TOWARDS AN EU GLOBAL STRATEGY
Consulting the experts

Foreword by Antonio Missiroli
Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts
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**Foreword**

*Antonio Missiroli*

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Annex
The preparation of the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), launched after High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini was given the mandate to present it by June 2016, has followed a number of parallel paths.

The European Council Conclusions from 25-26 June 2015 stated that ‘the High Representative will continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with the Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016’.

To start with, the member states have been consulted closely and regularly through the national Points of Contact, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as the Committee of the Permanent Representatives to the European Union of Governments of the Member States (COREPER) – not to mention the Political and the Security Directors of all EU-28 and the EU Military Committee – and this process will continue until June. A first discussion at ministerial level took place at the February Gymnich, and another one is likely to be held nearer to the June deadline. The Commission, too, has been closely associated with the EUGS preparatory work through a dedicated Task Force at Head of Unit level. At College level, an orientation debate took place on 2 March, and another is foreseen in the final stage.

As for the parliamentary dimension, the European Parliament has produced its own contribution (Rapporteur: MEP Sandra Kalniete), which was discussed in the presence of the HR/VP on 14 April. Furthermore, both MEPs and national MPs have taken part in many of the outreach events held in Brussels and other EU capitals – the one in Helsinki, in late January, was even hosted by the Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta) – while several national parliaments have organised EUGS-related events on their own. This was the case in Lisbon, for instance, and also with the inter-parliamentary conference held on 7 April in The Hague.

For its part, the EUISS – in close cooperation with the Strategic Planning Division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – has carried out a wide-ranging outreach and consultation process involving the broader expert community represented by think tankers and academics from across Europe (and beyond). This process was launched at the Annual Conference of the EUISS held in Brussels on 8-9 October 2015, and will be brought to fruition at the ensuing one in Paris on 21-22 April 2016. This ‘strategic semester’, as it has come to be known, has included events in virtually every EU member state, organised in collaboration with a national centre or institute and often with the direct participation of the foreign ministry (see the list in the Annex). The EUISS has co-funded many of these initiatives and incorporated them in a quasi-official ‘roadmap towards the EUGS’ managed by the External Action Service.

Furthermore, with extra funding generously provided by the Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo (Turin), the EUISS was able to ask 50 well-known analysts and commentators – roughly half from inside and half from outside the Union – to give their opinion in less than 1,000 words on
the priorities that the forthcoming EUGS should address and how. The resulting contributions, published daily between 15 January and 31 March on the website of the EUISS (www.iss.europa.eu) and also on the dedicated EUGS platform (https://europa.eu/globalstrategy), are collectively reproduced in this volume and offer a rich selection of independent views intended to nurture the drafting of the strategy.

Last, but not least, a competition was launched last autumn in which graduates and undergraduate students were invited to write no more than 800 words on ‘why the EU foreign and security policy is important for your daily life.’ The three winners of this competition have been invited to receive their awards at a ceremony during the EUISS Annual Conference. Their essays are published on the EUGS website.

All these initiatives have been planned and implemented in order to foster and feed the drafting process of the EUGS, led by Nathalie Tocci. As Federica Mogherini herself has stresses, the accompanying process is no less important than the final outcome, especially at a time when perceptions and views seem to vary significantly across Europe. This is why all the voices that have joined the discussion – some of which are printed in this small volume – do matter, and why the conversation is bound to continue also beyond June 2016.

Antonio Missiroli

Paris, April 2016
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Special thanks go to John-Joseph Wilkins, without whose work editing all these pieces in an extraordinarily tight schedule this compilation could not have been published.
The countries of Europe face serious problems: ageing populations, troubled economies, resurgent xenophobia, and a deteriorating security environment on their borders. Europe’s greatest strategic challenge, however, is recognising that it is no longer viewed by the US as the most important region of the world, thus signalling that Europe can no longer rely on American protection alone. In the future, European countries will have to provide for their own defence and chart their own course in international affairs. But whether they will do so successfully is far from certain.

EUROPE’S PATRON

Europe has been the central focus of US strategy for more than a century. The US entered both world wars to restore the balance of power in Europe, and it kept several hundred thousand troops there after the Second World War in order to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the continent. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 further committed the US to defending Europe in perpetuity.

For the next 40 years, the US provided the bulk of NATO’s military power and dominated its decision-making. US officials were eager to lead and their European counterparts were by and large content to follow. European officials became accustomed to relying on ‘Uncle Sam’ to defend them from external threats, provide protection from one another, and address disturbances in distant regions.

European defence spending declined steadily throughout the Cold War, and by its end even the UK and France were incapable of undertaking major military operations without extensive US support; a trend that has continued unabated since 1989.

Importantly, the presence of US troops on the European continent made conflict within the region near impossible. The ‘American pacifier,’ to use Josef Joffe’s apt phrase, helped dampen rivalries within Western Europe and allowed for a vibrant European Union to flourish. Washington was also the main driving force behind NATO expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite warnings that it would poison relations with Russia and create new security obligations that might be difficult to fulfil.

SHIFT TO ASIA

Notwithstanding this long tradition of engagement, Europe’s preeminent position in America’s strategic calculus is now over. China’s emergence as a potential ‘peer competitor’ and Asia’s growing economic importance is shifting US attention towards East Asia – and this trend will accelerate in the years to come.

A growing proportion of US military power will be assigned to Asia, while American officials will devote more time and attention to managing strategic partnerships there. Having once focused
on preventing Germany and the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, the US will now strive to keep China from dominating Asia. Europe will play little or no role in this effort. China is not a threat to Europe, meaning European states have no incentive to balance against it. On the contrary, they will be eager to invest in China and some may be happy to sell Beijing whatever it might desire, perhaps even sophisticated weaponry. Consequently, US leaders will be increasingly reluctant to subsidise Europe’s defence or guarantee its security, especially if European companies are helping China grow stronger.

Europe and the US will remain close economic partners, but European security will no longer be high on America’s foreign policy agenda and security cooperation will decline as Washington focuses its attention on Asia.

**POTENTIAL AND RISK**

The implications of these trends are profound. Instead of looking to Washington to provide the bulk of NATO’s defence capability, European countries will have to reacquire the capacity to defend themselves. The good news is that the major European countries have sufficient wealth and population to defend against any conceivable external threat, including a future challenge from a revanchist Russia. The population of the European Union is nearly five times greater than Russia’s and NATO’s European members spend nearly four times more than Moscow on defence. Properly organised and led, European countries are capable of defending their territory and launching limited military missions outside of Europe.

This optimistic assessment assumes Europe’s major states remain united, but there is reason to doubt that they will remain so. Indeed, the main challenge in the years ahead will be preventing renewed rivalries within Europe as the ‘American pacifier’ evaporates. The long conflict over the euro and the recent refugee crisis have already exposed serious fissures within the European body politic, and mutual suspicions are likely to grow if European governments begin to act on their own.

Thus, EU member states may need a ‘common foreign and security policy’ more than ever before, but producing one might be a difficult task.

After centuries of recurrent warfare, the past 70 years of great power peace in Europe is a remarkable achievement. The US presence in Europe was a key ingredient in this long peace, but it was also the product of imaginative leadership by a generation of European statesmen.

Can the next generation of European leaders show equal imagination, and keep Europe peaceful and prosperous as America’s attention shifts elsewhere? While there are hopes that they will meet the challenge, the odds are stacked against them.
The call for a new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is premised on the assumption that the strategic environment has ‘changed radically’ (as the European External Action Service [EEAS] recently put it) since the original European Security Strategy (ESS) was published in 2003.

In fact, while the EU’s strategic environment has obviously evolved over the past 12 years, what is striking in reviewing the 2003 paper is how prescient it was. The ESS paper identified terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime as the main challenges the EU would face – today’s list would not be very different. In 2008, a review of the ESS confirmed the validity of this assessment, usefully adding cyber threats, energy security, and climate change – again issues that remain central in 2016.

In other words, as the EU reviews its security strategy today, what is required is less a fundamental revision of its priorities and more an emphasis on how to implement the policies called for in 2003.

**A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT**

To be sure, the global strategic environment has evolved since 2003. Two broad sets of developments in particular seem most relevant.

The first is the growing challenge the EU faces from a more assertive Russia. In 2003, Russia was still struggling with internal change and arguably on the bumpy road towards integration with the West. As late as 2010, it was still possible to imagine a ‘reset’ with Russia that would diminish tensions and ultimately put the Cold War firmly in the past.

That outcome appears much more distant today.

Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, Russia has moved in a more authoritarian direction at home and adopted a more aggressive policy abroad – most troublingly with the annexation of Crimea, armed intervention in eastern Ukraine, use of energy as a foreign policy tool, and unauthorised military overflights in northern Europe. A clear priority for the 2016 review needs to be how to maintain European solidarity and border defence against the Kremlin’s aggression.

The second major strategic change that affects European security is the mounting instability across the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring. Terrorism, regional conflict, and state failure were already identified in 2003 as priorities, but the repercussions of the wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere are intensifying the challenges.

These phenomena are now producing unprecedented refugee flows, radicalising Muslims in Europe, destabilising neighbouring states, and fuelling the growth of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The recent terrorist atrocities in Paris and the all-too-real prospect of further attacks underscore the seriousness of the threats emerging from the region.
A MORE COORDINATED EU

Correctly prioritising threats and issues, however, is only part of the challenge, and in many ways the easy part. The harder and more important part is to effectively operationalise the EU’s approach. Indeed the 2003 strategy called for all the right things for the EU to be effective – more energy, means, and coordination – but delivery has been lacking.

Three priorities seem essential if the EU wants its global strategy to be more than a strategic ‘wish list’.

The first is devoting additional resources for security, intelligence and defence. This is of course a familiar refrain, but that does not make it less true. The continued decline in European defence spending limits the EU’s ability to contain and deter Russia or play a major role in the greater Middle East.

Similarly, it has become abundantly clear that the internal terrorist threat in Europe is vastly greater than the EU’s ability to monitor and contain it. More resources would fill important gaps and potentially save many lives. Failing to provide them is a false economy because of the massive economic cost of successful terror attacks.

The second priority must be greater integration of European security and intelligence efforts. It is shocking that years after major terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, European intelligence and police services are still not sharing basic information about potential terrorists and that there is no common watch- or no-fly list.

The integration of Europe’s intelligence and security services has not kept pace with the integration of its markets and the opening of its borders, a gap that must be bridged to keep Europe safe, and the European project alive.

Finally, the EU should prioritise the coordination of defence and security policy with its most important foreign partner, the US. In 2003, US and European strategic perspectives had significantly diverged over the war in Iraq, contributing to the most severe crisis in post-war transatlantic relations.

Since then, those perspectives have once again converged, and the threats faced are similar and understood as such. Americans are no longer from Mars and Europeans no longer from Venus: neither can afford to maintain old divisions over the use of force and the relative roles of the EU and NATO.
Whenever the EU undertakes a strategy-defining exercise related to some aspect of foreign policy, the core question surfaces of how to balance interests and values. The new Global Strategy will be no exception in having to address this thorny and pivotal issue.

An increasingly prevalent argument is that the EU ought to be more tightly instrumental and ends-oriented in pursuing its interests. The Global Strategy’s focus on security issues reinforces a widespread perception that the EU is experiencing a shift from a transformative-liberal power to a realpolitik actor.

Faced with an irredentist Russia, a febrile Middle East, refugee surges and terror attacks, governments have now more than ever a justified motive for hard-headed geo-strategy.

### BALANCING INTERESTS AND VALUES

The familiar framing of ‘interests versus values’ somewhat distorts EU foreign policy debates. The relationship between values and interests is complex, and sometimes there will be a trade-off between the two, while other times certain values can enhance self-interest, further complicating the process of arriving at a definition for what is a ‘value’ as opposed to an ‘interest’.

The most positive argument is that a more liberal world order – rules-based, democratic, rights-respecting and interdependent – would serve as the EU’s best security guarantor. This conviction can easily be over-stated, because more democracy does not necessarily equate to more security. Having said that, the inverse mode of thinking can be even more grievously erroneous: propping up autocratic regimes against strong domestic pressures for change will often backfire against European interests.

It is important to note that taking values seriously is not a matter of the EU behaving as a kind of super-NGO, driven by nothing more than good charitable intent. European foreign policies are and should continue to be guided by interests. What then becomes the problem is that ministers and commissioners often overlook the way in which interests are in fact entwined with values.

Realists, for example, insist that there is little scope for a focus on values especially as the re-shaped global order consists of unmitigated predatory power – if ‘we’ are in decline, then ‘our’ liberal values must be irredeemably doomed, many argue. Such conceptualisations, however, lack the nuance to capture what is in fact a highly eclectic emerging order – one that is far from being entirely value-free.

Contrary to what is often assumed today, jettisoning values would not bring EU foreign policy smoothly and harmoniously into tune with underlying global trends. What unfolding international change does call for, more subtly, are alternative means and tactics for protecting certain political values.
A NEW ROLE FOR THE GLOBAL STRATEGY

The new Global Strategy will undoubtedly pay lip service to the role of values within foreign policy.

The challenge is then to remedy the EU’s Achilles heel which is that general statements of ‘strategic’ philosophy are usually not matched by middle-level tactical guidelines.

It is clear that the Global Strategy is not concerned with pre-empting day-to-day foreign policy decisions. However, the Global Strategy can offer added-value in the mid-range between macro-abstract principles and quotidian decision-making, if it does not limit itself to generic principles. And it is precisely in this mid-range that the EU needs greater clarity and precision in how to advance what might be termed interest-driven values.

A given tactical approach towards certain values can be strategically damaging, while another tactic adopted in pursuit of the same values can yield positive security gains. The way in which certain values are supported is just as important as the values themselves. This is where previous EU security documents fall short, and where the Global Strategy could provide some kind of operationally meaningful guiding template.

Furthermore, tactical questions are rarely black and white. In its concrete policy options, the EU is rarely faced with absolute, sharp-edged choices between ‘interests and values.’ The more meaningful metric is whether it can exert tangible leverage over very select reform issues in highly specific national or regional contexts.

In working towards mid-range policy guidelines, the EU should talk less about ‘European’ values as the basic norms of human rights and accountable governance as they are not exclusively European. The EU needs to cease holding a menu of liberal norms to be synonymous with the specific rules that govern relations between EU member states. Other countries can advance a whole range of progressive ‘values’ without looking at all ‘European’ in the rules, institutions and norms they choose.

A tactically pressing challenge is that regimes around the world are simply getting better at neutering human rights, development, democracy and civil society initiatives. If the Global Strategy fails to address this disturbing trend it will miss what is now one of the most constraining impediments to effective EU foreign policy. Again, this requires much tailored tactical rethinking, not a Global Strategy replete with imprecise assertions that ‘values are important’.

One final and sobering point: the ascendency of illiberalism is today not only a problem ‘out there’, beyond the EU’s border, but one that needs to be combatted also within many member states. European foreign policy can no longer be understood merely as an exporter of desirable values; it also needs to be crafted more thoughtfully to receive global support in the service of the EU’s embattled internal values.
The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) drove the agenda of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for about a year or two – then its impact fizzled out.

While it remains a core reference text to this day, it has little real impact on actual decision-making. If we want to avoid the same fate for the future EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy (EUGS), we have to already start thinking about the impact we want it to have.

The main reason why diplomats and officials stopped referring to the ESS is that there was no bureaucratic necessity for them to do so. As the workload is huge and the number of people involved in this realm is relatively limited, the tendency is to focus on the urgent or the inescapable. The trick therefore is to make the EUGS inescapable, too.

A NEED FOR REFORM

First and foremost this requires an EUGS that is not just a catalogue of important issues but also a real agenda for action. Of course, a Global Strategy must be truly global in scope, and catalogue what we deem important around the world. But that is only the necessary first step to arrive at the crucial second phase: prioritisation.

This means identifying the items from the catalogue for which the EU will launch an initiative. Objectives are to be clearly set, and met during High Representative Mogherini’s current term. For each priority it is important to identify which existing instruments have to be strengthened or revised – or alternatively what new instruments need to be created and by when.

The EUGS can thus be interpreted as a mandate to the High Representative and, through her, to the apparatus of the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). This clear allocation of tasks, with deadlines to report back to the European Council or the Foreign Affairs Council, will render the EUGS bureaucratically inescapable.

Second, the member states must also be involved in the implementation of these tasks. This will ensure that they, too, are motivated to use the EUGS as a guiding document. From the start, member states have been closely involved in the drafting of the EUGS through regular consultations at various levels. These have included meetings in Brussels, chaired by the EEAS, with contact points designated by individual foreign ministries.

Creating a permanent follow-up system that also monitors the implementation of the EUGS – as well as all subsequent EU documents’ compatibility with it – would add a structural element to member states’ involvement and enhance the impact of the strategy. To this end, the discussions involving contact points could be made permanent, or this could simply become an explicit mandate of the Political and Security Committee.
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Third, effective implementation of the EUGS requires flexibility. However, as unanimity is required for nearly all decisions, the CFSP is handicapped by its intergovernmental nature. That said, the Lisbon Treaty already contains a way of rendering decision-making more flexible: the European Council can adopt ‘decisions defining the strategic interests and objectives’ of the EU, which the Foreign Affairs Council can subsequently implement by qualified majority vote (QMV).

Only three such ‘common strategies’ (as they were previously called) have ever been adopted, the last one in 2000. The instrument could be reactivated by translating each of the main priorities of the EUGS into a ‘common strategy’.

A CHANGE IN DECISION-MAKING

By making full use of existing treaty provisions, a cultural change could thus be brought about in CFSP decision-making. With regard to the priorities identified by the EUGS, the High Representative, supported by like-minded member states, could systematically resort to QMV and gradually introduce a much more flexible decision-making practice.

Finally, to keep the EUGS relevant it must be limited in time. No agenda for action can remain relevant for more than one term of office. It is therefore best to stipulate in the EUGS itself that it will be revised no later than five years after its adoption. The same process of strategising which is now underway should be initiated by the High Representative every time he/she is elected.

If we can learn from the missed opportunities of the past, there is no reason to not get the process right this time.
When asked to name the top priority for a new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), the temptation is to plunge straight into the ever-fascinating debates on specific issues and topics. But the weakest link in the production chain of EU foreign policy needs to be addressed before the operational details. Namely, the failure to define the foreign policy interests of the EU.

**FRAMING SHARED INTERESTS**

It would be a surprise if the new strategy had any major policy impact. The biggest hope in terms of impact is that the plan can achieve what no other official EU document has ever done: identify the genuine shared foreign policy interest of all 28 member states in every region of the world and in every relevant policy field.

To many, this will sound dull and esoteric. But one reason for the EU’s foreign policy weakness is its inability to define the very starting point of policymaking: the interests of those acting. And it is not necessary to read Hans Morgenthau or follow the realist school of thought to understand that interests are central to all international politics.

According to Article 22 (1) of the EU Treaty ‘the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union’ in the realm of EU external action. In theory, the Council is the right institution for this, as it is the member states which are the masters of EU foreign policy. In practice, however, this is precisely why the Council is unable to take a step back, free itself of the member states’ perspectives, and define the interest of the Union as a whole.

To be sure, decisions will ultimately have to be made by the member states. But the definition of the EU’s interests needs to come from elsewhere. This is where the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the new strategy come in.

To exercise leadership in the EU, making these shared interests visible is half the battle.

Institutional leadership in the EU can come only from intellectual power, not from the weak bureaucratic competencies enshrined in the treaties.

It will come from generating the best ideas and from offering smart compromises to the 28 member states. It will come from being a strong voice advocating the Union’s common interests.

The EEAS should promote this common position after carefully considering all the national, regional, and sub-regional interests which might exist in the EU, after looking at global expectations and demands, and after assessing, without illusions, the assets and instruments of the European arsenal for pursuing those interests. It should also not view general notions such as democracy, human rights, stability, and sustainability as ends but as starting points to help define strategic and operational goals that can directly lead to tangible outcomes.
Doing all this in the broad field of foreign policy, with all its intricacies and idiosyncrasies, is hard work. That is why nobody has attempted it in the past. It is also why whoever finally does decide to do it will greatly benefit. After all, he who defines the terms of the debate determines its course and outcome.

**PROGRESS IN THE FACE OF CRITICISM**

Defining the EU’s interests is also part of the EU’s internal power game. This is a good thing, as it fosters competition. Within the EU system, few are better suited to produce such a cohesive document than the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EEAS she heads. These are the principal players in the review process and the only ones that will still feel responsible even if the member states choose to forget all about it. The process was never wildly popular in certain national capitals anyway.

The EEAS – despite its many shortcomings, its lack of funding, and its sometimes shaky morale – still boasts enormous in-house expertise. It can also draw on a wealth of information coming from the EU’s 139 delegations and offices around the world. The High Representative and the EEAS should use their unique position to become the voice which offers a clear definition of the EU’s shared interests on a regular basis: the new EUGS should be the starting point for this.

There is a risk that this will not endear the authors of the EUGS to the member states – at least not all of them, especially the larger ones. There will be much criticism, accompanied by accusations that the High Representative and the EEAS lack the mandate to take on such a task. This will have to be endured, especially given that it will most likely come from those who lack viable alternative.

In any case, the EUGS will only be a guiding document, more of a suggestion than an order. But it will be one that is indispensable if Europeans want to finally make progress on crafting a truly European foreign policy.
One critical priority that should be included in the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is a re-imagined and redeveloped strategy to counter violent extremism.

**A NEW THREAT**

Individual states within the EU have strategies to fight extremism with varying levels of effectiveness and different focuses. However, countering this phenomenon ought not to be programmed exclusively on a state-by-state basis, as the nature of the threat itself is inherently transnational and not bound by the structures and strictures of states.

Violent extremism is in its nature hostile to the EU’s core values of unification amid diversity, religious tolerance and gender equality. The rise of extremism now presents an existential threat to the Union, with growing numbers of European citizens voting for parties which hold populist, anti-immigrant, and anti-EU political views. Often, these groups resemble the most malignant political movements of Europe’s past. In addition, there is also the persistent and real danger posed by jihadists.

An effective strategy to counter extremism would be a model of twenty-first century statecraft, accounting for and leveraging the technologies, networks and demographics of the present day.

**CHANGING THE MODEL**

As existing strategies are largely ineffective, any future strategy should not be derived from current efforts. As such, new stakeholders and institutions should be engaged to advice on the development of the strategy, including many who may be historically disconnected from the EU’s policy development ecosystem. These include, but are not limited to, civil society organisations focusing on youth development, university organisations, media and technology groups that provide platforms, as well as content that can reach targeted communities.

There also needs to be a willingness to make mistakes of commission rather than omission. Thanks to its consensus-based model, the European Union tends to eschew any policies, programmes or activities that are characterised by even a small amount of risk. Its communications and programmes are designed so as to not offend. As such, when it comes to topics like combatting extremism, its policies lack effectiveness.

To the extent that consensus is necessary, it ought to be on the point that an effective strategy will test a variety of approaches, many of which will fail. If there is little or no possibility of failure, it means that the risk profile is too low. Bold strokes will be needed to effectively counter the goals of violent extremists.
NEW DIPLOMACY AND PARTNERSHIPS

Diplomacy tends to be rooted in formal interactions between sovereign nation states. Violent extremists, however, are the products of networks rather than governments. As such, a new diplomacy would supplement traditional diplomacy with outreach to – and engagement with – non-traditional stakeholders who are influential in such networks. By way of example, effective diplomacy with Islamic clergy would increase the level of activity and amplify the messages of moderates and would seek to ‘de-fang’ those that have historically been hostile to European ideals.

Radicalisation and recruitment are increasingly taking place on European and American technology platforms which are accessed through data connections provided by telecommunications companies. These firms are frequently owned or operated by Europeans (be they majority or minority shareholders).

When content inciting people to reject European values and embrace violent extremism is accessed on a Silicon Valley technology platform through a French or British telecommunications provider, it is in the interests of the EU to ensure that these private sector entities enforce existing laws and terms of service.

The Union can also play a role in instructing these Western, private sector entities about how their terms of service can be strengthened. Furthermore, there should be an increase in the two-way information sharing that flags up potentially violent actors to the EU and which provides private sector stakeholders with the expertise of foreign policy professionals.

A programme to counter violent extremism should not just be developed and rolled out in Brussels and European capitals. There must be an active presence (including full-time staffing) in key geographies including Turkey, Pakistan and throughout the Maghreb, the Gulf and the Levant. Just as defence, intelligence and security organisations are increasing their presence and operations in key geographies, so too must our diplomats, including EU officials.

There are numerous potential priorities for the EUGS, but the most prominent threat to European integration comes from a reassertion of nationalism, xenophobia and a rise in violent extremism.
The EU is a unique political entity which has achieved many milestones in the realms of political and economic integration. In spite of these substantial achievements, however, European security remains the prerogative of nation states, with decisions undertaken individually on the basis of national threat perceptions.

If the EU wishes to assert itself on the international scene, as well as effectively contain rising threats to human security (such as nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, organised crime and environmental degradation), it needs to be more active in coordinating a collective security policy.

The geographical proximity of the EU to the instability of the Middle East should further prompt the Union to assume a greater international role. This is particularly the case given that the geopolitical upheavals of the region are producing a sustained stream of substantial security threats.

The latest string of terrorist attacks and the successive waves of mass migration which have triggered widespread uproar in Europe are both examples of global challenges with roots in the Middle East. The European response has been to concentrate on consolidating military action against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), searching for new avenues to stem the influx of foreign fighters to Syria and to contain the spread of religious extremism and/or terrorist propaganda among Arab and Muslim populations in Europe. The EU has also had to reassess certain internal policies such as the freedom of movement within the Schengen area and the resettlement of refugees.

RAISING THE GAME

Although some of the recent ideas and proposals adopted to address the public outcry might be adequate for crafting short-term policies, they can hardly serve as a basis for a long-term efficient security strategy. A coherent EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) must stem from a clear political vision which acknowledges terrorism and mass migration as symptoms of a chronic disease which has destabilised the Arab world. The effectiveness of any EUGS therefore depends largely on its ability to comprehensively deal with the external, as well as the deep-rooted internal causes of these threats.

Bad governance, despotism, corruption and religious extremism are generally understood as the internal causes of the threats emanating from the Middle East. To effectively deal with these issues, substantive political, social, cultural and institutional reforms in the Arab world are required. Conversely, past European actions and current US and Israeli policies, as well as weak international institutions, are perceived to be the primary external causes. Radical changes in Western foreign policy and a comprehensive reform of the international system are therefore also required.
The responsibility for much-needed domestic reforms falls on the shoulders of Arab ruling and intellectual elites. Though a complex and lengthy process, the EU can greatly contribute to certain aspects.

**CHANGING THE GAME**

A top priority would be the reform of Arab religious institutions and educational structures. Two Arab countries stand out in particular: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. For example, Al-Azhar, Egypt’s most prestigious religious institution could play a pivotal role in helping contain extremist threats if it were to promote moderate interpretations of Islam to its followers in the Sunni world. Along with other religious schools, it could also support rapprochement with other theological branches of Islam, namely Shi’ism.

Similarly, the Wahhabi educational and judicial structures in Saudi Arabia ought to be reformed in an attempt to eliminate the roots of religious extremism. Importantly, reforms in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have to be undertaken in parallel in a coordinated fashion. The EU has a clear interest to push for these changes, but support must come in the form of technical and, if needed, financial aid. The process itself and the policies created must be pursued by Arabs themselves.

Furthermore, an honest reassessment of European/Western colonial and post-colonial policies towards the Arab world is necessary. This will help policymakers understand how Arabs perceive historical injustices from the Balfour Declaration of 1916 to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Successfully redressing these injustices will, in part, require the EU to be morally and politically committed to helping the Palestinian people establish their own independent state within the 1967 borders. This will, first and foremost, entail preventing further illegal Israeli settlements being built in the occupied territories. Achieving such a modest but difficult goal will, admittedly, not be possible unless the international institutional system is also reformed.

This must, however, be the number one priority: in the absence of an independent Palestinian state, the destabilisation of the Arab world will continue, as will the growth of terrorism inspired by Islamic extremists.
The EU’s 2003 Security Strategy was designed to heal relations between Europeans after a rancorous split over the Iraq war. But the chasm of understanding that forms the backdrop to today’s discussions about EU strategy runs deeper than Donald Rumsfeld’s split between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe.

The number one purpose of the new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) must thus be to try to recreate a sense of solidarity within the EU by creating a document that effectively links the two theatres to its south and the east. The 2003 strategy was an expression of the EU’s universalist ambitions. It gave form to the dream of an EU with the transformative power to reshape its neighbourhood and to spread its way of working to the global stage through the twin ideas of ‘conditional engagement’ and ‘effective multilateralism’.

But for most observers, today’s EU seems like the object rather than the subject of history. Instead of exporting norms and values to its neighbours, it is receiving people fleeing their countries. It is also being forced into the position of supplicant to states like Turkey and regions like the Balkans which it was lecturing not so long ago.

LOOK EAST – AND SOUTH

First, the EU needs to rethink its eastern and southern neighbourhood policies to cope with a drastically different environment.

To the east, the post-Cold War security order is broken – and there is much disagreement over how to repair it. The EU’s relationship with Russia has always been defined by a complex cocktail of history, geography and economics. Now, after the annexation of Crimea, there is a conflict between the ‘New Cold Warriors’ that want to remain defiant in the face of Russian aggression and engagers who are waiting for the right moment to water down sanctions.

When the Ukrainian crisis erupted, German Chancellor Angela Merkel used her leverage over other member states to foster a sense of superficial unity, but now much of this influence is being spent on the refugee issue rather than on Russia. To hold together in the long term, the EU needs to develop a strategic concept that is capacious enough to suit all of its member states.

The model for us to follow should be the US-China relationship: a trinity of balancing, engaging and shaping behaviour through international institutions. It is crucial that the EU gets engaged here and other countries than Germany need to put forward ideas for cooperation. Balancing must continue with sanctions, deterrence, reassurance and the pursuit of a European energy agenda.

To the south, the waves of refugees and the Paris attacks are driving member states to resort back to a security-dominated world view. But the hard reality is that Middle Eastern geopolitics is increasingly driven from within the region – with the proxy war waged between Saudi Arabia and Iran at the core. This has now been compounded by another proxy war between Russia and the US in Syria. Unfortunately, this means that the EU finds its interests poorly served by other powers.
For that reason, Europeans will need to be more engaged with de-escalatory diplomacy across a range of regional conflicts. Different member states can use the relative closeness of their relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran to nudge them in the right direction and create openings for progress. Europe should not be taking sides in this sectarian struggle, but instead should be thinking about how to build on an Iran nuclear deal to promote broader regional engagement, and at the same time reassure and support the capacity of Gulf countries while not ‘compensating’ allies in counter-productive ways. All this will be necessary if the influx of refugees – the most important issue linked to the southern neighbourhood – is to be successfully addressed.

**DIVERSIFY THE TOOLKIT**

It will be impossible to (re)build European solidarity unless the EUGS process involves member states much more than it has done so far. Unless it is anchored in a robust set of processes – possibly involving contact groups of four to five member states working up solutions in partnership with the EU institutions – the Brussels-led EU foreign policy will have little influence on how member states conduct their affairs. If this is not addressed, we will end up with paper solutions such as the relocation of refugees, where states signed up to a target of 160,000 but only 272 have found homes.

It is also time for the EU to rethink its foreign policy toolkit. For all the talk of differentiation, the comprehensive approach and greater mutual ownership, the EU’s thinking is still very much entrenched within the paradigms of the 2003 framework. To foster stability and uphold order in other parts of the world, the EU will need to adopt a less Eurocentric approach. We need, for example, to think about how to engage with other integration projects, whether it is Turkey’s neighbourhood policy, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), or the Chinese One Belt One Road project, all of which have been strikingly absent from EU planning.

The EU also needs to think about new tools, such as sanctions, a burgeoning area of policymaking which the EU was slow to adopt. A new sanctions bureau – within a larger Economic Statecraft Directorate – could help monitor their enforcement, and develop clearer guidelines on when and how to lift, as well as impose coercive measures.

Above all, the strategy review should avoid the temptation to engage with an ever-widening scope of EU foreign policy – in preliminary discussions, the process covered all regions from Latin America to East Asia. If the EU seriously wants to take on global problems, it must first concentrate its resources on its immediate neighbourhood.
Now is the right time for Brussels to release a new and ambitious EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), not only because of the major changes in ever-deteriorating global and regional environments, but also due to the challenges arising within the Union itself.

As a manifestation of ‘one voice’ in the field of foreign and security policy, the goals of the EUGS should be to reconfirm Europe’s leading position in a drastically changing world and to convince its member states and other international players that the idea of ‘more’ rather than ‘less’ Europe is still right.

ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

To this end, the EUGS should be the product of an assessment of a number of factors: current foreign policy instruments, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), internal political dynamics, and external threats coming from the east and south – among others.

Although it is clear that an effort to balance out these concerns has already been made in the EU’s evaluations of its environment, what bodes ill is that the EU may be stuck in – or even be addicted to – a culture of ‘crisis management’. By constantly reacting to problems, the EU is unable to develop any real capacity for strategic thinking. To a large degree, the dominance of a crisis management culture means maintaining the status quo by all means rather than making strategic choices in the face of systematic changes to the global and regional environments.

A serious and comprehensive EUGS ought to be able to deliver answers to the following questions.

First, what is the worst case scenario for the EU? In addition to maintaining the status quo through crisis management, is there a better approach to sustain and enhance the interests of the Union? Is there a smarter mindset to adopt in order to face current and future challenges besides traditional diplomatic and security policy frameworks built on concepts such as alliances or strategic partners etc.?

Another priority of the EUGS should be tackling ‘hybrid threats’. As this is a reality which most nations face today (albeit to varying degrees), the desire to build resilience to the phenomenon should be easily understood and accepted by the international community.

The EUGS could thereby demonstrate the EU’s willingness and ability to act as a constructive force in the international arena. Because of its culture of compromise, the EU is well placed to get others on board by balancing instant responses to threats and long-term political and financial projects to eliminate their root causes.

In order to make the EUGS comprehensive yet operable, the EU cannot ignore the reality of divergent interests among major international players. Nor can it afford to pretend that these conceptual differences are not widening. For example, the EU’s understanding of the
use of force (economic or otherwise) is very different to that of neighbouring Russia. Similarly, the EU perceives terrorism differently to China. So, the real challenge for the EU is to figure out how it can try to establish a network of pragmatic global partnerships which bridge these gulfs.

RE-THINKING THE OLD HABITS

The development of a ‘hybrid model’ in Brussels with a mixture of multilateral and big power-coordination mechanisms would strengthen any EUGS. The EU should also be confident of its dominant role in climate change, cybersecurity and other soft issues. At the same time, the EU’s inability to deal with hard security threats could be mitigated if the EU is able to fully exert its (unused) diplomatic influence as a mediator and major economic player.

The nuclear agreement with Iran saw the EU successfully coordinate major powers to strike a deal on a contentious issue. If regional, historic and cultural differences can be taken into account in this case, why not elsewhere?

It makes no sense to be idle or just complain about the worsening environment. After all, it should not be forgotten that the EU has made enormous progress since 2003. If Europe is able to find a better path to integration and adapt to internal changes, no amount of external threats could defeat it.

According to ancient Chinese medicine, external symptoms often indicate an internal, even psychological problem. Consequently, relying on purely external treatments is not only useless, but may also worsen the condition. First and foremost, therefore, the EUGS must address the Union’s inner malaise before power can be projected elsewhere.
The refugee crisis is morphing into one about the very nature of the European project. This is far more critical for the Union than the euro crisis, which, ultimately, could be resolved with a show of financial solidarity and money. The refugee issue, however, strikes at the heart of the values that underpin EU members’ core political solidarity.

As refugees continue to head northwards, the muted euro crisis-era criticism of Berlin’s insufficient support for debtor countries has turned into a situation in which the EU’s anchor state stands almost alone. It is particularly painful for Berlin, which has done much for the newcomers while several countries – among those ones that Germany helped bring into the Union – are not prepared to do their share.

Given these cracks opening up in the EU’s foundations, a new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) must have the ambition to be more than just a ‘good deal’ for its member states.

The old continent will continue to see its divisions widen if it only tries to stand still, eventually either giving into realists who advocate minimalist goals, or adopting a defensive agenda that dodges the difficult issues.

A QUINTET FOR ACTION...

The question is, of course, how to make Europe globally relevant once again. First, European leaders must recognise two important long-term trends: the diminishing dominance of ‘the West’, of which Europe is a critical element; and the reduced capacity of old-fashioned military power to shape the world.

These two dynamics bind Europe inextricably to the US, and the relationship with Washington is the most important strategic element of any EU strategy. The US will remain militarily dominant for the foreseeable future even if the ability of the West’s armies, navies and air forces to project power across the world is diminished. Democracies must stick together, too, conscious that the majority of the world’s population live under non-democratic or semi-democratic systems.

But Europe should not adopt a policy of alignment, either, because the US, with its own priorities, is not prepared to bail out Europe in all circumstances. To navigate between the dangerous extremes of denial on one hand and abdication of responsibility on the other, the EU should focus on those priorities where it has unique interests that do not conflict with those of the US, but are sufficiently distinct to require specific responses. Five spring to mind:

Russia: Moscow’s growing military strength needs to be counterbalanced by a solid European military alliance with the US. But Russia’s deepening socio-economic weaknesses require a specific European policy of engagement. After all, a failing Russia would be first and foremost a European problem.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA): more than 45 million Muslims live in Europe, and most of their families came from the neighbouring MENA. Continued chaos in the region will
generate more terrorism and more refugees. In response, Europe should do more to hold Turkey close. For political credibility, it also needs to develop a principled, united long-term policy, including on the Israel-Palestine conflict and issues of justice and accountability. Militarist policies alone will only backfire.

Sub-Saharan Africa: the continent has the potential to become a major source of conflict and transnational terrorism if its many governance issues – particularly in the Sahel – are not addressed. But, successfully governed, it can also become the greatest engine of growth of the twenty-first century, considering its youthful demography, abundant natural and hydroelectric resources, and rich arable land.

Cybersecurity: this is a priority for all countries that have entered the digital age, and one in which the EU needs to protect its distinct privacy and commercial interests.

Rebuilding global institutions: this must be done even if it means sharing more power. The EU is based on multilateralism and the rule of law, and it will wither away if the UN system, the Bretton Woods institutions, and regional organisations go into decline.

Absent from this list of priorities are Asia and Latin America. Despite important historic and economic links, they are not priorities, and the EU should accept that it finds it difficult to leverage its economic and limited military power for distant political goals.

...AND A WIDER DEBATE

To address Europe’s main needs, the EUGS should integrate the Union’s strong development policies, embrace more conflict prevention, make full use of regional dynamics, avoid quick fixes (especially military ones), and use principled engagement to consolidate the norms that give it most clout. The EU’s weak crisis management shows how its intergovernmental approach no longer works. Europeans should build a shared strategic and military culture, without which a pro-active foreign policy, including effective force projection, is unlikely to emerge.

First, though, Europe needs confidence in itself. Foreign policy cannot be the product of a technocratic process; it must be the expression of a human community. In that regard, the most important strategic priority may well be to stop the fragmentation of Europe, integrate all its citizens into its politics, bureaucracies and narratives, and end the fear that is gripping national voters.

Ultimately, rather than the advice of experts, Europe needs a very public debate among all its citizens on what it stands for and what is worth defending.
The response of EU member states to the arrival of over one million refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in 2015 helped stabilise the immediate crisis. But while expedient, the measures they took are mostly palliative, temporary fixes that leave the EU largely in a reactive mode. More needs to be done. The refugee crisis is likely to continue or worsen, but even if it does not its scope and scale already mean that its consequences will take many more years to be overcome.

This issue needs to feature prominently in the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) if it is to meet the challenge. But for this, it must stop thinking of each refugee crisis as a short-term ‘emergency’, and replace its narrow focus on providing humanitarian assistance with policy responses based on a better understanding of the long-term drivers and trends of those crises and focused on sustainable development rather than emergency relief.

**A DISTORTED PICTURE**

The scale of the challenge is evident. In 2015, the number of forcibly displaced persons worldwide exceeded 60 million, prompting UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres to call for “a paradigm change” in response to a challenge that “is now clearly dwarfing anything seen before.” To effect such a change, the EU must correct two distortions skewing its policy responses.

First, conceptualising refugee crises as emergencies enables national governments to justify contributions as necessary and finite to their domestic publics, but obscures understanding of what generates and sustains refugee flows. This discourages long-term planning and preparation, and precludes more effective responses. Armed conflict is certainly the immediate driver of displacement, but focusing on it too narrowly as the primary event overlooks the long-term trends that have already accentuated vulnerabilities and undermined resilience in local communities, resulting in greater levels of displacement once conflict starts.

Second, EU policy responses are also skewed by the restriction of interventions in refugee crises to humanitarian assistance, especially delivery of food aid, followed by water, sanitation, and shelter. Certainly these are critical to physical survival, but single-minded adherence to an emergency framework for intervention restricts the development of new approaches that may better meet the needs of an unprecedented global refugee crisis. In order to offer better prospects of developing long-term sustainability and resilience, this means, most obviously, facilitating the engagement of forcibly displaced persons in host economies – assisting them to assist themselves and to contribute to their hosts, for example through training, funding, and legalising work as a growing number of experts in the region urge. It also means helping to build and fund coping mechanisms for host governments and communities to relieve the strain and mitigate anti-refugee sentiment.
A NEW PARADIGM

Clearly, the cooperation of local governments or de facto authorities is necessary for such an approach to succeed. It cannot be implemented everywhere. But even the complex case of Syria suggests what can be done. Already, a significant number of Syrian refugees undertake informal, low-paid work in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, generate consumer demand, and inject rental money into the housing market. This has distorted local wages and rents, straining relations with host communities, but also provides income streams for many, and has frankly alleviated an otherwise disastrous situation. The UNHCR and other agencies have also helped by providing refugees with vouchers and rent subsidies to be spent locally, while helping select central and municipal authorities to cope with expanding demand on public services so as to minimise negative impacts on nationals.

But the UNHCR – as the primary implementing agency for the EU and other major donors – and most humanitarians remain locked within an emergency framework when it comes to planning and preparation for the future. They collect extensive data, but do not engage in data analysis that might lead to alternative approaches. This risks being a self-defeating approach as aid fatigue sets in and per capita assistance to refugees drops, at the same time as their dependency on aid deepens. Paradoxically, it is the EU that is already testing the merit of a different approach, by seeking Turkey’s agreement to issue work permits to Syrian refugees in order to regulate their employment while discouraging them from migrating to Europe.

The EU’s purpose is self-serving, but could pave the way to rethinking its general approach more radically. Three factors should compel it to do so. First, the return of refugees to their countries is always very slow even after peace is restored: in 2014, a mere 126,800 of some 60 million refugees worldwide were able to go back home.

Second, conflict trends and the scale of dislocation and physical destruction in the Middle East and North Africa region, which alone accounts for half the world’s total of forcibly displaced persons, show the potential for more flows – and parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia are no different.

And third, aid fatigue, the eurozone’s continuing travails, global geo-political rivalries, and the rapidly shrinking revenue of OPEC oil producers who might have contributed a greater share of humanitarian assistance all make maintaining the emergency framework non-viable.

Not providing humanitarian assistance is not an option. But neither is it a sufficient response. To make a difference, the EU must develop a new paradigm capable of changing the conditions and cost-benefit calculations of millions of refugees wherever they are, not only those landing on its shores.
In the last eight years the European Union has endured a series of unprecedented crises. These have included the global ‘credit crunch’ of 2008-9 that threatened to break up the eurozone, the spillover of Islamist violence and extremism in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ and ensuing civil wars in Libya and Syria, and the ‘hybrid warfare’ tactics used by Russia to reassert its influence in the European Neighbourhood. Then, in 2015, when hundreds of thousands of migrants fleeing conflict and hardship in the Middle East and Africa arrived in Europe, the EU found itself confronted with the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War.

Moreover, the EU is struggling with the backlash against its badly-timed and equally badly-designed countermeasures. We are currently witnessing growing popular discontent with Brussels, which is increasingly seen as elitist and out of touch with its citizens’ concerns. Public anxiety about the deteriorating security and geopolitical environment only serves to increase the gap between the EU institutions and citizens, thereby undermining the sense of mutual solidarity and interdependence that is one of the cornerstones of the EU.

As a result, a rising wave of political populism embraced by both left- and right-wing eurosceptic parties threatens to hijack the working agenda of the European Parliament and the European Council in the next few years. If that happens there will be no place for an EU global strategy. It would be wholly subordinated to the loose and vague consensus of interests prevailing among the members of the new ‘Concert of Europe’ and their separate relationships with the biggest external powers.

A NEW CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM

In an attempt to reduce the probability of this scenario occurring and to bolster the EU’s security architecture, policymakers must adopt a new, flexible and dynamic approach to security based on the model of a ‘pulsating organisation’ – a set of rules and procedures enabling rapid and effective crisis response.

First, however, some points need to be made about how a new security mechanism should not be designed. It is not possible, nor indeed would it be useful, to build another bureaucratic security and defence alliance similar to NATO that would only end up being overshadowed by the Atlantic alliance’s capabilities and command structures. Nor is it prudent to outsource European security tasks to organisations like the OSCE. The latter has already proved inefficient in monitoring and mediating a fragile armistice in eastern Ukraine. Finally, it is not realistic to imagine that a European army, intelligence service or cyber security task force can be built without a single chain of command above the national governments, just as we cannot imagine European Monetary Union without the EU Commission and European Central Bank. In the same way that competing national economic interests and goals within Europe had to be reconciled in the 1950s and 60s, the national security concerns of the member states must be taken into account and national governments assigned an active role in formulating common European security and defence policies.
SECURITY IMPERATIVES

In the past year the EU has found itself struggling to cope with a migration crisis of unprecedented proportions. As this crisis has unfolded it has become clear which countries can be identified respectively as ‘target destination countries’, ‘transit countries’ and ‘sources’ of the migrant flows. The tactical political response from the target destination countries has been to buy time to shield themselves from the massive influx of refugees, while transit countries and source countries have decided to avail of the EU freedom of movement regime to transfer the burden of migrants onto others.

To implement an effective EU response to this crisis, the target countries should prepare temporary camps to accommodate migrants, and both target destination countries and transit countries should set up registration ‘hotspots’ to filter out potential terrorists and radicals, as well as provide relief facilities to care for the aged, young, sick and starving. Finally, in collaboration with the migrants’ countries of origin, concerned member states may take humanitarian or military action to address the causes of the crisis.

All phases of such a crisis response effort must be fully supported by the EU funds and budget, which would work as an insurance policy for the member states confronted with critical situations. To be eligible for financial aid as participants in the new mechanism, governments would be required to conduct annual defence and security policy reviews in consultation with bordering member states or friendly external nations, which would in turn improve the performance of their military and security agencies. Nations would, in collaboration with their immediate neighbours, be required to plan at least two training exercises, beyond NATO obligations, to tackle the most urgent common threats or pre-identified security risks and participate once every two years in an all-European simulated crisis response operation. If the country meets these requirements it is guaranteed to receive financial aid automatically in the event of an emergency arising.

That means that in the next 50 years EU funds must be redirected to the nations that cooperate in resolving security issues or reacting to crises. It would be in the national interest of every member state to participate in relevant exercises and use the earmarked funds judiciously, so that in a really dangerous situation they can rely on an efficient EU crisis response mechanism.

This approach would also mean that, instead of involving all member states in crisis decision making, the European Council would delegate powers to the directly affected members and their partners, with support from the EU Commission, and scrutiny of the EU Parliament and the European Court of Justice.
The fundamental priority of EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) should be the defence of stability and prosperity that the EU has enjoyed since its inception, which is currently under existential threat.

69 years have passed since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome and it has been 27 years since the fall of communism in central and eastern Europe. Yet the EU is in no mood to celebrate, as it has never been as insecure and vulnerable as it is today.

When the EU adopted its first Security Strategy in 2003, its main concern was the stabilisation of its neighbourhood and the projection of its values around the globe. Today, with the European homeland facing multiple threats, the EU no longer has the luxury of focusing on promoting its vision and pressuring its norms on others. Instead, the EU needs to concentrate on securing its own borders, deterring potential external aggressors and eliminating the threat of terrorism.

Should the EU fail to face up to these challenges its very existence will be put in question. This will embolden external aggressors and Europeans themselves will become more susceptible to anti-EU rhetoric.

**BORDERS AND TERRORISM**

The threats and inadequacies that need to be addressed are all well-known and fall into three major areas – managing migration flows, securing the continent against terrorist threats, and deterring Russian aggression against EU member states.

Managing the influx of refugees and securing the EU’s external borders are essential for the maintenance of freedom of movement inside the EU and the continued existence of the Schengen area. It is also vital if the rise of Eurosceptic and populist parties is to be stemmed. This will not be achieved without the serious efforts of all EU member states to secure the Union’s external borders, especially to the south. At the very least, this would require regular contributions by all member states to border monitoring and border patrol missions. It would also require the powers and resources of Frontex to be boosted.

The EU also needs to revisit the idea of creating European Border Guards, which should be urgently deployed to Greece and Italy. In the meantime, the networks and logistical capabilities of human traffickers should be hit and dismantled. Unfortunately, there is little time to apply these measures, as the end of winter is likely to see Europe hit by new waves of migrants.

The fight against terrorism requires efforts on many fronts. First and foremost, it requires greater coordination between counter-terrorism departments of the member states and enhancing the powers of the EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator. Establishing trust between counter-terrorism bodies will take time and effort: left to their own devices, they tend to
hide behind a veil of secrecy and follow their own familiar ways. The impetus to cooperate across borders must therefore come from the very top and be constantly monitored and encouraged.

The military campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is another vital aspect of counter-terrorism efforts. The EU does not have a direct role in this operation and it is difficult to foresee one being established in the future. However, since France invoked Article 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon following the attacks last November, the solidarity of all member states is required. It is essential that member states provide the resources and capabilities requested. Defeating ISIL in northern Iraq and Syria – or at least stopping its recruitment drives and slowing its momentum – would undoubtedly weaken terrorist cells operating in Europe.

**THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE**

Finally, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, a conventional threat to EU territory is a real possibility. Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its actions in eastern Ukraine, elements of hybrid warfare are being tested in the Baltic states. At the same time, Russia is making regular incursions into the airspace and waters of northern member states. There is no denying that Russia’s behaviour towards the EU’s eastern flank is growing ever more belligerent.

In responding to the Russian challenge, it is important that the EU cooperates closely with NATO. With the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw set to discuss improving deterrence in eastern Europe, it is important that the alliance is supported by adequate EU measures – including the maintenance of sanctions as long as the Minsk agreement remains unfulfilled. The EU should also continue its efforts to diversify its energy mix away from Russia, which tends to use its energy dominance for political purposes.

The threats and challenges facing the EU are now far greater than they have ever been since the end of the Cold War. A failure to confront them now and act together would ultimately prove catastrophic for the Union.
The world has changed dramatically since the EU adopted its first security strategy in 2003. The biggest security risk for the EU and its member states now is not only military or non-traditional security threats from neighbouring countries or even environmental challenges, but also the degradation of the rules-based international order.

Although the slow decline has been almost indiscernible, particularly from Europe, it will prove to be one of the most serious threats to EU security in the long run. Therefore, it is this matter which the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) should prioritise.

**COUNTERING EROSION**

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the principles of the EU external action are defined in Article 21.1. This reads ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’

These principles are the same as those which underline the existing rules-based world order, established immediately after the Second World War. Since then, former antagonist nations Germany and Japan have been integral elements of this order, acting as its principal guardians as part of or alongside the European Union (or its predecessors).

Because of the shifting constellation of great powers, this rules-based order, including the freedom of navigation, has been challenged and is now at risk. When it comes to these principles, traditional notions of boundaries count for little: if EU members attach more importance to their individual short-term economic and trade interests, they will accelerate the decline of the rules-based world order. As such, they would be shooting themselves – and their international partners – in the foot.

In order to avoid the accidental neglect of the interests of its like-minded partners, coordination activities in the EU’s regional Working Parties, such as the Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI) chaired by the European External Action Service (EEAS), should be strengthened.

Bilateral meetings with the EU’s strategic partners should be carefully planned and outcomes should be implemented according to the second paragraph of Article 21.1 of the Lisbon Treaty. This reads ‘The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.’ This should be done primarily in order to ensure that the EU’s security interests are not undermined in the process of developing strategic partnerships.
SEEKING STABILITY

Particularly in light of recent terror attacks, further efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional arms, including illegal firearms, are required. The EU has been a long-standing and respected promoter of disarmament initiatives and a major contributor to various projects, including those related to nuclear safety. This should continue. Although EU member states hold differing views on nuclear weapons, this has led to both weaknesses and strengths in regard to EU-level policy. Incidentally, the same might also be said for EU energy policy. If policy margins could be further narrowed down, the EU would wield greater influence on the world stage.

Disarmament and non-proliferation have also been some of the major areas of activity of the UN. Given that the EU and its member states have attached great importance to the UN, it is natural that they would seek for it to operate more effectively. For this to happen, however, a conscious effort to reform the organisation is needed, and in particular the UN Security Council (UNSC). Moves by the EU to work towards reforming the UNSC would help this important universal organisation (based on the rule of law) play a truly global role.

The EU and its member states have been the biggest contributors to global development, and while humanitarian assistance is based on impartiality and is not a tool of EU foreign and security policy, it has nevertheless promoted the significance of the Union across the globe. In addition, CSDP missions and operations have contributed to conflict prevention and peace building efforts from Africa to Afghanistan.

However, in order to continue promoting stability in the world – which would serve to strengthen the security of the Union and its member states – greater coordination among various external policy fields is required at the EU level.

Since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the subsequent steps towards the unification of Europe have enhanced not only the wellbeing in the Union, but also world peace. Based on its impressive past achievements, with an invigorated EUGS the EU again can lead the world by example.
An EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is something Europeans have needed for a long time. National governments still cling to the idea that they have the ability to control increasingly transnational economic forces, while also believing that regional and global problems can be solved nationally.

However, this way of thinking is naïve, futile and, indeed, outright dangerous. Only by recasting the very idea of political community can we Europeans hope to harness the power that national politics has lost, thus giving new impetus and legitimacy to the project of European integration.

**INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CROSSROADS**

Thinking innovatively about who we are also means that we have to contextualise our presence in the world. Instead of presenting bold visions with feet of clay, we have to meaningfully connect the EU’s local, regional and global contexts. This is exactly how the EUGS must proceed: it has to start with credible answers to the internal challenges of the EU as a political community, while simultaneously connecting these answers to the problems in its neighbourhood. Only from there can it proceed to identify its global goals and partners.

The EUGS finds itself at the intersection of the EU’s changing internal dynamics and its changing external environment. Although the EUGS is focused on the external dimension of EU politics, there is an inseparable link to the internal developments of the Union. Virtually all the recent divisive issues in the EU have an external dimension – be it the question of (non-) enlargement, the eurozone crisis, sanctions against Russia, and most recently, the migration crisis.

Being able to address these internal contradictions is an essential starting point for a credible EUGS. How can we talk about solidarity with refugees when we ourselves are reluctant to welcome those fleeing war? How can we talk about the relevance of international law when we resign ourselves to the fact that it is being violated on our very doorstep? How can we insist on the principles of liberal democracy in relations with our partners when authoritarian tendencies are clearly visible in several EU member states? Without a clear EU stance on these problems, the EUGS is doomed to become just another irrelevant document with no impact whatsoever.

A word of caution here: it may be tempting to recast all these issues as security problems. However, nothing would be more harmful to the EUGS than the securitisation of its priorities. Although the strengthening of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is certainly a step in the right direction, such measures have to be complemented by ample attention to the broader socio-economic, cultural and environmental causes of current problems. The EU needs to be capable of protecting itself militarily, but this should not be done at the expense of its values. Accordingly, the EUGS must seek to promote the fundamental values of the Union.
SELECTING RELEVANT PARTNERS

As much as the EU would like to see itself as a global player, it should not be in denial about its own political and geographic position. As the refugee influx reminds us, we cannot ignore the problems on our doorstep.

At the same time, some (particularly the bigger EU member states) will certainly not want to lose sight of their own global commitments and special relations. As a result, the EUGS will either be selective or vague and non-committal.

But for a number of reasons, there is no doubt that the European Neighbourhood will have to be the starting point. How could the EU be credible globally, if it lacks leverage in its immediate neighbourhood? More specifically, the EUGS needs to provide a clear answer regarding the future of enlargement in the Balkans, and it needs to overcome the current comatose state of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Of course, beyond its neighbourhood, the Union will need to cultivate strategic connections. But the task here is a simpler one as the EU is lucky in that – with the exception of an increasingly authoritarian Russia – none of the great powers of the day pose a direct threat to the EU or to any of its member states. Hence, unlike the US, it can not only define the best course for its strategic partnerships, but will also most likely see its plans come to fruition.

The EUGS’ success will ultimately depend on the connections between three primary fields: the EU as a political community, the neighbourhood, and the world as a whole. Only an internally resilient Union, capable of re-affirming its core values and of inspiring the loyalty of its citizens, can project influence beyond its borders, and thus remain a role model for its neighbours. Only then can we expect to see the impact of the Union’s once-praised transformative power; a power that these days is sadly absent.

Once this has been achieved, the Union must concentrate its resources on ways to re-create at least a semblance of normalcy in its vicinity. After all, only a stable and prosperous neighbourhood will allow the Union to project its influence globally.
In the field of foreign and security policy the EU lacks policy coherence and punches significantly below its weight. The status quo is that member states take leadership on immediate crises, leaving longer-term strategy and foresight to Brussels.

To become a more coherent international actor in foreign policy and security matters, the EU needs to first define its priorities as well as how to engage. Overall, the EU needs to reassert its role as a normative actor and promote a rules-based global system.

A CRISIS OF MULTIPOLARITY?

The immediate foreign and security priorities for any EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) are evident: terrorism, refugees, Russia, Libya, and cybercrime. Events in the Middle East present the largest long-term challenge given the low levels of political inclusion in a region that is likely to experience high levels of violence and instability for many years.

Africa, with its many developmental and security challenges, will also demand its share of attention given its proximity and historical relations with a number of European countries. Longer-term challenges will inevitably present themselves in Asia where potential conflict in the South China Sea and eventually competition between China and India will also demand engagement by the EU.

The key characteristics of the changing world are apparent for all to see. As the world becomes more connected and integrated (in terms of technology, trade and the media), it appears to become more brittle, with an apparent increase in the number of crises that demand rapid responses. The current sense of global drift, uncertainty and crisis is set to increase exponentially, placing inordinate pressure on politicians to ‘do something’.

Some of the current sense of crisis is merely due to the increase in transaction speed – technology is advancing rapidly and in a more flat and crowded world, our ability to react to events appears to have declined. Everything is ‘now’ and conveyed in near-real time – creating an urge to immediately (re)act.

Yet even in this age of information overload our ability to distinguish the signal from the noise (i.e. key strategic developments amongst the cacophony of data overload) continues to depend upon human judgement, experience and insight.

Diplomacy in the form of face-to-face knowledge and trust – the ability to communicate directly with leadership across divisions – during times of tension will increase in importance. A more hot, flat and crowded world needs more diplomacy than in the past.

In theory, a multipolar system which recognises that China and eventually India will rival the economic size of the EU and the US should serve as a more flexible system – a greater global shock absorber, able to take more strain and deal with greater complexity than the rigidity of
bipolarity. But change is unsettling and the seismic shifts in the global balance of power that is currently being experienced as we move towards multipolarity adds to a heightened sense of turbulence and volatility.

Multipolarity is complex, messy and requires intensive political interaction, but a system where power is diffused is inherently more stable (although more complex) than a system where stability is determined by one or two dominant countries. The economic downturn of 2008 (that started with the subprime mortgage crisis in the US) and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 are good examples of the extent to which the actions and developments within a single dominant country can prove globally disruptive.

THREE MAJOR ROLES

Against this backdrop, the single most important strategic role of the EUGS must be to foster political support for the development of a global rules-based system – including the strengthening of global governance institutions such as the reform of the United Nations and its Security Council. The strategic challenge here is twofold: managing the relative decline of the US and engaging with a rising China, drawing both into a global system where rules are set by legitimate institutions and not the most belligerent or richest country.

Second, at an operational level the EU should plan to continue to promote international technical agencies. As a result of its consultative policy development processes, the quality of EU policy frameworks on cybercrime, terrorism, migration and the like set high standards. Technical agencies, such as EUROPOL and EUROJUST, are unparalleled in efficiency and value-added. The EU excels in carving out and operationalising common frameworks for action to include countries with different interests and priorities. These are attributes in short supply globally where the EU has a comparative advantage.

The third and most important practical role for the EUGS is to foster policy coherence and communication across the EU institutions and between EU member states. This is a thankless and time-consuming task that requires ongoing and often exhaustive engagement and explanation, but essential if the EU is to advance a common foreign and security policy.
The European Union adopted its first European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, at a time when, for the most part, a seemingly sustainable and favourable status quo had come to prevail in its neighbourhood. Against the backdrop of the post 9/11 environment, the Second Gulf War and revelations about Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme, the main threats to Europe were identified as transnational terrorism, failed states, regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, along with organised crime emanating from the Western Balkans. Although many of these threats still persist, their nature, as well as the security environment that Europe is facing, has altered significantly since then. The new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), should therefore be shaped by the changing nature of the security challenges facing the EU.

A TRANSFORMED SECURITY LANDSCAPE

In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ the security order in the Middle East, which was based on a balance of power structure that had remained virtually unaltered for decades, virtually imploded with the partial or total collapse of the state structure in Syria, Iraq, Libya (and counting). The competition among different regional and global actors now manifests itself openly in the form of proxy wars. Furthermore, when the first ESS was drafted, what radical Islam signified for Europe was a distant Taliban-backed al-Qaeda presence in the Af-Pak area with some operational capabilities and affiliated cells abroad. Today, in addition to a multitude of jihadist organisations operating throughout the Middle East and North Africa, one major actor, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), is struggling to establish a caliphate straddling across Syria, Iraq and Libya. In sum, the threats of transnational terrorism, failed states and regional conflicts that were spelled out in the 2003 ESS have become realities.

For Europe the repercussions have been manifold. For one, the conflicts, as well as the global jihadist movement and threat posed by the ‘foreign fighters’ phenomenon, are now much closer to Europe. As such, European states are directly exposed to the fall-out from these conflicts – refugees, domestic religious and political radicalisation, transnational terrorism and returning foreign fighters, among others. Thus for Europe, human security issues are being transformed into homeland security issues. Europe must strategise policies, formulate responses and develop tools to tackle internal and external human security issues. The first fundamental conclusion to draw from these developments is that the EUGS has to revisit and re-order the list of perceived threats and recommended responses with an emphasis on the issue of human security.

The EU’s eastern neighbourhood has had to contend with a resurgent Russia that has annexed parts of Georgia and Ukraine, and is now in direct confrontation with transatlantic interests in Syria. In order to assert its influence over its perceived hinterland, Russia has utilised its military, economic, energy, cyber and hybrid resources and capabilities. Russia’s aggressive political and military posture presents a direct threat to EU member states in eastern Europe and the Baltics. Compared to the early years of the previous decade, the EU is now compelled to think more
in terms of hard security and develop responses to the perceived threat from its large eastern neighbour which for the foreseeable future appears to be intent on consolidating its presence in the region.

A third observation regarding the EUGS relates to the requirements of budget austerity. European austerity measures enacted after the 2008 crisis, which included the lowering of defence budgets in many cases, have limited Europe’s military capabilities. These binding constraints are leading European policymakers to re-assess the future role of Europe in managing global and regional conflicts. Therefore a renewed and more realistic ‘job description’ should guide the new strategy. Equally important will be the agreed content on the transatlantic alliance.

A NEW (TRANS)ATLANTICISM

Due to the challenges emanating along both its flanks, Europe finds its security interests converging with those of the US. This represents another divergence from the 2003 ESS which was drafted and reiterated amidst harsh criticism of Washington’s unilateralism and military interventionism – most egregiously on display with the 2003 Iraq War. Thus strengthened transatlanticism should underpin the EU’s strategic thinking; furthermore, this emphasis on an improved security relationship with the US and NATO is clearly likely to be more acceptable to European polities in light of the security developments of the last few years.

Bearing in mind the ambitious self-perception of the EU as a global actor that was articulated in the 2003 ESS, the sobering lesson since then has been that while the EU may play a leading role globally in some affairs (such as the push for clean energy) its capability to influence the security environment is limited. The Union therefore needs to recalibrate its ambitions and its mission statement. By focusing on a limited number of key areas, the EU may actually have a more tangible impact on global affairs.

By scaling down its self-appointed goals, Europe would not necessarily abandon its other ambitions. The EU may and should develop ways of relegating responsibility, collaborating with external actors and other international organisations, or simply promote ways in which its members may find arrangements to work on a given task without involving the entire Union in order to push for the fulfilment of its foreign policy and security agenda beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
Creating an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is a necessary exercise. Achieving more of a shared world view among the EU’s 28 member states, and a greater shared understanding of when and how Europeans should pull together, is an essential pre-condition for common action. Above all, this requires realism.

**THE NEED FOR REALISM**

The dramatic global power shifts of the last decade have punctured Europeans’ preferred view of themselves as an ascendant soft-superpower. We were engaging in ‘effective multilateralism’ with ‘strategic partners’, and assimilating our ‘neighbourhood’ as part of a liberal, democratic, rules-based world.

Up until now, the current EUGS review process has done a good job of describing how the world – now more connected, contested and complex – has changed. But even since last summer the EU’s position has deteriorated further, with the outside world now impinging on everyday European life through issues such as terrorism and the migration crisis – with European solidarity as collateral damage.

If, then, the EUGS itself is to pass its key test – that it actually influences policymakers in national capitals – it must be both clear-eyed and hard-headed. There are several examples of where realism is particularly needed.

No draw-bridge option for migration – Unless we are prepared to watch people drown and to mine our land borders, the facts of geography, and long-standing intermingling of populations, mean that there is no way Europe can insulate itself from the conflicts and crises of the Middle East and Africa. Whatever is done to ‘strengthen control of our external borders’, whether nationally or collectively, Fortress Europe is unachievable.

Serious, committed efforts for stability and prosperity in the ‘countries of origin and transit’ is therefore essential. Military means must be used, as well as aid and trade, but intelligently – terrorism may be drawn to Europe by ill-judged military action abroad.

The US matters more than ever – The US has seen its influence wane along with Europe, to the extent that it is no longer the world’s sole hyper-power. But Silicon Valley, the shale revolution, and favourable demography all contribute to vast enduring strengths. To keep the Russians out of Europe, we continue to need to keep the Americans in: and the future health of the transatlantic alliance will depend on Europeans doing more for their own defence, and taking up the slack as the US pivots to Asia by being more active in our own ‘backyard’.

Strong transatlantic relations also requires the implementation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – but must avoid the sort of slavish adherence to US instructions that served us so ill in Afghanistan, for example. With the West on the back foot, the two sides of the Atlantic need each other more than ever – allowing scope for a less co-dependent relationship.
Tension between values and interests – Of course, European foreign policy must be values-based. It is ‘who we are’, it is in our treaties. It is therefore essential to sustain liberalism within Europe. But there will often be occasions when self-interest – particularly economic, at a time of imperfect recovery from the last decade’s financial crisis – trumps principle. This is evident in, for example, our relations with China, or the bilateral relations of many member states with Gulf states. The strategy will be more plausible if it frankly acknowledges this tension.

It should also point out that Europe cannot reasonably expect 100% conformity with its own values set. Arab electorates, for example, consistently opt for mildly Islamist governments who often have attitudes towards women and gays most Europeans find deplorable. But we need to respect their choices and support future Morsis. Otherwise, we are left with Sisi or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Still an economic superpower – Despite everything, Europe remains an economic superpower – and, happily, that matters more in today’s world. Competition between major powers is increasingly being conducted through the means of geoeconomics as opposed to old geopolitical tools. Europe should understand and embrace the political potential of its economic instruments.

It is the member states that matter – aid and trade, the main economic instruments, are Commission ‘competences’. But the EU’s foreign and defence policy is essentially intergovernmental; for better or worse, it is the European Council that has been pre-eminently the place where the EU’s successive crises have been handled, or not.

There is no hope for an effective external strategy unless the member states set aside the destructive ‘competition’ between southern and eastern security concerns. Examples such as Portugal flying combat air patrols over the Baltic states, and Latvia sending soldiers to the Central African Republic should be applauded and such efforts further encouraged.

The member states must rediscover the virtues of solidarity and remember that it is not always a matter of everyone acting together: it is often a question of small-group cooperation, supported by others or just accommodated in the spirit of ‘constructive abstention’.
The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was a political landmark and a remarkably prescient document. The current preparation of an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) led by HR/VP Federica Mogherini is an opportunity to rectify one glaring omission: the document altogether ignored the nexus between the liberal, open order it wished to promote on a global scale, and the state of governance in Europe.

DEMOCRACY TAKEN FOR GRANTED?

Indeed, the creators of the ESS blithely assumed that this question had been resolved once and for all. The text reads:

‘The creation of the European Union...has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent [...] the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible actor.’

In other words, the ESS took for granted that the pluralistic, democratic, and rights-regarding governance it wished to see established worldwide – and which it rightly identified as a key precondition for Europe’s external security – had been permanently hardwired into Europe’s operating system, thanks in large measure to the European Union itself.

This was a colossal mistake, as recent events have proved. Vicious disagreements over the future of the eurozone, the conflict with Russia over Ukraine, and the refugee crisis have starkly exposed the divergence of interests, historical memory, and values within Europe. They have chipped away at solidarity and sidelined the EU as an actor in foreign and security policy. The ESS never did spell out the precise details of what a ‘united and peaceful’ Europe should look like. Still, this clearly is not it.

Our democracies do not appear so secure, stable, and dynamic anymore either. Across the continent, authoritarian or extremist movements and parties are playing on voters’ fears, poisoning civic discourse, taking public spaces hostage, and putting governments on the defensive (except where the authoritarians are already in power). Nor is their purpose merely to shoulder in and secure a place at the trough of representative politics for themselves. The radicals do not object, per se, to parliamentary immunity or government handouts. But this is also about principles. Their ultimate goal is to kick the system over and smash it: to make way for illiberal rule.
MENACES TO THE LIBERAL ORDER

These forces, while undoubtedly home-grown, do have their outside supporters. Not China, apparently: while it is quick to pit EU governments against each other when its interests require it, it doesn’t seem to object to their liberal constitutions. But Islamic fundamentalists revile everything Europe stands for – secularism, pluralism, women’s rights, gay marriage – and use terrorism to strike at its heart.

Russia’s leaders, with good reasons of their own to fear fundamentalist Islam, nonetheless find themselves in full agreement as far as things to hate about Europe are concerned. The result: Russian troll onslaughts on European social media websites, Russian funding for right-wing parties, government-backed cybercrime, or manufactured outrage over allegations of crimes against Russian immigrants.

The ESS offers scant guidance on how to frame such menaces to liberal order in Europe. On the external front, it notes that ‘large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable’ (that remains unlikely, but it has returned rather prominently to NATO’s calculations). Instead, it lists five ‘threats’: terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. Only the first and the last are of direct concern for Europe’s domestic security.

Oddly even for 2003, the strategy does not connect these concerns to states, preferring to pinpoint non-state actors – apart from a stern warning to countries which have ‘placed themselves outside the bounds of international society’ and which, in case of recalcitrance, ‘should understand that there is a price to be paid.’ Presumably this was intended to cause consternation in Pyongyang or Tehran.

It’s a safe bet that no one envisaged Russia annexing Crimea, fomenting war in eastern Ukraine, undermining governance in Kiev and the eastern European neighbourhood, and forcefully exploring the vulnerabilities of the European Union. It was even less reasonable to suppose that the former superpower’s belligerence could be linked to a growing internal failure of governance – leading it to employ asymmetrical methods of aggression more commonly used by terrorists.

The new EUGS must recognise the nature and the urgency of these new threats to the European project. Even more crucially, it must comprehend that their external and internal variants share a key common element: the fear and anger of those who are left stranded in the wake of globalisation (or believe they might be). Without functioning social contracts and robust representative democracy, there can be no security in Europe – or coming from it.
European leaders handed HR/VP Federica Mogherini an impossible mission last June when they asked her to come up with an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS). While Mogherini’s advisors prepare the EUGS, most of the threats predicted by Javier Solana’s 2003 security strategy are hitting the EU hard: terrorism, organised crime, state failure, and regional conflict. The refugee crisis is one of the results, with its disruptive effects and human suffering. In diverting energies into a new theoretical exercise, the EU risks fiddling while Rome burns.

MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

There is unlikely, ever, to be a global strategy involving 28 member states except on paper. European states are too diverse to implement a common strategy. Spain will always be more concerned about Morocco than about Ukraine; Poland will always worry about the eastern neighbourhood and remain unmoved by the troubles of North Africa. Germany and Italy seek dialogue with Russia, when conditions permit; central European states emphasise deterrence. France and Britain meanwhile are ready to use force in defence of national interests; Germany deplores military force for understandable historical reasons. France faces terrorist threats but is scarcely affected by the refugee influx. Compromise language and coalitions of the willing cannot paper over tangible divisions of interests.

The larger member states are simply not willing to delegate responsibility for issues touching on war, peace and vital national interests to the EU. They routinely exclude high-ranking EU representatives from sensitive foreign policy discussions, such as the contact group on Ukraine. The German chancellor, the Italian prime minister and their colleagues decide on the imposition and renewal of sanctions, EU institutions execute their decisions. It was Chancellor Angela Merkel who dashed to Istanbul in October 2015 to persuade the Turkish president to limit the flow of asylum seekers, leaving Brussels struggling to implement the ensuing ‘action plan’.

Territorial defence – the core of hard security – remains the preserve of the member states and of NATO. The role of the EU in hard security is negligible, despite a plethora of procedures, agencies, situation rooms, and EU flags flying over largely national policing operations. The EU has a limited track record in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. The previous HR/VP claimed credit for a partial breakthrough between Serbia and Kosovo; but it was really the incentive of EU membership that brought them together and even this is now fraying.

EU and NATO enlargement helped to transform the lives of more than 100 million Europeans. But Jean-Claude Juncker, the Commission president, has said there will be no further enlargement on his watch, thereby removing the EU’s most effective foreign policy tool. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), often derided as enlargement-lite, provides few incentives and has failed to instil a commitment to pro-democracy reforms in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, North Africa and the Middle East.
The notion of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a relic of the triumphalism that accompanied the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war. At the time, European leaders saw it as a route towards political union, with the EU taking over the traditional attributes of sovereign states. Today, faced with recession, the rise of populism, and a troubled neighbourhood, European politicians compete to prove that they are the most ardent defenders of national interests.

PLAYING TO EUROPE’S STRENGTHS

That said, the ‘return of realpolitik’ does not condemn Europe to impotence. The EU remains a force to be reckoned with in international relations. The EU’s strength comes from the outward projection of the policy areas where it has acquired authority internally. The EU can achieve more in its relations with Russia, for example, through the judicious application of anti-trust policy than it can through political posturing.

Moreover, if European leaders were ready to spend political capital on mobilising support for the proposed trade and investment partnership with the US, they could breathe new life into the transatlantic partnership. The US would then have to get its own act together, once the presidential elections are over.

The EU would gain respect and influence in the world if it gave top priority to Europe’s role in the technological revolution. Funding for this needs to be maintained and not diverted into stop-gap crisis measures. EU-sponsored advances in science, research, innovation and their application to business could do much to restore Europe’s global leadership.

Such initiatives would improve peoples’ lives, counter the prevailing sense of European decline, and do more to strengthen peace and prosperity than any number of grand strategies.
Any debate on a common security and defence strategy has always been difficult in the EU. Many member states have preferred to promote an EU security policy based on global security and the Union’s role as a force for good in the world, rather than a policy revolving around the security of the EU’s own territory and people.

The result is reflected in the existing security strategy. As long as the main threats to common security can be defined so that they can best be managed well beyond the EU’s borders, the political conclusions are easier to draw. The key question now is whether this still applies to the new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS).

**FOCUS ON THE EU’S HOMELAND**

In the current international environment, the EU cannot maintain its focus on distant problems, as the foundations of its identity and very existence are being challenged closer to home. Given the multiple challenges that currently threaten the Union’s unity and cohesion, the EUGS should signal a firm willingness to address all of them jointly and in a coordinated manner. It is of paramount importance that the strategy should be assertive and unambiguous in this respect.

The EUGS should thus first of all confirm the Union’s approach towards the key principles of the European political order, as the system of cooperative security in Europe is being increasingly challenged. The EU should assume a clear stance on how it aims to resist Russia’s renewed aggressiveness as a geopolitical player and contribute to upholding the principles of the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of European states.

In an atmosphere of escalating political and military confrontation and tension, the EU should seek to stress the value of both the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the non-negotiability of the key pillars of joint security.

Second, the EUGS should identify the key security challenges facing the EU as a result of the changing political environment, and provide a credible perspective on how to tackle them. A long-term policy aimed at eliminating the root causes of unmanageable flows of migrants or international terrorism cannot be formulated overnight and presented as a panacea in the midst of an acute crisis.

The EUGS must therefore provide a concrete view on how the EU’s existing resources – both joint resources and those provided by the member states – can be deployed to address the challenges and protect the Union from further destabilising consequences of the current crisis in world affairs.
TACKLE SECURITY THREATS

Traditional security threats emanating from inter-state conflicts and regional power struggles are usually the most difficult ones for the EU to deal with in its strategy. The fact that the main preparation and planning for addressing such conflicts takes place in NATO cannot, however, absolve the EU of the task of assessing the security risks that they pose.

First, for its part, the EU should recognise – in the spirit of its mutual defence clause (Art. 42.7 TEU) – that armed aggression against any of its member states implies an attack against the Union’s key values, its internal market and common currency, as well as its joint political institutions.

Second, it should acknowledge that a broad range of tactics and technologies are being used in today’s inter-state conflicts in order to identify the vulnerabilities of the EU system, and use the full panoply of instruments it has at its disposal when preparing to respond to them.

With the security risks against the EU’s territory and citizens escalating, there is every reason for the EUGS to finally create a better link between the threats that exist and the Union’s defence dimension, which thus far seems to have evolved separately from the Union’s immediate strategic needs.

If the new security strategy document takes this into account, it will hopefully strengthen the political framework underpinning the EU’s nascent strategic planning, including capability development and defence-industrial cooperation.

It should be stressed that a new EUGS based on a more self-centred vision of the EU’s security interests and goals will not curtail the EU’s aspiration to be a force for good in the world. To promote its own security, the EU needs multilateralism and effective partnerships. The weaker and more vulnerable the world becomes in this respect – and the more it is dominated by rivalry and power politics – the more exposed the Union will become. The EU’s own internal model thus continues to be a valuable instrument for promoting peace and stability in the world.

But when the effectiveness and validity of the model is being tested in the Union’s own backyard, the response has to be firm.
The new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is both a necessity and an important opportunity for the European Union. It is a necessity because the EU needs to redefine its own role in a world fundamentally changed since the last strategy was devised twelve years ago.

Profound power shifts, multiple conflicts, new instruments of warfare, growing instability in the European Neighbourhood, terrorism, as well as a reluctance of the US to engage in and with Europe, all require the Union to reassess its strategic priorities and objectives.

**THE TASKS FOR NOW**

The first necessary task of an EUGS in this context is to provide a collective understanding of the current and future challenges and opportunities the EU is facing in the world. This was largely accomplished with the document the High Representative presented to the European Council in June 2015.

Its second task is to remind the EU members of their collective strengths, interests and responsibilities in today’s world. Confronted with multiple and parallel crises, constant crisis management has taken priority over strategic reflection within the EU. The protracted time in which the EU has now been in crisis mode and the multiplicity of the political and economic backlashes have led to a sense of relativism among policymakers. The belief in the capacity to positively impact our collective futures is low. Political, as well as economic and intellectual elites no longer exclude the possibility of political failure and further demise of the integration project.

In this context, the EUGS is an important opportunity to seize. The EU remains a uniquely liberal, economically successful and democratically stable entity, based on principles and an acquis that should also shape the priorities of its external action. And because the European Union, despite the growing narrative of disintegration, is an integrated market, has a common currency shared by 19 member states and the principle of free movement enshrined in its treaties, there are collective vital interests to defend in an increasingly complicated world. With domestic political actors more and more willing to emphasise national over European interests and external actors, such as Russia or China, deliberately pitting member states against each other, the EUGS should convincingly explain the need for and the objectives of joint action.

The most important contribution of the EUGS would, however, be to trigger further reflection and policymaking processes upon its completion. This would be achieved by explicitly recognising the limits such a strategic document has in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing region and world.
THE TASKS FOR LATER

The first task after the completion of the document would be to set up transnational fora for policymakers and the policy community to provide space and scope for continued assessment of emerging trends and shared risks and opportunities. The belated realisation of the scope of the migration crisis and the complexity of handling it is one example why this collective anticipatory capacity needs to be strengthened. Another example is the underestimation of the strategic implications of the crises with Greece, both as part of the euro area crisis and in the context of the migration crisis.

The lesson from these cases is that the EU needs to provide the space to evaluate crisis management decisions in the context of strategy, since the most pressing decisions in crises create path dependencies and have strategic implications beyond the boundaries of the policy areas concerned.

Second, in a similarly forward-looking perspective, it is imperative that a serious reflection takes place on the means and instruments the EU should have at its disposal to tackle challenges and reach its objectives. A European ‘white book’ on defence would be a first important step into this direction, but given the complexity of challenges and responses, further tools should also be engaged.

The third task would be to consciously link the external and internal debates on challenges and strategy. The refugee crisis and threats such as hybrid warfare or terrorism show how the boundaries between internal and external developments are ever more blurred.

The EU can play an important role in linking the debate on domestic socio-economic and security developments with that on external threats and foreign and security policy. While this is happening increasingly at the level of member states, the EU can act as an important driver of taking the discussions on problems and challenges that are cross-border in nature to a transnational level.

It is very likely that not all member states will be willing and able to participate in the same way in a holistic discussion on strategy and the requisite means to implement it. In fact, differentiation between member states is likely to increase as a general trend in the EU. However, this can be counterbalanced by the recognition of member states that closer cooperation in external affairs is in their own strategic interests.

The EU needs to move towards more mature policymaking structures which not only means the availability of sufficient means and adequate instruments, but also the efficient and legitimate decision-making procedures that underpin their deployment.
The European Union is sometimes referred to as ‘an economic giant and a political dwarf’. This somewhat condescending definition implies that EU member states have always been reluctant to invest significant resources and energy into a common foreign and security policy, especially at the expense of social and economic development priorities. It is also a reference to the fact that Europeans have traditionally relied on US leadership, guidance and protection for most important political and security matters.

A FALSE ASSUMPTION

This perception is not necessarily accurate, nor is it fair to the EU. Europeans, not Americans, have been leading the global community in many critical areas of international public law ranging from the International Criminal Court to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The European Union remains the largest single provider of technical assistance in the world. Procedures, mechanisms and institutions of the Union have served as sources of inspiration and models for imitation by practically all regional integration projects for the last half a century.

If the European Union is regarded as a political dwarf, it is not because of a lack of political ambition or interest in international affairs. The problem is that the EU leadership was for a long time preparing itself for a global scenario that appeared to be not only highly desirable, but also the most feasible after the end of the Cold War.

The predominant assumption in Europe was that the world would move away from the bitter experiences of the 20th century, that cooperation would gradually prevail over confrontation, that soft power would replace hard power, and that European values would continue to expand geographically to become truly universal.

To the disappointment of many in and outside of Europe, the reality turned out to be very different, and the world of the 21st century produced many ugly examples of the old patterns of behaviour in international politics. Fundamental norms of international law have been regularly breached; global disarmament remains a dream; regional instabilities around Europe are multiplying; soft power has not replaced hard power as the ultima ratio of world politics; and ‘European values’ have been challenged not only around Europe, but also within Europe itself.

What does it mean for Europe? Should it abandon its vision of a more democratic and more cooperative, less militant and less confrontational world order and look at it as naïve and outdated? Should it accept the geographical limitations of European values and international law by returning to traditional realpolitik in dealing with present and emerging global powers? Should it adapt itself to new harsh rules set by somebody else in a new, harsh world?
A UNIQUE ACTOR

Many in Europe today argue that this is the only way to go. However, the last thing that the European Union should do now is to downplay its natural comparative advantages and to compete with other global players on their terms and on their territory.

For many reasons, non-European players will always be better at realpolitik than the EU. For many reasons, the Union is not likely to develop military capabilities comparable to those of US, China or Russia. For many reasons, the decision-making process in Brussels will remain more bureaucratic, protracted and cumbersome than in Moscow, Beijing or even in Washington.

That said, for the foreseeable future, nobody in the world can ignore the unique appeal of the European project; nobody can doubt the attractiveness of the European social model; nobody can question the creative potential of European societies. Although today the EU is arguably going through the deepest and the most dangerous crisis in its entire history, it is definitely not the first – and certainly will not be the last – crisis challenging European civilization.

EU politicians need to get rid of the remnants of the European triumphalism that has dominated their thinking since the end of the Cold War. The central place of Europe in global politics can no longer be taken for granted. Europe has to invest more in its common foreign and security policies, and it should remain what it has always been – a unique international actor very different from ‘regular’ great powers.

Above all, Europeans have to forge a new vision for the future – not only for the European Union itself, but also for the world at large. An alternative to the increasing use of realpolitik is needed today more than ever and Europe is much more likely to generate this than other, non-European global players.

As we know from the Lord of the Rings saga, dwarves, all their imperfections notwithstanding, are definitely not the worst creatures in Middle Earth. The time has come for the European ‘political dwarf’ to grow. Instead of turning into another huge, ugly and arrogant mountain troll, the European dwarf should grow into a powerful wizard instead – one who could help our confused and conflict-torn earth to enter a new epoch of its history.
While policy planners work towards an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), the priorities that have been spelled out thus far in a series of EU documents, as well as in speeches by HR/VP Morgherini have little to say on EU-Asia relations.

The most recent EU strategic review serves up a bland ‘the EU can offer consistent but also customised support to regional cooperation efforts in Asia. We also need to foster a rules-based approach to conflict management and respond to the opportunity presented by various developments in Asian connectivity.’ It refers to China as an emerged power in a subclause and dismisses diverse initiatives such as the BRICS, the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as unlikely to succeed.

Speaking at the EUGS conference organised by the EUISS and Real Institute Elcano, Barcelona, HR/VP Mogherini pointed to terrorism as an example of the “necessary link between different dimensions of action”, but while she spoke of Syria, Libya and Iraq she omitted Afghanistan and Pakistan. That Europe should focus on internal and neighbourhood challenges is understandable – and indeed necessary given the current conditions – but it does not amount to an EUGS.

PRIORITISING ASIA

A truly global strategy would put Asia at the top of foreign and security policies. Accounting for over two-thirds of global economic growth, the continent is changing rapidly with both short and long-term consequences for Europe, as well as the region.

There is a new map of Asia forming: a Chinese sphere of influence has emerged which extends west and southwards from China, through Central Asia and Russia to swathes of the Middle East and South Asia. Energy connectivity already exists between Central Asia and China and will soon include Russia from its east up to the Caucasus. Although transport connectivity is moving at a slower pace, China’s One Belt One Road will reinforce Beijing’s growing economic clout in Central and South Asia and the Middle East, while its dominance in the SCO adds a security element to the mix.

India’s neighbourhood and global strategies are being shaped by geopolitical changes in its region, where China has rapidly emerged as a critical player both on land and at sea. Although China is one of India’s largest trading partners (with a huge trade imbalance in its favour) and the two countries work together in a number of multilateral forums such as the BRICS, AIIB, Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership (RCEP) and SCO, Beijing is also a close ally of Pakistan, a country whose military remains dedicated to preventing India’s rise.

Within India there is a clear perception that these factors necessitate an Indian push for more even trade relationships and greater connectivity across Asia, as well as close engagement on cooperative security mechanisms with all major players in the continent. Both are, or should be, priorities for Europe as well, given that the thrust for reform of the Bretton Woods institutions comes from Asia (originally led by India, it is now being driven by China). Although a large num-
ber of EU countries have signed up to the AIIB, the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and China-led Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership (RCEP) risk dividing Asia into two economic blocs, something which would be to the detriment of both Europe and India.

Russia’s role in Asia also merits closer attention. Although Russia is broadly allied with China, Moscow’s new ‘Look East’ policy – as showcased at the Vladivostok Far-Eastern Economic Forum in October 2015 – is also pitched to South Korea, Japan and India (though it is still China dominated). As the weaker partner to China, Russia has a greater interest in pursuing cooperative multilateralism in Asia. But the Russian government’s room to manoeuvre is constrained by its need for continued Chinese investment and Moscow – with a few notable exceptions – is yet to establish a positive track record in multilateral fora.

COUNTERING TERRORISM

Given their shared threat, the sluggish cooperation between Europe and India on counter-terrorism is surprising. An effective EUGS would address this by attempting to link counter-terrorism bodies in the US, Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Asia and envisage joint efforts to build the capacity to respond effectively. There are remarkably few countries that do or can work together in this way, or that share the same interests in tackling terrorism. This is also all the more necessary because terrorist groups have already successfully internationalised their connections and operations.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the subsequent proliferation of so-called ‘foreign fighters’ has rightly led Europe to look inwards, as India has had to when faced with externally-generated terrorist networks that seek internal support. Yet if Delhi and Brussels are to emerge stronger internally and externally as a result of the challenge posed by ISIL – which they will – mutual support and coordination will greatly increase the chances of doing so.

With similar needs to preserve democracy, pluralism and civil rights, Europe and India, with their constitutional frameworks, could form two major pillars of a global strategy to combat terrorism.
The political intent behind the creation of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was to mend fences among EU member states, following the acrimonious divisions over whether or not to join the US-led invasion of Iraq. The slogan ‘effective multilateralism’ was born out of this effort; a notion projected by the EU onto the global level. The Union’s own Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), however, is still generally perceived as being troubled by ineffective multilateralism.

In an EU of 28, differences in historical trajectories, socio-economic realities, and in (geo)strategic and political interests highlight the cracks in the Union’s persona as an actor on the international stage. Differences in degrees of respect for the values on which the EU is built have also shown that these normative principles are an insufficient basis for consensus on foreign policy issues.

The EU’s post-Lisbon foreign policy successes (e.g. normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the adoption of sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, and the facilitation of the E3+3 nuclear talks with Iran) seem to be the exceptions rather than the rule.

If the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is to have a structural impact on the day-to-day policymaking in the Foreign Affairs Council, then the HR/VP will have to make a point of using the qualified majority voting (QMV) mechanisms and flexible arrangements which the Treaty provides. This will be necessary in order to overcome the lack of political will to act by one or more member states and to secure the EU’s common interests as defined by the EUGS and adopted by the European Council.

THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY

The political will, money, knowhow and other national resources devoted to EU foreign policy by more or less structured coalitions of member states can help assist in the implementation of the EUGS and increase the visibility and credibility of the Union as an international actor.

In the sphere of diplomatic dispute settlement, for example, the E3+3 model has been hailed as a way forward to more efficient and effective foreign policymaking by a contact group of member states, coordinated by the HR/VP. The latter is an important addition, as contact groups should not obstruct but rather buttress the EU’s structures in the foreign and security field. Respect by member states for the ‘constitutional’ duty of loyal cooperation with the EU institutions should prevent the Union’s external action from being diluted, undermined, rendered less visible or re-nationalised by the activities of such groups. The same applies to the operationalisation of the mechanism provided in Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), i.e. permanent structured cooperation to move European defence integration forward with a group of like-minded states.

However valuable the exploration of such flexible means to render the CFSP more effective, any actions by contact or core groups presuppose that they have been mandated or acquiesced to by all member states. After all, at the level of decision-making in CFSP, the general rule remains –formally speaking – unanimity (Article 31(1) TEU).
THE NEED FOR QMV

Yet, the Lisbon Treaty lists a few exceptions to the unanimity rule in CFSP (Article 31(2) TEU). The first of these is of particular interest as it caters for the situation where the Council can decide by QMV ‘when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a European Council decision relating to the EU’s strategic interests and objectives.’ Arguably, this leaves the High Representative plenty of room to initiate QMV decision-making in the Council to implement parts of the EUGS when the strategy is adopted by the European Council.

Such initiatives would not undermine the continued centrality of consensus for the adoption of CFSP decisions, because the exception represents a clearly stated derogation from the general unanimity requirement. In each case, any member state would be entitled to pull the ‘emergency brake’ and block the HR/VP’s proposal to proceed via QMV ‘for vital and stated reasons of national policy’ (Article 31(2) TEU).

If pressing for QMV proves too conflictual, then the HR/VP could try and persuade the outliers to resort to the ‘constructive abstention’ mechanism, which allows for up to a third minus one of the member states to stand aside while the majority forges ahead (Article 31(1) TEU). In the case of an abstention, the member(s) in question are not obliged to apply the decision, but nevertheless accept that the decision commits the Union.

As it is the HR/VP’s task to conduct the CFSP and operationalise the decisions taken by the European Council, she should more actively use the opportunities provided by the Treaty to render the intergovernmental method of decision-making in the Council more effective. It is a sense of flexibility and solidarity that the HR/VP should appeal to in putting the onus on the one or more member states that stand in the way of securing the EU’s common interests as laid down in the EUGS and adopted by the European Council.
The degradation of the EU’s geopolitical environment is fuelling the fragmentation of European politics and raises serious questions about the future of Europe’s security, prosperity and integration. The refugee and migrant flows straining Europe’s cohesion are the most pressing dimension of a broader trend. Foreign affairs are ‘coming home’, whether in the form of financial turmoil or the threat of terrorist attacks, while the EU faces a more assertive Russia to the east. Foreign policy is therefore a central component of Europe’s political and economic resilience.

The process leading up to an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) should define what the EU stands for and aims to achieve in international affairs (purpose and priorities), set organising principles for external action and broad roadmaps to implement them. Of course, no strategic document will solve the conundrums facing Europe’s politics and foreign policy, or fix pressing crises, on its own. However, Europe needs a joint strategic approach to prevent the aggravation of the risks – and seize the opportunities – that the current international environment presents. In particular, the EUGS should target and mitigate four fundamental disconnects.

**MIND THE GAP(S)**

The first disconnect lies between the far-reaching aspirations that informed the EU’s foreign policy and the reality of a harder, more divisive international and domestic context. The EU aimed to promote the rule of law, democratic values and multilateral cooperation in its neighbourhood and beyond. Disillusionment with frustrated aspirations risks triggering a swing towards retrenchment from a contested environment, and from a common foreign policy. This would, however, deprive the Union of the ability to promote its core message on the international stage.

So what went wrong? The problem was not Europe’s message per se, but the expectation that others, notably its neighbours, would more or less rally to its call, and that soft power and conditionality would largely suffice to ensure success. Today, acknowledging that it is an arduous task to deploy influence in a polycentric world should not lead Europe to give up on its core purpose but to pursue it in ways that fit the new context. The EU should concentrate its investment where progress is possible or it is imperative to act, set intermediate goals, and mobilise a wider toolbox including all levers of power.

The second gap, exposed by the current refugee emergency, is between tackling pressing crises and addressing the deeper, long-term trends that have engendered them. Crisis management will often be necessary, but must not come at the detriment of sustainable solutions. For example, there is ample evidence about the drivers of fragility that can feed destabilisation and about the cascading effects of the latter, from the Sahel to the Middle East. The EU has a major strategic interest in enabling the conditions for lasting development and inclusive political arrangements in its wider neighbourhood. Any sensible approach cannot be confined to technical programmes,
or military force, while neglecting the political dynamics on the ground. Policies without politics will not work. The EU will also need to engage all relevant parties, from the local to the regional and global level, helping connect sometimes disparate priorities and initiatives.

**SMART MULTILATERALISM**

The third disconnect is that between the need for cooperation to manage interdependence, and defuse tensions, and the competition of values and priorities that nurtures zero-sum thinking on the international stage. Multilateralism is growing more contested but progress is not impossible, as the Paris agreement on climate change or the Iran nuclear deal show. The EU should adopt a flexible approach to engagement that can serve a mix of purposes – rule-making, ad hoc initiatives, confidence-building or fending off competition. Engagement can also span different formats, from formal institutions to ad hoc coalitions, from strategic partnerships to transnational networks. And Europe’s relationship with the US will remain central to many of these formats.

Through diversified engagement the EU should aim, whenever possible, to strengthen the links between inclusive institutions and mini-lateral coalitions, reach out beyond the circles of the likeminded, seek ways in which old and new institutions can complement each other and aim for setting clear rules, beyond informal arrangements.

The fourth disconnect is that between the EU and national policies. The political ownership of member states is essential to the credibility of an EU foreign policy. But whether considering the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) or the EU strategic partnerships, national commitment has often fallen short of the goals that member states have jointly set for themselves. This is in part due to their different strategic cultures and priorities, and in part to their shared reluctance to pool resources and authority.

The diversity of the EU can be an important asset. But if the creeping renationalisation of politics and policies in Europe is not reversed, external forces will turn its internal diversity into a liability. The EUGS should be part of the response to Europe’s cohesion crisis, and mark a renewed national investment in Europe’s foreign policy.
If the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) correctly identified the central security challenges for the EU, it has undoubtedly been proven ineffective in finding proper methods to deal with them.

While the ESS rightfully proclaimed that ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’, the EU is now confronted with multiple internal challenges, ranging from economic problems to the rise of extremist political forces, exacerbated by an ‘arc of instability’ in its neighbourhood.

A new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is thus urgently needed. To start with, Europe needs to reflect on what went wrong. The EU’s deteriorating external security environment can be attributed to two main factors: a resurgent Russia under President Putin, and greater conflict between the autocratic regimes and the disaffected publics of the Middle East and North Africa.

It is true that the Russian takeover of Crimea and its support for the separatist rebels in Ukraine have intensified conflict on the EU’s doorstep. It is also true that a number of autocratic regimes in the Middle East are resorting to repressive measures to suppress their own people, something which is, in turn, transforming more countries on the EU’s southern flank into failed states.

That said, it is all too easy to lay the blame at the feet of others for the destabilised neighbourhood: as a key international player, EU policymakers also need to think about to what extent they, too, were responsible for the worrying developments of the recent past.

**TWO LESSONS TO LEARN**

At least two lessons can be drawn from the EU’s past record. The first is that the EU needs to enhance its capacity to understand the strategic thinking of others, and factor that into the policymaking process so as to avoid unintended consequences.

The EU, as the ESS explicitly stated, has no interest in creating new dividing lines in Europe through the process of enlargement. Yet, in its attempts to integrate Ukraine, the EU critically underestimated the resolve and capability of Putin’s Russia to maintain its influence in an area which Moscow considers to be in its sphere of influence. The result is that the confrontation with Russia has ended up creating a new and accidental division in Europe.

The second lesson that the EU can learn is that it needs to strengthen its capacity to assess its policy options before it and its member states start to act. The Union has problems fostering common policies and positions when confronted with complicated and serious challenges. As a result, it can often appear to suffer from paralysis and inaction.

Recent developments also point to another related problematic aspect of the EU’s foreign and security policy: without establishing common European guidelines, some key member states tend to act unilaterally and boldly, only to end up generating further unintended negative consequences for themselves and the Union as a whole.
Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts

Whether it was the Franco-British military intervention in Libya or Germany’s decision to accept an unlimited number of refugees, well-intended decisions by national capitals only exacerbated Europe’s problems at home and abroad.

The regime change in Libya did not lead the country to become more stable and democratic. Instead, it spawned a civil war, a perfect breeding ground for jihadist terrorists and a springboard for illegal migrants to Europe. In the case of the migration crisis, the wave of refugees did not subside following Berlin’s unilateral move and instead increased, putting huge strain on the maintenance of the Schengen area, and causing serious friction between member states.

TWO LESSONS TO IMPLEMENT

Given these past lessons, the new EUGS needs first of all to strengthen the EU’s capacity to understand the changing global environment and the aspiration and capacity of other players (be they state or non-state actors). It also needs to enhance the Union’s ability to evaluate all policy options available.

In order for this to be achieved, the External Action Service (EEAS) needs to devote more resources to strategic planning and further mainstream its role in the overall policymaking and policy coordination process. It also requires that the European Council takes greater interest in its task of maintaining strategic oversight and guidance of all foreign policy-related issues.

Facing multiple grave challenges at home and abroad, the EU cannot assume that its old ways of conducting foreign and security policy would continue to work in a substantially different world. To ensure that it continues to play an indispensable role in the shaping of the global order, a more strategic EU needs to be prudent and refrain from ‘feel-good’ policymaking.

Should it fail to address these shortcomings, the EU will be left only able to serve its short-term considerations at the expense of its long-term interests and global standing.
After decades of theoretical debates about ‘threats’ facing Europe, jihadist terrorism and the influx of refugees are now proving to be the disruptive factors which are forcing the EU to consider stability in and around its southern borders as a structural security issue rather than a ‘bureaucratic’ one (e.g. the European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP]). And given that the old distinction between internal and external security is obsolete, a Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is needed now more than ever before.

**FROM CONTAINMENT TO MANAGEMENT**

For the time being, however, all Europe has done to address these new risks is to adopt a policy of partial containment. The trouble is that this policy will work only if the problems spilling over from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remain limited and do not escalate further: something which is far from guaranteed. With the lowest energy prices in over a decade, two regional wars, failing states, the partial disengagement of the US and a partial comeback by Russia, a quick fix solution is obviously not available – and in any case is in the hands of regional actors more than anybody else.

In a fluid context where the European capacity to shape events is even more limited than in the past, the challenge of defining the nature of ‘threats’ is still with us: while France, in particular, considers itself at war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), other Europeans see much wider structural factors at play. Agreeing on the scope and nature of the risks in and from the MENA remains an unfulfilled precondition for any effective EUGS.

Against this background, a number of European political forces are sorely tempted by the idea of a ‘fortress Europe’. As the unilateral suspension of Schengen by some member states has shown, what this means in effect is a return to sealed national borders, resulting in a domino effect. Such a scenario is particularly worrisome for countries like Greece and Italy, which fear the emergence of a ‘mini-Schengen’ with European frontiers shifting northwards. The paradox is clear: there are now much greater incentives for an EUGS but the immediate defensive reaction of national governments is dividing the EU instead of uniting it.

France, in the wake of the 13 November terrorist attacks, invoked the ‘mutual defence clause’ (Article 42.7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) for the first time since the Lisbon Treaty came into force. At the same time, Paris refrained from evoking the ‘solidarity clause’ (Article 222), probably because that would have triggered a response at the EU level. In contrast, Article 42.7 defers any response to the sphere of bilateral agreements between France and each individual European partner. But a serious reflection is in order for the future of EU solidarity in the defence and security sector. What the French precedent boils down to in effect is little more than a ‘coalition of the European willing’.

Turning to the migration crisis, there is broad agreement on the need to strengthen the EU’s external borders – however, such borders still need to be properly recognised as European frontiers. The
most serious refugee crisis since 1945 first triggered a continental rift between north and south, and then a rift between east and west. Meanwhile, the collective inability to uphold Schengen is doing nothing to make the external borders more secure: a textbook lose-lose scenario.

Clearly, the Schengen system was one of the EU’s fair-weather policies. What we are discovering today is that the EU must be equipped for bad weather, too. The introduction of joint border controls at the EU’s external frontiers is a must, as is a truly European asylum system. At the same time, the Dublin Regulation must be reformed and new arrangements with Turkey on migration flows found.

The refugee crisis has an even greater potential than the euro crisis to shatter the trust between member states and the EU. Obviously, there can only be a Europe-wide solution. And yet the deal that is needed – more responsible behaviour on the part of national governments and greater European solidarity – is an extremely difficult deal to thrash out. Europe is simply in crisis-fighting mode, behaving in a reactive way although it is clear that the origins of the migration crisis are of a deeper, structural nature.

FROM REGIONAL TO GLOBAL

It has often been said that in order to become a global power, the EU would, first and foremost, have to demonstrate serious capacities in the ‘arc of crisis’ along its borders. If the EU is to do so, it is going to have to combine the strength of the European nation states with the specific leverage of the EU proper. However, divisions among member states run particularly deep on issues related to the immediate neighbourhood (the dilemma over how to deal with Russia is a telling example). It may therefore actually be easier to formulate a serious EUGS than develop effective regional policies.

The EU’s role is to channel national efforts in the same strategic direction, with the Union acting as a kind of ‘framework’ power, to serve as multiplier of the – limited – individual power of member states to influence regional trends.

Certain key elements of a regional policy remain indispensable, but the logic of Europe’s external action must be global. Events in distant places like Afghanistan, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, are just as relevant as the flows of migrants they produce. The irony is that regional challenges are making Europeans understand that even a ‘fortress Europe’ will need to act in faraway theatres. Completing this conceptual leap and turning it into coherent (and reasonably well-funded) policy choices is therefore the main priority.
Asia is currently not the top security concern of Europeans with several conflicts raging in our immediate vicinity. Yet it is of the utmost importance in a longer-term perspective. Asia has the world’s two most populated nations (China and India), and soon three out of the five largest economies (China, Japan and India).

Regional trends indicate greater defence spending (with India and South Korea now matching the UK and France), a regional arms race (with submarines and short-range missiles having the most destabilising potential), contested maritime spaces (with some parties claiming history trumps international law) and an increasingly disputed regional hegemony.

**ASIA MATTERS**

A Eurasian ‘arc of crisis’ spans the Middle East, South and Central Asia. The possible collapse of Afghanistan is already fuelling the second-largest inflow of refugees into Europe (after Syria). There are also huge non-conventional security challenges which have the potential to spark an interstate conflict (water scarcity is one, for example).

But Asia also brings opportunities. Persuading rising nations to effectively participate in – and not just pay lip service to – a multilateral world order and thereby contribute to global governance is admittedly no small task. Still, it is a path travelled earlier by Japan and to a lesser extent South Korea. For now, most European efforts are directed at China. However, while other major Asian nations have become significant contributors to the global rules-based order, it is likely that Beijing will continue to only engage in a limited fashion. After all, it is competition which often drives Asian international relations.

In South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, where Europe’s relative (although by no means absolute) influence is declining, several Asian countries – China, India, Japan, Korea and Malaysia to name the most obvious – are now key partners. Creating triangles of cooperation would extend and anchor Europe’s influence, something that is infinitely preferable to fostering a sense of competition between ‘old’ and ‘new’ actors.

In no continent does the security provided by the US matter as much as in Asia. It is not only a keeper of the peace, but also a regional balancer. Yet even in Asia, partners wonder about the future of certain US commitments, while others speculate about its relative decline. Europe has a role to play by furthering the rule of law in international relations and encouraging its use to resolve disputes, as well as enlarging the support base for democratic values. The EU’s role is necessarily distinct from that of the US, since the Union is neither bound by bilateral security treaties nor does it possess the hard power capabilities of its transatlantic ally.

Yet Europe has no less of a stake in the future architecture of the region. It should therefore not minimise its own potential. Countering nuclear proliferation, ensuring freedom of navigation at sea and in the skies, supporting legal arbitration and a diplomacy of peace, garnering Asian contributions on vital concerns for Europe and for the globe, intensifying relations with partners...
who share our values while engaging all others, are actions which will help make the 21st century a peaceful and progressive era.

COORDINATION MATTERS

None of these goals will be reached, however, if Europeans fail to pool the means and tools of diplomacy and security. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has of course been a step in that direction. But a truly comprehensive diplomacy involves linking foreign, trade, aid, and security policies. This may be less necessary with fair weather partners, as most Asian democracies tend to be. But it certainly applies to other political regimes, whether they are externally assertive or reactively defensive.

It is surely no accident that there is a degree of coordination among member states and the EU in countries such as China, with its powerful and coordinated government, or in North Korea, where pooling information and sharing modest diplomatic resources is a recognised need. Elsewhere, member states may have less incentive to coordinate their diplomacy, and the EEAS may focus more on assistance or exchange programmes than on a strategy which includes economic and political goals. And in some cases, economic competition undermines efforts to construct a common diplomacy.

As for defence and hard security, European member states have become key providers of defence hardware and technology throughout Asia, while the European Union as such focuses more on preventive diplomacy and comprehensive security. The resulting contradiction between the hard power capacities that member states transfer to Asian partners and the soft power image projected by the EU does little to further Europe’s image.

Instead, the EEAS and member states should try and work together on a number of issues. They have a common interest in supporting one another in, for example, clarifying the participation of Europeans in key regional fora or leveraging the limited naval presence of Europeans. They should also support shared stances on fundamental values such as human rights and encourage a common approach to trade and investment pacts. Doing so will translate into genuine international influence.
When the G7 was established in 1975, the economies of its member states (Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) commanded 70% of global GDP; this share has now declined to less than 50%. The US, while still the world’s sole superpower with overwhelming military might in absolute terms, is less inclined to exert its military power abroad after suffering a serious drain on its resources during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The credibility of future US global leadership has also been put in doubt throughout the US presidential election primaries amid provocative statements by some candidates regarding issues such as immigration.

For its part, the EU is weathering a number of crises which are testing its cohesiveness and resilience to serious stress – namely the sovereign debt crisis since 2009; the refugee crisis (with over one million asylum applications in 2015); and a referendum in the UK this coming June with the possibility of a ‘Brexit’ from Europe.

Meanwhile, Japan’s economy stagnated during the previous decades and the country is undergoing a profound demographic shift with an ageing society, a shrinking tax base, and public debt in excess of 200% of its GDP. Given these difficulties, an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) would be most welcome.

THE RISE OF OTHERS

In contrast to the G7, China’s influence is on the rise. This is evidenced through its establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative; the increasingly global scope of its international cooperation; and its ever more assertive maritime strategy in the East and South China Seas. Yet the sustainability of its rapid economic growth has recently been put into question.

Russia, seeking to regain its lost international prestige following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been increasingly willing to flex its military muscles and appears determined under President Putin to re-establish itself as a major world power. As a demonstration of the country’s aspirations, Russia’s unilateral annexation of Crimea enjoyed strong domestic support, and Putin’s approval ratings remain almost as high as ever. Sino-Russia cooperation is also intensifying as evidenced by the 2014 oil and gas deals (which are worth more than $400 billion over a 30 year period), improved coordination over the OBOR with the Eurasian Economic Union, and security ties through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

THE NEED FOR THE G7

To maintain global stability in this shifting geopolitical landscape, three key measures should be pursued. First, the G7, which has been said to be losing relevance due to the emergence of the G20, should be reinvigorated with an expanded agenda including political, as well as eco-
Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts

Economic issues. Political directors’ meetings must be held more frequently and aim to adopt a new orientation focused on strategic consultations among the G7 countries.

The principal objective should be to maintain and strengthen the liberal values of the global system as a foundation for shared peace and prosperity between democracies and non-democracies alike. At the same time, the US ‘rebalance’ to Asia has damaged its role as a global leader. The next US president must resolve to take proactive leadership globally with the strong support of the other G7 member states.

During this process, a number of potential differences in approach vis-à-vis China and Russia must be discussed and coordinated. Economic cooperation packages recently concluded between China and EU countries and member states’ participation in the AIIB may be natural given the financial incentives, but some in the US and Japan believe that this pays insufficient consideration to the broader strategic factors in relations with China, most notably its aggressive maritime strategy in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, Japan’s dialogue with Russia, which aims to find a resolution to the Northern Territories dispute, may also be viewed with some concern in the EU and US given the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Crimea.

Second, ‘track two’ Wise Persons groups among the G7 countries should be established. Given the complex nature of the challenge in managing global stability between liberal democracies and emerging powers, this is necessary in order to (re)construct a long-term approach to global governance and to ensure the injection of fresh ideas by experts and academics.

Third, strategic cooperation is needed to shape the future of global economic governance standards. In the Asia-Pacific, the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), including the US and Japan, has finally been signed. Although it must still be ratified by the signatories, it is a major step towards setting common rules and regulations between partners. But greater strategic cooperation is needed at a global level to promote and entrench liberal free-market principles across all regions.

To this end, the EU and the US should follow through on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, and the time has come for the EU and Japan to quickly conclude an EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement. The G7 should be ready to assist to ensure the complementarity of these mega-regional deals.
The European Union is going through a prolonged period of crisis, and as the regional and global environment becomes more challenging, the EU needs to adopt a global strategy that is pragmatic.

The EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) therefore has to start with an understanding of power, accept the realities of politics and aim towards preservation.

THE THREE PS

Foreign policy is about power, politics and preservation. Framing the EU’s foreign policy and designing a grand strategy requires the EU to be cognizant of all dimensions of these three Ps. The EUGS has to be interest-driven, but that does not mean that the EU will pursue its ends with any means.

The pursuit of the EU’s interests has, of course, to be guided in some way or other by its values and principles. A credible EUGS must be one that is grounded in realities and can be operationalised to have real impact on decision- and policymaking while taking this fact into account.

Despite the current crises, the EU retains considerable power. If and how it is able to translate its resources into actual influence should be one of the key deliberations in the EUGS. We are now all well aware of the fact that member states remain reluctant to substantially pool their sovereignty and delegate authority in the area of foreign and security policy. Hence the essentially inter-governmental mode of decision-making in CFSP. With enlargement and increasingly complex internal and external dynamics the divergence between member states’ national interests and between national and European interests should not be underestimated. This is where politics comes in.

The EU can no longer pretend that policymaking is purely a process of rational pursuit and can proceed in a technocratic, depoliticised fashion. If the EU wants an EUGS that can resonate, it needs active ‘diplomatic’ engagement with all its member states, and not a bureaucratic approach towards defining and pursuing common interests.

The EUGS should not be just another shopping list of threats and risks, and actions the EU can undertake to mitigate them. The EUGS should be about the EU doing all that it can to remain a relevant player in reforming and adapting the current rules of the game (or if there is to be a new world order, the EU being involved in the crafting of its new rules). As a result, its mantra of working with partners and promoting effective multilateralism (a guiding principle for EU foreign policy in the 2003 European Security Strategy [ESS]) remains as relevant if not more important in the new strategic environment.
A DELICATE BALANCING ACT

The two most important players in the changed global environment are the US and China. Both are not in any way the most ‘principled’ multilateral players, often resorting to unilateral approaches as and when it suits them. Other emerging or re-emerging players are also complicating the rules of the game. And as competition and rivalry between the US and China intensifies, the EU needs to think strategically about where it wants to position itself. It will need to strike a fine balance between a longstanding ally and an increasingly important player that already has substantive trade and investment ties with the EU.

Are the EU’s and the US’ core interests still as aligned as they were in the Cold War era? Is the EU prepared to accept the US’ ‘leadership’ and be a loyal ally even at the expense of its relationship with China? These are important questions that the EU needs to consider when formulating its EUGS. If the EU is keen to develop its own identity as a global player, the one guiding principle that sets it somewhat apart from major powers such as the US and China is its adherence to multilateralism.

Internally, the current migrant/refugee crisis has shown how unilateralism can challenge the very edifice of the EU. There is therefore the need for the Union to re-emphasise and invest in effective multilateralism. The EU should survey the existing plethora of multilateral forums and institutions and invest strategically in those in which they can make a difference, whether it is the OSCE, G20 or newer institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB).

While it is necessary for the EU to have vision and ambition, it is more important to be credible and focus on what is feasible and doable. The EU is facing unprecedented challenges in its own neighbourhood – from a resurgent Russia, to the waves of the refugees arriving in its backyard. An effective EUGS cannot ignore the realities of these immediate challenges.

The prominent political scientist Joseph Nye warned in a recent article about the dangers of a weak Europe. Thus, the exercise in crafting the EUGS must pay as much attention to the internal divisions as it does external threats. After all, foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics.
The world is in the midst of a period of great uncertainty – one that is likely to be prolonged. The rise of China, the return of Russia, crises in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and transnational challenges such as climate change, terrorism and irregular migration are just a few of the complex issues on the global agenda.

A NEW MENA FOCUS

Crafting a list of priorities for the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is, therefore, an unenviable task. But if there is one challenge that should be at the top of the EU’s global priorities it is helping to build a new order in the Middle East.

The consequences of the region’s current chaos hardly require rehearsing: enormous humanitarian suffering (and not just in Syria and Iraq); massive waves of refugees flowing to Europe; and the empowerment of terrorist groups.

To understand what the EU should do in the Middle East, first the problems need to be correctly diagnosed. We are told that the inadequacies of US policy, the rise of Islamist groups and rivalry between regional powers are the causes of the current disorder. More commonly the finger is pointed at rising sectarianism.

But what the region suffers from is less a problem of provenance, than a failure of governance. Under the old order, one-man, one-party or one-family regimes ruled by co-option and coercion. Mostly they relied on a social contract which provided public goods in return for public loyalty. That contract was underwritten by coercive measures that either prevented dissent from arising or protected regimes when it arose.

In most countries in the region, save a few hyper wealthy petro-monarchies, the social contract began to erode decades ago as population growth and popular expectations began to exceed economic rents. It was the breakdown of this social contract that precipitated the Arab uprisings; but it was also the performance of coercive measures – chiefly whether the security forces decided to stick with or abandon the leader – that decided the fate of regimes.

In the failure of the old order we can find the source of most, if not all, of the region’s current problems. Ungoverned or misgoverned spaces have created opportunities for extremists, and as governance has failed, regimes and extremists alike have stoked sectarianism in search of legitimacy. Governance failures have provided greater opportunities for states to meddle in the internal affairs of others, provoking regional power competition.

Ironically, the regional turmoil resulting from the Arab uprisings has made some sentimental about authoritarianism. Leaders have noted that heavy-handed coercion saves regimes. Post-uprising chaos has created a popular desire for stability over democracy. External powers long for the days when dealing with regional counterparts meant one man, one phone call, one time.
But this sentimentality should not cloud our judgment. Coercion may have saved regimes but an over-reliance on it has doomed countries to conflict and produced radicals. Once populations recover from their exhaustion, they will remember the material and other shortcomings of the old order. External powers may even recall why authoritarian leaders were no more reliable than democratically-elected ones.

A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

The EU can help create a new model of governance in the Middle East. Central to this should be a new social contract, so that governments can once again largely rely on co-option rather than coercion to ensure stability.

This will mean helping governments meet the material demands of their people, but it cannot just mean new state-run, EU-funded job-creation programmes. In most cases, the private sector must become the engine of economic growth, because the state can no longer play this role. This will require both external investment and internal reform.

Because material improvements to life in most Middle Eastern countries will not come quickly, any new social contract will also need to include mechanisms for broad-based consultation and participation. This does not necessarily mean, and probably should not mean, elections right away. But consultative mechanisms have to be real and effective enough to ensure that popular expectations of material change become realistic.

There is no single blueprint for building a new order in Middle Eastern states. But to succeed, the process will need to be gradual and organic. The role of the EU should be to cultivate a new order from below, rather than to dictate one from above.

To do that a lot of work must go into identifying the green shoots of a new order among the debris of the old one. Local examples of enterprise or good governance will need to be supported politically, developmentally and financially. All of this will need to be done while navigating a complex political environment and while continuing to manage the fallout of the old order’s collapse.
Since the adoption of the previous European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, discussions on strategic thinking and the EU’s global role have been a constant feature, though more within the think tank world than in the realms of politics and policymakers.

Although there is much speculation about its content and its implementation, there is, at last, a EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) on its way. Some expect the document to be an ‘all-embracing’ strategy which will provide answers to almost all the vexed questions that Europe is currently confronted with (and is likely to face in the next five years or so). For others, just the unfolding of the process itself has generated much excitement.

**BOOSTING CONFIDENCE**

The current discussions were initiated a few years ago by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and his Polish counterpart Radek Sikorski. A debate ensued across Europe inviting suggestions for a new EU strategy that would effectively correspond to the needs of a rapidly changing international environment while also simultaneously serving European security interests.

What emerged from these expert-driven discussions was that while there was no shortage of ideas, visions, tools and practical recommendations on ways and means to enhance and make the EU’s global ambitions operational, there was a clear lack of coordination and coherence of interests and policies among the member states. This not only resulted in insufficient investments in joint European economic, political and military capabilities, but also in a loss of confidence among member states with regard to the possible role that the EU could play on the international stage.

One of the key aspects for an effective European policy in international affairs is undoubtedly confidence. Confidence is a must in a rapidly transforming and unpredictable international environment. Confidence is also of vital importance in any scenario in which the EU faces critical internal challenges, be it the threat of the UK leaving the Union (‘Brexit’), the slow and complicated policy responses to the migration crisis, the negative effects of slow economic growth or post-euro crisis disagreements. All these issues have revealed the existence of clear fault lines within the EU itself. Instead of ever closer bonds, what we are witnessing is an ever distant Union.

Confidence also is a critical factor when dealing with Europe’s neighbours. It is no longer a question of whether the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is correct or efficient; it is a question of whether the EU is capable of agreeing upon and acting on the security interests and safety of its citizens and its neighbours. Europe’s ‘ring of friends’ does not exist anymore (if it ever did), and long-term conflicts in eastern Ukraine, Syria and other places are challenges which demand decisive actions from member states. In response, the EU has to abandon its traditional habit of producing position papers and must instead seek to undertake concrete actions.
DEFINING INTERESTS

The effectiveness of the EUGS is to a very large extent dependent on forging an agreement among member states on the common European interests that need to be promoted and secured globally. To this end, HR/VP Frederica Mogherini has emphasised the need for a well-defined set of interests. It is noteworthy that though the EU has strongly, convincingly and consistently articulated the core values that define European foreign policy, there is a marked hesitancy on its part to define and pursue interests – viewing them instead as an old-fashioned concept tainted by selfish nation state sentiments. Without defined and accepted interests, however, the EU is at best only a normative power which lacks the basis to extend its influence globally. While it is true that the EU’s strength lies in its values which have ensured prosperity and peace within its borders and beyond for the last 60 years, these values should not remain disconnected from interests. Instead, interests ought to be deeply rooted in values and should serve the purpose of protecting the latter.

The EUGS should also aim to put forward a new concept of resilience as a response to external and internal instability: it is needed in the realm of European policymaking, in European societies, and also in European institutions. The term aptly encompasses the numerous challenges and the responses needed to mitigate them. At the same time, any reference to resilience which lacks a precise definition of the term (and viable indicators to measure it), is not a serious attempt to adopt new policy tools. Resilience is not only about response to challenges and the ability to return to the status quo. Resilience is the ability to build and accumulate resources which prevent the need to respond in the first place.

Whether or not the EUGS will be successfully implemented depends on many factors, but one of the most important is building, sustaining and enhancing partnerships. Internally, the EU’s most important partnership is with its citizens. Ultimately, they are the main stakeholders of the EUGS.
As EU officials draft the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), ambitions are no doubt running high. This is, after all, the first time since 2003 that the EU has undertaken a comprehensive examination of its current threat environment, its core objectives, and its overarching place in the world. For months, drafters and contributors in and outside of formal EU channels have been recommending ways in which the EU can enhance its impact, strengthen its capabilities, and maintain its strategic focus in the midst of a turbulent threat environment where crises seem to surface almost daily.

**KEEP IT SIMPLE**

These are all important areas of focus. But in the face of an array of complex external threats (a historic migration crisis, the threat of terrorism, and a resurgent Russia), as well as internal challenges (the rise of anti-EU, anti-immigrant parties, the potential exit of one of its largest members, weak economies, and a loss of faith in the Union as a whole), the EUGS should focus on two basic tasks. The first is to reaffirm – through the lens of foreign policy – the rationale behind the very existence of the European Union. The second is to issue some low-cost, high-impact initiatives that correspond to the finite resources and limited political capital the EU currently has at its disposal.

Admittedly, neither of these tasks sound particularly inspiring. But for an organisation whose future is literally hanging in the balance, the EU cannot afford to produce an EUGS that outlines lofty policy ideas which are disconnected from today’s reality.

The generation that witnessed the creation and early evolution of the EU is being replaced by a group that is openly questioning the value and vitality of an institution that they increasingly see as unaccountable and unresponsive to their needs. The EUGS should open with a message that speaks directly to this scepticism with a primer on the assumptions and motivations of the founding fathers, which are worth repeating.

Where would Europe be today without such an institution? Without the treaties and decades of cooperation? Without the intelligence sharing and the joint diplomatic and military missions? Without the promise of membership that has spurred countries to undertake costly and politically charged reforms, which in turn have contributed to the spread of democracy and prosperity? Europe and the world more broadly would certainly look a lot darker.

Of course, it would be foolish to say that everything that the EU has tried to do in the area of foreign policy has been a raging success. The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) highlighted some of the EU’s foreign policy shortcomings in considerable detail. Similarly, this year’s EUGS will also have to offer a clear-eyed assessment of what is not working. If the EU has any hope of convincing particularly younger Europeans to remain invested in the European project, it will have to acknowledge their grievances. Yes, the EU is sometimes too slow to act. Yes, the EU lacks capabilities. Yes, the EU struggles to reach consensus especially in the area of foreign and security policy.
But those admissions should be paired with a detailed description of how today’s global security environment poses unique challenges for which there are no easy answers. In short, today’s security environment simply has no precedent. The West faces an interconnected web of global and regional threats, whose sheer volume and complexity are overwhelming.

A vast array of actors, ranging from great powers – such as Russia and China – to non-state groups – like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – and individuals, mix competition with cooperation across and within states, regions and the globe. The capabilities and tactics that our adversaries use to undermine our diplomatic, economic, and military advantages have also changed.

**AIM RIGHT**

It is therefore imperative that in taking stock of its foreign policy capabilities, the EU put forward some realistic policy recommendations for coping with today’s complex challenges. A good place to start would be in the area of resilience where the EU has both experience and capacity. And without spending billions, the EU is capable of making some new investments that could help reduce vulnerabilities and thwart adversaries.

Special emphasis should be placed on cybersecurity, border control, enhanced intelligence, and continuity of government in the face of a crisis. Resilience is smart policy for two reasons. First, investing in resilience would improve member states’ ability to anticipate and resolve disruptive challenges to their critical functions. Second, pursuing a range of affordable resilience measures also happens to be a useful counter narrative to those arguing that the EU cannot provide for its citizens’ security.

While the EUGS offers an opportunity to ‘think big’, the current fragility of the EU requires an approach that can both win over the sceptics and put forward some fresh – but politically and financially viable – ideas. The current drafters should aim to do both.
When US President Barack Obama published his first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2010, it bore a striking resemblance to the ones published by his direct predecessor George W. Bush’s administrations in 2002 and 2006. Even Obama’s close advisors such as current deputy national security advisor Ben Rhodes had to admit as much. Although the president had changed and the overall tone and texture of US foreign policy changed along with him, the fundamental structure of American interests nevertheless remained the same. Obama’s first NSS broadly reflected this continuity.

There was, however, one important difference between Obama’s 2010 NSS and the two Bush administration documents that preceded it. That difference was the priority given to the need for a deep and lasting economic recovery. President Obama referred to economic performance as “the wellspring” of American power: a strong and resilient domestic economy is a vital strategic interest, he argued, because without that strength and resilience the government would struggle to achieve the country’s other objectives.

The European Union faces a similar hierarchy of interests – with economic performance the number one strategic priority. The cornucopia of challenges to be addressed should not obscure that structural dependence. If anything, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) depends on the strength and resilience of economic performance even more than in the United States.

To understand why it is so vital, only a quick look at the strains on European solidarity posed by the financial crisis is needed.

THE ASYMMETRY OF CHALLENGES

Strategic challenges are almost always asymmetrical. For example, Europe’s southern flank is more exposed to the influence of cross-border migration, it has closer bonds with the peoples of North Africa, and it is more strongly affected by the instability in Libya and the conflict in Syria and Iraq.

Conversely, Europe’s eastern flank is more influenced by Russia, its historic relations are with the post-Soviet states, and its attention gravitates towards the conflict in Ukraine.

The countries of Europe’s south and east are all part of the same Union but they have different strategic priorities and must compete for relatively scarce resources. More resources alone will not eliminate that competition but fewer resources will make it more intense.

The asymmetry is not limited to traditional notions of security. EU member states also differ in their exposure to new security threats, like those associated with Islamic extremism, critical infrastructures, energy, migration, and climate change. The pattern of asymmetry is different, as is the structure of competition for limited resources, but the dependence on economic performance to underwrite European solidarity remains unchanged.
IT’S THE ECONOMY

The situation is further complicated by the impact of security challenges on economic performance. Instability on Europe’s borders cuts European exporters off from traditional markets, jeopardises access to energy, encourages cross-border migration and discourages cross-border investment.

Such factors matter not only because of their macroeconomic impact but also, and more importantly, for the way they tend to reinforce the differences between Europe’s member states. Think of the divergent economic interests of Poland and Italy or Finland and Greece.

The United States experiences similar asymmetries, but also enjoys two institutional advantages. One is the capacity to exercise strategic discretion. Although Congress is implicated in foreign policymaking, the broad priorities of US foreign policy are set and implemented by the executive branch. The other advantage is the ability to create dynamic structures for burden sharing through taxes, expenditures, and side-payments.

The European Union on the other hand relies more on collective decision-making and has fewer mechanisms for redistributing the costs of engagement. Hence, solidarity is more important for action at the European level and internal frictions are more constraining.

If anything, the European Union should give even greater strategic priority to a deep and lasting economic recovery than the United States. The reason is neither to trade off butter for guns nor is it to abdicate global responsibility. Europe is too important for world order to withdraw into splendid isolationism. That is one point (of many) on which the Bush and Obama administrations are in agreement. A strong Europe is an American strategic interest.

Only by attending to economic performance as the wellspring of European power, can the EU achieve that transatlantic objective.
The countries of Europe face serious problems: ageing populations, troubled economies, resur- gent xenophobia, and a deteriorating security environment on their borders. Europe’s greatest strategic challenge, however, is recognising that it is no longer viewed by the US as the most important region of the world, thus signaling that Europe can no longer rely on American protection alone.

In the future, European countries will have to provide for their own defence and chart their own course in international affairs. But whether they will do so successfully is far from certain.

**EUROPE’S PATRON**

Europe has been the central focus of US strategy for more than a century. The US entered both world wars to restore the balance of power in Europe, and it kept several hundred thousand troops there after the Second World War in order to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the continent. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 further committed the US to defending Europe in perpetuity.

For the next 40 years, the US provided the bulk of NATO’s military power and dominated its decision-making. US officials were eager to lead and their European counterparts were by and large content to follow. European officials became accustomed to relying on ‘Uncle Sam’ to defend them from external threats, provide protection from one another, and address disturbances in distant regions.

European defence spending declined steadily throughout the Cold War, and by its end even the UK and France were incapable of undertaking major military operations without extensive US support; a trend that has continued unabated since 1989.

Importantly, the presence of US troops on the European continent made conflict within the region near impossible. The ‘American pacifier,’ to use Josef Joffe’s apt phrase, helped dampen rivalries within Western Europe and allowed for a vibrant European Union to flourish. Washington was also the main driving force behind NATO expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite warnings that it would poison relations with Russia and create new security obligations that might be difficult to fulfill.

**SHIFT TO ASIA**

Notwithstanding this long tradition of engagement, Europe’s preeminent position in America’s strategic calculus is now over. China’s emergence as a potential ‘peer competitor’ and Asia’s growing economic importance is shifting US attention towards East Asia – and this trend will accelerate in the years to come.
A growing proportion of US military power will be assigned to Asia, while American officials will devote more time and attention to managing strategic partnerships there. Having once focused on preventing Germany and the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, the US will now strive to keep China from dominating Asia.

Europe will play little or no role in this effort. China is not a threat to Europe, meaning European states have no incentive to balance against it. On the contrary, they will be eager to invest in China and some may be happy to sell Beijing whatever it might desire, perhaps even sophisticated weaponry. Consequently, US leaders will be increasingly reluctant to subsidise Europe’s defence or guarantee its security, especially if European companies are helping China grow stronger.

Europe and the US will remain close economic partners, but European security will no longer be high on America’s foreign policy agenda and security cooperation will decline as Washington focuses its attention on Asia.

**POTENTIAL AND RISK**

The implications of these trends are profound. Instead of looking to Washington to provide the bulk of NATO’s defence capability, European countries will have to reacquire the capacity to defend themselves. The good news is that the major European countries have sufficient wealth and population to defend against any conceivable external threat, including a future challenge from a revanchist Russia. The population of the European Union is nearly five times greater than Russia’s and NATO’s European members spend nearly four times more than Moscow on defence. Properly organised and led, European countries are capable of defending their territory and launching limited military missions outside of Europe.

This optimistic assessment assumes Europe’s major states remain united, but there is reason to doubt that they will remain so. Indeed, the main challenge in the years ahead will be preventing renewed rivalries within Europe as the ‘American pacifier’ evaporates. The long conflict over the euro and the recent refugee crisis have already exposed serious fissures within the European body politic, and mutual suspicions are likely to grow if European governments begin to act on their own.

Can the next generation of European leaders show equal imagination, and keep Europe peaceful and prosperous as America’s attention shifts elsewhere? While there are hopes that they will meet the challenge, the odds are stacked against them.
Previously, the EU used its soft power to influence international relations. However, after recent global power shifts, soft power alone is no longer enough. The EU lacks a single and coherent geopolitical vision, while few political leaders believe the EU can play a geopolitical role. Therefore, the main priority for the new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) should be to achieve a better balance between soft and hard power, in support of clearly defined geopolitical objectives.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE?

Of course, it is wrong to completely dismiss the EU as a geopolitical player for a number of reasons.

First, the European Commission used the EU’s competition laws to stop Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline project. As the network cannot be owned and used by the same entity, the European Commission successfully terminated the project, thus depriving the Kremlin of an instrument for ‘buying’ political influence through bilateral pipeline deals with individual member states.

Second, unknown to most European leaders, Moscow considers the Union’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies a huge success, as well as a threat to Russian geopolitical projects. As those EU policies interfere with what the Kremlin considers to be its sphere of influence, it was no surprise therefore that the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement sparked a major crisis.

The EU rejects the notion of new spheres of influence because the countries opted to join the Union or participate in its projects themselves. But Russia’s fear was not entirely unfounded: one draft summit declaration stated that the region is of ‘strategic importance’ and the EU has an ‘interest in developing an increasingly close relationship with its Eastern partners, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.’

The Ukraine crisis demonstrated that the 1991 Charter of Paris for a New Europe is a dead letter. In the Charter, the parties agreed to ‘respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations’. The parties declared the principle of spheres of influence defunct. However, the only way to reduce tensions between Russia and the West is to acknowledge those spheres of influence. The new EUGS should recognise this geopolitical reality and initiate the development of a successor to the Charter of Paris.

The Ukraine crisis also demonstrated that soft power without hard power to back it up and the political will to coerce is meaningless. But the EU and European members of NATO are no longer credible military powers. This largely explains why the Kremlin could risk annexing Crimea and not fear the consequences of supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine.
A POSTMODERN DILEMMA

The new EUGS needs to address the Union’s postmodern dilemma; namely, that the use of military force has become obsolete for Europeans while outside the EU, power politics and traditional notions of territorial security remain very much alive. Consequently, the new EUGS should introduce a clear concept of coercion, i.e. the threat or limited use of military force and economic sanctions to change the strategic calculations of an opponent.

Finally, the EUGS should also focus on China. Like Russia, China uses its state-owned enterprises and foreign direct investments to buy influence in Europe, thereby undermining the EU’s political unity. For example, China buys ailing high-tech companies or stakes in firms such as MG, Volvo, Saab and PSA Peugeot Citroen, and invests in the financial sector, the energy sector, or infrastructure projects such as the harbour of Piraeus. Unlike the EU or Russia, China also exercises influence through bilateral agreements, such as the new Silk Road Initiative, and new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

In Asia, China does not consider the EU a geopolitical player, while Europe largely leaves affairs in the Asia-Pacific to China and the United States. A regional trade strategy is lacking and the EU does not participate in region-wide economic initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC). Despite numerous declarations, resolutions and meetings, a coherent European foreign and security policy approach to Asia is lacking as well. This should all change.

The EUGS should contribute to a change in mindset of European leaders, as too many politicians are out of touch with geopolitical realities. They feel threatened by global power shifts and are becoming increasingly nationalist and protectionist. Leaders must not only develop a coherent geopolitical vision, which takes the multipolar and fragmented global order into account, but must also know how to coerce. Ultimately, soft power without hard power is toothless.
After having been perhaps the most spectacular political endeavour of the 20th century, the European Union is now beset with troubles, confounding the achievement of its internal project with its geopolitical purpose and positioning. The never-ending costs of the euro’s hasty creation, as well as a multitude of external shocks, ranging from the complex power dynamics in Asia to the turmoil of the Middle East closer to home – and the resulting migration crisis – have added to the perception that the EU is in decline. Indeed, several parts of the world increasingly disregard its relevance and, sometimes gladly, watch the dwindling aura of a project that, until recently, European officials praised as a model to be pursued.

What should be the priority of an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS)? Which attitude should the Union adopt to give it the clout it deserves and that many in the world would still like it to have?

A BOLDER EUROPE

Boldness is the key priority. This does not mean resorting to violence, nor does it imply abandoning Europe’s traditional alliance with the US, but it does mean strongly asserting a European view – even if this goes against US desires. It means coping with fear and being less hesitant, displaying neither shame nor excessive caution to pursue, for instance, a third way between the US and China.

This is likely to mean having a different voice within NATO, one used to wisely circumscribe its scope and actions, pursuing measures that clearly enhance European security and not those that exclusively serve North American designs.

The required boldness demands replacing the often-vapid rhetoric of co-operation with African, Central, and South American nations – which sometimes contains post-colonial undertones – with a less-preachy one of partnership. Rather than simply espousing the niceties of the European model, real help – be it technological, educational, health or even political – could be offered by defining transparent objectives. China, India, Brazil and even Turkey’s progresses in these areas, though not necessarily praised here, have largely shown that the EU’s role, when not disastrous or ineffective, does not have a value differential from them, as regards the promotion of growth and even sustainability.

But the real litmus test is Russia. The EUGS must clearly define the EU’s relations with Russia, square up the existing contentieux and lay out plans for setting up a constructive, forward-looking agenda. Without creating a blueprint for co-operation that builds upon the (perhaps limited) common ground of their respective geopolitical visions, the EU will stay in the shadow of the US and its security remain uncertain. Moreover, the Union will continue to have fuzzy limits, the stability of which will ever be deemed uncertain, adding extra internal conflicts, as members position themselves assertively and distinctly towards the ‘Russian problem’.
Implementing these changes is primarily a matter of changing attitudes and traditional outlooks rather than devising new internal channels and programmes. It needs to be understood that no one is going to give the EU the latest technologies which it may need in the near future for free, nor will anybody secure it the energy and food sorely needed for tomorrow out of generosity.

Ministerial talks involving national diplomats, an innovative and more homogenous communications policy and skilful top-level diplomatic staff will all be required to boost the European External Action Service (EEAS). NATO will need to be reformed: while this is not impossible, it again demands assertiveness, level-headedness and time. The security bill may increase in the short term, though not much if the Russian predicament is solved.

THE POWER OF CULTURE

A second, major priority also exists: better use of cultural assets in security and foreign relations. The EU has overlooked both the enormous potential and the encompassing character of its cultural assets for some time now, more often than not while seeking to appease or follow other powers.

That Europe’s culture is rich is not in question; what matters is that its use to tackle a variety of issues (including even terrorism) remains undervalued. The continent has amassed deep cultural and civilizational experiences, as well as acquired many perceptions on the interactions between culture and society.

Introducing a larger culture-based element to the EU’s foreign policy means less reliance on military means (which have debatable results and often adversely affect civilians) and working more closely with different peoples, cultural leaders, political representatives and icons of the supposedly opposed factions. This is not only true on the external front, but also internally: the Union can still do more to successfully integrate disenfranchised or disadvantaged communities within its own borders.

An emboldened EU, displaying its unique personality, free from external influences and using cultural, as well as conventional tools to pursue dialogue and understanding – in the European-Westphalian tradition – can make a difference in the global order. A significant one.
The EU faces three major challenges that are shifting power inside it and weakening it in a more dangerous and complex world.

First, the economic crisis of 2008 sharply altered the distribution of power inside the EU, leaving Germany as a hegemon in economic matters, while the periphery has found itself impoverished and politically polarised. A global economic meltdown was initially avoided by the dynamism of the emerging economies, further diffusing power at the international level and leading to the establishment of the G20.

Second, Russia’s opposition to an agreement with Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014, led to the failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the subsequent annexation of Crimea, and to a severe deterioration of relations with Moscow. Engagement with Russia is indispensable to tackle many issues, from Syria to Ukraine and energy security. But how to go about it remains unclear, especially with sanctions in place and a regime that seems increasingly authoritarian and ready to use force at the international level to alter the status quo.

Third, the multiple wars going on simultaneously in Syria have potentially serious consequences for Europe. The confrontation between Turkey and the Kurds (inside Turkey and Syria), as well as with Russia, threatens to drive a key NATO member into taking military action. Furthermore, the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) exacerbated the threat of terrorism and the radicalisation of Muslim minorities in Europe.

Dealing with the issue of terrorism poses serious dilemmas in terms of civil liberties and privacy. Most acutely, the wave of asylum seekers that brought more than one million people to Germany in 2015 is a major issue that divides member states, polarises political debate within them, and feeds radical right-wing nationalist sentiments, which consequently threaten the very existence of the Schengen area.

The threats identified by the previous Strategic Review from 2008 remain, and most have become more serious (terrorism, cyber-security, climate change, migration, relations with Russia). Although some have diminished thanks to diplomatic efforts (nuclear proliferation/Iran), new dangerous threats have also emerged (Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Turkey). The policy prescriptions to deal with them also remain essentially the same: the EU needs to be more coherent, effective, and cohesive, and its alliance with the US remains the cornerstone of its security. More importantly, the EU needs to address the internal challenges that threaten its unity and weaken it internationally.

**LAC MATTERS**

Despite a certain commonality of values (democracy and human rights cultures) Latin America is a distant region of low priority for the EU and most of its member states. European interests in the region are essentially economic and diplomatic (garnering support in multilateral fora like the UN). It is a rather isolated and relatively peaceful area of the world that poses little dilemmas for the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) as such.
Yet, two threats can be identified. The most imminent one is the collapse of the Venezuelan economy, due to years of mismanagement and the fall of oil prices, which has led to scarcity, rationing, and the highest inflation rate in the world. The recent victory of the opposition in parliament has produced a divided government, incapable of taking action to prevent further deterioration. A social explosion could ensue, leading to military rule or civil war, mass migration and guerrilla warfare, with unforeseen consequences for neighbouring states – especially Colombia, which is in the middle of a delicate peace process.

Second, in most Latin American countries, public insecurity and organised crime thrive in an environment of acute inequality, fragile rule of law and, now, an unfavourable global economic context. The deterioration of the social fabric through corruption and the consequent delegitimisation of state authorities constitutes a serious challenge to young democracies. This also fosters migration and all sorts of illicit trade (weapons, drugs, people).

**AREAS FOR EU ACTION**

Two positive developments in the region are to be supported by the EU: the thaw in relations between Cuba and the US, and the peace process in Colombia.

At the multilateral level, a more constructive approach to the fight against drugs – from prohibition to regulation – due to be discussed at a UN conference in 2016, is already underway and could be enriched by the EU. European support for the ratification and implementation of the multilateral Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) could be helpful to the region. On climate change, Brazil and Mexico are strategic partners to be further engaged with.

The EU-LAC bi-regional dialogue has been a relative failure, except in the area of development cooperation, centred on research and education. Its axis, establishing region-to-region agreements, has worked only partially: just one with Central America was signed, while that with MERCOSUR stalled, and the Andean Community disintegrated. Instead, the EU achieved Association Agreements (AA) with individual countries: Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia. They now form the Pacific Alliance, a group with which the EU has yet to engage with.

Bilaterally, the EU is most effective when authority is centralised (trade) or coordination among member states in situ is close (development cooperation). After its latest review of cooperation policy, the EU has somewhat disengaged from LAC, losing influence. This is not easy to replace with other instruments of public diplomacy.
Many good ideas have been offered for the new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), including with regard to strategic concepts, priorities, and the (in)famous toolbox. Clearly, it should be about making sure that skilled diplomats are best able to solve problems when they arise. But it is also important to ask: what is the wider script they should follow?

TWO CONSTITUENCIES, THREE THEMES

We need to pay more attention to two critical constituencies at the margins of the EUGS debates: the young generations who will be its long-term beneficiaries and the people outside Europe who are on its receiving end. While it would be unwise to generalise about either of these two constituencies, they do tend to share a number of features, including seeing Brussels ‘from the outside’ as both an object of contestation and a source of recognition, a recognition which is often withheld.

It would be nice to ask both groups what they think about Europe's external finalité more often. While middle-aged Europeans can hardly pretend to speak on their behalf, we can at least say what we hear. Three themes stand out:

First, prevention. There is a silver lining to the lack of direct accountability of EU institutions and EU leaders acting together: they can be the guardians of long-term interests and pursue sustainable integration. The benefits of preventive action are usually invisible which is why it is best pursued collectively.

Second, citizens. Let us not get carried away with citizen-centred foreign policy; the ‘state’ is not going anywhere. But at least let us pursue a citizen-minded foreign policy. In the long run, empowering actors for change on the ground tends to be great value for money.

Third, memory. We would also do well to critically acknowledge, when and where we can, the echoes of our imperial past around the world. This means understanding the way we are often perceived in Asia, Africa or Latin America, by the same rising powers we are trying to court. Our paternalistic impulses often hinder our capacity for influence in our non-European world. Seen from the outside, European countries enjoy levels of development that ensure enduring (if diminished) EU influence due in no small measure to capital accumulated through colonialism.

This acknowledgement must be enriched by the very different stories of our member states, including those that were on the receiving end, from Ireland to Greece, and from Poland to Romania.
A POST-IMPERIAL POWER

Europe's post-imperial condition is about managing the tension between our tendency to reproduce these colonial legacies and our aspiration to transcend them. We need to put more effort and imagination into the latter and act as a post-imperial power with the constraints, duties and opportunities that this implies.

In this spirit, we must stop picturing our so called ‘neighbourhood’ in concentric circles, defined primarily by who can best play the game of ‘convergence-for-access’. We must give up governing others ‘at a distance’, and stop turning a blind eye to the social injustice inflicted on populations by local elites while rewarding corrupt oligarchs for paying lip service to EU demands.

We must start by tackling the fear of difference in our midst and reflect this state of mind in our foreign policy. This may mean allowing countries in the ‘neighbourhood’ we share with Russia the right not to choose between us – letting them come up with schemes for mutual accommodation and determine themselves the localised order which affects them as subjects of their own space rather than objects of competing spheres of influence.

A post-imperial EU must better navigate between the respective pitfalls of intervention in Libya and non-intervention in Syria *inter alia* by turning the responsibility to protect into a doctrine of effective anticipation rather than military force, helping citizens to hold governments to account as peers in an international effort to defy abuses of all sorts. Shoes are usually better than boots on the ground, especially if we can place ourselves temporarily in other people’s shoes.

Citizen empowerment is also key for effective post-imperial rule of law support focused on consistency between what we do within and outside our borders. Let us forget blueprints and concentrate on end users. We must be more ambitious in our criticism of arbitrary power and more humble in our claim to design remedies. And when we speak of democracy outside Europe, let us concentrate on people’s right to be freely involved in the contestation and pursuit of power in their own country; a right to politics, as Hannah Arendt would say.

The EU may be a post-imperial power in decline, but this decline is relative and slow. A post-imperial power is not a Switzerland writ large. An ambition to transform the world for the better can find its expression in the tools and mindset of ‘mediating power’ both among and within states. This will continue to be our best contribution to cooperation between regions and within multilateral bodies, rather than a spurious claim to constituting a ‘model’.

Ultimately, we will never live up to the expectations of our children and the rest of the world. But let us try.
For more than a decade the answer to the question of how the EU can influence developments in its most immediate neighbourhood – and in particular in the Balkans and Turkey – seemed so obvious that there was no need to put it at the forefront of any discussion of Global Strategy: stability and influence was guaranteed through a credible policy of European enlargement.

This vision remains present today in all EU documents and speeches. It underlies EU mediation between Kosovo and Serbia, underpins the way in which the EU approaches Turkey, and forms the background for EU efforts to calm tensions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. But is this policy still credible in light of developments in the region and within the EU?

**LESSONS FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS**

Few questions are more important for the future of European foreign policy in the next decade. None raise more fundamental issues about what constitutes failure, success, appropriate ambition and strategic foresight in EU foreign policy thinking. The EU’s most dramatic foreign policy failures have taken place in the Balkans in the 1990s, when millions of people were displaced and genocide took place in the heart of Europe – with open fighting in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, south Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between 1991 and 2001.

However, since then the EU’s most important success stories in conflict prevention have also taken place in this region. Significant progress was made in reconciling former enemies and in demilitarising the whole region. In 1999 in Helsinki the EU granted candidate status to Turkey. In 2000 in Zagreb and, even more explicitly, in 2003 in Thessaloniki the EU held out the promise of accession to all Western Balkan states.

Since then the EU has been engaged in one of the most ambitious geopolitical transformation projects ever launched, one that is putting its ability to inspire far-reaching change to its most demanding test yet. Applicant countries have to turn their economies around, transform their political cultures and overhaul their administrations.

The logic behind this vision seemed so strong that to some it no longer even appears to be a ‘foreign policy’ at all: enlargement came to be seen as a technocratic process, on bureaucratic auto-pilot, only occasionally in need of minor adjustments.

The EU’s stated ambition remains to make future wars unthinkable through regional and European integration. Peace through integration is an old vision, which guided US policy in creating the ‘West’ after the Second World War.

The outstanding success of US foreign policy in the twentieth century has been a source of inspiration for the European External Action Service (EEAS) in the Balkans. Therefore, the success or failure of efforts to pacify an integrated south eastern European is what will determine whether the EU will be a credible foreign policy actor elsewhere. For this reason, this region has to be at the heart of any EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS).
And yet, even those who have celebrated the transformative power of the EU in the past wonder whether it can pull off this feat and bring a post-crisis Western Balkans and Turkey into the European mainstream. If the EU honours its commitments to integrate the countries of the Western Balkans (and Turkey) into the Union, this would bring the number of EU members to 36 and its total population to 600 million people; some 100 million of these would be European Muslims.

**A MAKE OR BREAK MOMENT**

As the domestic context for foreign policy shifts across the EU, it is obvious that this vision is anything but ‘technocratic’. And the obvious question then arises: how many European governments, and publics, will still believe that a transformative enlargement to south east Europe will actually happen in the planning timeframe relevant for the EUGS? And if this vision is losing credibility, what does this mean for stability in the immediate European neighbourhood? If the EU is unable to influence even its most immediate neighbours after decades of efforts, then the scale for its global ambitions necessarily also shrinks, dramatically.

And yet, enlargement has found no successor as a strategy to overcome conflicts on the European continent. It has stabilised the continent like no other policy after 2000. There is still demand for it. And yet, for now, there is little supply.

Today across the EU some policymakers question whether the Union has already over-expanded. An air of fragility and doubt reigns, and doubt undermines trust. This easily translates into a sense of betrayal, most visibly in Turkey after 2005, but also in some Balkan countries.

Historically it was the Balkan experience in the 1990s that led to the emergence of a European foreign policy. It was a foreign policy born from humiliations in the Balkans. South east Europe remains, even today, the one region where an EU with global ambitions must not stumble if it wants to remain credible. For the EUGS, the lessons, opportunities and perils of policy towards this region must necessarily be central.
The European Union is drafting its new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) in a ‘more connected, more complex and more contested world’ and amid a growing debate and concern about the future of the European project itself.

The Lisbon Treaty and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have not exactly revolutionised European foreign and security policy. People wrongly believed that if you get the institutions right, you can get the policies right; whereas it should be the other way around. Beyond trade, the European Union has tended to be a kind of structure rather an actor. EU foreign policy displays not only a gap between goals and means, but also a gap between rhetoric and realism. When push comes to shove, outsiders still think of key member states which demonstrate a continued reluctance to act collectively and have a marked preference for bilateralism when dealing with strategic partners.

The European Union may have many strategies and create new policy areas, but so far it has not been able to develop a shared strategic culture. The key challenges in attempts to achieve such a culture are primarily related to coordination and the more coherent use of instruments.

FOUR WAYS FORWARD

First, the gap is growing between normative rhetoric and performance and we live in times when norm-setting is becoming increasingly contentious due to a big disconnect in world-views, mind-sets and practical agendas. The EU thus needs to become more pragmatic and try to work together with major players in devising new sets of rules. This is especially the case in spheres where few rules presently exist. Brussels should tone down its rhetorical overreach and shed its moral grandstanding. The Union needs to be more practical and not be reticent in becoming more transactional – especially when it confronts the perennial challenge of value addition beyond trade.

Second, the EU tends to spread itself too thinly; it is constantly in search of new projects rather than completing old ones. There is growing dialogue fatigue with most of its strategic partners and many discussion formats are either being discontinued or lie dormant. Instead of being obsessed with the process itself, the Union needs to rationalise its resources and focus on a limited number of issues with greater prospects of tangible outcomes.

Third, visibility remains a challenge for the European Union. There is a gap in how the EU communicates and explains itself to major partners. Since perceptions do matter in cementing or hindering ties, EU policymakers must address this concern more effectively if they seek to become a player of greater consequence in Asia and elsewhere.

The Union needs to progress from information dissemination towards more proactive engagement and dialogue to improve the visibility, understanding, and perception of the EU. As a result, the Union needs to explore innovative ways of how it can better target and synergise its media, communication and public diplomacy strategies with key partners in order to enhance
its visibility and overcome stereotypes and misperceptions. A crucial element of a more coherent and effective public diplomacy is to enhance the media skills of staff of EU Delegations. The European Union also needs to graduate from ad hoc activities in the cultural field to dedicating funds, hiring the necessary expertise, and creating an organisational template for cultural cooperation.

Fourth, there is a need to focus afresh on relations with India, especially under the new, pragmatic leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who considers the West to be an indispensable partner for the country’s modernisation. It is time to stop looking for a perfect deal on the free trade agreement (FTA), but aim for a realistic outcome which is a win-win proposition for both sides. It is also imperative for Brussels to expand its expertise on major Asian countries, including India.

A CHANGING BALANCE OF POWER

With the rise of the ‘Rest’, things are no longer quite what they seemed to be. Europeans have to revise their mental maps about the growing profile of emerging powers and the gradual shift of economic power to the east. But this may not happen soon as old habits die hard – especially as Europeans have for centuries been accustomed to exerting influence. After all, at one point in time, whether a political voice was heard at all often depended on Europe.

The changing balance of power has so far not significantly affected the narrative of Europe and the discourse it has established about itself. Europeans will have to change the idea that they can continue as before without adapting, especially as their normative narrative is being increasingly contested and challenged by the emerging powers which are beginning to offer alternative, non-EU narratives.

Ultimately, Europe needs to be more open to learning from others; it needs to listen more and lecture less and construct a new European narrative which is more open, inclusive and accommodative.
The American Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action drew attention to the fact that of the dozen contingencies classified as high priority (in terms of the harm that they could cause), two-thirds are related to events unfolding or ongoing in the Middle East. Because of their geo-political reach, ideological and military power and their employment of new tactics, it is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda, and other jihadist groups which not only pose the greatest challenge, but also demand the most urgent response.

TACKLING JIHADISTS OF ALL STRIPES

The 2016 Munich Security Report recently defined ISIL as ‘the best-financed terrorist franchise in history [that] poses an unprecedented threat to international peace and security’. ISIL organises and leads networks of militants and establishes connections with other radical jihadist groups through which it strikes not only in the Middle East and Africa (MENA) but also in Europe.

Furthermore, ISIL operates massively and effectively in cyber space and it is often through social media that it harvests support in radical circles in Europe. Moreover, its large territorial base means that it is indeed a terrorist group of a different order and magnitude.

In the UK’s 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (which could be appended to the EUISS publication ‘Towards an EU Global Strategy: Background, Process, References – 2015’), terrorism leads the list of top-tier risks. The British document underscores that a number of Islamist terrorist groups are active across the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, with growing reach into Europe.

The review also indicates that the emergence of ISIL and its unique brand of violent extremism has significantly increased the threat that terrorists who are directed or inspired by the group pose to European security; that some groups, especially ISIL and al-Qaeda, will also try to acquire chemical, biological and radiological capabilities; and that ISIL has exploited the internet and social media to distribute large quantities of often sophisticated online propaganda intended to radicalise and recruit large numbers of people in the Middle East and beyond.

Indeed, the international influence of ISIL beyond the Middle East is most menacing. The attacks in Paris or the shootings in San Bernardino are just two examples of ISIL’s capability to inspire jihadists across the world. Against this background, the British conclusion is that ‘the significant threat posed by terrorist groups makes it all the more important that we invest to tackle this issue head-on at home and abroad using the full spectrum of our capabilities.’

To adequately confront ISIL, blunt its advance in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and curtail its influence elsewhere, it is essential that a united front is formed, which pools its resources and capabilities, to undertake a campaign that employs extensive power projection, as well as new means and tactics. The immediate task should be to degrade ISIL in the Middle East and reverse its advances in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
However, down the line this will also call for action beyond the Middle East and for the use of a variety of ways to stop the organisation’s funding, decapitate its leadership, disrupt its international operational connections, and to fully defeat its military forces.

Thus far, the US, several European countries, and others have been actively engaged in this effort, primarily through air strikes in Iraq and Syria. But it is essential to do more to roll back ISIL and work towards the goal of defeating it before it metastasises further.

There are three other Middle East-related challenges of importance to Europe. First, engaging and containing Iran – so as to see it comply with the nuclear accord it reached with the P5+1 and curtail its support of terrorism in other parts of the Middle East such as Hizbullah in Lebanon.

Second, bringing order to Syria, Iraq, and Libya is also important, so as to re-establish stability and peace in these warring areas.

Third, pursuing an Israeli-Palestinian peace through a restored international process with greater regional Arab participation and aiming at a solution for ‘two states for two peoples’.

All these entail international efforts, mostly diplomatic, political, and economic, but not necessarily military ones. It is, however, the mission to degrade and defeat ISIL (as defined by US President Obama), which is not only the most urgent, but also the most demanding task in terms of concerted military cooperation and action among members of the Atlantic alliance. It should be viewed as the highest strategic priority for the EU, too.
It is clear that today’s world is less secure than it was 25 years ago; traditional threats are now accompanied by new ones, which are relatively more dangerous. In particular, radicalism and terrorism, fuelled by wars in the Middle East, have transcended domestic borders and become internationalised. Millions of refugees have fled their countries of origin in pursuit of safety, and they, too, can pose challenges to the new states they settle in.

Despite a plethora of threats ranging from a resurgent Russia to a nuclear-armed North Korea and transnational epidemics such as Ebola, it is the Middle East region which continues to produce the most serious dangers to world security. This is so for a number of reasons.

MIDDLE EASTERN PRIORITIES

First, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continues to be one of the most controversial issues that not only hinders cooperation between the EU and Middle Eastern states, but also triggers and fuels tensions within Europe between Muslim/Arab minorities and their fellow citizens.

Second, the failure of the Arab Spring to transform authoritarian countries into democracies has also exacerbated the fragility of these states, pushing some of them into civil war. As a result, there is little room for civil society and free media to operate, while human rights violations have increased. Also, large portions of state budgets have been reallocated to fight terrorism rather than being invested into human development. The failure of a peaceful transitional process from dictatorship to democracy of some countries has also discouraged others from embracing the democratisation process.

Third, the growing influence of religion (especially among the youth) in shaping politics and the flow of refugees to Europe and other areas is increasing tensions within and between societies.

The ongoing conflicts in the region have led to unprecedented atrocities and caused great damage to social fabrics and infrastructure. Ending these conflicts is key for global security: most importantly, the EU needs to work closely with Russia, Turkey, the US and the Arab League to achieve a long-term truce between opposition groups and the regime in Syria.

Although the EU has been active in the Middle East since the 1970s and it continues to be involved in efforts to find a just and fair solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the lack of progress in the peace process between the Arabs and Israelis was and is the biggest obstacle to any EU-Middle East partnership. While some accuse the EU for failing to align its political role with the financial support it provides, some of the blame should also fall on the other actors involved, namely the Arabs, Israelis and the US for not coordinating their efforts and creating an environment conducive to reaching a permanent peace.

To address this, the EU position towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should avoid being reluctant, responsive and incident-centred. EU policy should seek to be proactive and in-
crease coherence between the financial and technical support of its political agenda. The EU should consolidate its coordination with the US, the country which has controlled the peace process since the Oslo Accords in 1993. The EU should not be taking a back seat while the US dominates the process. Finally, the EU should make clear the link between its financial support to the Palestinian authority and the progress made in advancing democratic good governance.

**DEMOCRACY AND DIALOGUES**

One of the EU’s obligations is to spread democracy and human rights to areas which lack these values. This is no easy task, as democratic transition should be an organic process initiated and driven by local societies themselves, not one which is exported or imposed by outsiders. Nonetheless, communities in the Middle East are in dire need of the support, experience and knowledge of others – in particular the EU.

The EU should avoid being perceived by the Arab world as a supporter of dictatorships (tacitly or otherwise), or as ‘a teacher of democracy’. For this to be achieved, its policies should be based on the principles of partnership. Moreover, the EU should make a significant effort to convey the message that it not only works with the region’s leaders, but also with its peoples.

Local problems now transcend domestic borders, and the EU’s responses must reflect this reality. In particular, the EU should attempt to reach out and solve problems abroad through educational programmes and economic empowerment – which will ensure prosperity in the long run.

Back home, the EU needs to work on implementing policies of integration for those who have recently become Europeans. But this also requires European populations to follow the principles of acceptance. Showcasing successful stories of coexistence and highlighting the positive contribution of immigrants to European society in a number of fields (economy, sport, education, art and culture etc.) would accelerate and assist this process.

Any effective EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) should clarify the shared responsibilities of all actors for creating a secure world. Europe has its role to play, but other countries must be asked to realise and act upon their duties as well.
The task facing the authors of the new EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is a daunting one: it will not be easy to craft a document which must be both credible and realistic, as well as acceptable to member states and EU institutions alike. If anything, this task is even more difficult today than it was when four European think tanks published a European Global Strategy (EGS) in 2013, largely because the EU’s credibility and appeal have suffered considerably in recent years, both at home and abroad.

The EU is best understood as the instrument Europeans have developed over several generations to deal with the complex, multifaceted challenges posed by globalisation. Increasingly, however, many of its citizens are concluding that the EU is neither protecting them from the unwanted consequences of globalisation, nor helping them benefit from the many opportunities it has to offer. As a result, we are witnessing a growing tension between ‘globalists’ and ‘territorialists’, or those who believe open societies require open borders and those who see interconnectedness itself as a threat.

Thus, the future of the EU will largely be determined by the outcome of this struggle, and it is by no means certain that our own home-grown populists, who are so adept at providing deceptively simple answers to increasingly complex questions, will not finally prevail.

In light of this, the EUGS should make a powerful statement about the EU’s commitment to an open, competitive, innovative economy, but also to the social and political values it embodies. Europe’s appeal and strength (both at home and abroad) will continue to owe far more to our quality of life, equality of opportunity and individual and collective freedoms than to the strength of our armies or the negotiating skills of our diplomats.

Ultimately, the EUGS’ relevance will be measured against its ability to bolster security, prosperity and freedom within the EU itself, for it is the Union’s internal resilience and cohesion that should give us greatest cause for concern.

Given the speed at which the EU’s strategic environment is evolving, a relevant EUGS will probably need to be revised every five years or so. In the current climate, it would probably be best to produce a relatively modest text, but one that aims to provide concrete answers to the major challenges facing the EU, namely: managing unprecedented migration flows, which may cause the undoing of the Schengen area (undoubtedly one of the EU’s most valuable achievements); protecting our societies against terrorist attacks, by acting more effectively both at home and abroad; and deterring Russian aggression against some member states, which requires the EU to respond to a new kind of (hybrid) warfare.

All of these challenges have their origin in Europe’s (immediate) southern and eastern neighbourhoods, and it is here that the EUGS should concentrate its attention. To some extent, the EU is already doing this with a revamped European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which acknowledges that democracy promotion is only viable in a handful of states. Elsewhere, focus should be on energy security and fighting against climate change, security sector reform, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation, as well as tackling irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling.
The problem with this approach is that the citizens of some of these states will conclude that the EU is not really interested in enhancing their resilience against external threats, and simply hopes to create a buffer zone to protect itself from unruly neighbours.

This has already happened in Ukraine, and is likely to occur in Turkey in the wake of the current refugee crisis, which is why the 2013 EGS argued in favour of offering Ankara an ‘enhanced political partnership’ encompassing (but not limited to) deeper cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, without waiting for accession negotiations to be completed.

The 2013 EGS also called for the forging of a new Atlantic community with the US, built on the back of an ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement. Although a successful TTIP deal would undoubtedly boost badly-needed economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic, the US’ recent tendency to divide the world into Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and TTIP, inadvertently bringing Russia and China closer together, is something the EUGS would be well advised to resist.

In politics, timing is everything. In view of the British referendum, it would probably have been best to postpone the launching of the EUGS until later this year. If Britain decides to leave the EU on 23 June 2016, any text published that month will be stillborn.

Although Brexit would not be the end of the EU, the loss of Europe’s second largest economy would be a major blow to its prestige and standing worldwide. And even if reason prevails, the impact of what could well be a very close result will need to be properly digested.
There is a clear need for a new strategy document. Much has changed since the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). Most importantly, 13 new member states have joined the Union and the Lisbon Treaty has established the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by the High Representative. The external environment has deteriorated. The ESS’ goal of a ‘ring of friends’ in the European Neighbourhood has come to resemble a ‘ring of fire’, as Sweden’s former foreign minister Carl Bildt has noted.

In the wake of the Brussels bombings, the natural reaction will be to focus on the threat from within. Populist eurosceptic parties are already exploiting Islamist terrorism and conflating it with the refugee crisis. The Schengen regime – one of the EU’s greatest achievements – is under increasing pressure and may not survive in its present form. However, withdrawing behind national borders is not a feasible option: only increased cooperation among member states can effectively meet the challenges emanating from the outside. In the field of security, the answer is more Europe, not less. The Brussels attacks highlighted the need for greater integration. In dealing with the influx of refugees and migrants, the establishment of a European Border and Coast Guard is also a vital step forward.

SHOWING ADDED VALUE TO CITIZENS

The adoption of a EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) is an opportunity to show EU citizens the importance of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the legitimacy of the EU is being increasingly questioned domestically, the launch of the EUGS could be a useful exercise in explaining the added value of the CFSP, and counter- ing the trend of re-nationalisation of foreign policies. The EU has been a beacon for other regions, but its power of attraction has been severely eroded.

The EUGS provides a chance to send a signal to the world. The language of the strategy will be scrutinised by others, especially neighbouring countries. The EU’s most successful foreign policy has been enlargement. Therefore, the EUGS must unambiguously state that membership is not off the table and that the door remains open for European countries that meet the conditions. Europeans need not fear further enlargement, since those countries that actually manage to fulfil the EU’s objective criteria will have genuinely transformed themselves into success stories. This will not happen in the foreseeable future, but the incentive of membership should not be excluded. Widening has not prevented deepening – on the contrary, every round of enlargement has been a catalyst for closer integration. Enlargement has been a win-win proposition.

Strengthening transatlantic relations must be a priority for the EU, and the US will remain the EU’s primary partner because of shared values and common interests. Neither Russia nor China could ever be a substitute. Working together with the US enables the EU to have greater influence and be the global agenda-setter. To this end, concluding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would bolster and cement the transatlantic relationship politically, as well as economically.
Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts

There is increasing urgency for this. For years, Americans have fruitlessly urged Europeans to contribute more to their own defence, but now one of the leading candidates for the US presidency is even questioning the basic rationale of NATO. The trend towards diminishing US engagement with Europe is evident, be it a new isolationism or the pivot to Asia. The EU needs to invest more resources if it wants to be an equal partner and not a follower.

The obvious place to start would be greater cooperation between NATO and EU. Though both organisations are headquartered in Brussels and have largely overlapping membership, political will is necessary for reducing institutional barriers and creating synergies. One of the chief hindrances to closer cooperation is the Cyprus question. To be a more effective actor globally, the EU needs to resolve this frozen conflict within the Union.

DEFENDING EUROPE

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has largely focused on crisis management outside of the Union’s borders. The situation has changed dramatically since the 2003 ESS when it was unimaginable to discuss a response to hybrid threats or attacks on the territory of an EU member state. And last year saw France invoke the ‘solidarity clause’ (Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty) for the first time following terrorist attacks in 2015.

The EU should focus more on Europe. The rejection of European values and norms by the Putin regime in Moscow can no longer be ignored. While the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) can damage the EU, only Russia poses an existential threat. For the first time, a neighbouring power is not only contesting ‘spheres of influence’, but actively undermining the EU from within. While exploiting divisions within the EU has been a constant objective of Russian policy, the current combination of crises provides an unprecedented opportunity to unravel the security architecture of Europe.

It is no longer inconceivable that the territory of an EU member state could be threatened by hybrid tactics or even be occupied by military force. The response to such a contingency could not simply be compartmentalised as a matter solely for NATO. The EU needs to strengthen resilience and think through what consequences such a scenario would have on the functioning of its core elements.
The European Union desperately needs a boost of confidence. While an EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) can hardly become a panacea for Europe’s fragility, a well-crafted and operational text could be one step towards renewing trust in the European project.

A new EUGS should provide clarity and act as a guide for Europe’s international action. First and foremost, this means that external ambitions must be grounded in an increasingly dismal reality.

While in the early years of the last decade the EU flourished and the title of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) – A secure Europe in a better world – captured the optimism of the day, by 2005 the positivity inside the Union began to morph into something less certain.

Unsuccessful referenda in France and the Netherlands buried the constitution for the enlarged European Union. Although the Lisbon Treaty overcame the institutional conundrum, the onset of the financial and debt crises have largely defined the continent’s main policy priorities and constraints since 2009.

The EU today is internally more divided and its situation more precarious than at any other point in recent history. Terms like ‘Brexit’ and ‘Grexit’ or even mention of ‘Frexit’ capture the current political mood. In short, member states are principally focused on keeping the EU together rather than pursuing further integration.

Moreover, the EU’s surroundings do not resemble a better world. EU enlargement is on hold. Partnership with Russia has turned into conflict with Moscow. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) now effectively involves just three countries with limited control over their respective territories (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). And the European Union has become a contested term rather than a positive point of reference for partner countries.

Meanwhile, to the south, hopes surrounding the so-called Arab Spring have largely faded. Instead, the Union faces basic order and security problems magnified by the flows of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa.

DEVELOPING THE TOOLBOX

The EUGS must therefore originate from, as well as address the current crises facing the Union. In practical terms, it should be a basis for a more reliable EU external role in three ways.

First, the EU needs a basic toolbox for communication in external relations. Whenever possible, the Union has to be able to speak with a common voice vis-à-vis the outside world. And while EU member states often lack a common policy towards particular countries and/or regions, they almost always possess some shared aims and priorities with regard to specific international topics.
The EUGS should thus foster better communication mechanisms and clearer EU templates for engaging with the outside world. And member states should work along shared policy goals and EU red lines. Furthermore, the Union ought to generate its own set of baselines for various foreign and security policy priorities. When faced with the potentially worsening state of the EU and its environment, a shared understanding of standards for external action is essential.

Second, any credible foreign policy needs resources. The EU’s external communication will be hollow without substantive support on the ground. The EUGS should address both traditional and newer threats such as energy, cyber and information security, as well as indicate action plans for gathering realistic hard and soft means to face these challenges.

The European Union must become more resilient from within. This will be tricky as it will place additional demands on member states and national politicians at a time when the EU itself is becoming increasingly contested across domestic political arenas.

Yet, just as EU states have recently secured additional support for the eurozone, in the face of increasing external and internal threats member states must focus on investing in security. The EUGS could clarify the division of foreign and security policy responsibilities between the EU and its member states and thus help generate pressure for additional resource commitments. Both EU institutions and national governments need their respective roadmaps to raise future levels of resilience.

Finally, through the EUGS, the EU should underpin its long-term external strengths such as trade policy, international economic development and development assistance. The new strategy is an opportunity to tackle crisis management issues related to EU foreign policy competencies (which are at a developmental stage at best) and focus on systematic policy planning in more traditional community areas of international relations.

In recent years the EU has gained a negative image of being rudderless both within the Union and in Europe’s neighbourhood. The EUGS – a well-timed opportunity to give the Union greater purpose – must acknowledge this and learn from the mistakes of the past.
At the turn of the millennium, the European Union deluded itself with a false sense of security. It had sought to build a ring of friends that were supposed to become prosperous and more democratic, and to filter migrants coming to Europe. By doing so, Europeans made a twin mistake: they believed that their neighbours would emulate their example, and they outsourced their migration and border policies. This, in turn, had two consequences.

First, Europeans played into the hands of authoritarian and murderous leaders who exacted concessions in return for keeping migrants at bay. In the 2000s, for instance, Colonel Qaddafi obtained financial rewards, as well as international recognition. And the agreement that the EU struck with Ankara on 18 March 2016 to dry up the Aegean and Balkan routes for smugglers and refugees depends on Turkey’s willingness to comply. Second, Europeans ignored power politics. In designing the so-called ‘ring of friends’, the EU stumbled over what the Kremlin considered to be its sphere of influence. The Commission and the Council produced technical solutions, Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), for what actually was a political issue: competition over eastern Europe.

A global strategy worthy of its name should start with promoting security on the European continent and in its surroundings. The European Union established itself as a small community which forged a new way of conducting international relations in Europe. It gradually – and sometimes haphazardly and reluctantly – expanded its model and eventually began to dominate the continent and influence its periphery. This has now changed. The current challenges – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, forays in NATO members’ airspace, the war in Syria, inroads into the EU through Gazprom, corruption and disinformation, the refugee crisis, the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to Libya, Mali and Europe – are the result of some of the failings of the EU.

**PREDICT AND PREPARE**

First of all, the European Union, as a collective, has repeatedly proven to be unable to think ahead. The latest wave of refugees started to build up in 2011, when uprisings in the Arab world were crushed. Although EU agencies and institutions published figures, and NGOs offered solutions (such as the resettlement of refugees to undermine people trafficking and allow for vetting), little was done. National administrative budgets – of the German Federal Office for Migrants and Refugees, for instance – were cut, and capacities to register migrants did not expand, be it in Greece or Italy. And, since the European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2011 that Athens disregarded the rights of refugees, the latter could not be deported back to Greece if they had crossed that country to move illegally to another EU member state. All of these were indicators that the so-called refugee crisis was in the making, and yet the EU still did not anticipate the massive influx of migrants.
The crisis over Ukraine offers a similar account. Though the Kremlin imposed a massive embargo on Ukrainian goods as of the summer of 2013, and President Putin met four times with his Ukrainian counterpart in November, Europeans deluded themselves by firmly believing that Kiev would sign the DCFTA. No proposal was made to mitigate the consequences of the embargo – despite the fact that Brussels later increased the quota of Moldovan wine, which was also subjected to a Russian embargo for the same reasons.

**THINK AND ACT EUROPEAN**

Second, the decision-making process of the EU is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. The heads of state and government have abandoned the Monnet method for numerous reasons, primarily to protect their so-called sovereignty, and also, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel put it, to promote the speed and efficiency of decision-making by centralising decisions within the European Council. Whether this is successful is far from obvious. When asked why the EU could not foresee the refugee crisis, a minister and confidante of Chancellor Merkel retorted that he could not multitask. Overwhelmed by the series of crises, the European Council has become overstretched, and the specific issues it does not deal with, such as the Normandy negotiations, fall onto the shoulders of the German Chancellor – who is even more overburdened herself. Instead of being facilitated, the decision-making process in the EU is blocked: European and national civil servants cannot take political decisions and rely upon technocratic approaches. The DCFTA with Ukraine is a very good example of this lack of political thinking.

Last, because of prevailing of national sovereignties, the EU is incapable of controlling its own borders. Frontex was created to mount limited operations in order to repel illegal migrants. The external borders of the EU were, and still are, controlled by the peripheral member states. This system is dysfunctional, too.

The EU and its eastern neighbours share 4,000 miles of land borders, of which 1,400 are with Russia. 23 out of 28 member states have a coastline adding up to a little over 40,000 miles of indentations, caps, bays, and islands, some of which are very close to the borders of Asia and Africa, where problems abound. Only a European border guard would have a chance to work properly, patrolling coasts and inspecting harbours where, according to intelligence sources, surveillance is far too limited.
Facing pushback abroad and populism at home, many European foreign policy actors are becoming defeatist about values. They are tired of facing cynical counterparts who point to real or fantasy failings in our own rights protection or democratic practices. EU diplomats are also fed up with member states undermining Europe’s credibility by doing side-deals that undercut common positions based on values, or even contesting long-held principles of liberal democracy.

In this period of overlapping crises and dwindling self-confidence, it may seem convenient to drop the values agenda – to ease the problems of divisions between member states (no need for consistency) and the loss of soft power (no aspirations to change other countries). The priority is to deliver results on the foreign policy side of the crises – from tackling the roots of terrorism inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to stopping the flows of migrants.

A NEW REALPOLITIK

It is no surprise that a new realpolitik has emerged. Interests should trump values because our survival is at stake, say many politicians and officials.

The same logic runs through many issues: Russia is pushing back with propaganda, so we should remove ‘irritants’ (like political prisoners) from our relationships in the neighbourhood. Migrants are pressing at our frontiers, so we should lift conditions for goodies like visa liberalisation if countries promise to stop boats from leaving the shore. Populists are decrying rights and values in our domestic debates, so we should not preach to other countries. Terrorists are attacking our cities, so we should support governments that repress Islamic fundamentalism.

But this new realpolitik is pseudo-realism. It simplifies the challenges and assumes we can identify consistent ‘European interests’ in complicated situations. Moreover, it ignores three important realities about foreign policy: countries are not monoliths; many foreigners also cherish the values we hold dear; and a lack of respect for rights and freedoms does not bring long-term stability for third parties nor does it bring security for us.

First, European capitals have been stung before by cutting deals with authoritarian governments and failing to show their populations that the EU also cared about abuses and corruption. Remember the embarrassment at revelations that European leaders had supported Ben Ali and Mubarak right up until their overthrow in 2011? EU delegations then had to invest in new relationships with a wider range of civil society to regain some credibility. Europe should not keep repeating the same mistake: alliances of convenience with governments can backfire, and non-governmental actors are increasingly important worldwide (as last June’s Strategic Assessment pointed out).
Second, many people outside Europe cherish the values we call European, and many more aspire to the greater freedom and prosperity that Europeans enjoy. This remains a source of soft power because the EU gains respect when it shows what it stands for. There is no need to preach from on high. Rather, the case can be made on the basis of the European experience that well-functioning markets are underpinned by good governance and democratic practices. It is also supported by values surveys showing that Europeans have remarkably consistent views about the need to protect human rights and uphold the rule of law.

Third, a lack of respect for values does not bring long-term stability and security. The real trade-off is not between values and interests, or even security and rights. Rather, it is about the short term and long term. For example, will current repression make Egypt stable over the next ten years? Will reliance on increasingly illegitimate regimes in the Middle East deter radicalisation, or instead encourage recruitment to ISIL and other extremist causes? Will the Balkan countries be better partners on migration, crime and terrorism if the EU abandons its aims of improving governance and rule of law there?

THE NEED FOR THE TRANSFORMATIONAL

If EU foreign policy focuses just on the transactional and forgets about the transformational, we will not achieve security around our borders.

Short-term deals may be necessary in the current crisis, but we should not lower the ambition for long-term change in our neighbourhood and beyond. Furthermore, the waning of the EU’s gravitational pull should not jeopardise the commitment to a global order based on rules and rights, which serves our long-term interests.

The danger of this pseudo-realism is that it seems hard-headed and pragmatic while leaving some room for idealism. But there are hard interests underlying the longstanding values agenda that are not served by transactions alone.

Hopefully, the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) will look to the longer term, beyond the current crisis of self-confidence and towards the principles that will bring security to future generations.
There is a danger in making the strategic review too complex. There is merit in recalling the parsimonious interpretation of the world that has inspired realists: system anarchy; the fundamental role of states; the centrality of the distribution of power; balance of power. Indeed, power itself.

These basics remain the crucial elements of international relations. The currencies the EU prefers – multilateralism, international law, international institutions, diplomacy, soft and smart power – have all come into their own since 1945 and they have a vital role to play. But there should be no illusions: positive sum aspirations have not replaced zero-sum realities.

A REGIONAL FOCUS

Draft EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) papers speak of ‘taking the lead in stabilising Europe’s broad neighbourhood, including the neighbours of the neighbours’. What does that mean in practice? We need a clear answer to the following key question: not so much what should the EU aim to do, but what is it that the EU can realistically hope to achieve in the neighbourhood – including the neighbours of the neighbours. The geographic focus is important. The EU is a global trading actor and a key partner of the UN; but in terms of the deployment of crisis management power, it should not for the foreseeable future aspire to be anything other than a regional power.

What might the EU hope to achieve in the neighbourhood? Lucidity about the EU’s real leverage is essential. If EU accession is not on the cards, leverage is massively reduced. The most the EU can hope to do in the southern neighbourhood is to assist local and regional political initiatives aimed at stabilisation. An earlier paper from the High Representative correctly spoke of ‘rethinking the EU’s transformative agenda’. That is a crucial objective. The EU needs to focus much more on interests. In the context of a rapidly changing globalised system marked by power transition, the interests of the member states are massively convergent rather than divergent. The EU needs to recognise that, to quantify it, to act on it.

To the east, the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ means Russia. Tony Blair once said that we have to have enlargement because we cannot have instability on our borders. That statement is illogical. The further the EU enlarges, the greater the instability on its borders. Any strategy for the east has to start (not finish) with Russia. The EU has a Russia problem, not just a Putin problem. For 300 years. Russia has been an essential actor in the European system – one which cannot be integrated nor (equally importantly) ignored.

The EU’s Russia policy should involve, first and foremost, a lucid assessment of the cards the EU holds. The EU has been playing identity politics in Ukraine, while Putin has been playing Thucydides. Europe possesses many resources – technological, financial, commercial, scientific, demographic and political that vastly outweigh those of Russia. These should be deployed more strategically – which means more collectively.
Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts

In the immediate future, the EU must solve the Ukraine problem. The Union needs to be clear on two things. First, is Ukrainian membership in the EU’s interest? If not, it should be explicitly ruled out and a mutually acceptable arrangement negotiated between Brussels, Kiev and Moscow.

If Ukrainian accession is deemed to be in the EU’s interest, the second question becomes: at what price? To answer that question, the EU needs a strategy towards Russia that says very clearly: a) how its interests mesh with those of Russia – and they are many; and b) how far Brussels is prepared to go to confront Moscow over the issues on which they disagree.

**A FUNCTIONAL DEFENCE**

To achieve this, the EUGS must ensure the EU’s strategic autonomy. Almost 20 years after Saint Malo, the EU is more dependent on the US for its security than it was in the mid-1990s. As the CSDP story has unfolded, and as the US has tilted to Asia, the cries from Washington D.C. for Europeans to step up and assume leadership in their neighbourhood have become deafening.

Currently, the EU has the worst of all worlds. It has neither enlargement nor stability on the borders. It has a dysfunctional NATO that, despite the strong words of a succession of secretaries-general, is so ridden with internal contradictions as to be in a state of existential crisis – precisely when a credible deterrent is more necessary than ever. And it has a CSDP that has morphed into something very different from what was anticipated during its gestation – which was precisely an autonomous military and civilian capacity that would allow the EU to ‘play its full role on the international stage’, including by being prepared to conduct high-end warfare.

It has become a truism to call for greater ‘cooperation’ between the EU and NATO. But cooperation is not enough. We need (and the Americans want) that entity to be increasingly led by Europeans and genuinely competent. Europeans must finally emerge as the architects and guarantors of their own regional security. Europe should progressively merge CSDP into NATO and take over primary responsibilities, both political and military, within a transformed alliance.
### EU Global Strategy Expert Outreach and Consultation Process October 2015 – April 2016

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<td>17-18/02/16</td>
<td>Paris*</td>
<td>Europe and Africa: a strategic approach</td>
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<td>02-04/03/2016</td>
<td>Vilnius*</td>
<td>EU Global Strategy: eastern partners in European security</td>
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<td>The EU and the global development framework: a strategic approach to the 2030 Agenda</td>
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<td>Economics and politics in the transatlantic space: moving together or apart?</td>
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<td>Bucharest*</td>
<td>Wider Black Sea region: for a safer future</td>
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*Indicates involvement of ministries of foreign affairs
'The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) has always been about the process as much as the product itself. And in this process, the role of experts has been key. Reaching out beyond official institutions to the expert community has given the EUGS greater analytical depth, has generated innovative ideas and has allowed those of us drafting the document to understand far better the expectations of Europeans and non-Europeans alike. Many of the ideas and reflections in this volume will no doubt be echoed in the EUGS as we enter the final stages of the drafting process.'

Nathalie Tocci

Advisor to HR/VP Mogherini and lead pen-holder of the EUGS