Security, Stability, and International Migration

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I.

Conceptual Approaches[1]

Recent events suggest that the security of states can be affected by population movements and, in turn, that population movements are affected by the security considerations of states. Consider the following:

--As a result of an international embargo following its invasion of Kuwait the government of Iraq seized western immigrants, placed them at strategic locations in order to prevent air strikes, and offered to exchange Asian immigrants for shiploads of food.

--Palestinian immigrants in Kuwait collaborated with the Iraqi invaders, thereby strengthening Iraq's hold on Kuwait but at the same time threatening the position of Palestinian immigrants in other countries in the Gulf.

--Iraq recruited 1.5 million Egyptian farm laborers as replacements for the nearly one million men conscripted into the military to serve in the war with Iran. Many remained in the country even as relations between Iraq and Egypt deteriorated.

--As a result of an exodus of East Germans to Austria through Czechoslovakia and Hungary in July and August 1989, the East German Government opened its western borders. The result was a massive flight to

West Germany, clashes between refugees and the police, the fall of the East German government, and the absorption of East Germany by the Federal Republic of Germany.

--Following an announcement by Palestinian radicals that they would launch terrorist attacks against airlines that carried Soviet Jews to Israel, several governments instructed their state-owned airlines not to carry the immigrants.

--A band of armed refugees in Uganda from the Tutsi tribe launched an invasion of Rwanda in an effort to overthrow the Hutu dominated government and restore Tutsi domination.

--Fearful that a large scale influx of Vietnamese refugees might jeopardize the security of Hong Kong, the British government ordered the return of the Vietnamese in spite of considerable international protest.

These developments suggest the need for a security/stability framework for the study of international migration which focuses on state policies toward emigration and immigration as shaped by concerns over internal stability and international security. Such a framework would consider political changes within states as a major determinant of international population flows, and migration - including refugee flows - both as a cause and a consequence of international conflict.

A security/stability framework can be contrasted with an international political economy framework which explains international migration primarily by focusing on global inequalities, the economic linkages between sending and receiving states, including the movement of capital, technology, and the role played by transnational institutions, and structural changes in labor markets linked to changes in the international division of labor. The two

frameworks have much in common. Both turn our attention from individual decision-making by migrants to the larger social, political, and economic context within which individuals act; both are interactive frameworks emphasizing the linkage between migration processes and other global processes; and both frameworks pay close attention to the behavior of states and to the importance of borders, although the security/stability framework gives somewhat greater importance to state decision-making than does the international political economy approach, which often regards the state as a weak actor buffeted by larger global forces.

The two frameworks direct us to study different aspects of international migration, to ask different questions, to offer different explanations for international flows, and to create different conceptual tools for analysis. While at times complementary, the frameworks often yield different outcomes. A political economy perspective, for example, may lead the analyst to regard the movement of people from a poor to a rich country as mutually advantageous (the one benefitting from remittances, the other from needed additions to its labor force) whereas a security/stability perspective of the same migration flow may lead one to point to the political risks associated with changes in the ethnic composition of the receiving country and of the attending international strains that result if there are clashes between natives and migrants. A reverse assessment may also be rendered: a political economy perspective may lead the analyst to conclude that migration results in a brain drain from the sending country while worsening unemployment and creating housing shortages in the receiving country, while a security/stability framework may lead the analyst looking at the same migration flow to argue that internal security and international peace can be enhanced because the migrants are an ethnic minority unwelcomed in their home country but welcomed or at least

readily accepted by another country. The movement of people may be acceptable to both countries even though each incurs an economic loss Thus, a cost/benefit analysis may yield different assessments and policies depending upon which framework is chosen.

Much of the contemporary literature on international migration focuses on global economic conditions as the key determinants of population movements.[2] Differentials in wages and employment opportunities - a high demand for labor in one country and a surplus in another - stimulates the movement of labor. According to economic theories of migration, individuals will emigrate if the expected benefits exceed the costs, with the result that the propensity to migrate from one region or country to another is viewed as being determined by average wages, the cost of travel, and labor market conditions. Accordingly, it is argued, changes in the global economy, such as a rise in the world price of oil or shifts in terms of trade and international flows of capital, will increase the demand for labor in some countries and decrease it in others. Moreover, the development strategies pursued by individual countries may lead to high growth rates in some and low growth rates and stagnation in

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[2]On the political economy of international migration see, for a neo-Marxist perspective, Saskia Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, Alejandro Portes and John Walton, Labor, Class, and the International System (New York: Academic Press, 1981) and Stephen Adler, International Migration and Dependence (Westmead: Saxon House, 1977.), Stephen Castes and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1973). For other political economy interpretations see Charles P. Kindleberger, Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1963, Michael Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, Wolf R. Bohning, The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), Wolf R. Bohning, Studies in International Labour MIgration (London: Macmillan, 1984). Two recent works by economists on migration to the United States - Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), and George J. Borjas, Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy (New York: Basic Books, 1990), do not deal with the political or security dimensions of international migration.

others.   Uneven economic development among states and a severe maldistribution of income within states may induce individuals and families to move across international boundaries to take advantage of greater opportunities.

These economic explanations go a long way toward explaining a great deal of international population movements but they neglect two critical political elements. The first is that international population movements are often impelled, encouraged, or prevented by governments or political forces for reasons that may have little to do with economic conditions. Indeed, much of the international population flows, especially within Africa and South Asia, are only marginally determined, if at all, by changes in the global or regional political economy. And secondly, even when economic conditions create inducements for people to leave one country for another it is governments that decide whether their citizens should be allowed to leave and governments that decide whether immigrants should be allowed to enter and their decisions are frequently based on non-economic considerations. Any effort, therefore, to develop a framework for the analysis of transnational flows of people must also take into account the political determinants and constraints upon these flows.[3]

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[3]Among the studies which focus on the political determinants of refugee flows, the most comprehensive is Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Few studies so directly consider the relationship between population flows and the political processes within and between states that create them. For a study of the *effects* of migration, especially on foreign policy, see the particularly useful set of essays edited by Robert W Tucker, Charles B Keely and Linda Wrigley, Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. Also see Michael S Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy, International Organization 38 (Summer 1984) For an examination of how refugees flow affect and are affected by international relations see Gilbert Loescher and Laila Monahan, editors, Refugees and International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) and Leon Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics (London: Croon Helm, 1987). It should be noted that the standard works in international relations and in the political economy of international relations do not discuss international migration and refugee flows as determinants or consequences of international conflict. See, for example Robert O.Keohane and Joseph

A security/stability framework complements rather than replaces a political economy analysis by focusing upon the political context within which states behave. The object of this article is to identify some of these contexts, when security/stability considerations become paramount in the behavior of states.. I shall do so in three ways. The first is to identify types of international movements generated by considerations of state security and stability as distinct from those flows largely shaped by the regional or international political economy. I shall provide a brief description of forced and induced emigrations as examples of politically driven population movements with international repercussions. Secondly, I shall identify those circumstances when international migration is regarded as a threat to a country's security and stability. This leads us to consider how and when refugees and economic migrants come to be regarded as threatening by receiving and sending countries. Finally I shall consider the various ways states behave when faced with population movements they regard as a threat to their international security and internal stability.

Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Stephen D Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

II

Forced and Induced Emigrations: A Global Perspective.

It would be inaccurate to use the passive voice to describe much of the world's population flows. They do not merely happen. More often they are made to happen. We can identify three distinct types of forced and induced emigrations in the contemporary world.

First, governments may force emigration as a means of achieving cultural homogeneity or for asserting the dominance of one ethnic community over another. Such flows have a long and sordid world-wide history. The rise of nationalism in Europe was accompanied by state actions to eject religious communities that did not subscribe to the established religion, and ethnic minorities that did not belong to the dominant ethnic community. In the fifteenth century, the Spanish crown expelled the Jews. In the sixteenth century the French expelled the Huguenots. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the British crown induced Protestant dissenters to settle in the American colonies. And in the nineteenth century minorities throughout Eastern Europe - Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews, Turks, Hungarians, Serbs, Macedonians - were put to flight.

Many of the population movements in post-independence Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia are similarly linked to the rise of nationalism and the emergence of new states. The boundaries of many of the new post-colonial regimes divided linguistic, religious and tribal communities, with the result that minorities, fearful of their future and often faced with discrimination and violence, migrated to join their ethnic brethren in a neighboring country. Many third world countries also expelled their ethnic minorities, especially when the minorities constituted an industrious

class of migrant origin in competition with a middle class ethnic majority. Governments faced with unemployment within the majority community and conflicts among ethnic groups over language and educational opportunities often regarded the expulsion of a prosperous, well placed minority as a politically popular policy. Minorities were often threatened by the state's antagonistic policies toward their religion, their language and their culture, as the state sought to impose a hegemonic ethnic or religious identity upon its citizens. Economically successful minorities were often told that others would be given preferences in employment, a policy of reverse discrimination which effectively made it difficult for minorities to compete on the basis of merit. Many governments expelled their minorities or created conditions which induced them to leave, and thereby forced other countries, on humanitarian grounds, out of cultural affinity, to accept them as refugees. The list is long: Chinese in Vietnam, Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Bahais in Iran, Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, Ahmediyas in Pakistan, Chakmas in Bangladesh, and in Africa communities in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Sudan, to name a few.

Secondly, governments have forced emigration as a means of dealing with political dissidents and class enemies. The ancient Greeks were among the earliest to strip dissidents of citizenship and cast them into exile. Socrates himself was offered the option of going into exile rather than being executed. Contemporary authoritarian governments have expelled dissidents or allowed them to go into exile as an alternative to imprisonment. In the United States exiles from the third world -- from Ethiopia, Iran, Cuba, South Korea, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Chile -- have largely replaced exiles from Europe.

Governments may expel not only a handful of dissidents, but a substantial portion of the population hostile to the regime. Revolutionary

regimes often see large scale emigration of a social class as a way of transforming the country's social structure. The exodus of more than a half million members of the Cuban middle class was regarded by the Castro regime as a way of disposing of a social class hostile to socialism. In 1971 the Pakistan government sought to weaken the insurgency in East Pakistan by forcing large numbers of Bengali Hindus out of the country. The Vietnamese government justified expulsions as a way of eliminating a bourgeois social class opposed to the regime. The Kampuchean government killed or forced into exile citizens tainted with French and other western cultural influences in an effort to reduce its cultural and economic ties with the west. And in Afghanistan, the Soviet and Afghan military forced populations hostile to the regime to flee to Pakistan and Iran.

A third type of forced emigration can be described as part of a strategy to achieve a foreign policy objective. Governments, for example, may force emigration as a way of putting pressure on neighboring states, though they may deny any such intent. The refugee receiving country, however, often understands that a halt to unwanted migration is not likely to take place unless it yields on a demand made by the country from which the refugees come. In the late 1970s, for example, the United States government believed that the government of Haiti was encouraging its citizens to flee by boat to Florida to press the United States to substantially increase its economic aid. (It did.) In the 1980s Pakistan officials believed that Soviet pressure on Afghans to flee was in part intended to force Pakistan to seek a settlement with the Afghan regime and to withdraw military aid to the insurgents. The Malaysian government feared that the government of Vietnam sought to destabilize them by forcing them to accept Chinese refugees. The Federal Republic of Germany believed that the German Democratic Republic was permitting Tamil refugees

to enter through the Berlin border to force the FRG to establish new rules of entry that would tacitly recognize the East German state or, alternatively, as a bargaining ploy for additional financial credits (which it subsequently granted in return for halting the flow).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries colonization was an instrument of foreign policy, a strategy for extending control over a territory. The British settled their colonies in the western hemisphere, in southern and eastern Africa and in the Pacific; the French settled north Africa; the Portuguese populated Angola and Brazil; the Russians moved into nearby territories in the east, south and southwest. There were closely related economic motives to colonization. John Stuart Mill suggested that a country could overcome the tendency to diminishing returns from land by sending people overseas to cultivate open spaces.

The imperial powers also moved populations from one territory to another in pursuit of their own economic and political interests. Slaves were transported from Africa to the Caribbean and to North and South America. With the abolition of slavery, the British established a system of indentured labor which enabled them to satisfy the labor needs in their colonies (especially on British owned plantations) by moving Indians to East Africa, Mauritius, the Caribbean and to Fiji. The colonial powers also encouraged the migration of entrepreneurial communities, traders and money lenders whom they regarded as politically pliable, e.g., Indians to the Gulf, Lebanese to West Africa, and Chinese to Southeast Asia.

While the colonization of distant territories rarely led to enduring political or economic control, the colonization of nearby territories has almost always had permanent consequences. Americans moved westward into Mexican and Indian territories. The Chinese colonized non-Han areas. The

Russians colonized the Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic states and portions of Muslim-populated Soviet Central Asia. And the Germans moved eastward in central Europe. These flows displaced the local populations and transformed the politics of the areas that were colonized.

With independence many newly established regimes sought to decolonize themselves by pressing for the exodus of populations they regarded as imposed upon them by the imperial power. With few exceptions, white settlers were pressed to return home. French settlers vacated Algeria; most Portuguese left Angola and Mozambique; many British left Zimbabwe. The new regimes often pressed for the exodus of those who had been brought in by the imperial rulers as indentured servants, though they were now free laborers and many had become prosperous businessmen and members of the middle class. Uganda forced South Asians to leave. Sri Lanka pressed for the departure of Tamil tea estate workers. The Fijian military overthrew an elected government dominated by Indian descendants of estate workers and native Melanesian Fijians rioted against Indians in an apparent effort to force them to leave the island.

In summary then, induced or forced emigration can be an instrument by which one state seeks to destabilize another, force recognition, stop a neighboring state from interfering in its internal affairs, prod a neighboring state to provide aid or credit in return for stopping the flow, or as a way of extending its own political and economic interests or that of a dominant ethnic group through colonization. An examination of both historical and contemporary population movements thus demonstrates that countries of emigration have more control over international population flows than is widely believed and that what often appears to be spontaneous emigration and refugee movements may represent deliberate emigration policies on the part of

sending countries. To view refugee flows simply as the unintended consequences of internal upheavals or economic crises is to ignore the eagerness of some governments to reduce or eliminate from within their own borders selected social classes and ethnic groups and to affect the politics and policies of their neighbors.

III

When is Migration a Threat to Security and Stability?

The variations in the reactions of states to international migration, and their changes over time seem so great that one despairs of identifying some general explanation for when and why migration is regarded as destabilizing and a threat to a country or people's security. One answer lies in how societies define "security." If we understand security not simply as protection against armed attack but more broadly as the absence of threat to major societal values, then security has different meanings among different societies. Preserving one's ethnic character may be more highly valued in an ethnically homogeneous than in a heterogeneous society. Providing a haven for those who share one's presumptive universal values (political freedom, for example) is important in some countries, not in others. Moreover, what is highly valued may not be shared by elites and counter elites. A monarch may fear the influx of migrants regarded as radicals, but welcomed by the opposition. And the business community may be more willing than the general public to import migrant workers.

Any attempt to systematically classify types of threats from immigration also runs quickly into distinctions between "real" and "perceived" threats, or into absurdly paranoid notions of threat or mass anxieties that can best be described as xenophobic and racist. But even these anxieties are elements in

the reaction of governments to immigrants and refugees. It is necessary to find an analytical stance that on the one hand is not dismissive of fears and on the other does not regard all anxieties over immigration and refugees as a justification for exclusion.

Before turning to an analysis of how, why and when states regard immigrants and refugees as potential threats, it is first necessary to note that some obvious explanations are of limited utility. Plausibly a country with little unemployment, a high demand for labor, and the financial resources to provide the housing and social services required by immigrants would regard migration as beneficial while a country low on each of these dimensions would regard migration as economically and socially destabilizing Using these criteria, therefore, one might expect Japan to welcome migrants and Israel to reject them!

A second plausible explanation is the volume of immigration. It is self-evident that a country faced with a large-scale influx would feel threatened, compared with a country experiencing a small influx of migrants. From this perspective one might have expected the Federal Republic of Germany to regard the influx of a trickle of Sri Lankans with equanimity, but to move swiftly to halt an influx of 2,000 East Germans daily, or for the countries of Africa to feel more threatened by the onrush of refugees and hence less receptive than the countries of Western Europe confronted with a trickle from the third world.

Economics does, of course, matter. A country willing to accept immigrants when its economy is booming is likely to close its doors in a recession. But economics does not explain many of the differences between countries nor does it explain the criteria countries employ to decide whether a particular group of migrants or refugees is acceptable or is regarded as

threatening. Similarly, volume can matter, but again it depends upon who is at the door.

Ethnic affinity would appear to be the most likely explanation for accepting or rejecting migrants. Presumably a country is receptive to those who share the same language, religion or race, but may regard as threatening those with whom such an identity is not shared. While generally true, there are striking exceptions. For more than half a century Americans rejected "Oriental" immigrants while today most Americans regard Asians as a model minority whose educational and economic successes and patriotism make them more desirable immigrants than others who are in language, religion and race closer to most Americans but are less successful. Moreover, what constitutes cultural affinity for one group in a multi-ethnic society may represent a cultural, social and economic threat to another: note, for example, the response of Afro-Americans in Florida to Cuban migrants, Indian Assamese response to Bangladeshis, and Pakistan Sindhi response to Biharis.

We can identify five broad categories of situations where refugees or migrants are perceived as a threat - to the country which produces the emigrants, to the country that receives them, and to relations between sending and receiving countries. The first is when refugees and migrants are regarded as a threat - or at least a thorn - in relations between sending and receiving countries, a situation which arises when refugees and migrants are opposed to the regime of their home country. The second is when migrants and/or refugees are perceived as a political threat or security risk to the regime of the host country. The third is when immigrants are seen as a cultural threat or, fourth, as a social and economic problem for the host society. And the fifth - a new element growing out of recent developments in the Gulf - is

when the host society uses immigrants as an instrument of threat against the country of origin

1. <u>Refugees and immigrants as a source of international conflict</u> Since refugees are legally defined by most countries as individuals with a well founded fear of persecution the decision to grant asylum or refugee status implies a severe criticism of another state. Thus, the bitter debate in Congress in January 1990 over whether Chinese students should be permitted to remain because of the persecutions in China was regarded by the People's Republic of China as "interference" in its internal affairs, a judgment which many members of Congress (but not the President) were prepared to make. Moreover, to classify individuals as refugees with a well founded fear of persecution is also to grant them the moral (as distinct from political) right to oppose a regime engaged in persecution so judged by the country that has grant them asylum. The view of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is that the granting of refugee status does not imply criticism of the sending by the receiving country, but such a view clearly contradicts the conception of the refugee as one with a fear of *persecution*. Moreover, democratic regimes generally allow their refugees to speak out against the regime of their country of origin, grant them access to the media, and permit them (to the extent the law permits) to send information and money back home in support of the opposition. The decision to grant refugee status thus often creates an adversary relationship with the country that produces refugees.

The receiving country may have no such intent, but even where its motives are humanitarian the mere granting of asylum can be sufficient to create an antagonistic relationship. In the most famous asylee related episode in this century, Iranian revolutionaries took violent exception to the U.S.

decision to permit the Shah of Iran to enter the U.S. for medical reasons (which many Iranians regarded as a form of asylum) and used it as an occasion for taking American hostages.

A refugee receiving country may actively support the refugees in their quest to change the regime of their country of origin. Refugees are potentially a tool in inter-state conflict. Numerous examples abound: the United States armed Cubans in an effort to overthrow the Castro regime at the Bay of Pigs; the United States armed Contra exiles from Nicaragua; the Indian government armed Bengali "freedom fighters" against the Pakistan military; the Indian government provided military support for Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka to give the Indian government leverage in the Tamil-Sinhalese dispute; Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and the U.S. armed Afghan refugees in order to force Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan; the Chinese provided arms to Khmer Rouge refugees to help overthrow the Vietnamese-backed regime in Cambodia; and Palestinian refugees received Arab support against Israelis. Refugee-producing countries may thus have good reason for fearing an alliance between the refugees and their national adversaries.

Non-refugee immigrants can also be a source of conflict between receiving and sending countries. India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi once described overseas Indians as "a bank from which we can draw from time to time." Gandhi was clearly thinking of India's emigrants as a source for remittances, investment, and technology. He was assuming, however, that the diaspora is an ally, an assumption that not all countries can make. A diaspora made up primarily of refugees is, of course, likely to be hostile to the regime of the country from which they fled. But even economic migrants may become hostile, especially if they live in democratic countries while the government of their homeland is repressive. Thus, many overseas Chinese

were sympathetic to China's government until the regime became repressive at Tiananmen Square. Thereafter, many overseas Chinese supported dissidents within China and pressed their host governments to withdraw support for China. The Beijing government regards the overseas Chinese as a source of support for dissidents. In March 1990 the Chinese government sealed Tiananmen Square after receiving word that overseas Chinese, using fax machines, had called upon dissidents to peacefully protest by gathering in large numbers in the Square.

There are numerous examples of diasporas seeking to undermine the regime of their home country: South Koreans and Taiwanese in the United States (who supported democratic movements at home), Iranians in France (Khomeini himself during the reign of the Shah, and opponents of Khomeini's Islamic regime thereafter), Asian Indians in North America and the U.K. (after Mrs Gandhi declared an emergency), Indian Sikhs (supporting secession), and dissident Sri Lankan Tamils and Northern Ireland Catholics among others.

The home country may take a dim view of the activities of its citizens abroad, and hold the host country responsible for their activities. Host countries, especially if they are democratic, are loathe to restrict migrants engaged in lawful activities, especially since some of the migrants have already become citizens. The home country may even plant intelligence operators abroad to moniter the activities of its migrants and take steps to prevent further emigration. The embassy of the home country may also provide encouragement to its supporters within the diaspora. The diaspora itself may become a focal point of controversy: between the home and host countries, among contending groups within the diaspora, as well as between sections of the diaspora and the home government. Thus, struggles that

might overwise only take place within a country become internationalized if the country has a significant overseas population.

2. Refugees and immigrants as a political risk to the host country. Governments are often concerned that refugees to whom they give protection may turn against them if they are unwilling to assist them in their opposition to the government of their country of origin. Paradoxically, the risk may be particularly high if the host country arms the refugees against their country of origin. Guns can be pointed in both directions, and the receiving country takes the risk that refugees will dictate the host country's policies toward the sending country. Two examples come to mind. The decision by Arab countries to provide political support and arms to Palestinian refugees from Israel created within the Arab states a population capable of influencing their own foreign policies and internal politics. Palestinians, for example, became a political force within Lebanon in ways that subsequently made them a political and security problems for Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, France and the United States. The support of Iraqi invaders by Palestinians in Kuwait was an asset to Iraq since Palestinians (who number 400,000 in Kuwait) hold important positions in the Kuwaiti administration. Throughout the Middle East governments must consider the capacity of the Palestinians to undermine their regimes should they adopt policies that are unacceptable. Similarly, the arming of Afghan refugees in Pakistan limited the options available to the government of Pakistan in its dealings with the governments of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The Pakistan government armed the Afghans in order to pressure the Soviets to withdraw their forces and to agree to a political settlement, but the Pakistan government is also constrained by the knowledge

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that it cannot sign an agreement with the Soviet or Afghan governments that is unacceptable to the armed Afghan.

Refugees have launched terrorist attacks within their host country, illegally smuggled arms, allied with the opposition against host government policies, participated in drug traffic, and in other ways eroded a government's willingness to admit refugees. Palestinians, Sikhs, Croatians, Kurds, Armenians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and northern Irish, among others, are regarded with suspicion by intelligence and police authorities and their request for asylum is scrutinized not only for whether they have a well founded fear of persecution; but for whether their presence constitutes a threat to the host country.

These fears, it should be noted, are sometimes exaggerated and governments have often gone to extreme lengths to protect themselves against improbable threats.[4] But an increase in international terrorism has clearly affected government attitudes toward refugees.

These political risks to the host and home states, and to relations between them, it should be noted, can be independent of the ethnic, economic or social characteristics of the migrants. These characteristics can be regarded as a threat to the host regime, and particularly to the host society. We turn first to conflicts that arise when there are differences in cultural and national identity between migrants and locals, then examine some of the broader social risks associated with migration.

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[4]One of the more extreme responses was the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act passed by the U.S.Congress in 1952 which excluded any aliens who might "engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety or security of the United States." The act went beyond barring known or suspected terrorists to exclude writers and politicians known to be critical of the United States.

3. <u>Migrants perceived as a threat to cultural identity.</u> Cultures differ with respect to how they define who belongs to or can be admitted into their community. These norms govern whom one admits, what rights and privileges are given to those who are permitted to enter, and whether the host culture regards a migrant community as potential citizens. A violation of these norms (by unwanted immigrants, for example) is often regarded as a threat to basic values and in that sense is perceived as a threat to national security.

These norms are often embedded in the law of citizenship, that is who by virtue of birth is entitled as a matter of right to be a citizen and who is permitted to become a naturalized citizen. The familiar distinction is between the concept of <u>jus sanguinis</u>, whereby a person wherever born is a citizen of the state of his parents, and <u>jus soli</u>, the rule that a child receives its nationality from the soil or place of birth. The ties of blood descent are broader than merely parentage for they suggest a broader "volk" or people to whom one belongs in a kind of fictive relationship. The Federal Republic of Germany has such a legal norm. Under a law passed in 1913 - and still valid - German citizenship at birth is based exclusively on descent; thus the children of migrants born in Germany are not thereby entitled to citizenship. The Basic Law, as it is called, also accords citizenship to those Germans who no longer live in Germany and may no longer speak German but came (or their ancestors came) from the territories from which Germans were expelled after the war. Thus, thousands of immigrants who entered the Federal Republic from East Germany or from Poland were regarded as German citizens returning "home." Other countries share a similar conception. Israel, for example, has a Law of Return, under which all Jews, irrespective of where they presently live, are entitled to "return" home to reclaim, as it were, their

citizenship. Nepal also has a law which entitles those who are of Nepali "origin," though they have lived in India, Singapore, Hong Kong or elsewhere for several generations, to reclaim their citizenship by returning home.

Where such notions of consanguinity dominate citizenship law, the political system is capable of distinguishing between an acceptable and unacceptable influx, without regard either to the numbers or to the condition of the economy into which the immigrants move. In general, countries with norms of consanguinity find it difficult to incorporate ethnically alien migrants, including refugees, into citizenship. These countries are also likely to have political groups advocating sending immigrants home even though expulsion may impose severe economic consequences for the host as well as the home countries.

A norm of indigenousness may also be widely shared by a section of a country's population and even incorporated into its legal system. This norm prescribes differential rights between those who are classified as indigenous and those who, irrespective of the length of time they or their ancestors resided in the country, are not so classified. An indigenous people assert a superior claim to land, employment, education, political power, and to the central national symbols not accorded to others who live within the country. The indigenous - called *bhoomiputras* in Malaysia, sons of the soil in India, and native peoples in some societies - may assert an exclusiveness denied to others, often resting on the notion that they as a people exist only within one country, while others have other homes to which they can return. Thus, the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, the Malays in Malaysia, the Assamese in Assam, and the Melanesians in Fiji, among others, subscribe to an ideology of indigenousness which has, in various guises, been enshrined in the legal system and which shapes the response of these societies to immigrants. The *bhoomiputras* in

Malaysia regarded the influx of Chinese and others from Vietnam as a fundamental threat, indeed so threatening as to lead the government to sink Vietnamese boats carrying refugees. Similarly, the Assamese rejected the influx of Bengalis, Nepalis and Marwaris from other parts of India, (as well as immigrants from Bangladesh) fearing that any demographic change would threaten their capacity to maintain the existing legal arrangement under which native Assamese are provided opportunities in education and employment not accorded other residents of the state who are also citizens of India.

Nativism, a variant of the norm of indigenousness, played an important role in shaping the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 with its national origins clause providing for national quotas. This legislation, and the political sentiment that underlay it, resulted in a restrictive policy toward refugees throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. After the war, however, the older American tradition of civic pluralism was politically triumphant. It shaped 1965 Immigration Act which eliminated national quotas and gave preferences to individuals with skills and to family unification. The numbers and composition of migrants then significantly changed. From the mid 1960s to the later 1980s between five hundred thousand and one million migrants and refugees entered each year, with nearly half the immigrants coming from Asia.

Citizenship in the United States is acquired by birth or by naturalization. Originally, American law permitted naturalization only to "free white persons," but subsequent acts permitted naturalization to all irrespective of race. Apart from the usual residence requirements, U.S. naturalization law requires applicants to demonstrate their knowledge of the American Constitution and form of government and to swear allegiance to the principles

of the U.S. Constitution. Political knowledge and loyalty are thus the norms for membership, not consanguinity. It is in part because the United States has political rather than ethnic criteria for naturalization that the United States has been more supportive of immigration and in the main has felt less threatened by immigration than most other countries.

For much of its history a low level of threat perception has also characterized the French response to immigration. While a concern for cultural unity is a central element in the French conception of nationhood, the French have also had a political conception of citizenship derived from the revolutionary origins of the notion of citizenship. The French, as Rogers Brubaker has written,[5] are universalist and assimilationist in contrast with the Volk-centered Germans. The result is that the French have been more willing to naturalize immigrants than have the Germans and more open to political refugees than most other West European countries.

We lack a country by country analysis of the norms which determine how citizenship is acquired, who is entitled to become a citizen, and what are the norms with respect to whether there are different "nationalities" within each state and whether they have different rights. Such a description and a classification of these various norms is essential for any attempt to understand the different responses states make to immigrants and refugees and whether they regard an influx as political destabilizing and a threat to security.

Legal definitions of citizenship aside, most societies react with alarm when there is an unregulated large scale illegal migration of people who do not share the same culture and national identity. Examples abound. The people of India's northeastern state of Assam are fearful that the influx of

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[5]Brubaker, William Rogers, editor, Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989.

Bangladeshis will reduce them to a minority, a realistic fear given the precarious hold of the Assamese on the state. Illegal migration into Sabah from the Philippines and Indonesia - an estimated 700,000 or half of Sabah's 1.4 million indigenous population - has created anxieties in that state of Malaysia. The government of Malaysia is particularly uneasy since the Philippines lays claim to Sabah and some of its leaders insist that so long as the dispute continues Malaysia has no right to consider Filipinos as illegal aliens. Should the Filipinos acquire citizenship, it has been noted, they might win a third or more of Sabah's parliamentary seats and pursue a merger with the Philippines. The Philippines might thereby acquire through colonization what it is unable to win through diplomatic or military means.

Concern over colonization, it should be noted, can also be an internal affair in multi-ethnic societies. A central government may regard internal migration as a right of all citizens, but territorially based ethnic groups may regard an influx of people from other parts of the country as a cultural and political threat. Hence, the Moros in Mindanao revolted at the in-migration of people from other parts of the Philippines, Sri Lanka's Tamils oppose settlement by Sinhalese in "their" region, and a variety of India's linguistic communities regard in-migration as a form of colonization.

Colonization as a means of international conquest and annexation can in fact be the deliberate intent of a state. The government of Morocco, for example, moved 350,000 civilians into Western Sahara in an effort to claim and occupy disputed territory. The Israeli government provides housing subsidies to its citizens to settle on the West Bank. Since the annexation of the Turkic regions of central Asia in the 19th century the Czarist and Soviet regimes have encouraged Russian settlement while a similar policy of settling Han people has been pursued by the Chinese government in Sinkiang province.

4. Migrants perceived as a social or economic burden. Ethnicity aside, societies may react to immigrants because of their social behavior-- criminality, welfare dependency, delinquency, etc. - or simply because their numbers are so large (or so poor) that they place a substantial economic burden on society even if the migrants are of the same ethnic community as that of the host society. This sense of threat can be particularly acute if the government of the sending country appears to be engaged in a policy of population "dumping" by exporting its criminals, unwanted ethnic minorities, and "surplus" population at the cost of the receiving country. The United States, for example, distinguished between those Cubans who fled the Communist regime and Cuban convicts removed from prisons and placed on boats for the United States. India accepted Hindus from Pakistan in the late 1940s and early 1950s who preferred to live in India, but regarded as destabilizing and threatening the forced exodus of East Pakistanis in the early 1970s, which India saw as a Pakistan effort to change the demographic balance between East and West Pakistan at India's expense. Governments also distinguish between situations in which ethnic minorities are permitted to leave (e.g. Jews from the Soviet Union) and situations in which minorities are forced to flee (e.g., Bulgarian Turks and Sri Lankan Tamils).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries several European govern- ments promoted emigration as a way of easing the social and political burdens that might result from poverty and crime. In the latter part of the eighteenth century the British exported prisoners to Australia. It has been estimated[6] that between 1788 and 1868 England exiled 160,000 of its criminals to Australia

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[6]Hughes, Robert, The Fatal Shore, 1987.

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as a convenient way to get rid of prisoners and reduce the costs of maintaining prisons. In the middle of the nineteenth century the British regarded emigration as a form of famine relief for Ireland. In seven famine years, from 1849 to 1856, one and a half million Irish emigrated, mostly across the Atlantic.[7] In Germany, where 1,500,000 emigrated between 1871 and 1881, local officials believed that "a large body of indigent subjects constitute a social danger and a serious burden on meager public funds; better let them go."[8] Reacting to these policies one American scholar wrote in 1890 that "there is something almost revolting in the anxiety of certain countries to get rid of their surplus population and to escape the burden of supporting the poor, the helpless and the depraved."[9]

The fears of western countries notwithstanding, population dumping has not been a significant element in the flow of migrants from the third world to advanced industrial countries. To the extent that population dumping has occurred, it has largely been of ethnic minorities and the flight has been primarily to neighboring developing countries than to advanced industrial countries.

Forced population movements of ethnic minorities took place in eastern Europe during the interwar period, placing enormous economic and social strains upon the receiving countries, taking a heavy toll upon the migrants themselves, and worsening relations among states. But because there was an element of exchange, and minorities moved to states in which their ethnic community was a majority, settlement was possible and violent international

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[7]Jonston, H.J.M., British Emigration Policy 1815-1830, Shovelling out Paupers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
[8]Walker, Mack, Germany and the Emigration 1860-1885. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
[9]Mayo-Smith, Richard, Emigration and Immigration: A Study in Social Science. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1890. Reprinted 1968, pp 197-198.

conflict was avoided. In 1922-23 Greeks fled Turkey and Turks fled Greece. An estimated 1.5 million people from both nations were involved. In a different though related population exchange, the Greek government in 1923, in an effort to Hellenize its Macedonian region, forced the exodus of its Bulgarian population. As the Bulgarian refugees moved into Greek-speaking areas of Bulgaria, the local Greek population fled southward to Greece[10]. The world's largest population exchange was in South Asia where fourteen million people moved between India and Pakistan between 1947 and 1950. But since both countries respected the wishes of ethnic minorities in each country to settle in the country in which they constituted a majority, the exchange took place without a conflict between the two countries. Similarly, the forced exit of Jews from North Africa to Israel in the 1950s was not a source of international conflict since the refugees were welcomed by Israel. In contrast, however, the flight of Arabs from Israel in 1948 led to an interminable conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors since the Arab states did not recognize the legitimacy of the new state.

Where one state promotes or compels emigration to a state that limits or prohibits entry, the situation is fraught with a high potential for armed conflict.[11] The flow of refugees from East Pakistan to northeastern India, from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to Thailand, from Burma to Bangladesh, and from Bangladesh to India have been the basis for regional conflicts that have often become violent. The magnitude of the flows, the element of forced emigration, the social and economic burden on the receiving country, a history

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[10]Marrus, Michael R., The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
[11]For an analysis of how conflicting rules of exit and entry affect interstate relations, see Weiner, Myron, "International Migration and International Relations," Population and Development Review, 11 (3), 1985, 441-456.

of enmity between sending and receiving countries, the absence of a population exchange that might ease the land problem are all elements making these movements major inter-state crises.

Government officials, otherwise concerned with the plight of refugees, are often fearful that a decision to grant refugee status to a small number of individuals might open the floodgate beyond what society is prepared to accept. One reason states hesitate to grant refugee and asylum status to those fleeing because of economic and political conditions at home - as distinct from having a "well founded fear of persecution" - is the concern that the number of asylum requests would then increase. States prefer restrictive criteria in order to keep the influx small. Since laws of asylum are often imprecise and the policy that states will admit refugees with a well founded fear is subjected to varied interpretations, individuals who wish to enter a country but cannot do so under existing guestworker and migration laws may resort to claiming political asylum. Western European governments are thus torn between on the one hand a desire to be humanitarian toward refugees and on the other by a recognition that the more generous the law of asylum the greater the number of applicants. As the number of asylum seekers grows governments become more restrictive, insisting that evidence be provided that the individual does indeed have a well founded fear. A mayor increase in asylum applications to Switzerland in 1986 and 1987, for example, led to passage of a referendum proposing a ceiling on the number of entries under the laws of asylum. In recent years Western Europe has become more restrictive as the requests for asylum requests have increased. Policy makers argue that to admit even a small number of refugees who enter in search of betters jobs or because of political conditions or violence at home would be to open the door to larger numbers than they are prepared to admit.

5. Migrants as hostages: risks for the sending country.   Following the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the government of Iraq announced a series of measures in which migrants were used as instruments for the achievement of political objectives. The first measure was to declare that westerners living in Iraq and Kuwait would be forceably held as a shield against armed attack in an effort to deter the United States and its allies from launching airstrikes against military facilities where hostages might be located. The Iraqi government then made distinctions among Asia migrants, indicating its willingness to treat more favorably those countries (such as India) which did not send troops to Saudia Arabia than those countries (Pakistan and Bangladesh) that did. The Iraqi government subsequently declared that food would not be provided for Asian migrants (including Indians) unless their countries sent food supplies and medicines, thereby weakening the United Nations embargo.

While the Iraqi strategy of using their control over migrants for international bargaining is unique, it should be noted that the mere presence of migrants in a country from which they could be expelled has been for some time an element in the behavior of the migrants' home country. The countries of South Asia have long been aware of their dependence upon migration to the Gulf and have recognized that any sudden influx of returning migrants would create a major problem for domestic security as remittances came to an end, balance of payments problems were created, families dependent upon migrant income were threatened with destitution, and large numbers of people were thrown into labor markets where there already existed substantial unemployment. All these fears have now materialized. In the past, sending governments aware of these potential consequences have hesitated to criticized

host governments for the treatment of migrant workers. When workers have been expelled for strikes and other agitational activities, the home governments have sought to pacify their migrants - and the host government - in an effort to avoid further expulsions. Governments have often remained silent even when workers' contracts have been violated. Thus, the instinctive and understandable reaction of some governments with migrants in Kuwait and Iraq was to see first whether it was possible for their migrants to remain, and to assure the security of their citizens rather than to support international efforts against Iraqi aggression. However the Gulf crisis ends, the governments of sending countries are aware of the potential risks of their citizens being used in an international conflict. Migrants living elsewhere in the Middle East will be concerned with their own personal well being and with the security of their assets. Many migrants will take more seriously the advice of the Indian foreign minister who, speaking to a group of Indian migrant workers from Kuwait upon their return to India, said that they should have transferred their assets home earlier.

In the past international migration has been regarded as a way in which individuals escape from economically undesirable or politically threatening environments with potentially destabilizing effects upon receiving countries. The Gulf crisis suggests that migration can be dangerous for immigrants and for the sending countries as well.

Implications for Immigration and Refugee Policies

For the foreseeable future the numbers of people who wish to leave or are forced to leave their countries will continue to substantially exceed the numbers other countries are willing to accept. Indeed, for many reasons, the gap is likely to increase.

Democratization, or at least political liberalization of authoritarian regimes, is enabling some people to leave who previously were denied the right of exit. The removal of the Berlin wall resulted in an East German exodus although the government of the German Democratic Republic had hoped that by removing the wall they might thereby induce their citizens to remain at home. Under glasnost the Soviet Union has permitted a substantial number of Jews to obtain exit permits. And given the economic and political difficulties the new regimes in Eastern Europe are likely to encounter, we should anticipate a steady and perhaps rising demand for exit.

The political liberalization of multi-ethnic communist regimes has been accompanied by a reappearance of older conflicts among ethnic groups. There have been conflicts between Turks and Bulgarians in Turkey, Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania, Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus, Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo, and a variety of ethnic conflicts in Central Asia. There is thus a high potential for emigration from the multi-ethnic regions of Eastern Europe and from the Soviet Union, especially from the Baltic states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Africa's authoritarian regimes have had little success in preventing conflicts among tribal and ethnic groups, although they have often justified one party states and military rule as necessary for avoiding violent conflict. But even if democratization begins to take root in Africa as it has in Eastern

Europe, it is uncertain that ethnic conflicts, and the refugee movements that often result, will thereby decline. Indeed, the political transformations now under way in South Africa could result in increased conflicts as each of the various groups contend for control of the political system. Thus, struggles are already under way between Zulu supporters of Inkatha and Zulu supporters of the United Democratic Front in Natal, and among a variety of ethnic groups throughout the country.

A long-term decline in the birth rate in advanced industrial countries combined with continued economic growth is likely to lead employers to seek low-wage laborers from abroad. Transnational investment in manufacturing industries may reduce some of the manpower needs, but the demand for more workers in the service sector seems likely to grow, barring technological breakthroughs that will replace waiters, bus conductors, nurses, and house-hold help. Employers in Japan, Singapore, and portions of the United States and Western Europe are prepared to hire illegal migrants, notwithstanding the objections of their governments and much of the citizenry. So long as employer demand remains high, borders are porous, and government enforcement of employer sanctions is limited, illegal migration seems likely to continue and in some countries increase.

Continued degradation of the environment will result in an increase in environmental refugees. There have already been mass migrations within and between countries as a result of desertification,. floods, toxic wastes (chemical contamination, nuclear reactor accidents, hazardous waste), and threats of inundation as a result of rising sea levels. According to one estimate[12] two million Africans were displaced in the mid-80s as a result of

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[12]Jacobson, Jodi L., Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability. Worldwatch Paper 86. Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1988.

drought. A worsening of the environment in Africa, Bangladesh, and Eastern Europe could lead to further flight across international boundaries.

The presence of third world migrants in advanced industrial countries provides a beachhead for potential migrants. Information concerning employment opportunities and changes in immigration and refugee laws is quickly transmitted to friends and relatives. More broadly, with an increase in global communication individuals in low income countries are increasingly aware of opportunities elsewhere. Not only do many people in the third world view the United States and Europe as potential places for migration, but differences and opportunities within the third world are also becoming better known. Indonesians, for example, are seeking (illegal) employment in peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. Malaysians and others are aware of opportunities in Singapore. Oil-rich Brunei attracts workers from Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea export manpower, but also attract illegal immigrants workers drawn by their reputation for employment at high wages.

What strategies are available to states confronted with a rising demand for entrance? One possible response is to increase immigration. For many industrial countries migration is advantageous: more young people to remedy low national birth rates; manpower for service sector jobs that local people do not want; skilled manpower for labor-short occupations; new investments by energetic, entrepreneurial newcomers. "The absorptive capacity of West European countries," wrote the Economist,[13]"though not as great as that of America or Australia, is still bigger than timid people think. European politicians who run scared of rascist or anti-immigrant feeling will be doing

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[13]Economist, "The would-be Europeans,"August 4, 1990, p 15

their countries no favours. Their guiding principle as they map out Europe's immigration plans should not be "How few can we get away with letting in?", but rather, "How many can we possibly take without creating unbearable social strain?" For West Europeans, the Economist continued, "it will be easier to absorb East Europeans than North Africans, while immigration from the South, if it continues, is likely to be in the form of short-term guest workers, though experience shows that guest workers remain while in a recession resentment grows."

However many immigrants are admitted the numbers who want to enter will far exceed how many migrants countries are prepared to admit. Sealing borders is one response, but rarely wholly effective even in the case of islands. Control is difficult for any country with large coastlines or land borders. State regulation of employers (including penalties for employing illegals) and the use of identity cards has made a difference in the countries of Western Europe but is not an option readily usable for a country with large numbers of small firms, a poorly developed administrative structure, and officials who are easily corrupted. Moreover, however opposed the government and a majority of the population are to illegal migration, there are often elements within the society who welcome refugees and migrant workers: employers, ethnic kinfolk, political sympathizers, and officials willing to accept bribes.

Faced with unwanted flows whose entrance they cannot control, governments have increasingly turned to strategies for halting emigration. We can identify three such strategies.

The first is to pay for what one does not want. It has been suggested that an infusion of aid and investment, an improvement in trade, the resolution of the debt crisis and other measures that would improve income and

unemployment in low income countries would reduce the rate of emigration. Meritorious as these proposals are there is no evidence that they can reduce emigration, at least not in the short run. Indeed, high rates of emigration have often been associated with high economic growth rates. It was so for Great Britain in the 19th century, and in recent years for South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Algeria and Greece. Moreover, economic aid is unlikely to affect the political factors which induce people to leave. Nonetheless, under some circumstances, economic assistance can reduce unwanted migrations, but primarily when the sending country has the means to prevent people from leaving.. As noted earlier, U.S. economic assistance to Haiti halted a growing refugee flow; similarly, the flow of Sri Lankan refugees to West Germany from East Germany was reduced when the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to provide credits to the German Democratic Republic. In the Haitian case, government-to-government aid was intended by the donor country to persuade the recipient country to halt the exodus; in the German case, the aid was intended to persuade the recipient country to cease providing transit to unwanted refugees.

Assistance can also be used by governments to persuade other governments to retain their refugees. Thus, the United States and France have been willing to provide economic assistance to Thailand if the Thais would hold Vietnamese refugees rather than permit these refugees to seek entrance into the U.S. and France. The UNHCR and other largely western-financed international agencies provide resources to refugee receiving countries - especially in Africa - not only as an expression of western humanitarian concerns, but also as a means of enabling refugees to remain in the country of first asylum rather than attempting to move elsewhere, especially to advanced industrial countries.

Secondly, where generosity does not work or is not financially feasible, receiving countries may employ a variety of threats to halt emigration. Diplomatic pressures may be exerted. The Indian government, for example, put pressure on the government of Bangladesh to halt Bangladeshi land settlement in the Chittagong Hill tracts after land settlement led the local Chakma tribals to flee into India. The Indian government is in a position to damage Bangladesh trade and to affect the flow of river waters if the government is not accommodating. Where diplomatic means are not sufficient, the threat of force can be employed. When Muslim refugees moved from Burma into Bangladesh as a result of a similar policy of colonization, this time by the Burmese, the Bangladesh government threatened to arm the Burmese Muslim refugees if the colonization did not end. In both cases the threats worked to reduce or halt the flow. In another example, Palestinian supporters threatened international carriers who agreed to carry Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union to Israel, an instance of intervention by a third party which did not want an unimpeded flow between a sending and receiving country. The Arab League representative to the United Nations said that the influx of Soviet Jews into Israel could constitute a threat to international peace and security under the UN charter [14]

Thirdly, there is the ultimate sanction of armed intervention to change the political conditions within the sending country. In 1971 an estimated ten million refugees fled from East Pakistan to India following the outbreak of a civil war between the eastern and western provinces of Pakistan. This refugee flow was regarded by India as the result of a deliberate policy by the Pakistan military to resolve Pakistan's own internal political problems by forcing upon

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[14]New York Times, February 8, 1990.

India East Pakistan's Hindu population. Many Indian officials also believed that the Pakistan government was seeking to change the demographic balance between East and West Pakistan by shifting millions of East Pakistanis to India. The Indian government responded by sending its armed forces into Pakistan, occupied East Pakistan and thereby forced the partition of the country. Within months India moved the refugees home.

There were two other instances in South Asia where armed support for refugees was an instrument of policy by the receiving country. The Pakistan government armed a portion of the 3.7 million Afghan refugees who entered Pakistan following a communist coup in April 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion in December 1979. The aim of the Pakistan government was to arm the Afghans to force a Soviet withdrawal, to bring down the Soviet-supported Communist regime, and to repatriate the refugees. The first objective was achieved, but not the second and third. The other instance of intervention was the initial Indian support for the Tamil Tigers, a militant group fighting against the Sri Lankan government. The Indian government supported Tamil Tiger refugees in India and enabled arms to flow into Sri Lanka in an effort to force a political settlement between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan government, but the result was that the ethnic conflict worsened and the refugee exodus continued, a factor which led to subsequent direct intervention by the Indian military.

The high level of threat or direct use of force among the countries of South Asia to deal with unwanted refugee flows may foreshadow similar behavior elsewhere. The factors at work in South Asia include the ethnic affinity between the migrants and the people of the region into which they have migrated (a factor affecting the decision of refugees to flee but also increasing the anger of the receiving population), the adversarial relationship among

some of the countries in the region, the porosity of borders, and the lack of administrative, military and political capacity to enforce rules of entry. Faced with large unwanted population movements whose entry they cannot control, governments in the region have looked for ways to influence the exit policies of their neighbors.

In each of these instances the high politics/high conflictual feature of population movements has shaped which institutions make exit and entry rules and engage in international negotiations. Decisions on such high matters are dealt with not by ministries of labor, border control officials or by the courts but at the highest levels of government, in the foreign and defense ministries, the security and intelligence agencies, and by heads of government. The very form and intensity of response to unwanted migrations is itself an indication that such population flows are regarded as a threat to security or stability. These responses also indicate that some states do not regard refugee flows and emigration as purely an internal matter, even though international agencies, most notably the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, continue to assert that countries do not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of states that produce refugees even when there is a perceived threat to the security and stability of countries upon whom the burden of unwanted refugees falls.

While the notion of sovereignty is still rhetorically recognized, a variety of internal actions by states are increasingly regarded as threats to others. Thus, the spewing of nuclear waste and other hazardous materials into the atmosphere and the contamination of waterways which then flow into other countries is no longer regarded as an internal matter. In the same spirit a country which forces its citizens to leave or creates conditions which induce them to leave has internationalized its internal actions.

A conundrum for liberal democratic regimes, however, is that they are reluctant to insist that governments restrain the exit of citizens simply because they or others are unwilling to accept them. Liberal democracies believe in the right of emigration by individuals but they simultaneously believe that governments retain the right to determine who and how many shall be permitted to enter. Liberal regimes may encourage or even threaten countries that produce refugees and unwanted immigrants to change the conditions which induce or force people to leave, but they are reluctant to press governments to prevent people from leaving or to force people to return home against their will. They do not want regimes to prevent political dissidents or persecuted minorities from leaving their country; rather, they want governments to stop their repression. Mass flight across international boundaries justifies actions by states or international organizations to provide incentives, inducements, withdrawal of assistance, or a variety of individual or collective sanctions (e.g. trade or investment restrictions) to change the conditions which create flight.

The persistent imbalance between the number of people who wish to or are forced to leave their country and the numbers that countries are willing to admit creates a host of policy issues for potential receiving countries. One such issue is whether countries should provide a haven for refugees that other countries are prepared to admit. Should, for example, the United States admit Soviet Jews as refugees when Israel is prepared to admit all Jews? Should European countries admit Tamils fleeing Sri Lanka if they can find a safe haven in India? Perhaps not. What is required is not a globally uniform policy on refugee admission - a policy which would lead many refugees to seek haven in the richest country - but rather an understanding that governments need to give primary attention to those refugee seekers who cannot find a haven. Such

a position also implies that countries that admit refugees be given financial assistance by those countries that do not admit refugees - not only for humanitarian reasons but to avoid an unwanted influx, that is to pay for what one does not want. Instead, there has been an intense debate in much of Western Europe over whether asylum should be granted to small numbers of asylum seekers from developing countries, while the bulk of the world's refugees receive asylum in developing countries without adequate financial resources for their care and maintenance.

At the same time third world countries with a large refugee influx must decide whether the presence of international refugee agencies and an influx of resources for refugees is generating more of what they do not want. Political judgments as to whether camps should be closed and refugees sent home are made more difficult when international agencies insist that refugees must not be forced home against their will even though the government of the host country believes that conditions for return are reasonably tolerable. These judgments are also shaped by the host country's concern that the refugees are becoming permanently dependent upon outsiders for support and that their continued presence constitutes a growing political and economic problem.

For advanced industrial countries that admit immigrants there is a preference for a migration policy which creates the fewest domestic or international political problems. One policy option is to admit those who best satisfy the requirements of the receiving country: who have skills needed in the labor market, or capital to create new businesses, or relatives who would facilitate their integration into the society. The criteria for admission then

become more meritocratic based upon an agreed upon point system.[15] It is more difficult, and morally contentious, to give preferences to those most acceptable by the home population, though "acceptable" can often mean education and skills rather than culture and race. Moreover, for a labor-short Western Europe, the incorporation of countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Community will be politically more palatable than opening borders to north Africans without raising awkward issues of culture and religion. But a limited, largely skill-based immigration policy will leave large numbers of people banging on the doors, seeking to enter as refugees or, failing that, as illegals.

An alternative policy based upon the needs of immigrants and refugees is more difficult to formulate, more difficult to implement, and legally and politically more contentious, but morally more attractive. But no policy, short of the obliteration of international boundaries and sovereign states, can deal with the vast numbers of people who want to leave their country for another where opportunities are greater. A moral case can be made for giving preference to those in flight, even at the cost of limiting the number of immigrants admitted to meet labor force needs or to enable families to reunite. If countries have a ceiling as to how many people they are willing to admit, there is a strong moral argument for providing admissions first to those who are persecuted or whose lives are in danger, and have few places to go. But for reasons indicated earlier only a narrow definition of what constitutes a refugee with a case-by-case review will enable states to put a cap on what they regard as potentially unlimited flows. We thus conclude with a paradoxical

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[15]Wattenberg, Ben J. and Karl Zinsmeister, "The Case for More Immigration," Commentary, 89(4), 1990, 19-25, and Simon, Julian L., The Economic Consequences of Immigration. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

formulation, that large scale unwanted mass population flows that threaten states require that states, individually or collectively through international organizations, seek ways to influence the domestic factors that force and induce people to leave their homeland, even though such interventions may themselves create international conflicts.

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