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New Dimensions of the International Security System after the Cold War

Leonid Kistersky

Center for International Security and Arms Control

Stanford University

April 1996
Leonid Kistersky was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control in the fall of 1995.

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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Security System in Transition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring the Security of Ukraine</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Contribution of International Financial Institutions to the</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Security System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO’s Role in Constructing an International Security System</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations Organization as the Core of the Post-Cold War</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Security System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Dr. Leonid Kistersky wrote this study while he was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control in the fall of 1995. Dr. Kistersky is a leading Ukrainian specialist on international relations and Chief Consultant at the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kiev. He served at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva from 1977 to 1982; he held ministerial rank in the Ukrainian government as chair of the National Center for the Implementation of International Technical Assistance to Ukraine; and he was the E. L. Wiegand Distinguished Visiting Professor at Brown University in 1993-1994.

The topic of Dr. Kistersky’s paper is a very important one. The post–Cold War international security system has been the subject of intensive debate and analysis. What is especially valuable about Dr. Kistersky’s paper is that it treats the international security system not in the abstract, but in terms of its relevance for a new state—Ukraine—that is seeking to define and defend its own security interests.

Ukraine made a fundamental choice about the direction of its own security policy when it renounced nuclear weapons. Having made that choice, Ukraine has to define its interests and shape its policy in the context of the post–Cold War international security system. One of the interesting things that Dr. Kistersky’s paper does is to explore what help the international security system provides—and fails to provide—for a new state seeking a secure position in the world.

The search for security is of course not confined to Ukraine, and for that reason the analysis provided by Dr. Kistersky is of general interest. The international security system faces many new challenges in the aftermath of the Cold War, and Dr. Kistersky puts forward his ideas about the way in which the system can be strengthened to meet those challenges. In the course of his analysis he touches on a number of important specific questions such as NATO expansion, the role of international financial institutions, and the future of the United Nations.

Dr. Kistersky’s paper is a valuable result of cooperation between the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University and the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kiev.

David Holloway
Co-director, CISAC

Sergei Piroshkov
Director, NISS
Executive Summary

This paper considers the emerging structure of the international security system after the end of the Cold War. It describes the changes that have taken place in world politics with the end of the bipolar confrontation, and the new threats and challenges that face the international community in the post–Cold War era. It discusses the implications that this new international system has for European security and, in particular, for the security of one of the newly independent states—Ukraine. The role of international organizations, in particular the United Nations, in countering new threats to global security is examined, and a number of recommendations proposed for reforming the UN to meet these challenges more effectively.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact has left Central and Eastern Europe in a security vacuum. Regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), however important, are unlikely to fill this vacuum and become an effective security structure for the new Europe. The further expansion of NATO may well have an adverse effect on the domestic political process in Russia. As a temporary measure, a “neutral area” could be created for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the security of which could be guaranteed by NATO and Russia.

As for Ukraine, it finds itself at the crossroads of regional politics, with influential domestic groups of both pro-Western and pro-Russian orientation. Its membership in NATO in the near future is neither likely nor desirable, and may have a negative effect on European security. However, the security of Ukraine, and in particular its relationship with Russia, is a very important factor for European stability and for relations between Russia and the West.

In this new global situation, the UN could become an effective center for global security. To adequately perform this function, the organization needs profound reform. This reform could include three main stages: strengthening the UN’s role as a forum of discussion, creating a center for diplomatic coordination and conflict prevention, and creating a mechanism for implementing the UN’s decisions. In the distant future, the UN may assume responsibility for administering the nuclear weapons remaining after global nuclear disarmament.

Other steps in the reform process may require altering the UN Charter, including expanding the Security Council to 20–21 members, with new members such as Germany and Japan (among other new regional leaders) taking the permanent seats; and revising the right of veto of the permanent five and possibly replacing it with a consensus or a majority vote mechanism.

The UN peacekeeping operation is another domain that requires close examination and restructuring. The organization should be primarily concerned with conflict prevention. Peace enforcement operations should take place only by decision of the Security Council, and member states should provide more support, financial and other, and be encouraged to contribute troops.

In the area of economy and development, the UN should take the leading role through creation of a UN Development Council. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) could perform the role of a coordinating body for other international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the World Bank.
New Dimensions of the International Security System after the Cold War

Leonid Kistersky

The International Security System in Transition

The end of the Cold War has drastically altered the global landscape and the realities of peace and security. Until recently, the international security system was defined by the potential for dangerous nuclear confrontation between two hostile, ideologically driven systems. Rapid world transformations, particularly the more fluid global movement of goods, capital, and people, have made it necessary to restructure the international institutions that were created during the Cold War. As the world becomes highly interdependent economically, a drastic shift in international relations is taking place: from a power-oriented mode of policy to economic and political methods of international law enforcement. Now, undivided ideologically, the international community is capable of cooperating more effectively to prevent conflict.

During the Cold War, international security was maintained through a balance of weapons of mass destruction between the two superpowers. The sovereignty of other states was vicariously “loaned” to one of the superpowers in exchange for protection from possible aggression from the other. Until the beginning of 1990s, therefore, international security was based precariously on resistance to a designated enemy, and Western policymakers were predominantly concerned with the possibility of thermonuclear conflict between the two hostile blocs, or a massive invasion of armored divisions from the Eastern bloc.

But the end of the Cold War, and the disappearance of hostile military and political blocs, has not led to greater international security, as had been predicted. Rather, the contrary is true. Instead of one clear potential peril during the Cold War, the international community must now confront diffuse threats as it deals with the unforeseen consequences
of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. Separatism and aggressive nationalism have sown the seeds for military conflicts around the world. Moves toward self-determination and secession that were neither guided nor prepared for, as in the case of Yugoslavia; the sudden disintegration of a heavily armed empire; the formation of more than a dozen sovereign states with enormous problems; and the political and economic restructuring of the former Soviet-bloc countries of Europe have led to serious international security problems.

The removal of the fear of imminent global conflict has not yielded an adequate “culture” of international cooperation, which is now urgently needed. For the last fifty years, since the creation of the United Nations, there have been more than 150 local and regional wars and conflicts. More than 20 million people have been killed and more than 80 million wounded, disabled, or displaced. Many local and regional military conflicts have sprung up recently, posing new threats to global security: in Yugoslavia, Georgia, southern Russia, eastern Africa, and Turkey, among others. As 1995 came to a close, almost 50 such conflicts, some of them threatening to expand, were taking place. The war in Yugoslavia is occurring at the very doorstep of Western Europe. In his report “Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence,” Carnegie Corporation President David A. Hamburg warned of the consequences of “localized” conflicts: “Today worldwide, fed by the powerful currents of aggressive ethnic nationalism, there is a virtual epidemic of armed civil or intranational conflict—the kind often thought of as “internal” but that can readily spill over the borders of nation-states.”

It is obvious that the new situation created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union demands a new approach to present and potential armed conflicts. The international community does not at present have a system to prevent or combat military conflicts; it seems that a catastrophe must occur before the need to construct a new international security system is recognized. The elaboration of an adequate international security strategy, and the means to implement it, must be the highest priority of the world community.

Newly born European democracies have found themselves in a security vacuum. International and regional security organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have gained in prominence. All former Soviet republics and Eastern European Soviet clients were incorporated into the OSCE. As Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss have pointed out, however, “This geographic slight-of-hand...should not obscure the harsh reality that nine of its fifty-three members are actively participating in shooting wars. Moreover, their economies have more in common with the vast majority of developing countries than with the advanced industrialized members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).” While the OSCE may lack the full means to fulfill its ambitious intent, the organization is important in a symbolic and normative sense. These newly sovereign states have demonstrated a special interest in joining these and other organizations of the former rival bloc, on the assumption that membership serves as recognition of their independent statehood and helps to guarantee their security.

Some reputable publications stress the importance of regionalism in general and argue that it is gaining more and more prominence in the contemporary world: “Organizations for regional cooperation of varying capacity and effectiveness now cover most parts of the world, and regional collaboration remains a strong aspiration worldwide...Progressing from a customs union through a single market towards monetary and political union, the European Union (EU) has continuously extended its areas of integration, developing ever stronger supranational institutions...The EU continues to be a strong pole of attraction to countries outside it and has become a decisive factor in the unification of the European continent, though it may not be the appropriate model for all regions.”
While regional security is important, it cannot be a substitute for the universal international security approach of the United Nations. The EU has recently expanded to fifteen mostly developed Western European countries and achieved a remarkable level of economic and political integration, with a substantial degree of sovereignty delegated to the Union’s supranational institutions. It took the EU almost forty years to achieve this level of integration. Moreover, it constructed its “world beyond frontiers” very cautiously, accepting only those countries that had already achieved or nearly attained the high level of economic and democratic development of the major Western European economies. Thus, the EU model represents not a purely regional grouping but rather an organization that integrates nations with similar levels of development. Of course, it is regional in a geographic sense, but its basis is definitely a similar-level model. The level of economic development of the countries of North and South America is not that close, and their “integration achievements” are considerably less striking. The development of trends toward regional economic integration is relatively recent. Its goal is important but rather limited: Regionalism may promote economic cooperation and facilitate countries’ integration into the world economy, but it cannot provide stable security in a region and cannot be a substitute for a comprehensive international security system. Regional organizations will be dominated by their major regional power: Europe would be dominated by Russia, Asia by China, and North and South America by the United States. Therefore, it is premature to try to replace construction of a universal UN-based international security system with regional security fortresses.

Despite their limitations, regional economic integration trends are very promising, and they should be closely linked with and coordinated by a universal organization. Regional organizations have an important role to play in supplementing and contributing to universal security efforts. But if developed separately, determined only by geography, regional groupings may create serious contradictions between individual countries in the region and between the regions. Moreover, there is always a strong risk that regional organizations may develop into hostile blocs and groupings. Europe is no longer divided by conflicting economic and military blocs, since the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization ceased to exist. But NATO’s recent move to expand further to Eastern Europe may trigger the creation of unfriendly blocs or groups of countries in Europe. To this end, to prevent the development of confrontational regional trends, the UN system must be given the authority to coordinate regional developments both through its central headquarters and regional offices.

The UN and the OSCE now include all Eastern and Central European countries. That is, for the former communist-bloc European countries these are universal organizations. The OSCE does not play a role in European security issues, leaving this challenging task for the UN and NATO, but is trying to be increasingly involved in numerous disputes and military conflicts on the former Soviet territory. It has sent its missions to virtually every turbulent region of the former Soviet territory, including Chechnya, in attempts to assist the conflicting parties in settling their disputes. However, the OSCE’s efforts lack both the operational capabilities and enough political will on the part of the organization’s Western members to be actively involved in mediation and peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union and beyond.

The CSCE, in its attempt to take over the UN functions at least regionally, in its 1992 Helsinki summit declaration identified itself as a “regional organization” in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, which will enable it to coordinate peacekeeping operations with the UN. This declaration also indicated that the “CSCE may
benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations such as the EU, NATO and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities. Other institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), may also be asked by the CSCE to support peacekeeping in the CSCE region. “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States addressed the question of whether NATO could be replaced by the OSCE, as some Russians advocate: “Hardly. The OSCE was never designed to perform the same functions. It is too large, too cumbersome, too much a victim of its own disparity, and in any regard could never perform NATO’s core purpose—to provide a credible commitment between its members to defend one another.”

One substantial point remains unclear in the Helsinki declaration: why not strengthen the United Nations peacekeeping facility rather than dispersing it among several even less effective organizations?

Membership in these regional groupings is far from enough to ensure the security of their members. Military and political alignment cannot substitute for effective economic and foreign policies. The example of Kuwait demonstrated the insufficiency of security guarantees by military means only. To sustain the peace after the huge military confrontation has required a regime of strict economic sanctions under UN auspices. Economic sanctions have proved more effective than military enforcement. After the military action—Desert Storm—was over and the aggressor was forced out of Kuwait, both sides claimed victory. But only strict economic sanctions against Iraq made the country cooperate, at least to some extent, with the international community and allow international observers to inspect its nuclear facilities. Economic enforcement has also increased internal pressure on Iraq to adhere to principles of international behavior and cooperation in order to lift at least partially the UN-coordinated economic sanctions. This is an example of negative economic stimuli that produced a very impressive effect when coordinated on a global level by a universal international organization such as the UN.

The leaders of the international community must ensure a guided and conceptualized transition to the post–Cold War world. A consolidated approach should be taken to the creation of a new system of international security, through a restructuring and strengthening of the already existing universal institutional structure and its three main spheres—economic, political, and, to a lesser extent, military. An independent group of international experts (political scientists, physicists, lawyers, politicians, diplomats, and the like) should be set up to draft the bases of the post–Cold War international security system.

Shortly after the end of the ideological and military confrontation between East and West, individual world leaders and reputable international organizations put forth their initial visions of the post–Cold War international security system. In his address to the UN General Assembly in October 1990, U.S. President George Bush said that his country viewed such a system as “a partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.” These ideas were echoed by many world leaders.

However, credit for taking the initiative toward practical development of the post–Cold War international security system belongs to the North Atlantic Alliance. In its London Declaration of July 1990, NATO outlined its vision of the new Europe and its increasing role in the international security system: “The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey
toward a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence this Alliance must and will adapt.” The Copenhagen Council stressed that the European division was over and invited Central European and would-be newly independent states to implement the London Declaration and to join the Alliance for the sake of common security: “Our common security can best be safeguarded through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements.” The Copenhagen Council further stressed that “Consistent with the purely defensive nature of our Alliance, we neither seek unilateral advantage from the changing situation in Europe nor threaten the legitimate interests of any state, but rather pursue our efforts to ensure that all peoples of Europe can live in peace and security. We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free.” Hence, the idea of a “whole and free Europe” began to be actively promoted and implemented into the project which later became the “Partnership for Peace” program.

President Clinton has repeatedly explained from a number of international high rostrums that NATO’s Partnership for Peace program is not intended to separate Europe again into East and West, but to promote democracy, market economic transformations, and mutual security. The importance of collective security was recognized formally in the UN Charter, which stated that a conflict anywhere was a threat to the international community and that peace everywhere is in the interest of everyone. During the Cold War it was next to impossible to implement this philosophy, since the world was ideologically divided. Each superpower was responsible for its “region of influence.” Now, when the Cold War and ideological rivalry are over, the international community has a real chance to set up an international security system based on the universal principle of the United Nations.

### Ensuring the Security of Ukraine

Positive economic stimuli, especially for the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are vital for the creation of stability. In Ukraine, for example, there has been no serious and concerted program of market economic reform in the more than three years since the country regained sovereignty, as a result of which Ukraine faces constant threats to its continued integrity. The single most serious threat to Ukraine’s security is its extremely poor economic performance: “Ukraine’s very survival as an independent nation is at risk due to the complete collapse of the economy. Awareness of this danger has finally been articulated by the political leadership. The slogan ‘Ukraine’s very viability as a state is at stake unless radical reforms are undertaken’ is now widely accepted.” Although the new government has recognized that Ukraine’s inability to introduce market reforms poses the most serious threat to its security, different members of the government understand the reform process very differently. Only recently, a new program of economic reforms has been drafted and the process of some market transformations got under way, with strong positive economic
stimuli from Ukraine's major international partners supporting the country's market reforms and its denuclearization.\textsuperscript{10}

In the post–Cold War period countries react much better and more eagerly to economic leverage than to military threats or actions. Great powers with global interests need not promote their interests solely through military enforcement. There are now other means to promote and defend these interests. Foreign aid expenditures are more effective for both donors and recipients, boosting both economies. To this end, the Republican-dominated U.S. Congress's drive to reduce budgetary expenditures on foreign aid may reciprocally limit the ability of the United States to defend its interests by peaceful means.

In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western democracies believed that the democratization and market transformation of the former Soviet republics could develop with only slight Western technical and other guidance and very modest financial assistance. By now, however, it is clear that this meager and superficial policy is facing rising opposition in the Newly Independent States. Western countries in general and the United States especially have a much greater role to play in encouraging the democratization of political life and the transformation to market economies throughout the former Soviet Union, and especially in the two largest states, Russia and Ukraine.

The viability of sovereign Ukraine, the largest state after the Russian Federation to emerge from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, will be a critical indicator of future developments in the region. After Russia, Ukraine has the largest population, the largest army, the largest economy, and the most advanced technology of any of the post-Soviet states. Moreover, Ukraine is one of the four successor states of huge nuclear arsenals. As P. Terrence Hopmann and Richard Smoke write in their introduction to Security in Eastern Europe: The Case of Ukraine, “As the time passes, development of democracy and stability in Ukrainian politics would add to the security of Europe and is an important value for its own sake. Development of a well functioning market economy would provide investment and trade opportunities for the West...”\textsuperscript{11} Thus, successful democratic and market transformations in Ukraine are important not only for Ukraine but also for the West, for very different reasons.

A general interlocking of Ukraine's security with the overall European and global security framework should be timed for completion at about the time the last nuclear weapons leave the Ukrainian territory. Thus, over the coming years Ukraine's security would rest more and more on the international security system and less and less on its nuclear arsenal. During this period, Ukraine needs to receive firmer support for its territorial integrity (especially in the context of possible challenges to Crimea) from the global security framework in general and especially from this framework's key player—the United States.

Ukraine is looking in two opposing directions to fulfill its security aspirations. The Western vector strongly desires to increase cooperation with different Western organizations like the European Union, the Council of Europe, and NATO. With respect to the latter and Ukraine's proclaimed neutrality, Ukraine has already joined the Partnership for Peace program and has further indicated that it will not seek full membership in this military bloc in the near future. The Eastern vector is directed toward improving relations with Ukraine's powerful neighbor and main single creditor—Russia. It is clear that Russia will follow any developments in Ukraine's Western vector closely. If not balanced by developments in the Eastern vector, Russia may become rather isolated from European economic, political, and military developments. Such a situation may in turn prevent the international community from erecting a new post-Cold War international security system.
Thoughtful politicians in Ukraine understand that the United States naturally has important strategic interests vis-à-vis Russia, including such matters as nuclear nonproliferation and peacekeeping in the UN framework. Of course, those politicians also understand that the magnitude of American interests vis-à-vis Ukraine cannot be compared with American interests in Russia, especially after the denuclearization of Ukraine is complete.

On the other hand, Ukraine's security is vital to the United States from many viewpoints. Above all, an independent Ukraine is a guarantee of the irreversibility of the democratic process throughout the former Soviet republics—which were disrespectfully labeled the "near abroad" by Russia—and the main guarantee that there will be no new empire on the former Soviet territory and no revival of the Cold War. In the security vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nature of relations between Russia and its neighbors, especially Ukraine, is the great question. Friendly and mutually advantageous relations between the two interdependent states are crucial for international security. Hostile relations between them, or the end of Ukraine's independence, would create a completely different and very unfavorable security situation for the world.

Crucial Western involvement made possible the January 1994 Moscow agreement that provided international guarantees for Ukraine's elimination of its nuclear arsenals. Western and especially U.S. auspices provided Ukraine with adequate international respect, confidence, and incentives to take a more flexible stance toward nuclear disarmament. The agreement made an important contribution not only to the improvement of Ukrainian-Russian relations, but also consolidated both countries' relations with the West. The conflict between Kiev and Moscow over the Black Sea fleet also needs Western mediation and comprehensive support. Deliberating on U.S.-Ukrainian relations at the Leadership Conference of the Washington Group held in October 1995, Coit Blacker, special assistant to President Clinton for national security affairs and senior director of the Office of Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs, said that "in terms of building security structures, the fundamental goal of our policy is to ensure regional stability, so as to provide Ukraine the confidence it needs to focus attention, not on the neighbors, but on crafting a better future for its citizens." 12 Without the West's purposeful and active economic and political support, the Newly Independent States are unlikely to succeed in transforming their societies into democratic and prosperous ones.

Ukraine's official policy of neutrality has not kept the country from its aspirations to become a member of a number of Western organizations, unions, and councils. Ukraine badly needs integration into European structures to counterbalance its heavy dependence on Russia. "But although few will question Ukraine's European-ness, Kiev's limited progress in economic reform, together with proximity to Russia, makes the matter of possible Ukrainian membership of the EU, WEU and NATO a sensitive one." 13 Much depends on Ukraine's own ability to enact economic and other transformations. Ukraine's human rights record, for instance, is very impressive, and Council of Europe membership was granted to Ukraine in September 1995—a privilege Russia did not receive until very recently. 14

Some prominent Ukrainian politicians view NATO as the only effective military organization in Europe that can secure for Ukraine a strategic counterbalance to Russia. Like their colleagues in some Eastern European countries, they are pressing for NATO membership in an attempt to attain security guarantees against their eastern neighbor. This proposal, if accepted, may only further destabilize the situation in Europe. To appease the appetites of former Soviet bloc members for another military bloc, the Western Alliance established in
1991 the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which provides a forum for consultations between NATO and its potential members from the East. Among these potential new members, Ukraine is not a likely candidate in the near future.

Analysts from Ukraine’s most reputable think tank, the National Institute for Strategic Studies, believe that from the strategic perspective of its national security the country should gradually enter the European security system. As the most efficient component of the system, Ukraine must actively develop its interrelationships with NATO. The Atlantic Alliance, naturally, is the basis of the security system that is being transformed today. As an inseparable component part of Europe, Ukraine must steadily move toward developing a dialogue with NATO. Important steps along the way are participation in the Partnership for Peace program and entrance into NATO’s political structures. Thus, the process of NATO’s expansion to the East does not conflict with the strategic policy of Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s readiness for closer cooperation with NATO should fully conform to the Alliance’s policy with respect to new members. Former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes encapsulated this policy recently when he stated that NATO does not need security consumers, but needs countries that are fully capable of bearing the responsibility, including risk-sharing and financial commitment, of full membership in the Alliance. At present Ukraine is neither economically nor militarily in a position to sustain full-scale cooperation with NATO and bear its share of responsibility within the organization. Because Ukraine voluntarily agreed to eliminate its nuclear weapons and accept the expansion of NATO up to its frontiers, which caused a vehement reaction from Russia, Ukraine has the grounds to expect special treatment from the Alliance.¹⁵

Thus, joining NATO in the near future will not serve Ukraine’s security interests. However, Ukraine does hope to cooperate closely with NATO through the Partnership for Peace Treaty, which it envisages not as its defender but as an intermediary and guarantor in resolving disputes with Russia and preventing the outbreak of armed conflict. NATO has already successfully undertaken this function in helping to resolve the problem of removing nuclear weapons from Ukraine. Although NATO and Russia no longer confront one another militarily, they still retain spheres of influence in Europe and are therefore in potential rivalry. Ukraine’s accession to NATO would lead to a new NATO-Russia confrontation, with Ukraine at its epicenter.¹⁶ Moreover, the recent acceptance by would-be members from Central and Eastern Europe of NATO deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories may further complicate Ukraine-Russia relations. In ridding itself of its nuclear weapons, Ukraine is running a serious risk of becoming a nuclear-free hostage of both sides.

The current level of uncertainty in Ukrainian-Russian relations is the most important threat to European security. If relations between the two countries degenerate into the use of force, the security of the entire world will be at stake. Therefore it is vital for the West’s own interests that the West and especially the United States play a much larger role in assisting these two powerful countries, both to maintain the peace between them and to make greater progress toward democracy.¹⁷

The United States, the European Union, and some other bilateral donors have through grants and credits provided the main stimuli for Ukraine’s reform. Despite limited financial resources, the United Nations also plays an important role in project promotion for Ukraine’s reform process. The UN (through the UN Development Program) has a potentially outstanding role to play in managing the proceeds of international credits on behalf of the Ukrainian government, as very successful current experience in Latin America has proved. (For Argentina, for instance, the world community has recently committed U.S. $52 billion.)
Only concerted action with the support of international aid can help to initiate and consolidate democratic transition and economic reforms in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{18} 

Ukraine’s official position with respect to the role of the UN, and specifically its role where countries in transition and Ukraine specifically are concerned, was clearly articulated at the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly. Ukraine commended the UN’s activities in the areas of peacekeeping and conflict prevention, providing assistance to the poor and unfortunate, and uniting countries and peoples through the principles of democracy, justice, and progress. It expressed great hope that the UN system would play an important role in shepherding the process of state-building in new or restored democracies, with special emphasis on force prevention and observation of the standards of international law. Ukraine’s representative to the United Nations gave this aspect of the UN’s new activity special importance as a matter of the highest priority.\textsuperscript{19} The countries with new or restored democracies, as it was repeatedly pointed out by many representatives at the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, are now seeking greater cooperation with the UN.

Now, no one would object to the idea that sovereign Ukraine is geostrategically important to Western democracies in particular, and to the international community as a whole. But it is difficult to agree with the reasoning advanced by some Ukrainian and foreign scholars and politicians in favor of preserving “an independent Ukraine.” They believe that Ukraine provides a large and effective buffer zone against possible Russian misbehavior in Eastern and Central Europe. This is a shortsighted and dangerous position. It provokes misbehavior by Russia and humiliates sovereign Ukraine by treating it as a “buffer zone” against a villain of the peace.

\textbf{The Contribution of International Financial Institutions to the International Security System}

In the rapidly changing post-Cold War world, international financial institutions (IFI) must also undergo adequate changes and transformations. At its October 1995 annual meeting in Washington, D.C., World Bank President James Wolfensohn outlined several immediate priorities and said that the central role of the Bank Group is to bring “together in a systemic approach to development the ideas, the financing, the people and knowledge of all these components and of a successful development program. This is an extraordinary opportunity for this institution to leverage its unique capacity: to integrate development and make it truly sustainable.”

Of the three major IFI, the youngest of them, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), provides the most effective financial support for Ukraine. Despite its limited financial resources, EBRD pursues an effective policy of supporting private sector enterprises through Ukrainian private banks. It has developed a new type of partnership with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, channeling its resources toward development of the most efficient private enterprises. As the experience of countries in transition shows, a developing private sector may serve as effective leverage to force governmental structures to start introducing institutional changes conducive to further democratic and market transformations. It is hardly realistic to expect governmental structures to effectively stimulate private sector development in Ukraine in the near future.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has its own limitations. Ukraine and other countries in transition have enormous balance of payments and budgetary problems. The IMF is not in a position to be an effective instrument in these countries since it does not have adequate financial resources for these purposes. Moreover, because of the very poor performance of countries in transition, the IMF’s liquidity position will deteriorate significantly in the near future. Consequently, the external debt problem, and in particular its multilateral component, will place added pressure on the international financial system. This is an important indicator not only of countries’ own economic performance, but of the ineffectiveness of the policies of the IFI. This is a great challenge for the IMF: to mobilize additional financial resources in support of the development of market forces in countries in transition, and to encourage in the recipient countries more effective policies to achieve this goal.

Unfortunately, until now the World Bank has not only been of very little help to Ukraine, it has sometimes been detrimental to Ukraine’s fragile economy by amplifying mistakes of the local economic policy. This happened partly because the World Bank failed to interact effectively with governmental structures and to attain a true picture of the Ukrainian economy, and mainly because of the professional negligence of the chief of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (IBRD) office in Ukraine. He spent too much of his time orchestrating intrigues against those in the country who wished to prevent the IBRD from imposing destructive loans on Ukraine. In fact, the Kiev office was pressuring Ukraine to accept any loan to mark its activity in the country. On a number of occasions the World Bank office chief in Ukraine directly violated the country’s sovereignty for the sake of generating profit. It would be fair if the IBRD were to allocate part (perhaps 30 percent) of its net profit to a special interest-free fund to help countries that are experiencing temporary or transition-induced financial problems contribute their share of the UN budget.

In the fall of 1992, for instance, the IBRD signed a preliminary so-called Institution-Building Loan agreement with a minister of economics and a vice prime-minister responsible for economic reform in Ukraine. This almost market-term U.S.$40 million loan agreement was intended, inter alia, to “strengthen,” with millions worth of personal computers and funds for conferences abroad, the Ministry of Economics, which remains the major instrument of the centrally planned economy in Ukraine. This was exactly the type of project new World Bank President Wolfensohn had in mind with his statement at the 1995 annual meeting that “projects must be well managed and corruption eliminated.”

In fact, an institution-building loan may only be effective if it is complementary to the efforts of the private sector, which is not yet the case for IBRD activity in Ukraine. International and local experts spent more than half a year redrafting this devastating agreement. Only after a year had gone by did the World Bank approve a substantially new loan agreement, with some grant components, that will support privatization, help modernize the payments system, and establish a treasury system to improve the government’s ability to manage budget revenues and expenditures. Institution-building loans in countries in transition have proved to be misguided attempts to teach old institutions new tricks.

The highest priority for the IBRD’s institution-building loan in Ukraine should be complete transformation of the entire system of state management. The current distribution of legislative and executive powers in Ukraine is the major impediment to democratic and market reform there. Ironically enough, Ukraine, while experiencing severe economic and budgetary problems, maintains a triple system of economic management—the Presidential administration, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Ministry of Economics, which in turn
duplicates all other ministries. Thus, with its severe budgetary deficit Ukraine combines the U.S. (Presidential administration) and the British (Cabinet of Ministers) types of macro-management, plus an additional layer (Ministry of Economics). In addition, Ukraine retains overinflated budget-financed soviets at all levels: nation, region, city, and district. It would be more effective for Ukraine to employ the U.S. type of administration, since the president of Ukraine is the only person in the country with nationwide support. The administration should be fully responsible for reforming the country. The Cabinet of Ministers should be dramatically reduced and merged with the administration, and a new post, vice president, created for management of the everyday work of the administration. At the same time the administration must drastically curtail its direct management of the economy, reform the taxation system in order to give more prominence to production stimuli, support home and foreign direct investments, promote private business development, and considerably reduce the share of public expenditures in gross domestic product. At this point Ukraine needs only one level of soviet, at the national level—the Parliament.

To adapt to the post–Cold War world the World Bank itself needs considerable institutional changes. The IBRD is not a private commercial bank. It is an intergovernmental financial institution that receives financial resources from governments for specific lending purposes. It needs to regain the trust of developing countries and to earn the trust of countries in transition. The IBRD must drastically alter the way it interacts with recipient countries. First and foremost the bank should aim to attain results from its credit policy that are conducive to market reform transformations in client countries. It should support the development of the private sector and help to bring direct foreign private investment to vital sectors of the developing and transitional economies. That is, it must more effectively provide “development resources” for the countries engaged in market reforms. The bank must also become more open and accountable to its members.

In October 1995, in his first address to the World Bank’s governors since taking office, Wolfensohn emphasized that the bank must “deepen our collaboration—as we have begun to do—with the UN system, the IMF and the WTO.” One cannot but agree with this complex approach to the development problems of borrowing countries in general and countries in transition in particular. New customers of the IBRD from Eastern Europe have already experienced severe debt-servicing problems, which will only be aggravated in the future. During his visit to Moscow shortly after the 1995 annual meeting in Washington, Wolfensohn expressed his concern about the present use of the bank’s resources and the creditworthiness of countries in transition. He stressed that without free access to world markets for their competitive products, countries would not be in a position to pay back international creditors. Russia and other Newly Independent States do not have this access, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not going to provide it for them in the near future. “It is not an easy task to invest in the country which does not have an opportunity to export,” said Wolfensohn.21

Wolfensohn had special reason to voice concern about countries that lack export opportunities. U.S. and Russian research has unequivocally identified a number of highly politicized and even destructive loans in the IBRD’s Russian portfolio. The majority of loans in this portfolio do not have any potential to increase revenues in order to improve the country’s debt-servicing capacity. The dubious quality of this portfolio, if amplified, may threaten the financial stability of the World Bank itself. Another concern of recipient countries relates to the IBRD’s widely employed practice of extending multimillion dollar loans for training and retraining purposes, goals which are better served via grant funding as
is the practice of the European Union and a number of bilateral donors. This is also the case with the World Bank’s Ukrainian portfolio. The bank has again initiated a very expensive and ambitious project to educate the country, the so-called Public Economic Education (PEE), which includes “a large number of activities aimed at enhancing the public’s understanding of the economic reform processes: (a) weekly economic roundtables with journalists, (b) provision of lectures, materials, organizational support and other inputs to central and regional agencies in Ukraine involved in PEE...”

Moreover, many World Bank projects retain a disproportionately high share of expensive and inexpert consulting services.

As far back as the early eighties, many developing countries expressed their concern over “the widespread failure of World Bank loans to alleviate poverty, their devastating environmental, social, and political effects, and their contribution to the Third World’s debt crisis, all of which are now being acknowledged by the U.S. Congress, Canada’s Auditor General, and by the World Bank itself.” The World Bank annually provides almost $20 billion in loans to dozens of countries, loans which are increasingly claimed to be inefficient and sometimes harmful to borrowing countries. The quality of the World Bank’s almost $200 billion loan portfolio is steadily deteriorating and becoming less liquid. Even more alarming, these portfolio problems were caused by severe miscalculations in World Bank field offices and a lack of professional control from bank headquarters. In many cases, such as in Ukraine, field offices do not possess a clear and full picture of what is happening in a country’s economic and political life, and thus some of their loans are from the outset doomed to failure. Some experts believe that one-third of the World Bank’s loan portfolio is failing.

In 1992, the board of directors of the World Bank was confidentially informed about the portfolio problems. According to the report, “the quality of the portfolio has deteriorated significantly” since 1980, and “almost half of the projected increase in bank exposure is to countries that are currently considered to be high risk.” The directors were also warned that the World Bank’s reputation as a development institution was widely questioned. After this, several industrial countries cut back their International Development Association (IDA) contributions, while the United States Congress threatened “not to appropriate any new funds for the World Bank unless it adopted a new, more open information policy and independent inspection panel.” These actions were followed by Canada’s recommendation to the Group of Seven partners of a financial assessment of the World Bank.

In response to increasing criticism and dissatisfaction, in 1994 the World Bank made public its “Next Steps” document, which included dozens of specific steps and the establishment of an independent inspection panel. The critics’ response to these steps was largely negative, however, since they represented a standard bureaucratic dodge “and an avalanche of new paper, almost all of which are not linked to any concrete commitment, target, or indicator of tangible improvement in project quality itself.” The reaction of the U.S. Congress was equally dissatisfied, but more resolute: it passed legislation in 1994 that withheld 50 percent of the Bank’s funding for fiscal year 1995 until it was assured that the bank implemented the promised reforms.

It seems, however, that the U.S. Congress’s “early warning system” had little impact on World Bank reformers, whose most recent attempts to improve the performance of the bank, by increasing accountability and transparency, have also failed. During debate over the 1996 IDA replenishment, Congress once again threatened to cut off funding to the World Bank. In fact, Congress has issued such ultimatums to the World Bank since 1992. Each threat was followed by the bank’s promises to introduce necessary changes. By all standards the IBRD is
financially an ill institution and any commercial bank with a loan portfolio of such low liquidity would see its depositors gone. World Bank President Wolfensohn acknowledged at the 1995 annual meeting the urgent need to reform the bank. More effective than outside threats to the World Bank, however, would be the assistance of an independent group of international experts authorized to introduce gradual reform-oriented measures.

The first step on the road to real reform should be the introduction of genuine transparency and accountability to creditor and recipient countries. Until now, the World Bank has successfully employed the Soviet-style system of closed information provided by Project Information Documents (PID), which provide short summaries of the bank’s project loans but virtually no information about the projects themselves. Similarly, the bank’s independent inspection panel, which was established to investigate complaints from those directly affected by its projects, has failed to make the bank’s loan activity more transparent and accountable. The number of inefficient projects has not decreased, and portfolio quality has not improved.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 as specialized UN institutions. Since that time, both institutions have drifted away from the UN system, to which they still formally belong. Deeply dissatisfied with the contribution of the international financial institutions to the development process, the UN General Assembly in 1992 adopted a resolution (A/RES/47/181) that requested the Secretary-General to prepare “an analysis of and recommendations on ways to enhance the role of the United Nations and the relationship between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions in the promotion of international cooperation for development...” In doing so, the international community reiterated the UN’s ultimate responsibility toward the Bretton Woods institutions, and gave the UN a clear mandate to make these institutions more conducive to world development—the most important task faced by the international community today.

To meet the challenge of making World Bank credits an effective component of the development and market transformation process in the Newly Independent States, an intergovernmental body should undertake to coordinate the activity of the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO, and regional banks like the EBRD. To concentrate their financial efforts, and to avoid contradictory country reports at the very least, international financial institutions must closely coordinate their activity in general and with regard to individual countries in particular. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, after some restructuring, may serve as an ideal coordination body. It has relevant departments and programs and an experienced staff who have proved to be very supportive of developmental needs, especially in the sphere of money, finance, and trade. While some believe that the private sector is not responsive to multilateral management and to UN coordination, a study by respected UN researchers Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart refuted this.

The Bretton Woods institutions need to play an active intellectual role, particularly in educating political leaders, in order to help newly independent countries to create financial structures conducive to development and to assist them in financial integration. International financial institutions have a great role to play in helping countries to overcome economic disintegration and to promote the ideas of economic interdependence. Helping countries to overcome economic disparities will save the international community many more financial resources in the future. International financial institutions must make their resources available to assist countries not only to develop market economies, but also to help
reform international economic relations. This will help attain a more stable and lasting peace and a much higher level of international security.

Today, the role of economic growth as the main engine for development is widely understood. It is equally understood that only economic growth can generate positive transformations on the global level, including security transformations. But successful development requires effective cooperation through coordination on all levels. To this end, international financial institutions, as UN specialized agencies, represent an important source of finance allocated to them by governments for the purpose of promoting development. It is the UN that is responsible for their effective performance; if the UN needs a more comprehensive mandate to coordinate the activity of the IFI, such a mandate should be unequivocally granted to it by member nations.

NATO’s Role in Constructing an International Security System

In September of 1995, NATO unveiled its blueprint “Study on NATO Enlargement,” which addressed expansion of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO expansion would commit the Alliance to military protection of a large new region consisting of former Warsaw Treaty Organization member states against a hypothetical threat from their former pivotal ally and security guarantor. This controversial plan to expand the Alliance naturally means a dramatic extension of NATO’s security guarantees, including nuclear protection if necessary, and an increase in members’ defense budgets. This blueprint reflects the ideas of those who believe that NATO’s new role in the post–Cold War period is to fill the security vacuum in Europe by extending its guarantees to the East.

In his comments to NATO member countries and “partner” countries (a euphemism for potential members), which were primarily directed at Russia, former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes said that expansion “will be a gradual, deliberate and transparent process.” Later, Claes was more direct: “We'll continue to make efforts to strengthen our relations with Russia... We can’t imagine a strong, credible security architecture in Europe without Russia.” Moscow’s vehement opposition to NATO expansion is well known. According to one news analysis, “Many Western defense specialists insist that building good ties with Russia is far too important to be jeopardized by an expansion of questionable need.”

To soften the blow, diplomats from some influential NATO member countries stressed that the expansion decision did not include an intention to deploy nuclear warheads on the territory of new members, or to permanently station NATO troops there. Troop deployments have only temporary status during joint military exercises. Member countries also indicated that they are in favor of broadening the avenues for transatlantic cooperation for more European participants. They see NATO enlargement as a relatively easy operation to be tailored according to financial capabilities. On the other hand, they acknowledged the political impediment to enlargement created by Russia’s stance.

This diplomatic clarification did not soothe Moscow. Shortly after the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Russia indicated that in general it would not mind dismissal of NATO, but did not strongly object to its existence. Russia strongly insisted, however, that NATO’s “Eastern component” remained unchanged, and stressed that any gain for NATO in this direction would be viewed as a loss for Russia. There is a widespread view among top Russian politicians and bureaucrats, including some officials at the Security Council, that Russia is
surrounded by unfriendly states, including former Soviet republics, that are encouraging NATO to move closer to Russia's borders in order to further the country's disintegration. And, even if NATO and Russia were to find a mutually acceptable European security scheme based on NATO expansion including Russia, it could possibly provoke the same "vehement opposition to NATO expansion" from Russia's important eastern neighbor. Former republics of the Soviet Union and former Soviet-bloc countries are like predators brought up in a zoo—the Soviet Union—and then released. They must bear the full weight of this burdensome freedom, and this freedom, along with their internal problems, poses the greatest threat to their own security. Their interests must be reconciled with those of other states. The expansion of NATO may increase the threat to the security of those countries that remain outside this organization. In fact, expanding NATO to the east has the potential to divide Europe into a "wealthy and secure South and poor and insecure North." The latter would again become dominated by non-NATO Russia. These developments might well lay the basis for two unfriendly if not hostile blocs in Europe.

To avert a direct confrontation with Moscow over Atlantic Alliance expansion in Eastern Europe, NATO and the European Union established in January 1994 the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, which was designed as a compromise and a transition scheme for future enlargement of NATO to the east. The program was offered to all Central and Eastern European countries; today, some twenty-five countries from Central and Eastern Europe are participants. It is aimed at easing the transition period to NATO expansion by offering potential new members the possibility to establish military cooperation and intensify political interaction with Europe. This transition process is intended to help the partners establish democratic relations between their military and civilian administrations, learn the philosophy of collective defense, undertake joint actions in peacekeeping, military planning, and exercises together with NATO troops, and, finally, to give NATO an opportunity to evaluate the ability of potential new member nations to meet the full membership demands of the Alliance in the future. Thus, the PFP provided the Alliance with a double opportunity—to ease the security vacuum in Europe while buying time for a critical political decision concerning priorities for the adoption of potential members. PFP members acquired a legal avenue to express their views concerning the future development of European security and their role in it. In this way, NATO seems to be redesigning itself for the global security demands of the future.

Among all the existing international structures, NATO should be singled out as the most efficient military and political organization and the basis of the European security system. That is why NATO’s current issues and strategic planning constitute the foundation for further development of both the European and world security systems. In his opening statement at the January 1995 NATO seminar, Willy Claes identified the three major issues the Atlantic Alliance faces today: peacekeeping in Bosnia, relations with the Russian Federation, and enlargement to the east. The latter issue has been provoked to a great extent by the Russian Federation's inability to demonstrate that it is capable of preserving the country in its present composition. Until 1993, the opposite thinking prevailed in NATO and the United States. Still, both alternatives are considered possible, and both are considered to be unsafe.

During the decades of the Cold War, the Alliance not only survived but thrived. It gained in power and authority because it was able to overcome its internal discrepancies for the sake of attaining important goals, and not only military ones. In fact, NATO has always pursued multipurpose tasks. It helped its members to abandon distrust of one another and to
overcome the nationalistic tendencies and political rivalries that had corroded Europe for so many centuries. This combination of economic, political, and military integration counter-balances tendencies toward disintegration both within member countries and within the security zone.

As Europe became less safe and more unstable after the official end of the Cold War, and the former Soviet Union, despite the democratic transformations of states like Russia, weakened and became less regarded internationally, it was easy to predict that NATO would try to fill in the security vacuum in Europe. Moreover, since the European continent initiated the two world wars, the United States will actively strive, by doctrine, to repair European security in order to provide for its own security and interests as well as the security of its allies. Russia’s military remains the second most powerful in the world and the first in Europe. Despite the fact that the Cold War concept of superpower hostility no longer holds—Russia’s military superiority does not mean that it may attack or even threaten its former allies—the world still clings to the old doctrine. On the other hand, with its enormous nuclear and conventional military power, Russia has become a hostage of its own uncertain reforms, ethnic conflicts, and other problems of the transition period. This is why former Soviet-bloc countries that used to look for security guarantees view NATO as a “defender of the last resort.”

With the goal of harmonizing its relations with Russia, in addition to negotiating an individual agenda of cooperation through the Partnership for Peace program, NATO tried to speed up its cooperation with Russia beyond the program. However, the Atlantic Alliance totally ruled out the possibility of building its relationship with Russia on the “spheres of influence” basis, and from the outset has rejected attempts by the Russian Federation to influence NATO decisions. Some at the Alliance feel that to preserve the organization’s identity it should keep its distance from Russia, not only because Russia possesses the second most significant military capability in the world, but also because of its brutal actions on former Soviet territory. Of course, it was an illusion that so shortly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union Russia could serve as Eastern Europe’s core of democracy and stability. The patterns of behavior that Russia inherited from the Soviet system could not be shed overnight. The projection of Russia’s influence onto the former Soviet territory could hardly provide for stability and security. Russia’s actions in Chechnya, for instance, disclosed not only the shortcomings of military planning, but, more importantly, the persistence of the use of brutal power. Adherents of this view believe that this characterization of Russia’s military, along with the country’s political instability and uncertainty, may pose a potential threat to its neighbors. Nevertheless, NATO seems prepared either to persuade Russia that steps toward expansion do not represent any threat to the country, or to compromise with it.

The Atlantic Alliance was established to defend Western Europe from possible attack from the Soviet Union, which is hardly probable any longer. Moreover, America’s European foreign policy component as well as foreign strategy was primarily based on a unanimous political commitment to the Alliance against possible aggression and the global threat from the East. While the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed this threat, it increased the danger of localized and regional conflicts. Still, a general sense and fear of possible aggression from that region seems to dominate Alliance headquarters. Russia is very likely to inherit not only the assets of the Soviet Union, but its worst liabilities as well.

In past years the Alliance demonstrated its ability to foresee political developments and react to them in a flexible manner. It managed to modernize and expand itself on its Western flank, to create new strategies for out-of-area activities, and to develop new responsibilities,
including humanitarian, peacekeeping, and military operations. Now, NATO is trying principally to develop new responsibilities on the European continent. Proponents of NATO expansion believe that the Alliance has always viewed Central Europe as the key to stability in the European region, and thus will support nation-building and democratic transformations there. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and current U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom William J. Crowe, Jr., said in an interview, NATO wants now to support the development of young democracies in Eastern European countries. “It is clear those countries are very uneasy and anxious, and that they want some reassurance about their security, particularly since they live in the shadow of Russia. NATO has made the decision that it would like to offer some fashion of security assurances to those countries.”

In doing so NATO is accepting a great deal of responsibility for giving those countries the assurances they want, and, if need be, comprehensive support to provide them with “a sense of stability that will allow them to proceed into democracy.” Of course, this is an important form of moral support for these countries, which used to delegate a part of their sovereignty in exchange for assurances of stability and security from an external menace, either real or imaginary. Once part of a military bloc, they now feel very uncomfortable about not belonging to any collective power able to guarantee their security. But incommensurably more important for them is their internal ability to reform and, at the same time, to sustain social stability in their countries in line with a carefully balanced foreign policy.

NATO is also one of the fastest developing international organizations. Its strategic plans are primarily aimed at adaptation to the rapidly changing European and global security landscape. Its most recent experience with peacekeeping operations compelled NATO to initiate combined operational formations for the purpose of having under its command highly mobile rapid deployment troops able to meet the requirements of swiftly changing security circumstances. What is really new about this concept is that NATO envisages the possibility of allocating the troops under the WEU command if, for some reason, the Alliance wishes to abstain from direct involvement. Nevertheless, allotment of troops to the WEU does not mean that they will be separated from NATO for any period of time. The new approach, according to the Alliance’s strategy, would be of practical help in meeting the new requirements of European security problems.

Contemporary international experience has clearly demonstrated that a high degree of enforcement is indispensable to enable the international community to implement its decisions in localizing, seizing, or preventing deadly conflicts. Within the Atlantic Alliance, only the United States has the logistics capability to support a military operation in any part of the world. Consequently, at present NATO is the only multinational military lever with enough enforcement capability to persuade its members to allocate more political, financial, and military efforts to defend democratic values elsewhere. Partial expansion of the Alliance’s commitment to the East would inevitably require such an allocation, which would not necessarily pay. The delicacy and controversy of the expansion and of military operations beyond NATO’s original “theater of development” is well understood by prominent scholars, who understand the original intent of NATO and at the same time the necessity of reconciling its balancing role with post-Cold War realities. In the opinion of one scholar, “Unless Russia gets to participate on an equitable footing in these operations, these NATO activities may take on the coloration of Western empire-building, or worse, of training for aggression. The prime goal of NATO is as a counterweight to a Russia which, whether it is peaceful or aggressive in Europe, retains the capability to act offensively there and must therefore be counterbalanced.”
theater of development,” especially to the east, without Russia’s participation or concert may give more prominence to its offensive rather than defensive nature. Moreover, given the political instability and uncertainty in contemporary Russia, NATO’s expansion may further weaken the position of the democratic wing of Russia’s political spectrum in favor of leftist and nationalist political parties. Leaders of great military powers are the most important potential troublemakers in the world—that is why it is vitally important to support the processes of democratization in those countries. NATO expansion might also trigger an increased reliance on nuclear deterrence by Russia, since economically the country is not in a position to maintain conventional weapons deterrence. Thus, the consequences of expansion may turn out to be the opposite of what was originally intended.

NATO expansion is not only a very delicate international political issue, but also a complicated problem for the Alliance’s major player, the United States. “Any extension of NATO would require ratification by the Senate, because it would be a major amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty. In view of the U.S. commitment to help defend the territory of the NATO member states, through use of American nuclear weapons if necessary, such a step would entail a major debate.” And, with a Democratic president in the White House and a Republican-controlled Senate, the outcome of this debate will remain uncertain for at least another year.

In order to fill the security vacuum that has opened between Russia and NATO, and to prevent a new division of Europe into two blocs, it would be very desirable to create in Central and Eastern Europe a new temporary regional security system. Such a system would link the countries of the region not in a military alliance but in a neutral area, the security of which would be jointly guaranteed by NATO and Russia. There is no way in which an Eastern or Central European country can obtain absolute security, but participation in such a system would give it the maximum attainable measure of security. Another advantage is that it would keep open the possibility of constructing a global security system on a non-bloc basis. Either way, it is clear that the international community needs to work out a new conceptual framework for European security relevant to the realities of the post-Cold War world, and to cement the architecture of the new international security system on the basis of universality.

Notwithstanding the fact that presently the Atlantic Alliance as a military bloc is the main factor of security in Europe, it has already demonstrated the exercise of security actions on a non-bloc basis by committing considerable ground forces to the UN peacekeeping operation and supporting its no-fly zone regime in Yugoslavia. However, NATO’s subsequent bombing of Serbs was a unilateral bloc decision that provoked a vehement reaction from Russia and caused some damage to the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship. Broadly speaking, NATO should not play a separate role in peacekeeping, since it is a rather limited club of privileged countries. On the other hand, the Alliance has an important role to play in these operations if mandated by the UN Security Council.

It took the hard work of almost a generation for Western Europe to recover after World War II, and almost two generations to achieve the present level of political, economic, and military integration among the fifteen Western European countries of the European Union. Naturally, this integration scheme is bound to broaden and to expand further to accommodate new members. For the countries of Eastern Europe, however, it will take quite a bit of time to recover from the years of centrally planned economies and to be able to meet the demands of membership.
The United Nations Organization as the Core of the Post-Cold War International Security System

Some 50 years ago, the United Nations was created with the aim of providing a system of comprehensive global security. In his April 1945 address to delegates from 51 countries gathered in San Francisco for the United Nations Conference on International Organization, U.S. President Harry Truman said that we must realize the magnitude of the problems before us lest modern warfare, if unchecked, were to ultimately crush all civilization. President Truman emphasized that the world was confronted with a choice between two alternatives: the continuation of international chaos or the establishment of a world organization for the enforcement of peace. It is hoped that the second alternative was chosen. Fifty years of UN activity and the end of the Cold War have given the international community a unique chance to outline the organization’s tasks for the next millennium.

Today, the UN is the most universal international organization, with a well-developed infrastructure of specialized agencies and institutions involved in virtually every aspect of international security—political, economic, military, environmental, and others. Individuals and countries from all over the world address the United Nations seeking help in resolving issues of fundamental importance. They address the organization as the world’s most reputable, universal, and democratic global institution, which during its relatively short tenure has demonstrated its capability to successfully resolve a variety of diverse and complex problems. Requests to the UN range from appeals to protect the security of nations to actions to protect individuals prosecuted by undemocratic regimes. The United Nations ably served these, the highest aspirations of individuals and countries, by using its potential as a global institution.

There are two contradictory tendencies at work in the contemporary world—the internationalization of life in its every aspect, which brings countries closer and makes peace more secure, stable, and prosperous; and, on the other hand, the extreme nationalism that triggers social unrest and military conflicts. In his recent report, the UN Secretary-General singled out some important principles of the UN system to be maintained: “The healthy globalization of contemporary life requires in the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of states.”

Naturally, the UN needs to be adapted to the task of guaranteeing international peace and security under contemporary conditions. As Thomas G. Weiss, associate director of Brown University’s Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and executive director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, rightly pointed out, “Now that the dust is settling from the initial post–Cold War period, there is a requirement for intense reflection and redefinition on First Avenue.” To fulfill those tasks effectively, to be able to meet the new challenge, the UN needs to develop a new range of capabilities. Even those capacities that exist are not properly coordinated and utilized. This is widely recognized and should be given first priority as the UN restructures and reforms. According to Weiss, “Disparate components of multifunctional operations—military forces, civilian elements, humanitarian action and diplomatic negotiations—are not orchestrated jointly and
coordinated with UN specialized agencies and non governmental organizations (NGOs). Complex operations require better-established headquarters facilities as well as chains of command and procedures for control." At present, the UN system is essentially a diplomatic club. It needs to enhance its economic and military authority to respond adequately to the requests of member states. This complex and potentially long-term process should be initiated as soon as possible.

In fact, the need to transform the United Nations system is already widely recognized. In 1992, India initiated the General Assembly resolution requesting the Secretary-General to elicit the views of member states on UN reform. The majority of governments responded in favor of reforms, particularly with respect to the composition and procedures of the UN Security Council. In 1993, the General Assembly decided to set up an open-ended working group to consider possible changes, and adopted a resolution with a view to restructuring and revitalizing the economic and social activity of the UN: “A process is now under way to institute smaller executive bodies to give continuous guidance and direction to management. These bodies would translate general policy guidance into specific activities in each fund and program. The new governing bodies would be more oriented to dialogue and decisions than to statements and resolutions.” This “open-ended” approach, however, despite being very democratic, was not workable. The group was able to use an open-ended approach in the sense that any government, institution, or individual could communicate its views to the group for consideration. But the idea to restructure and strengthen the UN’s economic and development capacity merits respect and further attention.

At the request of the members of the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented in June 1992 his report An Agenda for Peace (UN document A/47/277-S/24111), which contained “analyses and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping.” In January 1995, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali presented his position paper An Agenda for Peace 1995 (UN document A/50/60-S/1995/1), which largely supplanted the earlier document. Discussion of these documents showed that member governments largely supported the general ideas and recommendations for reforming the UN system in identified fields, despite some disagreement. The 1995 discussion in particular revealed a number of specific points of disagreement between countries and groupings. Although they accepted the general idea that the UN system requires reform in order to adapt to the changing world, member countries nevertheless failed to fully achieve the nonconfrontational, consensual approach essential to refashion the organization.

The economic and social leadership role of the United Nations is essential to the process of global development. But it is important to recognize that a dozen economically developed member states provide almost all the funding for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Of course, even in this case the UN system must preserve the principle of universality, at least insofar as each member country has the opportunity to present its views and ideas to an economic decision-making body. This body should include representatives of the major economies and of regional or income groupings in order for it to be an operational, effective, and universal instrument of development. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) would be a suitable base for this purpose. UNDP and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), together with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)—the UN’s principal organ for the promotion of
economic and social development—should be radically restructured and merged as discussed earlier to form a UN Development Council. This council would be charged with promoting the global development process and providing UN leadership in this field.

UNCTAD is well suited to serve as the basis and secretariat for the Development Council and a coordinating body for international financial institutions and the WTO. For more than thirty years UNCTAD has served the development process in a number of ways. During the Cold War and its strict “North-South” division, UNCTAD provided developing countries with invaluable services that no one else could or was willing to provide; served as a practical economic linkage between developing countries and between them and developed economies; promoted external trade and international financial cooperation; accumulated important experience in dealing with the countries now in transition; and provided effective technical assistance to developing countries and countries in transition with the highest share of direct benefits for the recipients. UNCTAD developed an international “old boys’ network” the world over—a number of its successful staff members later became economic ministers and leaders in related fields in many countries.

A philosophy of reforming the UN system should be developed by an independent permanent working group of scholars, diplomats, and politicians with solid international experience appointed by the Secretary-General. The group should work on an everyday basis under the chairmanship of an Under Secretary-General. Experience has shown that independent commissions or open-ended working groups produce very good reports and sometimes intelligent recommendations that would not have political status and practical implications. There are examples of excellent reports and recommendations produced by commissions on international development issues or on global governance. The time is ripe for the UN General Assembly to ask the Secretary-General to set up a UN permanent working group on reform, whose recommendations, after the General Assembly’s authorization, should be implemented. The ultimate goal of the UN reform process is to turn the UN system—as it was envisaged in the charter—into the international community’s principal mechanism for promoting peace and economic and social progress on the global level, and to make the UN a coordinating instrument for intergovernmental bodies in these areas.

The problems of the UN have deep and complex roots. The founding members entrusted the UN system with very diverse and very ambitious tasks in virtually every sphere of human activity, and the system managed to accomplish many of them. But the founding members failed to delegate to the system enough of their individual power and authority to achieve all of the tasks and aspirations. The effectiveness of UN leadership in meeting the goals of the international community depends decisively on the political will of member states, and on the financial means and commitment of these states. Member states are reluctant to commit adequate resources to the growing demands of the UN system. On the other hand, major military powers have begun to demonstrate their eagerness to take charge of some world events with the formal approval of the UN. The UN system must be delegated enough opportunities, authority, and power to perform its functions as an effective global security center in the years ahead.

To make UN restructuring legal and effective, the international community may wish to begin the reform process by altering the charter, which was adopted more than half a century ago. The charter was as good as the times for which it was written; now, the times are greatly changed, and many of the charter’s chapters need adjustment and revision. Instead of dismantling the UN system and establishing new institutions, as some suggest, it would be more practical to change the policies and attitudes of the UN.
During the jubilee session of the General Assembly in 1995, many heads of delegations suggested ways of altering the UN to make it more responsive to the modern world. World leaders who spoke at the session could not, of course, avoid mentioning the problem of UN funding. The organization that served the world community for 50 years is now on the brink of bankruptcy, a situation for which many world leaders share responsibility. To avert complete collapse of the UN system, some speakers proposed to curtail their support sharply and possibly to force the United Nations to close about half a dozen agencies. According to one news analysis, “This would be the most extensive shrinking and restructuring of the organization in its half-century of existence.”\textsuperscript{36} Such a course, however, might yet mark the beginning of the disintegration of the most universal and valuable international diplomatic forum in the world, which in fact successfully fulfilled the major goal of its charter—to prevent World War III and help make the world more democratic. The numerous intense meetings and discussions that take place each day in the lobby of the UN between world leaders on not only global but also on regional and bilateral issues is evidence in favor of the organization’s role as a diplomatic world center.

Any major world power, or any country at all, can express its dissatisfaction with the performance of a particular UN agency by withdrawing from the agency and ceasing to contribute to its budget. This occurred several times during the Cold War. The United States, for instance, which is a major contributor to the UN budget, more than ten years ago withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and from the International Labor Office (ILO) in disagreement over their highly ideological activities. Although this was a heavy moral and financial blow to these organizations, they survived and continue to function. Some politicians and scholars argue that the period known as “the end of the Cold War” is itself over. While this is debatable, it is clear that we have witnessed the end of the world’s strict ideological divide. The major world power is still outside these organizations, proving that it is much easier to leave than to return. Equally, the economic disintegration of the last empire proves that the restructuring of the UN system should not be confused with its destruction.

Noted speakers at the jubilee session singled out several UN agencies to be dismantled. Among them was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, whose functions, it was proposed, could be taken over by the new World Trade Organization. Of all the institutions of the UN, however, UNCTAD is the most professional international economic and financial organization, with the greatest potential among all other international organizations, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to provide valuable services to developing countries and in particular to countries in transition. The international community also should think twice before setting up a new international organization instead of assigning new responsibilities to existing organizations.

Leaders of several countries that had contributed the largest number of peacekeeping troops to the United Nations stressed the urgency of UN reforms in this area. UN peacekeeping operations require improvement and substantial support from the international community. The UN has undertaken overly ambitious missions with inadequate financial or military support, as in Bosnia, and has been unable to fulfill its mission. In Bosnia, moreover, the UN peacekeeping operation began when military conflict there was already in full swing. It was not the United Nations that failed in Bosnia, but the world’s major powers, who largely underestimated the magnitude and the depth of the conflict.

Of course, major contributors could withdraw from UN peacekeeping activities. NATO, or the United States itself, could perform this function alone. For the world’s major
democracy to conduct peacekeeping operations without international support, however, it would first have to assume an unwelcome role in the world. NATO, the United States, major world powers, and other countries may wish to rent their troops to the UN to fulfill a particular peacekeeping mission sanctioned by the Security Council. While leading democracies may undertake enforcement steps of an economic and political nature on their own, coordinated measures under the auspices of the UN often prove more effective. Military enforcement actions must be undertaken only under decision of the UN Security Council.

Restructuring of the UN system should proceed via several carefully calculated stages. The first stage should focus on restructuring designed to strengthen the UN’s role as a forum for discussion of the problems of international security. In the second stage, the world diplomatic coordination and conflict prevention center should function effectively within the UN system. In the third stage, a stronger mechanism for implementing UN decisions must be put into effect. As a very long-term goal, after completion of the nuclear disarmament process the UN Security Council might have some of the remaining nuclear arms under its control.

To implement one of the charter’s basic ideas, the General Assembly should be the principal organ of the UN system. In this unique international body, each country enjoys equal voting power. Its role as a universal forum for global discussion should be realized. The General Assembly is the only forum in the world in which the voice of each country, even the smallest, can be heard by everyone, regardless of whether it contributes 0.01 percent or 25 percent of the UN budget. However, the General Assembly is empowered only to discuss issues and to adopt non-binding resolutions.

To make the General Assembly more effective in the decision-making process, the number of its committees must be reduced and its primary influence on world political, economic, military, and other issues exerted through budgetary deliberations. This should be the focal point of efforts to revive the reputation of this universal forum. The Assembly’s agenda should be curtailed in order to increase the efficiency of deliberation. Instead of delivering courtesy speeches at the UN General Assembly, heads of state, prime ministers, and heads of delegations may wish to involve the Secretary-General in advance preparatory work to increase the effectiveness of their bilateral, multilateral, and regional meetings. In this manner the UN secretariat has great potential to develop its international leadership to increase the efficiency of collective diplomacy efforts within the UN system.

Ultimately, if it concentrates on vital and practicable tasks, and if the UN members concur, the General Assembly may in the distant future play the legislative role of a world parliament. In 1991 four Nordic countries formed the Nordic Project to communicate to the United Nations ideas to restructure its economic and social activity. The Project envisaged setting up an International Development Council as a global parliament. In addition, the international community already has in the European Parliament an example of a successfully developing regional legislative superstructure. Thus, in the future, the UN General Assembly may be transferred to the world (or international, or interregional) parliament by way of electing to it qualified representatives with rich international experience.

The main political organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, should be expanded to twenty or twenty-one members. Ten of these should be permanent, including in addition to the present five members such important world economic powers as Germany and Japan. Included among the other three might be such emerging regional leaders as Mexico, Brazil, or India; or perhaps one African country or one Middle Eastern country. Since the role of the non-permanent members in influencing decisions is rather limited— and
the most important of these are sometimes agreed upon and adopted privately, in the course of informal consultations—it may be practical to limit the composition of the UN Security Council to nine to eleven permanent members only.

In 1963, when its membership more than doubled from the initial 51 members of 1945, the United Nations gained valuable experience in restructuring itself. At that time the permanent membership of the Security Council remained unchanged, but the number of rotating members increased from six to ten. Since the Council’s total membership grew to fifteen, the number of votes required for a decision increased from seven to nine. By 1995, membership had almost quadrupled from the original figure half a century ago.

At the time of its formation, the composition of the UN Security Council mirrored that of World War Two’s victorious great powers. The victors, however, have never been truly united. They were deeply separated ideologically and have always been rivals. During the Cold War they drove one another to the brink of global nuclear conflict. Even deeply divided, however, the permanent members of the UN Security Council were able under the collective security provisions of Chapter VII of the charter to engage in enforcement actions in order to preserve peace and ensure security. It is clear, though, that important UN failures to sustain peace and development can be traced to the fact that the UN’s major institutional instrument is still based on the Cold War principle.

The permanent members of the UN Security Council should make greater financial contributions to the budget of the United Nations. They may also wish to consider other additional forms of direct or indirect financial support for the UN. Permanent Security Council members must demonstrate leadership not only in economic and military development, but should also serve as examples in the areas of democracy and peacekeeping. As world leaders in every sphere of contemporary activity, they must be prepared to contribute a far greater share to world stability and peaceful development.

The right of veto within the Security Council should be democratized to prevent the disagreement of major powers from blocking decisions, and thus UN activity, in a troubled area. In the post–Cold War era, when deadly ideological disputes are a thing of the past, several models of the veto right in the UN Security Council with expanded membership are feasible: (a) The right of veto may be abolished and replaced with a majority right vote; (b) a consensus approach could be taken; (c) the veto right could be exercised by any two countries together; or (d) decisions concerning regional issues could be subject to a “regional” veto.

The jubilee debates at the General Assembly vividly demonstrated that these two agenda issues—the composition of the Security Council and the veto right—are the source of intractable disagreement so far among member states.

UN activities should be reoriented away from controlling and limiting existing conflicts to conflict prevention. The UN should set up a preventive action facility to identify and rank potential and active “hot spots” in order to undertake actions to prevent conflict development at an early stage. As a conflict preventive approach, UN forces should be deployed in an identified conflict area to avoid an outbreak of hostilities. UN preventive actions may separate parties in a country or countries in a region. This became crucially important after the end of the Cold War, when the international community made peacekeeping one of the major instruments of international security. Peacekeeping has considerably expanded both in size and cost for its major contributors since the end of the Cold War. Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace contains a very rich set of definitions, analyses, and recommendations for the international community. But very few of these recommendations were
implemented by those who commissioned the report. On the other hand, as the UN Secretary-General once remarked, reform is a continuing process and we must be guided by the needs of the future and by the shape and content that we wish to give it.

The complexity of peacekeeping and the need to increase its effectiveness is now widely recognized the world over. The major contributor to the UN's peacekeeping budget is the United States, which contributes 30 percent. In May 1994 the United States initiated a review of its policy toward multilateral peacekeeping. As a result of this review, in May 1994 President Clinton issued Decision Directive 25, which reaffirmed U.S. support for multilateral peacekeeping. At the same time the Directive prescribed that the United States refrain from taking part in or authorizing peacekeeping operations that do not serve the country's national interests. It also listed various additional circumstances and factors that may influence the U.S. voting strategy at the UN Security Council for peacekeeping operations.

At present, the UN's peacekeeping capacity is constrained. It is able to use force only in self-defense, and unable to respond to all demands. As part of a long-term strategy, it would be wise to examine the possibility of diverting part of the resources made available through national and NATO demilitarization for UN peacekeeping. Despite heavy criticism for some peacekeeping failures and their heavy financial cost, the UN peacekeeping function and activity merits support and empowerment on the highest international level. Failed peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia nonetheless prevented innumerable human losses. Regarding Bosnia, for instance, U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said, "In 1992, which was the last year before the U.N. went in, there were 130,000 civilians killed in Bosnia. The U.N. force went in to try to stop the carnage. They were partially successful. In 1993, the number was 12,000. In 1994, the number was 3,000, and so far this year, which is almost half over, there are less than 1,000. Now, 1,000 people killed is still a tragedy, but if we pull the U.N. force out, I believe we'll go back to 1992 and see tens of thousands of deaths again." Both the UN and its member states may be proud of carrying out numerous successful humanitarian, observer, truce supervision, protection force, and other complicated peacekeeping missions in many countries. These missions helped to save millions of lives and make this world more safe and democratic than it otherwise would have been. Experience has shown that it is much costlier and more difficult to stop a conflict in progress than to prevent one. Sometimes only enforcement measures can stop a conflict. It is also worth remembering that in 1988 the UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

In order “to identify ways of distinguishing peacekeeping from old-fashioned military intervention,” according to Professor David Holloway, co-director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University, it is vitally important for the major military and economic powers that provide the leadership in peacekeeping and for the world community in general to work out some basic principles and a legal basis for these activities. Holloway suggested the following six criteria for operations in which military forces take part: (1) The operation should be on proper legal footing, i.e. authorized by the UN Security Council or an appropriate regional organization; (2) The mandate should be clear with respect to the objective of the operation and its duration; (3) The force should ideally be a multinational force, with no more than 50 percent of the troops from one state; (4) It may be possible to employ operational criteria too, and this may require the development of peacekeeping doctrine by individual states; (5) A peacekeeping operation needs to be accompanied by a parallel political peace process; and (6) Peacekeeping operations must be monitored in detail and on the ground by the international organizations that authorized the
operation. Of course, one cannot expect that these and some other internationally justified criteria could be accepted and met at once. But it is important for international peace and security that they are addressed and begun to be discussed at a high political level by the international community as soon as possible.

Along with the increase in UN membership, peacekeeping and related operations registered almost a similar increase. Until 1991 the UN Security Council had authorized force only twice in its forty-five year history, in South Korea and the Congo; in the next four years (1991–mid-1994), it issued five authorizations for military law enforcement—in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Yugoslavia. “At the end of 1990, the United Nations was involved in eight operations with a total of 10,000 troops. At the end of June 1994, seventeen operations were being conducted, with more than 70,000 troops, costing about $3 billion on a yearly basis.” During the post-Cold War period the concept of conflict has changed dramatically. The number of interstate conflicts has diminished, but intrastate conflicts have burgeoned as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Of course, the need for military law enforcement is an alarming trend. However, in the post–Cold War period the Security Council has demonstrated increasing unanimity in support of enforcement actions. Since conflict prevention is more realistic now, this may lead to positive global security transformations.

It is clear that the UN peacekeeping function needs improvement to adapt to the demands of the post–Cold War environment. But NATO “peacekeeping” cannot replace that of the UN, which by its very nature is the more democratic and universal approach. It could be made less expensive and more democratic and effective if after the Security Council’s decision to enforce a peacekeeping operation, the UN is able to “rent” NATO’s troops or sanction its military operation under UN auspices. Any peacekeeping operation requires legitimacy conferred by the highest international level. The Security Council of the United Nations has been authorized under Chapter VII of the charter and should remain the only authorization body for peacekeeping and internationally conducted military operations. Of course, major military powers may be reluctant to delegate their troops under the UN or NATO command, as is the case now. But even if it were to be conducted with a large Alliance involvement, a UN -authorized military peacekeeping operation under which to delegate their troops is more attractive to the major powers. An international mechanism to resolve this delicate issue should be worked out to prevent delay and misunderstanding between major military powers when decisive and prompt actions of the international community are necessary. Member states may wish to set up a UN Military Council to monitor peacekeeping operations.

Many countries view their participation in peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations as a very prestigious international involvement, as a recognition of their peaceful international policy and home democratic transformations. Ukraine, with its enormous budgetary problems, views its one peacekeeping battalion as an important instrument of foreign policy and an international recognition of its achievements. China’s involvement in the UN peacekeeping process merits special respect and attention. This prosperous country may turn into one of the major world economies and military powers in 20 to 25 years.

In the late seventies China was a troublemaker in Asia. In the late eighties the country officially became a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In the early nineties, in its first international military operation with peaceful purposes, the People’s Republic of China sent its first UN peacekeeping unit to Cambodia.
tional military assignment, as the Chinese press rightly noted, “constituted the Chinese army’s initial involvement in the international military arena.”

Emergency measures today account for the lion’s share of the main UN budget. The major UN budgetary line is peacekeeping, which constitutes more than one-third of the budget. This, together with money spent on the second largest expenditure, refugees and humanitarian relief, accounts for almost 70 percent of the expenditures of the main UN budget. Of course, the UN is not in a position to cover the increasing costs of managing local and regional conflicts, despite the fact that the amount of money spent is relatively modest. To give but one, albeit a very striking, example, the resources given to the United Nations for its peacekeeping operations in 1992 were less than the combined cost of operating the fire and police departments of the New York City. All permanent members of the UN Security Council (including potential new permanent members) must be prepared to step up and contribute more efforts and resources to reshaping the evolving international security system.

In order to strengthen the UN’s mandate in the field of development, a new Development Council should be created. This council should consist of some 25 members and include major economies and regional representatives, none of them possessing the veto right. The fifteen major economies may be permanent members and the latter ten could be elected for three to four years on a rotating basis. The Development Council would control the strategic activity of international and national organizations. It must be an international body with legal rights to make decisions at the highest level, to examine economic dangers to global security, and to coordinate all necessary actions. Besides the emergency measures mentioned above, it should also examine more general problems, such as global poverty, unemployment, international migration, and new ways to foster sustainable human development. UNCTAD may perform analytical and secretarial functions for the Development Council.

The high degree of economic interdependence in the international community today necessitates a high level of economic leadership and guidance, and the Development Council may serve as a coordinating and regulatory international body for the system of international economic relations. This function is in fact already in place within the UN, which has at its disposal a chain of international specialized economic agencies, offices, economic commissions, and programs. It seems that those government representatives who propose to set up expensive new international organizations often are unaware of the existing structure and capabilities of the UN. Moreover, leading economies continue to maintain wasteful practices when international financial institutions produce unrelated and sometimes contradictory reports and recommendations for recipient countries. The IFI also lack coordination of their credit efforts in recipient countries, which further erodes the efficiency of their development efforts.

For their part, recipient governments, particularly those of some countries in transition, are not in a position to exercise this coordination themselves. Thus, the activity of the IFI needs coordination at two levels: at the highest international level, the level of the UN, to work out a common development strategy, and at the national level, in particular in countries in transition, to help recipient countries develop market transformation strategies and to make international development efforts an effective component of this effort.

With the assent of recipient governments, local UN offices in member states may be entrusted with responsibility for coordinating international and bilateral foreign development efforts. In Ukraine, for instance, the UN mission proved to be the most effective and the most inexpensive international agency in this regard. The United Nations Office in Ukraine
has existed since November 1992, and it was the first of the new UN offices in the region to be visited by the UN Secretary-General a year later. The Office operates in Ukraine on behalf of the UN system and places development and human security issues at the center of its activity in the country. It serves as an effective and valuable channel of communication between Ukraine and several UN programs and funds.

For three years, with its very limited and modest resources, the UN office has provided for Ukraine on a grant-only basis concrete and useful services which help to promote democratic and market transformations in the country. It helped to develop in Ukraine a strategy for international assistance; regularly produces high quality Human Development Reports and annual Development Cooperation Reports on all aid flows to Ukraine; established the UN Internet Project linking Ukraine to the information superhighway; organized the multi-donor Crimea Integration and Development Program; provides training and advice on labor, employment, and social protection issues, on environmental monitoring, on industrial restructuring, and on international public procurement and debt management; and performs many other projects of technical and other assistance in the country.

The UN office in Ukraine, as distinct from other international offices, works closely not only with governmental institutions, but to a growing extent with nongovernmental organizations and individuals. This is especially the case in such areas as environmental management and women’s, children’s, and health care issues in general.

Also in contrast to the practices of other international and foreign offices, the local UN office whenever and wherever possible employs Ukrainian citizens rather than foreign specialists, and to the maximum extent possible procures equipment and other supplies in Ukraine. The office helps Ukrainians to gain valuable experience through short-term training courses and study tours, and on long-term assignments overseas as specialists. “The scope of this cooperation will expand and the value of the integrated approach will become even more evident as the UN helps the country to address the enormous challenges of the triple transition to statehood, democracy and market economics.”

Ukrainian representatives have publicly acknowledged that the United Nations office in Ukraine has been conducting wide-ranging and useful activities aimed at the strengthening of peace and stability and the development of democracy and economic reforms in Ukraine. Speaking in November 1995 at the opening in Kiev of the new premises of the United Nations office, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said, “In Ukraine, we continue to view the United Nations as one of the reliable guarantors of our national security, of our territorial integrity and of the inviolability of our borders. The United Nations office has a particularly important role to play in solving the entire complex of problems relating to Chernobyl and the environment, in providing medical and humanitarian assistance, and in promoting reform and the restructuring of the country’s economy.”

UN member states may give UN country offices more authority in the framework of the Development Council to coordinate the activity of the IFI according to the UN’s development strategy. Moreover, UN country offices together with UN regional centers may also be entrusted with enough authority and resources to monitor the development of potential conflicts. In this way they have an important role to play in preventing conflicts.

With all their money, the IFIs failed to establish themselves in recipient countries as development centers. UN local offices demonstrated more authority and intellectual leadership to perform this mission. UN country missions should be supported by the international community and by recipient governments in this new role, which is in line with the UN Charter and the initial earmarking of the Bretton Woods institutions.
The five UN Regional Commissions deserve special attention. These commissions performed a very useful and pioneering task in the regions and in countries in each region. They furnished the countries with analytical, advisory, coordinating, and other valuable services to establish better interrelationships in the regions. With the growing trend toward regionalism, however, the role of Regional Commissions should also be reconsidered and restructured. Duplication of efforts and the accompanying waste of resources in these regions—especially in economic analyses, which are currently performed by a number of international organizations in each country—should be avoided. UN regional organizations should exist to coordinate the activities of the UN country offices, whose role and importance should be radically strengthened.

Decisions adopted by the UN should be carefully monitored, and appropriate sanctions imposed in case of noncompliance. The Security Council has at its disposal enough legal power through Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter to tackle disputes, acts of aggression, and other types of peace violations. Open external acts of aggression as in the case of Kuwait are less frequent today than internal threats within countries, which now represent a much greater menace to world peace and security. As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright wrote, “Increasingly, threats to international order are not clear but rather devilishly complex: violence caused not by international aggression, but by civil war, fragile cease-fires that do not hold, extremist political movements that spread terror, or ethnic fighting that spills unpredictably across national lines.” To prevent breaches of peace Albright suggested that enforcement is now a greater challenge than edification of international law, and that Security Council enforcement of internationally accepted standards of behavior is more possible than it has ever been.

The concept of enforcement does not contradict the UN Charter, which recognizes that force is sometimes essential to uphold law and protect peace and security from possible threat. At the time it was drafted, the “enforcement authority” of the charter represented a very high level of confidence between the major powers. However, due to unfavorable global developments during the Cold War, the United Nations only twice undertook enforcement measures against those responsible for direct aggression: in 1950 on the Korean peninsula, and in 1990 in the Persian Gulf. During the post-Cold War period, international enforcement can be applied more effectively to restore peace and security, but also to prevent an aggression or a conflict. The UN does not have a monopoly on these actions, as some countries fear. Only member states have the right to impose enforcement actions and sanctions. They alone can authorize and finance these measures.

At present the UN system has the opportunity to expand in many ways its role as the world’s coordination center. It may set up an early warning and monitoring information and analytical facility to identify and track potential developments in “troubled areas.” Along with this it may identify coordinated international economic and political actions to ensure a potential trouble area’s adherence to internationally accepted standards of behavior. In developing its role in preventive diplomacy the UN system may increase the role of its main judicial instrument, the International Court of Justice. If requested by a legitimate government, recommended by the court and so decided by the Security Council, the UN may undertake steps to prevent the outbreak of fighting or other dangerous developments in a given country or area.

Naturally, the United Nations should not act as a global government that dictates its will or that of its influential members to the world community and individual countries. It is an intergovernmental organization of sovereign states that seek common ground for coopera-
tion in their long-term self-interests... There simply has to be a comprehensive, worldwide forum for global issues. Surely it is time to consider how some of its functions, and the components and mechanisms within it, could be extended, and new ones created if necessary, in order to strengthen the hand of the international community in preventing highly lethal conflicts.” 46 If the UN is entrusted with this role by the international community, it will definitely need to delegate to the organization more political and financial support, authority, and in later stages some sovereignty.

Through its years of peacekeeping activity the UN system has accumulated a wealth of experience in controlling and resolving conflicts, as well as some relatively new experience in conflict prevention. According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The most important of them are preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peacekeeping; peace-building; disarmament, sanctions; and peace enforcement. The first three can be employed only with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Sanctions and enforcement, on the other hand, are coercive measures and thus, by definition, do not require the consent of the parties concerted.” 47 Plainly, it is better and much cheaper for the international community to prevent a conflict by means of an early warning system and cooperative diplomatic measures rather than by coercive military actions. The Department of Political Affairs set up by the Secretary-General to perform “early warning” functions and to analyze political developments and possible preventive actions is experiencing a basic impediment in its practice. It is difficult to expect a country to accept that it needs a specific type of UN assistance. Of course, the UN is not supposed to force its preventive measures on countries that do not wish to accept them. To overcome this barrier to preventive diplomacy the UN should rely more substantially on its country offices. They should be given more authority to work with recipient governments on a regular basis.

Naturally, international problems cannot be resolved overnight. The more parties that are involved in solving an outstanding issue, the more time and effort required to find a mutually acceptable solution. As a rule, the UN is addressed to resolve problems that have long and very complicated histories, especially in conflict resolution. Decisions in such matters often take the form of long-term solutions, and the international community has to be prepared to embark upon time- and effort-consuming measures and mechanisms to resolve post–Cold War security problems. When a problem has been already identified and addressed by the international community, the UN should begin by setting up in a country office a special ad hoc group to monitor the situation closely and to keep the UN Secretary-General informed in order that timely decisions may be made.

In the post–Cold War period, effective UN conflict management actions, regardless of the stage—from pre-conflict to post-conflict—should be consolidated, purposeful, and long-term. They should combine the means and efforts of the UN and the parties concerned in every sphere, including military and economic enforcement as specified in the charter, when peace and security are threatened.

Former U.S. Senator Alan Cranston, now a board member of the Gorbachev Foundation/USA, believes that addressing the budgetary problems of the UN should take highest priority. Cranston made the following recommendations: the international community should allocate a percentage share of international financial transactions to the UN budget; budgetary discipline should be strictly observed, and a country-debtor to the UN budget should be deprived of voting rights until it fulfills its financial obligations; each country should not enjoy a one-vote power but voting power should somehow mirror a country’s
contribution share to the UN budget; and veto power at the Security Council should be democratized in conformity with the new international realities.48

The international community may also wish to consider other sources of funds to repair the UN budget. A UN support fund, for example, could be replenished through an arms sales and purchase tax, tax exemptions for private companies, and individual donations.

There are many budgetary loopholes in the everyday practice of the UN that account for substantial financial leakage, and which could be repaired relatively easily. The number of meetings and their duration could be drastically curtailed, for example. And, member states also may wish to reconsider the number of official languages in use at the UN. One or two working languages may be enough. A country or group of countries that desire interpretation and translation into their language could contribute additional payment to the UN budget to cover this expense. The publication of delegates' statements and the dissemination of countries' internal documents should be the responsibility of the missions of individual countries and accomplished at their own expense. As in the case of NATO, countries should have unilateral and multilateral expenditures to introduce more discipline to UN expenditures.

UN member states should adhere to Article 19 of the UN Charter to make their payments to the UN budget on time. This article would deprive countries that do not observe financial discipline of the right to vote in the General Assembly. At present, some developing countries and countries in transition may experience temporary financial difficulties that prevent them from observing Article 19. In recent years, noncompliance has become so massive that member states may wish to reconsider this measure in order to give members in arrears time to pay their financial contributions to the UN budget. Otherwise, to introduce budgetary order, such members should be deprived of the voting right. Order begins at home.

All of the above proposals could contribute to an effective process of UN reform. By the beginning of the next century, the United Nations could be helping to accelerate integrative processes in the world, promoting further development of democracy and development, and thereby ensuring creation of an effective system of international security.
Notes

8 Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting in ministerial session, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991.
13 Peter van Ham, “Ukraine, Russia and European Security,” p. 45.
14 Russia became the 39th member of the Council of Europe on February 28, 1996.
15 Sergei Pirozhkov and Volodimir Chumak, “Ukraina i NATO,” Politika i Chas, no. 6, 1995, p. 17.
19 Statement by Dr. S. Pirozhkov, representative of Ukraine, at the 50th Session of the General Assembly, Plenary meeting on agenda item 41 titled “Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies,” 13 November 1995, New York City.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.

27 Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, Renewing the United Nations System (Sweden: Motala Grafiska, 1994), 16.
47 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, 12.
48 Personal meeting with Sen. Alan Cranston, Stanford University, 12 October 1995.
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