The world devoted enormous sums in human energy, lives, and economic resources to the military-strategic competition that was the cold war. Each side invested billions in armaments that could have been spent otherwise, fought wars, and forced much of the developing world to choose between a client capitalism of oligarchs and dictators and some variant of a Soviet style one-party system. Neither side was willing to shift the conflict to the terrain of economics and culture, for neither could imagine a future in which the other system existed. There were moments, however, when the reigning Manicheanism seemed in doubt. Among them, none was more plausible than the weeks after Stalin’s death, when the shock of his absence led Soviet leaders as well as some in the West to eschew the familiar discourse of diametric opposition. As they probed a possibly different relationship, they ultimately failed to communicate and ended up on the road traveled over the next three decades.

Soviet concessions between Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953 and the June 17 uprising in East Berlin are well documented. In the first weeks of the new era, Soviet foreign policy depended chiefly on Georgy Malenkov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Lavrenty Beria, minister of the newly merged Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and State Security (MGB). Neither leader had a savory reputation, and Beria was a very unlikely reformer. Yet jointly or singly they made statements and launched initiatives that led the newly elected Eisenhower to respond in his speech, “The Chance for Peace,” on April 16. The President made no concessions but was nonetheless conciliatory. He invoked the wartime alliance and challenged Soviet leaders to match their words with deeds. “What is the Soviet Union Ready to Do?” Eisenhower asked rhetorically. “Whatever the answer be, let it be plainly spoken.”

Scholars disagree about Eisenhower’s options. John Lewis Gaddis cites a missed “opportunity to reunify Germany.” Walter Lafeber notes American hesitation under pressure of McCarthyism, and Vladislav Zubok and Konstantin Pleshakov see a lost chance “for those in the Soviet leadership prepared to move away from the universalist ideology of communism and the practice of global confrontation.” Contrarily, Richard H. Immerman and Robert R. Bowie stress Soviet intransigence, as does Vojtech Mastny, who finds the Soviet desire for change “strictly limited.” In the discussion of the motives and intentions of the two states, the issue of communication remains unexplored. How well did the rivals understand each other’s messages? Did the new Soviet leadership fail to convey a desire for detente simply because they lacked a language that American policymakers and American journalists could understand? Alternatively, if their objective was simply propagandistic, did they blunder for the same reason in an effort to split the emerging western alliance and prevent West German rearmament? In either case, as Eisenhower observed, Stalin’s successors needed the skill of “plain speech.” Winston Churchill wrote to Eisenhower of a similar concern on April 11: “We do not know what these men mean. We do not want to deter..."
them from saying what they mean."  

We have no equivalent statement of linguistic puzzlement from the Soviet side, but it is not unreasonable to assume that they found the language of American politics equally troublesome. The long hiatus in close relations, broken only by the brief and guarded wartime cooperation, left each side nearly bereft of skilled interpreters of the other’s culture and political language.

The strategic balance after Stalin’s death can be considered favorable to mutual agreement. It was a moment of perceived parity, if only in the sense of mutual anxiety. The United States worried over the Chinese Communist victory and the imminent French defeat in Indochina, but took comfort in Western Europe. Soviet leaders faced a crisis in Eastern Europe but success in Asia, as well as in their peace propaganda.  

Both nations had acquired thermonuclear weapons, and although the American superiority in bombers was considerable, the Soviet side could take consolation from its successful networks of spies. Citizens in each country yearned for peace and a better material life. Soviet wartime memories were heartrending, and victory led some to question the Stalinist system.  

Nearly thirty million people had died, and Soviet poverty was galling to those who had seen life abroad. Stalin’s death was less of an opening in America, where anger over the takeover of Eastern Europe and the Korean War had spurred Dwight D. Eisenhower’s landslide victory in 1952. Nevertheless, there were signs of a possible opening there too and also among America’s closest allies.

Belligerency in foreign affairs was intrinsic to each nation. Militarism accorded with an American willingness to advance America’s special role in the world by force that harkened back to Teddy Roosevelt. The resort to arms in foreign relations also suited Lenin and Stalin’s thinking. The military-strategic character of the cold war was not predetermined, however. 

On the American side, George F. Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, and others sought a competition more reflective of the Jeffersonian and Wilsonian traditions, according to which the United States could peacefully radiate freedom to all peoples. Eisenhower was also wary of enlarging the military’s role in American life. On the Soviet side, Stalin’s first successors, eager to raise living standards and satisfy the rising expectations of Soviet citizens, likewise sought to diminish military expenditures. In exploring this option, they inadvertently fell back on approaches to the West developed concurrently and contradictorily after the Soviet Civil War by diplomats Georgy Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov, and to a lesser extent by Nikolai Bukharin and his rival Leon Trotsky. Bukharin and Trotsky, although far from gentle by character, stressed economics and culture because they genuinely believed in the superiority of the socialist system. Chicherin and Litvinov valued the benefits derived from diplomatic and economic relations with capitalist powers without giving up the revolutionary project. Stalin saw the world otherwise, but with his passing, the pattern of implacable military and political confrontation he established appeared to float free of its moorings.

On March 15 Malenkov launched his “peace offensive,” announcing, with reference to the United States, “there is no dispute or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries.”  

Yet he and his colleagues could not deal with the American democracy as Stalin had with Hitler or even the western de-
mocracies during World War II. The informational world in which they operated had changed thanks in part to the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Company. To convince Eisenhower and his militantly anti-Communist advisors, they had to make a case that would resonate with the American public. To do this they needed to modify the language of Soviet public life. Khrushchev accomplished something of the sort with the thaw and so cleared the way for agreements by himself and his successor. Gorbachev and his advisors did considerably more, but at a point when it was already too late to prolong the Soviet system.

The political language available to Soviet leaders in the spring of 1953 reflected a longstanding censorship and monopoly of public expression. Lenin instituted this hegemonic linguistic order, and Stalin extended it by adopting rituals of theater to rally support for his brutal programs. Public utterances acquired a bombastic and self-reflexive character, more appropriate for giving orders than making arguments, and the government secured conformity through terror. Varlam Shalamov summed up the power of this performative culture in his Kolyma Tales, when he recorded a cynical camp saying, "If you don’t believe it, take it as a fairy tale." But, in fact, Soviet people could not take the official public narrative as a fairy tale because it infiltrated every aspect of life. Therefore the "plain speech" Eisenhower urged was neither accessible nor familiar to the new leaders, who were not fluent in any language other than the linguistic conventions of Stalinist public life.

The content of the "fairy tale," as well as its lexicon, also presented difficulties. Foremost was the legacy of Stalin’s cult, a cultural system in which the leader, the party, and the state took credit for all achievements and in which Soviet citizens were beholden to their leaders for everything allotted to them. I have elsewhere called this relationship between state and citizen the economy of the gift. Its effect on foreign affairs was to encourage a perspective in which the Soviet Union appeared larger than life and the surrounding world smaller. Thus the story the press told after May 9, 1945 was that Stalin had foreseen the war, saved the country, and also the world. By stressing the world’s obligation, journalists appealed to Soviet pride and enlarged the economy of the gift. The notion of Stalin as benefactor was epitomized by his portrayal as Grandfather Frost, the Russian Santa. He had appeared in this role on the front page of Labor, the official trade union newspaper, on December 30, 1936, smiling at a tree decorated with schools, buses, planes, and other such "gifts" and ringed with happy children.

The Soviet press fit the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan into this narrative by portraying the U.S. as a false benefactor, beneath whose "charitable" mask shows a policy of imperialistic expansion, Pravda editorialized on March 14, 1947. On New Year’s Day, 1949, the paper showed Uncle Sam as Santa, handing Europeans a pie marked "credit," beside a tree decorated with "crisis," "unemployment," and "atom." The caption was "The Marshallization of the Christmas Tree." C. D. Jackson, a hard-line advisor to Eisenhower observed in late 1955 that "So long as the Soviets had a monopoly on covert subversion and threats of military aggression, and we had a monopoly on Santa Claus, some kind of seesaw game could be played. But now the Soviets are muscling in on Santa Claus as well, which puts us in a terribly
dangerous position.” The lasting power of this cultural construction was still evident on December 31, 1999, when Boris Yeltsin presented Vladimir Putin to Russian voters with a New Year’s tree in the background.

The Soviet “Santa’s” preferred gift to the postwar world in 1948 and 1949 was peace. Nothing complicated the Soviet-American dialogue following Stalin’s death so much as the Soviet peace propaganda of the previous five years. Soviet publicists had debased the word and the concept to such an extent that it became virtually useless in communication with the Eisenhower administration and American society. The Soviet sponsored “peace movement” was launched in early August 1948 at the World Congress of Cultural Activists in Defense of Peace in Brotislav (Wroclaw), Western Poland. In January 1949 Stalin proposed a Soviet American “peace pact,” and moved the peace campaign to the center of the Soviet public culture. A World Congress of Peace Advocates convened in Paris in April, and Pravda reported on the Stockholm Petition to ban nuclear weapons, which had allegedly been signed by 500 million people. “Who are you with—the 500 million... or the handful of imperialists and their hired agents?” asked Iuri Zhukov, Pravda’s Paris correspondent. At issue was the moral merit of the rival Santas. The writer and chief Soviet delegate, A. Fadeev, rebuffed the claim that “people of the so-called Atlantic community possess a ‘monopoly’ on culture and humanism, and we, Soviet people, heirs to Pushkin and Tolstoy, Mendeleev and Pavlov, who have created the first country of socialism in the world with our hands, are some how the enemies of ‘western,’ ‘Atlantic’ culture.”

The division of the world into “camps” of peace and war placed a cumbersome requirement on Soviet journalists and spokesmen for they had to downplay the country’s most militant activities. Thus Soviet editors largely ignored the Chinese Civil War, the Berlin blockade, and even the Cominform’s expulsion of Yugoslavia in late June 1948. The Soviet press allowed American and British radio six weeks to shape the telling of events in Yugoslavia before denouncing Tito as an archenemy. Similarly, it was Truman and not Stalin who on September 23, 1949 announced the successful Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb a month after the test. Soviet journalists could have celebrated Soviet possession as a national achievement or as a victory for the international proletariat but neither presentation fit the story of Soviet benevolent leadership of the peace camp, and hence the successful test went unreported.

The adulation of Stalin as world benefactor reached its zenith in the official celebration of his seventieth birthday in December 1949. Soon afterwards, on January 30, 1950, in the wake of the successful bomb test and the victory of the Chinese communists, he secretly authorized the North Korean attack on South Korea and provided Soviet assistance. The invasion began on June 25 when the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) entered South Korea. Seoul, less than fifty miles from the border, fell on June 28. Concealing Soviet involvement and denouncing that of America, Soviet publicists brought the Manichean theme of peace and war to a crescendo and Soviet public life was choreographed to suit this purpose. As the NKPA advanced in late June and July, the Soviet press dwelled on several pre-arranged domestic events that highlighted the peacefulness of the country and its leader. The first was the “free discussion” of the ideas of
deceased linguist Nikolai Marr, which began in Pravda on May 9, 1950 with an announcement of shortcomings in Soviet linguistics, and filled two of Pravda’s six pages every Tuesday until July 4. Stalin intervened three times in the “discussion” about Marr, beginning on June 20, six days before the North Korean attack, so that when the fighting began he appeared to be engaged in a high-minded intellectual dispute about linguistics. Meetings of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, beginning on June 12, and of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic on July 5 to consider “a budget of peace,” served a similar purpose. These were followed by the opening of a Soviet campaign to sign the Stockholm Appeal on June 30, and meetings of peace advocates in Moscow in October and in Warsaw in November. Lastly, from June 28 through July 9 a Joint Session of the Academy of Sciences and Academy of Medical Science of the USSR met to consider Pavlov’s legacy.

Korea was a milestone in the official self-representation of the country. By pretending to act peacefully, while secretly aiding North Korea militarily, Soviet leaders, propagandists, and rank-and-file participants in the official culture validated the Manichean division of the world on the basis of peace and war. Hence in the realm of images Stalin loftily discussed the nature of language, while Truman, “leader of the free world,” met with generals about troops, bombs, and casualties. Ehrenburg recalled how incongruous Stalin’s public stance seemed at a time when many feared war: “Stalin busied himself with issues of linguistics, but ordinary citizens bought salt and soap.”

The result was to freeze the official Soviet national identity as the advocate of peace. Ignoring Soviet military involvement, Soviet publicists praised the North Koreans’ bravery and charged the U.S. with atrocities. In late August, Pravda’s correspondent, V. Kornilov charged MacArthur with carrying out “germ warfare,” an accusation that figured in later propaganda campaigns. The Soviet propaganda weekly New Times was vociferous in contrasting the two superpowers. The issue for July 5, 1950, the first on the war, devoted its front page to pictures of the Stockholm Appeal and its lead article to “American Aggression in Asia.” A cartoon on July 19 showed one hand holding a dove with a petition titled “peace signatures—hundreds of millions in favor”—and another showing “the Voice of America,” spewing out “Atom bomb! Cold war! Shooting War! Hydrogen Bomb,” labeled “one against.” The Second World Peace Congress, held in Warsaw from November 16 to 20, issued an “Address to the United Nations” urging the withdrawal of foreign armies from Korea and an international commission to investigate crimes and “in particular, the question of the responsibility of General MacArthur?” Speaking at the congress, the Soviet writer, Alexander Fadeyev, accused the U.S. of “All the horrors of the fascist atrocities that came up at the Nuremberg trial.” The Soviet government continued its peace campaign throughout the Korean War. Bohlen, ambassador to the Soviet Union soon after Stalin’s death, recalled ineffective “meetings at which the CIA discussed ways to counter the Hate America campaign.”

The Korean War also changed America’s self-image. Until the invasion, the United States had competed with the Soviet Union for the role of peaceful benefactor, and President Truman had rebuffed those in his
administration eager for rearmament. As the war approached, the press was indecisive; the tone of The New York Times in May and early June, 1950 was defensive, with many references to Soviet militarism and the growth of Soviet power. A cartoon on Sunday, May 21, showed a giant “Powder Key” looming over Berlin and a small man with the globe for a head covering his ears. A week later the paper published a picture showing a confident Uncle Sam fencing a surprised bear out of Western Europe with barbed wire labeled “Arms Aid Program.” The Times summed up the U.S. position in the lead article of the News of the Week in Review for June 11 with a statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson:

All during the week in statements by other top-ranking officials—and by President Truman himself—the same theme was reiterated. The theme is that American policy is peace policy—to strengthen the West in order to discourage Soviet aggression and thus prevent war. This was a kind of “peace offensive”—the West’s offensive. Heretofore the Americans have more or less assumed that the world knows that the United States is not an aggressor nation. At the same time the Russians have sought to “monopolize” the dove of peace—which they have made the symbol of the Communist peace drives—and the propaganda has had considerable effect.”

The war ended the effort to wrest the dove from the Soviets. The experience led many Americans to conclude that the country could not set the world right simply by virtuous example. National pride now became entangled with the impulse to extend American military power. Reacting to the North Korean invasion, the Truman administration, which had defended a peacetime budget against the rearmament plan sketched out in the April 14 report to the National Security Council known as NSC-68, now opted for military containment, to the chagrin of Kennan and Bohlen. Bohlen later noted, apparently regretfully, with reference to the proliferation of U.S. military bases, “It was the Korean war and not World War II that made us a world military-political power.” The moderate voices that had survived Joe McCarthy’s campaign against domestic subversion disappeared from the press, which adopted a uniformly combative tone. On June 28, 1950, three days after the invasion, the New York Times hailed Truman’s decision to intervene with a lead editorial “Democracy Takes its Stand,” and the columnist Hanson W. Baldwin suggested that the United States might have blocked “a communist program of conquest during the summer months in which Korea was to have been merely the first step.” On July 17, Time featured Stalin’s menacing face on its cover. The editors asked,

Where is the Korean War leading the World? Will the fierce forest fire in the mountainous land below the 38th parallel be confined to the Korean peninsula? Will it spread around the globe, to sear the capitals of the world with atomic fire? Or is 1950 the beginning of a series of slow limited wars that will keep the U.S. and its allies committed in battle for generations?”

A map in the new section, “War in Asia,” showed lines from Moscow to Korea, Formosa, Indochina, Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and West Germany. “NEXT?” was the caption. British cartoonist David Low expressed the consensus in the New York Times on July 2. While tanks roll across the Korean border, Stalin and his advisors stand arm in arm holding a sign reading “Next step to shove America
out of the Pacific.” The caption reads, “Honest Mister, there’s nobody here but us Koreans.”

Throughout the war, American and Soviet policymakers clung to their initial stances. Thus when Stalin died on March 5, 1953, the superpowers confronted each other with sharply contrasting public faces. The Soviet Union professed peaceful intentions. The United States in the person of the new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, blustered. It can be argued that the Soviet stance was hypocritical since they professed peace and made war, whereas America’s aggressive rhetoric approximated the leaders’ intention to defend the perceived national interest militarily. Hence, from the Soviet view it may have appeared that American policymakers meant what they said; whereas their American counterparts could conclude that the Soviets did not.

This mutual perception had possibly serious consequences, since American leaders were soon to dismiss Soviet initiatives as mere propaganda, arguing that the bear was again crying wolf. Soviet analysts read Dulles’ tough rhetoric rather than Eisenhower’s more moderate statements as indicative of American intentions. Each side stumbled over the content of the other’s propaganda as well as its institutional foundation. Soviet leaders were confounded by a multiplicity of voices, while Americans passed over nuance in an ideological system that they believed to be monolithic. Tragically, this was probably the moment when these two contrasting national identities were set in stone.

Ahead lay the arms race, the wars in Indochina and Afghanistan, the ideological polarization of Africa and Latin America, as well as myriad smaller conflicts fought largely by proxies. The troubled ceasefire in Korea on July 27, 1953, the Austrian State treaty on May 15, 1955, and the arms agreements of subsequent decades represented no more than temporary interruptions.

In the aftermath of Stalin’s death, these two rigid national identities were momentarily shaken. Stalin’s heirs launched their peace initiative to gain legitimacy by increasing the state’s gift to society. Better relations with the United States could mean trade and decreased military expenditures. Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov broached the issue on March 9, but in a manner likely to confirm American skepticism about the gap between words and deeds in Soviet behavior. Molotov gave the premier address. After reaffirming that “Stalin’s cause will live for ages,” he stated simply, “In foreign policy our chief concern is not to permit a new war, to live in peace with all peoples.” Beria, while hailing Stalin’s legacy with equal fervor, went further in stressing the importance of peace and the government’s “policy of international cooperation and the development of business-like ties with all countries on the basis of reciprocity.” Each affirmed the continuity of Soviet foreign policy. In effect, they broached the issue of peace while insisting that nothing had changed. Beria, for example, described the government’s foreign policy as “the Leninist-Stalinist policy of the preservation and strengthening of peace,” inadvertently invoking with his American audience the hypocritical peace campaigns of the Korean War. Molotov’s statement may have equally baffled outsiders. After denying that the Soviet Union had any “aggressive aims,” he announced:

Our foreign policy, which is known to the whole world as the stalinist peace-loving foreign policy, is a policy of the political defense of peace between peoples, of the
unwavering defense and strengthening of peace, of the struggle against the preparation and unleashing of new wars, a policy of international cooperation and the development of business-like ties with all countries who also strive for this.

The Eisenhower administration and the American press initially discounted these overtures. Yet gestures and proposed actions accompanied Soviet rhetoric. On April 1, Carton Savage of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff noted to the Director of the Staff (Paul Nitze), “Since the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953 there have been more Soviet gestures toward the West than at any other similar period.” He offered a “check list of Soviet gestures” that included the following: 1. Agreement to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war; 2. Proposal for the resumption of armistice talks in Korea on what appears to be a reasonable basis; 3. Proposal for British-Soviet talks in Berlin to reduce air incidents in Germany (a British plane had been shot down); 4. Statement by General Chuikov that a conference “called to prepare a peace treaty with Germany and the reunification of the country corresponds fully and wholly to the Soviet Union’s attitude; 5. Soviet admission in propaganda that the United States and Britain had a hand in the defeat of Germany in 1945; 6. Soviet permission for a group of American correspondents to enter Russia; 7. Soviet approach to a Norwegian representative at the UN, discussing a possible meeting between President Eisenhower and Malenkov to consider subjects of tension including atomic energy control and disarmament.

The press was privy to most of this activity, and on April 13 Newsweek, published “Peace Bids: A Calendar of Communist Offers,” and the magazine’s list was also impressive. Soviet leaders made other accommodating decisions or overtures. These included the freeing of ten British civilians held for three years in North Korea (NYT, March 21); the amnesty on March 27 of all Soviet prisoners serving sentences of less than five years, which resulted in freeing roughly one million, a third of the camp population; the granting of permission for the Russian wives of some non-Russians to leave the country, and an agreement to trade ill and wounded prisoners in Korea (NYT, March 29). North Korea agreed on April 11 to the exchange of prisoners. Another sign of change observed at the time was the repudiation of the Doctors’ Plot on April 4. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Beam) wrote on the evening of April 4: “This startling event, perhaps more than any other, provides most concrete evidence thus far of the present regime’s break with Stalinism since it must be accepted that Stalin himself either engineered the doctors plot, or gave his approval to one initiating bloc.” Winston Churchill agreed. He informed Eisenhower on April 11, “Nothing impressed me so much as the doctor story. This must cut very deeply into communist discipline and structure. I would not like it to be thought that a sudden American declaration [presumably a reference to Eisenhower’s upcoming speech] has prevented this natural growth of events.” On April 24, the new American ambassador to the Soviet Union, “Chip” Bohlen noted “the cessation of the hate-America campaign,” but warned that little of substance had changed. Materials from Soviet archives suggest that Beria may have considered proposing a neutral capitalist Germany and that Malenkov sup-
ported him, possibly because he was worried about nuclear weapons. In fact, Soviet relations with the West warmed somewhat. Later, in addition to ending the Korean War and signing the Austrian State treaty, the Soviet Union annulled the ban on marriages with foreigners; repatriated German prisoners of war; established relations with Greece, Israel, and Yugoslavia, and renounced claims to Turkish territory.

In view of the events in the weeks after Stalin’s death it seems surprising that the Eisenhower administration did not respond more favorably to the initial Soviet gestures. The difference between Eisenhower’s and Churchill’s perceptions is striking, even given the language of the Republican Party platform on which he was elected, the paranoia of America’s new cold war culture, and the American concern to promote Western European military integration. Eisenhower repeatedly dismissed as propagandistic the Soviet initiatives Churchill wished to explore. The American press largely accepted the Eisenhower administration’s reading of events. Thus on April 29, the New York Times ran a front-page article on Dulles’ rejection of Soviet overtures with the caption, “U. S., In Effect, Bars Molotov Peace Bid.” The fact that the Eisenhower administration rejected Soviet overtures and convinced the American public that it was proper to do so probably owed something to previous Soviet peace propaganda and to the competing national postures of the two countries as world-wide benefactors, as well as to Soviet policies throughout the world. In refusing to engage with the Soviets and to accept the Soviet peace initiative as genuine, the Eisenhower administration chose to replay the propaganda match that the United States was perceived to have lost in the first two years of the Korean War.

Whereas the aging Churchill thought of his place in history when he considered western policy toward the post-Stalin regime, Eisenhower recalled past slights in the war of words. Churchill wrote to Eisenhower on March 11, “I have the feeling that we might both of us together or separately be called to account if no attempt were made to turn over a new leaf.” Eisenhower replied, however, the same day: “Even now I tend to doubt the wisdom of a formal multilateral meeting since this would give our opponent the same kind of opportunity he has so often had to use such a meeting simultaneously to balk every reasonable effort of ourselves and to make of the whole occurrence [sic] another propaganda mill for the Soviet.”

Three weeks later, on April 5, Churchill wrote again with the same purpose, noting “the apparent change for the better in the Soviet mood,” suggesting “that we ought to lose no chance of finding out how far the Malenkov regime is prepared to go in easing things up all around.” Eisenhower replied on April 6 that he was considering a speech but again warned of propaganda: “This whole field is strewn with very difficult obstacles, as we all know, but I do think it extremely important that the great masses of the world understand that, on our side, we are deadly serious in our search for peace and are ready to prove this with acts and deeds and not merely assert it in glittering phraseology.” In fact, the Eisenhower administration had been preoccupied with propaganda and “psychological warfare” from the moment of Stalin’s illness.

Eisenhower sought to counter Soviet proposals, and on April 16 he gave the speech he had been considering, despite Dulles’ opposition.
recalled the hopes of 1945 and contrasted Soviet force and subversion with American efforts for “true peace” based on cooperation and on each nation’s right to choose its form of government and economic system. He stressed the cost of the arms race and the new Soviet leaders’ “precious opportunity... to help turn the tide of history.” He pointed to conflicts in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Austria, and Germany, proposed a fund for world aid and reconstruction, and challenged the Soviet government to provide “concrete evidence” of its desire for peace. He offered a five point proposal for arms reduction, including limitations on the numbers of armed forces, limits on the proportion of all production devoted to military purposes, international control of atomic energy, limitations on other weapons “of great destructiveness,” and enforcement through inspection by the United Nations. The New York Times praised the speech. “Eisenhower Asks Soviet Deeds: Peace in Asia and Disarmament; Would Use Savings to Aid World,” read the headline. On April 17, Pravda published a short summary of Eisenhower’s address in the middle of page four, criticizing him for defending the arms race and “the North Atlantic bloc,” for ignoring China’s national rights, and for failing to support the unification of Germany according to the Potsdam Agreement. The authors listed the five points on nuclear disarmament. To confuse the issue, however, the Soviet press otherwise retained its usual format, again sending the inadvertent message that nothing had changed. Pravda’s lead editorial on April 17 was “Daily Attention to Communal Livestock Production,” and Izvestia, which also published TASS’s report, invoked the old stalinist jargon by comparing the Soviet state, “which expresses the will and interests of the broadest masses of the people,” to the bourgeois state, “which by its very nature is alien and hostile to the masses of the people.” This presentation was unlikely to generate a positive response from either the Eisenhower administration or the American press. The Times first emphasized the negative features of TASS’ commentary, and then questioned its meaning. On the very day of the Soviet response, Dulles described Eisenhower’s speech as a “peace offensive” based on America’s rebuff of Soviet aggression. He decided Soviet initiatives as a “peace defensive,” a retreat before American power and “a tactical move of the kind which Soviet communism has often practiced.” By Sunday, April 19, Dulles had gained sway, and American journalists began to treat Soviet initiatives as a continuation of the ongoing propaganda struggle between the two sides. On April 20, Newsweek caught the flavor of the moment with the caption, “Western Cold Peace Strategy: Check the Gift Horse’s Teeth.” A week later the magazine’s headline was sharper: “Ike Demands Deeds, not Words as Reds Talk Peace, Wage War.” A cartoon showed a small dumpy Malenkov threatened by a towering wave labeled “Ike’s 5 Points for Peace.” On April 22, the Soviet press again signaled interest in negotiations, but perhaps too subtly to attract notice. The second among the familiar May day slogans that appeared on the front pages of the central newspapers was “Long Live Peace between Peoples!” Following the slogan was an unattributed quote from Malenkov’s speech of March 15: “There is no dispute or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries.”
On April 25, Pravda and Izvestia responded directly to Eisenhower’s speech by printing a translation and identical front-page commentaries. The editors welcomed Eisenhower’s appeal, but defended previous Soviet policies and criticized those of America. They too urged action not words. They expressed puzzlement at the contrast between Eisenhower and Dulles’ speeches. “It is difficult to judge what comprises the external policy of the USA,” they wrote. Soviet analysts were divided on the meaning of Eisenhower’s speech, but after Dulles’ address they concluded that there was little chance of improving relations.57

The American response to the Soviet commentary and translation was largely negative. Again propaganda was the issue. On April 25 Bohlen cited the editorial and “accurate and full translation” of Eisenhower’s address as “unprecedented,” but the intention, he observed, was to defend the Soviet position and to “avoid the appearance of throwing cold water on any prospects of peaceful solution and improved relations initiated by the President.”58 Similarly, a high level “interdepartmental report” dated April 24 noted that “there is no basis for concluding that the fundamental hostility of the Kremlin toward the West has abated, that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet rulers have changed, or that the menace of Communism to the free world has diminished.”59 Another interdepartmental report dated April 30, conveyed a similar judgment that “the rulers of the USSR envisage a prolonged political warfare campaign exploiting the ‘peace’ theme.”60 Dulles likewise warned the NATO council in Paris in late April against Malenkov’s “phony peace campaign.”61

At the 141st meeting of the National Security Council on April 28, C. D. Jackson, expressed “surprise and anxiety” that “the American newspapers were hailing it [the commentary in Pravda] as a great and concrete concession by the Soviet Union,” even though “they had offered no compromises.”62 Jackson worried for naught. The New York Times welcomed the Soviet response on April 25, but soon soured on Soviet motives.63 “Observers thought the White House caution was well taken,” the paper reported on Sunday April 26. The editorialist concluded: “This new statement... dashes humanity’s hopes that the Soviet leaders’ declamations about peace since Stalin’s death would be followed by a real change of policy.” An accompanying cartoon showed a highflying peace dove carrying “Eisenhower’s Peace Program,” followed by a huffing Malenkov with a dove on a leash labeled “Soviet Peace Offensive.”64 Newsweek on May 4 also justified the administration’s caution: “Until it is satisfied that there’s no hook in the lure, the Eisenhower Administration won’t bite [‘at the Soviet peace bait’].” U.S. News and World Report printed Dulles’ warning that “The free peoples are susceptible to Soviet guile because they so passionately want peace that they can readily be attracted by illusions of peace.”65 Its cover story was “Africa Next Goal of Communists.”

The Soviet initiative suffered from the opacity of Soviet politics, which kept outside analysts and journalists guessing about who was in charge. “The great question confronting intelligence officers was to determine whether this new set-up in Russia constituted personal dictatorship by Malenkov or some sort of committee control,” observed Allen Dulles at the National Security Council on March 11.66 Six weeks later, Bohlen wrote: “The great question for the future which only time will answer is
whether or not the Soviet system can be run by a committee or whether it requires the arbitrary power of final decision by one man.” 67 The press was also at sea. On March 11 The New York Times printed an article by its Soviet specialist Harry Schwartz comparing the new leaders’ speeches with that of Stalin on Lenin’s death thirty years earlier. On March 14, Schwartz provided an expose of a doctored picture of Molotov with Stalin and Mao captioned “Pravda Edits Picture Made in ’50, Moving New Premier Up.” Such apparent readiness of the part of Soviet leaders to distort factual records did little to reassure the American public and the administration regarding the veracity of Soviet official statements. 68

Churchill pressed on in vain for a summit, anticipating developments that would only come much later in the wake of detente. His objective, he told Eisenhower on March 27, was “to encourage and aid any development of Russian life which leads to a wider enjoyment by the Russian masses of the consumer goods of which you speak, and modern popular amenities and diversions which play so large a part in British and American life.” 69 On April 11 Churchill wrote that “great hope has arisen in the world that there is a change of heart in the vast, mighty masses of Russia and this can carry them far and fast and perhaps into revolution.” 70 On May 4, he had even sent Eisenhower a draft letter to Molotov, suggesting a meeting, but Eisenhower replied negatively. “Far from there having been any Communist actions which we could accept as indications of such seriousness of purpose, the Pravda editorial [about his speech] repeats all the previous Soviet positions and we are now faced with new aggression in Laos.” 71 He also warned against “any action which could be misinterpreted” at a time “when the Soviet peace offensive is raising doubts in people’s minds.” Despite a stroke on June 5, Churchill persisted, but was reportedly losing patience with his ally. His private secretary, Sir John Coville, noted in his diary after they had lunched on July 24: “Very disappointed in Eisenhower whom he thinks both weak and stupid.” 72

In Moscow, on April 24, Bohlen began to question his initial appraisal suggesting that although Soviet rhetoric sounded familiar it might have a different meaning because the leadership could not “disregard as cynically as he [Stalin] did the contradiction between word and deed.” 73 The Berlin uprising intervened, however. Speaking at the National Security Council on June 18, the day after the event, Eisenhower reiterated his determination to “lend no semblance of moral support for Soviet imperialism,” stating that “he had made it crystal clear that if there were to be a four-power conference he himself would certainly not be present.” 74 At the same meeting C. D. Jackson voiced the opinion that “the East Berliners had pulled the rug from under the Kremlin.” As he put it: “The Russians can scarcely come, in the circumstances, to any four-power conference posing as spokesmen for a contented democratic Germany which only seeks to be reunited.” 75 On July 7, nearly three weeks after the clash in Berlin, Bohlen reported to the State Department:

I believe that we can no longer without detriment to our purposes continue to dismiss the present phase of Soviet policy both internal and external as simply another “peace campaign” designed solely or even primarily to baffle and divide the West. The events that have occurred here cumulatively add up, in my opinion, to some-
thing considerably more important, offering on the one hand more opportunities and on the other considerably more dangers than the standard propaganda gestures which we have seen since the end of the war.”

He concluded, “In its foreign relations most evidence to date would indicate that the Soviet Government desires a return to diplomacy and a lessening of world tension for an indefinite period of time.”77 Years later in a June 1964 interview, he looked back with some disappointment: “I think it would have been very useful to have had a Summit conference in 53. We might have gotten a great deal out of it. I must say, I didn’t advise it then because I didn’t see the situation as it looks now.”78 The insight came too late. Harrison E. Salisbury, who met often with Bohlen in Moscow, recalled of Eisenhower and Bohlen: “He [Eisenhower] seemed to have no interest in the tales Bohlen wanted to tell about the new crowd in Moscow. Though not surprised at Dulles, Bohlen was shocked and bitter at Ike.”79

The American reluctance to test the sincerity of Malenkov’s and Beria’s apparent desire for normalization of relations owes much to the linguistic conventions in which the Soviet leaders expressed their views. Yet Soviet rhetoric was more than off putting. Those who used it sharply restricted their range of actions as well as the extent to which their American counterparts could understand them. The historian J. G. A. Pocock has described this dilemma: “Men cannot do what they have no means of saying they have done; and what they do must in part be what they can say and conceive that it is.”80 The old political language retained its hold on most Soviet leaders months after Stalin’s death, as revealed in the transcript of the speeches at the secret Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU from July 2 through July 7, 1953 at which Beria was denounced.81

To engage effectively with the United States in the spring of 1953 Soviet leaders would have needed to jettison the most fundamental precepts of their political speech and formulate others. They would have had to dispense with the Manicheanism on which the legitimacy of the regime had depended almost without interruption since the days of Lenin. In 1953 this would have meant giving up the contrast between a peaceful Soviet “camp” and the warlike American one. Discarding the old basis for discourse would also have undercut the country’s claim to be humanity’s chief benefactor. Nor could a more open-speaking regime have maintained the core value of the political order that citizens had to thank the leader, the party, and the state for all goods and services. To pursue negotiations with the United States would have required a rhetoric consistent with a different conception of the Soviet place in the world and of the nature of Soviet society.

Only a tremendous crisis or trauma could cause Soviet leaders to drop the lens through which they saw the world and the voice they used to describe it. The initial defeats by the Nazis and the threat to national survival in World War II was one such trauma, and the rhetoric changed, if temporarily.82 As soon as the tide turned favorable, however, the Stalinist leadership returned to the old rules of speech. Stalin’s death was another trauma, since he had effectively centered the language of politics on his person. The fact that the slogan “Thank You, Comrade Stalin,” was no longer relevant provided an opening
for new leaders to develop new forms of speech, but the process was slow, uneven, and ultimately unsuccessful. In the crucial months between March 5 and the East Berlin uprising, Stalin’s heirs proved unable to express themselves differently enough to win a hearing from the skeptical Eisenhower administration and the American public. The message the new leaders conveyed was not sufficient to defeat the powerful and enemies of normalization in the United States. If a chance to tone down the arms race was in fact missed in 1953, failure to communicate may explain in part why. Soviet ideology, which suffused the language of public life, constrained the new leaders’ ability to express a desire for peace and perhaps even to imagine what such a policy would entail. Americans in government and in the media for their part neither accepted Soviet peace overtures as literal statements nor as meaningful messages. They were so fully invested in the cold war rhetoric that they were unable or unwilling to perceive nuance or subtlety in Soviet statements. For the Eisenhower administration to have engaged with the new Soviet leadership would have required a significant break with the militant vision of America’s world role set out in the 1952 Republican Party Platform.

Why did Churchill and Eisenhower hear the same Soviet rhetoric so differently? Churchill, from his vantage point in war-ravaged Britain, was not immersed in the almost religious American cold war culture. Nor did he have to contend with the same expectations about his country’s role in the world. He may have also been less angered by the Soviet peace campaigns of the Korean War. Perhaps in the twilight of his career he had the vision to move beyond Manicheanism. Churchill may have been more attuned to messages of both sides, but as an American ally he could do no more than state his views as he did.

Could Soviet leaders have mastered a new political language in the short time available to them before the East German uprising? Such a departure would have probably required a phase of preparation, such as “the thaw” under Khrushchev or glasnost under Gorbachev. Soviet public culture and its message, including the cult of the leader, the economy of the gift, and official Manicheanism could not have been discarded in their entirety without imperiling the system itself, as Khrushchev and Gorbachev both found later.

What might an agreement have looked like in the spring of 1953 had leaders successfully expressed a desire to forge one? Faced with the prospect of a rearmed West Germany in NATO, Stalin’s successors were willing to consider a neutral united and demilitarized alternative, and they did not commit themselves to the two-state option and the promotion of a socialist East Germany until after the June uprising in East Berlin. A second area of accord might have involved the movement of military observers. The four-power agreements after the war allowed for some such movement in Germany, and an extension of this arrangement might have had a prospect of success. Later Eisenhower was to propose the open skies program, which the Soviets were unwilling to accept. Although neither option would have led to significant arms reductions, either would have represented a start. Cultural exchange was another area in which the possibility for an opening may have existed, even though the Soviets were suspicious of such activity. In each case, however, the momentum of the strategic-military struggle proved too great to overcome.
The cold war continued as a largely military and strategic struggle for almost another four decades, at great cost to Americans, Russians, and other peoples around the world. The 1970s and 1980s were marked not by peaceful competition but by bloody local wars. The hardships at present for so many people in the post-Soviet successor states derive in large part from the high cost of the protracted cold war. If indeed a window of historic opportunity opened partially on Stalin’s death neither of the opponents was able to use it for effective communication. Rhetorical constraints, largely of expression on the Soviet side and of perception on the American, closed the window before anyone had a chance to see the view.
End Notes

1. I thank Karen Brooks, Georgiy Cherniavskiy, Daun van Es, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Louis Galambos, John Higham, Anna Krylova, Lary May, Yale Richmond, Blair Ruble, Ron Suny, Ruud van Dijk, and Ron Walters for their helpful comments. I presented early versions of this essay at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago in January 2000, a joint seminar of the Kennan Institute and the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C, and the Russian Studies Workshop at the University of Chicago.


4. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 129. W. W. Rostow shares this view in Europe after Stalin: Eisenhower's Three Decisions of March 11, 1953 (Austin, 1982), 74. See also William L. O'Neil. American High: the Years of Confidence, 1945-1960 (New York, 1986), 208, who cites Eisenhower's "muffling attitude toward Russia" and Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe (New York, 1991), 53 who writes, "It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the West missed a rare opportunity in the spring and summer of 1953 to renegotiate the division of Europe."


8. On Soviet concerns about discontent in Eastern Europe see Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe:

9 I argue this point in Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton, 2000), 195–98; See also E. S. Seniakovaia, Frontovoe pokolenie. Istoriiko-psykhologicheskoе issledovanite (Moscow, 1945).

10 Pravda, March 15, 1953.


12 The penetration of this language into the secret councils of the leadership is evident in the many publications of documents. See, for example, J. Arch Getty and Olge V. Naumov, eds., The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939 (New Haven, 1999).


14 See also the article by B. Gribor ‘ev, “Novogodnie ‘dary’ g-na garrimana,” in Trud, January 8, 1949.

15 Quoted from the C. D. Jackson papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas in Brands, The Devil We Knew, 43.

16 Pravda, August 26, 1948.

17 Pravda and Izvestia February 2–5, 1949 also gave foreign comments on Stalin’s remarks.

18 Pravda, April 7, 1949.

19 Pravda, April 27, 1949.


22 He commented in Pravda on June 20, 1950, July 4, 1950, and August 2, 1950. His comments on August 2, 1950 consisted of three replies to letters, which together with his earlier remarks were reprinted as a separate booklet.

23 Il’ia Erenburg, Liudy, Gody, Zhizn’: Vospominaniiia v trekh tomakh (Moscow, 1990), 3:154.


June 3, 1950.

33. Bohlen, Witness, 303
34. Izvestia, March 10, 1953.
35. FRUS, 1138.
37. FRUS, 1141.
38. The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 41.
39. FRUS, 1158.
42. The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 31. Sic appears in the quoted passage.
43. Ibid., 32.
44. The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 33.
45. Ibid., 38.
48. I cite the text in FRUS, 1147-55.
50. Martin Walker in The Cold War: A History (New York, 1993) suggests that Pravda published a critical commentary whereas Izvestia, Malenkov’s power base, published the speech in full. He cites G. Arbatov, The System (New York, 1992), 43. In fact, both Pravda and Izvestia published the critical summary by TASS on the 17 and both also published the speech and a commentary on April 25.
52. I cite the text in the New York Times, April 19, 1953.
54. Newsweek, April 20, 1953, 40.
55. Newsweek, April 27, 1953.
56. Newsweek, April 27, 1953. The cartoon is by Packer from the New York Mirror.
58. FRUS, 1164-65
59. FRUS, 1163.
60. FRUS, 1163.
61. Private memorandum, late April, 1953, Dulles Papers; cited by Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston, 1973), 173.
65. U.S. News and World Report, May 1, 1953, 94.
66. FRUS, 111
67. FRUS, 1157-58.
70. The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 41.
71. FRUS, 1170-71.
73. FRUS, 1158.
75. Ibid, 10.
76. FRUS, 1193.
77. FRUS, 1195.
78. Quoted by Rostow in Europe after Stalin, 70, from the J. F. Dulles Oral History Project in the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University,
82. Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!, 159-94.