El acceso a la información y la libertad de expresión son dos caras de una conquista universal: el derecho que tenemos los humanos de decir y saber datos, hechos y causas. Comunicamos para “poner en común”. Informamos para que el mundo nos haga sentido.

Y es aquí cuando entro en conflicto. ¿En qué momento los muertos que publicamos a diario perdieron el sentido?

Porque es obvio que esas fotos, esos nombres y esas circunstancias ya no generan ningún asombro y, lo que es peor, ninguna resistencia moral de parte de quienes consumimos la denominada “nota roja”.

Mientras que el mundo se concentra en la incomprensible violencia que nos entrega el terrorismo de Medio Oriente; en Latinoamérica y,

específicamente en México, Colombia o Brasil, la guerra contra el narcotráfico acumula a cuenta gotas una cantidad inaceptable de muertes. Una guerra fundamentada en una razón anacrónica: el moralista prohibicionismo estadounidense.

En ese contexto, los medios de comunicación de Sinaloa seguimos publicando casi tres asesinatos diarios. Asesinatos que solo llaman la atención si agregan alguna nueva variante a la barbarie: tortura, decapitaciones... video. Sin dichas variaciones, esas muertes solo representan un hecho doloroso para sus familias y círculos cercanos; el resto de la población las presenciamos como testigos en la indiferencia. Y, vergonzosamente, muchas veces también en el morbo.

Me atrevo a afirmar que ese comportamiento social no es muy distinto en el resto del país. Lo mismo en Tamaulipas que en Guerrero o Morelos, la “normalización” de la violencia es un efecto natural tras diez años sostenidos de una guerra de baja intensidad que para 2018 acumulará algo así como 200 mil muertos.

La cifra es difícil de dimensionar. Pero uno a uno, prácticamente todos esos muertos han pasado por las páginas de los diarios y los titulares de televisión local y nacional. Incluso los desaparecidos (que no son pocos) suelen dejar algún registro mediático en estos tiempos gracias a las redes sociales.

Entonces, algo estamos haciendo muy mal los medios mexicanos para que esa realidad continúe inalterada. Nuestro pecado es de acción, pero también de omisión.

Sobre decir que no estoy hablando de hacernos responsables de la policía o la procuración de justicia. Sino de hasta donde los medios mexicanos tenemos una obligación ética que va más allá del mero periodismo para contar esa realidad violenta. Para analizarla y atrevernos a proponer modelos distintos de aproximación.

No tengo respuestas definitivas. Creo que una aspiración así de ambiciosa puede materializarse a través de un ejercicio continuo y compartido de reflexión, discusión y profesionalización del periodismo mexicano.

Para sentar un caso concreto, aprovecho esta oportunidad para compartir aquí una serie de criterios que hace 6 años decidimos en Noroeste sobre el tema, con la única intención de mejorar nuestro oficio y de ser responsables con nuestras decisiones editoriales:

## RESPONSABILIDAD FRENTE A LA VIOLENCIA

Cobertura y publicación responsable de la información relacionada con inseguridad y delincuencia organizada

La situación inédita que se vive en el País, en el estado y la región en cuanto a la escalada de violencia, obliga a reforzar la responsabilidad de nuestras publicaciones.

Día a día, en nuestras decisiones editoriales nos enfrentamos a nuevos y difíciles dilemas.

En Noroeste lo tenemos claro: la violencia existe, tenemos que decirlo, la autocensura no es la decisión acertada para una publicación responsable, no se puede evadir la responsabilidad periodística, pero ésta tampoco puede ser un escudo para publicar irresponsablemente información que haga apología de la violencia o fomente la ilegalidad.

Por este motivo, en Noroeste establecemos la siguiente:

### Declaración de Criterios:

- 1) Noroeste publicará siempre todos los hechos de violencia de los que tenga conocimiento**, cumpliendo su compromiso de informar la realidad a la sociedad a la que sirve. La sección destinada para ello se denomina “Seguridad y Justicia”, acorde con la premisa de desarrollar la cultura de legalidad entre los ciudadanos y de justicia penal en las autoridades.
- 2) Publicamos en portada los hechos relacionados con violencia cuando éstos abonan en la construcción del estado de derecho**, por ejemplo: detenciones y decomisos relevantes; así como en la defensa de los grupos vulnerables, tales como violencia de género, abuso de menores y víctimas inocentes.
- 3) Publicamos en portada dichos hechos con un enfoque de prevención y alerta a la ciudadanía.
- 4) No publicamos hechos violentos que consideramos forman parte del discurso de intimidación y terrorismo de grupos de crimen organizado, tales como mensajes en mantas, enfrentamientos armados, asesinatos, actos de tortura, entre otros; excepto cuando éstos trascienden a otras esferas como la política y la civil.
- 5) No publicamos rumores, hipótesis o información no confirmada, ni señalamos responsables sin tener certeza.

- 6) No publicamos encabezados amarillistas ni sensacionalistas, nos remitimos a los hechos.
- 7) No publicamos palabras e imágenes que puedan llegar a ser ofensivas, por ejemplo aquellas donde la sangre es la protagonista principal.
- 8) No publicamos nombres completos ni domicilios de víctimas, victimarios o cualquier otra persona relacionada.
- 9) No publicamos nombres ni direcciones de hospitales a donde fueran trasladadas las víctimas de un hecho violento.
- 10) No hacemos descripciones que hagan apología de la violencia.
- 11) No publicamos el lenguaje de los grupos delictivos, ni transcribimos textos de sus mensajes.
- 12) No publicamos fotografías ni nombres de acusados de delito, especialmente de menores de edad.
- 13) No difundimos rostros de elementos policiacos, militares o de rescate presentes en los hechos de alto impacto.
- 14) Los comentarios a las notas de noroeste, com no son el pensamiento o enfoque del personal de Noroeste y son eliminados cuando su contenido puede considerarse vulgar, difamatorio, ofensivo o que pone en riesgo a los ciudadanos.

.....

Dichos criterios fueron presentados en todo el estado a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, líderes empresariales, de opinión y académicos con el propósito de socializarlos mejor y hacerlos disponibles a todos nuestros lectores en nuestras diversas plataformas.

El aprendizaje ha sido continuo, nos hemos equivocado infinidad de ocasiones y hemos tenido que volver una y otra vez a discutir hasta dónde esos lineamientos continúan vigentes. La realidad sinaloense es tan diversa y sorpresiva que a pesar de que los criterios pretenden una utilización general, su aplicación suele ser casi siempre casuística.

La experiencia nos ha enseñado, también, la dificultad de sostenerlos en medio de un ambiente de presión reiterada y acoso sistemático, tanto del poder político como del crimen organizado. Nuestras dos principales amenazas.

Por un lado, el poder político local ha estado siempre inconforme con nuestro talante crítico y suele aprovechar las coyunturas o escenarios donde el crimen organizado está presente para disfrazar sus amenazas, presiones o agresiones. Utilizar métodos que imitan o simulan el modus operandi del narcotráfico es la coartada perfecta para la clase política.

En ese contexto pueden incluirse las casi 100 averiguaciones previas que Noroeste sostiene ante la Procuraduría de Justicia Estatal. Expedientes que permanecen todos impunes con el trillado argumento de que no pueden clasificarse como delitos contra la libertad de expresión, sino como mera violencia del fuero común: robos, asaltos, amenazas, agresiones físicas. O en el colmo del cinismo, agresiones que responden a nuestra "mala suerte", cómo me dijera el Gobernador Mario López Valdez en abril de 2014, tras recibir un balazo en un supuesto robo de auto. Móvil que hasta ahora no han podido demostrar.

Por otro lado, el crimen organizado es una presión permanente para el periodismo mexicano. En nuestra redacción sabemos que el monstruo siempre está allí: desde que diseñas la cobertura hasta que tomas las decisiones de qué y cómo publicar.

Como protocolo permanente, en Noroeste procuramos hacer siempre el ejercicio de prever las posibles reacciones del crimen organizado ante nuestras publicaciones. Sabemos que con los criminales no existe garantía alguna de seguridad y que en la mayoría de los casos las autoridades son omisas, cómplices o parte del mismo sistema mafioso. Pero, como señalamos en el primero de nuestros lineamientos, insistimos en que tenemos la obligación de seguir publicando todos los hechos a pesar de las presiones y en que la ciudadanía tiene derecho a saberlos.

Como ejemplo, una de las presiones más relevantes sucedió en Mazatlán en 2010 cuando un grupo del crimen organizado atacó nuestras instalaciones con más de 60 balazos de AK-47 para obligarnos a publicar información no confirmada del grupo criminal contrario. Al día siguiente, nuestro titular explicaba el ataque y sus razones con total transparencia acompañado de un titular contundente: "No vamos a ceder".

Esa agresión fue un momento más para el aprendizaje. Gracias a ella pudimos confirmar que el crimen organizado suele tener una estrategia de comunicación: su canal es la violencia y su fin es el miedo.

Los medios debemos estar conscientes de hasta dónde estamos informando y hasta dónde nos volvemos sus mensajeros. Esa es la razón por la que en el periódico decidimos dejar de publicar los mensajes integros que dejan en lonas callejeras o los detalles morbosos de sus asesinatos como mutilaciones o actos de tortura.

Cabe mencionar que en 2010, cuando dichos criterios fueron construidos, el nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal Acusatorio para México estaba muy lejos de su concreción y, si bien tiene como fecha límite para su implementación nacional el año 2016, es importante recalcar que prácticamente todos los criterios consideran el principio de presunción de inocencia de los acusados. Así, también, fueron diseñados en la lógica de poner en el centro de nuestro periodismo los derechos de las víctimas y sus familias.

Sabemos que los criterios son perfectibles y estamos abiertos a continuar con su perfeccionamiento. Sabemos que la natural evolución de la situación actual, así como de la legislación mexicana, nos obligará a modificar desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos cada vez que sea necesario. Pretendemos continuar afinando un marco de referencia que ha resultado útil en la toma de decisiones editoriales ante casos difíciles.

En tiempos en que la sobre-información es la regla, para nosotros lo importante es poder tomar distancia del día a día y que nuestros contenidos no sean el resultado de una inercia operativa sino de un proceso dirigido de toma de decisiones colegiadas.

En "La Edad de la Nada", Peter Watson señala que la Segunda Guerra mundial fue el semillero de muchos de los avances sociales del siglo XX. *Avances llamados a concretarse en un carácter plena y exclusivamente laico, con los que mucha gente tuvo la oportunidad de llevar una vida más satisfactoria en lo cotidiano.* Con esto quiero decir que son momentos de barbarie y dolor los que nos dan de pronto la capacidad de re-significarnos y buscar la trascendencia. La violencia como instrumento de redimensionamiento del ser humano.

No solo en un sentido metafísico sino eminentemente práctico. El reto de nuestro periodismo radica en estar en sintonía con esa aspiración por hacer mejor la vida de las personas en los aspectos más mundanos y utilitarios, al mismo tiempo que aspira a proporcionar referentes éticos y morales más profundos y sólidos.

En ese sentido nuestra propuesta es muy concreta: los medios mexicanos tenemos que dejar de ser "voceros" del poder o, en el mejor de los casos, "espejos" de la realidad.

Lo primero, porque es una clara claudicación de nuestra función primordial. Cómo dijera Daniel Moreno, reconocido periodista mexicano y actual Director General de Animal Político: el mayor problema de los medios mexicanos es su descartado oficialismo.

Y, lo segundo, porque aspirar a solo reflejar lo que sucede afuera, por fidedigno que sea, es una postura muy cobarde para un medio de comunicación con valores claros y una agenda definida en el contexto violento en que nos desarrollamos.

Cierro este texto con una pregunta: ¿aprenderemos algo en México tras esta época de violencia reiterada y dolor compartido?

No tengo grandes esperanzas en el futuro del periodismo mexicano. La perversa combinación del crimen organizado y el oficialismo nos genera una tercera amenaza preocupante: los medios que son, al mismo tiempo, causa y consecuencia de un mal equilibrio donde el dinero, la corrupción y la violencia determinan el tamaño de la verdad a la que los ciudadanos podemos acceder.

Ese segmento representa la mayor parte de la industria y está muy lejos de lo que el momento histórico mexicano les demanda. Ahí donde los gobiernos apuestan por el silencio y la negación de los muertos y los desaparecidos, siempre hay medios y periodistas dispuestos a reproducir el discurso oficial. Medios y periodistas que, además, son usados para descalificar y atacar a medios independientes.

En contraparte, las voces dispuestas a señalar y demostrar los casos de simulación de justicia, violaciones de derechos humanos, impunidad o corrupción son todavía muy escasas en el periodismo mexicano.

Por eso insisto en que los medios tenemos una responsabilidad ética más grande que nuestro rol periodístico. Sugiero que debemos ir más allá y asumirnos como verdaderos constructores de conversación. Verdaderos entes discursivos en el más profundo de los sentidos.

Eso implica una comprensión institucional que brilla por su ausencia en el contexto periodístico mexicano: la idea clara de que el narcotráfico y el crimen organizado es un problema complejo que rebasa nuestras aproximaciones tradicionales de sentido común y la naturaleza cuasi artesanal de nuestro oficio.

Esa complejidad es acaso la gran característica de nuestro tiempo. Los fenómenos y problemas del siglo XXI tienen alcances y configuraciones donde la aceleración del cambio, la multiplicación de los actores y la cantidad de información definen su comportamiento sistémico. Con esa premisa en mente, el periodismo mexicano debe aprender con urgencia cómo tratar cada una de las historias y casos que la realidad de inseguridad y violencia nos presenta todos los días.

En "Nota(n) Roja", el periodista mexicano Marco Lara Klahr nos dice: "La nueva y más compleja circunstancia mexicana requiere mayor rigor en el tratamiento de tales temas. Los problemas asociados al mundo de la delincuencia no se pueden explicar como un cuento popular. Son fenómenos más complejos que tienen que ver más con los grandes intereses económicos que con los dramas personales."<sup>1</sup>

No veo otra forma de abordar esa realidad si no es con un enfoque multidisciplinario que utilice herramientas como la ética, el análisis del discurso, el pensamiento complejo, la dinámica de sistemas, el design thinking, entre otros.

El enfoque tiene que responder lo mismo a conocimientos de la ciencia dura o el hard data, que a conocimientos de las ciencias suaves o humanidades como la filosofía o la ética. Para recordar al filósofo francés Edgar Morin: los enfoques parcelarios no son útiles ante problemas complejos. Y en ese mismo orden de ideas, en el fondo de ese nuevo abordaje discursivo debe subyacer una pretensión ética.

Como señala el académico Luis Astorga en "Seguridad, traficantes y militares", respecto del discurso generalizado sobre el narcotráfico:

*"La representación de los fenómenos y las cosas pasa por el lenguaje y las imágenes. Diversos agentes sociales generan discursos e imágenes, determinando uno u otro significado, acerca de las drogas ilícitas, los usuarios de las mismas y los traficantes. Dichos agentes pueden ser gobiernos, agencias antidrogas, instituciones policiacas, organismos internacionales, funcionarios, públicos, políticos, juristas, médicos, religiosos, periodistas, académicos, compositores de corridos, etcétera. Y la producción simbólica de estos agentes se transmite a la sociedad, por lo general, a través de los medios de comunicación, como discursos, imágenes y estereotipos."*<sup>2</sup>

Con lo que publicamos y con lo que decidimos no publicar, los medios estamos construyendo una cierta conversación, un discurso preformado. De nosotros depende abonar a la reflexión o construir estereotipos. Por eso más vale tener claro cuál es el discurso al que se aspira. Compartirlo y hasta discutirlo con la audiencia. En estos tiempos de redes sociales, la unidireccionalidad del poder mediático es una quimera, más vale llevar el diálogo con la audiencia más allá de las "Cartas al Editor" si no queremos volvernos sordos y quedarnos solos.

El ecosistema digital es la gran oportunidad que la tecnología nos brinda para entablar una conversación auténtica sobre lo que más preocupa a los consumidores de nuestros contenidos: su seguridad y la de sus familias. Personas y familias que quieren, como es natural, vivir en paz para aprovechar a fondo sus libertades. Vivir en paz para ser la mejor expresión de sí mismos.

El rol de los medios mexicanos es ahora, más que nunca, una responsabilidad profesional y ética con esa posibilidad de realización de los ciudadanos. Una responsabilidad con la construcción de una mejor comprensión de la naturaleza compleja del narcotráfico, la violencia y el crimen organizado. Una responsabilidad con el desarrollo de una conversación constructiva que fomente una cultura de paz y ponga en el centro de las preocupaciones de la sociedad los derechos humanos de las víctimas y grupos vulnerables.

A los medios nos toca ahora escuchar más que hablar. Aprender más que enseñar. Ser una voz más en la conversación y no "la voz". Ejercitar el diálogo. Practicar la palabra. Vaya tiempos los que nos toca vivir, a los medios y periodistas nos toca ahora ser aquel de quien nuestro oficio se ocupa: el otro.



# BUENAS PRÁCTICAS PARA DESARROLLAR TODO EL POTENCIAL DEL NUEVO SISTEMA DE JUSTICIA PENAL EN MÉXICO

## GOOD PRACTICES TO DEVELOP THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN MEXICO TO ITS FULL POTENTIAL

Guillermo Raúl Zepeda Lecuona, Research Professor, ITESO  
Paola Guadalupe Jiménez Rodríguez, Evaluation Coordinator,  
Jurimetría



This essay takes a look at the reform of the judicial system in Mexico and the operation of the New Criminal Justice System (NCJS). Authors Guillermo Raúl Zepeda Lecuona, Research Professor at ITESO, and Paola Guadalupe Jiménez Rodríguez, Evaluation Coordinator at Jurimetría, discuss best practices designed to transform the troubled system into an effective and ethical administrator of justice. A consequential task, the implementation of the NCJS presents the institutions of the criminal justice system in Mexico with enormous challenges. In both local and federal jurisdictions, thousands of public servants face the arduous task of fulfilling the principles and goals of the NCJS. The authors recommend that the reforms prioritize three areas: improving services to victims and users; differentiating and focusing on criminal policy; and improving the research capacity of government ministries.

La implementación y arraigo en la operación del Nuevo Sistema de Justicia Penal (NSJP) implica enormes desafíos de transformación para las instituciones del sistema de justicia penal en México. En las diversas jurisdicciones tanto en la competencia local como la federal, miles de servidores públicos enfrentan la ardua tarea de dar vigencia a los principios y metas del NSJP.

Por ello consideramos de gran importancia documentar las buenas prácticas que pueden replicarse en todo el país para desarrollar el mayor potencial del nuevo sistema con mejores estándares de calidad.

En este breve texto presentaremos algunas de las buenas prácticas que pueden impactar en las consideramos como áreas y políticas estratégicas en la operación del NSJP:

- 1) Mejorar la atención a víctimas y usuarios**
- 2) Diferenciar y focalizar la política criminal**
- 3) Mejorar la capacidad de investigación de los ministerios públicos**

Sobre estos tres ejes se presenta información relevante y algunas rutas de acción que se pueden seguir, principalmente mediante la

incorporación de buenas prácticas, para el logro de los objetivos.

### 1. MEJORAR LA ATENCIÓN A VÍCTIMAS Y USUARIOS

En 2014, en México se denunciaron solamente el 10.70% de los delitos ocurridos,<sup>3</sup> y del resto, el 63.1% no se denunciaron por causas atribuibles a la autoridad, como son: por considerarlo una pérdida de tiempo, por desconfianza en las autoridades, por trámites largos y difíciles, por actitud hostil de la autoridad y miedo a la extorsión. Esto aunado a la descoordinación institucional, el deficiente acceso a servicios de calidad, desconocimiento de los servidores públicos para brindar atención adecuada a las víctimas, falta de acceso a un enfoque diferenciado y un inadecuado acceso a medidas de prevención, atención, asistencia y reparación,<sup>4</sup> pone de manifiesto la gran problemática que existe en el país.

Según cálculos realizados a partir de la información de la Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) de INEGI,<sup>5</sup> el tiempo medio en minutos, considerando la mediana<sup>6</sup> de los datos para cada estado y a nivel nacional sobre

el tiempo dedicado a denunciar un delito ante el ministerio público, se tiene que en México el tiempo medio de duración para denunciar un delito en 2014 fue de 119.08 minutos, es decir, prácticamente le toma dos horas denunciar a una persona que ha sido víctima de un delito. De 2010 a 2014 este valor ha mostrado una tendencia ascendente, tal como se puede apreciar en la gráfica 1.

Dentro del país se observan resultados diversos entre las entidades. Durante el periodo comprendido entre 2010 y 2014 el valor mínimo fue de 51.98 minutos para Nayarit en el año 2011; y el valor máximo fue de 234.48 minutos, es decir, casi 4 horas para Puebla en 2010.

Ante estas situaciones, resulta necesario diseñar e implementar mecanismos que coadyuven a que se garanticen plenamente los derechos de las víctimas del delito o de violaciones a sus derechos humanos, los cuáles están reconocidos en diversos tratados internacionales de los que México forma parte, así como constitucionalmente y en la propia legislación mexicana en la materia.

La reciente Ley General de Víctimas (LGV)<sup>7</sup> de observancia nacional, identifica una serie de principios que deben respetarse en la materia,

tales como: dignidad; buena fe; complementariedad; debida diligencia; enfoque diferencial y especializado; enfoque transformador; gratuidad; igualdad y no discriminación; integridad; indivisibilidad e interdependencia; máxima protección; mínimo existencial; no criminalización; victimización secundaria; participación conjunta; progresividad y no regresividad; publicidad; rendición de cuentas; transparencia; y trato preferente<sup>8</sup>.

Una de las estrategias que se puede implementar para el cumplimiento de dichas disposiciones es establecer un Protocolo de atención víctimas, que sirva como documento rector para todos los servidores públicos que intervengan, directa o indirectamente, en el proceso de atención a víctimas. En algunas entidades del país, como Oaxaca y Chihuahua, se han hecho importantes avances en la materia, principalmente para la los centros de atención para mujeres víctimas de violencia; sin embargo, resulta necesario brindar una atención diferenciada y especializada para todas las víctimas del delito y usuarios del sistema de procuración de justicia.

La LGV considera que “las víctimas recibirán ayuda provisional, oportuna y rápida de acuerdo a las necesidades inmediatas que tengan relación directa con el hecho victimizante” (LGV, art. 8), por lo que se le deben de brindar distintos tipos de servicios y atenciones, como atención médica, psicológica y jurídica, transporte de emergencia, alojamiento transitorio, entre otros.

**De forma general, los principales elementos de este modelo son:**

- Adopción y desarrollo del Modelo Integral de Atención a Víctimas (MIAV)
- Servicio centrado en las necesidades de las personas: la “ruta de la víctima”, dejando el esquema tradicional centrado en el ministerio público, y pasando a un modelo de atención centrado en las necesidades concretas de los usuarios brindado por profesionales con la formación adecuada y especializada para atención de personas víctimas de delitos y de violaciones de derechos humanos.
- Atención y cobertura de los servicios bajo la premisa “todo bajo un mismo techo”, en dónde los operadores y servicios van hacia al usuario y no viceversa. Esta modalidad de concentrar a los operadores en un mismo espacio evita que la víctima sea revictimizada al ser enviada de una dependencia a otra. Entre los servicios que se pueden brindar se encuentran: personal del Registro Civil, servicios de atención ministerial e investigación criminal a cargo de los ministerios públicos, policías y peritos, personal especializado que presten servicios de trabajo social, psicológico y médico, entre otros de acuerdo a las necesidades específicas detectadas.
- Desarrollo organizacional e instalación de protocolos de atención diferenciada para grupos vulnerables, como adultos mayores, niños y niñas, personas con discapacidad, migrantes, indígenas y mujeres víctimas de violencia.
- Seguridad y accesibilidad para las víctimas.
- Vinculación con organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

- Seguimiento y control de la calidad de los servicios y satisfacción de las personas atendidas.
- Certificación de las competencias del personal y de los servicios proporcionados por parte del municipio.

Al implementar este modelo integral se estarían obteniendo diversos beneficios, en primer lugar, brindar un atención de mayor calidad y calidez a las personas víctimas de delitos y de violaciones de derechos humanos, evitando la doble victimización y brindando medidas de reparación y protección adecuadas; mayor coordinación e integralidad en los servicios prestados por los estados en concurrencia con los demás niveles de gobierno; e institucionalización de un nuevo paradigma de atención.

Otra buena práctica que se puede adoptar para mejorar la calidad y calidez de los servicios de atención prestados a víctimas y usuarios, y considerando los recursos escasos con los que cuentan las dependencias de gobierno, es establecer un censo de capital social, para de esta manera establecer una red de organizaciones de la sociedad civil que coadyuven con los distintos servicios que prestan las dependencias dentro de la estructura gubernamental. En Morelos se documentó esta buena práctica, en la que se cuenta con una red que apoya a la Unidad de Medidas Cautelares (UMECA) de la entidad.


Este esquema ha incrementado la cobertura, calidad, calidez y legitimidad de los servicios que se prestan bajo la coordinación de las autoridades estatales y ha demostrado ser sustentable y eficiente (hasta 60% menos oneroso que ampliar la estructura oficial de servicios). De forma general para implementar el modelo, es necesario realizar un censo de todas las organizaciones e iniciativas ciudadanas que operan en cada estado en beneficio de las personas; después establecer estándares de calidad; y seleccionar y apoyar a las mejores. En la figura 1 se pueden visualizar las fases para la integración de la red.

**2. DIFERENCIAR Y FOCALIZAR LA POLÍTICA CRIMINAL**

En este eje tiene como objetivos, en primer lugar, terminar con la desproporción en la judicialización de casos, y en segundo lugar, despresurizar las prisiones en el país. Respecto al primer punto, se tiene que en México no se brinda una política criminal focalizada, ya que suelen llegar a juicio una gran cantidad de casos por delitos culposos y no violentos, en lugar de focalizar los recursos para sancionar los delitos de alto impacto que tanto alteran la seguridad ciudadana en el país.

**GRÁFICA 1.**

Tiempo medio para denunciar un delito en México 2010-2014



Fuente: elaboración propia (2016)

**FIGURA 1.**

Fases para la integración de la red de organizaciones de la sociedad civil.



Fuente: elaboración propia (2015)

A nivel nacional para 2014, el 50.94% de las penas de prisión para los sentenciados en sentido condenatorio por delitos de competencia local fueron de menos de tres años, lo que implica que las personas quedarán con antecedente penal a pesar de haber conmutado la sentencia privativa de libertad por una multa (sanciones menores de dos años) o bien haber recibido un beneficio como suspensión condicionada de la sanción o una prelibertad. En la gráfica 2 se puede observar la distribución porcentual de las sanciones penales en México por delitos de competencia local según el tiempo de prisión.

En medida, esta situación ha ocasionado un aumento de las personas en prisión, sin que los ciudadanos nos sintamos más seguros. El sistema

penitenciario en gran parte de los estados del país está sobrepasado en sus capacidades, lo que conlleva además una violación sistemática de los derechos humanos de las personas que se encuentran privadas de su libertad. Para el 2015, veintidós estados de la república se encontraban a más del 100% de su capacidad, y de éstas, trece se encontraban a más del 120%. En la gráfica 3 se puede apreciar la tasa de ocupación penitenciaria por entidad federativa en 2015<sup>5</sup>:

Para atacar el problema de la sobrepoblación penitenciaria se han identificado tres buenas prácticas con alto potencial para coadyuvar en la despresurización de las prisiones: fortalecer el sistema de justicia alternativa, fortalecer y promover el uso de los servicios previos al


juicio, y trabajar de forma coordinada con la sociedad civil para incrementar la efectividad en el cumplimiento de las medidas cautelares y condiciones de suspensión de procedimiento a prueba.

En la actualidad muchos delitos menores que podrían canalizarse a la justicia alternativa y que, con la vigencia del NSJP podrían ser objeto de la suspensión del procedimiento a prueba (en los estados en los que ya opera el sistema acusatorio esta figura llega a representar el 12% de los procesos concluidos en los juzgados penales), se llevan hasta las últimas instancias: la sentencia penal que genera sobrecriminalización dejando a personas que delinquen por primera vez con antecedentes penales, e incluso con

**TABLA 1.** Personas en prisión preventiva en números absolutos y como proporción del número total de personas en prisión por delitos de competencia local


	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Baja California</b>	7360	8307	7340	6205	5709	4574	5176	5373	4888	4740
	58.27%	60.19%	53.32%	47.00%	44.88%	37.77%	40.20%	39.90%	37.00%	36.86%
<b>Morelos</b>	1222	1139	1224	1079	914	967	864	980	854	827

**GRÁFICA 2.** Distribución porcentual de sanciones penales en México 2014



Fuente: elaboración propia con información del Censo Nacional de Impartición de Justicia Estatal 2015

**GRÁFICA 3.** Tasa de ocupación penitenciaria por estado 2015



Fuente: elaboración propia con información de la CNS de la SEGOB

la experiencia de la prisión preventiva que hará difícil su reinserción en la vida social y económica del país. Este cambio de paradigma implica una agenda de transformación de cada uno de los eslabones del sistema penal en los estados y ejes transversales de política criminológica.

En este sentido, la justicia alternativa a través de la aplicación de mecanismos alternativos para la solución de conflictos (MASC) representa una ventana de oportunidad en el tema. En 2014 se resolvieron 136,115 asuntos por justicia alternativa en el área de procuración de justicia; a través de estos mecanismos se trata de procurar justicia mediante acuerdos, en lugar de criminalizar conflictos incipientes y no violentos.

En algunas entidades como Oaxaca y Baja California se han documentado buenas prácticas en la materia en sus órganos de MASC, obteniendo muy buenos indicadores de efectividad. Por ejemplo, la efectividad en la convocatoria en Baja California es del 86%, mientras que en Oaxaca fluctúa entre el rango de 65%-90%. El porcentaje de asuntos que se concluyen por acuerdo es 82.22% en Oaxaca y 86% en Baja California; mientras que la tasa de cumplimiento de acuerdos es de 72.5% en Oaxaca y 87% en Baja California.<sup>10</sup>

Otros estados como Morelos también han fortalecido el uso de los servicios previos al juicio, principalmente a través de la UMECA, que es una organización con autonomía técnica dedicada a: la obtención, verificación, y evaluación de información personal y de entorno social con el objetivo de enriquecer la argumentación jurídica, que informe la decisión judicial; y a dar seguimiento del cumplimiento de las medidas cautelares y las causales de Suspensión del Proceso a Prueba. A través de la UMECA se realiza evaluación de riesgos y seguimiento de las medidas cautelares y condiciones de suspensión, lo que enriquece la argumentación jurídica, permite a los jueces tomar decisiones más informadas y se impulsa el avance del derecho a la libertad durante el proceso.

A través de estas instancias se están dando resultados positivos en la calidad y confiabilidad de la información, así como en el cumplimiento de las medidas (96% en Morelos). Además, se han instrumentado protocolos de calidad para la obtención de información que aporta al cumplimiento de los principios del NSJP como el desarrollo institucional de las salvaguardas del principio de inocencia y la calidad de la información en el sistema de audiencias, además de cumplir con objetivos como los de legalidad, imparcialidad, objetividad, subsidiariedad y confidencialidad.

Con la aplicación de estos mecanismos se puede observar que Baja California y Morelos han logrado mejorar sus indicadores penitenciarios.

### 3. MEJORAR LA CAPACIDAD DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE LOS MINISTERIOS PÚBLICOS

El último eje prioritario que se aborda es respecto a la capacidad de investigación de los ministerios públicos para el esclarecimiento de hechos delictivos. Esto resulta imperante ante la situación de impunidad que se vive en el país, ya que la impunidad directa en homicidio doloso en el país para 2012 fue de 79.89%, es decir, de cada 10 homicidios que ocurren en el país, solo en 2 de ellos se condena a los responsables. A nivel estatal se tienen también cifras alarmantes en gran parte de las entidades. Morelos fue la entidad con mayor impunidad en 2012, mientras que Hidalgo fue la entidad con menor impunidad.

Se han identificado buenas prácticas para aumentar la efectividad en la investigación de los ministerios públicos, como es el desarrollo de modelos de gestión de causas para la investigación de casos con imputado desconocido que ha desarrollado Nuevo León. Estos centros de información e inteligencia para la prevención y la persecución del delito buscan mejorar la investigación criminal, aumentar la capacidad de respuesta efectiva, nutrir y focalizar las acciones de prevención y reducir las tasas de impunidad.

Actualmente la información con que cuenta los responsables de la procuración de justicia en muchas ocasiones se encuentra rezagada y fragmentada, lo que ocasiona que las acciones de prevención y reacción se realicen de forma intuitiva y poco objetiva. Ante esta situación resulta necesario contar con información completa y oportuna para diseñar e implementar de forma más eficaz y eficiente las acciones de reacción, prevención situacional (operativos) y social del delito.

Estos centros se dedican principalmente a la detección de tendencias y patrones en la conflictividad en determinada área, a través de una mejora en los procesos de captura, sistematización y georeferenciación de la información sobre riesgos, incidentes, delitos y modus operandi a través de las denuncias, los reportes policiales homologados, reportes a cabina, reportes al 066 e incluso prensa, adicional a la información de los servicios de inteligencia que se instrumenten.


#### REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS

Ley General de Víctimas (LGV), Nueva Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 9 de enero de 2013, última reforma publicada DOF 03-05-2013

PACHECO CUEVAS, Jaime Oswaldo. Manual de Implementación del Órgano Especializado en Mecanismos Alternativos de Solución de Controversias. Comité para la Evaluación y Seguimiento de la Implementación del NSJP de Corte Acusatorio. CASTAÑO DÍAZ, Héctor Marcos, y ZEPEDA LECUONA, Guillermo Raúl (coords.), México, 2016, 136pp.

Programa de Atención Integral a Víctimas (PNAV) 2014-2018 del Sistema Nacional de Atención a Víctimas, 2015.

**GRÁFICA 4.** Impunidad directa en homicidio doloso



Fuente: elaboración propia en base a la incidencia delictiva del SESNSP y de las Estadísticas Judiciales de INEGI

# APUNTES SOBRE MANDO ÚNICO Y DESARROLLO POLICIAL

## “MANDO ÚNICO” AND POLICE DEVELOPMENT

María Elena Morera Mitre, President, and  
Juan Pablo Arango Orozco, Researcher, Causa en Común



Mexico's municipal police forces have historically been plagued by corruption, infiltration by organized crime and a lack of capacity. To address these problems, the federal government has proposed a reform known as “mando único”, which would eliminate all of the municipal police forces and unify control at the state level. This essay analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed reform. Some of the strengths are the creation of standardized protocols and certified police forces. However, María Elena Morera Mitre, President of Causa en Común, and Juan Pablo Arango Orozco, Researcher at the organisation, argue that the new protocols are not clear and the implementation of the police development system approved in 2009 has not yet been accomplished. A study led by Causa en Común shows that 15 states do not cover the minimum criteria in police development and have used federal subsidies discretionally. The authors argue that changing the government bodies in control will not solve the problem unless a new model of policing is introduced in which the forces serve citizens rather than organized crime. The authors suggest that before discussing “mando único” as the best option, it is important to ensure that state governments are capable of implementing the current policies, such as offering capacity development and career opportunities to police.

La Policía Estatal Única es la iniciativa del Gobierno de la República que se busca reposicionar como solución a los problemas que aquejan históricamente a las instituciones policiales como son: la corrupción, la infiltración por el crimen organizado y la falta de capacidades para dar resultados contra el delito. Trata de achacar esa situación, principalmente, a la debilidad manifestada por las Policías Municipales. Esta iniciativa está en la mesa desde el sexenio anterior, pero no había sido considerada hasta que, luego de la desaparición de 43 jóvenes a manos de autoridades municipales en Iguala, Guerrero, en septiembre de 2014, el presidente Enrique Peña Nieto, la retomó como respuesta a la situación que atraviesan estas instituciones. Esto ha abierto la puerta a un debate nacional acerca de la policía que queremos. Ha puesto sobre la mesa las iniciativas de otros partidos, como son el Partido Acción Nacional<sup>11</sup> (PAN) y el Partido de la Revolución Democrática<sup>12</sup> (PRD) y que abogan por un cambio que en esencia, busca lo mismo –fortalecer a los organismos policiales–. Por último, está la iniciativa del Partido del Trabajo (PT)<sup>13</sup>, la cual privilegia el fortalecimiento del municipio y sus policías. No obstante, a diferencia de la iniciativa impulsada por el presidente, las otras están más abiertas a un modelo mixto y tratan de dar respuesta a los cuestionamientos de especialistas, organizaciones civiles y sociedad en general, como se explicará más adelante.

La iniciativa presidencial básicamente consiste en que las Policías estatales atraigan el control de las Policías municipales por considerarse, en la iniciativa presidencial, el eslabón más débil de la cadena de seguridad pública, lo que les impide realizar apropiadamente las tareas que tienen asignadas. El presidente Enrique Peña Nieto “plantea reformar siete artículos de la Constitución —21, 73, 104, 105, 115, 116 y 123—, y argumenta que estos cambios permitirán una mejor coordinación entre autoridades para combatir a la delincuencia<sup>14</sup> y evitar crímenes como el de Iguala. Desde la asignación de mandos por parte de la Policía estatal, hasta la disolución de poderes en el municipio para que el control sea tomado por el gobierno estatal o federal, pretende establecer un conjunto de reglas orientadas a recuperar el control de la seguridad en aquellos municipios cuyas autoridades hayan sido rebasadas por el crimen. No obstante, la idea de fondo es desaparecer a las mil 800 policías municipales del país para dar paso a 32 policías estatales con control de la seguridad sobre todos los municipios. Esto fue acordado en la Conferencia Nacional de Gobernadores a principios de enero de 2016, aunque las posturas han variado y están sometidas a la discusión política, como se verá más adelante.

Entre las supuestas bondades del mando único, las autoridades destacan la posibilidad de reducir la infiltración del crimen organizado en los municipios mediante la disolución de la Policía Municipal, que

sería absorbida por la policía estatal a través de un mecanismo no decidido aún, pero que ya ha sido ensayado integrando mandos “certificados” designados desde el gobierno del estado. También dicen que servirá para cristalizar un modelo nacional de la Policía con leyes y procesos operativos homologados. Hasta ahí suena como algo lógico, positivo y útil. El problema es que esa versión representa sólo una parte de la historia y no contempla las dificultades que una versión operativa de esta naturaleza podría generar. Se concentra principalmente en un cambio gerencial sobre los responsables de la toma de decisiones pero no considera aspectos trascendentes como el Sistema de Desarrollo Policial que está en la ley desde 2009 y que según datos de Causa en Común, no ha sido cumplida en su totalidad por lo menos en 25 estados.

Cabe señalar que el desarrollo policial consiste en el entramado de reingeniería organizacional pensado para la consolidación de instituciones policiales estructuradas y reforzadas alrededor de su capital humano en los ejes principales de: carrera policial, profesionalización, certificación integral y régimen disciplinario, los cuales están contemplados en la Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública como parte esencial de la modernización de la Policía en México.

En el Semáforo de Desarrollo Policial 2015, realizado por Causa en Común A.C. se detectó que la mayoría



de las Policías estatales, 15 para ser exactos, no cumplen con los criterios mínimos establecidos por la federación en materia de desarrollo policial. Es decir, desde que se acordó que el desarrollo policial sería el piso de partida para crear Policías profesionales y dignas, hace aproximadamente 6 años, los gobiernos de los estados han ocupado los recursos de fondos federales adicionales a su propio presupuesto, para, supuestamente, crear y generar estos estándares. Ellos se deberían reflejar en el desarrollo de estrategias para el cambio organizacional de la policía como son: profesionalización, certificación y acreditación, el régimen disciplinario y la creación de un sistema de carrera policial.

Dichos ejes de trabajo están mandatados por la Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública y son operados por su Secretariado Ejecutivo a través del diseño de lineamientos y estándares que deben, hipotéticamente, ser materializados por cada una de los organismos policiales del país a fin de modernizar las Policías en diversos ámbitos, como son: el equipamiento, la actualización de tecnologías, cambios en las leyes y reglamentos y principalmente, en la mejora de las condiciones laborales y materiales de los recursos humanos que integran estas instituciones. Para lograrlo, el Gobierno de la República ha creado y otorgado, desde hace más de 10 años, fondos de apoyo para generar estas condiciones<sup>15</sup>. Los fondos usados son: el Fondo de Aportaciones a la Seguridad Pública de los Estados y el Distrito Federal, (FASP), el Subsidio para la Seguridad Pública de los Municipios y las Delegaciones del Distrito Federal (SUBSEMUN) y el Subsidio para la Policía Acreditada (SPA). Para 2016, se desaparece el SUBSEMUN y da paso al FORTASEG, acrónimo del Subsidio a los Municipios y Demarcaciones territoriales del Distrito Federal y, en su caso, a las Entidades Federativas que ejerzan de manera directa o coordinada la función de seguridad pública. La idea de este cambio es fortalecer la profesionalización de policías municipales y abrir paso a la posibilidad de que el recurso sea ejercido con los criterios del mando único.

Sin embargo, los estados no han logrado consolidar, ni con sus propias corporaciones, un sistema policial que permita erradicar la situación estructural por la que atraviesan desde hace años. Consolidar una buena Policía, definitivamente cuesta mucho dinero, sin embargo, independientemente de tener un programa de financiamiento que permita ejercer más recursos, lo que hemos visto es una mala administración de ellos y una falta de capacidades técnicas para diagnosticar necesidades, tomar decisiones y dar seguimiento a resultados.

El FASP, el SUBSEMUN y el SPA, que hasta 2015 formaron la triada de las aportaciones federales a los estados para fortalecer sus policías, todos los años han reportado no solo desvío de recursos para fines distintos a los designados sino también importantes subejercicios. Por poner un ejemplo, Michoacán, en el periodo de mayor gravedad del fenómeno delictivo (2009-2014), dejó de ejercer el 31.6% de los fondos que recibió, lo que equivale a 490 millones de pesos sin utilizar y sin

saberse por qué no lo hizo. Además, en 2011, el gobierno de ese estado no pudo comprobar los gastos del FASP por 238 millones de pesos, de un monto de 258 millones que había recibido<sup>16</sup>. Tan solo en el reporte de gastos publicado por el Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, se reconoce un subejercicio de 5.9% de los recursos para el mismo periodo, lo que equivale a dos mil 624 millones 90 mil 524.06 millones de pesos, de los 43 mil 884 millones 952 mil 354 pesos que recibieron en esos cinco años consecutivos. Y esto no considera que esos recursos fueron ejercido en la opacidad, sin controles precisos, que tienen varias observaciones en las auditorías realizadas por la ASF, donde se señala la carencia de mecanismos contables que permitan conocer claramente el destino de los recursos, pues en variadas ocasiones se transfirieron a otras cuentas, no hubo registros de cheques expedidos, o simplemente se ejercieron para gastos distintos a los fines previstos. En una valoración al FASP que Causa en Común realizó en alianza con el Instituto Mexicano de la Competitividad, se recomienda transparentar el ejercicio de los recursos mediante la creación de un catálogo de gastos donde se precise aquel que quede protegido bajo los criterios de “seguridad nacional”. También solicitan crear un comité de seguimiento al gasto del FASP comprometido por las entidades, con el objeto de que verifique incumplimientos y pueda promover sanciones ante ellos.

A nivel jurídico, la investigación de Causa en Común reveló que tan solo en términos de lo que representa la base para la construcción de instituciones confiables: el desarrollo policial, 20 entidades carecen de Comisión de desarrollo policial o la que hay no funciona conforme a lo previsto, 12 no cuentan con reglamento del servicio profesional de carrera y 13 no han tenido ascensos en los últimos 3 años. Esto indica que la seguridad en México sigue siendo más un tema de interés político, de la administración de los riesgos que representa el crimen, que de efectivo interés por desarrollar capacidades técnicas y compromisos para fomentar la lealtad institucional que permitan mejorar el combate al delito en las entidades y la seguridad de los ciudadanos.

La situación señalada implica que las Policías Estatales aún tienen serias dificultades para diseñar e implementar los procesos básicos que un policía debe experimentar a lo largo de su carrera, lo que genera que sus integrantes carezcan de certidumbre sobre su permanencia y su crecimiento profesional, así como de incentivos para el buen desempeño de sus funciones. Peor aún, miles de policías carecen de protección jurídica institucional para ejercer su derecho a defenderse cuando son imputados por violaciones a su régimen disciplinario. Es decir, viven en un estado de permanente indefensión. Su institución no los cuida y por el otro lado, la sociedad los margina.

Para comprender esto de una manera sencilla, significa que hoy en día si un policía pierde la vida en el cumplimiento del deber, es muy probable que su familia quede en el desamparo y no reciba ni una indemnización, salvo contadas

excepciones. Significa que un policía se considera capacitado y listo para el servicio con tan solo seis meses de formación en un instituto de dudosa calidad académica, con una disciplina laxa y sin tener conceptualizada la trascendencia e importancia de su rol dentro de la sociedad. Implica que si un policía se ve envuelto en una situación donde tuvo que usar su arma para proteger su vida o la de otros, existen muchas posibilidades de que su institución no lo apoye jurídicamente y sea abandonado a su suerte, sobre todo cuando la situación es polémica. Significa que, si ese policía quiere estudiar y crecer profesionalmente, solo en pocos estados podrá acceder a un proceso institucionalizado para subir de rango o de nivel a menos que se someta a las necesidades e intereses del mando -sean legales o no-, para poder aspirar a un ascenso, ya que no hay estructura o medio que sirva para reconocer a los mejores agentes.

Entre otras, tales son algunas de las condiciones en que miles de policías estatales salen cada día a trabajar, además de las conocidas experiencias con la corrupción en los mandos o entre sus compañeros, que principalmente se repiten por la necesidad de conservar el empleo, de ganar un poco más de dinero o bien, para los más retorcidos, abusar del poder que la autoridad les confiere. Esa es la situación en la que viven los policías estatales de México al día de hoy.

Y si los gobiernos de los estados no han sido técnicamente capaces de cubrir su propio estado de fuerza que según el SENSP asciende a 127,630 policías en todo el país, hasta noviembre de 2015, es totalmente válido preguntarse si podrán asumir el control administrativo y de la carrera policial de otros 132,691 policías municipales más. Y si a esto añadimos la incapacidad manifiesta de entidades como Michoacán, Tamaulipas, Veracruz o Guerrero, donde la policía estatal y municipal ha sido más que rebasada y está bajo control de la federación a través de la Policía Federal, el Ejército y la Marina ¿Qué va a pasar cuando en esas entidades dichas autoridades se declaren incompetentes para hacer sus funciones? ¿A quién van a llamar?

Se genera esta duda por los graves casos de presuntas violaciones a derechos humanos ocurridos recientemente en México, entre los que destacan la desaparición de 43 estudiantes en Iguala Guerrero, a manos de policías municipales y estatales, ocurrido en 2014. De igual forma, la desaparición de 5 jóvenes a cargo de policías estatales de Veracruz, en el municipio de Tierra Blanca a principios de 2016. Pues incluso en el segundo caso mencionado el comando a cargo de los agentes responsables, era un policía que no pasó sus pruebas de control de confianza y aún seguía en el cargo.

La situación actual produce entonces la necesidad de preguntar ¿Qué tan cierto es el argumento de que las Policías Estatales cuentan con la infraestructura y las capacidades como para acoger las funciones de los municipios? ¿Qué garantías tenemos de que las policías de los estados no sufrirán infiltraciones del crimen? Así como, según las autoridades, es más fácil coordinar a 32 Policías estatales que a 1,800



municipales, se puede inferir que para el crimen organizado sería más fácil ponerse de acuerdo con 32 mandos estatales, que con 1,800 municipales. Y esta preocupación adquiere dimensiones más reales cuando recordamos los antecedentes históricos que tenemos de policías formando y hasta liderando las filas del crimen.

El problema, en todo caso, no es solo un asunto de mandos o de coordinación, sino también de la indefinición en la que se encuentra la necesidad de modelar la Policía que queremos y construyamos en ese sentido. En principio, se espera que sea útil a las demandas de la comunidad; que sea un modelo en el cual podamos confiar y no al cual, por su naturaleza represiva y lejana al interés civil se le tema incluso más que a los propios delincuentes, tal y como sucede en la actualidad en varias regiones del país.

El estado mexicano lleva veinte años queriendo inventar el hilo negro en sus fuerzas policiales, pero ha descuidado lo fundamental: la construcción de instituciones sólidas. Esa condición no depende solo de las leyes, las cuales requieren homologarse en su conjunto sin importar si se decide o no el mando único, o bien, o si se decide tomar la propuesta contenida en las iniciativas del PAN y PRD, que en esencia permite dejar algunos estados con mando único y otros no. Depende de la implementación de procesos administrativos y operativos que consoliden las condiciones profesionales de los policías, que constituyan incentivos para mantener la lealtad a la institución y ello no es un tema que solo implique los salarios o las prestaciones. Para mantener la lealtad a una institución se requiere una cultura organizacional que fomente valores fundamentales como la transparencia, la confianza, la lealtad y la comunicación. Esto implica promover el respeto entre pares, impulsar el reconocimiento a la importancia de sus funciones, crear condiciones para que los policías valoren y muestren la trascendencia así como el impacto que su trabajo tiene sobre las condiciones de la sociedad. Implica también que la policía se democratice, entendido esto como la integración de mejores controles internos y externos, sociales e institucionales, donde la participación de la comunidad tenga mayor peso en el diagnóstico de la situación y en la difusión de resultados. Y el desarrollo policial es justamente la punta de lanza para construir estas circunstancias.

Sin embargo, debido a que la Policía sigue siendo más un instrumento del poder político, usado a conveniencia de mandos elegidos por un perfil más político que técnico, que dependen directamente de las decisiones de la autoridad política y no tanto de sus resultados por los servicios ofrecidos al ciudadano, no se observan condiciones que favorezcan una modificación a ello con la instauración del mando único. Por ello, creemos que con el mando único se acentuará esa circunstancia. Además, siguiendo la línea del interés político, es más fácil, hoy en día, para un gobernador, dejar la responsabilidad de la seguridad en manos de la federación que aceptar sus omisiones o carencias en la materia.

Si no se considera la generación de criterios profesionales para perfilar los puestos de mando,

haciendo esto de conformidad con procedimientos estandarizados, libres de injerencia política, la situación del personal en un contexto de mando único se agravará porque la selección de mandos sin el perfil adecuado genera descontento entre el personal que muchas veces está mejor capacitado. También provocará que se siga reproduciendo una toma de decisiones sin fundamento técnico (y esto incluye a los militares. La función de un policía, salvo por el manejo de armas, es muy distinta a la de un militar). Incrementará el riesgo en las condiciones laborales y no dará oportunidad de que los problemas de delito que son únicos para cada municipio, puedan ser diagnosticados adecuadamente. Esto último, debido a que muy posiblemente se intentarán crear estrategias estatales sin considerar las particularidades que la naturaleza del delito tiene de acuerdo a las características específicas, en términos de oportunidades para delinquir, que existen en el contexto de las múltiples causas que deben ser abordadas para comprender el delito.

En suma, antes de considerar al mando único como la mejor opción para la creación de cuerpos policiales confiables y profesionales, sería deseable que las autoridades cumplan la ley vigente, esa que les dota de las facultades para reformar a sus policías mediante la creación de instrumentos como es la carrera policial y las unidades de desarrollo policial. Es importante ponernos de acuerdo sobre la Policía que queremos, realizar un debate serio que nos permita delinear una reforma policial acorde a nuestras circunstancias y necesidades.

Por ahora el debate gira en torno a cinco propuestas: la de la CONAGO, que implica el desarme temporal de 1800 policías municipales, acercamiento a tareas de proximidad y 32 policías estatales para “un mejor” combate al crimen organizado, la cual proponen, sea de carácter “temporal”<sup>17</sup>; la segunda es la del Gobierno de la República, que propone leyes concurrentes entre federación y estados, la desaparición de las 1800 policías para la creación de una policía estatal única y que el estado asuma total o parcialmente las funciones del ayuntamiento cuando se detecte infiltración del crimen organizado; la tercera, del PAN, es la llamada por ellos mismos “flexible” y que consiste en la creación del Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Pública y el Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses, los cuales funcionarían para diseñar, coordinar y supervisar los mecanismos de intervención y colaboración entre las Policías, así como la profesionalización de los servicios periciales del país. Esta propuesta, a diferencia de las otras dos, incluye también la creación del Servicio Nacional de Carrera Policial, que establecería la reglamentación para los procesos de “elección, ingreso, formación, permanencia, evaluación, reconocimiento y certificación de personal de instituciones de seguridad pública”<sup>18</sup>.

Por su parte, el PRD se pronuncia por una “reforma profunda” en la que se preserve “un papel en materia de seguridad pública para los municipios, la definición de estándares policiales, así como el establecimiento de un organismo certificador nacional de los cuerpos policíacos.”<sup>19</sup> Además, proponen que existan esquemas de mando único parcial o total “cuando las corporaciones policiales

de una entidad o un municipio no alcancen los requisitos cuantitativos de población o estado de fuerza establecidos en la ley, o no satisfagan estándares mínimos de eficiencia”<sup>20</sup>. Y la propuesta más reciente es del PT. Se centra en 3 líneas de trabajo: 1. Fortalecer a las policías, en particular las municipales, 2. Fortalecer criterios de elegibilidad de representantes federales y locales y fortalecer municipios con recursos para respaldar la infraestructura y personal policial.

Lo ideal es que, a través de una discusión seria, con la participación de especialistas y miembros de la sociedad civil a fin de definir de manera democrática un modelo de policía que sea útil a largo plazo. En esencia, desde Causa en Común, creemos que ese modelo policial debe pasar en primer lugar por un proyecto destinado a homologar capacidades y habilidades a través de la creación de estándares profesionales, en el cual la supervisión civil se integre de manera natural a las políticas de seguridad. Que además goce de la capacidad técnica y metodológica para el análisis de información delictiva que sirva como guía para perfilar la toma de decisiones.

En materia de certificación, deseamos que garantice su realización no solo en términos del control de confianza, sino que incluya el desempeño y las habilidades y destrezas, para fortalecer las condiciones operativas de la Policía. Para lograr esto se requiere fortalecer el papel del Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública para dotarle de mayor autonomía de funciones y de ser posible, con capacidades para sancionar a quienes incumplan los compromisos en materia de las políticas institucionales del ramo. Se necesita también que la estrategia de los gobiernos de los estados sea clara e incluya mecanismos para transparentar el uso de los recursos. Además, como una adición a la certificación, se debe añadir la necesidad de crear estándares que certifiquen a las instituciones, no solo a las personas.

En suma, para cualquier modelo que se adopte, es necesario que tanto ciudadanía como el Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública desarrollen un proceso de verificación y certificación de las condiciones institucionales requeridas como piso mínimo, para que una agencia policial pueda desempeñar sus funciones de manera adecuada. En todo caso, la crisis de seguridad que hoy viven varias entidades de la República y la propuesta del presidente en este tema representan una oportunidad histórica para en el Congreso en la discusión para definir un modelo policial adecuado para México en el que se dé importancia a la democratización y profesionalización de las policías y que, a su vez, esté encaminado a acercarse a la ciudadanía para generar corresponsabilidad respecto a los temas de inseguridad y desarrollo policial.

Es imperativo que las propuestas y la solución de modelo que se consolide en el Congreso tengan como centro las necesidades del ciudadano mediante el reconocimiento de las deficiencias en los servicios que la Policía oferta. Pues, sin una Policía donde los ciudadanos intervengan para supervisar, proponer y conocer, será muy complejo lograr la legitimidad y la eficacia que México necesita de sus corporaciones.

# LOS PLANOS PARA LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA PAZ A NIVEL LOCAL

## A MAP TOWARDS BUILDING PEACE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL



OBSERVATORIO  
NACIONAL  
CIUDADANO  
SEGURIDAD, JUSTICIA Y LEGISLACIÓN

Francisco Rivas, Director General, Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano

In this essay, Francisco Rivas, who leads the network of 15 National Citizen Observatories in Mexico, describes the challenges and opportunities that come with measuring violence in the country. Information, Rivas writes, provides the knowledge required by governments in devising methods of protection and crime prevention strategies. Accurate data allows them to make better policy, counter organized crime and identify peoples' needs. This essay argues official data lacks both quality and reliability, and Mexico needs to develop a system that encourages its reporting, transparency and accountability. Citizen engagement, advocacy and the introduction of transparency laws are needed to guarantee stakeholders are working with data that accurately reflects Mexico's circumstances in order to improve them.

En las últimas dos décadas México ha captado la atención internacional debido a los altos índices de delitos violentos como secuestros, extorsiones presenciales, lesiones violentas, homicidios dolosos y feminicidios. Un muestra de ello es que durante dicho periodo varias ciudades mexicanas han ingresado a la lista de las ciudades con las mayores tasas de homicidio por cada cien mil habitantes, posicionándolas como algunas de las urbes más violentas del mundo.

Sin embargo, el fenómeno de la violencia va más allá del número de homicidios, incluye acciones menos reconocidas y visibles que van desde la violación a derechos humanos, la abierta agresión del Estado hacia sus ciudadanos -ejemplos son las desapariciones forzadas, la falta de acceso a la justicia y las asimetrías que en esta materia se manifiestan por juicios justos, las agresiones dirigidas a reprimir la libertad de expresión-, hasta las agresiones y violencia de privados que pueden ser en el espacio público o en la intimidad del hogar.

Sin lugar a dudas, medir la violencia es un ejercicio complejo pero necesario. Esto se debe a que difícilmente se puede combatir algo que se desconoce como fenómeno y del cual se

carecen de indicadores precisos para medir los avances y retrocesos. Por esta razón, el *Índice Global de Paz* es una aportación importante para describir un fenómeno complejo, más allá de la mera intuición. Desde esta perspectiva, hay que tener presente que los indicadores permiten medir y evaluar los esfuerzos que se llevan a cabo frente a las problemáticas que se presentan. Por ende, si no contamos con indicadores precisos y confiables no podemos analizar exhaustivamente qué tanto y cómo hemos avanzado en pacificar la realidad social.

La base para que los indicadores sean confiables es que estos se nutran de información fidedigna y homogénea, pues sin esta solo se obtiene una fotografía imprecisa o abiertamente falsa de lo que sucede cotidianamente. Desde esta perspectiva, el compromiso para mejorar los índices de violencia deben pasar por un trabajo sólido para desarrollar sistemas que fortalezcan la denuncia ciudadana, la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas.

No importa el cristal con el que se mire, la información fidedigna es de utilidad para la sociedad y la autoridad. Simplemente recordemos que si contamos con información útil para entender las problemáticas sociales,

el comportamiento delictivo y la violencia podemos desarrollar distintas acciones sociales para enfrentarlos o para protegernos. Este es el caso de la creación de comités vecinales que coadyuvan para una mejor protección de los hogares; la identificación estratégica de rutas y horarios seguros para transportar mercancías o para establecer negocios por parte de los comerciantes; la toma de decisiones para las inversiones de los empresarios para evitar riesgos de diversa índole; la elección de rutas para ir a la escuela o al trabajo, así como de lugares para salir de noche y de parques para pasear perros; entre otras tantas acciones. Lo anteriormente descrito evidencia que las personas que están informadas son más propensas a protegerse a sí mismos, a sus familias y a sus negocios. Justamente en este plano es donde inicia la cadena de la prevención del delito.

Simultáneamente, la información sobre los fenómenos mencionados le permite a la autoridad generar políticas de prevención del delito, de reacción y desmantelamiento de bandas, de capacitación sustantiva de su personal, de políticas de readaptación social, así como identificar los requerimientos necesarios y el uso de los recursos públicos

respectivos. Con base en este argumento es un hecho que los compromisos por una información de calidad, por la transparencia y por la rendición de cuentas deben guiar el actuar de la autoridad.

Lamentablemente, tanto el Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano (ONC) como cada uno de los miembros de la Red Nacional de Observatorios hemos podido corroborar que la calidad de la información en el país que se utiliza para generar indicadores de resultados, continúa siendo muy deficiente. Hemos identificado que en varias entidades todavía existen funcionarios que mal registran e informan o que abiertamente manipulan la información para ocultar fallas, falta de avances o hacer parecer que la situación está mejor de lo que en realidad se encuentra. Aunado a ello, hemos encontrado importantes asimetrías en los procesos y mecanismos de transparencia de la información pública que generan una serie de incentivos para llevar a cabo malas prácticas, ya que se suele premiar a aquellos que informan inadecuadamente a la sociedad.

En el ONC creemos firmemente que para construir la paz en nuestras comunidades, primero, necesitamos entender integralmente lo que está sucediendo para cambiarlo. Por lo tanto, mientras sigamos teniendo autoridades poco comprometidas en esta materia, difícilmente podremos mejorar las condiciones de seguridad del país.

Debido a ello, el ONC ha desarrollado una red que hasta el momento cuenta con 15 observatorios locales certificados que se denomina Red Nacional de Observatorios de Seguridad. Cada uno de los miembros de esta red lleva a cabo importantes esfuerzos en el ámbito municipal y comunitario de 9 entidades federativas para la creación de los planos necesarios para la construcción de la paz. Para alcanzar dicho objetivo, estos observatorios trabajan directamente con las autoridades locales, analizan la calidad de las bases de datos considerando los criterios y metodologías implementadas para su construcción; solicitan los cambios pertinentes; le dan seguimiento mensual a las tendencias de los delitos de alto impacto; georeferencian ciertos ilícitos para identificar cuáles son las zonas más seguras e inseguras y por qué.

Este trabajo incluye generar información pública y accesible tanto para la autoridad como para la ciudadanía a través de los Reportes de delitos de alto impacto. De esta manera, los observatorios trabajan en dos vías: comparten con las autoridades los datos para generar los diagnósticos base para la prevención y reducción de los delitos para trabajar de la mano con la policía y las procuradurías; mientras que a la par mantienen informadas a las personas para que tomen las decisiones más adecuadas para

evaluar a los funcionarios y generar una genuina rendición de cuentas en la materia. No basta con decir que “la delincuencia va bajando” o que “estamos mejor que en los últimos diez años” si no somos capaces de demostrar que en verdad está sucediendo.

De esta forma, las acciones de los observatorios locales son el primer paso para la construcción de la paz, tal como lo es el Índice de Paz México 2016, que presenta el Instituto Para la Economía y la Paz.

Sin embargo, en México quien genera la estadística criminal para la creación de los planos para la construcción de la paz es la autoridad de los diferentes niveles. Lamentablemente, parece que aún no han entendido la importancia de contar con información válida.

Esto es un problema para quienes trabajamos con la información pública como los observatorios y el Instituto para la Economía y la Paz. No podemos ignorar cómo afecta que las autoridades no generen información del todo válida y comparable para la creación del Índice, que como todos, tiene fortalezas y debilidades. La fortaleza principal de esta aportación ciudadana radica en que utiliza una metodología seria, replicable y transparente que busca explicar y medir la debilidad de nuestro Estado de Derecho. No obstante, su debilidad es que se construye a partir de información pública generada por las instituciones que han generalizado la corrupción, que han dificultado el acceso a la justicia y la reparación del daño a las víctimas y que, en ocasiones, han obstaculizado la publicidad de la información por considerar que les afecta.

En el ONC analizamos mensualmente las tendencias de las averiguaciones previas y carpetas de investigación que las instituciones de procuración de justicia presentan públicamente sobre los delitos cometidos en su entidad. Periódicamente, reconocemos y enfatizamos que los rankings construidos a partir de información pública deficiente castigan a las entidades que hacen el mayor esfuerzo por presentar datos apegados a la realidad (como aparentemente sucede con Nuevo León y Baja California) y premian a aquellas que mal informan (como es el caso de Nayarit y Veracruz).

Por ende, lo más negativo y preocupante es que las autoridades usan la información para autolegitimarse, perpetuar políticas inefectivas que violan derechos humanos y promueven una imagen falsa de las condiciones de la entidad como muestra la siguiente nota informativa: Nayarit uno de los estados con bajo índice de impunidad.

No desestimamos la creación de este tipo de índices sino todo lo contrario pues representan esfuerzos necesarios y oportunos de organizaciones como el Instituto para la

Economía y la Paz. Lo que hemos insistido desde hace años, es que la información pública con la que trabajamos en México, pese a algunos esfuerzos aislados por fortalecerla, sigue siendo de muy mala calidad, por lo que tomar los datos sin analizar su procedencia, nos lleva a conclusiones equivocadas. El Índice de Paz un excelente instrumento que debe ser fortalecido y que tendrá impacto una vez que nuestras autoridades cumplan con su deber sustantivo: gobernar apegados a la norma y rendir cuentas por su actuar.

Para que esto se logre necesitamos contar con dos leyes fundamentales para conocer, medir y evaluar el desempeño de nuestros gobernantes: la Ley de Archivos y la Ley de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Públicos. La Ley de Archivos es una iniciativa que desde hace más de una década espera ver la luz. Es una iniciativa fundamental para que la Ley de Transparencia sea efectiva ya que establecerá qué información debe ser resguardada y cómo debe ser tratada.

El trabajo de los observatorios locales y del Instituto para la Economía y la Paz ya no sólo es la creación de planos para mejores políticas públicas en búsqueda de la paz, puesto que ahora necesitamos generar herramientas para evaluar la calidad de los materiales y procesos. Esto es fundamental para exigirle a las autoridades con evidencia y argumentos que mejoren y transparenten su actuar. México y la sociedad han cambiado y, por ello, no podemos continuar permitiendo más simulación e impunidad si queremos un país seguro, justo y pacífico.

# NON-DISCRIMINATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN MEXICO: A COMPONENT OF POSITIVE PEACE

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Senior Fellow, Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

**FSI** Freeman Spogli  
Institute for  
Stanford International  
Studies

Like many indigenous peoples, indigenous Mexicans still face inequalities and disenfranchisement. This essay looks at the wage gaps between indigenous and non-indigenous Mexican men and women, highlighting the states that have the best and worst ratios in earnings. Every state in Mexico faces some earnings gap, which serves as a proxy for discrimination, either based on gender or indigenous identity.

An important element of positive peace is the acceptance of others, particularly those from different religions, nationalities or ethnicities. In many countries a concrete way to measure acceptance as a positive peace dimension is the absence of discrimination against foreigners or immigrants. Central American immigrants all too often suffer from discriminatory practices in Mexico. But the most salient form of discrimination in the country is not necessarily towards foreign immigrants, but against its own original peoples. The most persistent poverty in Mexico is found precisely among its indigenous peoples.<sup>21</sup> Notwithstanding the recent empowerment of indigenous peoples throughout Latin America (with political representation and legislative recognition of their ethnic rights), the labor income gap between equivalently educated indigenous and non-indigenous workers in the region is somewhere between 27 and 57 percent.<sup>22</sup> Discrimination accounts for much of this income differential.

The extreme poverty rate among the population that speaks an indigenous language in Mexico, according to CONEVAL, the agency in charge of poverty measurement, is 38 percent.<sup>23</sup> This is four times larger than the 9.8 percent of the population classified as extremely poor in 2012. According to this agency, only a fifth of Mexicans can be considered to be neither poor, nor vulnerable of falling into poverty.<sup>24</sup> But for Mexicans who speak an indigenous language, this indicator of wellbeing is only 3.5 percent. This means that 96.5 percent of the indigenous people in Mexico are either poor because their income level does not cover basic needs such as food, clothing and housing costs; or

vulnerable to poverty because they lack at least one basic public good such as sewerage, electricity, health, social security or schooling.

The difference between incomes of indigenous and non-indigenous wage earners, according to the 2010 Census collected by INEGI, can be seen in Table 1. States are ranked according to the relative size of the unconditional gap in average wages for both men and women, according to whether they self-ascribe as indigenous. These unconditional income differences (that is, not taking into account differences in life cycle, human capital, family structure and other socio-demographic variables) are very large. These differences are, however, not quite a measure of ethnic discrimination.

Indigenous peoples have historically lacked equivalent educational opportunities, compared to non-indigenous citizens. Therefore they possess less years of schooling and have lower measures of education attainment. A large part of the incidence of poverty among indigenous peoples is related to this lack of human capital. Although discrimination might be behind different educational opportunities, it is important to calculate the income gap controlling for human capital formation. In a society with positive peace, indigenous ethnic identity should not be a disadvantage in labor markets, compared to equally qualified workers, compared across the same education levels.

Compensation will also be determined by a combination of other factors beyond education, including skills as well as differences in innate talent. There are also well known differences in earnings along the life cycle; and it would

not be surprising to find that there are some regional and sectorial differences incomes depending on occupation or economic activity. But all of these variations in labor conditions can be observed and measured, and therefore controlled for in measuring income differences.

Given that innate talent is not differentially distributed across ethnic groups, if a residual systematic difference is found in the earnings of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, controlling for differences in skills, human capital and other observable circumstances, it is quite likely that the remaining differential is driven by social exclusion and discrimination. The comparison has to be done in a counterfactual framework, estimating what the income would be of an equivalent individual that is indigenous, had he or she not been indigenous.<sup>25</sup>


In a preliminary effort to provide a methodology and some insights about how to calculate ethnic discrimination as a component of positive peace in Mexico, a matching estimation was performed.<sup>25</sup> The matching method takes advantage of the extremely large sample size of the Mexican census sample (10 percent of the population) in 2010, which allows for the comparison of incomes in counterfactual individuals that have exactly the same characteristics as an indigenous wage earner, except that they are not indigenous. The exercise was performed both with information on linguistic differences as well as voluntary self-adscription. The index of discrimination presented below uses only self-adscription, a broader definition of being indigenous than the linguistic approach.<sup>27</sup>

Table 2 provides the estimates of this metric of discrimination, for each state.<sup>28</sup> The table reports the number of indigenous men and women that were matched in the sample, where the “treatment” variable is being indigenous and the “control” variable is individuals that do not report an indigenous identity in the census. The credibility of the exercise hinges on believing that the ordering of matches is reasonable, so that the comparison in each pair involves people who have similar probabilities of being indigenous due to their underlying characteristics, but one reported being indigenous, while the other did not. Since this is a statistical exercise, it is possible to calculate standard errors, which allow for the calculation of confidence intervals at the 95 percent level.

Although the results are quite preliminary, some interesting patterns emerge. States are ranked according to the size of the estimated earnings gap for men, and numbers in bold are those where the estimated gap is statistically significant (in italic those significant at the 90 percent level). It turns out that the only state with no negative gap for women is Aguascalientes (although not statistically different from 0). The other states that do not seem to exhibit statistically different earnings for indigenous peoples are Zacatecas, Guerrero and Nayarit. In addition, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí show no statistical significant gap for

**FIGURE 1.**

Indigenous earnings gap by gender across Mexican states.



Source: Matching based on INEGI 2010 Census Sample

**TABLE 1.**

Unconditional differences in income between indigenous and non-indigenous wage earners (2010 census).

State	Non-indigenous	Indigenous	Earnings gap	Percentage of non-indigenous
<b>Zacatecas</b>	4621	4720	99	2.10%
<b>Aguascalientes</b>	6456	5893	-563	-8.70%
<b>Tlaxcala</b>	4194	3582	-613	-14.60%
<b>Michoacán</b>	4673	3767	-905	-19.40%
<b>Guanajuato</b>	5548	4451	-1097	-19.80%
<b>Morelos</b>	5131	4062	-1069	-20.80%
<b>Tabasco</b>	5761	4467	-1294	-22.50%
<b>Jalisco</b>	5862	4520	-1341	-22.90%
<b>Nayarit</b>	4991	3833	-1158	-23.20%
<b>Colima</b>	5733	4389	-1344	-23.40%
<b>México</b>	5809	4291	-1517	-26.10%
<b>Querétaro</b>	6626	4895	-1731	-26.10%
<b>Campeche</b>	5074	3639	-1435	-28.30%

State	Non-indigenous	Indigenous	Earnings gap	Percentage of non-indigenous
<b>Oaxaca</b>	4591	3276	-1315	-28.60%
<b>Hidalgo</b>	4668	3317	-1351	-28.90%
<b>Sinaloa</b>	6105	4151	-1955	-32.00%
<b>Distrito Federal</b>	8903	6016	-2887	-32.40%
<b>Sonora</b>	6293	4196	-2096	-33.30%
<b>Chihuahua</b>	6056	4017	-2039	-33.70%
<b>Guerrero</b>	4317	2821	-1496	-34.60%
<b>Veracruz</b>	4207	2734	-1472	-35.00%
<b>Puebla</b>	4218	2724	-1495	-35.40%
<b>Yucatán</b>	5332	3027	-2305	-43.20%
<b>San Luis Potosí</b>	5088	2861	-2227	-43.80%
<b>Chiapas</b>	3874	2081	-1793	-46.30%



**TABLE 2.** Non-discrimination towards Indigenous peoples in Mexico (measured as matched comparison of earnings in 2010).

State	Indigenous women	Women earnings gap	t-statistic	Indigenous men	Men earnings gap	t-statistic
Aguascalientes	196	342.967	0.71	362	210.883	0.394
Zacatecas	138	-272.346	-0.534	298	142.894	0.352
Distrito Federal	3722	-672.088	-2.245	5111	-614.114	-1.767
Tlaxcala	4307	-263.813	-3.242	8270	-345.003	-4.432
Guerrero	13804	-446.738	-1.293	16595	-354.494	-0.866
Morelos	3354	-455.835	-3.015	5936	-448.827	-2.914
Colima	1118	-443.597	-2.307	1883	-680.432	-3.337
México	10468	-766.682	-6.462	21488	-707.66	-5.52
Guanajuato	1101	-564.944	-3.519	2061	-721.864	-3.375
Nayarit	1144	-282.406	-0.279	2482	-638.896	-0.801
Oaxaca	48432	-425.975	-3.373	89909	-680.9	-5.164
Querétaro	12848	-436.193	-1.114	3216	-1027.996	-1.733
Puebla	21277	-453.823	-2.68	52034	-628.702	-4.593
Jalisco	3933	-453.015	-2.194	7747	-944.052	-6.75
Tabasco	758	-952.128	-2.068	1834	-927.254	-1.735
Chihuahua	1049	-565.538	-0.508	2686	-979.99	-1.808
Campeche	2202	-1017.752	-2.94	4366	-952.475	-1.585
Sinaloa	380	-855.608	-1.598	1169	-1194.844	-2.379
Hidalgo	7085	-647.737	-3.84	16504	-957.293	-3.002
Chiapas	10120	-720.246	-1.358	38544	-824.948	-2.104
Sonora	1837	-960.159	-2.087	4880	-1462.296	-1.692
Michoacán	7446	-576.648	-1.572	15219	-1235.331	-3.495
San Luis Potosí	3023	-289.183	-0.439	8345	-1412.647	-1.896
Veracruz	12848	-436.193	-1.114	42709	-1359.921	-3.676
Yucatán	25875	-812.32	-4.235	60862	-2237.003	-7.218

women.<sup>29</sup> The wage gap for indigenous men is usually larger than for women, reaching a very large magnitude in Yucatán. This suggests that in many states women are not discriminated due to their indigenous status, even though there could be some gender discrimination in place. However, it is important to highlight that the lowest rank in the case of women belongs to the two most important oil producing states, Tabasco and Campeche.

The table ranks states according to the absence of discrimination, according to the earnings gap of men, expressed as the percentage of the average earnings of non-indigenous workers in any given state. This is done in order to adjust for the difference in average earnings across states. The top five states in this ranking of non-discrimination are Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Distrito Federal, Tlaxcala, and perhaps surprisingly, Guerrero. Some of the most indigenous states in the country (Oaxaca or Puebla) are found at intermediate levels in the ranking. The last five ranked are Sonora, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí, with Yucatán in last place.



# 2016 MEXICO PEACE INDEX

## METHODOLOGY

**The Mexico Peace Index is based on the work of the Global Peace Index, the preeminent global measure of peacefulness that has been produced by IEP annually since 2007. The MPI is the third in a series of National Peace Indices, following the United Kingdom Peace Index and the United States Peace Index. Based on a definition of peace as the absence of violence or fear of violence, this index uses a similar methodology to the UKPI and the USPI. This is the third edition of the MPI.**

IEP's starting point in creating peace indices is to imagine a perfectly peaceful state, region, or country. In such a state, there would be no direct violence, no homicides, or violent crime. In addition, there would be no need for state actions against the perpetrators of crime and no need for the state to devote resources to violence containment. Thus, there would be no police employees and no incarceration. Citizens would have no fear of violence being committed against them, so there would be no harassment or public disorder. Finally, in a perfectly peaceful state, citizens would have no need to own firearms or other weapons for the purpose of self-defense.

Such a state is clearly theoretical, as there is no state so perfectly at peace. The peace indices thus aim only to provide a starting point for conceptualizing how to measure a society perfectly at peace. In police states where the government may exercise repressive control and have significant police numbers and intrusive monitoring, there may be relatively little crime, but this does not reflect an environment without the fear of violence. Similarly, a society that has a large proportion of the population incarcerated reflects high levels of historical violence and consists of a group of the population that, if released, could theoretically cause greater violence. A state without law enforcement would experience higher rates of violence. Through counting and building a composite index, which reflects these factors, a more comprehensive reflection of the peacefulness of a society can be obtained.

It is important to note that the MPI makes no moral judgment on what the appropriate levels of a state's response to containing violence should be. Different contexts and circumstances will call for different government responses to the problem of

violence. Thus, the MPI score should be seen as a measure of how close a state currently is to realizing a perfectly peaceful environment and not a moral judgment of its peacefulness, nor a judgment on the current administration.

In order to ascertain whether similar patterns and environments associated with peace at the sub-national level exist in different countries, IEP has maintained a largely consistent structure for all National Peace Indices. However, some differences are necessary as each country has its own history and specific cultural factors that need to be accounted for in order to properly capture peacefulness as a multidimensional phenomenon. In addition, data limitations may mean that some indicators that are available in one country are not available in another.

A composite index combines multiple factors in a standardized way to create a statistical measure that is aimed at making a complex idea simple to understand.

The MPI measures peacefulness at the state level in Mexico. A key reason for choosing this unit of analysis is that, similar to the United States, Mexico's state governments have wide-ranging powers allowing them to have a significant impact on the level of violence and thus the response to violence may differ significantly from state to state.

The MPI is composed of seven indicators, four of which are very similar to the indicators used in the USPI and UKPI. These are *homicide*, *violence crime*, *weapons crime* and *police funding*. The remaining three indicators, *justice system efficiency*, *detention without a sentence* and *organized crime*, are specific to the MPI.

## MEXICO PEACE INDEX EXPERT PANEL

---

The MPI Expert Panel was established to provide independent advice and technical guidance to IEP researchers in developing the index methodology. The Panel is composed of experts from independent, non-partisan, civil society and academic organizations. For the 2015 MPI it comprised:

- > **Carlos J. Vilalta Perdomo**  
Professor, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. (CIDE)
- > **Edgar Guerrero Centeno**  
Deputy Director General of Government Information Policies and National Government Censuses, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI)
- > **Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona**  
Director, Jurimetría, Iniciativas para el Estado de Derecho, A.C.
- > **Leonel Fernández Novelo**  
Local Observatories Coordinator, Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano
- > **Juan Pablo Arango Orozco**  
Researcher, Causa en Común
- > **Alberto Díaz-Cayeros**  
Senior Fellow, Center for Democracy Development and Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli, Institute of International Affairs, Stanford University
- > **Luis Mauricio Torres Alcocer**  
Researcher, Instituto Mexicano de Competitividad (IMCO)
- > **Jonathan Furszyfer del Río**  
Director of Security, México Evalúa

## DATA SOURCES

One of the key challenges in developing a composite peace index is finding adequate data over a sufficient period of time to accurately and comprehensively understand the underlying trends in peace. In general, IEP uses data from national statistics offices wherever possible. All of the seven indicators in the MPI come from government bodies in Mexico. IEP then uses survey data to adjust the figures in order to account for underreporting. Where possible the data source used for this study is the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security (*Secretario Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública*, SESNSP).

### 2016 MPI INDICATORS DATA SOURCES AND IMPUTATION METHODS

---

#### **Homicide**

**Definition:** The number of homicides per 100,000 people, measured as the number of cases that were investigated by the state prosecution authorities.

**Imputation:** None

**Source:** Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security/  
*Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP)

#### **Violent Crime**

**Definition:** The number of violent crimes per 100,000 people, adjusted for underreporting. Violent crimes include robbery, rape and assault.

**Imputation:** None

**Source:** SESNSP



## Organized Crime

**Definition:** The number of extortions, drug-trade related crimes, and kidnappings per 100,000 people. Extortion and kidnapping rates are adjusted for underreporting. Drug-trade related crimes include production, transport, trafficking, trade, supply, or possession of drugs or other “crimes against public health,” as they are termed in Mexican law.

**Imputation:** Where values were missing, IEP assigned the mean value for the given year before adjusting for underreporting.

**Source:** SESNSP



## Weapons Crime

**Definition:** The number of crimes committed with a firearm per 100,000 people. Includes intentional and negligent homicides and assaults committed with a firearm.

**Imputation:** Missing values are filled using the value from the 2015 MPI. With each release of data, SESNSP reports some revised numbers for historical data points. It is best practice to use the revised data, as it often reflects improved accuracy. However, in some cases, no value was reported at all for homicides or assaults committed with a firearm or the total number of homicides and assaults committed with a firearm was revised downward to zero. Where no weapons crimes were reported, IEP used the archived data on weapons crimes from the 2015 MPI.

In previous iterations of the MPI, Baja California and Baja California Sur did not report any weapons crimes for any year. For those two states, the indicator “deaths by firearm” from INEGI death statistics was used for the years that it is available. These values are used for the years 2004 to 2009 and an average of the three years 2007 to 2009 was used for the years 2010 to 2012. In the 2016 MPI, these historic values were used to fill any current gaps in the data.

**Source:** SESNSP



## Detention without a Sentence

**Definition:** The number of people in prison without a sentence divided by the number of homicide and violent crime cases, as counted in the homicide and violent crime indicators.

**Imputation:** Values for 2006 were used for the years 2003 to 2005.

**Source:** Secretariat of Public Security / *Secretaría de Seguridad Pública* (2006-2012) and the National Security Commission / *Comisión Nacional de Seguridad* (CNG) (2013-2015), data provided by Guillermo Zepeda and Paola Jiménez, *Jurimetria*.



## Police Funding

**Definition:** The federal government subsidies for state security from the Public Security Contribution Fund / *Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública* (FASP) per 100,000 people, in current Mexican pesos.

**Imputation:** None

**Source:** Secretariat of Public Finance and Credit / *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* (SHCP)



## Justice System Efficiency

**Definition:** The ratio of registered intentional homicide cases to successful homicide prosecutions.

**Imputation:** Values for homicide convictions are lagged one year and lagged values for 2014-2015 are the 2013 lagged values (2012 true values).

**Source:** Homicide convictions from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography / *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía* (INEGI) and the number of homicides cases from SESNSP



## Population data

**Definition:** The estimated population of each state in each year. Population data is used to calculate the per capita level of police funding and the rate per 100,000 people for homicide, violent crime, organized crime and weapons crime.

**Imputation:** None. INEGI provides estimates of the population based on Mexico's census through the year 2009 and projections based on population growth rates for the years 2010 to 2015.

**Source:** INEGI



## Underreporting multipliers

**Definition:** Number of crimes reported by victims on the victimization survey divided by the number of those crimes that victims stated they reported to the authorities.

Underreporting multipliers are applied to the number of rapes, robberies, assaults, kidnappings and extortions recorded by SESNSP.

**Imputation:** If 100 percent of a particular crime in a particular state was unreported, IEP used the max multiplier for that crime in the given year because otherwise dividing the total crimes by zero reported crimes would yield a multiplier of zero.

Conversely, some crimes did not appear in the victimization data at all – i.e., none of the sampled respondents reported experiencing that crime. This happens when the sample size in a particular state is very small. Other data indicates that there were not zero instances of a crime, but rather than not enough people were surveyed to capture experiences of that crime. In these cases, IEP used the average multiplier for that crime and year.

**Source:** National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security / *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública* (ENVIPE), 2012-2015

## CRIME DATA: REPORTED VS. SURVEY DATA

In constructing an index that relies on crime data, a decision must be made between a range of alternative sources, all of which come with their own advantages and disadvantages. For instance, for most countries, the recorded levels of crime tend to be significantly lower than the actual level. Although there is a range of reasons, often this is because many offenses are simply not reported to the police.

The underreporting of crime in Mexico is a significant problem. Specifically, the 2015 National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (*Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción*, ENVIPE) from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía*, INEGI) suggests that 92.8 percent of crimes in Mexico are not reported to the authorities. This survey uses a representative sample of households to analyze not only the impacts of crime on individuals and society but also perceptions of public security. It collects information on a number of different crimes, the victims and their context, and perceptions about public security, confidence in the institutions and the justice system.

One of the main advantages of this dataset is that it contains information regarding unreported crimes, as opposed to official data that only accounts for crimes reported to the authorities. The ENVIPE survey also contains information on the percentage of crimes that are actually reported to the police.

The level of underreporting varies quite considerably by both state and offense. According to the ENVIPE 2015 data, only 10 percent of extortions, 17 percent of rapes and 20 percent of robbers are reported. Out of the crimes reported, assault and kidnapping are the most reported, with roughly 30 percent of each being reported to the police. In comparison, estimates from the British crime survey suggest that around 40 percent of violent crime is reported in the UK, with the US closer to 48 percent.

The SESNSP data on rape, robbery assault, kidnapping and extortion have been multiplied by the ratio of reported to unreported crimes to allow for a more accurate reflection of the occurrence of violence in Mexico.

IEP calculates the underreporting rate for a number of crimes based on the information from ENVIPE. The survey asks each respondent if they were a victim of a particular type of crime and whether or not they had reported it to the authorities. IEP then divided the total numbers of crimes reported by survey respondents by the number of crimes that survey respondents said they reported to the authorities. This produces a multiplier for adjusting the official statistics. The adjustments are made for the crimes of rape, robbery, assault, extortion and kidnapping.

Two adjustments were made to produce a full dataset. Because of the small sample sizes, there are some cases where either none of the survey respondents reported the crime to the

authorities. In cases where none of the instances of a crime were reported, the max multiplier for that crime and year was assigned to these states. Second, there were some states where there were no respondents that reported experiencing a particular crime – either kidnapping or rape. If no crimes were recorded on the survey, the average reporting multiplier is used for that crime in that year.

Finally, the underreporting rates for each state and crime were averaged over time and these average underreporting rates were applied to the official statistics for every year of the MPI. This average over time is used for three reasons:

- **The underreporting rates** for each year do include some imputations, based on assumptions, given the above.
- **The victimization data** is only available for a subset of the years included in the MPI, and as such some proxy rate must be applied over time in any scenario.
- **Crime reporting** is quite problematic in Mexico, while ENVIPE is based on a sample of the state populations; as such, an average over time smooths out any large fluctuations in underreporting rates that may be the result of complex and imperfect surveying and reporting methodologies rather than a true change in reporting.

## INDICATOR SCORE AND OVERALL SCORE CALCULATIONS

The MPI indicators are scored between 1 and 5, with 5 being the least peaceful score and 1 being the most peaceful score. Banded indicator scores are calculated by normalizing the range of raw values based on each state's average value over the period 2003 to 2015. First, the average value for each state over the 13 years of the study is calculated. Then the outliers are removed from the range of average state values in order to identify the min and max of normally distributed average values. Outliers in this case are defined as data points that are more than three standard deviations greater than the mean. Next, the values for each year are normalized using the max and min of the normal range and are banded between 1 and 5. The calculation for banded scores is:

$$\text{Banded score} = \left( \frac{\text{raw value} - \text{min}}{\text{max} - \text{min}} \times 4 \right) + 1$$

Finally, if any of the banded values fall above 5, the state is assigned a score of 5 and if any values fall below 1, the state is assigned a score of 1.

After the score for each indicator has been calculated, weights are applied to each of the indicators in order to calculate the overall MPI score. The overall score is calculated by multiplying each indicator score by its index weight and then summing the weighted indicator scores.

There are many methods for choosing the weights to be applied to a composite index. In order to maintain consistency across IEP's various peace indices, the weights in the MPI mirror those used in the GPI, USPI and UKPI as closely as possible. The 2016 weights are the same as the 2013 and 2015 Mexico Peace Index.

The weights for the Global Peace Index indicators were agreed upon by an international panel of independent peace and conflict experts, based on a consensus view of their relative importance. To complement this approach and reflect the local context of Mexico, a second expert panel was formed consisting of leading Mexican academics and researchers to determine the final weights for the seven indicators in the MPI. These final weights are shown in table 16.

INDICATOR	WEIGHT	% OF INDEX
Homicide	4	25%
Violent Crime	3	17%
Weapons Crime	3	16%
Detention without a Sentence	1	6%
Police Funding	1	6%
Organized Crime	3	17%
Justice System Efficiency	2	13%

Source: IEP

With direction from the expert panel, a number of different methods such as equal weighting, principal component analysis and analytical hierarchical processing were used to test the robustness of the results.


## ACCURACY AND AVAILABILITY OF CRIME STATISTICS IN MEXICO

Most Mexican statistics are compiled by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). In the case of crime and security statistics, one of the primary sources is the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security (SESNSP), which collects detailed information on all types of crimes disaggregated for each of the Mexican states. In some cases, discrepancies between the sources are significant.

One of the main problems for statistics in Mexico is the quality of the administrative registries at the local and state levels.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately, this has become a key priority in domestic technical discussions between INEGI and the network of producers and users of data, with significant progress being made in terms of coordination and transparency.

Homicide statistics can vary depending on the data source, but the two different figures reported by INEGI and SESNSP are highly correlated ( $r=.99$ ). INEGI records the number of homicide deaths registered as a homicide in the Marriage and Deaths Registry (*Registro Civil*); the Marriage and Death

Registry records the presumed cause of the death as accident, homicide or suicide. SESNSP compiles the number of homicide investigations recorded by the Prosecution Authority (*Procuradurias Generales de Justicia*) in each of the states. SESNSP data has the advantage of being the most up to date, with a release-lag of only a few months; INEGI data is released almost a year later. It should be noted that SESNSP figures are based on the number of crimes reported to and cases opened by the authorities. For further discussion of the relationship between different sources of homicide data and recent trends in homicides, see page 40.



Although INEGI compiles most of the crime and socioeconomic statistics in Mexico, there is still some information that is not publically available or is compiled by different organizations, making data analysis a challenging task. In fact, one of the main obstacles to analyzing Mexican data is the transparency and quality of the information provided at the state level, as well as its consistency over time.

The MPI includes an indicator that accounts for police funding per 100,000 people. Ideally, the MPI would have included a direct measure of the number of police officers in each state, consistent with the GPI and both the UK and US Peace Indices. Unfortunately this data was not available for the entire period. However, the Public Security Contribution Fund (FASP) allocation to each state was available for the whole period and has been used as a proxy for police funding. The federal government criteria for the allocation of this funding are mostly the state population and the changes in violent crime in the previous year. Although FASP funding is not specifically directed to the police, most goes to police-related expenses.

Similarly, the weapons indicator would ideally be based on the availability of firearms, consistent with what was used in the US and UK Indices; however, data on firearm ownership in Mexico is not available by state. Data on weapons availability or the number of confiscated weapons in Mexico is not publically available and IEP was unable to attain this information within the research period. Given this limitation, the weapons crime

indicator is based on the proportion of crimes that involved the use of firearms, proxy data sourced from the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security (SESNSP).

Information for all of the crimes under the violent crime indicator (rape, robbery and assault) and the organized crime indicator (kidnapping, extortion and drug-trade related crimes) was sourced from SESNSP and data was available for the entire period. The same information is also compiled by INEGI, but SESNSP's data is usually released earlier.

# 2016 MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX METHODOLOGY

The Positive Peace Index is the first empirically-derived index aimed at measuring the latent variable of Positive Peace, using the definition of the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.

The starting point for developing the PPI was to correlate the Global Peace Index against over 4,700 cross-country harmonized datasets measuring a variety of economic, governance, social, attitudinal and political factors. This aggregation of data attempted to cover every known quantitative and qualitative data set measuring factors at the nation-state level. Each dataset that was significantly correlated was then organized under eight distinct domains of Positive Peace. These structures were derived by empirical inspection and from the large body of qualitative and quantitative economic, development studies and peace and conflict literature highlighting the importance of these factors. Rather than attempting to isolate singular factors associated with peace, this approach is focused on identifying the broad and complex associations that exist between the drivers of violence and a multitude of formal and informal cultural, economic, and political, variables.

The Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) is a composite index that measures Positive Peace at the subnational state level. To do this data sources were compiled from national statistics, census and survey questions covering as many aspects of the Pillars of Peace as possible. In 2016, the MPPI:

- **uses data from 64 indicators:**
  - 25 national survey questions
  - 23 national census data indicators
  - 10 regional survey questions conducted in Mexico
  - 6 data sources from academic and intergovernmental organizations
- **covers all 32 states.**



There are a number of considerations that need to be made when applying Positive Peace, a framework empirically derived from correlations at the global level, to sub-national measurement. Such considerations can be either conceptual or technical.

The global PPI is empirically derived by selecting indicators that correlated with peace at the global level. However applying Positive Peace at the sub-national level may produce a different set of relevant factors. This is demonstrated by the fact socio-economic factors that correlate at the global level do not correlate when measured at the Mexican state level. This is importantly more a function of the very unique nature of conflict and violence in Mexico in the short term than it is of the relevance of the eight Pillars to Mexico in the long term.

For example it is known that the set of factors that correlated with peace in Mexico in 2003 are different to the ones that correlate in 2015. Given the shifting nature of conflict within a country only by measuring all eight Pillars can the whole set of relevant factors to peace at any given time be assessed.

Therefore the indicators of the MPPI have been selected based on their relevance to the conceptual frameworks of each of the global Pillars rather than their correlation to peace in Mexico.

While national statistics relating to health, education and poverty are available for states, many conceptual aspects of positive peace lack subnational objective measures. For example, in measuring the Well-Functioning Government domain, organizations such as the World Bank and the Economist Intelligence Unit provide composite measures for rule of law, functioning of democracy and government effectiveness at the country level. Equivalent measures at the state level are not available.

Due to this the MPPI scores combine objective with subjective measures of Positive Peace aggregated to the 32 states. Where possible, preference has been given to objective measures and national statistics. Where this has not been possible, preference has been given to individual perspectives on local issues. For example, between the two questions “Do you believe your state is safe” or “Do you believe your town is safe?” the latter would be selected as it has more of a personal impact to the respondent and therefore any answer given is more likely to be an accurate portrayal of positive peace on the ground.

In 2016 additional sources were sought to replace many of the small sampled survey questions used in the 2015 MPPI. Questions with low response rates from the Americas Barometer have been replaced where possible by similar questions in the ENVIPE national survey. However, some of the Americas Barometer questions were kept and updated with new information provided in the latest survey from 2014.

Survey responses have to be quantified. In the questions selected from the Americas Barometer surveys this was done consistently by weighting more positive answers the heaviest. In the ENVIPE questions, the measure is the percentage of respondents who answered most affirmatively to each question. All quantitative assignments of survey responses are shown in Tables 18 and 19. Another issue is that the confidence in the

results of any survey is dependent on the sample size that has responded to it. To maximize the number of respondents to every Americas Barometer survey question included in the MPPI, responses have been aggregated from the three survey waves conducted between 2004 and 2014. Finally, timeliness and currency is an issue. Finding data at the state level can be difficult and as such often it is necessary to use data that is in some cases many years old. Aggregating survey data over multiple surveys can lose the impact of local events at the time they occurred. However, it is observed that positive peace at the global level is very slow-moving. That is, while violence and conflict can erupt and spread quickly, building and strengthening the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies takes a long time, sometimes decades. Therefore, although using current data is preferable using slightly older data when discussing positive peace still allows for valuable insights to be made.

## MPPI INDICATORS

In calculating the MPPI the first step is to normalize each of the 64 indicators. To do this each indicator is first categorized into either being a positive or a negative indicator. Positive indicators are such that it is desirable for a state to have more of the measure. For negative indicators it is more desirable for a state to have less of the measure. Table 17 lists all indicators in the MPPI.

**TABLE 17** MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX INDICATORS

DOMAIN	INDICATOR	YEAR	SOURCE
WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT	Do you know if any construction or maintenance of parks and sports fields was carried out in in your city or town last year?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you know if any actions were carried out in your town/municipality that improved public lighting in 2014?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you think that the federal police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you think that the municipal preventative police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you think that the state police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	2015	ENVIPE
	How much confidence does the federal Attorney General (PGR) inspire?	2015	ENVIPE
	How much confidence does the federal police inspire?	2015	ENVIPE
	How much confidence do judges inspire?	2015	ENVIPE
	How much confidence does the Ministerial or Judicial Police inspire?	2015	ENVIPE
	How much confidence do the Public Ministries and State Agencies inspire?	2015	ENVIPE
	Police respect laws vs. break laws to capture criminals	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
What degree of confidence do you have in jails and prisons?	2015	ENVIPE	
SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	Doing business rank	2013	World Bank
	Unemployment rate	2010	INEGI
	Do you know if any of the following actions were carried out in 2014 in your (municipality/town), as improving the income of the families?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you know if any of the following actions were carried out in 2014 in your (municipality/town), as to address unemployment?	2015	ENVIPE
	Evaluation of the economic situation of the country	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
	GDP per capita	2008	INEGI
	HDI — income	2010	INEGI
GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS	Life satisfaction	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
	Have residents in your community organized to address a lack of lighting?	2015	ENVIPE
	Have residents in your community organized to address a lack of water?	2015	ENVIPE
	Have residents in your community organized to address potholes or leaks?	2015	ENVIPE
	Pride in nationality	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
	Degree of trust in your neighbors	2015	ENVIPE
	Degree of trust in your coworkers or schoolmates	2015	ENVIPE
	Degree of trust in your family or relatives	2015	ENVIPE
	Degree of trust in your friends	2015	ENVIPE
LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION	Do you consider the Public Ministry (MP) and state attorney to be corrupt?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you consider the Federal Attorney General (PGR) to be corrupt?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you consider the Federal Police to be corrupt?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you consider judges to be corrupt?	2015	ENVIPE
	Do you consider the ministerial or judicial police to be corrupt?	2015	ENVIPE
	Police officer asked for a bribe	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
	Paying a bribe is justified	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
HIGH LEVELS OF HUMAN CAPITAL	State illiteracy rate	2011	Mexico Estatal
	Total fertility rate	2010	INEGI
	HDI — education	2010	INEGI
	HDI — health	2010	INEGI
	Life expectancy at birth	2010	INEGI
	Years of average schooling in the state	2011	Mexico Estatal

TABLE 17 >

DOMAIN	INDICATOR	YEAR	SOURCE
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION	Number of journalists killed	2000-2013	University of San Diego
	Books available in public libraries per capita	2010	INEGI
	Frequency of paying attention to the news	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
	Houses with radio	2010	INEGI
	Houses with TV	2010	INEGI
	Trust in the media	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS	Basic rights are protected	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
	Government should offer social services to foreigners	Aggregated 2004-2014	Americas Barometer
	Average number of people per house	2010	INEGI
	Average number of people per room	2010	INEGI
	Houses with no basic goods	2010	INEGI
	Houses with no connection to the public drainage system	2010	INEGI
	Houses with no electricity	2010	INEGI
	Houses with no running water	2010	INEGI
	Houses with no flooring material	2010	INEGI
	Percentage of population vulnerable to poverty	2006	OPHI
	Proportional mortality for nutritional diseases	2012	University of San Diego
	House with all basic services	2010	INEGI
	Houses with some kind of bathroom	2010	INEGI
	Houses with proper floor	2010	INEGI
	Not deprived in any dimensions	2010	INEGI

Source: IEP

Each indicator is normalized based on whether it is a positive or negative measure. For positive indicators scores are assigned a score between one and five. States that perform the best in any one indicator are assigned a score of one. States that perform the worst in any one indicator are assigned a score five. A state's score in each Pillar is the average of all its banded indicator scores. The overall MPPI is the average of a state's eight Pillars of peace score. In this sense each indicator is equally weighted in each pillar and each pillar is equally weighted in the overall MPI score.

**TABLE 18** QUANTITATIVE ASSIGNMENT OF ENVIPE SURVEY RESPONSES

DOMAIN	INDICATOR	YEAR
WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT	Do you know if any construction or maintenance of parks and sports fields was carried out in in your city or town last year?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you know if any actions were carried out in your town/municipality that improved public lighting in 2014?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you think that the federal police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you think that the municipal preventative police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you think that the state police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	How much confidence does the federal Attorney General (PGR) inspire?	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	How much confidence does the federal police inspire?	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	How much confidence do judges inspire?	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	How much confidence does the Ministerial or Judicial Police inspire?	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	How much confidence do the Public Ministries and State Agencies inspire?	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	What degree of confidence do you have in jails and prisons?	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	Do you know if any of the following actions were carried out in 2014 in your (municipality/town), as improving the income of the families?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you know if any of the following actions were carried out in 2014 in your (municipality/town), as to address unemployment?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION	Do you consider the Public Ministry (MP) and state attorney to be corrupt?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you consider the Federal Attorney General (PGR) to be corrupt?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you consider the Federal Police to be corrupt?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you consider judges to be corrupt?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Do you consider the ministerial or judicial police to be corrupt?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS	Have residents in your community organized to address a lack of lighting?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Have residents in your community organized to address a lack of water?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Have residents in your community organized to address potholes or leaks?	Percentage of respondents who answered Yes
	Degree of trust in your neighbors	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	Degree of trust in your coworkers or schoolmates	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	Degree of trust in your family or relatives	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot
	Degree of trust in your friends	Percentage of respondents who answered A Lot

Source: IEP

**TABLE 19** QUANTITATIVE ASSIGNMENT OF AMERICAS BAROMETER SURVEY RESPONSES

The quantitative value mapping of survey responses used in the MPPI.

DOMAIN	SURVEY QUESTION	SURVEY RESPONSE	QUANTITATIVE VALUE
WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT	Confidence that judiciary will punish the guilty	None	0
	Confidence that judiciary will punish the guilty	A little	1
	Confidence that judiciary will punish the guilty	Some	2
	Confidence that judiciary will punish the guilty	A lot	3
	Evaluation of administration's handling of citizen security	Scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents "Not at all"	Values from 1 to 7
	Evaluation of administration's handling of economy	Scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents "Not at all"	Values from 1 to 7
	Police respect laws vs. break laws to capture criminals	Occasionally can cross the line	0
	Police respect laws vs. break laws to capture criminals	Should always abide by the law	1
	Quality of municipal services?	Very bad	0
	Quality of municipal services?	Bad	1
	Quality of municipal services?	Neither good nor bad (fair)	2
	Quality of municipal services?	Good	3
	Quality of municipal services?	Very good	4
	Trust in judicial system	Scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents "Not at all"	Values from 1 to 7
	Trust in national police	Scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents "Not at all"	Values from 1 to 7
SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	Evaluation of the economic situation of the country	Worse	0
	Evaluation of the economic situation of the country	Same	1
	Evaluation of the economic situation of the country	Better	2
	Perception of national economic situation	Very bad (terrible)	0
	Perception of national economic situation	Bad	1
	Perception of national economic situation	Neither good nor bad (fair)	2
	Perception of national economic situation	Good	3
	Perception of national economic situation	Very good	4
	Perception of personal economic situation	Worse	0
	Perception of personal economic situation	Same	1
	Perception of personal economic situation	Better	2
LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION	Evaluation of administration's handling of corruption	Scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents "Not at all"	Values from 1 to 7
	Paying a bribe is justified	Yes	0
	Paying a bribe is justified	No	1
	Perception of public corruption among public officials	Uncommon	0
	Perception of public corruption among public officials	Very uncommon	1
	Perception of public corruption among public officials	Common	2
	Perception of public corruption among public officials	Very common	3
	Police officer asked for a bribe	No	0
	Police officer asked for a bribe	Yes	1

TABLE 19 >

DOMAIN	SURVEY QUESTION	SURVEY RESPONSE	QUANTITATIVE VALUE
GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS	Attendance at meetings of community improvement group	Never	0
	Attendance at meetings of community improvement group	Once or twice a year	1
	Attendance at meetings of community improvement group	Once or twice a month	2
	Attendance at meetings of community improvement group	Once a week	3
	Helped solve a problem in the community	Never	0
	Helped solve a problem in the community	Once or twice a year	1
	Helped solve a problem in the community	Once or twice a month	2
	Helped solve a problem in the community	Once a week	3
	Life satisfaction	Very dissatisfied	0
	Life satisfaction	Somewhat dissatisfied	1
	Life satisfaction	Somewhat satisfied	2
	Life satisfaction	Very satisfied	3
	Pride in nationality	Scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents "Not at all"	Values from 1 to 7
ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS	Basic rights are protected	Scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents "Not at all"	Values from 1 to 7
	Government should offer social services to foreigners	Strongly disagree	0
	Government should offer social services to foreigners	Somewhat disagree	1
	Government should offer social services to foreigners	Neither agree nor disagree	2
	Government should offer social services to foreigners	Somewhat agree	3
	Government should offer social services to foreigners	Strongly agree	4

Source: IEP

# METHODOLOGY FOR THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

IEP classifies the costs associated with the economic activity related to violence as the total economic impact of violence. This is defined as 'expenditures related to containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence'. The economic impact of violence includes the direct and indirect costs of violence, as well as a multiplier effect.

The economic impact of violence provides an estimate of the value of peace in Mexico. The costing model covers the period of 2003 to 2015 and includes the following indicators:

1. **Homicide**
2. **Violent crime**, which includes assault, rape and robbery
3. **Organized crime**, which includes extortion and kidnapping
4. **Firearms**
5. **Fear of insecurity**
6. **Private security expenditures**
7. **Indirect costs of incarceration**
8. **Federal spending on violent containment**, which includes the military, domestic security and the justice system.

The analysis incorporates federal-level public spending on the military because Mexico's military has been extensively involved in fighting the organized criminal groups domestically.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, IEP considers spending on the Mexican military to be included in the cost of internal security.



Some of the items not counted in the economic impact of violence include:

- › State-level public spending on security
- › The cost of domestic violence
- › The cost of violence to businesses
- › Insurance premiums
- › Household out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
- › The cost of drug-trade related crimes such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs.

These items were not included for two reasons. First, some items have been captured elsewhere in the model. For example, the costs associated with drug-trade related crimes are included in the cost of domestic security, including law enforcement, incarceration and the justice system. Secondly, reliable data could not be sourced at a state level for the entire study.

IEP estimates the total economic impact of violence by estimating three components:

- › **Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, perpetrator and the government. These include direct expenditure such as cost of policing.
- › **Indirect costs** that accrue after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated violent incident, such as lost future income.
- › **The multiplier effect** represents the flow-on effects of direct cost of violence, such as the additional economic benefits that would come from investment in business development or education instead of containing or dealing with the consequences of violence.

All prices have been adjusted to constant 2014 pesos, using official data on average annual consumer price index (CPI) from the Central Bank of Mexico. Where figures were denominated in a foreign currency, they have been converted into pesos using the average official exchange rate for the year the estimate was made.

## ESTIMATION METHODS

A combination of approaches are used to estimate the economic cost of violence to Mexico's economy. This economic analysis involved three components:

1. Financial information detailing the level of expenditure on items associated with violence was used wherever possible.
2. Unit costs were used to estimate the cost of violent activities. Specifically, an estimate of the economic cost of a violent act was sourced from the literature and applied to the total number of times such an event occurred to provide an estimate of the total cost of categories of violence.
3. Where data on the incidences of a particular type of violence was missing, the figure was either estimated based on an appropriate proxy or excluded from the study.

IEP uses federal government expenditure data for military, domestic security, and justice system as federal government violence containment cost. Data is sourced from Secretariat of Public Finance and Credit / *Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público* (SHCP).<sup>3</sup> State and municipal level spending are excluded from the study due to data unavailability.

The federal government expenditure data does not provide details of the spending at state level. Therefore, a combination of state population size and MPI score is used to estimate the likely distribution between states.

A unit cost approach is used to estimate the economic cost of homicide, violent crime, organized crime, fear of insecurity and firearms. Unit costs for the homicide, violent crimes and organized crimes are based on a study by McCollister (2010) that estimated tangible and intangible cost of violent crimes in the United States.

1. Direct costs or tangible costs of crime include medical expenses, cash losses, property theft or damage, and productivity losses.
2. Indirect costs include physical and psychological trauma as well as long term costs due to a violent incident.

In addition to the breakdown by tangible and intangible costs, McCollister (2010) offers further details of the costs by victim, perpetrator and justice system. Such itemization enables IEP to exclude the justice system costs to avoid double counting with expenditure data used for the justice system and domestic security.

IEP also uses Dolan & Peasgood's (2006) estimate of the unit cost of fear of crime to calculate cost of perception of insecurity in Mexico. The unit cost of firearms in the Mexican black market is used to calculate the total cost of firearms. Goodman & Marizco (2010) suggest that the price of a weapon in Mexico is two to three times higher than the price of the same weapon in the US market.

To ensure that cost estimates appropriately represent relative income levels in Mexico, they were scaled according to Mexico's GDP per capita relative to the US before being converted to 2014 Mexican pesos. This was based on the aforementioned US study suggesting that the indirect cost of a homicide approximates US\$8.4 million. The equivalent cost in Mexico was then calculated based on purchasing-power adjusted GDP per capita of US\$17,107 for Mexico as compared to US\$54,629 for the US in 2014. This is called the adjusted unit cost and it comes to 40.6 million pesos (US\$3.1 million) in 2014.

All the costs are adjusted to constant 2014 pesos using consumer price index (CPI) data from the Central Bank of Mexico. The base year of 2014 was chosen because it is the most recent year for which CPI data was available. Estimating the economic impact in constant prices facilitates comparisons over time.

Any GDP-related analysis uses the most recent available GDP data from INEGI.

## CALCULATING THE COST OF HOMICIDE, VIOLENT CRIME AND ORGANIZED CRIME

To calculate the cost for the categories of crime used in this study, IEP uses the data from the MPI.

Data on the incidence of homicide is sourced from the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security/ Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP). Incidents of homicide are multiplied by adjusted unit costs to calculate the total cost of homicide in Mexico.

Violent crime, which includes incidents of rape, robbery and assault are also sourced from SESNSP and are adjusted for underreporting. For more details on the data and underreporting adjustment refer to page 97. The economic costs of each category of violent crime are calculated using the respective adjusted unit costs.

The cost of organized crime is based on the number of incidents of extortion and kidnapping. To estimate total cost of extortions and kidnapping in Mexico, IEP assumes that extortions and robbery as well as kidnapping and assault are equivalent in terms of their economic impact on the victim. Therefore unit costs are sourced from McCollister (2010) and applied to extortion and kidnapping.

## COST OF FEAR OF INSECURITY

The National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security / Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) is used to estimate the perception of insecurity at the state level in Mexico. IEP uses the proportion of respondents who felt insecure for their safety, multiplied by the state's population to arrive at the number of people who reported a fear of insecurity. The ENVIPE survey estimates are available for 2005 and 2009 to 2015. Therefore, IEP estimates the fear of insecurity for the years for which data is not available. The unit cost of fear is taken from Dolan and Peasgood (2006), from which the adjusted unit cost is derived.

## COST OF FIREARMS

There is no official data available on the number of firearms in Mexico. A number of studies have attempted to calculate the annual increase in the number of firearms or annual imports from the US. Goodman and Marizco (2010) use firearms seizures on the US-Mexico border to estimate the number of firearms. However, such studies largely underestimate the annual increase in the number of firearms.

Therefore, IEP uses McDougal et al. (2013) to get estimates of the annual increase in the number of firearms. McDougal et al. (2013) estimates a demand curve based on the distance from the US-Mexico border using a time series data. They provide estimates of annual number of guns imported from the US to Mexico. The annual firearms estimates are applied by the unit cost of firearm in the Mexican black market.<sup>4</sup> The level of weapons crime per state is used to calculate the likely distribution of the cost of firearms in each state.

## CALCULATING THE INDIRECT COST OF INCARCERATION

The direct cost of incarceration is included in the government expenditure on domestic security and the justice system.

Therefore, IEP only includes the indirect cost of incarceration, which is the lost income due to imprisonment. This is calculated using the Mexican minimum wage and the number of inmates that would have been in full time employment. Data on the minimum wage for Mexico is sourced from department of labor and social welfare (STPS). Literature suggests that 60 percent of people who were sentenced to prison had full-time employment prior to being in prison and 20 percent of them have some employment inside prison. Therefore, IEP considers that 40 percent of the inmates would have been in full time employment. Minimum wage lost is calculated for 40 percent of the prison population in Mexico.

## CALCULATING THE COST OF PRIVATE SECURITY

No reliable data is available of the number of private security personnel in Mexico for the period of 2003 to 2015. The number of security officers for 2004 was sourced from Small Arms Survey. Also, the ratio of private security officers to public security officers is sourced from Small Arms Survey and was assumed to be constant overtime. IEP estimates the economic cost of private security using the ratio of private to public security officers and the minimum wage.

## ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COST OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

To estimate the total economic impact of violence, IEP uses a peace multiplier to estimate the additional economic activity that would have resulted if the violence was avoided. The conceptual underpinning of the multiplier is the opportunity cost of the resources lost by the victim, perpetrator, and the law enforcement agencies due to the crime. Therefore, the peace multiplier represents the flow-on effects of redirected expenditure from violence containment to more economically enabling activities such as business investment or education.

# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A MPI FULL RESULTS

**TABLE 20** 2016 MEXICO PEACE INDEX INDICATOR SCORES

There is a wide range in levels of peacefulness across both indicators and states in Mexico. A lower score indicates a better level of peacefulness.

STATE	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Aguascalientes	1.24	1.28	1.33	1.51	2.02	2.23	2.27	2.35	2.57	2.29	2.04	2.01	2.06
Baja California	2.97	3.03	3.19	3.38	3.48	4.07	4.03	4.02	3.83	3.51	3.25	3.03	3.06
Baja California Sur	1.91	2.28	2.69	2.54	2.65	2.76	2.57	2.57	2.26	2.62	2.96	2.61	3.04
Campeche	1.94	1.88	2.07	1.98	2.00	2.23	2.23	2.72	2.61	2.16	2.37	2.26	2.14
Chiapas	2.21	2.09	1.73	1.58	1.58	1.54	1.81	1.97	2.07	2.02	2.01	1.97	2.03
Chihuahua	2.43	2.32	2.54	2.65	2.58	3.71	3.99	3.79	3.76	3.56	3.20	2.96	2.82
Coahuila	1.46	1.49	1.79	1.66	1.81	2.18	2.26	2.57	2.81	2.95	2.75	2.40	2.17
Colima	1.95	2.22	2.34	2.37	2.34	2.31	2.41	3.05	2.71	3.67	3.20	2.64	2.84
Distrito Federal	2.38	2.33	2.38	2.33	2.38	2.58	2.99	3.44	3.23	3.11	2.73	2.54	2.53
Durango	2.09	1.74	2.53	2.52	2.72	3.40	3.76	4.27	3.95	3.45	3.15	2.70	2.64
Guanajuato	1.63	1.63	1.83	1.90	2.21	2.33	2.66	2.55	2.52	2.71	2.60	2.62	2.69
Guerrero	2.74	2.48	2.54	2.77	2.80	3.06	3.61	3.54	3.83	3.93	4.00	3.76	3.86
Hidalgo	1.43	1.49	1.62	1.42	1.56	1.55	1.69	1.99	1.76	1.52	1.81	1.79	1.76
Jalisco	1.83	1.66	1.71	2.10	2.23	2.37	2.48	2.92	2.86	2.64	2.64	2.39	2.43
México	2.51	2.49	2.40	2.49	2.17	2.21	2.44	2.41	2.56	2.78	2.86	2.60	2.40
Michoacán	1.90	1.95	1.91	2.30	2.26	2.52	2.74	2.43	2.54	2.70	2.76	2.71	2.37
Morelos	2.21	2.46	2.50	2.74	2.23	2.49	3.38	3.87	3.41	4.06	3.89	3.37	3.12
Nayarit	1.81	2.29	1.80	2.01	2.18	2.34	2.18	3.16	3.97	3.41	3.08	2.26	2.59
Nuevo León	1.48	1.47	1.53	1.77	2.14	2.05	1.94	2.67	3.67	3.19	2.59	2.42	2.70
Oaxaca	2.86	2.60	2.51	2.57	2.59	2.41	2.60	2.53	2.17	2.08	2.12	2.28	2.45
Puebla	2.01	1.94	1.79	1.87	1.86	2.03	1.99	2.18	2.26	2.52	2.27	2.10	2.24
Querétaro	1.27	1.30	1.35	1.28	1.32	1.34	1.41	1.70	1.87	1.92	1.97	2.03	2.07
Quintana Roo	2.71	2.36	2.28	2.21	2.67	2.96	2.83	3.11	3.04	3.16	2.91	2.83	2.69
San Luis Potosí	1.50	1.82	1.77	1.72	2.10	2.35	2.17	2.74	2.74	2.49	2.13	2.08	2.03
Sinaloa	2.56	2.51	2.81	2.90	3.32	3.74	3.89	3.85	3.90	3.77	3.62	3.42	3.41
Sonora	1.87	2.31	2.47	2.43	2.52	2.51	2.66	2.96	2.80	2.70	2.79	2.65	2.61
Tabasco	1.62	1.55	1.52	1.79	2.04	2.13	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.09	2.22	2.15	2.26
Tamaulipas	2.01	1.98	2.31	2.11	1.97	2.32	2.41	2.90	3.09	3.04	2.70	2.86	2.74
Tlaxcala	2.32	2.32	2.74	2.58	1.60	1.87	2.16	2.22	2.17	2.34	2.39	1.96	1.98
Veracruz	1.61	1.56	1.60	1.58	1.67	1.74	1.53	1.95	2.14	2.18	2.10	1.87	1.87
Yucatán	1.43	1.45	1.54	1.57	1.62	1.82	1.79	1.83	1.94	1.90	1.89	1.83	1.86
Zacatecas	1.93	1.67	1.80	1.48	1.54	1.64	1.54	2.02	2.15	2.42	2.30	2.21	2.55
<b>NATIONAL</b>	<b>2.15</b>	<b>2.11</b>	<b>2.15</b>	<b>2.23</b>	<b>2.25</b>	<b>2.48</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.91</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>2.50</b>	<b>2.50</b>

## APPENDIX B

### MPI AND POSITIVE PEACE INDICATOR CORRELATIONS

**TABLE 21** MPI AND POSITIVE PEACE INDICATOR CORRELATIONS, 2003 AND 2015

INDICATOR	2003 MPI	2015 MPI
Average number of people per house, 2010	-0.12	-0.3
How much confidence does the ministerial or judicial police inspire?	-0.46	-0.25
Paying a bribe is justified 2014	-0.27	-0.25
Proportional mortality nutritional diseases 2012	0.16	-0.23
Police respect laws vs. break laws to capture criminals 2014	-0.11	-0.22
Houses with radio, 2010	-0.25	-0.19
Books available in public libraries per capita, 2010	-0.06	-0.16
Houses with proper floor, 2010	-0.37	-0.16
How much confidence does the federal attorney general (PGR) inspire?	-0.43	-0.16
State illiteracy rate 2009	0.1	-0.15
State illiteracy rate 2010	0.1	-0.15
Do you think that the state police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	-0.33	-0.14
Houses with some kind of bathroom, 2010	-0.06	-0.14
How much confidence do the federal police inspire?	-0.51	-0.14
State illiteracy rate 2007	0.12	-0.14
State illiteracy rate 2008	0.1	-0.14
Houses with no basic goods, 2010	0.26	-0.13
Basic rights are protected, 2014	-0.2	-0.12
Houses with no connection to the public drainage system, 2010	0.13	-0.12
State illiteracy rate 2011	0.12	-0.11
Tell me the degree of confidence they have in jails and prisons, 2015	-0.29	-0.1
Do you think that the municipal preventative police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	-0.04	-0.09
Government should offer social services to foreigners, 2014	-0.14	-0.09
GDP per capita, 2008	-0.1	-0.08
Do you consider the federal police to be corrupt?	0.37	-0.08
Life satisfaction, 2014	-0.28	-0.08
Pride in nationality 2014	-0.23	-0.08
Unemployment rate, 2010	-0.31	-0.06
Do you think that the federal police would be able to help you in a situation of insecurity or crime?	-0.32	-0.04
Evaluation of the economic situation of the country, 2014	-0.19	-0.04
How much confidence do the public ministries (MP) and state agencies inspire?	-0.36	-0.04
Do you consider judges to be corrupt?	0.4	-0.03
Houses with no electricity, 2010	0.17	-0.02
Do you consider the federal attorney general (PGR) to be corrupt?	0.44	-0.02
OPHI – % population vulnerable to poverty, 2006	0.16	-0.01

TABLE 21 &gt;

INDICATOR	2003 MPI	2015 MPI
Do you consider the public ministry (MP) and state attorney to be corrupt?	0.43	0.01
Trust in the media, 2014	-0.24	0.01
HDI — health, 2010	0.07	0.02
House with all basic services, 2010	-0.19	0.02
Average number people per room, 2010	0.32	0.03
Frequency of paying attention to the news, 2014	-0.21	0.03
Life expectancy at birth, 2010	0.07	0.03
Police officer asked for a bribe, 2014	0.26	0.07
Tell me the degree of confidence that has on co-workers / business, school, 2015	-0.33	0.07
Do you know if any actions were carried out in your town/municipality that improved the income of families in 2014?	-0.04	0.08
How much confidence do judges inspire?	-0.34	0.08
Not deprived in any dimensions, 2010	-0.2	0.08
Tell me the degree of confidence that have family members or relatives (brothers, uncles, cousins, etc.), 2015	-0.2	0.08
Do you know if any actions were carried out in your town/municipality that improved public lighting in 2014?	0.09	0.09
Houses with no running water, 2010	0.23	0.09
Do you consider the ministerial or judicial police to be corrupt?	0.47	0.09
Tell me the degree of confidence that has neighbors, 2015	-0.32	0.12
Houses with television, 2010	-0.26	0.13
Houses with no flooring material, 2010	0.33	0.13
Do you know if any actions were carried out in your town/municipality that addressed unemployment in 2014?	-0.17	0.15
Tell me the degree of confidence which has in friends, 2015	-0.25	0.16
Years of average schooling in the state, 2011	-0.1	0.16
Years of average schooling in the state, 2010	-0.08	0.17
HDI — education, 2010	-0.09	0.18
Total fertility rate, 2010	0.11	0.18
Total number of journalists killed, 2000-2013	0.2	0.18
Do you know if any construction or maintenance of parks and sports fields was carried out in in your city or town last year?	0.1	0.22
Have residents in your community organized to address a lack of lighting?	-0.21	0.22
HDI — income, 2010	-0.08	0.23
Have residents in your community organized to address potholes or leaks?	-0.23	0.25
Have residents in your community organized to address a lack of water?	-0.18	0.31
Doing business rank, 2013	0.45	0.37

# END NOTES

## SECTION 1 RESULTS & FINDINGS

- 1 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 'Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2015: Principales Resultados', Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2015, [http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/envipe/envipe2015/doc/envipe2015\\_presentacion\\_nacional.pdf](http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/envipe/envipe2015/doc/envipe2015_presentacion_nacional.pdf), (accessed 5 January 2016).
- 2 CNN Wire Staff, 'Zeta Killers' say that they target Mexican drug cartel', CNN, 28 September 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/27/world/americas/mexico-video/>, (accessed 12 February 2016).
- 3 BBC Mundo, 'Los Mata Zetas, el Nuevo cartel de México', El Mostrador, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/mundo/2015/04/10/los-mata-zetas-el-nuevo-cartel-de-mexico/>, (accessed 29 February 2016).
- 4 For details, see M. C. Ingram, 'Community Resilience to violence: Local Schools, Regional Economies, and Homicide in Mexico's Municipalities', in D. A. Shirk (ed.), D. Wood (ed.), and E. L. Olson (ed.), *Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence*, San Diego, Wilson Center and the Justice in Mexico Project, 2014, pp. 25-62.
- 5 México Evalúa, 'La cárcel en México: ¿Para qué?', México Evalúa, 2013, [http://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/MEX-EVA\\_INDIX-CARCEL-MEXICO-VF.pdf](http://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/MEX-EVA_INDIX-CARCEL-MEXICO-VF.pdf), (accessed 27 May 2015).
- 6 O. Rodríguez Ferreira and D. A. Shirk, 'Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final Countdown for Implementation', *Justice in Mexico: Special Report*, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2015, p. 23.
- 7 For an estimate of the size and value in US dollars of the flow of illicit firearms from the US to Mexico, see T. L. McDougal et al., 'The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Trafficking across the US-Mexico Border', Igarapé Institute Report, 2013, [https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Paper\\_The\\_Way\\_of\\_the\\_Gun\\_web2.pdf](https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Paper_The_Way_of_the_Gun_web2.pdf), (accessed 27 May 2015).
- 8 C. Molzahn, O. Rodríguez Ferreira, and D. A. Shirk, *Drug Violence in Mexico*, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2013.
- 9 CCSPJP, 'San Pedro Sula, la ciudad más violenta del mundo; Juárez, la segunda', *Seguridad, Justicia Y Paz*, [website], 2012, <http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/541-san-pedro-sula-la-ciudad-mas-violenta-del-mundo-juarez-la-segunda>, (accessed 9 March 2016).
- 10 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 'Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2015: Principales Resultados'.
- 11 International Crisis Group, *Latin America Report No. 54: Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juárez*, Brussels, Belgium, International Crisis Group, 2015; and, Institute for Economics and Peace, *Informe Nuevo León*, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- 12 Diario Oficial de la Federación, Programa Sectorial de Defensa Nacional 2013-2018, 03 December 2013, [http://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle\\_popup.php?codigo=5326566](http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5326566), (accessed 17 March 2016).
- 13 T. L. McDougal, et al., 'The Way of the Gun'.
- 14 T. L. McDougal, et al.
- 15 T. L. McDougal, et al.
- 16 Los Zetas was formed in the late 1990s by a group of former Mexican military personnel as mercenaries for the Gulf Cartel, later developing a profile as an independent and powerful organization. See J. S. Beittel, 'Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations', *Congressional Research Service Report*, 2015, <https://www.fas.org/spp/crs/row/R41576.pdf>, (accessed 16 February 2016).
- 17 Institute for Economics and Peace, *Positive Peace Report 2015*, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- 18 2014 is the first year for which SESNSP reported the number of victims of homicide as well as the number of cases.
- 19 México Evalúa, 'La cárcel en México: ¿Para qué?'.
- 20 México Evalúa.
- 21 Based on the difference in overall MPI score from 2011 to 2015.
- 22 Overseas Security Advisory Council, 'Mexico 2015 Crime and Safety Report: Guadalajara', Research & Information Support Center, 2015, <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17189>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- 23 Earth Charter Initiative, 'Governors in Mexico signed an agreement to promote the Earth Charter', Earth Charter Initiative, [website], 2015, <http://earthcharter.org/news-post/governors-in-mexico-signed-an-agreement-to-promote-the-earth-charter/>, (accessed 17 February 2016).
- 24 K. Heinle, C. Molzahn, and D. A. Shirk, *Drug Violence in Mexico*, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2015.
- 25 International Crisis Group, *Latin America Report No. 54: Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juárez*, Brussels, Belgium, International Crisis Group, 2015.
- 26 Heinle et al., *Drug Violence in Mexico*.
- 27 O. Rodríguez Ferreira and D. A. Shirk, 'Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016', p. 21.
- 28 E. Pachio, 'Beltran Leyva, Zetas Battling Simona Cartel in Baja California Sur', InSight Crime, [website], 2014, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/beltran-leyva-zetas-battling-sinaloa-cartel-in-baja-california-sur/>, (accessed 18 February 2016); Fox News Latino, 'Once quiet Baja California Sur now plagued by drug violence as battle for 'El Chapo's' turf rages', Fox News Latino, 26 November 2014, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/11/26/in-once-bucolic-mexican-state-killings-surge-as-battle-for-el-chapos-turf-rages/>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- 29 Fox News Latino.
- 30 I. Gaxiola, 'Baja California Sur Governor seeks help of USA State Dept to combat crime', *Borderland Beat*, [website], 2015, <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2015/10/baja-california-sur-governor-seeks-help.html>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- 31 C. Covert., 'Bloody Zacatecas: Fighting continues between Los Zetas and gulf Cartel', *Borderlands Beat*, [website], 2013, <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/03/bloody-zacatecas-fighting-continues.html>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- 32 Covert.
- 33 Institute for Economics and Peace, *Peace and Corruption*, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- 34 Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index 2014*, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- 35 M. Oostveen, 'Querétaro Becomes a Symbol of Mexico's High-Octane Economic Expansion', *Nearshore Americas*, [website], 2013, <http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/mexico-quertaro-economic-growth/>, (accessed 9 March 2016).
- 36 T. Duncan, 'Jalisco New Generation Drug Cartel, Rapidly Increasing its Power in Mexico', *The Yucatan Times*, 25 May 2015, <http://www.theyucantimes.com/2015/05/jalisco-new-generation-drug-cartel-rapidly-increasing-its-power-in-mexico/>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- 37 M. Peterson, 'Mexican state of Guanajuato suffering poor water quality, erosion issues', *Southern California Public Radio*, 20 December 2013, <http://www.scp.org/programs/take-two/2013/12/19/35199/mexican-state-of-guanajuato-suffering-poor-water-q/>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- 38 Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, *Incidencia Delictiva del Fuero Común*, 2014, <http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/incidencia-delictiva/incidencia-delictiva-victimas.php#>, (accessed 24 February 2016).
- 39 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 'Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2015: Principales Resultados'.
- 40 Amnesty International, "'Treated with Indolence': The State's Response to Disappearances in Mexico", *Amnesty International Publications*, London, 2016.
- 41 A. Redacción, 'CNDH reporta 27 mil desaparecidos en México, cifra cercana a la de Segob', *Aristegui Noticias*, 5 June 2013, <http://aristeguinoticias.com/0506/mexico/cndh-reporta-27-mil-desaparecidos/>, (accessed 9 March 2016).
- 42 Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, *Incidencia Delictiva del Fuero Común*, 2014.
- 43 Heinle et al, *Drug Violence in Mexico*, p. 7.
- 44 Zepeda found in 2009 that 95,407 (41.5 percent) out of 229,915 prison inmates in Mexico were pending a sentence. See G. Zepeda Lecuona, *Los mitos de la prisión preventiva en México*, Washington, D.C., Open Society Justice Initiative, 2010, cited in Heinle et al, *Drug Violence in Mexico* 2015, San Diego, C.A., Justice in Mexico, p. 8.



- 45 J. Deaton and O. Rodríguez Ferreira, Detention Without Charge: The Use of Arrest for Criminal Investigations in Mexico, San Diego, Justice in Mexico, 2015, p. 10.
- 46 Heinle et al., Drug Violence in Mexico, 2015, p.10.
- 47 A. Baranda, 'Conoce reforma penal solo 11%', Reforma, August 7 2013; L. Álvarez, 'El 70% de los abogados desconoce los juicios orales.' En Línea Directa, August 2 2013, cited in O. Rodríguez Ferreira and D. A. Shirk, 'Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final Countdown for Implementation', Justice in Mexico: Special Report, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2015, p. 11.
- 48 Rodríguez Ferreira and Shirk, Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016, p. 24.
- 49 Rodríguez Ferreira and Shirk, p. 27.

## SECTION 2 POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

- 1 In the global PPI, good relations with neighbors measures relationships between countries. Mexico scores well in this domain. In the subnational Mexico Positive Peace Index, the domain good relations with neighbors measures aspects of community and social cohesion. Mexican states show varying degrees of performance on this subnational measure.
- 2 C. Molzahn, O. Rodríguez Ferreira, and D. A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2013.
- 3 Based on survey data that asked respondents if a police officer had solicited a bribe from them.
- 4 Perceptions of corruption in municipal police forces have not been included in the table because of differences in structure from state to state. On average, 62.5 percent of respondents considered their local police forces to be corrupt.
- 5 Reporters Without Borders, 'Mexico', Press Freedom Barometer 2016, 2016, <http://en.rsf.org/report-mexico.184.html>, (accessed 27 February 2016).
- 6 Reporteros Sin Fronteras, 'Periodistas Muertos', El Barómetro de la Libertad de Prensa 2015, 2015, <https://es.rsf.org/el-barometro-de-la-libertad-de-prensa-periodistas-muertos.html?annee=2015>, (accessed 27 February 2016).

## SECTION 3 ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE

- 1 The average annual wage income data is sourced from OECD for 2014 in constant 2014 pesos. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Average annual wages, 2014, [https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV\\_AN\\_WAGE](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE), (accessed 4 February 2016).
- 2 S. Morales Rosas and C.A. Pérez Ricart, 'Understanding militarization in Mexico beyond military expenditure: Veto players and institutional isomorphism, a two folded approach', paper presented to the 17th Annual International Conference on Economics and Security, Stockholm, 14-15 Jun. 2013, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/millex/ICES2013/papers/archive/morales-perez-understanding-militarization-in-mexico>, (accessed 27 January 2016)
- 3 The average annual wage income reported by OECD for 2014 in constant 2014 pesos. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Average annual wages, 2014.
- 4 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Federal budget revenues, oil and non-oil government, 2016, [http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely\\_Public\\_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx](http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely_Public_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx), (accessed 5 February 2016).
- 5 C. Hale, 'Fear of Crime: A Review of the Literature', International Review of Victimology, vol. 4, no. 2, 1996, pp. 79-150; T. Chandola, 'The Fear of Crime and Area Differences in Health', Health and Place, vol. 7, no. 2, 2001, pp. 105-116; and, J. Jackson, and M. Stafford, 'Public Health and Fear of Crime: A Prospective Cohort Study', British Journal of Criminology, vol. 49, no. 6, 2009, pp. 832-847.
- 6 K. Heinle, C. Molzahn, and D. A. Shirk, 'Organized-Crime-Style Homicide in Reforma and Milenio Tallies', Drug Violence in Mexico, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2015.
- 7 Note: government spending data does not include state level spending on violence containment.
- 8 etaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Programmable Expenditure of the Budgetary Public Sector. Functional Classification, 2016, [http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely\\_Public\\_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx](http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely_Public_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx), (accessed 2 February 2016).

- 9 A. Heinemann and D. Verner, 'Crime and violence in development: A literature review of Latin America and the Caribbean', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2006, <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-4041>, (accessed 4 February 2016).
- 10 S. R. Hiatt, and W. D. Sine, 'Clear and present danger: planning and new venture survival amid political and civil violence', Strategic Management Journal, vol. 35, no. 5, 2014, pp. 773-785.
- 11 J. Brauer and J. Marlin, Defining Peace Industries and Calculating the Potential Size of a Gross World Product by Country and by Economic Sector, Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney, 2009
- 12 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 'Crime Against Business National Survey Presentation: Main Findings', Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2014, [http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/establecimientos/otras/enve/2014/doc/enve\\_2014\\_presentacion\\_english.pdf](http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/establecimientos/otras/enve/2014/doc/enve_2014_presentacion_english.pdf), (accessed 28 January 2016).

## SECTION 4 EXPERT CONTRIBUTION

- 1 Lara, Barata. "Nota(n) roja". DEBATE, 2009.Lara, Barata. "Nota(n) roja". DEBATE, 2009.
- 2 Astorga, Luis. "Seguridad, traficantes y militares". Tusquets, 2007.Astorga, Luis. "Seguridad, traficantes y militares". Tusquets, 2007.
- 3 Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción (ENVIPE) 2015, INEGI
- 4 Programa de Atención Integral a Víctimas (PNAV) 2014-2018 del Sistema Nacional de Atención a Víctimas, 2015.
- 5 La Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) de INEGI recoge información acerca del tiempo promedio dedicado a denunciar los delitos ante el Ministerio Público en cada entidad federativa, estableciendo cuatro rangos posibles a elegir para los encuestados: menos de una hora, de una a dos horas, de tres a cuatro horas y más de cuatro horas. Cabe destacar que el rango de más de dos horas a menos de tres horas no corresponde a ninguna de las categorías señaladas por INEGI.
- 6 La mediana representa el valor de la variable que ocupa la posición central en un conjunto de datos ordenados, es decir, el 50% se encuentran por debajo de este valor y el 50% por encima del mismo. Para el cálculo se utilizó el método para datos agrupados en intervalos de clase.
- 7 Ley General de Víctimas (LGV), Nueva Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 9 de enero de 2013, última reforma publicada DOF 03-05-2013
- 8 Art. 5 de la LGV.
- 9 La información corresponde a la última información publicada por el SENSPP con corte al mes de octubre de 2015.
- 10 Pacheco, 2016
- 11 [1]Partido Acción Nacional. "Iniciativa con proyecto de decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan los artículos 21, 73, 76 y 123 Apartado C de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos", Gaceta del Senado LXIII/1PPO-45/58914, 4 de noviembre de 2015, consultado el día 10 de febrero de 2016 <http://www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=2&sm=2&id=58914>
- 12 Partido de la Revolución Democrática, "Iniciativa con proyecto de decreto por el que se reforman los artículos 21, 73, 76, 104, 115 y 123 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de seguridad pública", Gaceta del Senado LXIII/1SPO-75/60404, 2 de febrero de 2016, consultado el día 10 de febrero de 2016, <http://www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=2&sm=2&id=60404>.
- 13 Partido del Trabajo. "iniciativa con proyecto de decreto por la que se modifica y adiciona a la fracción XXIII del artículo 73 y, se reforma la fracción VII del artículo 115 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, con el propósito de fortalecer el principio de municipio libre en materia de seguridad pública, profesionalizar a las policías de los tres niveles de gobierno, y para someter a los gobernadores al principio de legalidad", Gaceta del Senado LXIII/1SPO-77/60503. <http://www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=2&sm=2&id=60503>
- 14 "Mando único policial y otras 10 claves del nuevo plan de seguridad de Peña", Torres Mauricio, CNN internacional, 3 de diciembre de 2014, consultado el día 2 de febrero de 2016. <http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/12/03/mando-unico-policial-y-otras-10-claves-del-nuevo-plan-de-seguridad-de-pena>
- 15 Según el estudio realizado por el think tank mexicano Ethos, entre 1995 y 2013 se pasó de 39,800.6 millones de pesos a 219,930 millones de pesos en el presupuesto destinado a seguridad, lo que representa un incremento, en precios constantes a 2010, de 452.5%. Tan solo en 2010, de acuerdo al mismo estudio, los estados ejercieron 68,424 millones de pesos en seguridad, de los cuales 10.1% correspondieron a fondos del FASP.
- 16 "Causa en Común denuncia omisiones para sancionar desvío de recursos", CNN México, 15 de noviembre de 2013. Consultado el 10 de febrero de 2016. <http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2013/11/15/causa-en-comun-denuncia-omisiones-para-sancionar-desvio-de-recursos>
- 17 "Conago plantea a Senado que Mando Único sea temporal", Robles de la Rosa, Leticia, Periódico Excelsior, 2 de febrero de 2016, consultado el día 10 de febrero de 2016. <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2016/02/02/1072420>

- 18 "PAN presenta iniciativa de reforma en seguridad; va contra el mando único", *Animal Político*, 3 de noviembre de 2015, consultado del día 2 de febrero de 2016. <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2015/11/pan-presenta-iniciativa-de-reforma-en-seguridad-va-contra-el-mando-unico/>
- 19 "Senadores del PRD presentan iniciativa para rediseñar sistema policial", *Figueroa Alcántara Héctor*, *Periódico Excelsior*, 2 de febrero de 2016, consultado el 8 de febrero de 2016. <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2016/02/02/1072658>
- 20 Ídem.
- 21 The United Nations Development Program has calculated a Human Development Index (HDI) separating the indigenous and the non-indigenous population in every Mexican municipality. Indigenous peoples have a development gap of about 30 percent lower HDI (compared to non-indigenous inhabitants living in the same place). Programa Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. 2010. Informe Sobre el Desarrollo Humano de los Pueblos Indígenas de Mexico. Mexico: PNUD -CDI.
- 22 Gillette Hall and Harry A. Patrinos. 2006. *Pueblos Indígenas, Pobreza y Desarrollo Humano en América Latina, 1994-2004*. Washington: World Bank.
- 23 The multidimensional poverty metric of CONEVAL takes into account income as well as the provision of basic public goods such as drinking water, health and education services, social insurance or food insecurity. CONEVAL. 2014. *La pobreza de la población indígena de México, 2012*. Mexico: Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social.
- 24 The CONEVAL methodology classifies not only poverty but also the vulnerability faced by families of falling below the threshold of the moderate poverty line or missing access to basic services.
- 25 This type of estimation is proposed by Ñopo, Hugo. "Matching as a tool to decompose wage gaps." *The review of economics and statistics* 90.2 (2008): 290-299. See also: Atal, Juan Pablo, Hugo Ñopo, and Natalia Winder. "Nuevo siglo, viejas disparidades: brechas de ingresos por género y etnicidad en América Latina y el Caribe." (2012). While in that work the largest limitation is the sample size of surveys, in this exercise we take advantage of census variables that allow for simpler matching techniques than synthetic control groups, for example.
- 26 For some technical reasons in the assembly of the dataset the estimation do not yet include the states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon and Quintana Roo. These will be added as soon as they become available.
- 27 The technique used for processing the data was propensity score matching. The procedure for estimating a propensity score of indigenous self-adscription (PERETN in the INEGI codes) involved predicting the dichotomic variable with the overall level of schooling (ESCOACUM) and the attribute of speaking an indigenous language (HLENGUA). In order to reduce the computational time involved in the estimation, only households that were surveyed with the long questionnaire are included. This still keeps more than two million individuals in the calculation, because INEGI oversamples in the poorest municipalities in Mexico (ensuring coverage of the 125 municipalities with the lowest Human Development Index as calculated by UNDP). The propensity scores calculated separately for men and women, but for the country as a whole, exhibited balance. The estimation then calculates the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of being indigenous for men and women matched separately, in order to ensure that there is no confounding effect of gender. Matching was done with the nearest neighbor along the propensity score by state.
- 28 As a robustness check, we also performed an exact matching estimation with a 1 percent sample of the census, in order to reduce the computational demands involved in the calculation. The specification for the exact matching of individuals was extremely parsimonious, controlling for differences in income attributable to the number of hours worked, the overall level of schooling and the stage in the life cycle. The technique was performed through the `nnmatch` procedure in STATA. The method is computationally intensive, because it requires searching matches for exact counterfactual, whenever possible, or the most similar individual in a non-parametric Mahanobis distance metric. The estimation involved calculating the difference in the income of wage earners (the `INGTRMEN` variable in the Mexican INEGI standardized codes) as distinguished by indigenous self-adscription (PERETN), matching exactly on gender (SEXO), illiteracy (ALFABET) and size of the locality (TAM\_LOC); including distance matches for years of schooling (ESCOACUM), hours worked (HORTRA) and age (EDAD).
- 29 And perhaps Sinaloa and Michoacán, which are statistically significant at the 90 percent level. For men there are several states that only pass the significance test at the 90 percent level too.

## SECTION 5 METHODOLOGY

- 1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (IMCO), *Strengthening Evidence-Based Policy Making on Security and Justice In Mexico*, Paris, France, 2012.
- 2 S. Morales Rosas and C.A. Pérez Ricart, 'Understanding militarization in Mexico beyond military expenditure: Veto players and institutional isomorphism, a two folded approach', paper presented to the 17th Annual International Conference on Economics and Security, Stockholm, 14–15 Jun. 2013, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/morales-perez-understanding-militarization-in-mexico>, (accessed 27 January 2016).
- 3 Note: Government spending data does not include state level spending on violence containment. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, *Programmable Expenditure of the Budgetary Public Sector. Functional Classification, 2016*, [http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely\\_Public\\_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx](http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely_Public_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx), (accessed 2 February 2016).
- 4 T. L. McDougal et al., 'The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Trafficking across the US-Mexico Border', Igarapé Institute Report, 2013, [https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Paper\\_The\\_Way\\_of\\_the\\_Gun\\_web2.pdf](https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Paper_The_Way_of_the_Gun_web2.pdf), (accessed 27 May 2015).

# REFERENCES

- Amnesty International, "Treated with Indolence": The State's Response to Disappearances in Mexico, Amnesty International Publications, London, 2016.
- BBC Mundo, 'Los Mata Zetas, el Nuevo cartel de México', El Mostrador, <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/mundo/2015/04/10/los-mata-zetas-el-nuevo-cartel-de-mexico/>, (accessed 29 February 2016).
- Beittel, J. S., 'Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations', Congressional Research Service Report, 2015, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf>, (accessed 16 February 2016).
- Brauer, J. and Marlin, J., Defining Peace Industries and Calculating the Potential Size of a Gross World Product by Country and by Economic Sector, Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney, 2009.
- CCSPJP, 'San Pedro Sula, la ciudad más violenta del mundo; Juárez, la segunda', Seguridad, Justicia Y Paz, <http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/541-san-pedro-sula-la-ciudad-mas-violenta-del-mundo-juarez-la-segunda>, (accessed 9 March 2016).
- Covert, C., 'Bloody Zacatecas: Fighting continues between Los Zetas and gulf Cartel', Borderlands Beat, [website], 2013, <http://www.borderlandsbeat.com/2013/03/bloody-zacatecas-fighting-continues.html>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- Chandola, T., 'The Fear of Crime and Area Differences in Health', Health and Place, vol. 7, no. 2, 2001, pp. 105-116.
- CNN Wire Staff, 'Zeta Killers' say that they target Mexican drug cartel', CNN, 28 September 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/27/world/americas/mexico-video/>, (accessed 12 February 2016).
- Deaton, J. and O. Rodriguez Ferreira, Detention Without Charge: The Use of Arraigo for Criminal Investigations in Mexico, San Diego, Justice in Mexico, 2015.
- Diario Oficial de la Federación, Programa Sectorial de Defensa Nacional 2013-2018, 03 December 2013, [http://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle\\_popup.php?codigo=5326566](http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5326566), (accessed 17 March 2016).
- Duncan, T., 'Jalisco New Generation Drug Cartel, Rapidly Increasing its Power in Mexico', The Yucatan Times, 25 May 2015, <http://www.theyucantimes.com/2015/05/jalisco-new-generation-drug-cartel-rapidly-increasing-its-power-in-mexico/>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- Earth Charter Initiative, 'Governors in Mexico signed an agreement to promote the Earth Charter', Earth Charter Initiative, [website], 2015, <http://earthcharter.org/news-post/governors-in-mexico-signed-an-agreement-to-promote-the-earth-charter/>, (accessed 17 February 2016).
- Fox News Latino, 'Once quiet Baja California Sur now plagued by drug violence as battle for 'El Chapo's' turf rages', Fox News Latino, 26 November 2014, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/11/26/in-once-bucolic-mexican-state-killings-surge-as-battle-for-el-chapos-turf-rages/>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- Gaxiola, I., 'Baja California Sur Governor seeks help of USA State Dept to combat crime', Borderland Beat, [website], 2015, <http://www.borderlandsbeat.com/2015/10/baja-california-sur-governor-seeks-help.html>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- Hale, C., 'Fear of Crime: A Review of the Literature', International Review of Victimology, vol. 4, no. 2, 1996, pp. 79-150.
- Heinemann, A. and Verner, D., 'Crime and violence in development: A literature review of Latin America and the Caribbean', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2006, <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-4041>, (accessed 4 February 2016).
- Heinle, K., Molzahn, C., and Shirk, D. A., Drug Violence in Mexico, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2015.
- Hiatt, S. R. and W. D. Sine, 'Clear and present danger: planning and new venture survival amid political and civil violence', Strategic Management Journal, vol. 35, no. 5, 2014, pp. 773-785.
- Ingram, M. C., 'Community Resilience to violence: Local Schools, Regional Economies, and Homicide in Mexico's Municipalities', in D. A. Shirk (ed.), D. Wood (ed.), and E. L. Olson (ed.), Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence, San Diego, Wilson Center and the Justice in Mexico Project, 2014, pp. 25-62.
- Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2014, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- Institute for Economics and Peace, Informe Nuevo León, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- Institute for Economics and Peace, Peace and Corruption, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- Institute for Economics and Peace, Positive Peace Report 2015, Sydney, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015.
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 'Crime Against Business National Survey Presentation: Main Findings', Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2014, [http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/establecimientos/otras/enve/2014/doc/enve\\_2014\\_presentacion\\_english.pdf](http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/establecimientos/otras/enve/2014/doc/enve_2014_presentacion_english.pdf), (accessed 28 January 2016).
- Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 'Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE) 2015: Principales Resultados', Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2015, [http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/envipe/envipe2015/doc/envipe2015\\_presentacion\\_nacional.pdf](http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/envipe/envipe2015/doc/envipe2015_presentacion_nacional.pdf), (accessed 5 January 2016).
- International Crisis Group, Latin America Report No. 54: Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juárez, Brussels, Belgium, International Crisis Group, 2015.
- Jackson, J. and Stafford, M., 'Public Health and Fear of Crime: A Prospective Cohort Study', British Journal of Criminology, vol. 49, no. 6, 2009, pp. 832-847.
- McDougal, T. L. et al., 'The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Trafficking across the US-Mexico Border', Igarapé Institute Report, 2013, [https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Paper\\_The\\_Way\\_of\\_the\\_Gun\\_web2.pdf](https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Paper_The_Way_of_the_Gun_web2.pdf), (accessed 27 May 2015).
- México Evalúa, 'La cárcel en México: ¿Para qué?', México Evalúa, 2013, <http://mexicoevalua.org/>, (accessed 27 May 2015).
- Molzahn, C., Rodriguez Ferreira, O., and Shirk, D. A., Drug Violence in Mexico, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2013.
- Morales Rosas, S. and Pérez Ricart, C. A., 'Understanding militarization in Mexico beyond military expenditure: Veto players and institutional isomorphism, a two folded approach', paper presented to the 17th Annual International Conference on Economics and Security, Stockholm, 14-15 Jun. 2013, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/morales-perez-understanding-militarization-in-mexico>, (accessed 27 January 2016).
- Oostveen, M., 'Querétaro Becomes a Symbol of Mexico's High-Octane Economic Expansion', Nearshore Americas, [website], 2013, <http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/mexicos-quertaro-economic-growth/>, (accessed 9 March 2016).
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Average annual wages, 2014, [https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV\\_AN\\_WAGE](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE) (accessed 4 February 2016).
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (IMCO), Strengthening Evidence-Based Policy Making on Security and Justice In Mexico, Paris, France, 2012.
- Overseas Security Advisory Council, 'Mexico 2015 Crime and Safety Report: Guadalajara', Research & Information Support Center, 2015, <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17189>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- Pachio, E., 'Beltran Levya, Zetas Battling Simona Cartel in Baja California Sur', InSight Crime, [website], 2014, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/beltran-levya-zetas-battling-sinaloa-cartel-in-baja-california-sur/>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- Peterson, M., 'Mexican state of Guanajuato suffering poor water quality, erosion issues', Southern California Public Radio, 20 December 2013, <http://www.scprr.org/programs/take-two/2013/12/19/35199/mexican-state-of-guanajuato-suffering-poor-water-q/>, (accessed 18 February 2016).
- Redacción, A., 'CNDH reporta 27 mil desaparecidos en México, cifra cercana a la de Segob', Aristegui Noticias, 5 June 2013, <http://aristeginoticias.com/0506/mexico/cndh-reporta-27-mil-desaparecidos/>, (accessed 9 March 2016).
- Reporters Without Borders, 'Mexico', Press Freedom Barometer 2016, 2016, <http://en.rsf.org/report-mexico,184.html>, (accessed 27 February 2016).
- Reporteros Sin Fronteras, 'Periodistas Muertos', El Barometro de la Libertad de Prensa 2015, 2015, <https://es.rsf.org/el-barometro-de-la-libertad-de-prensa-periodistas-muertos.html?annee=2015>, (accessed 27 February 2016).
- Rodriguez Ferreira, O. and Shirk, D. A., 'Criminal Procedure Reform in Mexico, 2008-2016: The Final Countdown for Implementation', Justice in Mexico: Special Report, San Diego, CA, Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2015.
- Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Federal budget revenues, oil and non-oil government, 2016, [http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely\\_Public\\_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx](http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely_Public_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx), (accessed 5 February 2016).
- Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Programmable Expenditure of the Budgetary Public Sector. Functional Classification, 2016, [http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely\\_Public\\_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx](http://www.shcp.gob.mx/English/Timely_Public_Finances/Paginas/unica.aspx), (accessed 2 February 2016).
- Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, Incidencia Delictiva del Fuero Común, 2014, <http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/incidencia-delictiva/incidencia-delictiva-victimas.php#>, (accessed 24 February 2016).

**NOTES**

A series of horizontal dotted lines for writing notes.



# Other publications from the Institute for Economics and Peace

---



## 2015 Global Terrorism Index

Institute for Economics and Peace, Nov 2015

The 2015 Global Terrorism Index Report analyses the impact of terrorism in 162 countries and identifies the social, economic and political factors associated with it.



## The Link between Peace and Religion

Institute for Economics and Peace, Oct 2014

A global statistical analysis on the empirical link between peace and religion.



## 2015 Positive Peace Report

Institute for Economics and Peace, Oct 2015

This report introduces new thinking and evidence about Positive Peace. It includes the Positive Peace Index, which measures Positive Peace in 162 countries, covering 99 per cent of the world's population.



## 2014 Global Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace, Feb 2014

The 2014 GPI Report analyses the state of peace around the world and identifies countries most at risk of becoming less peaceful.



## Radical Realism

Institute for Economics and Peace, Sept 2015

Twelve interviews with peacebuilders on developing the attitudes, institutions and structures of Positive Peace in Mexico.



## The Economic Cost of Violence Containment

Institute for Economics and Peace, Feb 2014

A new methodology that calculates the cost of preventing and containing violence in over 150 countries.



## 2015 Global Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace, June 2015

A statistical analysis of the state of peace in 162 countries and an assessment of the attitudes, structures and institutions that sustain peaceful societies.



## 2013 Mexico Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace, Nov 2013

The Mexico Peace Index measures the state of peace in all 32 Mexican states analysing trends and drivers of peace over the last ten years.



## Peace and Corruption

Institute for Economics and Peace, May 2015

The relationship between peace and corruption is statistically significant, as corruption is a leading indicator of peace.



## Pillars of Peace

Institute for Economics and Peace, Sept 2013

Pillars of Peace is a new conceptual framework for understanding and describing the factors that create a peaceful society.



## 2015 Mexico Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace, Mar 2014

The Mexico Peace Index measures the state of peace in all 32 Mexican states analysing trends and drivers of peace over the last decade.



## 2013 Global Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace, June 2013

The 2013 GPI Report analyses the state of peace around the world, identifying trends in violence and conflict, as well as the key drivers of peace.



## 2014 Global Terrorism Index Report

Institute for Economics and Peace, Nov 2014

The 2014 Global Terrorism Index Report analyses the impact of terrorism in 162 countries and identifies the social, economic and political factors associated with it.



## 2013 United Kingdom Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace, Apr 2013

The UK Peace Index report analyses the fabric of peace in the UK over the last decade and has found that since 2003 the UK has become more peaceful.



# INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS & PEACE

IEP is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human wellbeing and progress.



IEP has offices in Sydney, New York, Mexico City and Brussels. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

The Institute for Economics and Peace is a registered charitable research institute in Australia and a Deductible Gift Recipient. IEP USA is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization.



Scan code to access our  
Vision of Humanity website

FOR MORE INFORMATION  
[INFO@ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG](mailto:INFO@ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG)  
EXPLORE OUR WORK  
[WWW.ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG](http://WWW.ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG) AND  
[WWW.VISIONOFHUMANITY.ORG](http://WWW.VISIONOFHUMANITY.ORG)



MAR 2016 / IEP REPORT 38

ISBN 978-0-9942456-8-7



9 780994 245687 >