

Cotonou mid-term reviews – a lost opportunity for peace and development?

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Africa Peace Forum, InterAfrica Group, Saferworld

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Acronyms

ACP	Africa Caribbean and Pacific
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JAR	joint annual review
MTR	mid-term review
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NSA	non-state actor
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SISAS	Strategy for Implementation of Special Assistance to Somalia

Executive summary

The Horn of Africa is a region of social, economic and political instability which has suffered from the effects of conflict over a long period. The impact of conflict has been felt by the local population, civil society, national actors and international development partners. The European Union (EU) is one of the leading international development partners in the region through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the trade and aid agreement signed in 2000 by EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.

The Cotonou Agreement is implemented through Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) that identify the priorities of EU assistance and co-operation. The CSPs and NIPs in the Horn of Africa were completed between 2001 and 2003. The Agreement requires joint annual reviews (JARs) and mid-term reviews (MTRs) of the national and regional country strategies. The JARs are meant to happen every year and the MTRs halfway through the five-year implementation term of these strategies. Both of these review processes offer the opportunity to ensure that the programmes are updated and reflect the needs and performance of each ACP country. MTRs can lead to a change of programmes in the light of changed circumstances of an ACP state and the EU may decide to revise the allocation of resources accordingly.

The EU's growing commitment to conflict prevention is included in the Cotonou Agreement. Article 11 deals with peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. This includes political dialogue and exchange of views between EU and ACP countries on crises and conflict situations. Conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives, however, can only be long lasting if the local population and civil society organisations are involved. This is particularly so, given the potential impact that the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement can have on countries which are heavily dependent on aid and are conflict-prone. The level of their engagement in the Cotonou process reveals the extent to which EU activities in peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution can strengthen democratic legitimacy and establish effective mechanisms for governance.

The Cotonou Agreement has acknowledged the importance of involving civil society to discuss programming priorities addressing the root causes of poverty and conflict. This paper aims at assessing the implementation of this commitment. The report highlights the different frameworks for civil society participation across the Horn of Africa and shows that despite opportunities available, such as the MTRs, civil society engagement remains low. Moreover, the EU has a set of tools at its disposal to enhance conflict prevention in programming but analysis of the CSPs show that this is not reflected in the sectoral priorities.

1

Introduction: the Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed in 2000 in Cotonou (Benin) by ACP countries and the EU member states. The Cotonou Agreement builds on 25 years of co-operation and trade between EU and ACP countries which include:

- The Yaoundé I Agreement, signed in 1963 with newly independent former colonies (mainly from French speaking Africa) with the objective of giving Europe access to raw materials from its former colonies. It was renewed in 1969.
- The Lomé Agreement, signed in 1975 after the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC). It was signed for five years and renewed until 2000. Economic co-operation was at the heart of the relationship, with trade agreements based on non-reciprocal preference, enabling agricultural products to enter EEC countries free of taxes. From 1990, the Agreement introduced political aspects such as respect for human rights and democratic governance.

The objectives of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement are poverty eradication, peace and security, and the promotion of stable and democratic political governance. These objectives are to be achieved through national and regional programming instruments. National instruments are Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) that identify the sectoral priorities for EU assistance and co-operation. These documents are developed by each ACP country in collaboration with the EC's delegations and supposedly in consultation with non-state actors (NSAs).

A CSP should include:

- An analysis of political, social and economic context.
- A detailed outline of the country's medium-term development strategy.
- The outline of relevant plans and actions of other donors.
- Focal sectors for EU assistance.

An NIP complements the CSP and should include:

- Measures and activities undertaken to achieve the priorities stated in the CSP.
- The timetable for the implementation of activities.
- The allocation of resources for the programmes.
- The identification of eligible NSAs.
- Proposals for regional programmes.

Regional programming instruments include the Regional Strategy Paper and the Regional Indicative Programme for East Africa covering all the member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development¹ (IGAD) as well as Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. They play the same role as the instruments existing at the national level.

The Cotonou Agreement, in comparison to its predecessors, contain a number of innovations, including:

- The role of NSAs. The Agreement refers to the need to involve NSAs in policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. NSAs are defined as the private sector, economic and social partners (trade unions) and civil society (articles 4, 6, and 7). The Agreement creates new opportunities for NSAs to access funds under the NIPs and the Regional Indicative Programmes. Article 58 establishes the eligibility for these actors to obtain financial support.
- Political dialogue. The Cotonou Agreement creates a forum for the discussion of important political issues such as performance criteria, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. The EU intends to develop more flexible and diversified institutional arrangements to deepen and widen political dialogue between ACP countries, the EU and NSAs.
- Conflict prevention. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement explicitly includes peace-building and conflict prevention provisions. Political dialogue is seen as central to conflict prevention and should include co-operation between EU and ACP countries on conflict situations and peace-building.
- Differences between countries. The Agreement takes into account the specific aspects of each country and also regional linkages. Special treatment is given to countries that are 'least developed' or 'vulnerable'.
- 'Failed states'. Article 93 takes into account the exceptional circumstances of Somalia and includes co-operation with dysfunctional states like Somalia.
- Economic and trade co-operation. Within the rules of the World Trade Organisation, the preferential trade preferences granted to ACP countries need to be abolished. Negotiations are currently underway to adopt Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) involving new trade regimes by the end of 2007.

The total resources made available to ACP countries is renegotiated every five years. For the current period (2000-2005), the European Development Fund (EDF, the financial mechanism providing aid or financial co-operation to ACP countries) allocates €15.2 billion.

¹ The member states of IGAD are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

2

The framework for civil society participation

The civil society organisations interviewed over the Cotonou process view their role primarily as organising and determining the interests of citizens and community groups and articulating these interests in consultative meetings, thereby influencing national decision-making processes. They also see their role as one of monitoring and evaluating policy implementation.

The issues on the Cotonou Agreement in general revolve around which NSAs have participated, what was the nature of their participation and in what did they participate? Under the Partnership Agreement, NSAs are expected to give an input in the preparation of the:

- CSPs.
- NIPs.
- Regional Strategy Papers.
- Regional Indicative Programmes.
- Reviews of the national and regional indicative programmes and CSPs.
- Negotiations for the EPAs under Article 37.
- Preparation of annual, mid-term and end-term evaluations of the implementation of the CSPs and NIPs as required by the Cotonou Agreement.

JARs have been completed in 2002 and 2003 and the MTR is taking place throughout 2004 in each of the ACP countries. This provides an opportunity to discuss the priority issues for EU assistance (as defined in the Country and Regional Strategy Papers) and to evaluate the extent to which civil society has been involved in the implementation of the Cotonou programmes.

The criteria used in this paper to measure civil society participation include the following:

- The establishment of a mechanism to represent civil society organisations and the existence of a structured and consistent dialogue mechanism with the national government (eg Cotonou committee or task force).
- The capacity to influence government policy at the national level, eg were NSAs involved in designing CSPs and NIPs and in the review process?
- The capacity to influence EU policies that impact on ACP states (including EPAs).
- The existence of links with other regional or international NSAs.
- The ability to mobilise and raise awareness among the population and other stakeholders on Cotonou issues.

- The publication and dissemination of research findings on Cotonou issues.

Civil society influence over programming

Civil society influence over programming varies across the region but overall participation remains low. Article 4 of the Cotonou Agreement envisages that civil society organisations will be involved in the design and implementation of co-operation programmes. Under this provision, civil society is expected to be consulted in the elaboration of NIPs and CSPs. Yet the experience of Horn civil society organisations is varied. Participation ranges from nil to moderate. For instance, civil society participation in Djibouti is weaker. In Eritrea, the involvement, participation and knowledge on Cotonou issues is almost nil. Likewise, in Somalia, NSAs were not involved in the preparation of the Strategy for Implementation of Special Assistance to Somalia (SISAS), the EU assistance framework for Somalia. Uganda and Kenya provide examples of more active and commendable civil society involvement. Finally, in Sudan, civil society participation is bedevilled with the practical division of the country into North and South.

Regional

At the regional level, the programming process envisaged under Article 8 of Annex IV entails the elaboration of a Regional Strategy Paper and the indicative allocation of EU funds from which the region may benefit. There is no evidence of the participation of NSAs in the regional programming process for East Africa. Interviews conducted with civil society organisations revealed that their participation in the regional programming process is made difficult for two structural reasons. Firstly, Article 7 of Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement envisages that ACP states define the geographical regions that would form the basis of regional programming. This process has been slow and it has thus been difficult for the NSAs to follow what the final geographical division would be for East Africa. Secondly, in the absence of mandated ACP regional groupings, the process of developing Regional Indicative Programmes is to be undertaken by the National Authorising Officers (NAOs) of the countries within a particular region. By its very nature, such a process is exclusionary and leaves no space for participation by other actors, particularly by civil society.

Djibouti and Eritrea

In Djibouti and Eritrea, civil society participation in the preparation of the CSP and the NIP was non-existent. Both Eritrea and Djibouti are lagging behind due to problems associated with the lack of capacity of civil society and of the EC delegations. For instance, in both delegations, there is no member of staff specifically dedicated to liaising with civil society organisations, although the Djibouti Delegation has a staff member with civil society liaison as part of their responsibilities. Moreover, the EC does not have a delegation with a full mandate in Djibouti and is managed by the EC in Ethiopia. In 1996, the Djibouti EC Delegation was transformed into an 'Office'. The capacity and experience of the focal points is critical to deal with issues of non-state actors engagement.

There is a lack of adequate information on the existence of civil society organisations in these countries. Despite these drawbacks, Africa Peace Forum (APFO), InterAfrica Group (IAG) and Saferworld held a consultation meeting on the Cotonou Agreement in Djibouti on 7 March 2004, which was attended by civil society organisations, the EC delegation and the government. The meeting resulted in the establishment of an interim Cotonou task force consisting of nine civil society representatives.

The CSP for Djibouti allocates one percent of the NIP for civil society capacity-building, but the opportunity for accessing funding has not been exploited. These funds are supposed to benefit NSAs that work in areas related to gender, good governance, law and human rights. Civil society has not received any funding and progress is slow in mapping, defining eligibility criteria and agreeing on procedures for funding.

In Eritrea, the Horn project organised the first awareness-raising meeting in December 2003, which was attended by civil society organisations and the EC delegation but not by government officials. In both countries, but particularly in Eritrea, the government needs to facilitate the emergence of a more organised, independent and participative civil society. Although the Eritrea Constitution recognises freedom of association, NGOs can only operate in humanitarian and relief activities. Involvement in political, commercial and religious activity is prohibited. Even in areas of relief, approval by the government is a prerequisite and is limited in duration and area. This severely limits the scope of civil society engagement and independence. The Eritrea NIP allocates €8 million for good governance, capacity-building and support for civil society. Only €1 million is set aside for civil society support and peace-building initiatives. The prospects for civil society engagement remain limited as there are no opportunities for input into policy design and implementation due to the repressive political environment.

Ethiopia In November 2003 the joint APFO, IAG and Saferworld project facilitated the establishment of a provisional Cotonou task force comprised of nine civil society representatives. The task force organised a broader consultation meeting in August 2004 to expand its membership to a wider range of organisations representing Ethiopian civil society and the private sector. The expanded task force was given a one-year mandate to draw up a plan of action and terms of reference and a general assembly will take place within a year. A series of consultations to get input from NSAs on the CSP was held. Input was requested in February 2004 from the Cotonou task force on the MTR (and the JAR – the two were presented as one process) but the timeframe and other factors did not allow NSAs to adequately participate – the deadline for submission of comments on the JAR was March 2004. The fact that the Cotonou task force was asked by the EC delegation to submit comments on the JAR of the CSP for 2003, is a positive step. However, due to insufficient time and preparation, the inputs were submitted in September 2004, after the EC/NAO-prepared JAR/MTR was already sent to Brussels. The Cotonou task force inputs have subsequently been sent to Brussels and feedback is still awaited. Moreover, the EC delegation has contracted the British Council to carry out research ('mapping') on Ethiopian NSAs.

The CSP allocates €10 million to NSAs, which have not been disbursed yet. The Ethiopian NAO and the EC delegation have proposed that the allocation of funds to civil society be managed by two committees (a steering committee and an evaluation committee) comprising representatives from the EC, the government and civil society. The steering committee is chaired by the government while the evaluation committee is chaired by the EC. The evaluation committee has the capacity to approve or reject funding proposals submitted by Ethiopian NSAs.

Kenya Kenyan NSAs provide an example of active interaction and involvement in the Cotonou process. NSAs have organised themselves in two forums with the aim of effectively influencing the programming process. Given the broad definition of NSAs stated in Article 6 of the Cotonou Agreement, the private sector has established a forum, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), while civil society organisations are members of the Kenya Civil Society Forum. The existence of these two umbrellas reflects the overall good level of awareness on the Cotonou Agreement among Kenyan NSAs compared to many other Horn countries. Yet it is imperative for these networks to co-ordinate and harmonise their activities to maximise their impact. Moreover, despite the existence of NSA structures to engage with the government and the EC delegation in Kenya, civil society organisations do not feel that their concerns are adequately addressed in the CSP. In particular, there are no clear mechanisms for poverty reduction. Conflict prevention (in particular local conflicts

within the country), peace-building, food rights and regional trade should also be addressed.

The priority sectors of the Kenyan CSP are transport, rural development and macro-economic support. The choice of the focal sectors has not involved the participation of NSAs because the priorities were based on the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which was supposed to have been a consultative and participatory process. The consultations prior to the elaboration of the CSP consisted of meetings or workshops convened by the NAO or the Ministry of Planning. Civil society organisations are of the view that the consultations were not adequate as the criteria for selecting civil society organisations attending the consultative meetings were not clear and transparent. Further, the organisations that were consulted were invited to attend meetings without being given the agenda or informed that they were actually participating in the preparation of the CSP. Consequently, there was no preparation, prior discussion or formulation of positions. Thus their contribution was minimal.

The NAO has a good working relationship with civil society organisations. However, the government is still suspicious of fully involving civil society in decision-making processes. Due to this, there is no direct link between individual civil society organisations and the NAO or the EC delegation office. The NAO only deals with umbrella organisations. Within the delegation office, a liaison officer is in place to deal with civil society matters.

Kenyan NSAs have been allocated 2 percent of the NIP. However, the criteria for accessing these funds and the procedures for disbursement are yet to be agreed. NSAs are less concerned about the amount of funds allocated than about the criteria for accessibility and guidelines for submitting the financial proposals. Another critical issue is the need to enhance civil society capacity to absorb the funds.

Somalia/land

In the absence of a recognised government, Somalia did not ratify the Lomé IV Convention. On 18 November 1992, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers recognised Somalia as an 'exceptional circumstance' and the role of the NAO has been entrusted to the Somali Unit of the EC delegation based in Kenya. Within this framework, the EC has drawn up the Strategy for the Implementation of Aid to Somalia (SISAS) whose overall long-term objective is poverty reduction and peace-building.

In 2001 the EC Somalia Unit prepared the SISAS. Though Somali NSAs themselves were not involved in its preparation, eight civil society organisations ratified it. A technical committee was also established; it has 48 members from four regions. In April 2002, the tripartite APFO, IAG and Saferworld project, in collaboration with Horn Relief (a local Somali NGO), facilitated a meeting in Hargeissa with the EC Somalia Unit and civil society organisations. A provisional Cotonou civil society committee was formed and the 'Hargeissa Declaration' was signed giving a commitment to the development of participative structures for engagement with the EU. One of the objectives of the committee was to enhance co-ordination among Somali civil society organisations and to create channels for communication with the international community. The committee appealed to the European Commission to provide effective development assistance and to directly support all civil society peace-building and development efforts in areas of conflict and instability. The international community was urged to commit itself to the efforts of restoring peace and stability in Somalia and to support the peace process and reconciliation efforts.

In 2002, Novib Somalia launched the first phase of the project 'strengthening Somali civil society'. The specific project purpose is to strengthen Somali civil society in providing services and defending the interests of their members and constituencies.

The activities undertaken included a mapping of Somali civil society organisations and a report on donor assistance towards Somalia. In February 2003, a Somali Civil Society Symposium was held in Hargeissa to discuss and debate civil society work and vision.

Interviews revealed that the reason for non-participation of Somali civil society in the preparation of the SISAS is the absence of a central government or authority in Somalia and the endemic warlordism and clanism in the country. This necessitated the adoption of a different EU strategy in dealing with Somalia. Interviews with Somali civil society organisations indicate that the SISAS initiative is welcome. However, the strategy fails to involve civil society actors, particularly those affected by the conflict. Even though participation of NSAs is mentioned as part of the food security assistance programmes, the role of civil society in implementing conflict prevention strategy is not recognised.

There is no NIP for Somalia, hence no funding for local NSAs is available. The allocation of funds to Somali NSAs is channelled through international NGOs. The international community has established a voluntary co-ordinating body of donors, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, to ensure the co-ordination of aid interventions. Under this framework, the EC has been able to allocate funds for support of civil society, peace-building, governance and support for health and nutrition. The implementation of the funded programmes and projects has largely been left to international non-governmental organisations such as Novib, ActionAid, and Oxfam that have good and established networks operating in fragile security zones.

Sudan In Sudan, conflict prevention and peace-building are the underlying factors that determine civil society participation and interaction with the EU within the Cotonou framework. The CSP allocates €13 million to support the peace process, peace-building initiatives and institutional capacity-building for NSAs. The modalities for channelling funds to NSAs have not been established but the eligibility criteria guidelines for channelling funds to NSAs have been drafted by a consultant and submitted to the EC and NAO offices. Consultations took place with civil society organisations and the private sector in the preparation of the CSP. Sudanese civil society organisations, in their inputs to the CSP, stressed the need for the CSP to take into account regional disparities, inadequacy or lack of opposition parties and the participation of civil society in the peace process negotiations.

According to an analysis of Sudanese non-state actors undertaken by the Dutch-based NGO European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in 2002, non-state actors in South Sudan carry out activities in the fields of health, food security, education and conflict prevention and reconciliation. Yet, only Northern NSAs are viewed as legitimate by the Khartoum Government. The Cotonou Agreement has thus not been fully implemented in the South.

In Northern Sudan, civil society has played a great role on the political front. In 1964 and 1985 they were responsible for the overthrow of the government. An interim civil society committee was established in 2001/2 to work on Cotonou issues. A six-month programme was drawn up with the aim of mapping and identifying priority areas and developing eligibility criteria for civil society funding. In terms of civil society participation in the CSP and the NIP, the first consultations took place in March 2002, facilitated by ECDPM. An interim committee was then established for South Sudan.

In March 2004, the EU contracted a British consultancy firm Agrisystems to implement the civil society capacity-building programme in Sudan. Two consultants have been recruited, one based in Nairobi and the other one in Khartoum. The consultants are expected to come up with concrete proposals and priority recommendations for capacity-building, co-ordination and dialogue. To date there has been no concrete programme implemented, at least not to the knowledge of NSAs.

In Sudan, the North-South divide hampers a concrete and overall approach to Cotonou issues and the formation of a national steering committee. The civil war is the primary obstacle to development and is a major drain on the country's annual revenue. Since July 2004 events in Darfur involving indiscriminate killings by Janjawid militia, have added a new dimension to the North-South divide.²

Uganda In Uganda, NSAs participated in the elaboration of the CSP and NIP. Workshops, seminars and conferences were the mode of consultation. The consultative process, which began in 2000, was facilitated by the NAO, the government's official in charge of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, and the EC delegation. The first consultative workshop was held on 13–14 November 2000. It was an information-sharing forum on the Cotonou Agreement and programming principles, including investments and the role of the private sector and civil society and NSA participation. A follow-up workshop was held in March 2001. Its objective was to define the strategic framework for the ninth EDF in Uganda.

The European Commission has earmarked €246 million for the ninth NIP in Uganda plus €117 million for unforeseen needs.

A third workshop took place in November 2001 to cover organisational issues aimed at formalising and putting in place structures for a formal interface between NSAs, the government and the EU. It aimed at identifying the NSAs' capacity needs to enable them to play a stronger role in the Cotonou process, to raise awareness on the agreement and to work towards establishing a National Steering Committee that would facilitate dialogue between the EU, government and the NSAs.

In November 2001 an interim Civil Society Steering Committee (CSSC) working on Cotonou issues was established in Uganda. In 2003, a permanent CSSC formed of 11 organisations was created. It draws its membership from farmers and workers unions, network organisations working on faith-based, human rights, women, children and youth issues, as well as an international NGO. The role of the CSSC is to address EU-ACP Cotonou issues and to ensure civil society participation in the process.

Uganda has been the only success story among all ACP countries with regard to disbursement of funds to civil society. Uganda is the first eligible country to access funding to NSAs as part of the Cotonou framework. €8 million are allocated to Uganda NSAs for institutional support and as part of the capacity-building and governance programme. This money is to be used to fight poverty and build civil society institutions. The funding was made available through the financing agreement known as 'The Technical and Administrative Provisions for Implementation of Civil Society Capacity Building Programme' between the EU and the NAO. The beneficiaries of the programme are the members and constituents of civil society organisations and in particular the marginal and vulnerable sections of the population. The funding is allocated to civil society through calls for proposals which will be circulated to NSAs through regional information sessions.

² Subsequent to the research for this report, on 21-23 September 2004, the APFO, IAG and Saferworld project organised a civil society dialogue on Sudan in Addis Ababa, covering issues such as the MTR, the capacity-building programme and problems associated with its commencement. A key grievance from the SPLM/A, Government of Sudan and civil society representatives was on the issue of the capacity-building programme. A full report of this meeting will be available shortly.

Under the financing agreement, the eligibility criteria and programme of action was approved by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers (Brussels 15–16 May 2003). The additional criteria are that:

- Funding can be made available to networks, coalitions and alliances between Ugandan and non-Ugandan civil society as long as Ugandan organisations are the contract holders.
- Civil society organisations should be legal entities established in accordance with Ugandan law. In the case of non-legalised emergent organisations, community-based organisations and existing informal social networks, funds can be requested through intermediary civil society organisations.
- Activities designed to promote particular political or religious objectives are not eligible for funding.
- Civil society organisations need to have the sufficient technical and institutional capacity to ensure the correct and smooth implementation of the programme.

3

EU strategy for conflict prevention, management and resolution in the Horn of Africa

Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement deals with peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution and recognises the need for ACP and EU policies to address the root causes of conflict. The EU has a variety of additional instruments at its disposal to support conflict prevention in the region, including the political initiatives within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP is the EU mechanism of co-operation dealing with foreign affairs and security. CFSP instruments comprise political dialogue, declarations, missions and joint actions. However, the funding of CFSP is relatively limited, therefore the Cotonou Agreement provides the most relevant framework for regional dialogue.

The NIPs of the Horn countries allocate funding in support of initiatives directly or indirectly related to conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives. The CSPs for Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda include some analysis of conflict risks, however this is not reflected in the choice of supported sectors as macro-economic support and transport prevail.

The CSP and the NIP for Ethiopia contain provisions focusing on peace-building and conflict prevention. The CSP seeks to utilise all existing instruments for conflict prevention, peace-building and reconciliation. Capacity-building for governance in areas of legal and judicial reform is seen as a contribution to conflict prevention. After the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the EU suspended part of the eighth EDF funds to Ethiopia. However, in 2000, with the signing of the Algiers Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, the EU resumed full co-operation with Ethiopia. In line with the provisions of Article 11, whereby relevant peace-building programmes include the promotion of mediation and negotiation, the EU has supported peace-building efforts in Ethiopia and Eritrea. It has financed the OAU/AU peace process and made several declarations on Eritrea such as expressing concern over the imprisonment of activists within the country. In November 2004, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the human rights situation in Eritrea, calling on the Government of Eritrea to “abide by the international human rights convention”, “to lift the ban on the country’s independent press” and calling on the European Council and Commission “to open the consultation procedure in accordance with Article 96 of

the Cotonou Agreement in order to stop human rights violations and pave the way for political pluralism³.

In Djibouti, the EU engagement in terms of Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement has largely supported the demobilisation of combatants and their reintegration into society. Following a period of internal conflict in 1991-1994, the eighth EDF resources have concentrated on improving transportation networks and living conditions. There have been no activities in relation to the CFSP framework. The Djibouti CSP is based on its PRSP whose priorities are good governance and consolidation of internal and regional peace. Under the Djibouti NIP resources have been allocated in the form of budgetary support for macro-economic reforms and the implementation of the peace agreement with a focus on reconstructing basic economic infrastructures.

Special conflict zones of Sudan and Somalia

Sudan and Somalia remain conflict zones in the Horn of Africa. Somalia is still a dysfunctional state with no central government. Sudan is in practice divided into North and South. In 1990, the EU suspended its co-operation with Sudan due to lack of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. At present the Darfur conflict and the Janjawid rebels are causing loss of life in the Sudan. There is a need to focus on political dialogue and peace-building in these countries. Significant humanitarian assistance has been provided by the EU. The EU strategy in Sudan allows for rehabilitation activities implemented by international NGOs. This has allowed the EU to support more sustainable activities in the sectors of agriculture, health and water. Since 1999, the EU has been engaged in a formal political dialogue with Sudan on issues of human rights and democratisation. Moreover, the EU is a member of the IGAD Partners' Forum that supports the IGAD sponsored peace process for Sudan in Kenya.

The EU has been a major facilitator of the Somali peace process meetings held at Eldoret and Mbagathi in Kenya. Under the SISAS strategy, the EU keeps and observes neutrality in the face of clan and regional rivalry. The concept of a peace dividend is crucial to the EU implementation strategy. Flexibility is a constant feature that permits the EU to adjust to changes in the country. The biggest proportion of financial assistance from the EU is channelled through international NGOs and UN agencies working in partnership with NSAs and emerging administrations in support of sectoral policies in health and education.

Local Somali or Sudanese NSAs have not been involved in the conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives within the Cotonou framework. Interviews with civil society organisations in the conflict areas show that there is a bias amongst development partners as they support international NGOs rather than local organisations. In Sudan and Somalia, the feeling of bias is strong, taking into account that the EU has engaged a British consultancy firm Agrisystems to do NSA mapping (British Council for Ethiopia) while in Somalia EU aid is channelled through international NGOs. At the same time, there are certain challenges inherent to working with local civil society in conflict-prone contexts, and insufficient guidance is available to EC delegations on how to deal with these challenges.

Regional EU strategy for the Horn

The objective of the Regional Indicative Programme for East Africa is enhanced peace and security and the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The Secretariat of the regional organisation IGAD has received support particularly to enhance its capacity in conflict prevention, management and peace-

³ European Parliament resolution on the human rights situation in Eritrea P6_TA-PROV(2004)0068
<http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT%2BTA%2BP6-TA-2004-0068%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0//EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=X>

building including research into regional conflict and prevention capacities. The development of a conflict early warning system and efforts to stem proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region have been given consideration. The EU has supported the development of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) within the IGAD region. The protocol on establishing CEWARN institutions within IGAD was signed on 9 January 2002. The aim is to generate and put into operation structures for information gathering, analysis and sharing with a view to enhancing IGAD's ability to act pre-emptively to prevent possible conflicts.

4

Participation in the mid-term review of the EU strategies

The Cotonou Agreement foresees annual, mid-term and end-term evaluations of the implementation of the CSPs and NIPs. JARs have been completed in 2002 and 2003 and the MTR is taking place throughout 2004 in each of the ACP countries. This provides an opportunity to discuss the priority issues for EU assistance (as defined in the CSPs and Regional Strategy Papers) and to evaluate the extent to which civil society has been involved in the implementation of the Cotonou programmes and also the progress of the intended outcomes of programmes under the Cotonou Agreement.

The reviews assess:

- The results achieved in the focal sectors, as defined in the CSPs. The performance criteria are based on the use of resources, the macroeconomic performance and the level of poverty reduction.
- The use of resources allocated to NSAs.
- The effectiveness in implementing the programmes and the extent to which the timetable for commitments and payments have been respected.
- NSA participation and proposals for future engagement.

Only the MTR can lead to a change of priorities of the CSPs and NIPs (in the light of changed circumstances of an ACP state). Following the completion of the MTR the EU may revise the allocation of resources depending on the needs and performance of each ACP state.

The review of the NIPs is a significant process in the EU relationship with the Horn countries. The primary objective of the MTR is to evaluate whether the co-operation strategy embodied in the CSP and defined in the NIP is still relevant or whether it should be updated or modified. The MTR also determines future allocations to the country programmes based on performance and needs.

The MTR process incorporates various indices for measuring success. One of these is the level of involvement of the NSAs and results attained compared to the targets and indicators for the period under consideration. Involvement of NSAs and assessment of use and levels of disbursements is also considered. Interviews with civil society organisations in the Horn revealed that few of them were aware of the MTR process. The few NSAs that were aware believed that the MTR is a document to be drafted and not a process for evaluating performance and needs.

Uganda For instance, in Uganda, the only NSAs that were aware of the MTR were the Private Sector Foundation and the networks of NGOs, the NGO Forum and the Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA). Despite the awareness within the NGO Forum and DENIVA of the MTR process through meetings with the Cotonou Civil Society Steering Committee and information available on the Internet, no activities had been scheduled to participate in the review process. The Uganda NGO Forum had requested from the NAO and the EC delegation funding to conduct a pre-MTR civil society analysis. No response was received and due to the lack of funding it was difficult for the Forum to conduct its own review.

The absence of consultation with NSAs was justified by the Uganda NAO by the fact that civil society organisations had been actively involved in the review of the PRSP. The government felt there was no need to duplicate efforts and repeat the same process with NSAs again. Moreover, the review process being based on project implementation evaluations and field reports, NSA input was considered too “theoretical” by the government, despite the grassroots nature of the work of most NSAs. This observation reflects that NSAs are merely seen by the NAO as NGOs operating from the capital with no constituency. Moreover, the NAO failed to take into account the broader scope of the MTR which is supposed to review programming priorities, not just to evaluate projects.

The general conclusion across the region is that the MTRs were taking place too early to provide a meaningful review of programming faithful to the original objectives of an MTR. In Uganda the NIP was concluded in 2002, only two years before the MTR took place. The process of preparing proposals and getting projects implemented was just beginning. The lack of flexibility in the timeline is one of the practical factors undermining the participation of NSAs in the MTR process. NAOs interviewed explained that deadlines set by Brussels do not allow much time for involving NSAs.

An interesting observation in Uganda was that the Ministry of Trade officials knew that there was an MTR to be conducted. However, to them, this was a financial matter to be handled by the Ministry of Finance through the NAO office. The trade officials did not appreciate what the MTR was all about. They noted that they have neither been consulted nor informed of the annual or mid-term reviews since this was a matter in the docket of a different line Ministry. It is thus apparent that the need for consultation and co-ordination is required not only between the NSAs and the government but also between government departments and ministries.

Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan In Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan, there is no record of civil society participation in the MTR process.

In Djibouti, civil society first came to know about the JAR and the MTR only in March 2004 through an initial awareness meeting organised by the APFO, IAG and Saferworld joint project in collaboration with Djibouti civil society organisations.⁴ In Eritrea the first consultation was organised by the same project in December 2003.

In Sudan, a mid-term review drawing on lessons learnt and focusing on processes rather than programming is to take place, but information available to NSAs is limited and their involvement is as yet nonexistent. However, the fact that there are plans to look at process seems creative and flexible, which was appreciated.

⁴ A follow-up consultation with civil society in Djibouti was held in November/December 2004.

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- Ethiopia** In Ethiopia, civil society awareness of the existence of the MTR process was negligible. Their participation was non-existent in the design but as stated in earlier sections of this report, the Cotonou task force was requested in February 2004 to provide inputs to the JAR 2003, prepared by the NAO and EC. Inputs were finalised in September 2004 by a consultant, following review by the Cotonou task force.
- Kenya** In Kenya, civil society was not actively involved in the MTR process. The JAR for the year 2003, which is the basis of the MTR, was prepared by the NAO. Civil society organisations were invited to several meetings to discuss Cotonou issues without being fully informed that they were being consulted as part of the MTR process. The criteria used to select the NSAs that attended these meetings remain unknown and the notice period was short with no prior documents being circulated. This made it difficult for NSAs to give well-informed contributions to the process.
- In March 2004, the Kenya Civil Society Alliance organised a workshop in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation at Nanyuki with a view to preparing a civil society contribution to the MTR process. They were informed by the NAO that the JAR had been prepared and forwarded to Brussels. This clearly underscored the lack of information flow between civil society and the Kenyan Government. Kenyan civil society organisations lament the lack of information such as the timetable for action and activities planned for the year, funding and eligibility criteria and information on activities being done by other NSAs locally or internationally.
- The Nanyuki workshop enabled civil society organisations to initiate a parallel MTR process and form an independent view of the CSP and NIP. A conclusion emerging from this state of affairs is that the government and the NSAs are not co-ordinating their initiatives. The office of the NAO acknowledges that involving civil society at each stage of programming is complicated and time consuming.
- Somalia** In Somalia, the Somalia Unit of the EC delegation in Nairobi conducted a review of the SISAS. A consultative meeting was held in Nairobi with Somali civil society organisations.

5

Constraints for effective civil society participation in the Cotonou process

Assessment of the levels and nature of civil society participation in the Cotonou process in the Horn countries reveals that, despite opportunities available, engagement is low. The opportunities have not been exploited to yield maximum involvement in all parameters of participation. There are challenges that make local civil society organisations ineffective. Some of the reasons for this stem from the characteristics of the Horn region. This is a region of poverty, civil and political strife, and conflict. The majority of the states are small in terms of governmental resources available to alleviate poverty and create stable institutions and structures for democratic governance of their societies. Without stable democratic institutions, respect for human rights and the rule of law is constantly in danger.

NSAs have a role to play in alleviating poverty, conflict prevention and peace-building and enhancing civic awareness of the tenets of good governance, democracy and the rule of law as well as respect for human rights. However, there are numerous constraints ranging from:

- Financial and logistical resources
- The lack of information
- The lack of human resource capacity
- The good will (on the part of the EC and governments) necessary for effective engagement.

Inefficient consultations

In Horn countries there are no sustained efforts to hold consultations between and among the NSAs, the government and EC delegations. The few consultations have been ad hoc, erratic, unrealistic and with no serious preparation. There has been a lack of clarity on the agenda for discussion. Most participants in these consultative meetings are unfamiliar with the Cotonou process. In most cases, background information is provided late and in an insignificant quantity. There is no time for analysis, synthesis and preparation for any meaningful debate. Most consultations, if not all, have been in the capital cities and not in rural areas. This is expected to be done by the Cotonou committees or structures now in place in six out of the seven IGAD member countries.

The lack of information

Most NSAs involved in the consultation process have been little informed about the results of the consultations and there is minimal follow-up and implementation of the resolutions. Consistency, coherence and co-ordination of the various consultative meetings are lacking. Moreover, there is no established system of feedback flow. The NAO and the relevant ministries are informed of the key time frames and programme activities from the EC delegations and Brussels but no formal mechanism or structure exists for disseminating this information to NSAs. NSAs are not aware of the timetable for the development of National and Regional Indicative Programmes, funding mechanisms and how capacity-building support is being formally handled.

EC delegations have a role to play in ensuring that there is timely dissemination of information on key moments for NSA engagement in the Cotonou process. Developing communication tools is an opportunity to do so but maintaining a mailing list by itself is not sufficient. Civil society organisations/NSAs also need to be more proactive in finding out more – especially once they have some basic information and awareness to build on – without waiting for either the EC or the NAO.

The lack of harmonisation between the Cotonou Agreement and other frameworks

The implementation of the Cotonou Agreement cannot be isolated from other development frameworks aimed at alleviating poverty. These include the PRSPs, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the initiatives of regional structures such as the Africa Union, IGAD and the East African Community. Under Article 124 of the East African Community Treaty, states undertake to promote and maintain good neighbourliness as a basis for promoting peace and security. They also undertake to evolve and establish regional disaster management mechanisms and establish common mechanisms for the management of refugees. These processes and institutions have to be linked to the Cotonou initiatives to ensure complementarity and mainstreaming. Civil society must be well informed about these processes to ensure effective engagement. The Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme should be the entry point for harmonising these various initiatives. Civil society within the Horn region have rarely been involved in regional issues. There is need to forge a collective and common peace-building and conflict prevention agenda encompassing all stakeholders. Focal points in the Horn of Africa of the ACP Civil Society Forum need to be more connected to regional, national and local initiatives on Cotonou.

Weak civil society capacity

A major constraint to civil society participation is capacity. Many commentators have highlighted the lack of NSA capacity to participate effectively in the Cotonou Agreement partnership. Most of the Cotonou issues and particularly the negotiations on the EPAs are technical⁵. The specific challenge to many NSAs is the absence of adequate policy research capacity and analytical skills. An associated challenge is the funding and infrastructure limitations. The human resources needed to address the lack of analytical and research skills require substantial financial endowments. In all the Horn countries capacity is a recurring problem. The various national civil society forums or steering committees that have been put in place should provide a forum where civil society share experiences and strategies for engaging in the Cotonou process. There is a need to strengthen these forums and to enhance collaboration and information sharing. There is also a need to define principles and procedures for civil society engagement and to establish a systematic approach to civil society consultation rather than the current ad hoc system.

⁵ In line with the World Trade Organisation rules, the unilateral trade preferences that the EU has been granting ACP countries will cease to exist and ACP countries will have to provide reciprocal access to their markets for EU products by removing tariffs. Since 2002, the EU has been negotiating the framework for the new trade relations through EPAs.

Various initiatives and approaches have been made to enhance capacity-building in the Horn. For example, ECDPM has produced and disseminated an information pack *The Cotonou Agreement. A User's Guide for Non-State Actors*⁶ which was then adapted specifically for Somalia. The APFO, IAG and Saferworld joint project has also developed a guide on the EU and the Cotonou Agreement⁷ as well as an infokit on the MTR in English and French⁸. The same joint project has either conducted or supported awareness-raising seminars (and in some cases trainings) on the Cotonou Agreement in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia.⁹ Capacity-building should include a better understanding of the Cotonou Agreement, enhanced capacity for policy analysis and support to the development of participative structures and networks, organisational strengthening and access to flexible funding mechanisms.

Weak understanding of civil society funding mechanisms

A common weakness in all the Horn countries is the lack of clear appreciation of the funding mechanism for civil society within the framework of the EDF and NIPs. Even at the governmental level, there is no clear appreciation of the funding procedures under the EDF. Taking this into account, the Uganda NAO proposed that there is need for training programme managers and line ministries on the procedures and contents of the EDF resources. In all the Horn countries, governments represented by the NAO traditionally manage the EDF grants. There are no clear guidelines within the Horn countries for civil society access to the NIP resources. In Somalia and Sudan, international NGOs are the ones accessing resources while local civil society organisations are sidelined. The need for a channelling agreement similar to the Uganda approach is long overdue in the other Horn states. NSAs interviewed in Kenya and Sudan were of the view that the eligibility criteria should be developed in a transparent manner with an opportunity for consultation with NSAs. There is also a perception that the EC delegation should be involved in the preparation of the criteria as a means of guaranteeing transparency and fairness to all stakeholders. This view stems from the suspicion that governments may favour some NSAs over others.

Other challenges related to funding include delays in establishing the eligibility criteria for NSA funding and the reluctance or lack of incentive from some government officials to include NSAs in Cotonou decision-making processes as well as creating institutional structures for dialogue between NSAs and the government. As the survey indicates, in only one of the seven IGAD countries have NSAs to date been able to access any funding.

Weak co-operation between civil society and governments

A common source of concern raised in Horn countries relates to the lack of mutual trust between civil society and the governments. Civil society views the Cotonou process as being political and therefore not conducive for implementation by civil society. In the absence of a political and institutional context for participation, civil society feels that it is asked to validate the government's position rather than being able to provide input. There is a need to institutionalise and democratise decision-making processes to involve civil society organisations.

⁶ The guide is available from ECDPM at: http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index.htm

⁷ 'Understanding the EU. A civil society guide to development and conflict prevention policies. Horn of Africa edition', Saferworld and the Conflict Prevention Network with Africa Peace Forum and InterAfrica Group, June 2002.

⁸ The infokit is available from Bizuwork Ketete, regional co-ordinator, APFO/IAG/Saferworld: bizuworks@yahoo.com

⁹ Except for Sudan and Uganda, the consultations in the other five countries were financially supported by the joint project.

Centralised decision-making processes and capacity in the EU/EC Delegations

Many civil society organisations are of the view that bureaucratic processes in the EC delegations and in Brussels slow down progress because of centralised decision-making mechanisms in Brussels. EC delegations should be given the mandate, authority and capacity to effectively facilitate dialogue between NSAs and the government at local levels. Further decentralisation of decision-making power would increase the democratic and political space for genuine civil society and NSA engagement.

There is also concern over the capacity and experience of the civil society/NSA focal persons in some EC delegations and how able and empowered they are to build on their experiences of dealing with NSAs so that they can move away from ad hoc consultations with only a selected few civil society organisations and towards more inclusive and coherent co-operation with NSAs.

Unclear criteria for legitimate civil society structures

The identification of legitimate and independent NSAs is a challenge for EC delegations. Article 6 of the Cotonou Agreement provides a very broad definition of NSAs comprising the private sector, economic and social partners (such as trade unions) and civil society “in all its forms according to national characteristics”. This means that each country is supposed to identify NSAs. It may be necessary to develop clear criteria that will assist in the identification of legitimate NSAs. These criteria should be developed with all the stakeholders concerned, particularly EC delegations, the governments and existing NSAs. Although there is a general set of eligibility criteria which countries are supposed to adapt to specific situations, some countries have taken up these guidelines verbatim, while others have not been using them yet. To the knowledge of the authors, Sudan and Uganda are the only countries that have formally adopted eligibility criteria.

A constraint that is more visible in Somalia and Sudan relates to clan, religious and regional differences and the fact that women and young people are often marginalised from political processes. There is also absence of a broad-based educational system for the entire population. This is coupled with food insecurity. In Somalia, civil society organisations cannot operate freely in the entire country. If an organisation operates in an area controlled by a given clan, that organisation is not welcome in other areas controlled by different clans. This makes co-ordination and harmonisation a challenging task. A positive aspect is that SISAS has a component for enhancing the role of women in the development process.

Lack of co-ordination between national and regional civil society organisations

NSA activities at the national level need to be closely linked with regional and global initiatives to maximise channels of dialogue and sharing of experiences between countries and regions. It would be very beneficial, for instance, for civil society organisations across the region to work closely with other Cotonou bodies. The general lack of co-ordination and collaboration among NSAs was evident during the first phase of EPA negotiations. NSAs in the Horn countries did not participate in phase I of the negotiations. There was no structured mechanism for their involvement. In phase II, civil society from Uganda and Kenya are involved in the negotiations at national and regional levels. In these two countries national development trade policy forums have been established with civil society representation.

The ACP Civil Society Forum has been established as a common platform for civil society to address issues related to ACP-EU co-operation. It is the result of a 1997 civil society initiative, whereby NGOs representing different ACP regions were tasked with the role of regional focal points. The linkages between the Forum and national initiatives need to be improved, as these are weak or even non-existent in some countries.

6

Policy conclusions and recommendations

In all the Horn countries, the breadth and depth of NSA participation is limited. A number of preliminary trends are discernible upon which conclusions and policy recommendations can be made. There are a number of potential obstacles, challenges and dilemmas that affect civil society engagement in the process. Most of the challenges are acute in conflict-prone countries. However, due to the diversity of the region, the level of civil society engagement on Cotonou issues remains unequal.

The factors accounting for the differences include:

- The existence or lack of a vibrant civil society.
- Varying levels of civil society experience in public policy dialogue.
- The existence, or not, of a political environment conducive to civil society engagement with the state (such as freedom from conflict and freedom of speech).
- The human and financial resources allocated by the EC for dialogue with civil society.
- The capacity and leadership of EC delegations in country.

In Eritrea, Djibouti and Sudan, the governments' hostility to independent NSAs undermines the establishment of a political dialogue between civil society and the governments. In Eritrea, the absence of civil society engagement is due to very limited opportunities for dialogue. The few Eritrean civil society organisations in existence are not considered independent and there is a poor enabling environment for engagement with the state. In Djibouti, formal awareness-raising seminars or consultations are urgently required. This includes the need to enhance capacity-building support for NSAs. To address the suspicion between governments and civil society, there is need to develop constructive engagement between the parties. In Kenya and Uganda these conditions are met, which has resulted in a more active and organised civil society. Yet in Kenya and to a large extent in Uganda, support for the enhancement of institutions for good governance and financial assistance towards the peace process within the region is crucial. In these countries there is a need for enhanced policy dialogue. EC delegations themselves need to be given more capability to work in this way.

In conflict-prone countries such as Somalia/land and Sudan, the conflict has obviously had a major impact on the level of civil society engagement with their government and the EU. Given the context of protracted conflict, the opportunities for consultations, policy dialogue and advocacy work have been very limited or non-existent. Yet, there is much need for consultation with all relevant stakeholders when implementing development programmes or humanitarian assistance in areas of protracted conflict.

The EU and IGAD governments, as well as international NGOs need to ensure that programmes are implemented in such a way that they address the causes of conflict rather than exacerbate them. Moreover, given the conflict dynamics across the Horn of Africa, poverty strategies will only attain their objectives if they take into account the link between development and conflict. When the CSPs contain some analysis of the conflict risks, this is not reflected accordingly in the choice of priorities. There is also great need to use EU instruments to move from humanitarian assistance towards more sustainable rehabilitation and development programmes and to give a more important role to local civil society in peace-building and conflict prevention initiatives.

Horn civil society organisations need to be proactive in learning about the CSPs and EU instruments in which they can input. It is equally important for them to propose alternative models of dialogue with the EC delegations and governments when these formal consultations do not take place. The existence of civil society Cotonou structures can provide a suitable framework for advocacy work which can further be assisted by international NGOs. This can include providing timely information on contacts or key events and consultations, as well as awareness-raising sessions on the Cotonou Agreement and the role of NSAs.

Governments themselves have the responsibility to address the information gap by making timetables of forthcoming consultations publicly available.

The existence in some EC delegations of staff specifically liaising with civil society organisations has contributed to positive results in terms of dialogue and engagement with NSAs. This should be extended to many more delegations, especially in light of the ongoing decentralisation process that will give more responsibility for the management of aid to the delegations¹⁰.

In order to take forward these recommendations and engage in an ongoing dialogue, NSAs need to be able to access EU funds allocated to capacity-building programmes. The EU needs to make progress on the disbursement of funds and the eligibility criteria to deliver the commitments of the Cotonou Agreement on capacity-building.

Civil society organisations have expressed concerns over some of the priorities of the CSPs and NIPs, in particular infrastructure and macroeconomic reforms, as they do not immediately address the needs of the rank and file poor majority in these countries. For instance, social services, gender disparities and conflicts are not being addressed in the CSPs and NIPs. The choice of priority sectors was influenced by the availability of EU funds for these activities. In Uganda, where donor contributions account for 52% of the budget, the government has not been in a position to refuse or influence donor support in sectoral areas. For instance, the transport and rural development sectors have been over-funded, but the Government has not been able to use some of the funds to improve absorption capacity in these sectors. In addition, quite a number of focal sectors are very similar for several countries (eg macroeconomic support, roads and transport).

In some countries, the contents of the CSPs have been based on the World Bank PRSP. Therefore, the MTRs should have also assessed the development framework from which the CSPs are derived and how it can be informed by NSAs.

EU programming in the Horn does not take into account the realities of international economic relations. The EU Common Agricultural Policy for instance has a significant impact on Horn incomes. The EU needs to ensure that the impact of its trade policies do not undermine the poverty reduction and conflict prevention objectives of development programmes. Moreover, the CSPs need to be reviewed to assess if the programmes are consistent with the objectives of sustainable development.

¹⁰ More information on the deconcentration or devolution process can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/decentr/index_en.htm

Annex: Interviewees

Djibouti

Mr Ahmed Arait, Iris, civil society organisation
Ms Caroline Bivar, Civil Society Liaison Officer,
Delegation of the European Commission in Djibouti
Mr Pierre Philippe, Head of the Delegation of the
European Commission in Djibouti

Ethiopia

Ms Martina Fors, Delegation of the European
Commission in Ethiopia
Ephraim Zewdie, Office of the NAO

Kenya

Mr Peter Aoga, ECONews Africa
Mr Roland Kobia, Regional Political Advisor,
Delegation of the European Commission in Kenya
Dr Halima Noor, ECONews Africa
Mr Collins Obote, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Kenya
Mr Benson Ochieng, African Centre for Technology
Studies (ACTS)
Mr Oduor Ongwen, ECONews Africa
Mr Kenneth Waithiru, Kenyan NAO
Action Aid, Kenya
Kenya Private Sector Association

Somalia

Mr Eric Beaume, Operations Manager, Somalia Unit,
Delegation of the European Commission in Kenya
Ms Mila Font, Civil Society Focal Point, Somalia Unit,
Delegation of the European Commission in Kenya
Mr Mohamed Jama, Civil Society Forum, Somalia
Mr Walid Musa, Delegation of the European
Commission in Kenya
Mr Paul Simkin, Somalia Unit, Delegation of the
European Commission in Kenya

North Sudan

Ms Justine Omoro, Assistant, office of the NAO
Sarah Routley, Consultant with Agrisystems and
Regional Manager Capacity Building Programme in
South Sudan
Mr Jose Luis Vinuesa, Head of Section, Delegation of
the European Commission in Sudan

Members of the North Sudanese NSAs committee on
Cotonou:

Mr Hussein El Ahmar Koko
Dr Abu El Gassim
Professor Hasihm El Hadi
Dr Juma Kunda
Professor Simon Lubang
Mr Widad Abdel Mutaal
Dr Muawia Shaddad

South Sudan

Anisia Karto Achieng, Sudanese Women's Voice for
Peace

Ahmed Hussein Ahmed, Cotonou focal point team
leader, Joint Planning Mechanism SPLM and
Government of Sudan

Suzanne Jambo, Coordinator, New Sudanese
Indigenous Organization Network, Member of the
South Sudanese NSAs committee on Cotonou

Hussein El Ahmed Keko, National Nuba NGO based
at Omdurman

Peter Adwok Nyaba, Member of the South Sudanese
NSAs committee on Cotonou

Widad Abd El Mutual Osman, Assistant Secretary
General for Economic Development, Khartoum

Angelo Tiger Panyuan, Member of the South
Sudanese NSAs committee on Cotonou.

Simon Monoja Lubang Wadok, Sudan Council of
Churches

Uganda

Mr Geoffrey Mugisha, Uganda NGO Forum
Mr Patrick Ocailap, Deputy NAO, Uganda
Advocates Coalition for Development and
Environment (ACODE), Uganda
Delegation of the European Commission in Uganda
Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary
Associations (DENIVA)
Federation of Uganda Employers
Uganda Private Sector Foundation

Africa Peace Forum (APFO), based in Kenya, contributes to the prevention, resolution and effective management of conflict by engaging state and non-state actors in developing collaborative approaches towards lasting peace and enhanced human security in the Greater Horn of Africa and beyond.

InterAfrica Group (IAG) is an independent regional organisation based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which focuses on advancing peace, justice and respect for humanitarian law in the Greater Horn of Africa.

Saferworld is an independent non-governmental organisation that works with governments and civil society internationally to research, promote and implement new strategies to increase human security and prevent armed violence.



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