A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY: THE CASE OF JAPAN

Christopher W. Hughes
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick
United Kingdom
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Introduction: ‘wars on terror’, ‘axes of evil’ and the balance between military and political economy approaches to security

Following the events of 9/11, the US through the inter-linking of the issues of transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the states of the ‘axis of evil’, has fashioned a new global and regional security agenda. The administration of George W. Bush (and particularly the Department of Defense) has labelled this agenda a ‘war on terror’, and prosecuted it by a variety of means. Military power has clearly come to the fore in the US policy response, as witnessed in successive pre-emptive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-insurgency operations in the Horn of Africa and the Philippines, and the re-initiation of support for the Indonesian’s governments tackling of terrorism. The Bush administration has similarly indicated its willingness to confront by military means, if necessary, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

At the same time, the US has shown a propensity to support these military efforts with economic power. The degree of long term US commitment to, and patience with, the intricacies of ‘state-building’ programmes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in other regions of the world remains questionable. Nevertheless, at least over the short term it appears that the US has become more willing to distribute humanitarian, economic and military aid for the reconstruction of ‘failed states’, the regimes of which it has toppled, and for the strengthening of frontline states engaged in the struggle against terror networks and the proliferation of WMD. If the US does not quite practice state-building, then it has certainly rediscovered the importance of Cold War-style economic dispensations in fostering new and existing regimes supportive of the US and its goals across the Middle East, Africa and East Asia (even if, as indicated by the Millennium Challenge Account announced in March 2002, and the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, this economic assistance is to come with enhanced conditionality relating to economic liberalisation [White House 2002]). Conversely, US policy-makers as of late 2004 are once again considering the use of sanctions as a tool of economic power to force North Korea to desist from its nuclear programme. Hence, even though the US stands as a military superpower of unprecedented global and regional reach, and demonstrates an apparent predilection for military means in the first instance in order to realise its security objectives, it has certainly not lost sight entirely of the interrelationship between economics and security.
It is all too apparent that the logic and wisdom of the new US security agenda has undergone heavy questioning and criticism by policy-makers in other states, within the US itself, and by academic observers. The inter-linkages amongst the three components of terror networks, WMD and the ‘axis of evil’ is yet to be proven; and the assertion of the inter-linkages amongst the component states of the ‘axis of evil’ remains tenuous. Just as importantly, the US’s belief in the primacy of military power in dealing with these security issues has been questioned on grounds of long term efficacy. It is doubtful whether the application of military power, and thus an essentially technological approach, is capable of resolving the problems of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD which are more deeply rooted politically, economically and socially. Indeed, the contention has been that US policy approaches will eventually prove counterproductive, only serving to exacerbate antagonism and sources of threat towards the US. The Bali bombing in 2002, and further terrorist attacks in Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia and Morocco from 2002 to 2004 attest to this argument. All this, of course, is not to even touch upon questions of the legality and ethicality of US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The debate regarding the wisdom of the US ‘war on terrorism’ is set to rage on, but one certainty is that the new security agenda has forced, and will continue to force, new policy responses from other developed powers and key US allies. US-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have thus far produced divergent responses. In Afghanistan, the US was supported militarily by the UK, France and Germany. In Iraq, the US’s main source of military support was the UK. However, whilst these key US allies have been divided over questions of the differing utility and legitimacy of military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been possibly greater convergence amongst them and divergence from the US over the importance of state-building in these countries. For while the US has concentrated its efforts on the destruction of regimes and then the rebuilding of the physical infrastructure of states, it is the Europeans that have concerned themselves more with the real intricacies of peacekeeping and state-building. The professed objective of the European powers, lacking as they do the raw military power to match that of the US, is to find within the context of the ‘war on terrorism’, and regardless of whether they fully agree with the purported aims and trajectory of US military strategy, a niche role in future conflict prevention. This role concentrates not just on humanitarian assistance and development assistance, but also on filling the gaps between these two through policies of promoting human resource development and governance structures. The consistency and actual implementation of the European powers’ emphasis on state-building efforts is also not without question, but it does demonstrate a keen perception of the connections between economics and security, and one which is often focussed at a different level from that of the US.
The purpose of this chapter, given the divergent views at various times of the US and European powers concerning the relative utility of military and economic power for the pursuit of security ends, is to investigate the impact of the ‘war on terrorism’ on the security policy of Japan, which stands as another major developed power and key US ally, and historically one of the strongest practitioners of the political economy of security. Japan’s case considered alongside that of the US and European powers, and within the context of the ‘war on terrorism’, is instructive in a number of ways to understand the political economy of the new security environment.

Firstly, Japan has been heavily affected by the post-9/11 security environment to the degree that it may precipitate significant, if as yet still incremental, changes in the overall trajectory of its own security policy. Japan on the global level has shared US concerns about the spread of terrorism, and on the regional level these concerns have been reflected in the problems of potential links between al-Qaeda and insurgency in the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan has feared even more the proliferation of WMD in East Asia and beyond. As will be argued later in this chapter, Japan does not accept the full logic of the ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘axis of evil’, and the implied linkages between terrorism and WMD, and especially between Iraq and North Korea. Nevertheless, Japan is aware that the US for its part increasingly accepts this logic and may act upon it in seeking to constrain North Korea’s nuclear programme, and that this may then pose severe dilemmas for Japanese security policy in terms of countering North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons through military support for its US ally, or through the use of economic engagement.

The second and most crucial way that Japan’s case is instructive is that the ‘war on terrorism’ is not only exerting pressure for change in its security policy, but also that these changes take the form of testing Japan’s relative commitment to military and political economy approaches to security. Japan’s constitutional prohibitions have meant that the Japanese state has been highly constrained as a major military power in the East Asia region and globally in the post-war era. However, the Japanese state throughout the Cold War period, and with growing effect in the post-Cold War period, has faced steady pressure domestically and from its US alliance partner for the incremental remilitarisation of its security policy. Japan’s reaction to the events of 9/11 was to enact in October 2001 an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) that has enabled it to despatch from November 2001 successive flotillas of its Japan Maritime Self Defence Forces (JMSDF) (a euphemism for the Japanese navy) to the Indian Ocean in order to provide logistical support for US and the military forces of other states engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (Hughes 2002). This change is again incremental and provides the JMSDF with a solely non-combat role. But it does represent the first time that Japan’s military has been
officially despatched overseas in wartime; is an acceleration of the incremental pace of remilitarisation; and is a portent of Japan’s increasing moves to participate in US-led military ‘coalitions of the willing’. Japan has further indicated its potential preparedness to support its US ally militarily by passing in 26 July 2003 a Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA). This law has enabled the despatch since December of the same year of a 600-strong unit of the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) to provide logistical support for US and coalition forces in Iraq and in the surrounding Persian Gulf states.

At the same time as Japan’s future military role has once again come into question as a result of the ‘war on terrorism’, its utilisation of economic power for security purposes has also been the subject of scrutiny. Japan’s constrained potential as a military actor in the post-war era has obliged it to consider the use of economic power to deal with security problems of both a military and non-military nature. Japan, as elucidated in more detail in sections below, has articulated conceptions of comprehensive and human security that stress the interrelationship between economics and security; has long favoured state-building policies as the key to stability in the East Asia region; and since the early 1990s has rivalled the US as the first or second largest national donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world.

Japan in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’, therefore, is presented with important questions about how it should respond to new global and regional security agendas. On the one hand, it is faced with demands to expand its military contribution to security via the mechanism of US-inspired coalitions. On the other hand, Japan has been presented with new opportunities to use its economic power to support a political economy approach to security. This may involve contributions to US reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but also support for the European powers’ emphasis on state-building projects. Japan is presented with the need to reconcile military and economic approaches to security. In certain instances these two approaches may prove compatible with each other and with US and European policy. In others, Japan may converge towards a military role and political economy approach that fits with that of the US. In yet others, it may force Japan to diverge from the US and to seek an economic role in security that approximates more with the European approach. Either way, it can be seen that the ‘war on terrorism’, in the same way as the case of the European states, carries fundamental implications for Japan’s relative commitment to military and economic power in the overall make-up of its security policy.

In turn, Japan’s case for a third reason may prove instructive in thinking about the impact of the ‘war on terrorism’ on the political economy of international security. This is because the case of Japan, beyond demonstrating the effects of the US’s new global security
agenda on economic approaches to security of one particular state, also carries implications for other states world-wide. For if it can be divined that Japan as one of the most committed of the developed states to the use of economic power for security ends, and as one of the largest aid donors in the world, has become less convinced of the efficacy of economic approaches to security, then this raises the question of how far the other developed states will persist with these approaches. In other words, if even Japan feels that it cannot make a difference to global and regional security through the use of economic power, this leads to the consideration that the future of the new security agenda may indeed be dominated by US conceptions of the primacy of military power.

Japan’s security policy evolution is thus an important test case to examine the impact of the ‘war on terrorism’ on the political economy of security and related policy implications for a range of developed states. This chapter seeks to explore the evolution of Japan’s security policy and its role as a test case in a series of stages. The chapter begins by examining Japan’s conceptions of the interconnections between economic and security both prior to and post 9/11, and the means by which Japan has used economic power in the past in the service of its security policy. It then moves on to explore how these economic tools of security policy have fared under and been adapted to the post-Cold War and post-9/11 security environment. Japan’s policy-making commitment to the use of economic power in addressing security problems arising from the ‘war on terrorism’ and in other contexts is next examined, in parallel with a discussion of Japan’s increasing commitment to military means.

In terms of overall arguments, this chapter seeks to stress that Japan in responding to the ‘war on terrorism’ has in some ways actually strengthened or least sharpened its usage of economic power. Japan has retained its strong conceptions of comprehensive security and been obliged to make a series of changes to its economic stateraft and ODA policies that have meant that in many instances it has more sophisticated instruments to use for conflict prevention. However, the chapter also argues that although Japan remains committed to political economy approaches towards achieving security, it simultaneously is increasingly entertaining a large military role for itself. The overall consequence is that Japan’s military role is beginning to outstrip its economic role in international security. Hence, the greater likelihood is that Japan over the longer term may emerge as a bigger military actor more closely aligned to the US, rather than as an important economic actor forging a role closer to that in approach of the European powers.

Japanese conceptions of the political economy of security

Japan’s traditions of the political economy of security from the early modern to contemporary eras
Japan’s policy elites, prior to and since the emergence of the Japanese state into the modern international system, have been aware of the inextricable linkages between political economy and security. The Japanese term for ‘economy’, \textit{keizai}, formulated during the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867) is an abbreviation of the phrase \textit{keikoku seimin}, which can be translated literally as ‘administering the nation, and relieving the suffering of the people’. This phrase is derived itself from Confucian thought which stresses public ethics as the basis for the virtuous ruler. Japanese views of the economics have thus been fundamentally bound up with questions of social justice and stability, and have often contrasted with Western-oriented and Newtonian-influenced views of economics as an objective science that can be disembedded from social contexts (Morris-Suzuki 1989: 13-14).

Japanese elites’ stress on the interrelationship between economic management and stability, both domestic and international, was carried through into the Meiji period (1868-1912), when Japan was first to emerge as a modern state. Japanese policy-makers were aware that, in order to survive and avoid colonisation as a late-starter in an international order dominated by the early-starter military and economic imperial powers of the West, it was necessary for Japan to embark on an intensive programme of nation- and state-building. For Japan this state-building process was encapsulated in the slogan of \textit{fukoku kyōhei} (rich nation, strong army), which emphasised in equal measure the development of a strong domestic economy and technologies and complementary military capabilities (Samuels 1991). Japanese policy-makers in the remainder of the Meiji period, and in the succeeding Taishō and Shōwa periods prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, further came to the conclusion that Japan’s programme of state-building and national survival required access to natural resources and overseas markets, and thus the acquisition of Japan’s own empire in East Asia (Hook et al 2001: 28).

Japan’s catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Allied powers in World War II, and the failure of its regionalist imperial experiment in the shape of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, greatly discredited in the eyes of many Japanese the role of military power as the primary, or necessarily sufficient, means to achieve security. Japan’s demilitarisation under the US-led Allied Occupation, and the corresponding growth of anti-militaristic and anti-nuclear norms in Japanese society, further ensured that its future military role would be heavily circumscribed. Japanese policy-makers certainly did not ignore altogether the role of military power in security affairs. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s decision to seek and sign a security treaty with the US in 1951 (revised in 1960), and to accept Japanese light rearmament through the eventual formation of the SDF in 1954, reflected a pragmatic perception that alignment with and security guarantees from the US were essential to Japan’s survival in the midst of intensifying Cold War pressures in East Asia. In turn, by the early 1980s, as US-Japan security cooperation increased, Japan’s alignment with the US gave way
to a security relationship that could openly be termed as an alliance. Moreover, Japan, encouraged by the US, upgraded its national military capabilities and range of missions in support of US power projection functions in the region.

Nevertheless, despite Japan’s willingness to depend in large part on the US for military security during the Cold War and since, it is arguable that the most distinct feature of Japanese security policy in the post-war period has been the continuing recognition of the interrelationship between economics and security. Prime Minister Yoshida’s vision of post-war Japan’s role in international society, often referred to as the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’, was one, which, whilst not eschewing military power altogether, saw Japan as ultimately ensuring its national security through economic means. Yoshida and other influential Japanese policy-makers in the early post-war period were cognisant that it had been domestic economic instability during the ‘Great Crisis’ of the 1930s, and the subsequent failure of the state to provide economic benefits and redistribute economic costs, that had precipitated domestic social and political instability, and which had then fuelled militarism and Japanese external military adventurism. Hence, even if the Japanese state had not entirely failed in this period, its pre-war history had demonstrated the chain of linkages between domestic economic, societal and political insecurity, and the generation of international conflicts.

In a similar fashion, Japanese policy makers were aware that economic insecurity, and the incapacity of state structures to respond to these challenges, and the concomitant risks of conflict, were not limited solely to Japan’s own example. From the Meiji period onwards, Japan’s elites looked on in apprehension at China’s failure to emerge into modern statehood and to develop commensurate economic and military institutions, its internal disintegration, and then its consequent dismemberment by the imperial powers. Japan’s decision, often haphazardly arrived at, to intervene in China and to seek its own further imperial aggrandisement was seen at the time as a defensive act to prevent the Western domination of Japan’s neighbour. Following Japan’s eventual defeat in World War II, policy-making opinion remained divided over the justification and wisdom of Japanese actions. Nonetheless, Japanese policy-makers were united in accepting that pre-war China’s travails represented an example of how failing states could produce conditions for internal conflict, external intervention, and regional destabilisation, with the end result that Japan could become dragged into a disastrous conflict.

Japanese policy-makers’ historical experience in East Asia thus reinforced the long-held view of the intrinsic linkages between economic, social, political and military security dynamics. In many ways, economic insecurity, and the inability of states to provide the conditions for economic prosperity and social stability, were seen as the root causes motivating conflict on Japan’s part and conflict centred on neighbouring states. Japan’s
fundamental understanding of the political economy of security derived from the Tokugawa period, and running through the pre-war and post-war eras, in turn fed through into key security policy measures premised on the importance of economics.

Therefore, in addition to alignment with the US and light rearmament, the Yoshida doctrine’s other major tenet was that Japan should concentrate on economic restructuring and the rebuilding of the state’s economic functions, as only this could fully guarantee Japan’s internal security and stabilise its external security behaviour. In conjunction with this, Yoshida and successive policy elites emphasised the importance of restoring economic ties with East Asia and other regions in order promote the stability of Japan’s international security environment. This task was thought to be especially important in East Asia due to the fact that many of the newly independent sovereign states of the region were systemically weak. These states needed to be buttressed economically to cope with the internal stresses derived from the legacy of colonialism, such as ethnic divides and questions of regime legitimacy, and to cope with the harsh external pressures of the onset of the Cold War in the region. Japan’s concentration on economic reconstruction and economic ties with the East Asia without doubt contained a large element of mercantilism. Nonetheless, this mercantilism was benign to some extent; charged as it was with the Japanese belief that improved economic ties would certainly boost the Japanese economy back to a position of pre-eminence in East Asia, but that it would still benefit the other states of the region through enhancing their economic development and state-building processes.

Japan’s comprehensive security policy and ODA policies

Japan’s keen perception of the linkages between economics and security was further demonstrated in the Cold War period by its conceptualisation of comprehensive security policy and its development of economic security policy tools. The concept of comprehensive security was first articulated during the administration of Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi (1978-80), with the premier’s commissioning of the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) to produce a Report on Comprehensive National Security. The successor administration of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō (1980-1982) then adopted elements of the report as national policy, and established a new Comprehensive National Security Council in December 1980 (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983). The concept was produced set against a background of enhanced economic uncertainty and strategic fluidity in the international system, and was notable in stressing not only the interrelationship between economic insecurity and the generation of military conflict, but also that problems of access to economic resources and economic dislocation should be viewed as security threats to states and their citizens in their own right.
The comprehensive security report’s emphasis on the political economy of security was matched by Japan’s emerging aid policy in this period. Japan had been a modest ODA donor in East Asia since the 1950s and 1960s as part of its reparations and normalisation programme with former colonies. Japan rapidly increased its ODA disbursements in East Asia and globally from the mid-1970s onwards. In part, Japan’s expansion of ODA provision was a device to counter hostile sentiment resulting from increased Japanese economic penetration of East Asian states, to secure energy resources in the Middle East, and Japan’s growing image as an ‘economic animal’ and purveyor of economic threats. Japan, in major part also, increased its aid provision in order to support US Cold War strategy and those states in East Asia and other regions that were seen as crucial in playing a ‘frontline’ role (or as described in the official Japanese parlance, ‘aid to countries bordering on areas of conflict’) in countering the resurgence of Soviet power. Japan thus increased its ‘aid to USA aid’ in the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea (Pharr 1993: 251).

Nonetheless, at the same time as Japan accepted the need and utility to provide aid to support key US allies, it is also apparent that Japanese ODA policy in this period was motivated by a deep and genuine recognition of the links between economics and security, and a wider security agenda that went beyond the immediate exigencies of the Cold War. Japanese ODA was designed in this period not simply to ensure the security of pro-US regimes, but also had a very significant bent towards long term developmentalism and state-building. Japan’s aid to ‘frontline’ states in Northeast and Southeast Asia was concentrated in efforts to develop the industrial infrastructure to foster long-term economic growth and domestic political stabilisation. Moreover, Japan’s ODA was not allocated exclusively to overt US allies. Japan directed increasing quantities of ODA towards China as a means to support its reform efforts and to assist in preserving its internal economic and political stability. For Japan’s policy-makers the lessons of the pre-war still held constant: there was only one threat greater to Japan than a strong China, and that was a weak one, with all its attendant problems of civil strife and unpredictable external relations (Hughes 2004: 155).

Japan’s emergence as an ODA ‘great power’ in the latter stages of the Cold War was clearly not without problems. It was often directed to serve Japanese private business interests as well as those of the recipient state; its strategic and security purpose was often poorly articulated and the implementation subject to inter-ministerial rivalries; the emphasis was on large industrial infrastructure projects and immediate economic growth rather than human development; and ODA was often directed to support authoritarian regimes in the belief that these offered the most viable governing structures to support high speed growth, and that they would then steadily evolve into more democratic forms as economic development produced
manageable incremental social and political change (Watanabe 2001). Still, Japan’s provision of ODA in this period represented a clear manifestation of the belief that economic growth held the key to state-building strategies, internal social and political stabilisation, and thus ultimately the prevention of conflict domestically and internationally.

Japan’s conviction in the interconnection between economics and security is further shown by the fact that in the post-Cold War period it has not only maintained but in certain ways strengthened its economic approaches to security policy. Japanese government-commissioned reports relating to the future of national security policy have continued to argue that Japan should adopt a comprehensive approach whereby it employs economic and military power in careful combination (Advisory Group of Defense Issues 1994: 7; Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the Twenty First Century 2000: 45). In addition, the onset of globalisation pressures and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 have indicated anew the security threats associated with economic dislocation. Japanese policymakers have witnessed how in the case of Indonesia the financial crisis has plunged individuals into poverty, heightened societal insecurity, questioned the legitimacy of the ruling elites, enfeebled the central and local government apparatus of the state, undermined state-building agendas, and opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ of ethnic tensions and separatism, often leading to violent conflict.

The Japanese government’s response to these security problems engendered by economic liberalisation and globalisation has been to continue to provide large scale ODA to the states of East Asia. Japan’s principal economic approach towards security in East Asia thus remains one of developmentalism in the belief that this will undergird state-building programmes and eventual economic and political stability (Hughes 2000: 232, 243, 250-251). However, Japan’s ODA policy in the post-Cold War period and in dealing with the fall-out from globalisation has not been static and has shown new adaptability. Japan approved an ODA Charter in 1992 which outlined for the first time the principles underlying its aid programme, and emphasised that Japan in future aid allocations it would take note of issues such as recipient states’ record on the development of WMD, arms expenditure, democratisation and human rights. Japan then revised the ODA Charter in mid-2003, providing its aid policy with an increasingly heavy emphasis on conflict prevention (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003a).

Japan’s record of strictly following these principles has been open to question, and particularly its subordination of political issues to economic interests (Hook and Zhang 1998). It is fair to say, though, that the original and revised ODA Charters have given Japan’s aid programmes a more explicit political and security-oriented character in the post-Cold War period, and this has then slowly fed through into important changes in the sectoral direction of ODA provision. The majority of share of Japan’s ODA is still directed towards economic
infrastructure and production. But this share since the late 1980s has gradually decreased, whereas Japanese support for the less physical and material aspects of state-building such as education, health, administration and civil society has gradually increased (Hirono 2001: 13-14). Japan has also begun to follow other developed states in promoting programmes such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and improved governance. This type of approach was emphasised particularly by the Japanese government’s Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace which was established by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō to investigate ways to increase Japan’s role in international efforts for the consolidation of peace and nation-building (Kokusai Kyōryoku Kondaikai 2002)

Japan’s increasingly targeted ODA policy has been further refined through the articulation of the concept of human security. In 1998 the Japanese government established a United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security to support UN human security-centred agencies, and in January 2001 formed a Commission for Human Security charged with deepening understanding of the concept. Japan under the banner of human security has mainly emphasised those threats to human life, livelihoods and dignity generated by globalisation and economic liberalisation, including poverty and debt relief, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational crime, infectious diseases, and the provision of health care. In May 2003, the Commission for Human Security issued its final report. The report again drew attention to the importance of ODA as a means to address the root economic sources of human security, conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery; and it stressed the interconnection between poverty, human security and conflict generation, and the consequent need to use economic means to address this set of issues (Commission on Human Security 2003: 72-90).

Japan’s future ODA programmes and emphasis on human security should once again not be seen as unproblematic. Japan’s own economic difficulties mean that its ODA budget has been subject to cuts (cut by 10 per cent a year since 2001). Renewed Sino-Japanese tensions have enhanced pressures inside Japan to use ODA as means of leverage over China rather than as a means to engage and build economic interdependence, and these principles may be applied to other contexts. ODA implementation and strategy is still subject to inter-ministerial rivalry, and the bulk of the ODA allocation are still focussed on large economic infrastructure projects. Human security is also problematic in the sense that Japan needs to iron out certain contradictions and inconsistencies. It needs to consider whether support for authoritarian regimes in East Asia is always consistent with individual human security, and why it chooses to ‘securitise’ (Waever 1995) certain problems such as migration and hunger
in certain parts of East Asia but refuses to treat similar issues in the same way in the case of North Korea (Hughes 2004: 218-219).

Notwithstanding this, however, Japan’s ODA policy and economic approaches to insecurity can be seen to have had important applications in the East Asia region in the post-Cold War period. Japanese involvement in the Cambodian peace process was notable because this saw the first despatch of the SDF on limited peace-keeping operations. But Japan’s most important role was the use of economic assistance for post-conflict reconstruction, and the offering of economic inducements to the governing parties to maintain the peace settlement following the abortive coup of 1997 (Hook et al 2001: 188-189). Japan has had a similar involvement in East Timor: despatching its largest SDF contingent to date for peacekeeping and reconstruction duties, as well as providing targeted aid for state-building activities (in fact underwriting Timor-Leste state to the point of providing 25 per cent of the total aid budget for the new state).

From the above discussion of the evolution of Japan’s security policy from the early modern through to the contemporary period it can be seen that it has been consistently characterised by an emphasis on the economic roots of insecurity, and, concomitantly, the importance of economic policy tools to tackling extant security problems. Japan has professed, and to a large degree practised, a comprehensive view of security that seeks to use economic and military power in balanced combination, often with economic power as the foremost policy instrument. Japan, in terms of policy tools, has sought to use ODA and the building of economic interdependence as a means to promote developmentalism, economic growth and state-building agendas. In the post-Cold War era it has further complemented its conception of comprehensive security with one of human security that seeks to address the economic causes of individual human security.

In many ways, then, Japan can been seen to stand apart from other developed states in the consistent level of its commitment to, and prioritisation of, political economy approaches to security. Japan would also seem to be well placed to respond to a range of contemporary security problems that are generated by economic globalisation, or which require the application of economic power. It could be argued that Japan is also in a uniquely strong position to contribute to international security in the ‘war on terror’ through support for state-building agendas and human security. The questions thus explored in the next section is how Japan’s comprehensive security policy has fared under the conditions of the ‘war on terror’; how far it has been seen to remain relevant and to make a distinct contribution in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction; and how far the balance between economic and military power has been skewed in responding to the problems of transnational terrorism and the US-crafted security strategy.
Japanese comprehensive security policy and the ‘war on terror’

Japan and the Afghan campaign

Japan’s security policy following the events of 9/11 and initiation of the US ‘war on terror’ has been presented with some difficult choices, and subsequently divisions have emerged amongst its policy-makers regarding the optimum response and the appropriate mix of military and economic policy tools. Japanese policy-makers, on the one hand, have expressed their abhorrence at the terrorist attacks on the US; recognised fully the threat of transnational terror networks to international security; and pledged backing for the efforts of the US and international community, including military action, to eradicate terrorism. Japan’s own experience of the ‘hyper-terrorism’ of Aum Shinrikyō sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995 has heightened its sense of the importance of countering trans-national terrorism.

On the other hand, though, despite the shared recognition of the potential threat of terrorism and acceptance of the need for a measure of military response, Japan’s policy-makers have maintained serious reservations about the general wisdom and effectiveness of the US policy approach. In particular, Japanese policy-makers and public opinion have debated whether the application of overwhelming military power should be the primary means to combat terrorism, and how effective this approach will really prove over the longer term if it is not backed up with the application of appropriate and sufficient amounts of economic power (Terashima 2002). Japan’s policy elites above all have argued that the root causes of domestic and transnational terrorist phenomena lie in the economic dislocation, societal alienation, human insecurity, and the failure of state apparatuses to provide for the security of their citizens. Japan has contended that the logical response to terrorism should then be the application of economic power. This should address not only the humanitarian fall-out from military action, but also address the very roots causes of terrorism by engaging in economic stabilisation and state-building programmes. Hence, Japan’s policy-makers in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks often found themselves occupying a position closer to their counterparts in Europe than in the US.

Japan’s overall preference for political economy understandings and approaches towards terrorism was demonstrated by its response to the US-led war in Afghanistan. Japanese policy-makers soon after 9/11 sensed that it would undoubtedly be necessary to provide support for US military action against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and were motivated in this belief by a variety of factors. Japan’s political and bureaucratic leadership were certainly wary that there should be no repeat of the ‘Gulf War’ syndrome of 1990-1991, when Japan had been subject to heavy US and international criticism for its alleged reliance on ‘chequebook’ diplomacy and provision of economic assistance to the coalition war effort, rather than making a ‘human’ and military contribution. In addition, sections of Japanese
policy elites were conscious that the response to 9/11 would form a major test of the political credibility of the US-Japan alliance relationship, and an opportunity for Japan to further expand incrementally the potential range of its support for US global and regional military strategy. Just as importantly, though, and as indicated above, much of Japanese policy-making opinion was also convinced that an initial military response would be necessary to disrupt the *al-Qaeda* network in Afghanistan, and even if this also involved the simultaneous destruction of the Taliban regime.

Japan was therefore prepared to offer a degree of heavily circumscribed military assistance to the US-led coalition in the Afghan campaign. Japan’s ATSML enabled the despatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean area in order to provide non-combat logistical support to US and the forces of other states engaged solely in combating terrorism. The ATSML was drafted in such a way that Japan support for the campaign was made possible only by the existence of relevant UN resolutions and was consequently limited to operations in Afghanistan. Japan has no obligation under the ATSML to provide support in any other theatre of operation, and the law itself is limited to a two year, although extendable, time frame. Japan did then take important new steps in its military policy in the despatch of the SDF overseas for the first time during ongoing combat operations, and, as argued elsewhere, the ATSML has set important potential precedents for US-Japan alliance cooperation in other contexts (Hughes 2002). But Japan’s support for the Afghan campaign still represented only one more incremental step in the expansion of it military role in international security, and demonstrated its continued inherent caution in becoming embroiled in military conflicts.

Japan’s principal contribution to attempts to eliminate terrorism in Afghanistan came instead in the form of the utilisation of economic power. Japan in the run up to the campaign in certain ways could be seen to reprise its Cold War role of providing ODA to ‘frontline’ states in order to buttress US military strategy. Japan’s government provided a total of US$300 million of bilateral assistance to Pakistan from September 2001 onwards for education, health and poverty reduction. From October 2001 onwards it also discontinued its limited sanctions on India and Pakistan, imposed since May 1998 in response to their nuclear testing activities Japan further pledged a total of US$18 million in immediate assistance to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Japan’s SDF delivered a range of humanitarian assistance to Pakistan for Afghan refugees, and the government pledge US$102 million via the UN and other agencies of refugee assistance.

However, Japan’s approach in using economic power to contribute to the effort against *al-Qaeda* consisted of more than just immediate humanitarian aid and support for states friendly to US war aims on the periphery of Afghanistan. Japan following the fall of the Taliban demonstrated that it was deeply committed to state-building efforts in Afghanistan as
forming the most likely eventual solution to terrorist activity in this region. Japan hosted in Tokyo the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan on 21-22 January 2002. Japan at the conference pledged up to US$500 million for rebuilding the government and physical infrastructure of the country, and the conference itself raised a total of US$4.5 billion. The Japanese government then dispatched a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan in March 2002 which concluded that Japan should concentrate its ODA towards Afghanistan not simply in short term humanitarian assistance but also longer term assistance in areas such as the rebuilding of media infrastructure, capacity building in administration, human resource development in education and health, and training for women for reintegration into public life. Japan concluded also that significant proportions of its ODA should be allocated to ‘grassroots’ projects managed by NGOs, including drilling water wells, and health and education training. Japan from July 2002 onwards announced its intention to support UN programmes for the DDR of former combatants; the training of Afghan civilian police; drug control; and the resettlement of refugees. It then sponsored a further conference in Tokyo in February 2003 on the ‘Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan’ which reiterated these aims. Finally, Japan has seen the Afghan situation as means to further expand its programme of human security: providing assistance under its UN Trust Fund for Human Security for programmes relating health, education and the removal of anti-personnel landmines.

Japan can be seen to have played a highly active role in attempting to combat the reemergence of terrorism in Afghanistan by non-military means. Its approach has focussed on the provision of aid for state-building and human security agendas. It has devoted funds not just to the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, but also to enable the new Afghan administration to attempt to effect economic and social restructuring. Japan has also shown that its commitment to Afghanistan’s future is long term, all indicating that it is very much concerned with the intricacies of state-building. In this sense, Japan has certainly been able to stand upon its conceptions of comprehensive security and to make a distinct contribution to international security. It can also be seen to have stood closer to the Europeans than the US. For while Japan’s economic assistance has often complemented that of the US, and the US has shown a significant commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the Bush administration’s interest to Afghanistan as a whole, let alone state-building, has come to be questioned from an early date.

Japan’s political economy approach to addressing security problems, and especially the issue of terrorism, has extended also to its own region in East Asia. The response of the US to the problem of Abu Sayaf Group (ASG) terrorism and insurgency in the Mindanao province of the Philippines has been to employ a mix of military and economic means reminiscent of the Cold War. Since late 2001, the US has despatched up to 1,200 special
forces personnel to assist in the training of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in anti-terrorism techniques. It has also provided US$100 million in aid, but a significant proportion of this is made up of military assistance in the form of weaponry transfers. Japan’s approach has contrasted strongly with that of the US. Japan’s constitutional prohibitions clearly preclude it from any type of military option in the Philippines. But it is also the case that Japan again has shown a distinctly different understanding of the root causes and optimum means to assist the government of the Philippines to deal with terrorism.

Japan has viewed intra-state separatist conflict and terrorism in the Mindanao area of the Philippines as in part the outcome of the relative failure to date of that state’s developmental agenda, and the resultant severe economic disparities imposed on Mindanao. Consequently, the Japanese government in December 2002 unveiled a ‘Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao’. It argued that strife in this Mindanao had, ‘aggravated the issue of poverty the area, creating a hotbed of terrorism’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2002: 2). Moreover, it stressed that the conflict undermines opportunities for FDI in the region and the development of the Philippines as a whole, thus reinforcing the cycle of poverty and conflict. Japan’s ODA package for Mindanao has aimed to break this cycle by improving the training of human resources in the region, and by providing basic human needs such as medical care, rural development and infrastructure. In this way, Japan’s declared aim has been to support the government of the Philippines’ efforts to fight simultaneously poverty and terrorism.

Japanese policy in Indonesia has also taken a slightly different tack from that of the US. As noted earlier, Japanese policy-makers watched with apprehension the onset of the East Asian financial crisis from 1997-1998 and the strictures imposed on assistance to Indonesia imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US, aware that these would undo many of the state-building efforts of the Indonesian regime and subsequently have major implications for political stability and internal security. Japanese predictions were borne out with the political turmoil at the centre of Indonesia which produced the collapse of successive governments, challenges to the territorial integrity of the Indonesia archipelago, and enhanced conditions for the operation of terrorism. Japan’s preferred policy has been to maintain the territorial integrity of Indonesia, and it only switched to the support of Timorese independence when it became clear that international intervention made this a fait accompli. Japan also attempted to broker in 2002 what has ultimately turned out to be an unsuccessful cease fire agreement in Aceh as another means to preserve Indonesia as one unit. Japan’s support for the territorial integrity of Indonesia has involved the continued disbursement by Japan of large sums of bilateral and multilateral ODA.

Japan’s current political and economic support for Indonesia is clearly problematic in terms of bolstering what has become a democratic regime but which is also engaged in the
repression of internal dissent in certain of its provinces. Japanese policy-makers, however, see their support for the Indonesian state as the policy option least likely to result in insecurity for the bulk of the population, and also as a means of addressing the problem of terrorism. Japan again sees the key to tackling terrorism in Indonesia as the strengthening of state capacities, the improvement of economic conditions, and dealing with economic disparity, poverty and injustice, factors that there were termed in the 2003 Japan-Indonesia Joint Announcement on Fighting International Terrorism as the ‘root causes of terrorism’ (MOFA 2003). Japan’s approach towards the ‘war on terror’ in Indonesia has, as in the case of the Philippines, had to contrast with that of the US due its inability to project military power in the region or offer any form of military assistance. But its heavy emphasis on continued state building, curbing the impact of economic liberalisation, and developmentalism, has also meant that its approach to Indonesia has a stronger political economy edge than that of the US.

**Japan, the political economy of security, and the ‘axis of evil’**

Japan’s reaction to the terrorism of *al-Qaeda* immediately following 9/11 and to the US-led campaign in Afghanistan indicates that it has sought to further expand incrementally its military role in international security, but that its prime response has been to emphasise approaches to security that utilise economic power. This political economy approach to security has to some extent complemented that of the US by supporting key allies in the ‘war on terror’, but in other ways Japan has shown signs of diverging from the US path due to its long-term commitment to state-building and human security. Japan it can be argued has continued to stand upon its principles of comprehensive security policy, and has indeed sharpened the focus of many of its tools of economic security.

However, as the US ‘war on terror’ has developed in scope and intensity, it is probable that Japan may find it increasingly difficult to adhere to the comprehensive security policy line, and that the overall balance in its security policy may begin to shift decisively towards the utilisation of military power. President Bush’s identification of the ‘axis of evil’ in the 2002 State of the Union address, and the seeming translation of this into actual US security strategy, has posed severe dilemmas for Japan. Japanese policy-makers, whilst implacably opposed to terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, had long been sceptical about the real state of Iraq’s WMD programme and of any effective link between Iraq and *al-Qaeda*. Just as importantly, they perceived few links between pre-war Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Japan is aware of the possible trade in ballistic missile technology between the latter two. Nevertheless, Japanese policy since the late 1970s has actually been to attempt to improve ties with Iran. Its motivations for this policy include a strong interest in energy security and oil supplies from Iran, but also a conviction, similar to that of many EU states,
that engagement with Iran is the approach most likely to moderate its security behaviour and development of WMD. Even as late as February 2004, and as international pressure mounted on Iran to open its nuclear facilities to inspections, Japan concluded new oil concessions in Iran’s Azadegan fields.

North Korea, in contrast, is perceived as a clear threat to Japanese security due its previously clandestine and now openly declared nuclear weapons programme and development of ballistic missiles. But again Japan’s optimum policy approach towards North Korea since the mid-1990s has been one of balanced military deterrence and economic engagement. Japan thus looked upon the ‘axis of evil’ concept with a mixture of puzzlement and apprehension: puzzlement in that it could see no linkages between its component states; apprehension, in that it saw the US as possibly intent in not only eliminating the Iraqi regime and waging war in the Middle East, but also possibly moving on next to North Korea and provoking an unnecessary conflict in East Asia with deep implications for Japan’s own military security policy.

Japan has consequently reacted to the war in Iraq with considerable caution. It has felt obliged to express strong backing for US military actions due to its shared concern over WMD proliferation, and because it has seen its public support for the US as a test of the political solidarity of alliance ties. Moreover, while Japan has felt deep discomfort at the US’s eventual sidelining of the UN in the launching of the Iraq war, it has adopted an approach which views limited cooperation with the US as the best way to curb its unilateralist tendencies over the longer term. All the same, though, Japan has been determined that it should be highly cautious about being sucked into the Iraq conflict militarily. Japan’s ATSML, as noted above, premises SDF despatch on UN explicit resolutions related to the combating of terrorism, a condition clearly not met in the case of the Iraq war. Japan in June 2003 did pass the LCSMHRA to enable the dispatch of the JSDF for logistical and reconstruction efforts. However, the JSDF is still provided with a purely non-combat role, and the Japanese government has despatched its forces to Samawah, southwest of Basra, the most stable area that it could find in the country and thus with the minimum risk of becoming involved in armed clashes.

Meanwhile, Japan has attempted to compensate for its inability to contribute militarily to the war in Iraq by again employing economic power. Japan’s government has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq, and hinted strongly at its willingness to provide ODA for reconstruction efforts. Japan announced a plan in May 2003 to provide economic aid for rebuilding the physical infrastructure of Iraq in the areas of water and energy supplies, health, and education. Japan at the International Donors’ Conference on Reconstruction of Iraq in October 2003 pledged US$5 billion (US$1.5 billion in grants; and
US$3.5 billion in ODA loans) disbursed bilaterally and multilaterally, and in cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations. However, Japan’s ability to employ its economic power for security ends in Iraq has been hindered by the lack of stronger UN mandates supporting the US and UK reconstruction efforts; its need to confirm very much to a US-dominated reconstruction agenda that has focussed on physical infrastructure; and the seeming lack of a consistent plan on behalf of the occupying powers for the rebuilding of the Iraqi state.

The case of Iraq is one where Japan’s comprehensive security policy and application of tools of economic security policy has been very much blunted by the US approach to the ‘war on terror’. Arguably, though, the case of North Korea, at the other end of the ‘axis of evil’, and as another potential target of the US ‘war on terror’ and campaign against WMD proliferation, is one where Japan may find that it has to radically transform the nature of its economic security tools or discard them altogether. As noted above, Japan’s approach towards North Korea since the first revelations of its suspected plutonium-route nuclear programme in the mid-1990s has been one of military deterrence combined with economic engagement. Japan’s primary military role in responding to the potential North Korean nuclear threat has been to further augment its support for US power projection capacity to deal with military contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in Northeast Asia. This has taken the form of the revised 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation, which make clear for the first time the range of logistical support that Japan will provide to its ally in a military contingency. At the same time, Japan has supported US efforts to engage North Korea via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). KEDO has sought to provide heavy fuel oil and funding for the construction of two light water nuclear reactors (LWR) in North Korea, in return for the North’s freezing and eventual dismantlement of its nuclear programme. Japan’s government has pledged a total of US$1 billion for the construction of the LWRs. Japan additionally has supported South Korea’s ‘sunshine’ engagement policy towards the North, and periodically provided major quantities of food aid bilaterally and via multilateral agencies to North Korea.

Japanese economic engagement of the North since the mid-1990s has been hampered by the lack of normalised diplomatic relations between the two states, which precludes the full scale provision of ODA. In turn, Japan-North Korea normalisation talks, ongoing since the early 1990s, have been undermined by a range of bilateral disputes, including the fate of Japanese citizens abducted to North Korea since the 1970s, and North Korea’s claims for compensation and apologies from Japan for its period of colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula. Japan has persisted with attempts to engage North Korea bilaterally, and to support US and South Korean engagement strategies, in the realisation that military conflict to resolve
the nuclear problem is a highly costly option, and that in large part North Korea’s external
military brinkmanship is driven by its internal economic crisis and the need to extract
economic concessions from the US and its allies to ensure its survival (Hughes 1999).
Moreover, if Japan were to finally engagement with North Korea, it would mean that
significant Japanese economic power could be brought to bear in seeking to resolve the root
economic causes of North Korea’s insecurity and its presence as a threat to regional
security—Japan likely as it is to agree to provide up to US$10 billion in ODA and what it
terms as ‘economic cooperation’ in order to settle North Korea’s claims for colonial
compensation.

Japan’s approach towards the North Korean security problem can be seen as one
which understands the North’s military behaviour as driven by economic insecurity, and is
grounded on the belief that the North can to some degree be contained militarily, but that
ultimately its security behaviour can only be moderated through the application of military
power. Japan’s approach towards North Korea, though, has been thrown very much off
balance since the advent of the Bush administration. North Korea’s inclusion within the ‘axis
of evil’ confirmed for many Japanese policy-makers the US’s disenchantment with
engagement policies towards the North, and raised fears that the US might even consider
military action against the North to halt its nuclear programme; a policy line which had
previously been thought of as a non-option due to the likely devastation of the Korean
Peninsula and the strong objections of China, and the US’s own allies.

Japan has been further unnerved by North Korea’s defiant stance towards the US
since late 2002. In October 2002 North Korea revealed that it possessed a previously
unknown uranium enrichment programme providing another possible route to nuclear
weapons acquisition. Following this, in December 2002 North Korea announced that it would
restart its plutonium reprocessing programme, and in January 2003 its intention to withdraw
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By 2003 both North Korea and the US had
declared the 1994 Agreed Framework as effectively void, so throwing the future of KEDO
into doubt.

Japan’s own policy response has been to attempt to use diplomatic means to nudge
both sides back into dialogue. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō made landmark
visits to North Korean in September 2002 and May 2004 for direct talks with Kim Jong-II.
The purpose of these summits was to clear away many of the obstacles to the progress of
Japan-North Korea normalisation, to stress Japan’s concerns to the North about its nuclear
programme and solidarity with US position on non-proliferation, and to demonstrate to the
US the importance of dialogue with the North. Japan’s diplomacy experienced a number of
successes and failures which cannot be explored in depth here. But whilst Japan was not
wholly successful in de-coupling North Korea from the ‘axis of evil’ in US eyes, its diplomacy, coupled with that of South Korea, has at least succeed in contributing to the restart of intermittent US-North Korea dialogue and the holding of the Six-Party talks on the North Korean issue from 2003 onwards.

Japan still, though, faces a harsh dilemma over the North Korean issue. Its optimum policy is one which addresses the political economy of insecurity in North Korea through dialogue and economic engagement. However, the restart of US-North Korea dialogue has proved to be a fractious process, resulting in further North Korean threats towards the US and its allies involving its nuclear programme and other military capabilities. Meanwhile, Japan itself is unable to engage North Korea more vigorously because of its own bilateral difficulties in the normalisation process, its concerns about North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile programmes, and its desire not to be seen to break ranks with its US ally. Japan is then faced with a deteriorating security situation on the Korean Peninsula and has few policy tools that it can activate for its stabilisation.

The outcome is that Japan may be faced with serious choices about how it will react if North Korea refuses to desist from its nuclear programme. If the US pushes for economic sanctions against the North, Japan will have to convert its tools of economic engagement from carrots to sticks. It is envisaged that Japan will cut remittances from the large North Korean community resident in Japan, and cooperate in the interdiction of North Korean shipping. Japan’s National Diet in January 2004 passed legislation to enable the stoppage of remittances in the event of UN sanctions, and in October 2004 has hosted exercises for the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Even more significantly, if there is a repeat of the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, Japan will need to provide clear military support for the US under the revised Guidelines for Defence Cooperation. Japan may be forced to consider other types of military action if North Korea continues to try to coerce its neighbours with its threatened nuclear programme. Japan since December 2003 has agreed to purchase an off-the-shelf Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system from the US, with all the attendant consequences for further accelerating North Korea’s ballistic missile programme and China’s nuclear modernisation. Japanese hawkish policy-makers, such as the current Director General of the Japan Defence Agency, Ishiba Shigeru have also begun to moot the issue of what approximates to preemptive strikes by Japan on North Korean missile sites—an interesting echo of the new US national security strategy. Hence, the end result of the US’s intention under the Bush administration to pressure North Korea more actively on its nuclear programme as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and campaign against WMD, could be for Japan to ultimately abandon its economic engagement approach towards the North, and to prod it into becoming a more
assertive military actor in the region and to contravene many of its post-war concepts of comprehensive security.

**Conclusion: Japan’s opportunities for comprehensive security found and lost?**

Japan since 9/11 has found itself caught in a chain of events that, in the same way, as other developed states and US allies, has obliged it to reconsider its stance vis-à-vis the US, and to reconsider its overall security policy. For Japan, this challenge has been particularly acute as the constraints upon its use of military power and high degree of military dependence on the US have meant that it has had to move with considerable caution in order not to alienate the US. From the sections above, it is clear that Japan has experienced varying degrees of ambivalence towards the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘axis of evil’. It has agreed with the objectives of eliminating terrorism and WMD, but has often doubted whether the US fully understands the underlying political economy causation of these threats, and whether the US’s somewhat crude application of military power and economic power really promises a long term solution to these problems. Nonetheless, Japan has felt it necessary to offer a degree of support to the US, and the ‘war on terror’ and ‘axis of evil’ have begun to effect important change in its security policy.

Japan’s immediate response to the 9/11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan through the mechanism of the ATSML has established important precedents for the expansion of its military role. However, the reconstruction of Afghanistan has also offered opportunities for Japan to refine its political economy approach to security and deploy economic assistance in state-building and human security projects, thus representing in many ways a continuation of its comprehensive security policy.

The ‘axis of evil’, the Iraq war, and the new nuclear crisis brewing in North Korea, however, have not proved so conducive to the practice of comprehensive security policy. Japan has found it difficult as yet to bring its economic power to bear in Iraq, and in a situation so heavily dominated by US visions of state reconstruction. Meanwhile, in the case of North Korea, and possibly regardless of Japanese attempts to prevent the US from extending its military approach to halting WMD proliferation to East Asia, Japan is now confronted with a looming military crisis. Japan finds itself unable to use economic approaches to resolving the crisis, and, when push comes to shove, may choose enhanced military cooperation with the US and the build-up of its own military capabilities in order to respond to the nuclear threat. The result will be to push balance in Japan’s security policy much more towards that of military power, so undermining its claims to comprehensiveness.

The overall conclusions that must then be reached concerning the impact of the ‘war on terror’ and ‘axis of evil’ on Japan’s security policy is that it is indeed generating
fundamental changes, and that these changes may take the form of Japan’s declining emphasis on the political economy aspects of international security. Arguably, this is ironic, given that the onset of globalisation and evidence from the post-9/11 security environment indicates that economic insecurity more than ever accounts for many sources of contemporary threats. Moreover, if it is asked where Japan is best equipped to make a difference regionally and globally in a post-9/11 world, the most likely response would be through a political economy approach to security rather than through military means. However, the US’s logic of the ‘axis of evil’, and Japan’s deepening alliance ties with the US, are creating the circumstances that may push Japan away from comprehensive approaches to security.