Security Problems within Post-Soviet Space............................................... 1
   Nika Chitadze

The Western Balkans Between Statehood and Integration......................... 5
   Mehmet Elezi

Towards a Trans-Mediterranean Partnership for Peace?......................... 9
   Alain Faupin

Russia and the “Orange Revolution”: Response, Rhetoric, Reality? . 15
   Graeme P Herd

Legitimacy and the Transatlantic Management of Crisis .......................... 29
   Erik Jones

Crisis Management: The Transformation of National and
International Systems of Response.................................................... 33
   Andrzej Karkoszka

NATO Before and After the Second Gulf War ........................................ 43
   Mustafa Kibaroglu

Counter-Terrorism Capability: Preventing Radiological Threats............. 47
   Vladimir Lukov

   Michael Mihalka
Why Is Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Important for Preserving and Developing Transatlantic Relations................................................................. 81
   Plamen Pantev

Russia’s Perception and Hierarchy of Security Threats.............................. 85
   Dmitry Polikanov

Iran’s Nuclear Program: U.S. Options After the Elections....................... 93
   Matthew Rhodes

Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: From Aid to Development........................ 99
   Mladen Stanicic

European Security and Private Military Companies: The Prospects for Privatized “Battlegroups” ................................................................. 107
   James K Wither
Security Problems within Post-Soviet Space

Nika Chitadze *

The problems of security within the territory of the former Soviet Union are numerous. The security architecture in the CIS is still in the process of formation, which complicates the situation. The situation in the CIS represents a combination of many factors, such as:

- The disintegration of a huge, multiethnic, totalitarian empire;
- The security asymmetry between powerful ex-hegemony and weak neighbors;
- The weakness of state institutions in all members of the CIS;
- The dominance of ethnic nationalism;
- The simultaneous processes of reintegration and disintegration;
- The absence of democratic traditions in local political and economic culture and weakness of civil society;
- The continuing presence of the Soviet mentality and Soviet management culture among the representatives of the state authorities;
- The deep social and economic crisis in all states of the CIS, which is caused by the transition from a planned to market economy.

As a rule, the tactics and priorities of national security determine the overall security concept of sovereign states. The CIS states have not yet managed to clearly work out their own security concepts. Even Russia, in spite of its long experience of sovereign statehood and its central role in the former USSR, has been unable to definitively articulate its own security interests. As for other states within the CIS, the problems of national security have turned out to be a real test for the new political elites, who lack necessary experience, a foundation in strategic culture, and ability in foreign-policy planning. The definition of security interests represents a very difficult task for all states of the CIS. The reasons for this are the unsettled political and economic status of the region, unpredictable dynamics of the internal development process of the CIS, and security codes and relations among the CIS states, as well as between the CIS and the rest of the world. Newly independent states have found themselves in an international system where sovereign states act according to their national interests. Now the CIS states must try to determine their role and function in both the regional and global contexts, and identify their top security priorities and most pressing national tasks.

The foreign policy and national security priorities of the CIS members differ. The division of the CIS members into two main groups is a primary cause of the weakness of the CIS. The first group consists of those countries whose principal foreign and military policy priority is the pursuit of integration with the Russian Federation, which

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is a primary actor in this regard. This group contains members of the collective security agreement, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the Russian Federation itself. Additionally, five members of this organization are also participants in the Customs Union.

The second bloc within the CIS consists of members of the so-called GUUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova). Members of GUUAM have many common problems, especially in the field of maintaining territorial integrity and fighting against separatism. Separatism in Georgia (in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Azerbaijan (in Nagorno-Karabakh), and Moldova (in Transdniestria) represents one of the main political problems facing the members of this group. Some problems with separatism exist also on the Crimean Peninsula, in Ukraine. Another priority for the GUUAM members is to strengthen cooperation with respect to the Euro-Asian transport corridor and the transportation of Caspian oil to the West.

According to some analysts, this loose coalition may be transformed into a military-political body, when aggression against one member state of GUUAM will be considered as an attack on other member states. This step will reduce the external threat, and will also raise the interest of Western countries, especially members of NATO, in dealing with such an organization. For the next few years it will be impossible for members of GUUAM to become plenipotentiary members of NATO, but the territory of the GUUAM states may become a zone of NATO strategic interests as a buffer zone between NATO and the Russian-centered collective security system.

Prospects for the Solution of the Security Problems in the CIS

Recent positive developments in Europe give us reason to say that there exist opportunities to solve at least some of the security problems facing the CIS countries. First of all, the most important factor is the process of NATO expansion and its increasing role in the world.

After the accession of new members from the Baltic and the Black Sea region to NATO membership, the agenda for the future of NATO will include the development of close cooperation with the CIS states. First of all, it is necessary to mention a speech by the former Secretary-General of NATO in August 2002 in Glasgow, when he argued that, “new and energetic relations with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia would be one of the symbols of NATO in the twenty-first century.” Of course, this does not mean that states of the Caucasus will become fully-fledged members of NATO any time soon. But consultations concerning the experience of NATO in the sphere of security sector reform (civil-military relations), transition of national armed forces to NATO standards, defense management, strengthening of democratic institutions, and other areas will have a positive impact on democratization in the CIS and will help to strengthen the national security and national independence of these states, as well as to reduce the level of external threat.

In this respect, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has played an especially positive role. From the political point of view, the most important fact has been the clause that NATO would organize consultations with the members of PfP in cases
where a PfP state was under a direct threat to its territorial integrity and national independence. This article repeats Article IV of the Washington treaty concerning the consultations of NATO member states in cases of foreign threat. The difference is that a necessary condition for it is active involvement in the PfP.

Another important factor for the solution of the security problems in the CIS lies in the economic realm. Economic development of post-Soviet states may create the basis for fighting terrorism, illegal migration, unemployment, and ethnic separatism. Economic development can defeat separatism because the *de facto* authorities and populations in the separatist regions will likely be willing to become engaged in economic processes that are going on at the national level if they have economic interests at stake. One of the positive examples is Cyprus, where representatives of the Turkish part of this state are trying to develop close contacts with their colleagues in the Greek part of the island. This process is being led primarily by the pursuit of economic development of the Greek part of Cyprus, and the prospect of joining the EU.

The implementation of international economic projects may give added impetus to the resolution of security problems in the former Soviet Union. Such projects include the Euro-Asia Transport Corridor project and the idea of renewing the Great Silk Road. The genesis of the new Silk Road program was launched in Brussels in 1993, when the European Commission invited the ministers of trade and transport of three Caucasus and five Central Asian states. At the conference it was decided to set up the Eurasian Transport Corridor and initiate a special regional technical assistance program, known as the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA). In September 1998, an international conference entitled “Revival of the Historical Silk Road” was held. Representatives of thirty-two Eurasian states and thirteen international organizations attended. The parties signed an agreement about starting the construction of a communication and transport corridor across Eurasia. At this stage, the main coordinator of TRACECA is the TACIS program of the European Union.

Other international projects within Eurasian territory are the Caspian oil and gas projects. According to the expectations of many experts, over the next ten to fifteen years the world demand for oil will rise by two to three percent per year. The Caspian region, with its sizeable reserves (200 billion barrels) has become a focus of the strategic interests of many Eurasian countries, as well as the United States. Over the past several years the U.S. and other democratic and economically developed states have come to consider the prospects for extracting and exporting Caspian oil and natural gas as a very important political and economic factor. One of the main aims for Western states is to lessen their energy dependence (particularly for oil and gas) on the politically unstable Middle East, and to seek alternate sources. The Caspian oil projects in Azerbaijan involve, in addition to U.S. companies, thirteen companies from Eurasia (nine European and four Asian). As for Kazakhstan, here another key regional player is involved, i.e. China. The major players in the energy field here are the U.S., the Russian Federation, the EU member states, Turkey, Iran, China, and Japan.

Thus, the expansion of NATO to the east and the successful fulfillment of these economic projects will create a basis for strengthening the security and national inde-
pendence of the CIS countries. These factors will also play a critical role in addressing the restoration of territorial integrity in several post-Soviet republics.
The Western Balkans Between Statehood and Integration

Mehmet Elezi *

The current threats to European security no longer come from within the continent. Friendship, partnership, and collaboration have now taken the place of interstate confrontation. Some tense issues exist, such as the Basque problem, the Irish problem, Kaliningrad, Transdniestria, etc., but they are largely isolated. The Cyprus crisis, silent since about thirty years, has represented a potential danger that extends over the entire island, but it seems like this issue is moving towards a solution as well.

There is another region that is calm for now, but not yet definitively: Southeastern Europe. At various times during the last century this region has been a threat to the security of the continent, causing headaches even in the major European capitals. If the assassination of Duke Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo sparked off World War I, the siege of Sarajevo has become a nightmare for the continent and the international community. Can this dramatic cycle be considered completely closed? One thing is for sure: one cannot speak about achieving security in the continent without calming its hot spots, such as Southeastern Europe. The intervention of NATO in Kosovo in 1999, the Stability Pact, and the attention of Washington and Brussels to the progress of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region are historical steps in this direction.

This region has mainly suffered from ethnic conflicts. Besides the human tragedies, they have lost a great deal of time and have delayed the region’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic security framework. But it is this integration itself that is a decisive factor for the prevention of conflicts. Thus, a vicious circle has been created. Therefore, the path of the Western Balkans toward Euro-Atlantic integration is longer than it seems.

Aside from the lack of democratic standards, there is still one more obstacle to the integration of the region. This quite specific obstacle relates to the process of state formation. The majority of the countries of the region have not completed the circle of statehood. In other words, they are not as yet consolidated states with clear and defined boundaries. Their claims for integration into NATO and the EU without being states with clearly defined borders do not look extremely mature.

The combined state known as Serbia and Montenegro has a temporary status. This means that even the individual status of each state—Serbia and Montenegro—is temporary. After the nationalists’ return to power, and with burning social and economic domestic problems, everything in Belgrade is more complicated than it was two years ago. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not yet a functional state. The Serbian republic of Bosnia is more influenced from Belgrade than from Sarajevo. There are voices in favor of reviewing the Dayton agreement. Kosovo has a provisional status as an international protectorate. Until recent months, the formula “standards before status” has been foggy and undefined. Eight points of the so-called Grossman plan have clarified what is to be done, but the violent riots that took place recently have created new difficulties. Mace-

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Albania is a country with defined state sovereignty, but it can only be described as shaky. The crisis in spring of 2001 clearly showed this.

The only countries that do not have statehood problems in this part of the region are Albania and Croatia, but they are very sensitive in this regard. Being neighboring countries, as well as both kin states and host states, they have to cope with the impact of changes to any boundaries.

The four wars that drenched the territory of former Yugoslavia with blood had an ethno-nationalist motivation. After the establishment of peace, the mentality of some ethno-nationalist politicians has adapted itself like a virus, but it has not been defeated. In illustration of this point, there are two notable “M’s” of evidence.

The first “M” is called Mitrovica. Mitrovica is a divided town in Kosovo. This division is specific: it does not start from the bottom up, but the other way round. The division of Mitrovica and the development of Serbian parallel institutions are sponsored by Belgrade. Belgrade requires this state of affairs in order to play the populist nationalist card within Serbia to distract public attention from internal problems. But it needs this situation even more as a card for concessions when the final status of Kosovo will be discussed. In the case of the independence of Kosovo, Mitrovica can be used in two ways.

One way is to maintain Kosovo within its present borders, as provided by resolution 1244, which means that the territory of Kosovo cannot be expropriated. In this instance, Kosovo would serve as a regional model of the democratic integration of minorities in the country’s life. Skopje, as a vulnerable neighbor, declared that this solution would not destabilize Macedonia. The violent acts of the past year, which represented a setback, raised some question marks, but the general opinion is that they do not close off the prospects for a multiethnic society. The UN administrator Harry Holkeri declared on 9 April that those acts are not representative of Kosovo society. According to him, they only represent some elements that have their own schemes for the future of the country.

The other way that Mitrovica can be used is to transfer North Mitrovica to Serbia, which means division of Kosovo; or, in other words, the legalization of a situation that already exists in practice as a fait accompli. The Serbian nationalists are trying to make use of recent outbursts of violence for this purpose. The process of cantonization on which Prime Minister Kostunica is insisting is being looked at as a new step towards the division of Kosovo. Judging from the point of view of values, such solution would be a step backwards. It would represent the triumph of the concept of the ethnic state over the integrating concept of a multiethnic society.

In practice, the consequences are more complicated. The division of Kosovo would have a boomerang effect for Serbia itself. According to the same principle, the Presheva Valley, a part of Serbia with an Albanian majority, would demand to join Kosovo. Vojvodina and Sanjak would react according to the same principle as well. Serbia could hardly demand that a double standard be applied to these areas. The division of Kosovo would be both an opening of a Pandora’s Box and a time bomb. The whole region could become embroiled via the domino effect. The Bosnian Serbs would
demand union with Serbia, and the Albanians of Macedonia would in turn take a stand against the stability and unity of their state.

So the precedent of Mitrovica could pave the way to a reaction leading to other divisions. According to the American analyst Patrick Moore, “the problem—or virtue—of partition is that it would most likely involve not just Kosovo but every state in the region … if carried to its logical conclusion, partition would mean setting up a Greater Serbia, Greater Albania, Greater Croatia, and smaller Muslim and perhaps Macedonian states. Montenegro would go it alone, as may happen in any event.”

The second “M” is Macedonia itself. The crisis in this country appeared to be a collision between the concept of democratic coexistence and the concept of ethnic domination. The democratic alternative for a Macedonian multiethnic society is being strongly promoted by the international community, but the concept of ethnic domination is still active. It is represented by the opponents of the Ohrid Agreement. It seems that they are working toward division of the country. Their aim to divide the country seems suspect, even as far as the long-term interests of the Macedonian Slav population are concerned. Why?

At first glance, the main problem for Skopje is the Albanian population of Macedonia, although the institutional demands of the Albanians so far have not gone beyond equality in conformity with standards widely accepted by the international community. But Macedonia has unresolved issues with all of her neighbors. Belgrade does not recognize the Macedonian Church. Sofia recognizes the state, but does not recognize the Macedonian nation and language. Macedonia has problems with Athens, regarding the national symbols, her name, and the flag.

A little more than a million Macedonians in the remnants of a divided country would face the risk of losing their national, linguistic, cultural, and religious identity. The violation of this identity would jeopardize the sovereignty of these fragment states as well. That would be the main national challenge raised by a possible Macedonian division, even if such a division were carried out peacefully. Protecting Macedonia as a multiethnic and democratic society is today the only way to preserve the sovereignty and pursue the Euro-Atlantic integration of this country. It is also a crucial step for the region’s stability as well.

Some politicians and analysts see the reconfiguration of Southeastern Europe according to the principle of ethnic states as a specific recipe for its long-term stability. This is the case because they are influenced by the experience of the bloody wars and the complex composition of the region. But they also consider the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, etc., seeing state fragmentation as a tendency of our age. As Patrick Moore points out, “such observers argue that the future lies with ethnically based partition whether one likes it or not, and that it would be best for all concerned to get the matter over with sooner rather than later.” An internationally reputed personality who knows this region quite well—Lord Owen—spoke long ago about this idea. Carl Bild is also a near-supporter of this view.

Maybe seen from the perspective of realpolitik, such a scenario would be a pragmatic approach to achieving long-term regional stability. But nobody has given an answer to the question, Can this recipe be implemented without repeating the sinister
tragedies of the past? What is described as the exchange of territories and populations is simply a euphemism for ethnic cleansing. That is why the Oxford professor Noel Malcolm, the author of two very much appreciated books about Bosnia and Kosovo, calls this “a terrible idea.”

Once again taking the realpolitik point of view, maybe it is necessary to pay a bill for the peace and security of the future generations, and perhaps it is a price that cannot be avoided. But how can we diminish its cost and keep everything under control in a problematic part of Europe that is traditionally considered a powder keg? That is the question.

The dilemma—integration or ethno-nationalism, the product of the vicious circle—has only one answer: integration. The potential benefits of integration could serve as a carrot. It may help to finish the process of state-formation for those countries where this process has not concluded yet. This will require a culture of compromise for all the parties, which is not typical of the region. It will also facilitate the task of emancipating the political class, especially in the countries with an aggressive tradition and indicators of ethno-nationalism. In parallel with this should be the promotion of democratic reforms.

The effectiveness of this formula can be seen in the common commitment of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia in the framework of the Adriatic Charter. They have strong support from Washington and Brussels to fulfill the standards to join NATO, probably in 2006.

As for Albania and Croatia, as I have already mentioned, they do not have statehood problems. But both of them (and especially Albania) have problems with the consolidation of democratic institutions, improvement of reforms, and fighting corruption and organized crime.

When political scientists want to give a definition of democracy, they summarize: democracy means a free vote, plus more democracy. So the key problem for Albania is the organization of free and fair elections. In previous years, Albania has had bad experiences in this regard, but if the violation of the electoral will is repeated, there is no more democracy. Under such circumstances, it will be impossible to carry out genuine reforms, to really fight illicit trafficking, corruption, and crime. The prospects for NATO integration become foggy. A government that is the result of an electoral fraud can not be part of the regional solution. On the contrary, it is part of the problem, or is the problem itself.
Towards a Trans-Mediterranean Partnership for Peace?

Alain Faupin *

I am convinced that the common and frequent use of certain words sometimes blurs their true meaning. But when one takes the precaution of asking oneself, just before taking hold of a problem, “What’s up?” one comes to grip with the ideas behind the words, which the topic really deals with. This is what I did in this case. What does one really mean by “Partnership for Peace” and by “the Mediterranean”? The answers to these questions led me to wonder about the points of application of this “partnership”: on one side, a world that it has helped to restructure since the end of the Cold War, on the red ashes of the Soviet empire; on the other side, a fractured world in search of peace, stability, security, and development. This situation can suggest three different approaches: a long preparatory phase; a common sense solution, progressive and limited in scope; or an offensive and wide-ranging approach.

The question of the role of this “partnership” is not a recent one. An abundant literature has emerged on this topic, but has not resolved the question. It is appropriate for this issue to be back on the table at a time when the Euro-Atlantic partnership has either met most of its goals or reached the limit of its sphere of action and when NATO, confronted with the absence of an enemy, is forced to develop a new raison d’être that can justify its survival. Is the situation that urgent? It is true that security and stability cannot wait, although they are long-term objectives. It is precisely for that reason that one should not delay the preparation of the ground, as Marshal Lyautey, a long-time Governor General of Morocco, once put it.1

The Istanbul Summit, the ongoing war against terrorism, the aftermath of the Iraqi campaign, the willingness to promote economic growth but the persistence of dramatic underdevelopment lead us to start thinking of the role of a “Partnership for Peace.” But it is not possible to deal with everything at the same time. The question needs to be well framed, and the answer should encompass all the relevant aspects of the topic. Are we to speak about defense and security in general, or concentrate on defense? Do we include all the actors within the security sector, or just the armed forces? Such questions are potentially endless.

From Semantics to Praxis

Let us focus now on an analysis of “a Trans-Mediterranean Partnership for Peace.” A “partner” is a part of a whole. It can be an entity with which another entity is allied against other players in a game or in a geographic ensemble. A partner is a person with whom we discuss. A partner can also be a community with which another community has relations and exchanges.

* Major General Faupin, DCAF.

1 When his decision to reforest the Atlas Mountains in Morocco with cedar trees was questioned by a civil servant, on the grounds that they grew very slowly, he told him: “… no better argument to begin without delay!”
As far as “partnership” is concerned, let’s define it here as an association of enterprises and of institutions gathered in view of accomplishing a common goal. This implies an agreement, if not an actual alliance.

“Peace” is a very vague notion, which can be understood as the absence of war, or as the political, economic, and judicial combination that allows that condition to last as long as possible. There are different sorts and different degrees of peace: armed peace; local peace; peace that is beneficial to some and damaging to others; Pax Romana, Africana, Americana, Arabica, Europeana… and the eternal peace!

What exactly does “trans-Mediterranean” mean? It has two close but not identical meanings: one is “on the other side of the Mediterranean,” which therefore excludes the sea itself; the other is “through the Mediterranean,” designating less clearly what is on the other side of the sea.

Last but not least, of what “Mediterranean” do we speak? Is it of this gigantic lake in the middle of lands with its two crashed basins—the Black and the Red Seas—which make the Mediterranean entity a region in itself, bordered on the four cardinal points? It is also possible to slice it into five sections: the two annexed seas, the Western Mediterranean, the Central Mediterranean, and the Eastern Mediterranean. There is also the north rim and the south rim. This multiplicity shows how necessary it is to come up with a clear definition. And this is not obvious, but rather a matter of point of view.

Taking stock of all the above, what about the notion of a “Trans-Mediterranean partnership”? Against whom? Against no one, but in search of peace, alongside familiar players who know one another, respect their partners, and who have already opposed each other in earlier instances? With players who might not be in the same geographic situation: maritime states or countries of the hinterland? What do Norway and Algeria have in common? Oil? One can speak with “discussion partners,” and that has been going on (and on), endlessly, for years and centuries—peace plans, road maps, good offices, mediations, negotiations—to very little avail. There are also “deep love” relationships, based upon strong feelings, but also relationships of disenchantment, as sudden and as strong, between familiar partners. Would this all fall under “the Partnership”?

In practical terms, everybody knows what the NATO Partnership for Peace is made of: its objectives, its financing, and its major activities are mainly intended for peace operations. The enlargement of NATO has made its evolution unavoidable.

The PfP, as an initiative of cooperative security, is anything but rigid, and has just enough political goals (such as protecting human rights, safeguarding individual liberties, promoting democracy, fostering democratic control of the armed forces) to make it possible to deal technically and fundamentally with its fields of competence, among which is preparation for peacekeeping operations. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) shows that the partners need to have a new framework for international consultation, just as the Partnership Action Plan (PAP) shows that they intend to increase their interoperability, a *sine qua non* condition for efficiency in any given peacekeeping operation.
The PfP has contributed to the reconstruction of a region that was divided during the Cold War into two different worlds, and has helped to recreate a homogeneous region: the Euro-Atlantic area. This is a region characterized by real geographic continuity and a genuine identity, built out of cultural, economic, monetary, and conceptual (not to say political) elements.

The reconciliation processes that are so important to reunifying the region, with very few exceptions (Cyprus being an ugly one), have been achieved. This move is more fundamental and has more structural implications than any other action that the PfP has undertaken. The OSCE and the EU have helped, but it is obvious that the PfP has accelerated the trend. The challenges faced by this rejuvenated Europe are shared and often common. They sometimes turn into threats, but they generally consist in societal problems that have been generated both inside and beyond the borders of individual member states, which are increasingly common borders. The Mediterranean is one of them, the most porous of all. Europe is now a coherent and cohesive entity.

A Recomposed World Facing a Fractured World

The Partnership for Peace has powerfully contributed to the restoration of Europe’s geographic continuity by filling the fissures created and kept open through constraint by the Soviet system and the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War and the birth of new states, as well as the quick return to democratic practices in the former Soviet satellite states, have allowed NATO to bridge the remaining gaps. This initiative expressed clearly the will of the populations to rejoin the Western family, from which force and ideology had kept them separated for forty years. It has emerged as a major factor of commonality among the different communities of our continent, one that is based on shared values (democracy ranking first), rather than on diverging interests. The European Union has also made a significant contribution (along with the OSCE over the past ten years) to institute the rule of law in a manner that is economically sound, socially coherent, and security-minded.

Facing a great variety of both old and new challenges, behind common borders, Europe now has to refurbish its defense tools. The PfP has already contributed to this endeavor, but is now reaching the limits of its competencies. It needs a new geopolitical raison d’être: either by expanding to the east (PAP-DIB)\(^2\); by expanding to the south of the Mediterranean or to the greater Middle East; or by taking over new missions, as recommended in Prague (PAP), especially with regard to anti-terrorist policies. However, it is obvious that, in so doing, we would jeopardize the geographic continuity and the cultural homogeneity that we have achieved thus far.

With the exception of a few common points between the northern and the southern rim of the Mediterranean, such as olive oil, scarce water, hot sun, Islam, cultural mosaics, and less than brilliant economies, this region is deeply fractured. Last but not least, active plate tectonics often add their catastrophic note to a relatively dull picture.

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As we have seen, there are five “small Mediterraneans,” if we take into account the Black and the Red Sea annexes. Economics divides more than it unites; the flows of exchange are, with the exception of oil and gas, more North-South than South-North. Natural resources are unevenly shared, and the soaring demographic growth in the region remains one of the main causes of underdevelopment and of insecurity. These social and economic problems, used by Islamist fundamentalists and extremists for political gain, are the wellspring of most of the region’s internal unrest, and of much international turmoil as well.

Security systems in the region vary from one country to another, but none (except the Israeli security apparatus) is controlled by the parliament. Besides, there is almost no security cooperation between the countries in the region at any level: bilateral, sub-regional, or regional.3 “Fragmented” is another adjective that would aptly characterize the South, which only unites when it comes to the conflict involving Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Arab world has tried several times to unite, but has only succeeded occasionally, and then largely only at the level of words. National interests are too divergent, denominations are too exclusive, and alignments are too strong; all of these are perennial sources of division. Only a lengthy process of reconciliation could overcome these divisions, provided it were sustained by a strong political and democratic will.

Solutions

Nothing can or should be undertaken between the North and the South without the formal agreement of the nation states involved (I could have said “of the populations”). The decision should be theirs. The principle of ownership should apply fully and be totally respected; that is the first and major condition for the success of any North-South initiative.

Government structures in the South are for the most part authoritarian. It would be completely unrealistic to ask the population of these nations to give their say on a program of armament or the engagement of forces in a peacekeeping operation, or even for the reform of the security sector. The point of departure to promote a change in the mindset is therefore a personal commitment of the heads of state and of government themselves. From there, two options are open.

The first, inspired by a rigorous and cautious analysis, would be based on a clear identification of the security challenges, capabilities, and needs in a given geographical area. Such options would be limited in space, time, and scope, and would be implemented in a slow but reasonable process.

The second would answer the West’s impatient quest for security. The West has shown itself eager to intervene on a larger geographical scale and on a greater number of issues in pursuit of solutions to its own security concerns. This would be a quicker but riskier process.

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3 The only exceptions are the Turkish-Israeli cooperation agreement, and, of course, Turkey itself, a member of NATO.
What seems evident to us in the North is probably not as clear to our partners in the South, where the system of values is different—neither better nor worse, simply different. Our American, Spanish, British, and Polish friends (to name a few of the seventeen NATO countries currently involved in the conflict in Iraq) can testify to that. There are more trivial expressions in use to convey the idea that one cannot be forced in a project if one is not convinced.\textsuperscript{4} I shall therefore insist again that nation-states—and, if possible, populations and their parliamentary representatives—take hold of these initiatives and succeed in persuading their respective countries of their necessity.

Beyond this is the need to organize a formal engagement—followed by practical measures—to contribute to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue by helping all the stakeholders to reach an agreement and to conclude it. This engagement would also aim at easing the tensions that exist between neighbors, whatever their causes, both in their degree of intensity and their extent.

The states in the region must also strive to improve their institutions, to make them more transparent, more democratic, and less prone to arbitrariness and corruption. Finally, the dialogue frameworks (NATO, Barcelona, bilateral) should remain wide open during the entire duration of the exercise. Only these structures can allow for the exchange of ideas, the elaboration of proposals, and eventually the transfer of expertise.

Once the prerequisites are met, the installment of a partnership would be possible under the following conditions:

1. The goals would focus on progressively improving interoperability between the armed forces of states in the North and the South, whatever their institutional involvement is (EU, NATO, OSCE, UN). Three areas should then be focused on and be provided with the same assets as in the Euro-Atlantic area.
   - The first area is the education of defense personnel, civilian and military alike; this is already conducted through bilateral cooperation agreements. The signing of a partnership protocol would speed up the process and provide additional assets, as well as a common doctrine.
   - The second area is training in military techniques (with adapted assets) in the fields of leadership, planning, command and control, communication and logistics, etc.
   - The third area directly precedes the operational engagement of forces and aims at shaping them to that end. It consists of national, regional, and international exercises.

2. The second condition is to focus only on operations that are in the humanitarian realm, or fall under the rubric of the “Petersberg tasks,” whatever organization (NATO, EU, OSCE, UN) has the mandate of conducting and controlling them.

\textsuperscript{4} “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink” being the best known.
3. The third area is that of a common system intended to administer, advise, animate, control, and monitor this new partnership for peace.

These goals can be seen as modest, and not sufficiently ambitious. They would, however, represent a significant leap forward, and their implementation would take time. Indeed, what is important here is to ensure that not one or two countries of the southern rim participate in the implementation of such programs, but that all of them do so, and together.

Meanwhile, it would be totally ineffective and incoherent to transpose the European experience to the South, because we do not share the same ideas about events, geography, and the use of force. Furthermore, any move that could be associated with the notion of Western pressure would be sooner or later rejected. The endeavor is therefore a difficult one, and appears to be not so promising. The prerequisites are capital. The expansion of the territorial limits of the Partnership beyond the maritime states of the Mediterranean does not seem realistic, and all the current warning lights and indicators are advising against such a trend. The nation-states of the so-called “Greater Middle East” are clearly reserved in their enthusiasm as far as the involvement of the West in their own business is concerned.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me sum up some of the key elements that such an effort must take into consideration:

- Time factor: what is the exact degree of urgency?
- The extreme and growing geopolitical complexity and diversity of the region;
- The importance of national, cultural, and religious sensitivities;
- The diverging security perceptions between the North and the South;
- The assets (dialogue, cooperation, evolution of the mindset and of the rule of law);
- The need for transparency and for ownership.

Under these conditions, and with cautious, intelligent, and proper handling, it is possible to envisage a trans-Mediterranean partnership for peace.
Russia and the “Orange Revolution”: Response, Rhetoric, Reality?

Graeme P Herd *

Introduction

The Ukrainian presidential elections, which took place during November and December of 2004, have been labeled the “Orange Revolution.” Within former Soviet space, they have been interpreted as a Western-backed “exported revolution.” As such, these events are perceived to be part of a pattern of Western-backed revolutions stretching from Tirana and Belgrade to Tbilisi and Kiev, one that is now set to unfold in a tsunami-type chain reaction throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This article identifies the main arguments that support such a contention, questions its validity, and highlights key flaws and weaknesses in the assumptions that underpin it. It argues that the idea of Western-backed revolutions is so powerful that it has begun to shape foreign- and security-policy responses within the CIS, not least the Russian Federation. The “Orange Revolution” will not result in honest elections, greater transparency and accountability, better governance, and peaceful transitions of power, but rather the opposite. “Immunization” from the “Orange virus” may only be secured through the adoption of the Belarus authoritarian model, by “tightening the screws.” This will have negative consequences for democratization efforts and the role and function of NGOs (both indigenous and foreign), diplomatic missions, international exchanges, and other organizations in Russia and the CIS.

The “Orange Revolution” as “Orange Virus”

The presidential election in Kiev has been held up by analysts, politicians, and journalists in the Russian Federation as another worrying example of Western attempts to “manufacture democracy” in former Soviet space. Under the guise of mass popularity (“unpaid spontaneity” being considered a political oxymoron), Western-funded international organizations that advocate democracy—such as the OSCE, as well as U.S.-funded NGOs such as Freedom House, the U.S. Democratic Party’s National Democratic Institute and the Republicans’ International Republican Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the George Soros-funded Open Society Foundation—are

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considered to have underwritten the “revolution.” Diplomatic missions are also perceived to play a critical role (the U.S. embassies and USAID projects and programs in particular) in the deployment of revolutionary technologies that have facilitated regime change. This understanding of the role of national, international, and non-governmental organizations as both capable and willing to act in concert suggests that other post-Soviet states will then be targeted for regime change in a systematic and coordinated fashion, and in accordance with a secret strategic blueprint for change.

For evidence, those who hold this view argue that we have witnessed a number of revolutions, beginning in Serbia in 2000, followed by the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in November 2003 and the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in November 2004. These “revolutions” (so the argument goes) have been linked by a series of common features. The driving force behind each was a youth protest movement that used catchy slogans and symbols or logos. In Serbia it was Otpor (“Resistance”) with the slogan “Gotovye” (“He is Finished!”) and the logo of a black fist on a white background. In Georgia, the youth movement was called “Kmara,” which doubled as the slogan “Enough,” and used the logo of a black fist on a yellow background. In Ukraine, the movement and the slogan were both “Pora” (“It is time”)—complemented by a new anthem, “Vstaway!,” or “Rise up!”—and accompanied by the symbol of orange scarves.

The networks and relations between these groups were consolidated through the sharing of media and PR and organizational knowledge. The Belgrade Center for Non-violent Resistance, for example, has helped train activists in Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine. One of its activists, Sinisa Sikman, commented: “They [Pora] are applying knowledge and skills that we have previously taught them.”\(^1\) Aleksandar Maric, a leader of Pora who worked with Ukrainian activists as part of a Freedom House program, stated: “We trained them to set up an organization, how to open local chapters, how to create a ‘brand,’ how to create a logo, symbols and key messages. We trained them how to identify the key weaknesses in society and what people’s most pressing problems were.”\(^2\)

One Russian commentator noted, “As proved by experience, revolutions occur in states with weak leaders and strong oppositions. Establishing contacts with various international foundations and securing the funding happens according to the familiar scenario. One only has to remember how active the Soros Open Society Foundation is on former Soviet territory. Also take for example the U.S. Ambassador Richard Miles, who managed to do his job both in Belgrade and in Georgia. Further down the line, the streets get engaged in the regime change process, encouraged by business persons and oligarchs dissatisfied with incumbent regimes.”\(^3\) The thesis acknowledges that an attempt by “the West” to stage a “velvet revolution” during the 2001 presidential elec-

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1 ONASA/AP, Belgrade, 27 November 2004.
tions in Belarus failed. Although a youth movement named “Zubr” (“Bison”) was active (and sported an orange bison as a rallying symbol), the necessary preconditions — “weak leaders and strong opposition” — were not in place to ensure “success.” Taking a more global perspective, Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe and Venezuela under President Hugo Chavez (11 April 2002) have been added to the list of failed Western-backed post-modern *coup d’etat* attempts.

**Chain Reaction?**

To put it simply, the view of the progression is as follows: “The day before yesterday: Belgrade. Yesterday: Tbilisi. Today: Kiev. Tomorrow: Moscow.” With respect to this understanding of events in Ukraine, and as part of an effort to place the Ukraine revolution in the context of other such “revolutions” in the Balkans and South Caucasus, many analysts have begun to examine the implications of such events for their relations with Ukraine and the West. They have also questioned whether such events might spread more broadly to the other CIS states, and have forecast some of the likely consequences for foreign and security policy-making in these states.

Russian analyst Sergei Markov is particularly specific. “I think the ‘orange revolution’ in Moldova is about 80 percent ready,” he has stated. “In Kyrgyzstan it’s 40 percent ready, and in Kazakhstan it’s 30 percent ready.” Another analyst declared, “Russia cannot afford to allow defeat in the battle for Ukraine. Besides everything else, defeat would mean velvet revolutions in the next two years, now following the Kiev variant, in Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly Armenia.” RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Ilyashenko agreed, arguing that the events in Ukraine would have a direct impact on electoral strategies and political succession throughout the CIS: “We may see a series of Rose Revolutions in post-Soviet republics in the next few years. The former Soviet elite standing at the helm there will have to hold elections sooner or later. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may follow the Ukrainian example, and the West will hardly accept a smooth transition of power to the establishment heirs there.”

Vyacheslav Nikonov, the President of the Politika Foundation, echoes such thoughts. “In Ukraine we are seeing yet again the implementation of an American ‘velvet revolution’ plan or, rather, a special operation to replace a regime that does not suit the United States, a process that had already been successfully tested


6 Yuri Stroganov, “We Haven't Lost Ukraine Yet, But We Must Learn From Our Mistakes,” *Trud* 2 (12 January 2005): EV. Translated by Gregory Malyutin.


in ‘banana republics’ and was then transferred to the countries of Eastern Europe and Georgia. In just the same way as in past instances, diverse international structures and institutions have now been brought in to ‘unravel the knot.’”

Gleb Pavlovsky, president of the Moscow-based Foundation for Effective Politics, and a political consultant who worked for Viktor Yanukovich’s campaign team in Ukraine, has drawn parallels between U.S.-sponsored regimes in Latin and South America during the Cold War and U.S. actions in post-Soviet space, arguing that there is a “transfer of a certain continental model to another continent.” However, he noted one important difference amidst this sea of similarities: “Now this is being done in the era of media technologies.”

Former Russian State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev has described the situation in Ukraine as “extremely alarming,” arguing that “We have the impression that what is taking place on Kiev’s streets is not happening spontaneously—it is a well-prepared action. You can even tell from the emblems that this is a revolution for export. These oranges, which do not grow in Ukraine, have suddenly become a symbol of liberals.” Sergey Mironov, the Russian Federation Council chairman, stated that it was possible to detect “a producer's hand” in the Ukrainian revolution, just as in Yugoslavia.

The implications of these events for Russian power, prestige, and image are not open for debate—they are perceived to be negative. The Ukrainian presidential elections have been interpreted in the Russian media in the terms of a foreign-policy Waterloo, a “political Stalingrad,” Russia’s worst foreign-policy defeat in the post-Soviet period. One commentator has argued that recent events in Ukraine “can be seen as a planned strike against Russia aimed at creating ongoing instability on its southern borders. If this is pulled off, Russia will come up against a whole range of very complex problems: financial (the place of our capital in Ukraine), economic (linked to oil and gas pipelines to the West), political (questions of integration), military (the status of our fleet in Sevastopol), and demographic.”

Countering the “Ukraine Scenario”: The Belarus Option?

The implications of the Kiev election for Russia’s domestic political order and its foreign policy, particularly within the CIS, have been widely debated by political analysts and elites in Moscow. One analyst noted that, since revolutions that are 100 percent imported fail to take root in foreign soil, it follows that external factors can only act as catalysts, and that therefore “some internal prerequisites do need to ripen. Thus, the question in principle becomes this: Does Russia have immunity to the ‘orange virus’?”

9 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 1 December 2004.
11 RIA news agency, Moscow, 3 December 2004 (in Russian).
12 ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, 27 December 2004 (in Russian).
13 Vyacheslav Kostikov, Argumenty i Fakty, Moscow, 30 November 2004.
The ways and means to stop the expected chain reaction of domino democratization have been avidly discussed throughout the CIS, with many analysts arguing that only stern preventative and pre-emptive counter-measures will stem the tide of revolutionary proliferation.

Certainly, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov has stated that the CIS is Russia’s top foreign-policy priority. Russia subsidizes the majority of the CIS through energy supplies. As Ivanov argued, “These are precisely the reasons why we react and will react the way we do to exports of revolution to the CIS states, no matter and what color—pink, blue, you name it—though of course we recognize and we understand that Russia has no monopoly on CIS states.” He went on to note, “Yet someone has not abandoned stereotypes of the past, which is proven by the reaction of certain circles in Europe and the U.S.A. to the political crisis in Ukraine.” Even prior to the presidential elections in Ukraine, “there had been clear signals that the West would not recognize the ballot results if the wrong candidate won the elections.”

This fear of Western-imported revolution appears to either herald a new crackdown or justify current policies towards opposition groups in some CIS states. NGOs, international organizations, diplomatic missions, and independent trade unions are increasingly perceived to constitute threats to internal security. In response, laws on protests and referendums are being toughened, and independent trade unions, opposition leaders, and their political parties are being squashed. Foreign and security policy is also influenced by such a perception, and it is likely that U.S./NATO-PfP military-to-military contacts will be scrutinized more closely than hitherto. Some states will likely grow more isolated from Western influences, and the image of the West as an external enemy may well be strengthened.

However, such policies may well backfire and implode under the weight of unintended consequences. Stanislav Belkovsky has noted with regard to Russia politics, “the anxiety is evident and will be expressed in the future in the form of screw tightening. The laws on protests and referendums will be toughened, independent trade unions will be dispersed, unfavorable parties will be finished. Most likely, an attempt will be made to propagate the image of the external enemy represented by the West.” In Belkovsky’s analysis, such a tendency will lead Russia down the Belarus path, towards a more authoritarian and managed future. “However, making this a professional action is unlikely to be a success—the personnel and professional shortage of the incumbent state power is too obvious,” Belkovsky states. “Most likely, this will lead us to experience some sort of déja vu, remembering the late stagnation era, and a partial repeat of the path Belarus is taking now.”

Andrey Illarionov, Russian Presidential Adviser on Economic Issues, has also forecast the self-defeating nature of further “Belarusification” tendencies in Russia under

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Putin. He argues that short-term victories over “the mass media, democratic institutions responsible for sending out messages, including messages of distress, crisis, and catastrophes to the public and to the authorities” through the “amputation of such institutions” would ultimately lead “to catastrophic consequences for the country and for the entire public. The consequences, compared to what they could be under an open system, occur on a much greater scale because in this situation, problems do not get solved. They accumulate, they become concentrated and sooner or later they are directed to the center of the political system. A way out of such crises happens not through elections but through revolutions. If there are no normal, traditional, legal methods of solving the crises then nothing else short of revolution is left.”\(^\text{16}\)

One other factor that undermines the move towards a “Belarusification” of Russia’s domestic political landscape as an attempt to immunize Russia from the “Orange virus” or “plague” is the impact this would have on Russia’s relations with Euro-Atlantic states and institutions. “Moscow fears confrontation with the West far more than it fears the loss of its own influence within the former Soviet Union.” Adoption of the “Belarusification” option precludes G8 membership and strong EU trade relations. At any rate, this option is rendered very unlikely because Russia is now “too deeply involved in globalization, and too greatly dependent on the West—the chief customer for our oil and natural gas, our chief creditor, our chief supplier of investment and technology.”\(^\text{17}\)

Boris Nemtsov, leader of the political right in Russia, though not agreeing with this characterization of the Ukrainian presidential elections, does express concern that Russian political strategists and campaign managers will learn the wrong ‘lessons’ from the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 and apply them to the March 2008 presidential elections in Russia. “I am afraid that Russia will draw the opposite conclusions, namely, that censorship should be tightened, the opposition should be squeezed and so on. These will be fateful mistakes that may precipitate a revolution in Russia.”\(^\text{18}\) Despite such a prediction, at a meeting of the All-Russian Civic Congress–Russia for Democracy and Against Dictatorship with representatives of the liberal parties Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, the speakers stated that Russian society was not ready for “street democracy.” Nemtsov himself noted, “There can be no orange revolution here. First of all because the ambitions of our politicians, including myself, are inordinately high and, unfortunately, have been put above Russia's national interests.”\(^\text{19}\) As another analyst noted, “The Ukrainian model of regime-toppling (through

\(^{16}\) Ekho Moskvy radio, 30 December 2004.


\(^{19}\) RIA news agency, Moscow, 12 December 2004.
elections and street revolution) may be applied to Russia. There are no problems with money for it. The only problem is with the people.”

If events in Ukraine do not support tendencies toward a much more managed authoritarianism on the Belarus model, what alternative lessons might be drawn? Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Centre for Studying Elites at the Sociology Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has argued that Ukraine is a dress rehearsal and trial run for the March 2008 Russian elections, and it illustrates the importance of transferring the center of power from president to parliament ahead of the election through amendments to the constitution or laws on government. “Vladimir Putin will assume the leadership of the One Russia party and a government of the parliamentary majority will then be elected,” she argues. “The only problem is in the choice of a candidate from the current Russian authorities for the post of future president without power. A strong personality will not do for this post, but a weak one may not get enough votes from the population.”

In a similar vein, Profil magazine addressed the issue of political succession in Russia’s 2008 elections. In what it labeled “Operation Successor,” the magazine’s writers argued that the state is attempting to ensure succession by placing under its control financial and administrative resources (through the appointment and promotion of leaders who are personally loyal to the Kremlin), political parties and the electoral system, institutions, and the media (“the media space is docile to the point of sterility”; the “population is being entertained, enticed, counseled, but not informed”). It argues that the factors for selecting the 2008 successor are the same principles that were formed in 2000, on the eve of Yeltsin’s resignation. The first principle is that the successor must guarantee continuity of the elite. Second, if an economic crisis occurs, it must be managed without blame being directed towards Putin, tarnishing his reputation.

Although Konstantin Remchukov, the Russian deputy minister of economic development and trade, does not discount the possibility of such revolutions in other post-Soviet states, he argues that it will happen only where regimes have been in place “for at least two terms and became hackneyed among the people.” Societies in which expectations have been shattered are susceptible to the “charismatic passionate enthusiasm of masses.” In Russia, by contrast, “we have a different level of popularity and perception of Putin,” and citizens link their expectations of public justice and order to the President—expectations have yet to be shattered. In Russia, the Kremlin exercises almost complete control over the political system, realistic political alternatives are absent, the Russian economy is reviving, and Putin continues to be popular (his

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An example recent approval rating was 69 percent)—but can the same be said for other regimes in the CIS? Analysts from Tajikistan to Armenia, Kyrgyzstan to Belarus, have argued that their states would also be unable to sustain such a “revolution.”

Fedor Lukyanov, editor in chief of the magazine *Rossiya v Globalnoy Politike* (Russia in Global Politics), has argued that Russia’s integration into the West “has been virtually frozen.” CIS states increasingly realize that Russian patronage no longer guarantees that incumbents can hold onto power, which will further undermine the CIS and the bilateral relations between Putin and post-Soviet leaderships. In addition, “the de facto curtailment of a Single Economic Space project, which … becomes pointless after Ukraine’s withdrawal, will be far more painful.” He predicted that Moldova could be “the Ukraine of 2005”—that is, the geopolitical asset whose loss will result in new costs to Russia. It was feared that the 6 March 2005 Moldovan Parliamentary elections might result in a “Grape Revolution”\(^\text{24}\) - but such a scenario did not emerge.

**Reality Check**

Does the CIS face a wave of Western-backed revolutions-for-export that will wash through former Soviet space, demolishing incumbent regimes and implanting pro-Western candidates from among the disparate counter-elites and opposition parties in these states, and so encircle Russia? Such an interpretation appears overblown, distorted by our proximity to the present, and lacking more considered judgment. Opposition movements throughout the CIS may well have been emboldened by the events in Tbilisi and Kiev, but the prospect of a more level playing field during election periods is less likely due to foreign interference, and more likely due to the emergence of stronger civil societies and institutions of democratic political culture than incumbents expected and believed would be possible after little more than a decade of post-Soviet governance.

What then of the “revolution for export” thesis? This idea, though weak in its essentials, is grounded in fact: Euro-Atlantic states and institutions do actively support the process of free and fair elections and political pluralism both in theory (for example, democratization underpins the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002) and in practice. There is a case to be made that Western security services did actively attempt to undermine the Milosevic regime following the Kosovo conflict, and that the overthrow of Milosevic in 2000 was partially orchestrated by external powers. However, the assertion that international organizations, states, and NGOs act in concert to achieve a grand strategy of transforming the CIS states into democracies through the export of catalytic revolutions rests on assumptions that are hard to credit.

First, it assumes that disparate organizations, institutions, and states are able to think strategically, exhibit high degrees of discipline to achieve a consensus of approach and division of labor, and then implement such a strategy. Such an understanding assumes homogeneity in outlook and orientation among, for example, the full spectrum of unruly NGOs, as well as the ability of governments and NGOs not only to

cooperate but also to work in lock step. While they do both support human rights and democratization efforts, these two groups hardly present a monolithic bloc. How are we to square George Soros-funded “regime change” in the U.S. (he supported the Kerry candidacy to the tune of $15m) with his alleged cooperation with the Republican Institute for International Affairs in fomenting the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine?

Second, what of the contention that covert security services use unwitting NGOs as dupes or proxies, and are able thereby to effectively outsource the “revolution” and run it by remote control? To argue thus is to invest far more confidence in the power and ability of security service analytical and operational capacities than recent evidence of their miscalculations (in cases where real national interests were at least professed to be at stake) would suggest is warranted. The outsourcing of revolution through NGOs can never be as careful, systematic, and controlled as the proponents of this thesis would characterize the progress events; contingency, personalities, and the ability of civic organizations to set their own agendas should not be overlooked. The unification of three respective opposition blocs into one in Ukraine to push the opposition movement forward could hardly have been imposed from the outside.

Third, are we to believe “the West” has an overarching active policy and strategy with regard to this region? What of the failure of Western policy towards Ukraine, which at best might be described as “benign neglect”? As one analyst has pointed out, “Since President Leonid Kuchma took office in 1995, USAID has dumped close to $1.5 billion into Ukraine. The destination of every penny of those funds is a matter of public record. Most of that money has gone to support reforms within the Ukrainian government. Only a few million dollars a year has gone to support a free press, free elections and other civil society-building initiatives. The bulk of USAID funding definitely did not end up with the opposition. Rather, it ended up with Kuchma’s corrupt government. One could thus argue that the United States did more to prop up the Kuchma regime than it did to support the opposition.”

Fourth, even in an age of omnipresent information technologies, are PR firms and pollsters really all-powerful? Gleb Pavlovsky, in classic poacher-turned-gamekeeper mode, cautions against “exaggerating the importance of political technologies and the revolutionary technologists as they are called. In fact, these are advisers or their support services. They may offer advice and consultations, and the most they can do is offer a scheme.” Other analysts have discounted the extent to which the events in Kiev are ‘exportable’ within the CIS, arguing that not all CIS states can be considered pliant “victims of the West's democratization techniques,” since not all of them possess the preconditions necessary to support successful “revolution”: “weak, closed-off regimes with authoritarian leanings, incapable of either sharing power or suppressing attempts


to encroach on their monopoly of power.”27 The internal political environment must be suitable for the import of revolution. If, for example, the popularity of the incumbent president is high, civil society is weak, the political elite is prepared to promise change, elections are not stolen in such blatant fashion, and the incumbent lacks a credible rival, then imported revolution will not take root. The failure of a “Grape Revolution” to take place in Moldova during the March parliamentary elections is a case in point.

Fifth, the ineptness of Putin’s counter-productive “Ukraine policy” has also been identified as a factor in shaping the “Orange Revolution.” The policy itself constituted a self-inflicted wound: “Moscow with its technology of interference has deepened the split in Ukrainian society—but to its own detriment. The Russian presence allowed radicals to resurrect elements of the national liberation struggle and to return—at least a section of citizens—to 1991, that is, to Ukraine’s struggle for independence from Russia. Putin became the factor that helped to unite Ukrainian nationalists, liberals, and socialists against the authorities and against Moscow. Having taken part in the Ukrainian struggle, Moscow has not only excluded for itself the role of arbitrator in the Ukrainian process, but has also narrowed the field for domination in the post-Soviet space. To our eyes, an event has taken place that in terms of its consequences for Russia may turn out to be more serious than the expansion of NATO and the EU.”28

In short, “the West” lacks the ability—never mind the political will—to conduct such “special operations,” while incumbents in the region usually have both the will and ability to suppress internal dissent. Where such “revolutions” do occur, they are characterized by the presence of unpopular incumbents that have lost control over both their popular support and substantial parts of their own state apparatus. The real threat to authoritarian regimes is not that foreign NGOs work in concert with Western security services, but that they work at all. Under certain conditions, self-determination can occur, and peoples can assert their rights. Teaching the principles of democracy to citizens in a semi-authoritarian system will inevitably empower the incumbents’ opposition and work to the disadvantage of pro-government parties. It remains a reality that “[p]eaceful popular protests backed by OSCE standards on elections can bring down entrenched corrupt regimes that rely on vote fraud to remain in power.”29 But while highlighting shortfalls in transparency and democratic accountability does undermine authoritarian regimes, replacing “imitation” with “electoral” democracy hardly constitutes a postmodern coup d’etat.

27 Vladimirov, “An Exportable Revolution.”
Prospectus, 2005–2008: Rhetoric Trumps Reality?

However, the “exported revolution” thesis cannot be dismissed so lightly; it will have a political impact. A belief in the thesis, whether sincere or fabricated, will shape domestic and foreign policies in CIS states, particularly in how post-Soviet elites safeguard power and manage political successions. Just as in some Central Asian states the allegation that the political opposition is linked to Al-Qaeda has been used to legitimize a crackdown by authorities on legitimate parties, so too in the rest of the CIS the allegation that opposition parties are backed by Western security services will prove to be both a powerful and perhaps even a popular mobilizing tool for the incumbents and a clear means of justifying greater state control over political opposition. Incumbent authorities are now able to play the “Ukrainian card” during elections: “What is better,” they ask, “stability and inter-ethnic accord or confrontation that threatens a split in society?”

Following the Parliamentary elections in February 2005, President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan faced anti-government protests. He declared in a speech to parliament that the “opposition is directed and funded from the outside.” Akayev went on to assert: “The events in Kyrgyzstan are not isolated from any of the so-called color revolutions that have been staged in other . . . countries over the last 18 months. Such revolutions, which are nothing more than coups, go beyond the framework of the law.” Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, denounced as “counter-productive” and “tactless” the E.U.’s public criticism of the parliamentary election. In particular, he criticised a statement issued by the E.U. foreign policy and security chief, Javier Solana, expressing concern that the parliamentary vote “fell short of OSCE (the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe) commitments and other international standards.”

It is not beyond the realm of possibility that many post-Soviet elites might even sincerely believe such a thesis, particularly those who view security issues through the prism of their Soviet experience, drawing on Stalin for notions of encirclement and on Leninist/Bolshevik ideology to shape their understanding of the phenomenon of ‘revolution.’ The 1917 October Revolution highlighted the fact that revolutions need vanguard parties consisting of intellectuals, ideologists, and organizers. If Russia has not supplied them, then “the West” must have done so. It therefore follows that the monolithic West has a strategic approach to post-Soviet space that allows for a carefully coordinated, systematic approach to regime change: after all, that is how the Soviet Union approached its international relationships during the Cold War. Max Boot, a well-known U.S. neoconservative, has argued that a little external help goes a long way.

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in supporting democratic opposition movements to overthrow anti-democratic incumbents: “We need to apply elsewhere the lessons of Ukraine, which are also the lessons of Georgia, Serbia, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, Poland, Lithuania and other countries where despotic regimes have been toppled since the original ‘people power’ revolution swept the Philippines in 1986. An obvious candidate for a similar transformation is Iran.” Such statements can only reinforce current fears and paranoia among stakeholders within the CIS and Middle East, as illustrated by Syrian responses to the “Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon.

The “Orange Revolution” poses policy questions for CIS states, foreign and domestic security services, diplomatic missions, NGOs, and other actors in civil society within the CIS. There are three constants that we can accept. First, all of these actors increasingly compete or cooperate to occupy the same policy arena in the CIS. Here agendas, initiatives, issues, goals, objectives, policy instruments, and tools are created, pursued, and utilized. Second, it is generally accepted that it is legitimate for foreign diplomatic missions to support the efforts of the government and peoples of their host state to build a modern, prosperous, stable, and democratic country in accordance with the laws of the state and international practice. To this end, a focus by foreign states on the legitimacy of the process of free, fair, and transparent elections is not a breach of a state’s sovereignty or interference in its internal affairs, unless the diplomatic missions explicitly support one particular candidate or faction. Third, a hallmark and one measurement of democratic political culture is the acceptance by state authorities of the idea that NGOs and civil society are free to support both a democratization process and particular candidates or parties, even if this undermines the power of incumbents.

In some states in post-Soviet space, these constants are barely acknowledged as legitimate. Cooperation and coordination between diplomatic mission and NGOs as an end in itself is increasingly perceived in a negative light. This link is not viewed as pursuing the goal of building a vibrant and democratic civil society, but as a means to another more sinister and threatening end—regime change. Some regimes in the CIS have understood only too well the complexity and power of Western-style NGOs and civil society as actors; they can have simultaneously competing and cooperative agendas, with significant implications for domestic, foreign, and security policy. However, the possibility that such influence can occur not only outside the formal control or informal influence (or even knowledge?) of Western diplomatic missions/security services is not countenanced.

Moreover, the growing power of civil society—particularly when an expression of popular protest sparked by the intense frustration and disappointment of a stolen election and a brake on change—is underestimated by most of the ruling elites in the CIS. An exception is Russian MP Aleksandr Lebedev, deputy head of the Duma CIS committee and co-chairman of the Russo-Ukrainian inter-parliamentary commission. With reference to the “Orange Revolution,” he noted, “In the final analysis, it was not the

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administrative levers and not interference in Ukraine’s affairs by one state or another, or for that matter by any other forces, that was crucial there. It was the fact that three million people took to the streets in Kiev that was, in my view, the more important development. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to imagine that three million people could by means of some sort of political spin be induced to take to the streets in temperatures that were as low as minus 12 Centigrade and stay there for weeks on end. It was an expression of the will of Kievans and Ukrainians who had flocked to Kiev.\textsuperscript{34}

Lastly, this begs the question of whether democracy as a political system is a universal concept. President Akayev, for example, has argued that “national democracy” and the securing of stability is a first prerequisite that must be attained before Western-style democracy can follow. Interestingly, Anatol Lieven has argued something similar with regard to Russia in a recent issue of \textit{Foreign Policy}: only a semi-authoritarian government now will allow for the possibility of liberal democracy in Russia in the future; therefore, President Putin is to be supported.\textsuperscript{35} If this is so, then to what extent can the goal of “stability first” in support of higher national goals (“national democracy”/traditional values) be pursued by regimes, before diplomatic missions and NGO observers conclude that despotic authoritarianism is the real goal and that incumbents are determined to hold on to power at any and all costs? What levels of torture, imprisonment, and harassment in pursuit of “stability first” are permissible? Where should diplomatic missions draw the line between achieving strategic security partnerships and upholding their democratic values? Although these difficult questions have no uniform answer across the CIS, it appears that Western tolerance levels and cost/benefit analyses are still measured in the terms of \textit{realpolitik} and national interest. Tolerance is low when perceived national interests are at stake, high when they are not: for example, on 26 December 2004 there were around 25 OSCE monitors in Uzbekistan, 10,000 monitors in Ukraine.

After the events of the “Orange Revolution,” new considerations might now focus and shape thinking on the subject of strategic power distribution and continuity among post-Soviet incumbent leaders. Can incumbents finesse a transfer of power to their chosen successors on the Yeltsin-Putin model, or will they increasingly run the risk that this attempt is more prone to break down along the lines of the Kuchma-Yanukovich variant? Would the use of constitutional courts, securing two-thirds majorities in parliaments, or popular referendums secure the same goal, or could this goal precipitate the very expression of mass people power that it sought to avoid? Might incumbents be more inclined to allow for a more or less democratic transfer of power to counter-elites in return for immunity from prosecution for corruption while in office? The treatment of Shevardnadze and particularly Kuchma will be closely watched in this respect. In the final analysis, are the military and security forces to be relied upon as a loyal praetorian guard that will obey presidential orders and suppress popular discontent, or

\textsuperscript{34} Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, 14 January 2005.
might they refuse to respond or be sufficiently divided that incumbents run the risk of execution, as was the case in the 1989 Ceausescu Romanian instance of “revolution”? 
Legitimacy and the Transatlantic Management of Crisis

Erik Jones *

The United States-led coalition in Iraq is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. The evidence is everywhere around us. It can be seen in the decision by incoming Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to withdraw his country’s forces from Iraq as soon as possible.1 It can be read in the growing British popular support for an independent European foreign policy, in the decline of German and French popular support for the Bush Administration’s “War on Terror,” and in the large percentages of respondents across Europe who question the sincerity of American efforts to reduce international terrorism.2 Word of the crisis is on the lips of almost every European politician, and it is in the pages of almost every major newspaper or journal published on either side of the North Atlantic.3

But is this really a crisis? If so, should we accept that it is a crisis of legitimacy? The problem is that there is an argument for every piece of evidence. Zapatero could be accused of abandoning his allies, giving in to terrorists, or bowing to ill-informed or misguided public opinion. British Prime Minister Tony Blair could be blamed for bungling public relations, particularly on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, but more generally in his communication of the case for war. Meanwhile, political elites in France and Germany could be accused of playing upon anti-Americanism, even as journalists and pundits stoke controversies (and suggest conspiracies) to sell their publications. Of course, such arguments may be false, disingenuous, even mendacious. But if they are true, then it is hard to claim that there is a crisis of legitimacy. It may even be difficult to accept that we are facing a real crisis at all.

At the bottom of all this, what really matters is our sense of legitimacy and of the importance of legitimacy to the management of an actual, physical, violent, and potentially explosive crisis situation like that found in Iraq today. There is much rhetoric surrounding the concept of legitimacy, but there is an underlying reality to the concept as well. Only by grasping that reality can we begin to apprehend the problems that are besetting the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and the solutions that must be pursued by the Bush Administration and its allies in Europe.

Theoretical Legitimacy

The concept of legitimacy is easier to invoke than to understand. The problem is not that we are unfamiliar with the meaning of the term; rather, it is that the term has so

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* Erik Jones, Chatham House.
many meanings that are only subtly different from one another. To give an example, we might think about breaking up the concept along two dimensions, with a normative-positive dichotomy on one side, and a means-ends dichotomy on the other. An act of state can be legitimate either because it is “right” or because it is accepted, and it can be judged for how it is undertaken or for what it has achieved. When we are talking about legitimacy, we could be talking about any possible combination of these dimensions, we could be focusing only on one without regard to the other, or we could be giving equal weight to the universe of possibilities as a whole (see Fig. 1).

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Figure 1: Shades of ‘Legitimacy.’

Beneath this problem of meaning lies the problem of judgment. Any concept of legitimacy necessarily refers to the perceptions of some political agent. An act of state is only legitimate if it is perceived to be legitimate. The problem of judgment is one of arriving at agreement on who is the appropriate judge. Here it is helpful to use an example in order to avoid obscuring real-world complexity with metaphysical abstraction. Who is the best judge of the United States’ policies in Iraq, other states or “public opinion”? If it is other states, then should we focus on the “willing,” the “unwilling,” or the “opposed”? If it is public opinion, is it limited to the American public, should we consult the opinions of other countries, or should we rather focus attention on the Iraqis themselves? Moreover, who is to say that the choice of political agents to act in judgment is not itself subject to considerations of legitimacy? For example, who is to say that Spanish public opinion is somehow irrelevant to consideration of the legitimacy of the policies of the United States?

Finally, the two problems of meaning and judgment are concatenated. Political actors must first adopt a standard for legitimacy before they can pass judgment. Thus, different groups may hold to different standards, and therefore make different judgments, even where all parties agree on the objective nature of the facts. Indeed, this is largely where we find ourselves today in Iraq. The problem is not that anyone has a radically different perception of the reality of the events as they are unfolding. Rather, it is that different groups are keying on different details, applying different standards, and coming to different conclusions. There is no mystery here. If anything, it is hard to imagine how all the parties would wind up with the same interpretation of the same events. Put another way, legitimacy—at least as it is understood here—seems uniquely prone to controversy. And where controversy is ubiquitous, it is hard to equate such controversy with crisis.
Practical Legitimacy

But there is a crisis brewing over Iraq, and that crisis is one of cooperation. Whether we speak of civil disorder within the country itself, the splintering of the “coalition of the willing,” the growing rebelliousness of back-bench politicians in Britain, or the inability to agree on a workable United Nations (UN) mandate, it is clear that cooperation is becoming more difficult, and that this difficulty in cooperation is becoming ever more detrimental to the effectiveness of the U.S.-led coalition and of American strategy. This breakdown in cooperation is bringing us to “the point of time when it is to be decided whether any affair or course of action must go on, or be modified or terminated; the decisive moment; the turning point.”4 In other words, we are approaching a crisis.

The point to realize is that this crisis of cooperation is not merely symptomatic of a crisis of legitimacy. The breakdown of cooperation is the crisis of legitimacy, practically understood. To accept this point, however, it is necessary to turn away from theoretical notions of legitimacy and to embrace the concept as an expression of sociological reality. In the Weberian sense, the “legitimacy” of a political authority is its ability to engender obedience or, somewhat more loosely, cooperation.5 Later writers, like Seymour Martin Lipset and Fritz Scharpf, have added a few more wrinkles to this Weberian notion of legitimacy—by extending it to different types of judgment or measures of acceptance—but all remain committed to the necessary link to obedience or cooperation. Moreover, they also retain the Weberian distinction between legitimacy and coercion. The use of force may encourage obedience or cooperation, but even an overwhelming application of force cannot ensure that either obedience or cooperation will be the outcome.

This notion of legitimacy is practical because it helps to narrow the effective diversity of meaning and judgment outlined above. What does legitimacy mean? It means whatever works to achieve obedience or cooperation. Who is the appropriate judge of this legitimacy? The judgments of any actors whose obedience or cooperation is necessary to ensure (or facilitate) the success of state action should be considered appropriate. As a practical point, legitimacy does and should mean different things, depending upon the audience addressed. There can be no one standard when there is more than one group sitting in judgment whose opinions matter for the success of the policy.

Cooperation and Coercion

Of course, legitimacy is not the only source of obedience or cooperation. Coercion works as well. The U.S.-led coalition can assert its authority against all forms of insurgency in Iraq, the Bush Administration can cajole its allies into staying the course, and the Blair government can use its whips against back-benchers. However, the problem with coercion is that it is subject to judgment. In cases where such judgments can have

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4 This is the 1913 Webster’s Dictionary definition of “crisis.”
no impact on the effectiveness of state action, then they may be viewed as irrelevant. However, where such judgments matter, they cannot be so easily ignored. Popular opposition to the war in Iraq can engender opposition within the “coalition of the willing.” Such opposition can also fuel anti-American sentiment in a way that makes it more difficult for the United States to meet with cooperation in other areas as well.

No matter what the argument is for explaining why this opposition has emerged, the fact that opposition exists is problematic enough. Whether the Bush Administration has acted in a manner that is right or wrong, whether its actions are moral or legal, is not important. What matters is whether Bush Administration assertions can convince different groups or actors to change their view of American policy. Such affective change cannot be coerced, but it is necessary to encourage future cooperation.

Moreover, such affective judgments are centrally significant for the transatlantic management of crisis. The United States and its European allies must find a formula for cooperation in crisis management, a formula that must be acceptable to all parties. There is no sense in appealing to a priori principles about national interests or reasons of state unless there is reason to believe that such appeals will find a receptive audience with all who stand in judgment. Whatever the personal views of any given administration, practical legitimacy is a question of acceptability, not right or wrong.

Within any formula for transatlantic crisis management, the governments of Europe and the United States must give due attention to “winning the hearts and minds” of those groups involved in the conflict. This is not some clever strategy held over from the Kennedy Administration’s early involvement in Vietnam. Rather, it is the essence of legitimacy. Without it, the governments of Europe and the United States must accept the inevitability of having to use coercion to ensure cooperation and of facing the political judgments—both domestic and foreign—that such coercive actions will inevitably entail.

The alternative of coercion has little appeal outside the extreme case. When the enemy is Saddam Hussein, Al Qaeda, or the Taliban, there may be some sense in fighting to the bitter end. However, most enemies are neither so discretely identifiable nor so comprehensively beyond use or redemption. Slobodan Milosevic may have been an intractable enemy of peace in Europe, but the Serbian people cannot and should not be so easily disregarded. Their cooperation is essential to peace and security in the Balkans, and that cooperation must be made dependent upon perceptions of legitimacy, not upon the threatened use of force.

**Conclusion**

The reality underlying the present crisis in Iraq is that multilateral action and nation building reflect two sides of the same coin: legitimacy. However, the legitimacy at issue is practical, not theoretical. If the Bush Administration is to succeed with its policy in Iraq, then it must get the relevant actors, both domestic and international, to agree to cooperate. Such agreement stems from commitment, not coercion. It represents an act of judgment, not a bending of will. Realization of this simple reality will alleviate not only the present crisis, but also the next.
Crisis Management: The Transformation of National and International Systems of Response

Andrzej Karkoszka *

In the past, several wise men have passed their judgment on a proper response to a crisis. And so, Talleyrand advised, “In critical situations, let women run things.” James Reston said in 1967, “International crises have their advantage. They frighten the weak but stir and inspire the strong.” In another bon mot, the Diplomat’s Dictionary says, “The usual response of international organizations to crises passes through predictable phases: they ignore the problem; they issue a statement of concern about it; they wring their hands while sitting on them; they declare that they remain seized of the matter; they adjourn.” Regrettably, none of these half-serious comments are helpful.

Neither are the experiences of the decades of the Cold War of much assistance. During those days, several serious international crises occurred. Some of them had a truly historic and strategic nature, like the Berlin crisis in 1949 and 1961, the Suez crisis of 1956, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the crisis at the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Others were of lesser magnitude, with smaller possible implications, and these occurred more frequently. All have had more or less far-reaching political consequences; all have been described, debated, and analyzed at length. However, these experiences and analyses prove of limited value in understanding and preparing for today’s menace, which may bring crisis upon us.

The crisis of today may be brought on by a faceless, stateless, unpredictable, irrational, immoral, non-territorial, transnational threat, created by the rise of global terrorist activities. Those who pose this threat use unpredictable instruments and methods of action spanning the widest spectrum, including various forms of warfare affecting mass populations. The old tenets of deterrence seem to fail entirely in the face of readiness for self-sacrifice. Old means of warfare accustomed to a symmetrical doctrine and a comparable type of forces are painfully inadequate, disproportional, and ineffective. It is clear that the traditional response, focusing on a framework of national preparedness and organization, is no longer able to cope with the global character of the threat, which materializes in unexpected (or at least randomly chosen) locations. There is no longer any differentiation between civilian and military targets. Notwithstanding the false veil of religious argumentation, the main purpose of waging this type of warfare is seemingly to inflict “pain” on industrial states and societies that are associated with Western civilization. If so, then the destruction of human life is as important to the promoters of this new type of warfare as is the destruction of the national and international economic, technical, financial, administrative infrastructure of states and nations. In this way the menace is oriented at all levels of the modern organization of societies: from the international, regional, national, and local levels down to the in-
dividual citizen. That is why the response to a potential crisis that may be created by such a threat requires a novel approach, much beyond that associated with the field that has heretofore been known as “crisis management.”

The traditional crisis management approach, associated usually with natural catastrophes, responses to organized crime, internal political or social confrontations, or international inter-state conflict can be taken only as a preliminary basis for the new approach. All the traditional measures of early warning, intelligence gathering, legal order, technical and organizational preparedness, and international assistance and cooperation have to be augmented, transformed, and strengthened to cope with the new types of potential crisis. The traditional functions of such instruments of crisis response as military forces, police, intelligence services, civil emergency services, and state and local administrations need a redefinition and new procedures to encourage effective interaction if they are to be ready to confront these new circumstances.

The new crisis management approach has to prepare for all possible and hard-to-predict contingencies, be targeted against a vast range of possible perpetrators, able to execute a massive surge in “response capabilities,” prepare all elements of the system for a quick/instantaneous reaction, and have the ability to respond in a measure commensurate to the threat. On top of all this, it must respond with all its organic and supportive elements commanded and controlled in a comprehensive and timely manner, assuring both unity of command and unity of effort in usually messy and dramatic circumstances.

A Few Theoretical Notes on the Concept of “Crisis”

The term crisis seems to be used rather indiscriminately, as many situations are deemed important enough to give them a sense of “criticality” or “urgency,” depending on context, the real or perceived sense of gravity of a given situation, and the attitude of the observer/analyst. With such a vague understanding of what constitutes a “crisis,” it is correct to say that the adequacy of response to a difficult situation will depend in part upon the quality of the classifying categories used and our ability to correctly recognize the event’s importance and its consequences. The definition of “crisis” usually depends either on conditions that have systemic consequences or on the decision-making framework. The first approach, linked to a systemic aspect, defines a crisis as a situation that disrupts the system or a part of the system by creating an abrupt or sudden change in one or more of the basic systemic variables. Thus, it may be said that crisis carries the potential for an unexpected or dangerous systemic transformation. It suggests the relationship to such terms as change and conflict. Whether or not a crisis actually produces significant change depends on various factors, such as the nature of the modification incurred and the available techniques for crisis management. It also depends on the sensitivity of the system to the actual crisis situation.

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As far as the second approach is concerned, it refers to a process by which decisions are made in response to a situation that is perceived as a crisis. Thus, the crisis acts as a stimulus; the decision represents a response. In this approach, a crisis may be defined as a situation that threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit and/or restricts the amount of time available for a response before the decision is made, and often surprises the members of the decision-making body by its occurrence. The key elements of importance here are the reality of the threat, the amount of time available, and the degree of surprise in a given situation. Decision-making in a crisis situation depends substantially on the specific perception of the situation by the actors involved in the decision-making process. If the actors are well prepared, the threat is well anticipated, and the bureaucratic, legal, and technical frameworks are ready for a wide spectrum of contingencies, the typical “crisis situation” is transformed into a “reflective situation.” In the last case, the decision-making is similar to that for a “crisis situation,” but the reflexive decisions are based on expected circumstances. In spite of time pressures and a lack of chances to consider major alternatives to an action, the flexibility exists for a proper adaptation of reaction, and the decision can be made more rapidly than in an actual crisis situation.

Both of the theoretical approaches briefly sketched above point to the necessity for the serious preparation of the appropriate response mechanism, enabling an effective crisis management approach to avert as much as possible the negative consequences of a sudden break-down of internal, individual, and societal order, as well as the disruption of the international security system, which may be caused by a crisis.

**The National/International Security Sector as a Crisis “Response Mechanism”**

A classic mechanism of response to a crisis focuses on the clearly separated roles of the individual elements of the national security apparatus. Thus, international crises were usually met by a combination of military forces and diplomatic means, assisted by foreign intelligence services. Internal crises were managed by domestic law enforcement agencies or by the civil emergency system, involving the local and (if required) state-level civil administration. This separation of roles is no longer tenable. The new threat brings about the prospect of a crisis to which the response, if it is to be effective, must be organized on a wider front, drawing on many, if not all, available institutions and forces. All of them must contribute in a concerted effort, bearing directly or indirectly on the final result. According to the classical norms of any strategy based on multi-factor, multi-force, across-the-board activity, such an approach presupposes common legal frameworks, the availability of the full range of information about the threat, broad dissemination of that information in a time-urgent fashion, unified understanding of the intentions of commanding authorities, readiness of various assets, and standardized training for various contingencies.

A good example of the new approach to risk, and hence to the preparation for a new type of crisis, is given by the Comprehensive Risk Analysis project, mandated by the Swiss Parliament in 1991. The idea behind the project is that there exist three
methods to safeguard and enhance national security: two traditional—that is, empirical, or measure-oriented—approaches, and a new one, the risk-oriented approach to preparation. The last one presupposes a systematic assessment of all possible incidents or developments—including natural disasters; technological mishaps; ecological destabilization; cut-offs of the supply of energy, food, and strategic goods; economic meltdown; health system degradation; migration; political and social crisis; dangers to internal security—that could seriously endanger the basic national infrastructure and the livelihood of the population. All of them may be interlinked, and thus call for a comprehensive approach to preparedness and response by the entire national security structure.

As we talk about a host of different institutions and agencies, separated in their professional functions for decades, the proposed integration of effort and response is a very tall order. It requires time, concerted effort, and tangible resources to execute. It is all so much more demanding that we have neither much time nor common understanding of the matter or the resources at hand. The military are not allowed or prepared to act in domestic contingencies. National legislation is only now being developed to govern the new functions of different agencies.

The intelligence services are not prone to cooperate even within the national setting, let alone the international one. The dissemination of classified data is restricted to a very small circle, while in crisis situations it has to reach to the lowest levels of decision-making in a short period of time. The whole range of the command and control function has to integrate local agencies with the top national levels of administration. The state authorities must learn to cooperate with private industry and business in the execution of common goals. International organizations have divergent perceptions of required measures and procedures, not to mention their cumbersome decision-making and force-generation processes.

On a positive note, one must mention the existence of various national and international civil emergency systems, which can stand as a basis for the forthcoming development of a collective crisis management approach. However, the technical, organizational, and resource capacities of these existing crisis management systems need to be seriously augmented for them to be able to meet the new challenge. The politicians can no longer treat the task of crisis management as a secondary one from the point of view of state security, heretofore understood mainly as a matter of defense or law enforcement. Today, in a time of global terrorism and international organized crime influencing our mass survival (in cases of terrorists being armed with weapons of mass destruction) or our basic economic and social interests (in cases of criminals bringing havoc to wide sectors of the economy and society), the role of crisis management cannot be confined to functions such as search and rescue, fire protection, and sheltering or supporting a local population. The crisis and emergency management system is now at the forefront of any state’s security protection mechanism.

As far as the international crisis management system is concerned, the situation is even more complex. The national-level incoherence and weak preparedness for crisis management is compounded by the rudimentary character of the international structures devoted to crisis management; by disagreements on the political framework of
decision-making for crisis prevention; the lack of common standards on organizational, technical, and procedural aspects of crisis management between various state members of respective organizations; the possible duplication of efforts; or, more often, complete neglect of crisis management altogether.

The gravity of the problem is, however, resulting in an increasingly intensified emphasis on crisis management on both the national and international levels. Each state in the Western hemisphere, and many outside it, seems to be taking up or pondering over the need to augment its crisis management capability. The issue has also become more frequently debated within international forums, raising the prospect of a better multilateral response to local, sub-regional, or wider global crises.

**National Crisis Management—The U.S. Homeland Security System as a Model?**

The new character and the unprecedented scale of the threat, epitomized by the attacks of September 11, calls for the full spectrum of responses, from early warning, deterrence, crisis preparedness and management, and consequence management, down to hard-core military defensive measures. Each area was found wanting and not entirely up to meeting the new tasks.

The U.S. crisis management system, built up during the Cold War and focused on preparedness for a nation-wide response to a possible nuclear attack (consisting of early warning and a partial sheltering of the population), and a more local response to civil emergencies,stemming from natural and technical disasters, was found inadequate to the new threats, as evidenced by the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001. The newly created White House Office of Homeland Security turned its attention to the readiness of “first responders” at the local level, enhancing border, airport, and seaport security, and improved intelligence sharing among federal agencies. From the outset it became apparent that there is a need for rapid and much tighter integration of the activities of the numerous federal institutions responsible for overall crisis management: the Coast Guard, Customs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the FBI, police, the medical system, the Department of Energy, the transportation control system, and the intelligence services, to name the most obvious ones. In May 2002, a National Strategy for Homeland Security was announced, consisting of six missions, of which two—intelligence and warning, and emergency preparedness and response—seem to fall within the core of the realm of crisis management. The rest, namely border and transportation security, domestic counter-terror and law enforcement, protection of critical infrastructure, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection belong to the realm of “defense”—that is, physical protec-

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tion against, and reaction to, the actual act of terror, providing an additional technical, human, and structural capability to the system of crisis management. The Homeland Security Act of 25 November 2002, creating the Department for Homeland Security, turned out to be the largest transformation of the U.S. internal security system in the post-World War II era, comparable only to the changes undertaken more than fifty years ago in the U.S. external security system, when the Pentagon, CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs were created. The new department has put together many heretofore separated security, law enforcement, civil and industrial emergency institutions and services, to be augmented by the newly created (as of 17 April 2002) and independent Northern Command of the military. The new department links not only several lateral institutions, working in different areas, but also consolidates various levels of administration and services—from the federal down to the local level—into one huge complex responsible for crisis preparedness and response. The 2003 budget for the new department amounted to $37.7 billion. However, this huge budget is concentrated at the federal level, with no parallel increase of funds at the state and local levels.

Along the lines of the Strategy for Homeland Security, serious re-arrangements were undertaken within the whole U.S. intelligence community, consisting of no less than fifteen different agencies. The role of the CIA in the gathering and distribution of intelligence data is slated to increase. In consequence, the resources for intelligence gathering and analysis, so far devoted mainly (80 percent) to military tasks and operated through Department of Defense, will have to be reallocated. The data concerned with the terrorist threat is to be integrated by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, now under the CIA (but proposed to be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security) and also incorporating similar units from the FBI and other agencies. In this way, and for the first time, data on foreign and domestic threats are to be merged.

One of the biggest hurdles confronted by the new U.S. crisis management system seems to be a proper—that is, timely and comprehensive—distribution of relevant information on the credible threat and the coordination of crisis response within the huge

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new bureaucracy. The existing internal communication networks used for intelligence purposes are secret, encrypted, and require users to have the highest clearances. Now, the potential users of this material—local officials, emergency workers, law enforcement officers—are located down the chain of command and are far more numerous, and are often not given access to this information. The existing procedures set up according to the U.S. National Information Security Act and Cyber Risk Reduction Operations necessitate the strict protection of computer networks, impeding the level of interoperability among various agencies. The existing U.S. national emergency alert system established during the Cold War and based on television and radio broadcasting networks works on the national level, but is highly unreliable on the state and local level. The integration of command functions is developing adequately on the military side of the system due to the efforts of the newly established Northern Command in the form of the Joint Terrorist Task Force for Civil Support, but the military do not have the leading role in managing the Department of Homeland Security. The whole system of command and control requires frequent training and exercises, but state and local budgets are not adequately financed for this purpose. Some aspects of the efforts to increase the general level of awareness and information gathering on possible threats—like the Terrorism and Prevention System (TIPS program), which envisages the recruitment of citizens to provide information on suspects and dubious activities—are sparking opposition from those concerned about civil liberties and creeping McCarthyism.

The U.S. Homeland Security administration and its growing role in crisis prevention may be seen as the upper limit of a national effort to confront the new security threats and adopt a national crisis response system. It is supported by financial and technical resources that most likely cannot be matched or replicated by other states. But, in fact, the U.S., faced for the first time with a direct and “inchoate,” or “amorphous,” threat to its national territory, is doing what other states (particularly those in Europe) have done for a long time before, although on a lesser scale. The European states—especially those, for example, like Switzerland, Germany, or Finland—having invested for years in their civil emergency and civil defense systems, seem to be much better prepared to respond to the new breed of security challenges. In the case of Finland, the state believed to be best prepared for such eventualities, the approach to crisis management is based on a Total Defense Concept envisaging the mobilization of all sectors of society in case of crisis, linking all civil defense and rescue services. The system is well coordinated on the regional level, and is equipped with an efficient communication system, radiation monitoring, and is linked to a robust border security management capability. However, in most other national cases, problems of informa-

tion gathering, analyzing, and disseminating—as well as the construction of efficiently coordinated national structures able to respond to and manage the new type of crises—may prove technically and politically daunting, and very costly to boot. It seems that the challenges posed by the new type of threats are only now becoming the first order of business for many governments.

**International Crisis Management – a Task for the Future**

The EU Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 contains a formulation placing the Petersberg tasks at the core of European security and defense policy, within which the non-military measures and civil-military coordinated efforts are to be Europe’s strength, to be used in the area of international crisis management. The Helsinki summit of the EU in 1999 posited civilian crisis management as being of parallel importance to the development of the Union’s military capacity. According to this formulation, a specialized civilian crisis management committee was established, reporting to the Political and Security Committee of the Council. Within the committee’s purview were the creation of the EU police corps (5,000 strong) capable of deployment in a crisis area together with the appropriate command structures; preparation of a law enforcement detachment (judges, prosecutors, administration, and penitentiary specialists); development of a body of experts in the area of civil administration in a broad spectrum of civil affairs; and a capability to field a civil protection corps able to respond quickly to natural disasters (linking to the humanitarian assistance policy already established within the European Commission).

During 2001, the civilian crisis management developments at the EU, falling as they did within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, were partially overshadowed by the efforts devoted to the military elements of the ESDP, particularly with the creation of the EU Rapid Response Forces, which may be taken as an augmentation of the EU’s approach to crisis management on the more demanding, military side. In connection to these activities, the establishment of the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management group and a Joint Situation Centre widened the EU’s array of crisis management structures. The capability of the system was already put to the test in the actual operations of the EU on police missions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003. In the same year the EU Council decided to further improve the EU’s crisis management planning and response capabilities, establishing a special civil/military planning cell. The purpose was to be able to augment selected national military headquarters, to allow them to be used as part of the framework for EU-wide operations. As the report of the Working Group VIII (called the “Barnier Report” after the name of its chairman) indicated, the EU’s security and defense policy needs a broader capability than the traditional crisis management approach to ensure security within and without the EU, based on the reinvigorated solidarity among member states.

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The progress made in the EU’s crisis management capabilities during the last few years is commendable. However, the real crisis response capabilities of the EU system are far from robust or efficient. Among its shortcomings, one could enumerate several conspicuous ones. First is the decision-making process for rapid response, falling into the realm of the “third pillar” of the community, depending entirely on the individual national will and decision to act, harmonized only at the level of the Council. Second are the structures for planning and management. Although they are quickly maturing and gaining necessary experience in organizing international crisis response, they are still only at the early stage of their development. Third is the fundamental dependence on national intelligence sources and the unwillingness to establish a common intelligence policy and sharing of information. Fourth, the existing national crisis management systems are not all well connected and able to cooperate in time of need. This last deficiency has in some cases, like the German-Polish-Czech or German-French instances, been ameliorated after experiences of floods covering wide areas of these states, but this is still more a local than a pan-European network of cooperation. In sum, the EU crisis response is still in the nascent stages of its formation, and will take years to become a reliable and efficient system, able to cover the entire territory of the Union, not to mention the wide areas around it, where it may be needed most.

While the EU’s crisis response capability may be described as developing with a clearly stated purpose and some resolve, NATO’s ability to react and to manage crises (other than purely military ones) does not yet seem to be in the cards. Partially, this may stem from the still prevailing classic definition of the Alliance’s mandate, concentrated on the military response to possible threats and paying less attention to other, non-military contingencies. The well-established NATO capacity to react to a serious security challenge to any of the member states stems from the era of the Cold War, when the threat was tangible and perceived by all. That old crisis response mechanism did not change substantially over the years. However, the shift in the character of the threat confronting the members’ security today is already well acknowledged in the relevant official documents of NATO that have been issued in the last five years. NATO adopted the posture of a quasi-regional security organization, assuming responsibility for security and stability of areas far beyond the Treaty’s legal area of responsibility. It thus became involved in a number of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, involving many tasks other than military ones.

So far, one obvious response to the new security circumstances has been the whole gamut of programs and initiatives leading to the transformation and modernization of the capabilities of the conventional national militaries. Within these developments, one of the more recently undertaken steps is the NATO Response Force, designed to be able to serve in times of urgent international crisis. However, as it is envisaged today, this force seems intended for a high-intensity conflict more than for a wider range of contingencies, including low-intensity and geographically restricted crises precipitated.

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15 Inga Czerny, “Ministrowie spraw wewnętrznych krajów UE o walce z terroryzmem (Ministers of internal affairs of EU states on battle against terrorism),” Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 March 2004.
for example, by non-state actors. Though debated within NATO, such a wide conflict management capability—which would include better adaptation of doctrine and available technology, better understanding of the “new” threats, joint handling of non-military security threats, and interaction with other European and international organizations involved in an international crisis management—still seems a matter for the future. Once developed, however, it would enter the territory already well covered by the EU’s efforts and capabilities. Such a course of events would probably have a positive impact on the abilities of both of the organizations.

The NATO posture seems strongly influenced by the U.S. preoccupation with the anti-terrorist campaign, in which the Alliance as a whole has a much less clearly defined role. The main value of the Alliance’s mechanisms in this respect may consist more in providing a forum for intelligence exchanges, as far as the other members are able to add to the vast capabilities of the U.S. information gathering system. Additionally, the Alliance’s political framework facilitates the mobilization of allies for a particular crisis response, including a military operation among a coalition of willing states.
NATO Before and After the Second Gulf War

Mustafa Kibaroglu *

For an assessment of the possible roles NATO may have in the future, and their possible implications for international security, it would be useful to look back in order to make a meaningful assessment of where NATO was before the second Gulf War, and where it is heading toward in its aftermath.

It would not be inaccurate to argue that NATO came about as the product of the strategic vision of the United States for the post-World War II era. Anticipating that the war would come to a close with the victory of the Allied powers, whereby the Soviet Union would occupy a significant portion of continental Europe, the United States wanted to initiate the necessary institutional frameworks that would enable it to maintain a foothold in Western Europe. As such, it was believed that the U.S. would achieve a “forward defense” capability against its primary antagonist, namely the Soviet Union, on the eve of the nuclear age. Hence, the estate value of Western Europe, neighboring the Soviet Union as well as its zone of influence, was extremely precious to the United States. Having the capability to strike the heartland of the Soviet Union from this near location, if need be, while keeping the continental U.S. still far from the reach of most Soviet military capabilities, was made possible thanks to the existence of the NATO alliance. The “delicate balance of terror” that was eventually achieved due to the mutual “second-strike capabilities” of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union ensured that a certain degree of stability could be maintained during the Cold War period.

With the collapse of the bipolar system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we must admit that continental Europe has lost its vitally significant strategic value for the U.S. NATO, which was the institutional framework born out of such a role, needed new roles to justify its existence after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union. That role was soon to be assumed by the Alliance as a result of the atrocities in the Balkans. The modalities of this new role, however, have come about as a result of painstaking deliberations between the Europeans and the Americans. At a time when an integrated Europe was poised to assert itself as a major power in world politics, Europe’s continued dependence on the military capabilities of the U.S. was still a necessity for the aspiring European states, with Germany and France at the forefront.

Those in Europe who wanted to undermine the role of NATO in the European security and defense structures, or even to abolish it, failed first in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then in Kosovo. The nature of disagreement at that point was more political, rather than legal or otherwise. At that time, there was not a serious debate on the legitimacy of NATO’s (and thus the United States’) military interventions in southeastern Europe. Both the Europeans as well as the Americans have agreed that, even though these were

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“out-of-area” type military operations, the so-called “emerging humanitarian law” would justify such interventions.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 have caused a dramatic change in the strategic vision of the United States. Up until that moment, the United States trusted its capabilities to retaliate in kind, and relied on the threat of the use of force to deter actual or potential aggressors. However, the September 11 attacks have shown that the U.S. could not wait until being attacked and then retaliate, because the damage that could be caused in such attacks could be catastrophic, as seen in New York and in Washington D.C. Moreover, those who would stage the attacks would probably have no specific physical location or infrastructure against which to retaliate. Therefore, these non-state actors, which relied on terror tactics, had to be prevented from implementing their plans. This could only be possible by preemption. Hence, the “preemptive strike” doctrine was adopted by the United States.

Even though the European members of the Transatlantic Alliance gave their full support to the U.S. in its military campaign against Afghanistan by enacting Article V of the Washington Treaty, substantial differences emerged soon after, when the U.S. wanted to expand the scope of its campaign by putting Iraq in line for military action. The reason behind the reluctance of some influential European members of NATO to give their support to the U.S. in its war against Iraq was two-fold. First, there was no clear link between the tragic events of September 11 that led the way to the Afghan campaign and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Second, there was this time serious disagreement between the Europeans and the Americans on the legitimacy of an intervention in Iraq. Hence, “in the absence of legitimacy” of an intervention, the leading members of the Alliance did not want to commit themselves, and thus refrained from giving their support to the U.S. There have been extended discussions on the legitimacy issue in the international arena, without making much reference to specific legal documents or articles of treaties.

The implications of such a loose debate became clear when Turkey wanted the Alliance to enact Article IV of the Washington Treaty with a view to paving the way to take the necessary measures in case Article V had to be put in operation. The same group of European countries, namely the Franco-German pact and a few others, has adamantly opposed Turkey’s application. Such a treatment of Turkey heavily undermined the value of Turkey and of the Alliance as well. Although they did not specifically make the reference (at least to my knowledge) at any stage in their opposition, the Franco-German pact implicitly referred to Article I of the Washington Treaty, which suggests that the Allies should “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

It must be clear from the above statement that it would be inconceivable for the Franco-German pact to begin taking precautionary measures as envisaged by Article IV without their prior consent to the legitimacy of the U.S. involvement in Iraq in compliance with the basic principles of the UN. Hence, Article I of the Washington Treaty requires consistency with the UN’s purposes for the involvement of any of the NATO allies in an international conflict. Having failed (in the view of the French and
the Germans) to comply with the requirements of Article I, enacting Article IV and then Article V would be both unnecessary and impossible.

No matter what happened and why, the allies must look ahead and try to resolve their differences within the Alliance. NATO is both available and willing, and we should find ways to make the best use of its already existing and unmatched capabilities. The threat posed by non-state actors is huge and real. We have not yet, hopefully, experienced terrorism carried out with weapons of mass destruction, which is, unfortunately, not very unlikely. NATO can adapt itself to the requirements of the fight against terrorism. Those countries that believe they are immune to terrorism may soon be forced to realize that this cannot be the case for anybody. The only way to be safe from terror is by not being the target of terror. Those who have targeted the U.S., Britain, Turkey, and Spain may very well target other members of NATO in the future.

Therefore, while it is still not too late to unite NATO’s capabilities against non-state actors, peace-loving countries must do so at their earliest convenience and use NATO as the common platform to unite their will. NATO being a military organization that has fulfilled, to a great extent, the strategic vision of the U.S. since 1949 will survive as long as it fits into the new strategic vision of the U.S. for the twenty-first century. Otherwise, NATO may not have any additional value for the U.S. to justify maintaining it any further.

The civilized world has to defend its values against non-civilized intruders, namely the non-state actors that rely on terror as a tactic. It is hardly possible to determine who these actors are; where they are; how they communicate; what their capabilities are; and what their objectives are. No missile shields, no nuclear weapons, no large standing armies, no traditional components of sophisticated warfare capabilities of individual states can properly deal with the threat posed by these rootless, stateless groups. Intelligence is the most (if not the only) powerful and effective instrument that states need to defend their nations and their values. Since the threat is spread throughout the globe, the “battleground” should be the entire globe. Hence, worldwide cooperation is needed. But if there is one particular area where cooperation is most difficult, it is intelligence. NATO is the most appropriate venue where there has been a high level of sophistication of intelligence gathering as well as sharing. NATO’s existing capabilities must therefore be made available to all peace-loving countries all over the world; NATO would also benefit from the intelligence that can come from these states. As such, NATO may very well assume a global role.

The continuation of NATO is highly important for the security of Turkey, but the relationship is not solely one-sided. Turkey can also contribute to a significant extent to the new role of NATO with its outstanding capabilities in collecting and developing intelligence. Turkey’s close links in all regards with nations in its periphery, where the fight against terror is more heated, enable it to have timely access to strategic information about what is happening on the ground in these areas. Time will certainly prove the value of Turkey’s contribution to the preservation of peace in the world. The civilized nations do not have the luxury to stay aloof from proposals to combine individual national capabilities against non-civilized administrations and terrorist groups.
Counter-Terrorism Capability: Preventing Radiological Threats

Vladimir Lukov *

Introduction of a New Phenomenon of Global Mini-Terror

For many decades, terrorism was perceived as a contest between two sides: on the one hand, a group of people or an organization, and on the other, a sovereign state. However, during the course of the second half of the twentieth century, various countries began to use terrorist organizations to promote state interests in the international domain. In some cases, states have established “puppet” terrorist organizations, whose purpose is to act on behalf of the sponsoring state, to further the interests of the state, and to represent its positions on either the domestic or regional front. In other cases, states sponsor existing organizations on the basis of mutual interests.

The patron state provides its beneficiary terrorist organization with political support, financial assistance, and the sponsorship necessary to maintain and expand its struggle. The patron uses the beneficiary to perpetrate acts of terrorism as a means of spreading the former’s ideology throughout the world, or in some cases, the patron ultimately expects the beneficiary to gain control of the state in which it resides or impart its ideology to broad sections of the general public.

State-sponsored terrorism can achieve strategic ends in cases where the use of nuclear and conventional armed forces is not practical or effective. The high costs of modern warfare, and concern about non-conventional escalation, as well as the danger of defeat and the unwillingness to appear as the aggressor, have turned terrorism into an efficient, convenient, and generally discreet weapon for attaining state interests in the international realm.

Now the main role in playing the card of radiological terrorism seems to belong to small mini-terror devices. For example, representatives or supporters of failed regimes, rogue states, and other non-state actors may take hand-grenades and connect them to bags filled with radiological materials. That is the simplest description of a so-called “dirty bomb.”

Today the greatest threat for Russia, the U.S., and NATO is the possibility of a secret and sudden attack with radiological or improvised nuclear weapons. Many analysts have come to the common conclusion that from now on there is a new phenomenon in the arenas of global policy and economy, namely global terrorism.

The actors of global terrorism possess a non-state status. It consists of failed and disaffected states, ethno-religious terrorists, greedy and socially irresponsible proliferators, narco-traffickers, and other organized criminals, who are taking advantage of the new high-speed information environment and other advances in technology to integrate their illegal activities and compound their threat to stability and security around the world. Radiological terrorism is one of the most potentially effective

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among a wide array of cheap and unpredictable tools of global destabilization. While a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or a “dirty bomb,” could be used as an element of terror, its potential effects cannot be compared with the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. But the public does not necessarily perceive the difference.

Over the coming years, the post-September-11 syndrome is going to create much confusion in the objective understanding of the security threats posed by radioactive sources. That is the core of the problem, which can be solved not by building old-style anti-terrorism capacities, but by taking preventive action—in short, in building a counter-terrorism capability.

Passive Anti-Terrorism and Active Counter-Terrorism

Nuclear security has given rise to countermeasures, such as nuclear material control and physical protection. For other radioactive materials, including sources, the traditional approach has been to consider security as an integral part of the safety effort, i.e. for the radiation protection of workers and for public safety. The events of 11 September 2001 triggered a reconsideration of the risks for, and consequences of, terrorist acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials.

So both the existing and the coming dangers of radiological dispersal devices have been recognized. In addition to records of past events in which there was a threat or risk of the dispersal of radioactive material, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database contains some 470 confirmed cases of illicit nuclear trafficking. There are reasons to believe that the reports to the IAEA cover only a small part of all smuggling cases. It is noteworthy that a majority of the cases appear to involve a criminal element. The purpose, however, is often unknown—whether the goal of the trafficking was financial, environmental, or malevolent use. All in all, the possibility that terrorists would use radioactive materials for malevolent purposes cannot be ignored. Moreover, it is time to treat thieves, smugglers, saboteurs, and terrorists equally. All of them are participants in asymmetric warfare. So they are combatants, not criminals, if they try to deal with fissile materials in any way that leads to terrorist attacks.

Radioactive sources are employed for beneficial purposes throughout the world, in industry, medicine, agriculture, and research. Accidents involving radioactive sources and reports of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials have raised awareness of the safety and security risks posed by sources that are outside effective control. The terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid also triggered a lot of international concern about the potential use of radioactive sources by terrorist groups in Europe.

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and March 2004 have alerted the world to the potential of nuclear/radiological terrorism. Today the world finds itself on the brink of an outbreak of asymmetrical warfare, characterized by the usage of many mini-components of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, huge military contingents may become useless in such warfare.

For example, numerous caves at Tora Bora in the mountains of Afghanistan have revealed how close terror networks may have come to producing crude radiological
dispersal devices. Although the destructiveness of these “dirty bombs” in terms of loss of life and injuries is much smaller than in the case of a nuclear explosion, the consequences would still be horrible. It would also create enormous panic and chaos among the population, and would have severe psychological effects in big cities where the population is informed about radiation. Less well informed people living in the countryside or in the mountains may live with radiation around till the day they die, unaware that it has been carried there by the wind.

In industrialized countries the costs of a wide-scale evacuation of the affected population, the subsequent cleanup of contaminated property, and the long-term health hazards would be very considerable. It is, of course, impossible to accurately assess the likelihood of an attack with “dirty bombs.” But it is precisely for this reason that effective cradle-to-grave control of powerful radioactive sources is urgently needed to protect them against use in terrorist acts, theft, or mishandling. The high number of accidental contaminations with radioactive material in the past two decades points in the same direction. Such measures of protection are passive, and ineffective in deterring terrorists.

The security of radioactive materials has traditionally been relatively light. Hence, there is a clear need to strengthen existing security measures as well as to identify and implement additional measures against the potential malevolent use or accidental misuse of radioactive sources.

Methods of anti-terrorism have changed since the era of sporadic attacks directed against Westerners, for example, from the 1960s to the 1980s. In 2001, a new system of anti-terrorism in nuclear industries appeared to protect nuclear power plants from attacks involving a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device (IND). In response to these concerns, U.S. federal agencies initiated steps to develop a better understanding of the magnitude of the threat and to improve their counter-terrorism capability.

New methods based purely at the technological level are dedicated to the prevention of radiological terrorism. They include: 1) personal radiation detectors, with alarms; 2) hand-held instruments for the detection and identification of radionuclides; 3) radiation detection portal monitors; and 4) portable radiation detection instrumentation.

In fact, all these changes were designed by the IAEA in the 1990s, when they were established as part of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Moreover, there were directives issued by this UN “nuclear watchdog” agency to support the implementation of these standards and launch a model project for upgrading the radiation protection infrastructure in its member states.

These initial declarations were met with a wave of seeming cooperation. At first, more than fifty member states participated in the early phase of this model project, and in recent years the number has increased to more than eighty. In 1998, the IAEA, jointly with the European Commission, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the World Customs Organization, organized a number of international conferences on the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials.
The Bush Administration in the U.S. found the courage to declare a long-term strategy of pre-emptive strikes at any kind of terrorism, taking special aim at those terrorists who were preparing to use radiological methods. But only a few chosen countries were allowed to participate in the newly formed Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) group. Why?

As President George W. Bush once said, “America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the policy of this nation: America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most deadly weapons.” It is a good idea. But terrorists are making up their own minds, and are looking for “dirty bomb” components everywhere. So the ranks of the PSI are to be enlarged in the same way as NATO has done, but far more quickly and with more material Russian participation.

Russia could start moving in the same direction, with clients of the former Minatom as well as with Russia’s new partners in nuclear businesses. Why not? The point is that the U.S. and other NATO countries seem to have become more preoccupied with domestic terrorism than international terrorism since the events of September 11 and March 11.

Of course, the IAEA, and especially leading nuclear nations, constantly make assessments of the threat potential (quantitatively as well as with respect to the characteristic assumptions about the probable targets of radiological incidents) by drawing on the expertise and training of the institutions involved (the human “detectors”) and by formulating specific scenarios to be considered (e.g., scrap metal monitoring versus airport passenger scanning, nuclear facility perimeter monitoring versus fast scanning at borders). While security arrangements have been maintained to a pretty good degree all over the world, the effect of this reactive anti-terrorist practice will diminish over time.

It has been estimated that in the United States alone, 500,000 of the two million sources of radioactive material may no longer be needed, and thus could be susceptible to being orphaned or become a target of theft by terrorists. In the European Union, some 30,000 sources are in a similar position.\(^1\) Under these circumstances, properly trained and paid Russian contingents could help NATO in monitoring, identifying, and preventing potential radiological accidents and terrorist attacks abroad. This project needs further consideration and financial support.

Many IAEA member states and several international organizations responded positively to the proposal, and therefore the IAEA decided to conduct regular international conferences on the security of radioactive sources, in addition to its other activities in the field. The findings of conferences held in 2003–4 have been brought to the attent-

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tion of the IAEA Board of Governors, with the evident (but unspoken) conclusion that previous models of fissile materials protection by police and border guards will be quite useless in the ongoing global war on terror.

It is important to emphasize prevention, instead of the focus of previous efforts to localize the effects of radiological emergencies, if any. Advanced technology helps to reduce faulty operations at nuclear units or in radiological devices. Besides, there are probably up to 30,000 radioactive sources that are out of administrative control worldwide. It is therefore important for responsible authorities to establish systems of Internet monitoring and counter-terrorist preventive systems to block such emergencies before they take place, not to handle them the day after.

**New Times and Tools for Counter-Terrorism**

In early April 2004, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice practically admitted that for more than twenty years the U.S. had essentially failed in the prevention of domestic and international terrorism. She pointed out the lack of an effective counter-terrorism doctrine in the U.S. According to her, anti-terrorism declarations were all well and good, but they were not properly supported with the development of an effective capability during previous U.S. administrations. Such a conclusion seems to be applicable to many states, expect a few, like Israel, Great Britain, Russia (only in Chechnya), etc.

In order to go about separating anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism, two remarks should be made from a methodological point of view. The first one concerns the problem of definition. Today, many authors and specialists in Russia and NATO, especially Americans, use a variety of terms: “mega-terrorism,” “super-terrorism,” “terrorism of weapons of mass destruction” (WMD), and—one of the latest—“catastrophic terrorism” (global climate change because of green-house gases from fossil fuel burning). In Europe and Russia, the more classical term—“non-conventional terrorism”—is preferred, referring thus to the use, or the threat to use, nuclear and radiological agents or weapons. The second remark is more substantial. It concerns the effect of non-conventional terrorist attacks and models of their prevention.

Most researchers consider radiological terrorism as a new kind of weapon of mass destruction. Devils may be known and unknown. Between limited or mass destruction non-conventional terrorist attacks and extreme or mass annihilation attacks, there is only one difference. It lies in the number of potential victims of any such attack. Only extreme non-conventional terrorist attacks could produce the destruction of a whole city with many thousands of victims and contaminate a large area for a long period of time. More limited attacks might cause hundreds of deaths, perhaps even more, but only on a limited scale (for instance in a stadium, an embassy, a mall, etc.), and without contaminating the area for a long time.

In any case, the prevention of radiological threats is cheaper than the reduction of the potential damage caused. In the U.S., there still exists an old alarmist tradition to calculate “possible losses” that usually serve to justify high budget expenses for contractors who deal with the recovery of damages in anti-terrorism actions.
In fact, experts on terrorism may not be able to calculate or evaluate the real threat presented in this nuclear/radiological field by terrorist organizations in the short and medium term without the support of analytical smart software. Nevertheless, there are also some figures that are extracted from “hand-made” research from 1998–99.

Since the 1980s, the security and safety of military nuclear sites, civil radiological hospitals, and nuclear power plants increased tremendously. That is why incidents of nuclear terrorism (involving attacks or threats against nuclear facilities and radiological terrorism) sharply declined over the past three decades, from 120 incidents during the 1970s to only 15 in the 1990s. In contrast, the incidence of chemical and biological terrorism showed a gradual but steady rise. In the 2000s, we are witnessing a rise of radiological terrorism all over the world because of its low ratio of cost to effectiveness.

Since the year 2000, threats have represented 55 percent of the incidents; 20 percent were threats to use WMD in terrorist attacks. Of this category, threats to use chemical agents represented the majority of incidents (55 percent), threats to use biological weapons represented 25 percent, and nuclear terrorism threats 20 percent. Threats against particular facilities represented 34 percent of the incidents, all of them threats against nuclear reactors and installations.

According to these calculations, 25 percent of the incidents related to an actual terrorist attack. 13 percent of the incidents referred to actions against facilities of weapons of mass destruction, the majority of them against nuclear facilities, but always when nuclear material was absent from the facility, and thus did not present a real physical danger to the environment. 12 percent of the incidents refer to actual use of non-conventional agents. In this category were included incidents that resulted in casualties, but also incidents in which the perpetrators succeeded in placing the materials at their destination without causing any injuries. 88 percent of the incidents of actual use of agents of mass destruction were incidents of chemical terrorism (these figures seem to be overestimated grossly, and are not the focus of this article).

As to the location of radiological terrorism actions, almost 53 percent of the incidents occurred in the United States, and nearly 28 percent occurred in Europe. The incidents that took place in the Middle East represented only 4 percent of the total. Of those, ten out of twelve were incidents of chemical terrorism, and two were of a biological nature. However, it should be noted that Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and possibly Sudan) have made relatively massive use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, which means that these countries and their proxies had fewer moral constraints against the use of such weapons. In the 2000s, signs of the transportation of fissile materials unauthorized by the IAEA were tracked down in Niger, Turkey, and many other countries. Some of them became reasons for toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003. 10 percent of the incidents occurred in Asia, most in Japan (mainly incidents of chemical terrorism), and less than 2 percent were in South America and Africa.

From the existing data, it is clear that the developed, industrial world—the G-8 countries—has become the main ground for radiological terrorism. The United States is leading the targeted countries. This could mean that the counter-terrorism capability is needed most of all in those countries that are advanced in the development and ex-
ploitation of nuclear energy. The fact that very few incidents were registered in the Middle East and South America could imply that radiological terrorism was less used in areas where conventional terrorism was already widespread and successful.

As to Russia and other CIS countries, the only serious radiological incident—which was a mock or hoax attack—was the placement in a Moscow park on 23 November 1995 of “a radioactive container”—in fact a barrel containing radioactive elements—by Chechen terrorists. The quantity of material in the container and its radioactivity (Cesium-137 used in X-ray equipment and some industrial processes) did not present a serious threat of contamination of the area nor of damage to public health.

At the same time, the danger exists that limited, low-level radiological attacks will be carried out in the near future. The most serious danger is the threat of attacks against existing nuclear/radiological civil facilities in the developed countries, as well as in Russia.

Of course, some passive protective measures are being planned by the IAEA. Ensuring the security of radioactive material is about preventing the loss of control of the material. But no pre-emptive measures are on the horizon of the global nuclear industry. For a very good example, here is a list of proposals made in 2002 by a Nuclear Security Plan of Action:

1. Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
2. Detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.
3. State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control.
4. Security of radioactive material other than nuclear material.
5. Assessment of safety/security related vulnerability of nuclear facilities.
6. Response to malicious acts, or threats thereof.
7. Adherence to and implementation of international agreements, guidelines, and recommendations.
8. Nuclear security co-ordination and information management.

But there are doubts that these limitations and protective measures will be sufficient to stop those who pursue radiological terrorism. In short, all previous models of protection of radioactive material allow the member states of the IAEA only to control occupational, medical, and public exposures, as well as to coordinate the necessary actions related to the preparedness for and response to radiological emergencies.² In the current security environment, this is not enough.

“Trust and Check-up” Methods in Countering the Radiological Threat

The nature of terrorism has been changing steadily since the end of the Cold War.

Many factors are driving this change, including the erosion of national borders, the increasing ease of travel, the revolution in information technology, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Preventing terrorist activity very much depends on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence, and on cooperation between different jurisdictions, levels of government, and the private sector.

As Henry Kissinger put it recently (12 April 2004), terrorists want to disrupt global market relations where they have no standing or hopes to gain profitable positions in the future. This economic aspect of global terrorism has been consistently camouflaged with anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, etc. hysterics, which often serve the commercial and financial interests of players in the global markets.

In response, terrorists have started to pay more attention to “domestic” stores of radiological materials for future strikes at democracy and free markets in the post-industrialized world, which is rapidly developing nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels. All these changes in the nature of terrorism and the methods of its worldwide activity demand a new, internationally accepted doctrine of counter-terrorism, backed up by ample funds and corresponding capability.

Ways of Increasing Counter-terrorist Capability

The countering of radiological terrorism needs to create capability at several parallel levels:

• Intelligence (technical, digital, and human);
• Prevention of terrorist and rogue elements from obtaining radiological and nuclear agents, or the equipment and know-how to produce them;
• The preparation of specialized teams to deal with radiological attacks in the field, even in urban warfare;
• Investments in R&D for detection, protection, decontamination, and treatment equipment and supplies;
• International cooperation in the fields of international law enforcement treaties, as well as in operational intelligence and monitoring of suspected nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorists.

The threat of large-scale acts of nuclear terror and the potential for radiological terrorism will enhance the need to prevent terrorist schemes and give warning before such acts happen. The utmost importance of early warning appeared clearly after the September 11 attacks in the U.S.; the U.S. Department of Energy was not at all prepared to deal with the use of hijacked civil aircraft for suicide attacks on nuclear power plants inside the country. In cases of nuclear terrorism without warning, even the first-responder teams could be destroyed before they act. In cases of radiological threat, the early warning could at least permit mobilization for counter-terrorism actions on the part of the endangered population. Therefore, it is important to develop a list of alert indicators concerning the imminent use of radiological/nuclear agents. Now e-indicators are in fashion in the U.S., but not yet in poorly Internet-equipped Russia.
The existence of small groups and cells of highly motivated religious extremists, left/right-wing fanatics, and unpredictable esoteric or millenarian cults—which in many senses act anarchically—means that the work of penetrating and infiltrating these groups is highly difficult. Thus the use of human sources of intelligence should be expanded and perfected; the counter-terrorism expertise, the cultural knowledge, and the language aptitudes of intelligence officers should be improved in military and civilian colleges and universities.

It is also important that intelligence services cover the so-called “gray zones” and do not permit the formation of blind spots in the overall intelligence picture, such as Afghanistan until recently, Somalia, some other areas in Africa, the jungles in the Philippines or Indonesia, etc. Such gaps in intelligence coverage would permit terrorist groups to find safe haven in such places in which they could grow, later to proliferate to the outside world. This means that the investments of governments in counter-terrorism capabilities, both human and technological, must be enhanced on a very large scale.

As far as the proliferation of non-conventional agents and weapons is concerned, particularly to the extent that it may impact terrorism and affect the security of whole countries, the coming decade will certainly present the most formidable task. The challenge in this case is two-fold: on the one hand, it is necessary to penetrate and monitor the activities of the various networks and organizations in their attempts to acquire or use radiological and nuclear material to create “dirty bombs” and other kinds of weapons to be used in asymmetrical warfare. On the other hand, there is a need to identify, monitor, and neutralize the providers of fissile material and nuclear and other technology and know-how used in the preparation of such weapons.

These counter-terrorism units’ mission is linked to the overall task of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, but in many senses it is more intricate. This means that the interaction and cooperation between the security and military establishments, the scientific community, and industry must be strengthened and developed in a manner that can help identify at the earliest possible stage any interest shown on the part of rogue (non-state) elements in the search for non-conventional capabilities, radiological or otherwise.

Special attention should be given to the poor standards of security at nuclear facilities and the possibility that former—or even currently active—nuclear scientists and technicians would assist terrorist organizations in achieving nuclear/radiological capability (as the father of the Islamic nuclear bomb Abdul Kadir Khan in Pakistan did in favor of some rogue states, like Libya, Iran, and North Korea).

Nuclear waste facilities and transportation routes in the industrial countries should be also considered as potential sources of raw material for terrorist organizations, or as targets for attacks by these same organizations. This is even more true in many poor countries, which have become receptacles of such waste for economic reasons. Therefore, strict security measures must be adopted for these plants, deposit places, and transportation routes, above and beyond the IAEA requirements.

Particularly noteworthy is the case of two Pakistani nuclear scientists who in 2003 probably advised Osama bin Laden in his efforts to develop some kind of nuclear or
radiological capability. It is not yet clear how much they knew about the practical steps in this enterprise, and how much practical know-how they passed on to Al Qaeda. According to recent publications, hundreds of small radioactive power generators scattered across the Soviet Union decades ago and largely forgotten (a so-called problem of radiological “orphans”), could fall into the hands of terrorists. The IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database includes over 280 confirmed incidents since 1993 involving radioactive sources. The actual number of cases may well be significantly larger than the number reported to the IAEA. Customs officials, border guards, and police forces continue to detect numerous attempts to smuggle and sell stolen sources.

There have been formed twelve international instruments related to the prevention and suppression of global terrorism, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Ongoing efforts aim at the protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport. Also on the list is the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which establishes as an offense the delivery or construction of a weapon or device through which there is a release, dissemination, or impact of radiation or radioactive material. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is also recognized for its contributions to nuclear security, which are no longer satisfactory under the growing pressure of radiological terrorism.

On the other hand, it should be noted that Russia has created a special elite force to defend its nuclear facilities and bases, and it seems that the level of security at these installations has greatly improved. Will the Kremlin wish to apply such experience to other CIS countries? There are doubts on this account, because of the lack of any draft of a counter-terrorism doctrine.

Another area of concern in building the counter-terrorism capability in Russia is the interest that criminal elements and organized crime syndicates show in this lucrative activity, although it must be stressed that, up to now, most of the known cases of smuggling of radiological materials have been either deceitful operations by swindlers or sting operations by Russian special and security services. Nevertheless, the activities of criminal elements in nuclear trafficking poses a great challenge to the established security system, as it is known that the connections between organized crime and terrorist organizations are difficult to monitor.

The funding of such illicit transactions, which involve great sums, implies the necessity for strict monitoring of financial transactions and money laundering. The measures taken in this regard by the U.S., Europe, and other countries as a consequence of the September 11 attacks illustrate the importance of this aspect of counter-terrorist activity. Lately it was learned that several large Muslim charity organizations in the U.S., which had been connected to Osama bin Laden for years, had contacts with terrorist operatives who tried to obtain radiological weapons for Al-Qaeda.

And, last but not least, the problem of cultivating a counter-terrorism capability with popular support is that these counter-terrorist measures could imply limitations on civil rights and liberties and on the right of the public to information. Let me show several examples of so-called “passive” preventive measures:

- The need to monitor the academic curriculum and the personal background of nu-
clear students and researchers involved in projects who may use their knowledge for illicit or violent activities (this would cover a pretty long list of nuclear sabotage cases at several nuclear power plants in the United States).

- There is already a trend to limit and censor the amount of open scientific and security information accessible on the Internet (the U.S. has decided to limit the data published on nuclear facilities, etc). Recently, there has been another initiative to get U.S. Congress approval for e-mail and web site monitoring of data connected to nuclear/radiological know-how, and even direct links to professional sites and e-forums that deal with such knowledge.

- Countries producing dual-use radiological materials will have to enact strict laws concerning the commercialization of these products in order to find the most efficient ways to monitor and ensure their proper implementation.

Finally, it is a commonly accepted idea that the physical and digital security of sensitive civil nuclear facilities, plants, and radiological laboratories should be greatly improved, and that access should be curtailed. Lately, the United States, Russia (in and around the Rostov nuclear power plant near Volgodonsk-city), and some European states have taken even military steps in order to defend such facilities, mainly nuclear power plants, in light of growing information indicating the interest of or plans by Islamist groups to attack them.

The U.S. has been the most advanced country in the preparation of the necessary emergency infrastructure to cope with the aftermath of a nuclear terrorist attack. The Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act has permitted training in radiological preparedness for personnel in 120 major cities across the U.S., and this number has recently been increased to 157 cities. This includes training of emergency responders and medical personnel, virtual and field exercises in dealing with nuclear/radiological threats in cities across the United States, and the improvement in the planning and coordination of federal, state, and local agencies dealing with nuclear/radiological terrorism.

The U.S. has also developed training publications, technical reports, and planning guides, and has established some rapid response teams against signs of radiological terrorism, including its emergency communications system. In fact, the United States created such anti-terrorists units in the 1970s. There was the NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Team), which from 1975 to 1993 intervened some thirty times in nuclear-related incidents. But none of these efforts were directed against non-state actors, and were dependent on numerous legal formalities.

Under the current Bush Administration, the U.S. is ready to enlarge its market of counter-terrorism “goods and services” in many countries. First of all, this undeclared counter-terrorism doctrine and corresponding capability are available to the few countries that can invest, even proportionally, the same financial, scientific, and technological resources in the defense against this and other kinds of non-conventional terrorist threats. Therefore, there is need for Russia, as well as the U.S., to help and support other poorly prepared countries to protect themselves in advance.

The Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) of the U.S. State De-
partment has already begun to do this: it trains host nations with American diplomatic and military facilities in a preparedness program for dealing with radiological and similar attacks, and offers first-responder awareness training. The S/CT also manages the interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), designed to provide support to the host nation in the event of an attack on a U.S. installation in that country. This kind of assistance could be expanded to permit threatened countries to better prepare themselves for any attack, even one not connected with U.S. or Russian nuclear interests.

It is an accepted axiom today that cooperation on the bilateral, regional, and international levels is essential in preventing and neutralizing global terrorism. Without sincere and close cooperation between the various countries in the intelligence field, each country, as past experience has shown, will at some point become a victim of terrorism, including in its radiological forms.

A promising development in 2004 was the creation of the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) of the United Nations, under the rubric of the Center for International Crime Prevention. The TPB intends to research the subject of WMD terrorism and develop a set of practical advisories to UN member states to cope with the threat. There have also been initiatives on the part of countries like France and Russia to improve international legislation at the United Nations concerning the financing of terrorism or the prevention of nuclear terrorism. The advanced industrial countries—not only the G-8 countries, but also Singapore, China, India, South Korea, Brazil, and others—are to invest and participate in a coordinated international effort to develop technical prevention tools, because in the long run every country could be a target for nuclear/radiological attack or blackmail.

Traditional international arms control measures are less effective in monitoring and controlling proliferation efforts by small terrorist groups, and might not detect the development of a radiological dispersal device or other tools of radiological terrorists, who may easily use legal commercial supplies and equipment, to say nothing of illegal ones. Nevertheless, traditional arms control measures may influence behavior, though they will be more effective when directed at state sponsors of terrorism, slightly touching non-state actors in the process. However, it is important to build international consensus against radiological terrorism, not only for the sake of prevention or the simple isolation of small states from nuclear energy projects (which is counterproductive for nuclear energy in its historic competition with fossil fuels), but for quick liquidation of radiological terrorism advocates as combatants in asymmetrical warfare. They are no longer “criminals” who deserve trials and imprisonment.

Counter-Terrorism Doctrine: From Intelligence Gathering and Exchanging to Surgical Strikes without Trials

In August 2001, President Bush received a two-page report on Al Qaeda’s intentions to attack U.S. vital interests in the coming months. There were no signs of terrorists’ practical steps inside the U.S. that could be disrupted beforehand. Of course, good intelligence is the best weapon against terrorism. While reactive investigation may prove useful for some purposes, now it is generally considered that, with unpredictable
crimes like terrorism, a proactive strategy is best. When in reactive mode, there is a tendency to throw the full range of resources at the problem. This is not necessary, because terrorists do have quite predictable social and psychological motivations.

In many ways, terrorists simply behave like common criminals who take politics and religion very seriously. Also, because they have no legitimate social structure (like a nation-state or official organization) supporting them, the role of group support and the group’s belief system becomes extremely important. At a minimum, Russia-NATO analysts must strive toward including all the following in intelligence gathering and interpretation:

1. **Group Information**: Name(s), ideology (political or social philosophy), history of the group, dates significant to the group, and dates on which former leaders have been killed or imprisoned. (Terrorist groups often strike on important anniversary dates.) Some groups also have a scripture or manifesto, which is important to obtain (doomsday dates). So it is clear that “soldiers of Allah” are not the only ones born with a death wish, but are created by specific conditioning processes of indoctrination, recruitment, and training. And they are not to be treated as criminals and future POWs, because they are happy to sacrifice their life.

2. **Financial Information**: Source of funds, proceedings from criminal activities, bank account information. For example, sudden influxes of funding or bank withdrawals indicate preparation for activity. It is also important to determine the group’s legal and financial supporters. Generally, anyone who would write an official letter of protest or gather names on a petition for a terrorist is a legal-financial supporter. Sometimes, an analysis of support may reveal linkages and/or mergers with other domestic and/or foreign terrorist groups.

3. **Personnel Data**: Lists of leaders (and changes in leadership), lists of members (and former members), any personal connections between its members and other groups of similar ideology, and the skills of all group members (in this case, nuclear weapons expertise, electronics expertise, etc.) Knowing the skills of the group is an important part of threat assessment. If the philosophy revolves around one leader, it is important to know what will occur if something happens to that leader. Often, the analysis of family background is useful to determine how radically a leader or member was raised. Group structure, particularly if the organization pattern is cellular, determines who knows whom.

4. **Location Data**: Location of group’s headquarters, location of group’s “safe havens” (where they hide from authorities), and location of group’s caches (where one may hide fissile materials and other components of nuclear weapons and supplies). Out-of-the-blue attacks on caches are the most fruitfully used counter-terrorism technique. It is important to specify the underground that exists where terrorists can flee. This is harder than detecting safe havens. Terrorists like to live in communal homes instead of living alone. These civilians may become victims of radiation from hidden fissile materials, even in small quantities. That is why human intelligence is of such great importance.
Today’s radiological terrorists defy deterrence or suppression because they do not seek targets of opportunity as ordinary criminals do, but rather focus on symbolic targets. As a group, terrorists are very team-oriented, and always prepared for suicide missions. Average criminals are undisciplined, untrained, and oriented toward escape. Terrorists are just the opposite. They have prepared for their mission, are willing to take risks, and are attack-oriented. If captured, they will not confess or snitch on others, as ordinary criminals do. Traditional law enforcement methods of investigation are not all that effective in obtaining useful information about terrorism, and terrorists cannot be deterred like ordinary criminals and treated as POWs. They should be attacked with deadly surgical strikes, without any need for trials or investigation, if there exists digitally proved evidence of their fatal intentions. Supercomputers equipped with smart software cannot be mistaken in such a judgment. And it does not matter that operators of these analytical devices may have the chance to promote the counter-values of totalitarianism.

Response Requirements

Authorities in all IAEA member states need to incorporate the above mentioned responsibilities into legislation, plans, and procedures in order to minimize the probability and the consequences of such events. It is also recognized that all NATO countries and members of the European Union are increasingly dependent upon each other. So, any misconduct in one NATO or EU country may end up as a nuclear emergency or radiological accident in another nation, requiring a well-coordinated response there. It is therefore essential that the security of radioactive sources and the response to radiological emergencies not be considered just as a national problem. They need to be addressed on the regional and global level, and treated as problems that have to be solved through newly formed modalities of international cooperation, with an emphasis on counter-terrorism against non-state actors.

In responding to radiological emergencies of any kind, it is recognized that:

• It is the responsibility of authorities in the respective states to respond;
• Handling these events may require tools such as combat units representing several states;
• Handling these events in a state that harbors terrorists may require resources exceeding the capabilities of several counter-terrorist units.

In order to be able to fulfill their tasks, these units need real time information from the national or international center of counter-terrorism, and financial and material resources (both state and private). In order to be able to respond to emergencies or potential emergencies in the best possible way, any counter-terrorist unit should establish mechanisms of cooperation in line with the recommended vision of the common doctrine of counter-terrorism.

There are formal interstate regulations that will need to be revised. The IAEA member states need to review the legal framework and propose ways of improving the cooperation mechanisms so as to ensure more binding commitments from member states to provide adequate and timely information to other member states at any sign of
a radiological threat or nuclear event. Such an international scale for response to nu-
clear events has been developed; what is needed is a more detailed scale for mini-
threats of a radiological nature.

Moreover, there could be developed UN special service approaches on the basis of
this preemption concept of counter-terrorism. But no concept can be approved without
first testing existing counter-terrorism technologies. So one should clearly recognize
that enhancing the mechanisms of international cooperation in response to nuclear and
radiological terrorism and similar emergencies would be significantly reliant upon the
UN member states’ military capabilities for responding to such emergencies and mak-
ing such responses more cost efficient.

For example, the IAEA member states could follow up on IAEA General Confer-
ence Resolution GC (46)/RES/9 and enhance their efforts to improve their national nu-
clear and radiological security capabilities, implementing international standards and
recommendations. The same mechanism is quite adaptable to international cooperation
in counter-terrorism in response to small-scale radiological emergencies.

Common Counter-Terrorism Measures

In the early 2000s, passive measures of anti-terrorism were in widespread use. For ex-
ample, in Turkey people used to call a three-digit telephone number operating around
the clock if they found any radiological materials. All companies that were involved in
nuclear/radiological industries had to have their personnel trained on-site and then be
certified by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority.

Around the world there are many online educational programs and training
seminars with a focus on preparedness for and response to radiological accidents that
have already happened. After such e-certification, nuclear regulatory commissions in
the IAEA member states urge staff to prepare emergency response plans.

In Spain, some planning is in place for nuclear power plants, but emergency pre-
paredness for dealing with radioactive sources is less structured. An emergency plan
should include a reference hospital, which nuclear regulatory authorities have in Ma-
drid. Any radiation victim might be immediately transferred there by helicopter. But
the Spanish plan deals with a nuclear accident for which there was some warning, not
an unexpected mini-attack by radiological terrorists.

I suggest a benchmarking study with the aim of compiling a practical list of best
practices within Russia and NATO. Then, such a research team may form a corre-
sponding database for the IAEA, the new counter-terrorism bodies of the UN, and the
general public. It will have a deterrent effect on terrorists, and also maintain civilian
resistance to their mini-radiological threats.

We need an Internet-based checklist of any attempts at radiological terrorism in the
world, updated and accessible around the clock, seven days a week. While it is abso-
lutely clear that certain response actions are needed for an emergency situation arising
from a radiological dispersal device, we also need to prepare for what precedes that
event. For instance, what is to be done when we have a report of the theft, or when we
know that something is on the move to a store of radiological materials? This is a new,
challenging situation, which requires further analysis and, more importantly, action.
Recently, nuclear nations have begun to focus on the small number of countries bent on violating the nuclear non-proliferation norm and acquiring fissile materials for nuclear weapons. But the radiological materials that could be used in “dirty bombs” exist in a variety of forms in virtually every country in the world. And they are often only loosely monitored and secured, if at all. Taking measures to control dangerous and vulnerable radioactive sources is the responsibility not just of a few nations, but of all nations. That is a new job for their national security systems.

Last year, the United States announced the Radiological Security Partnership Initiative. It is a three-pronged approach to addressing the potential threats from under-secured, high-risk radioactive sources. The first prong is helping countries accelerate and expand national initiatives to keep track of and better secure national inventories of high-risk radioactive sources. In this regard, the new U.S.-Russia partnership may include another new initiative to provide some technical assistance and equipment to Russia-NATO Committee member states to facilitate effective tracking of high-risk sources. Second, all countries need to draw on international re-training resources that can give practical advice and assistance in bringing these radiological sources under tighter control. The Russian Federation is currently working with the U.S. and the IAEA to identify and secure high-risk radioactive sources in the territories of the former Soviet Union. This tri-party model may be adapted to meet the counter-terrorist needs of other countries. Such a model is working well in the territories of the former Soviet Union, and could become global in scale.

Of course, there are some bottlenecks, like the budget convergence of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Industry and Energy through the Federal Agency of Nuclear Energy. All these budgets are quite opaque to foreign investors. Here is a good example provided by NATO countries: they have a lot of extra-budgetary support for military innovations as a result of their financial transparency for investors and sub-contractors. In Russia, unfortunately, financial transparency of the power ministries is a dream. But joint counter-terrorism measures require trust in order to work. The U.S. has established numerous detection checkpoints on suspected smuggling routes, in order to better detect illicit traffic in radioactive sources. And the same initiative is under way to improve the ability of Russia-NATO to detect the transport of radiological or/and nuclear materials into our countries from outside. As the third prong of this plan, I would now expand this project by focusing on other major transit and shipping hubs, which will improve joint Russia-NATO efforts to interdict and prevent illicit trafficking in high-risk radioactive sources globally.

There are some good results coming out of the IAEA consultations that are leading to approval of selling U.S. border monitoring equipment to many countries. This equipment in some cases can be as simple and small as the radiation pager in the form of a car-key trinket. Such small devices, when used in large quantities, can play a decisive role in the growing effectiveness of this critical global counter-terrorist initiative. By working with mobile telephones and through the Internet, such a Russia-NATO shared focus on reducing the potential threats from both the highest and most minimal radiological risk sources will bring excellent results. So human intelligence is to become the key element of the counter-terrorism strategy, but aided by technology.
The Radiological Security Partnership has already become a U.S. priority, but the contribution made—only $3 million over the next fiscal year—is a tepid demonstration of the Bush Administration’s commitment to the Partnership. In particular, this money will support joint efforts to work with governments of developing countries to secure high-risk radioactive sources in their countries.3

Old, Useless, and Expensive Measures for Protecting Radiological Materials

Many analysts have come to two logical conclusions: first, the safety and security of radioactive sources are intrinsically linked one with the other; second, source security must be an important but subordinate element of source safety, not the other way around. The subsidiary nature of the security of radioactive sources with respect to their safety has been recognized over the years in both international and national standards dealing with radiation, where security requirements have ranked as important but not all-encompassing elements of safety standards. Thus, radiation safety is concerned with preventing adverse health and environmental impacts from radiation sources in general, and radioactive sources in particular.

Traditionally, radioactive source security has been looked at as concerning preventing the loss of control of the source, whether through inadvertent, intentional, or malicious means. Nowadays, it is better to direct some pre-emptive strikes at the fingers or hands of those who try to reach radioactive materials. It is no use to shoot the legs or chase previously established terrorists after lethal combat (not criminal!) operations. You may guard radioactive materials, and you may use preventive strikes on terrorists. The latter is cheaper and more effective.

Why should radioactive sources be the focus of security interest when hundreds of dangerous chemicals and biological agents are readily available for harmful terrorist acts? It is not evident that a radiological dispersal device could be an element of terror—its potential effects cannot be compared with the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon—but the public does not necessarily perceive the difference. It is just as much a tool of blackmailing oil and gas lobbies against nuclear energy as a competitor in the global energy market.

The Russian-American Dream about Radiological Terrorism Prevention May Come True

At present, the counter-terrorism capabilities of Russia and the United States are completely incompatible. See the U.S. structure, as follows:

• The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) were both created with full support of the U.S. lawmakers as a response to the U.S. intelligence failures prior to the September 11 attacks. The TSC was opened in December 2003 to consolidate all the U.S. government’s terrorist watch lists into one central database.

• The TTIC, which began operations almost two years ago (in May 2003), serves as the U.S. federal government’s hub for terrorism-related analysis. It collects information from all fifteen U.S. intelligence agencies.

• The joint efforts of these centers, with information flowing back and forth between them, create the daily threat matrix for the president.

In Russia, on the contrary, there is lack of cooperation between even departments within ministries and federal agencies, to say nothing about private businesses, like in the U.S. At this point, no official counter-terrorism doctrine has been developed for the Russian Federal Assembly to be adopted as a set of laws to make counter-measures legal and transparent to public scrutiny. But steps in this direction are to be made.

The number of terrorist elements is not large. But this does not mean that the new counter-terrorism preparations and legislative steps are unnecessary. On the contrary, in Russia and other NATO countries, we are already witnessing some groups, particularly those engaged in the collection of funds for terrorist organizations, retreating. In addition, we have seen non-Russian individuals—hard-core members of various nationalistic and separatist groups—who are now willing to talk to us and, in some cases, to assist counter-terrorism units.

To this end, the Russian counter-terrorism capability can be described as follows:

• Efforts of Russian and NATO law enforcement agencies to track down terrorist activities as counter-terrorists pursue their investigations;

• Devoting greater effort to providing information on screening procedures for governments of the G-8 countries as leaders in nuclear energy development, including their corresponding ministries of defense, energy, labor, citizenship and immigration, and finance;

• Pursuing its own preventive investigations, particularly those on domestic and foreign extremists, in order to be able to provide intelligence about possible future attacks.

On the wider front, Russia, along with other Western democracies and their Asian analogues in Central Asia, has already introduced many anti-terrorist legislation initiatives (the Shanghai Six Countries Agreement). Many Russian anti-terrorism acts have already created the capability to deter, disable, identify, and prosecute those engaged in terrorist activities or in supporting these activities. The intent of the legislation makes it an offense to knowingly support terrorist organizations, whether through overt violence, or by providing support through documentation, shelter, or funds. One integral part of the new Counter-Terrorism Capability Act requires e-publication of a list of groups in the world deemed to constitute a threat to the security of Russia and NATO.

Before the events of September 11, the G-7 and Russia (G-8) preferred to discuss ways of combating terrorism. For example, in the Ottawa Declaration of 1995 there is a set of “guidelines for action” intended to increase international collaboration in the prevention of terrorism that committed member countries to:

• Refuse substantial concessions to hostage-takers, ensure those responsible are brought to justice, and join existing international treaties on terrorism by the year
Promote enhanced mutual assistance of a legal nature;

Pursue measures to prevent the terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials;

Inhibit the movement of terrorists and falsification of documents;

Strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation in maritime, air, and other transportation sectors;

Counter terrorist attacks against public facilities and infrastructure;

Deprive terrorists of funds;

Increase counter-terrorism training.

Russia declared its full support for United Nations Security Council resolution 1373, adopted by the Security Council on 28 September 2001, aimed at international terrorism. In the future, persons knowingly providing support for terrorism, whether through overt support, or by providing funds, materiel, or shelter, will be deemed criminals. But, in fact, they are combatants, who are deserving of pre-emptive strikes (before they are able to reach radiological weaponry, for example), instead of legal procedures in courts “after capture” if their “dirty bomb” did not work.

Meeting for the first time since the tragic events of September 2001, the leaders attending the June 2002 G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta discussed many challenges and new tasks in fighting terrorism. Russia confirmed its commitment to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks, but no counter-terrorism doctrine has been developed and approved at the federal level at this point. All corresponding decisions have been made at ministerial levels, with meager results in maintaining counter-terrorism capability. In the recently formed Federal Agency on Nuclear Energy (the former Minatom), for example, the threat of radiological terrorism is considered to be “exaggerated.”

Why is this so? In Russia and other NATO countries, there are fears that a more robust counter-terrorism capability will foster Russian, American, Canadian, etc. versions of the Gestapo, or will stimulate political repressions against legal opposition.

At any rate, in 2002–4, Russia and its G-8 partners agreed on a set of six non-proliferation principles aimed at preventing radiological terrorists (or those who harbor them) from acquiring or developing nuclear and radiological weapons, missiles, and related materials, equipment, or technologies.

Russia, like other CIS countries, has a UN mandate to collect information both at home and abroad, and to advise NATO countries’ governments about activities that may constitute a nuclear/radiological threat to the security of the Russian Federation. This includes any NGO or even anyone who advocates the use of radiological threats as a tool of violence to further political, religious, or ideological objectives. In the 1990s, when Russia was engaged in wars in Chechnya and other “hot spots,” the ratio of operational anti-terrorist resources devoted to the military, interior forces, and Federal Security Service’s counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence programs was approximately 80 percent to 20 percent in favor of counter-terrorism. Under the first and the second terms of President Vladimir Putin, this ratio has now tilted substantially in
favor of counter-intelligence, making public safety—the protection of Russian lives—no longer the number one priority of Russia.

**Conclusion**

Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication. Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among member states of the IAEA, and with Russian partners in the enlarged NATO. Which form of cooperation will be the best will be seen in the near future.

As we increase our capabilities in different areas of counter-terrorism, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, and security sector reform. The latter would be part of a broader process of institution building. Some skeptics even were promoting postponing last year’s presidential election in the United States, if the Bush Administration was late in forming a proper counter-terrorism capability. There were some historic precedents for this, such as when Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected several times under pretexts of preparations for the World War actions against the Axis powers.

Now the European Union is reluctant to strengthen its counter-terrorism capacity because of a different political situation. Russia also is not in any hurry, because topics of terrorism prevention already helped President Putin’s team in the recent re-election in March 2004. Now this team feels no need to devote extra resources to counter-terrorism measures, although a lot of rhetoric is in the air. On the whole, European countries and Canada are not taking active steps in this direction. Their previous concept of joint anti-terrorism security has been worked out inside the old NATO structures. And all the innovations that the U.S. is promoting seem to them expensive and even counterproductive.

However, it has been recognized that potential “dirty bombs” disrupt society by creating public panic based on fear of radiation, and they also create a zone where significant cleanup efforts must be undertaken at potentially great cost. Thus, there is sort of an Euro-Atlantic security “doctor’s dilemma”: to foster radiological terrorism fears among citizens in order to make them ready to “swallow” counter-terrorism measures (including, for example, such a “remedy” as cancellation of presidential elections); or, vice versa, to continue to ignore “futile” fears in the face of growing radiological threats, like Russia and some European Union countries do. Such a position may dismiss any pre-emptive measures against global terrorism, including radiological threats, instead emphasizing traditional anti-terrorism methods.

Today, small and unstable countries like Myanmar or Syria are on the way to a “nuclear future.” If the counter-terrorism doctrine is approved by the UN Security Council, and Russia-NATO teams are given corresponding license to prevent radiological terrorism, this nuclear future will be far safer than the nuclear present. It means that the global functions of the enlarged NATO will not create “conflicts of interests” between nuclear nations and states of the so-called radiological “gray zone,” through which poorly monitored transportation of radiological materials occurs.

Michael Mihalka *

The NATO Response Force (NRF) was intended to make NATO responsive to the security needs of the twenty-first century. However, by U.S. standards it is unlikely to be rapid, responsive, or much of a force. Nevertheless, the NRF will prove the most important vehicle for adapting European forces to the needs of modern expeditionary ventures.

The United States proposed a “NATO Response Force” at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in September 2002. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cautioned his colleagues, “If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, that can deploy in days or weeks rather than months or years, then it will not have capabilities to offer the world in the twenty-first century.”¹ The Americans had become increasingly concerned that the Europeans had become preoccupied with the needs of the 1990—that is, to provide stabilization forces after a conflict—and were ignoring the new threats that had appeared after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. “There are no more threats to NATO from within Europe, but from a nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction,” a U.S. official demurred. “NATO needs an expeditionary force, a strike force, that can move fast.”

The NATO Secretary-General, Lord George Robertson, took a similar tack and urged the allies “to think carefully about the role of this alliance in the future, not least in protecting our citizens from criminal terrorists and criminal states.” He stressed that the NRF would not compete with the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force. “The bottom line is that NATO’s Response Force and the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force will be … complementary,” he insisted.²

Background

The rationale for the NRF was laid out in an article by Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler.³ They argued that the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) adopted by NATO at the Madrid Summit in 1997 had largely proved a failure because it lacked focus and a sense of priorities. The five major categories of the DCI were sound—deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability of forces and infrastructure; command, control, and information systems—but they concentrated on inputs rather than outputs. Binnendijk and Kugler were more concerned about

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* Dr. Mihalka teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff Officers College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
2 “‘NATO Response Force is no Rival to EU Plan,’ says Robertson,” Deutsche Presse-Agenc- tur, 8 October 2002.
whether European forces could fight effectively alongside U.S. forces rather than about whether some European forces had capabilities comparable to those of U.S. forces. They observed that, following the DCI approach, “At best, in times of crisis, NATO will still be cobbling together an untrained multinational force rather than drawing upon an integrated and flexible force that already exists.” This is a critical observation: American forces are deemed to be more effective not only because they have forces equipped with some of the latest technologies, but because they train and exercise together in a joint fashion to perform expeditionary missions. In other words, it is not the capabilities that make the force, but the demands placed on the force that makes the capabilities.

The Europeans Drag Their Feet

For their part, the German and French reaction to the concept of the NRF was guarded and tentative. Joschka Fischer, the German minister of foreign affairs, told his parliament, “We view the American proposal for a multi-national response force as constructive.” Although he said the force was needed to deal with the “nightmare of a major terrorist attack,” Fischer said that Germany could only provide troops for such a force under three conditions:4

- The NATO Council would have to maintain the right to decide on deploying the rapid reaction force;
- Germany’s Parliament would first have to approve any deployment before troops went into combat;
- Any NATO force would have to be compatible with the planned 60,000-member European Union (EU) Rapid Reaction Force due to be set up the following year.

These terms were underscored by Defense Minister Peter Struck, who said, in an apparent reference to the United States: “There must be consensus in NATO—one country cannot decide alone.”

Struck wasn’t even sure that the NRF would be used for offensive operations. When asked whether the NRF could be used for offensive operations, Struck responded,

These are matters that must be discussed in detail. So far, there exists only the general idea of installing such a NATO force, while so far many states reserve intervention forces for themselves. But to the new force, also, applies NATO’s principle of consensus. It would be wrong to assume that the United States could simply use the Response Force in any corner of the world. Everything is done through a resolution by all nineteen, or soon to be twenty-six, member states.5

For her part, the French Defense Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie said that, although she supported the concept, the force should not operate outside Europe, be used in a pre-emptive manner, or operate without a UN mandate. The political requirements of first securing a UN mandate and then parliamentary approval from the states involved would seem to take the “rapid” out of any rapid reaction force.

The U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade as a Model for the NRF

The NRF is a joint and combined force of about 20,000 troops composed of national contributions. The ground element will be brigade-sized with special force units, a joint naval force, and when fully functional will be capable of 200 combat sorties a day. It should be ready to deploy within five days, and have sufficient organic logistics to operate for thirty days. The force will have a period of unit training, then six months of interoperability training, followed by six months on standby or deployment. The first two rotations, starting in October 2003, were kept small so as to provide a test bed for a force that was not intended to achieve full operational status before October 2006. A force generation conference will determine which forces countries will make available.

Conceptually, the force in the U.S. military that the NATO Response Force most closely resembles is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade, especially some aspects of the Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) that was set up by the then-Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, as an anti-terrorism force in September 2001. It is no accident that General Jones was chosen to be the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR) after 9/11. The U.S. Marines brought a joint combined and expeditionary mentality to NATO in an era when it was sorely needed. The Fourth MEB (AT) consists of a Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and an Anti-Terrorism Battalion (AT Bn). It also includes the Marine Security Guard Battalion (MSG Bn) and Marine Corps Security Force Battalion (MCSF Bn). The CBIRF element provides rapid response to chemical or biological threats. The Marine Corps Security Force Battalion also maintains two Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Teams (FAST).

The Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), also known as Task Force Tarawa, perhaps provides the standard against which a NATO Response Force might be measured. An MEB and the NRF are roughly the same size and have roughly the same missions. The Second MEB is a scalable, combined force capable of conducting forced-entry missions and sustaining combat operations for up to sixty days. It has both fixed-wing and rotary organic air assets that are capable of operating out of expeditionary airfields established with organic assets. Mission requirements will determine the size—anywhere from four to seventeen thousand troops—of the Marine Air

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Ground Task Force (MAGTF) formed from the Second MEB. Using a variety of means, including amphibious shipping, strategic air, and pre-positioned equipment, the Second MEB can be deployed for action within five to fourteen days. The unit most recently saw service in Iraq.

**How Much and What Kind of Force Is Needed?**

Some authors have argued that the NATO Response Force of 20,000 troops is not large enough to be effective. Another author has argued that the NRF is nothing but “a token use of Europe’s best military forces in the service of the U.S.” These arguments are wrong in two very important senses. First, a quick examination of actual “short-notice” expeditionary operations since 1990 reveals very few operations where more than a brigade-sized force (around 5,000 ground troops) was used. Second, the number of actual forces dedicated to the NATO Response Force would probably be three-times the 20,000 figure, as these forces would need to train prior to coming on standby status, and would need to refit afterwards.

Only two “short-notice” operations have required more than a brigade-sized force since 1990. The first Gulf War involved around 700,000 U.S. and allied forces (against roughly 550,000 Iraqis), while the Iraq War of 2003 involved roughly 200,000. No European state would agree to use the NRF to fight alone against the forces of a major nation-state like Iraq. A more plausible scenario would be one where the United States is tied down in a major conflict (such as Iraq) when a transnational terrorist group conducts a mass casualty attack on the soil of a NATO member, and the NRF would be tasked to take out the training camps of the transnational terrorist group—in other words, a scenario very much like the one that occurred after 9/11 in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, like almost all conflicts, has a number of unique aspects that make it difficult to generalize about future conflicts based on its example. As Anthony Cordesman has written, “Political and military uncertainties whose impact U.S. and British planners could not predict when the fighting began nearly all worked out in favor of the United States, Britain, and the Afghan opposition.” Nevertheless, an examination of the sequence of events and deployments in Afghanistan might prove instructive.

The deployment to Afghanistan was not particularly speedy. The first air strikes did not occur until 7 October 2001. The U.S. took some care to ensure the political legitimacy of its actions, even though it did not intend to use NATO or the UN as the basis for command. Although several special forces units were deployed throughout the conflict, the first major units, (Marines) arrived in Kandahar on 25 November, two and a half months after the September 11 attacks. Very few of the battles during the Afghanis-

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The Afghan conflict involved more than 2,000 allied forces. About 2,000 allied forces participated in Operation Anaconda in March 2002, including 1,200 U.S. soldiers. The U.S. never committed more than 7,500 ground troops to the Afghanistan conflict. Despite the large size of the Afghan theater, the U.S. never deployed any formation larger than a few thousand troops.

The U.K. campaign against the Falkland Islands provides another example of expeditionary warfare. The British assault force numbered just 7,000 troops; around 4,000 troops landed on 21 May 1981. The Argentines had invaded the islands on 2 April. The delay in responding owed more to the distances involved (7,500 nautical miles) and the need to support the operation from the sea than to any lack of readiness of the forces. Several of the units involved—the 3 Para and the 40 and 42 Commando—were embarked on 7 April. Although the British received critical U.S. support, only British forces fought. Moreover, the U.K. could not assume that it could quickly gain air superiority, much less the kind of air supremacy that the U.S. has enjoyed in all of its recent conflicts.

Air power may pose a much more serious shortfall for the NRF and the Europeans, but the value of air power is often difficult to assess. Statistics from Operation Desert Storm (Gulf War I) and the operations in Serbia/Kosovo and Afghanistan show that the U.S. share of the sorties flown were 85, 62, and 92 percent respectively. The proportion of sorties flown by U.S. forces that involved precision-guided weapons were even higher: 89, 80 and 99 percent respectively. However, using sortie rates can be quite deceptive, as the total tonnage of munitions dropped by the U.S. relative to its allies is masked by these figures. In Afghanistan, B-52s and B-1s delivered 11,500 of the 17,500 weapons dropped—65 percent of the total—although they flew only 10 percent of the sorties. B-52s and B-1s also played prominent roles in the recent Iraq conflict. In fact, the European air forces have nothing comparable to a medium bomber in their inventory.

The missions suggested for the NRF also would not seem to require a ground element larger than a brigade. The FAQ prepared by SHAPE says the force’s potential missions are as follows:

- It could be deployed as a stand-alone force for crisis response in efforts such as:
  - Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO);
  - Support consequence management (CBRN events or humanitarian crisis situation);
  - Crisis response operations, including peacekeeping;
  - Support counter-terrorism (CT) operations;
  - Embargo operations;

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10 Cordesman, Lessons, 11.
11 Cordesman, Lessons, 5.
Deployed as an initial entry force to facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces in a JOA from a benign up to a hostile environment, with or without host nation support (e.g., peace enforcement);

Deployed as a demonstrative force package in order to show the resolve of member nations (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required).

For operations against terrorists, the NRF would need to rely on special operation forces, so the composition of the NRF matters as much as its size. And, in fact, the SHAPE FAQ reads very much like the requirements for the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

How Fast?

The NATO NRF requirement is that the force should be ready to deploy within five days, and that it should be able to sustain itself for thirty days. The SHAPE discussion of the NRF adds an important caveat: “when NATO decides to employ it.” So there are several real problems in the speed with which the NRF could be deployed—the time it would take for NATO to use the force, the time it would take to get ready to deploy, and the time it would take to get the force into the field. This whole process would take a minimum of two weeks, and quite possibly longer.

Let’s start with the deployment of the force. According to a recent RAND study assessing the requirement to deploy a Stryker brigade globally within 96 hours, “The main conclusion of this report is that a force with more than 1,000 vehicles cannot be deployed by air from CONUS to the far reaches of the globe in four days. However, with some mobility enhancements, it is possible to achieve deployment timelines on the order of one to two weeks, which is quite rapid for a motorized force.” In other words, even the U.S. military would have trouble deploying a brigade quickly; this does not say much for the potential speed of the NRF, which may lack important organic strategic lift capability, at least in the short term.

Alternatively, the NRF could be deployed by sea. After all, at seventeen knots, a sea force can move 2,000 nautical miles in five days. NATO recognizes the need for better strategic sealift capability, and recently concluded arrangements to secure several roll-on/roll-off ships.

However, there exist some very real issues concerning whether NATO will be able to quickly decide to send the force in the first place. The SHAPE FAQ on political decision-making and control of the forces once they are deployed contains few answers, and many questions. Many NATO members will almost surely insist that a UN mandate be secured before their troops can be deployed abroad. As can be seen from the following table, the publics in most European countries would greatly prefer that their

government seek UN authorization, even if a country’s vital national interests are at stake. Only in the U.K. is there a majority in favor of action without UN authorization.

Table 1. Percentage of respondents to the question: *When vital interests of our country are involved, it is justified to bypass the UN (If needed: “vital interest means when stakes are high”).*[^13]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree Strongly</th>
<th>Agree Somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree Somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree Strongly/Refuse</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many in the political leadership in Europe reflected the sentiments of their public over the need for a UN mandate in Iraq. The French President Jacques Chirac said, “Whatever the circumstances, France will vote no.” He added, “War is always the worst solution.” In March 2003, an opinion poll of French citizens showed that 64 percent opposed the war in Iraq without an authorizing UN resolution—and that 69 percent thought that France should veto any such resolution. The protracted debate over the second UN resolution over Iraq illustrates the difficulty of securing a consensus for action when there are serious policy differences involved. Even in the case of the September 11 attacks, the initial French elite reaction was at best lukewarm in favor of action, and only became so after French public opinion polls supported a decisive response.

Elite and popular sentiment ran strongly against the Iraq war even with UN authorization. The Spanish daily *El Mundo* claimed that “President Bush must not now reject the authority of the United Nations because ‘it does not bow to the interests of the USA.’”[^14] The French Defense Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie said on 14 March 2003,


at a meeting of EU defense ministers in Athens, “There is no possibility that France will participate in a military intervention without a UN resolution.” Issues of global status seemed to matter as much as the credibility of the UN, or whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. One German commentator noted:

What weighs heavier, though, is the subjugation of the United Nations to U.S. military strategy: either you go with us or we do it with a coalition of the willing. This was an unpardonable challenge of Russia, the great power that was, and France, the would-be great power of today. … This, not Iraq, is the real reason for the heap of rubble that threatens to bury the United Nations, NATO, and German-American relations. We are currently witnessing an unprecedented struggle for power with the aim to put Gulliver, in the past kept at bay by the Soviet Union, in chains again. The historic date was 5 March, when France, Germany, and Russia joined together to oppose the “hyperpower”: a war resolution “would not be permitted.” This was the renversement des alliances, the reversal of alliances—as in 1757, when “archenemies” France and Austria suddenly ganged up against Prussia under King Frederick.

An examination of international opinion polls in the run-up to the intervention in Iraq reveals considerable popular opposition to the war, even with a UN resolution. For example, a January 2003 FORSA survey found 69 percent of Germans opposing the war. A poll conducted by the magazine Der Spiegel found 74 percent against the war. 57 percent of Danes opposed the war even with a UN mandate, and 79 percent in its absence. A Gallup International Poll released in early 2003 revealed that public opposition to the war was not greatly diminished by the presence of a UN mandate (see Table 2 below). The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would make countries even more unwilling to commit forces without a clear and compelling casus belli and a UN mandate.

Although this opinion poll applied primarily to Iraq, it illustrates the problems of securing approval for action when the goals of the operation are not altogether clear. Even with a UN mandate, the process of securing parliamentary approval in certain countries could be slow. To illustrate the difficulties posed by the requirements to go through UN and parliamentary approval, NATO staged an exercise in October 2003 specifically designed to focus on the utilization of the NATO Response Force. The Germans were skeptical, and the French dismissive. The French defense minister came to the exercise late, and left early. However, the German Defense Minister Struck was sufficiently impressed that he returned home and requested a change in parliamentary procedures that would allow a select committee of the Bundestag to approve an NRF-type deployment. The Social Democrat–Green majority in the German Parliament would have none of it. The SPD parliamentary group’s spokesman on internal policy, Dieter Wiefelspütz, told the Berliner Zeitung that every future military operation

Table 2. Percentages of respondents to the question: *Are you in favor of military action against Iraq?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under no circumstances</th>
<th>Only if sanctioned by the UN</th>
<th>Unilaterally by the U.S. and its allies</th>
<th>Don’t know/no opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

would continue to require the support of the full Bundestag. “Germany is not going to be able to wage war without the approval of parliament,” he emphasized.\(^{18}\) The Bundestag granted Struck only a very small concession: exploratory and other small-


scale operations could take place, unless a Bundestag party group expressed reservations within a week. If so, then it too would require approval from the full Bundestag.

The other problem highlighted by the exercise was what some NATO officials call “usability.” Very few of the forces that NATO allies have can be deployed quickly. Lord Robertson said, “Out of 1.4 million non-U.S. soldiers under arms, the eighteen non-American allies have about 55,000 deployed on multinational operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and yet they feel overstretched…. That is a situation that is unacceptable.”\(^{19}\) Finally, it was made clear at the exercise that SACEUR was limited in his ability to plan for hypothetical contingencies.\(^{20}\)

**How Sustainable?**

A problem that has not caught the attention of many European policy-makers is the question of the sustainability of the NRF, even with only a thirty-day requirement (which is half that of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade). Several U.S. military officers that I interviewed question the commitment of the Europeans to providing the materiel necessary to sustain operations abroad.\(^{21}\) They point out that no Western European country has sustained contested ground operations abroad above a battalion level without U.S. help since the Suez crisis in 1956. The mission the British were given in Iraq was designed to minimize the stress on their logistics train. Nevertheless, the chief of the British General Staff, General Sir Michael Walker, said in March 2004 that the U.K. would be able to mount an operation on the level of the Iraq conflict before the end of the decade: “We are unlikely to be able to get to large-scale (readiness) much before the end of the decade, somewhere around ‘08 or ‘09.”\(^{22}\) Without continuous exercises and experience from actual operations, and with continuing budgetary pressures that favor force structure over sustainability, European militaries may lack the ability to meet even the thirty-day requirement specified for the NRF.

**Continued Reliance on the United States**

When the NRF concept was first vetted, the United States said that it would not participate. This led several European generals to complain that the U.S. was not taking the proposal seriously. However, these generals were missing the point, since the objective was not to figure out how to improve interoperability between U.S. and European forces, but to spur the transformation of European forces. Whatever the initial U.S. reluctance, it quickly became clear that the Europeans lacked a number of important capabilities that would need to be provided by U.S. forces. These included strate-

\(^{19}\) Peter Spiegel, “War Game at NATO Talks Highlights the Need for Quick Deployment,” *Financial Times*, 10 October 2003.


\(^{21}\) Interviews, NATO School in Oberammergau, January 2004.

Strategic lift has always been a sore point between the U.S. military and European militaries. The Europeans have sought to remedy this deficiency by buying a strategic air lifter from Airbus called the A400M. However, uncertainties regarding the size of the buy have delayed the initial operating capability of the system. France is now slated to take delivery of the first system in November 2009, and only thirty aircraft will be produced a year.23 The Europeans could compensate for their lack of strategic airlift by turning to strategic sealift, but the timelines for procurement in this arena are little better.24 NATO has assessed that it needs twelve to fourteen additional medium-size roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) vessels.

No European country has a battle management capability comparable to that of the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), an airborne radar capable of tracking moving targets. Therefore, in the early rotations of the NRF, the U.S. is offering Joint STARS support. In the mid- to far term, NATO intends to buy an Air Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability based on the same model as the NATO AWACS. The AGS system would “provide synthetic-aperture radar imagery and ground moving-target-indication information in near-real time in order to support intelligence-gathering, time-sensitive targeting, and bomb-damage assessment.”25 However, even under the best of circumstances, this system would not be operational before 2010.

Only the French have a bare-base deployable air headquarters; no other European country has such a capability. Since the NRF operates in eighteen-month rotation cycles (six months training, six months stand-by, and six months refitting), one deployable air headquarters is not enough. Aircraft carriers might work just as well during the other two cycles, but in truth the United States will clearly be called upon to fill in here as well.

**Double-Counting and the Comparison between the EU and NATO Intervention Forces**

At first blush, it would seem that the proposed EU Rapid Reaction Force would compete for the same forces as the NATO Response Force. Both forces seem to require intervention capabilities. But in theory this is not the case, as the missions of the two forces are different. The NRF is intended as a joint, short-notice, forced-entry expeditionary force of about 20,000 troops in which the land component is about a brigade. In contrast, the EU Rapid Reaction Force is intended for the full range of Petersberg missions, and is projected to be able to provide 60,000 troops within sixty days. Its

mission is closer to that of a stabilization force than it is to a long-notice expeditionary force. The NRF is an on-call force, while the exact troops involved in an EU-led expedition would be determined by a troop conference.

Nevertheless, certain European politicians view the NRF as simply a more responsive EU Rapid Reaction Force. The German Defense Minister Peter Struck said in November 2002, “[T]he missions of the NATO force will differ from the EU crisis reaction force only to the extent that it is to be available more rapidly.”26 Some European politicians see little difference between the two. This view was expressed by Struck’s counterpart at the Foreign Ministry, Joschka Fischer.27 And Struck’s French counterpart, Michele Alliot-Marie, expressed a similar idea: “The two intervention forces must supplement each other, they must not be rivals. The NATO Response Force must also not have priority over the European Rapid Reaction Force. Situations can occur, in which the EU would like to intervene without NATO considering it appropriate, and the other way around. For instance, the EU will probably replace NATO soon in Macedonia and in Bosnia.”28

However, theory often flies in the face of practical exigencies—like constrained budgets. Some of the smaller countries will be stretched to offer a contribution to either force, and they lack the resources to contribute to both.29 Moreover, even the richer countries will find their defense budgets under increasing pressure in the face of mounting social costs. The recent German defense reform called for a division of forces into those capable of intervention, stabilization, and homeland defense. The Germans intend to fund 17,000 forces capable for intervention—only enough to meet the requirements of both the EU rapid response force and the NATO Response Force. However, successive German governments have revised their defense budgets downward, and the expensive intervention forces may prove a lucrative target in the future. In fact, as German forces have taken on more and more missions, their budget has been reduced, prompting one respected German newspaper to say, “The Bundeswehr is in a miserable state.”30

Conclusions

However effective a vehicle the NRF may be for transformation, it is unlikely to be used for sustained force-entry brigade-sized expeditionary operations. Fortunately, the requirement for such operations remains low. The NRF may be used for show operations, such as the European Rapid Reaction Force conducted in Rwanda in June 2003, but it is unlikely to be deployed in any situation where there is a clear risk of combat.

26 Buechner, “Not Every Country.”
However prepared the forces themselves may be, political factors may prevent them from being used rapidly, if at all. The October 2003 NATO exercise (called a “study seminar” because of political sensitivities, rather than a “war game” or “exercise”) made clear that political procedures for authorizing the use of force could severely hamper the deployment and use of forces. An attempt to streamline that process in Germany ran into political obstacles. Thus, the speed with which NATO could respond to a crisis depends on political factors. Even for those countries that do not need parliamentary approval for short-term deployments, such as France, there remain questions as to whether UN authorization is required. If recent history is any guide, unanimity within the UN Security Council may be slow in coming, if it comes at all. It is certain most countries are uncomfortable with the notion of pre-emptive strikes.

The NRF will continue to rely on U.S. capabilities to top up the force at least until 2010, and perhaps much longer than that. This reliance on the U.S., along with budgetary pressures, may delay European procurement decisions even longer, and adversely affect the process of European defense transformation.

Still, at the end of the day, the NRF will provide the best vehicle for transforming the European militaries. Unlike the EU Rapid Reaction Force, where the emphasis is on improving the capabilities rather than the performance of the force, the NRF will serve as a vehicle for improving performance. The needs of the mission will drive the transformation of the European forces’ capabilities, logistics and support systems, and the political means of authorizing action. Because the NRF is a multinational force, shortfalls will appear among the various countries participating. However, without the NRF serving as a standard, the participating countries would be much more likely to fall behind in transforming their forces when left to their own devices.
Preserving and developing transatlantic relations has proved to be an indispensable tool for handling the various challenges of global international relations, both in the past century and in the first years of the present one. The attraction of membership in NATO for countries that are still undergoing the process of post-conflict rehabilitation activities, the accession of new members to the Alliance from the former Soviet bloc, the examples of vitality and institutional modernization by the North Atlantic organization itself are significant arguments in this direction. Whatever the differences within the transatlantic community have been in the past and are at present, preserving and developing relations between Europe and North America have no substitute in terms of guaranteeing the democratic trends and stability in the world. There are allies, partners, friends of the transatlantic community, but they do not play a substitute role in promoting the progress of human civilization. Making the world safe for global economic activity, a place where human rights and dignity matter, is the heart of the transatlantic philosophy and construct.

Post-conflict rehabilitation activity is just one of the areas that has a crucial stake in keeping and upgrading the transatlantic relationship. However, it is becoming ever more important.

First, the need for effectiveness in international security relations shows that the durability of peace after intra-state or inter-state conflicts is linked not just to an efficient peace-enforcing and peacekeeping operation, but also to the level of democratization of the conflict-stricken societies, to the success of the institution-building process, security sector reform, disarmament of the conflicting sides, the return of refugees, and to the social and economic progress that is made after the end of the hostilities. All these activities are becoming already part of a forward-directed approach to conflict prevention. Both Europe and North America are interested in effective conflict-prevention results. Is there a single government of the transatlantic region today that is not interested in the success of the post-conflict rehabilitation efforts of the Coalition Forces in Iraq, including the creation of a secure environment in this country and in the region of the Greater Middle East? It is certain that no country of the transatlantic community would profit from the degradation of the situation in Iraq, but all will succeed if stability and economic vitality are restored. One of the important lessons of the Balkan post-conflict rehabilitation process has been that success would not have been possible without a working transatlantic cooperation mechanism.

Second, in the wake of conflict, war-torn societies are an especially attractive potential milieu for promoting and creating terrorist activity. Resolute steps toward rehabilitating these societies should prevent this from happening or intensifying. It would
be interesting to consider the Iraqi case from this perspective. There were opinions before the war in Iraq that the result of the U.S.-led coalition’s intervention would lead to intensified terrorist activity. The alternative view was that the intervention was directed toward the pacification of a dictatorial regime that sooner or later would have openly staged the same activity that terrorists already carried out. There are clear difficulties in implementing post-war rehabilitation in Iraq while a mounting Al Qaeda terrorist struggle adds to the resistance being promoted by remnant elements of the regime of Saddam Hussein. But only a success by the international community in post-war rehabilitation in Iraq would deprive the Islamist-driven terrorists, especially Al Qaeda, of the argument that the Muslim world is doomed to never catch up with the rest of the civilized democratic world. The success of democracy and the market economy in Iraq is in the interest of the transatlantic community in its fight on terrorism. So, post-conflict rehabilitation bears a strong counter-terrorist aspect too—an aspect that the transatlantic community cannot neglect, especially when diverging perspectives pull the countries of the community into different positions in critical periods of international relations.

Third, facing the reality that, at the present day, international institutions have little or no capacity for sustaining, coordinating, and practically implementing crisis management, peacekeeping and peace-building activities, even when the needs for these efforts are most glaring, transatlantic cooperation and solidarity is an indispensable method of coping with this issue. While in the case of the Balkans the transatlantic community has arrived at solutions without major difficulties by shifting responsibilities (and also by orienting the futures of the nations of South East Europe toward the European Union and NATO), post-conflict sites in other regions of the world are not that lucky. The vehicle of transatlantic relations is the leading potent factor that could organize the efforts dedicated to dealing with the security, economic, social, and political distress of the post-war societies of the Greater Middle East, Africa, and Asia. It would include not only identifying the donors of economic help but also support humanitarian organizations to carry out their activities and organize security stabilization efforts. Transatlantic cooperation is crucial for involving, motivating, facilitating, and supporting all other international institutions that possess any ability to contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation.

Finally, post-conflict rehabilitation is important for transatlantic relations from both a theoretic and strategic point of view: no conflict should any longer be approached without a clear vision of where to drive the developments after the hostilities end. Definitely this is an ambitious task that neither the U.S. nor the EU is able to carry out alone on a global scale. The challenge facing both the U.S. and the EU in solidifying their global roles is how to define their cooperative attitudes towards each other in outlining their post-conflict rehabilitation activities. The task is ambitious, since post-conflict rehabilitation is an extremely broad effort, encompassing social, political, security, military, economic, and financial activities. For example, humanitarian aid, security sector reform, and economic reconstruction are just parts of the more systematic effort defined as post-conflict rehabilitation. Considering the immensity and high costs of the task on the one hand, and the persisting budget limitations for every international
actor on the other, the implementation of this post-conflict management tool requires above all the economic support of both the United States and the European countries. Transatlantic cooperation could be the vehicle and the driving force in attracting the world’s capabilities in coping with post-conflict rehabilitation tasks.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that post-conflict rehabilitation requires transatlantic solidarity, but the very transatlantic relationship could overcome its moments of difficulties and doubts by utilizing the cooperative potential of the post-conflict rehabilitation effort itself. A better study of the unique opportunities provided by this indispensable human activity is more than necessary.
Russia’s Perception and Hierarchy of Security Threats

Dmitry Polikanov *

As Russian President Vladimir Putin enters his second term and Russia embarks on the course toward modernization (some experts would call it authoritarian modernization, though), the country is approaching an important phase in its development. The general message sent by the modernization process is the end of the transition period in Russian politics and economy, which will require the formulation of new tasks for the future. Among them, it will be necessary to reassess Russia’s place in the world and to see how to ensure the country’s competitiveness (a fashionable word for the Russian establishment) in the global arena. Therefore, the Russian perception of security threats becomes a subject of extreme importance.

Meanwhile, all the major conceptual documents behind the modernization process were approved as long ago as 2000—i.e., before the major shifts in international relations that have taken place in the past five years. At the time of their elaboration, the authors did their best to predict the trends of global development and tried to make the formulas as abstract as possible. Somehow, they succeeded in grasping some of the prevailing tendencies (e.g., NATO’s use of force beyond the traditional areas of responsibility and without authorization of the UN Security Council) and in foreseeing, for example, the increasing influence of the international terrorist threat on the world’s security situation. This has helped to preserve the relevance of certain elements of Russia’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. However, as usual, the interpretation was more important than the facts and, regrettably, the perception contained in the 2000 doctrines is partly outdated today and contains certain hints of Cold War thinking.

The 2000 National Security Concept gives a broad vision of Russian national security interests and the key factors affecting them. It starts with economic security issues, and clearly emphasizes the importance of the downgrading of the Russian economy, and especially its technological potential, its evident orientation on the export of raw materials and fuel, the stagnation of the agriculture and banking sectors, and the brain drain that has resulted in technological dependence. The World Bank report on Russia’s development issued in 2004 indicates that not much has changed since then, and predicts that the influence of energy export will only increase in the foreseeable future. This will not only be connected with high oil prices, but also with the government’s need for extra resources to implement Putin’s presidential ambitions (doubling of the GDP by 2010, and cutting poverty in half in the next three years) and the lack of alternative sources of revenue other than export duties and taxation on oil and gas.

The social threats highlighted in the report include uncontrolled migration, secessionism and economic disintegration of the state, diminishments in the effectiveness of the legal system, depreciation of spiritual values, extremism, the worsening crime

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situation, and corruption. Another factor is the growing gap between the rich and the poor and the degradation of the health care and social security systems, as well as increasing drug and alcohol consumption and huge demographic problems. Again, most of these threats remain topical today.

Putin’s efforts to strengthen the vertical orientation of power have led to more centralization of the country and the elimination of secessionist sentiments. His plenipotentiary envoys in federal districts have succeeded in bringing local legislation into compliance with the Russian Constitution and, hence, have consolidated the legal space of the nation. Nonetheless, the poverty problem is one of the most urgent for present-day Russia, where a large share of the population (up to 30 million people) lives below the poverty level. Crime and corruption have become even more urgent issues than they were in 2000, which has resulted in various initiatives: the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Committee under the auspices of the president in early 2004; the administrative reform aimed at making the criminal justice system more transparent and “technologically savvy”; the Ethical Code developed by the Russian business community; the anti-corruption examination of all bills in the Duma, etc. Finally, the problems of drugs and demography are taking on threatening forms and require immediate solutions. Nonetheless, the Anti-Drug Committee set up in spring 2003 is still in the process of settling down to business and has yet to achieve significant results. Meanwhile, the worsening demographic situation in the Far East makes it more vulnerable to external threats and may provoke secessionist sentiments in the long term.

The 2000 Concept divides additional threats into three categories: international, military, and border. The classification is not perfect and creates some confusion, but such flaws of the structure do not have a negative impact on the text of the document, which is quite logical in its narration. Most of the international threats have come to pass, and it is not clear how Russia still survives under such conditions. This would seem to imply that the way these priorities and threats are formulated is somewhat distant from reality, since these threats are not so vitally detrimental to Russia’s security after all.

The attempts of some states to diminish the role of international institutions, including the UN and OSCE, have succeeded. Russia’s political, economic, and military influence in the world continues to decrease. Military blocs keep strengthening, and NATO enlarges toward the east without any serious objections from the Russian side. Foreign military bases and large contingents near the Russian borders have become a reality in the world, which is busy waging the war on terror. Moreover, the United States is enhancing its military capabilities in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan are recent examples), as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. Weakening integration processes in the CIS have transformed this organization into a discussion forum, rather than a fully functioning body capable of defending Russia’s economic and political interests. The escalation of conflicts near Russia’s borders and the external borders of the CIS is more or less over, though the issue of Afghanistan is still of some importance from the point of view of drug trafficking and its potential to cause further instability in Central Asia. Fortunately, there are no
territorial claims, but some states continue to “resist Russia’s strengthening and diminish its positions” in various parts of the world. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has turned into the top security problem confronting the country. Terrorism, especially international terrorist activities, has also arisen to the top of the security agenda. The domination of some states in global information space and the development of information warfare techniques have not abated, and Russia is still squeezed out of this process.

In the military sphere, NATO and “coalitions of the willing” expand the scope of their operations beyond their traditional areas of responsibility and without the sanction of UN Security Council resolutions. The technological gap in the military realm is increasing, and Russia is falling behind in the modernization of its armed forces. The threat of intensified activities of foreign intelligence services is a “ghost” of the Cold War, but recent trials indicate that some parts of the elite, including siloviki (notably the FSB), are still serious about this security challenge.

Border threats also failed to disappear. The economic, demographic, and cultural expansion of states that border Russian territory takes the form of the “Chinese threat”; there can be no other explanation today (although in 2000 the authors might have meant the expansion of Western values as well). Cross-border organized crime and activities of foreign terrorist organizations are on the rise, and nowadays require a military response, according to the Defense Minister.

The 2000 Military Doctrine maintains that the level of direct military threat in its traditional forms has become quite low. At the same time, the document is even more sodden with Cold War formulas and perceptions, but also takes into account the Chechen war experience. Among external threats to Russian security it names territorial claims, interference of other states in internal affairs, and attempts to ignore Russia’s interests in international security and Russia’s strengthening as an influential center in a multi-polar world. The emergence of hotbeds of armed conflict near Russia’s borders and the military buildup of international security formations as well as their expansion work to the detriment of the security of the country as well. Another issue is the deployment of foreign troops on the territories of states that neighbor and are friendly to Russia, in violation of the UN Charter. The document names such threats as training, equipping, and operating armed formations in the adjacent states that may be used against Russia; intelligence activities; discrimination against Russian citizens and their legitimate interests abroad; and international terrorism. Domestic threats, according to the Russian military, include attempts to overthrow the constitutional government, the existence of extremist, separatist, nationalist, religious, and terrorist movements, which may affect the territorial integrity and stability of the country; the emergence of illegal armed formations and attacks against infrastructure; illicit trafficking in arms; and, finally, organized crime connected with terrorism and smuggling.

It can be seen that most of these formulas are based on preserving the principle of national sovereignty and protecting Russia against interference in its internal affairs on the part of other states, notably Western states. A significant component of the document is the list of threats connected with the activities of armed formations and extremist and terrorist movements. This was a step forward resulting from the Chechen
experience, which also helped Russia to fit into framework of the “war on terror” sys-

tem quite painlessly.

Three years later, after the events of September 11, the hostage-taking in the Mos-
cow theater, and the war in Iraq, the Russian military decided to update their basic

doctrines and presented in fall 2003 a document outlining the “Actual Tasks of the

Armed Forces.” This “White Book” of the Russian Defense Ministry did not go too

much beyond the list of threats mentioned above (it seems that many of them were just
copied and pasted from the previous documents), but it altered the list of priorities.

First of all, the document mentions the growing importance for today’s security
climate of WMD proliferation, terrorism, ethnic and religious radical movements, drug

trafficking, and organized crime. It also claims again that the level of direct military

threat is low, and that no conflict outside Russia currently poses a substantial threat to

its stability. Moreover, the military argued that they took into account the changes in

the global environment and excluded from their planning considerations the probability

global nuclear war or large-scale conventional wars with NATO or U.S.-led coal-

itions.

Among other important postulates is the reassessment of the role of the armed

forces. They should no longer limit themselves to containing external threats, as

Chechnya has shown the power of international terrorism and the interconnections

between external and internal threats. Second, the armed forces should play a more ac-
tive role in protecting Russia’s economic interests (the Caspian Fleet is one of the ex-

amples), as most of the conflicts and interventions today concern specific economic

matters and business interests. Third, the Russian armed forces recognize the danger of

the transformation of nuclear arms into a battlefield weapon. However, this leads to a

Cold War conclusion—namely, let’s continue to rely on and upgrade our strategic de-
terrence potential. Fourth, the paper tends to focus on constructing a central role for the

Ministry of Defense in coordinating the security activities of the state, which is caused

by the personal ambitions of Sergei Ivanov. The Russian Defense Minister keeps con-
centrating power in his hands, and the changes in the government in spring 2004

helped him to transform the Ministry into one of the richest agencies in the Russian
government—a real power “monster machine” in the Russian system.

The document also differentiates between external, internal, and cross-border

threats, which is a more streamlined classification system in comparison with the past.
Key external threats (among some of the mantras of the past) include the interference

of foreign states and coalitions in internal affairs (lessons learned from Kosovo and

Iraq), instability in neighboring countries caused by weakness of central governments,

and the development of WMD programs by states, coalitions, or political movements.

While the first priority is hardly applicable in the Russian case, and seems an ex-

ample of “tilting at windmills,” two others certainly reflect the realities of the modern
world. The problem of the low level of legitimacy of the regimes in the post-Soviet
space, under these circumstances, is of particular importance to Moscow (witness re-
cent developments in Kyrgyzstan). Somehow it seems that the Kremlin tends to focus

on “consolidating” the regimes, even if they are non-democratic, as a part of its strat-
ey to maintain its influence in the region. This in fact contradicts the U.S. and EU
strategy in the region, and thus creates potential tensions in the relations of Russia with these global actors.

As for some new accents, aside from traditional apprehensions about military buildup near the borders and enlargement of military blocs, one may mention the change in formula concerning the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of friendly states. It became more assertive, and includes not only the requirement for the sanction of the UN Security Council, but also Russia’s approval. Besides, Moscow pays more attention now to the protection of rights and freedoms of Russian citizens abroad, especially with respect to the recent clashes with Latvia about educational reform. The military also added the threat of hampering Russia’s access to strategically important communications, which might be a link with Russian interests in the Caspian and Caucasus regions.

The list of internal threats did not undergo significant changes. Violent change of the constitutional government and threats to territorial integrity, training and equipping of illegal armed formations, and illicit trafficking in arms remain the top priorities. But the analysts have supplemented the list with the growing threat of organized crime (when it reaches a scale where it threatens the security of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation).

Finally, the Russian military is preparing to face cross-border threats, the importance of which will increase, according to their predictions. The cross-border challenges, which are external in nature but internal in form, include the activities of international terrorist organizations on Russian territory (clearly drawing on the Chechen experience), as well as their training and equipping on the territory of other states. Besides, as we have already mentioned the economization of the Russian threat perception, Moscow draws special attention to cross-border crime, including smuggling, which requires military enforcement and support to be provided to the border patrol (particularly in the cases of Tajikistan and Georgia). Hostile information activities and drug trafficking has also shifted to these spheres as well.

As for priorities at the regional level, Central Asia and the so-called “Southern direction” are the most important in terms of ensuring Russia’s security. Moscow is especially concerned about the situation in Afghanistan in this respect. Nonetheless, the “Western direction” and “Far Eastern direction” are mentioned more specifically from the point of view of potential operations, which can lead one to believe that the General Staff is still looking for adversaries in the wrong places (this is confirmed by the anti-NATO rhetoric of the doctrine and the recent waves of dissatisfaction about NATO enlargement and the expansion of military infrastructure to the Baltic states). The recent warnings of the Defense Minister to Western countries that enter Russia’s traditional zone of influence also falls into this pile of old arguments.

One cannot blame the Russian analysts for the shape of this general list of threats, since many of them stem from the history of Russia and her traditional concerns. However, one has to conclude that many of the security challenges are far less visible than others that are not at the top of the list and which the armed forces and other security agencies should be ready to address.
There are clear discrepancies in the hierarchy of threats as far as the political leadership and the military are concerned. While the president and his team are more willing to focus on more realistic tasks, such as “soft” security matters (organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking) and cooperative approaches (for example, the interaction between the Collective Security Treaty Organization and NATO on this matter), the military remains quite obstinate in promoting the “hard” security agenda (the CFE Treaty is a good example). What unites both is the recognition of the threat posed by terrorism to Russia’s security, and the tough approach that is suggested in solving this problem.

Unfortunately, one may predict that, as Moscow drifts toward “modernization,” the executive branch will have to look for the ideology to support the reforms (though President Putin seems to be a classical unideological bureaucrat). People support the meanings embodied in the reforms, but not the ideological trappings with which they have been draped (sharing negative feelings towards “communism” or “democracy,” while having more positive responses toward “order,” “stability,” etc.). This ideological justification will probably be some form of conservative nationalism, bearing in mind Russia’s domestic developments (VCIOM’s March 2004 poll indicates that “non-Russians” elicit the highest negative feelings among a range of suggested terms). In this case, Russia may continue its drift to reasserting its status as a Great Power (based in nationalistic competitiveness), and will be more focused on hard security and strengthening its outdated armed forces. Such a geopolitical agenda focused on hard security issues may hamper Russia’s integration into the club of the leading nations of the world, and hence diminish its role in global decision-making. Moreover, Russia’s clumsy attempts to expand its influence in the post-Soviet space seem to work in the same direction, and result in clashes of interests with the U.S. and Europe.

When it comes to public perceptions, they mostly coincide with the apprehensions of the elite. Russia has passed a complicated period in its history, when its foreign and security policy was widely separated from the aspirations of the population. People highly praise President Putin for his foreign policy activities, and are far less critical on these issues than on his domestic political agenda. VCIOM’s poll of February 2004 indicates that 61 percent of the Russian public believes that international terrorism is the most significant threat to Russia’s security. In fact, the overwhelming majority named terrorist acts in Moscow and the North Caucasus as one of the key events of 2003. Almost 23 percent assume that the growing gap between rich and poor countries and the increasing military-political influence of the United States are two other sources of instability. It is striking that 17 percent fear a new world war due to the growing instability in the world, while 16 percent are afraid of the increasing influence of the Islamic world. WMD proliferation and the global economic crisis posed by the depreciating dollar are important for only 12–13 percent of the respondents.

At the same time, people are quite pragmatic in assessing the process of NATO enlargement and the worsening of relations with former Soviet republics, which are placed at the bottom of their list of priorities. As a matter of fact, only 35 percent still regard NATO as an aggressive bloc threatening Russia’s security, though more Russians (44 percent) are concerned with NATO enlargement. The number of those op-
posed to any military blocs is growing; people are becoming increasingly pragmatic, and do not want to take on any extra obligations. As for the former Soviet states, most of the Russians (61 percent) are against any domination of Moscow over these countries, and are critical of their government for its inability to improve relations in this regard. Only 5 percent believe in the danger of a powerful China (this is a typical percentage, actually, as other polls show), and this coincides with the perception of the military, who prefer to engage China through the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation and other mechanisms.

Thus, one may conclude that Russia’s perception of threats is becoming more advanced and closer to the realities of the modern world. However, Russia’s affection for hard security matters may move it further away from the European agenda. It will also prevent rapprochement with the United States, as Russia formally keeps condemning the use of force without the authorization of the UN Security Council (though, if its interests required it, Moscow would be ready to proceed with such strikes). The reminiscences of the Great Power syndrome (in the FSU zone) and the legacy of the Cold War (opposition to NATO) will further hamper Russian integration into processes of global decision-making. They may deflect Russia from solving its genuine problems and promoting real modernization of its armed forces. Finally, one has to remember the existing gap between Russia’s capabilities and its aspirations to meet present-day security challenges, including the threat of terrorism. Therefore, Russia has to rethink its old concepts and develop some new conceptual approaches, free from traditional fears that at this point are largely chimeras. The renewed Russian Security Council, headed now by ex-Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, may become the appropriate body for such new thinking (though its present composition does not thus far allow for meeting such challenging tasks). True reassessment of Russia’s national interests and threats will help Moscow to ensure continued progress toward modernization and become genuinely competitive on the world arena without confrontation.
Iran’s Nuclear Program: U.S. Options After the Elections

Matthew Rhodes *

Iran’s growing nuclear capability is emerging as the number one issue for the Bush Administration in its second term. For the past three years, the dominant focus on Iraq, in the words of former Secretary of State Colin Powell, “sucked the oxygen” from other security issues. Now, however, it is increasingly Iran that stands center-stage in defining the uses and limits of the strategy of preemption, the agenda for the broader Middle East, and the future of America’s relations with Europe.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran’s first steps toward nuclear capability date back to the time of the Shah. These efforts have continued under the post-revolution Islamic Republic. As a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, made permanent in 1995, Iran has a right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful, civilian purposes, but forswears the development of weaponized applications.

Iran’s leadership continues to insist it adheres to these conditions. However, the general temptations nuclear weapons offer in terms of perceived prestige and security, together with Iran’s pattern of deception and concealment of important elements of its program, have raised doubts about its true intentions. For example, Iran failed to disclose the existence of a large uranium enrichment facility at Natanz or a plutonium separation plant at Arak to the International Atomic Energy Agency until after a tip from an exile group in 2002. A series of subsequent IAEA reports has highlighted additional discoveries, such as advanced centrifuge designs from Pakistan, and criticized Iran’s halting cooperation with inspectors.

Questions of intent aside, estimates of the timeframe under which Iran would achieve the capability to produce usable nuclear weapons vary from as little as a year according to some U.S. sources to five to six years, according to intelligence agencies in Europe.¹ Israel reportedly expects this threshold to be breached in just two years, by 2007.

Learn to Love It

Though little discussed publicly, one possible reaction would be to view a nuclear-capable Iran as a matter of little concern, or even as something desirable. After all, despite its parallel missile program, an Iran with a handful of crude nuclear devices would for some decades lack any credible means of delivery against the U.S. home-

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¹ Marc Champion and Carla Ann Robbins, “EU Believes Iran is 5 to 6 Years from Atom Bomb,” Wall Street Journal, 10 November 2004.
land. More fundamentally, such an Iran would still be subject to the logic of deterrence and threat of retaliation by not only America’s nuclear arsenal, but its overwhelmingly superior conventional forces as well. Meanwhile, the defensive reassurance of nuclear weapons could prove a stabilizing, moderating influence on Iran’s relations vis-à-vis its regional rivals.

Two sets of concerns run counter to this reasoning. The first focuses on some specific characteristics of Iran. The country’s recent history as a tribune of wider Islamic revolution and as a sponsor for identified terrorist groups such as Hezbollah raises the fear that officials, with or without approval from the top leadership, could pass a usable nuclear device to radical, undeterrable non-state groups. Alternatively, crucial technical know-how or a finished bomb could be transferred to other governments, along the lines of the former Pakistan-centered A. Q. Khan network. Even short of such leakage, the very possession of nuclear weapons by a state openly opposed to U.S. presence, allies, interests, and values would alter the balance of power within the Middle East in ways that could constrain U.S. options in future regional crises.

The second type of concern has less to do with Iran per se than the impact of an additional nuclear-capable state on the global non-proliferation regime. Especially following the “break-out” by India and Pakistan in the late 1990s, and the claimed development of weapons by North Korea, such an obvious failure of the NPT system could trigger its collapse and produce a domino effect of other countries scrambling to acquire such weapons themselves. In the absence of the technical or organizational elements for “stable deterrence,” such a chain reaction would only raise the stakes and heighten tensions among regional rivals. It would also multiply the potential opportunities for unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons as well as their transfer to non-state terrorist or organized crime networks.

Such issues underpin the broad consensus against a nuclear Iran. Much less unity exists, however, regarding the best means of averting such an outcome.

**EU Negotiations**

The first option for the U.S. would be to lend its support to the negotiations with Iran being conducted by the so-called EU “troika” of France, Germany, and Great Britain. In November 2004, these produced a signed agreement under which Iran pledged to suspend activities related to the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel during further talks on potential technical, economic, and political support from the European Union.

An advantage of this option is simply the fact that it is already on the table. Encouraging European efforts here would also provide an opportunity for the type of burden-sharing in security matters the U.S. has been calling for from its NATO partners for years. Finally, an affirmative response to expressed European requests for stronger backing could help overcome lingering tensions caused by disagreements over Iraq and reaffirm the solidity of transatlantic relations.

Most American officials, however, simply don’t believe these negotiations will work. Their doubts extend to issues of duration, verification, and the basic sincerity of
Iran. The Iranians failed to honor a similar agreement signed in October 2003, and have expressly characterized their latest commitment as “a voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation.” Even should Iranian fealty to this version prove more robust, there is a sense that the agreement simply rewards prior misbehavior, setting a poor precedent for other aspiring nuclear powers. Worse, critics charge that the process smacks of “appeasement,” with all the historical and moral baggage carried by that term.2

**Economic Sanctions**

A second approach for the U.S. would be to threaten or impose tougher economic sanctions on Iran unless it agreed to strict verification that it had abandoned specific types of activity that could lead to production of nuclear weapons. This would add a “stick” to the primarily “carrots” offered under the troika talks. The timing for such leverage might also be more advantageous than in the recent past if analysis is correct that Iran’s leaders have embraced a “China model” strategy of seeking to defuse popular resentments of political restrictions through increased economic growth and opportunity.3

On the negative side, sanctions alone have at best a highly mixed historical record of success in changing the behavior of targeted governments. President Bush’s remark to the press in December 2004 that the U.S. had already “sanctioned [itself] out of influence” with Iran reflected the fact that existing U.S. sanctions, strengthened most recently by the Helms-Burton Act, leave little room for imposing additional restrictions unilaterally.

The chances of winning support for broader international measures at this time also appear limited. The Europeans have presented their approach of negotiated incentives as a more promising alternative to sanctions. In 2004, China signed two major long-term energy agreements with Iran, each totaling tens of billions of dollars. Russian technicians are nearing completion of a nuclear power facility in Iran at Bushehr, and talks have taken place on the possible construction of several additional reactors. Finally, with world oil prices hovering at $40–50 per barrel, effective broad-based sanctions against Iran could inadvertently spark a global energy crisis, with serious consequences for the U.S. and other petroleum-dependent economies.

**UN Referral**

A third possibility, and one advocated by U.S. officials, is formal referral of the Iran case to the UN Security Council for discussion as a looming threat to international peace. This step offers the prospect of increasing international focus and pressure on the matter, adding legitimacy to any other measures taken later, and countering the critique of the U.S. as reflexively unilateralist.

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However, other members of the Security Council, including all four other permanent members, have opposed this step. As with economic sanctions, France and Britain have presented the troika framework to Iran as a means of avoiding direct Security Council scrutiny. China’s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing underlined his government’s opposition on a visit to Tehran last November, in keeping with Russia’s longer standing position.

Preemption by Regime Change

The remaining three approaches are variants of preventive action of the type covered by the label “preemption” in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy. The first of these would be Iraq-style preemption via change of regime. Indeed, in the run-up to intervention in Iraq, an oft-quoted saying in Washington policy circles had it that “everyone wants to go to Baghdad; real men want to go to Tehran.” Press reports in early 2005 of military updating of contingency war plans for Iran and of sightings of reconnaissance drones over that country have fueled speculation that such action is in the works.

The case for applying large-scale military preemption to Iran is if anything stronger than that for Iraq in 2002–2003. Iran’s open nuclear efforts—together with its admitted past omissions in disclosure of enrichment activity—put it ahead of even the high-end pre-2003 intelligence estimates of Iraq’s nuclear capacity. The same is true of Iran’s missile program and record of ties to terrorist groups. Furthermore, given the prominence of debate on Iraq, President Bush’s successful re-election could be interpreted as a fresh popular mandate to apply preemptive strategies elsewhere. Finally, thousands of U.S. troops are already in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s immediate neighbors, theoretically offering the basis for a two-pronged attack.

Negative considerations here also begin with the fact that thousands of U.S. troops are already in Iraq and Afghanistan. Maintaining approximately 150,000 troops in the region through successive rotations has already strained the U.S. military’s manpower resources. The hopeful recent experience of national elections in both countries and accelerated training for indigenous security forces notwithstanding, the immediate possibilities for diverting significant forces from current assignments in these countries and/or mobilizing comparable numbers of additional U.S. forces from elsewhere are doubtful at best.

At the same time, Iran’s conventional military, while ultimately no match for the U.S., would present a significantly more formidable foe that of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Among Iran’s foreseeable first moves in the event of hostilities would be to stir up increased unrest inside Iraq in an effort to challenge and tie down U.S. resources. Iranian forces could also threaten oil shipping through the chokepoint of the Straits of Hormuz.

International support for U.S.-led regime change would also be lower than it was with Iraq. In that case, UN resolutions dating from the Gulf War in the early 1990s, together with Iraq’s widely accepted record of repeated violations, provided a separate legal basis for intervention. With Iran, the justification would rest on prevention alone.
Although President Bush also used the occasion of his January 2005 State of the Union address to pledge to “stand with” Iranians striving for greater freedom in their country, the perceived legitimacy of using military force as a means to that end has been further weakened by the stated opposition of Iran’s best-known pro-democracy activist Shirin Ebadi, recipient of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize.4

Accordingly, even the countries that have provided the greatest levels of support in Iraq are unlikely to do so again in Iran. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has called military intervention there “inconceivable” and unlikely to be justified under “any circumstances.”5

**Preemption by Surgical Strike**

An alternative to regime change would be a more focused, limited attack aimed at destroying the facilities and infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear program. This would require far fewer forces for much shorter duration. Even should such strikes also spark a popular revolt, there would be no necessary long-term responsibility for stabilization of the country. Domestic and international criticism could also be expected to be comparatively muted and short-lived.

On the other hand, many of the negatives of the regime change approach would still apply. International criticism, while reduced, could still prove significant; Foreign Secretary Straw’s remarks above, for instance, actually referred to the prospects of air strikes. Rather than undermining the Iranian regime’s hold on power, such strikes could bolster its popular support.

Finally there is the question of effectiveness. Along with long experience of dealing with external surveillance and international inspection regimes, the precedent of the Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 has taught Iran and other nuclear aspirants to pursue greater survivability for the core elements of their nuclear capabilities. To this end, the Iranians have dispersed facilities across the country, hardened or hidden many sites underground, and created redundancies in important areas. Moreover, successful destruction of the twenty to forty key sites cited in one estimate would significantly set back Iran’s program, but would leave the country with the technical knowledge to rebuild in the future.

**Preemption by Proxy**

A final version of preemption would be explicit or implicit encouragement to a concerned third party to carry out surgical strikes on its own without overt U.S. involvement. The leading candidate for this role, Israel, has strong regional intelligence capabilities and, as noted above, recent experience in targeted strikes. Vice President Dick Cheney’s remarks in a January 2005 radio interview suggesting that the U.S. might not be able to restrain Israel from undertaking such actions have been the highest-level ac-

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knowledge of this scenario. For their part, Israeli officials, including Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, have denounced Iran’s negotiations with the EU as a transparent effort simply “to buy time.”

This approach would of course also entail great risks. U.S. denials of involvement would be subject to doubt, and the concerns regarding effectiveness would still apply. Even without encouragement from Iran, such action by Israel in particular would have an inflammatory impact across the Middle East, including in Iraq. It would also likely prove fatal to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process precisely at the moment of its most hopeful progress in years.

**Conclusion**

The not terribly profound conclusion to be drawn from this survey is that there are no good, easy options. However, two basic points will have to guide the U.S. and others in confronting this challenge.

First, any effective policy will have to combine both carrots and sticks. Given the many plausible reasons for Iran to desire nuclear weapons, it will give up its steady development of the capability to build them only when it concludes that its key security and economic interests will be advanced by doing so and harmed by not.

Second, it follows that greater public coordination and unity between the U.S. and Europe is needed. The current approach, described by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage as a “good cop, bad cop” routine, has largely run its course. Key carrots, such as security guarantees and WTO membership, require support from the U.S. Similarly, key potential sticks, such as economic sanctions, UN action, and the prospective shadow of military force, become more credible when backed by the Europeans.

The high-profile visits to Europe in February 2005 by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and President Bush himself sharpened the transatlantic discussion on Iran without fully closing the existing gaps between the U.S. and European positions. The search for a successful formula that incorporates the twin principles above thus promises to command the administration’s security policy focus for some time longer, while the pressure for effective action continues to mount.
Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: From Aid to Development

*Mladen Stanicic*

Introduction

The new European approach regarding the economic aspects of post-conflict rehabilitation (PCR) in the so-called Western Balkans was set out in the preparation documents for the EU Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. It stated, *inter alia*, that as the Western Balkan countries gradually moved from stabilization and reconstruction based on aid to association and sustainable development, policies pursuing economic and social cohesion at both the national and regional levels would become increasingly relevant. What was required was to better integrate the goal of economic and social cohesion into EU policy towards the region. There was a pressing need for new strategies to promote structural reforms across the region, including additional forms of pre-accession assistance. This would encourage states in the region to mobilize their own resources to support positive development in particularly critical areas. At the institutional level, these countries should be granted the status category of pre-accession without negotiations, which would enable them to access the pre-accession funds such as SAPARD (Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession). In other words, these countries should be treated as pre-accession candidates without the obligation to open negotiations on membership until they were found by the Commission to be fit on their individual merits.

The region in question consists of five states—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro—that have already joined the process of stabilization and association with the EU, together with Bulgaria and Romania. In the summit’s final document, the five countries undergoing the process of stabilization and association were given the message that “the gates of Europe are open, and prospects of entering the EU are encouraging.” It was said that it was expected that Bulgaria and Romania would be granted full membership by 2007. In this document, all the states were for the first time mentioned as countries within the Western Balkans region, and thus this term was officially introduced into the policies of the EU. Having in mind what had gone on in the region’s tumultuous recent past, at the point the region of the Western Balkans became one of the regions where the processes of post-conflict resolution should be practiced within the new framework, tailored to new developments in the area.

The first step in this direction concerns the need to make a major change in the strategy of providing further financial cooperation or financial support to the region. The cooperation or financial support that is provided should be directed at making the region capable of independent economic development, formulated as making the tran-
transition “from aid to self-sustainability.” One of the main preconditions for the implementation of this strategy is to provide these countries with access to pre-accession funds, like those provided under SAPARD or the ISPA, which would be very helpful in the process of adjusting some segments of these countries’ economies to the EU criteria. For instance, the SAPARD fund is very valuable in the adjustment processes regarding agriculture. This is significant, since it is well known that agriculture is very important for the EU, as it represents a key issue in EU relations with associated member states. The ISPA fund is important for adjustment processes in the domains of transportation and ecology.

The Role of Croatia

Economic analysis shows that none of the countries in the region, not even Croatia (despite being the most advanced among them), is economically and institutionally able to finance the desired level of development from its own resources. Each of them needs foreign capital. Now the question becomes how to get it—what each of these countries should do, or what they should do together, in order to attract foreign capital, preferably in the form of foreign investments in the region. Political stability, which is a crucial precondition for post-conflict rehabilitation, is the first criterion on the list, on the basis of which the foreign investors are deciding to invest in certain areas. The importance of this criterion was magnified in the past few years. Croatia has advanced the most in this regard, followed by Macedonia. The remaining three countries have not yet started serious negotiations. That is why the Croatian contribution to the process of post-conflict rehabilitation in the region has relevance. Croatia has the biggest potential to lead the entire region along the lines of the new “from aid to self-sustainability” strategy, which is very likely to be its main contribution to the rehabilitation process in the region. Keeping in mind the fact that Croatia is expected to get official candidate status in June, it would enable the country to apply for pre-accession funds. This kind of development will enable Croatia to foster its internal stability, and thus to enhance foreign policies that will contribute to the stability of the whole region and beyond. Croatia’s contribution to European security will certainly rest in its growing and constructive participation in the establishment of long-term stability in the region. Once Croatia becomes a full-fledged member of the European Union, it will act as a real producer and no longer only as a consumer of stability. Croatia will influence the states in the eastern part of the region in terms of spreading liberal democratic ideas. By meeting all the European standards and criteria, Croatia will contribute to regional security by creating a model for its eastern neighbors. That is the main contribution that Croatia can make, both to an effective and long-lasting PCR process as well as stability in the region.

The new Croatian leadership has strongly underscored its ambition to bring Croatia to full-fledged membership in the EU and NATO as soon as possible. The transfer of power after recent elections was smooth, thus proving a high level of success in democratization and institution-building. In the last two years, real GDP growth was among the highest in the transition countries, averaging above 5 percent. The forecast
for this year is more moderate, foreseeing a gain of less than 4 percent, primarily due to the slowing down of domestic consumption. Since this category accounts for about 60 percent of the GDP structure, this will significantly affect economic growth. This underlines the main structural problem of the Croatian economy, which is that growth is mainly based on domestic consumption instead of on export. This trend complicates the problem of servicing foreign debt, which exceeds $20 billion (or, in relative terms, more than 80 percent of GDP). This is more than is permitted by the Maastricht criteria, and the trend continues; the projected budget deficit for this year is more than 4.5 percent. In the first eleven months of the last year, the trade deficit amounted to $7.1 billion, and the unemployment rate has been growing steadily (currently at 18.9 percent). Inflation is at its historical minimum of 1.5 percent, allowing for the lowest price increases since independence. The new government has declared that it was aware of the gravity of the structural problems in the Croatian economy, which might create an impediment to implementing structural reforms in line with the EU standards (Copenhagen criteria) and other necessary measures.

Since 1991, Croatia has been receiving European Commission assistance. Currently, the only assistance program that is in place for the five countries under the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) is the CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) program, which has built on the previous assistance programs. In turn, these were based on the ECHO and Obnova programs, which allowed for total allocations of 381.61 million euros up to 2000. Since then, such assistance has been focused on the return of refugees and other humanitarian support efforts, which have absorbed about 90 percent of the total resources. Other allocation areas were trade, industrial standards, improvements of the labor market and investment climate, justice and home affairs, environment management, etc. The indicative financial allocations for CARDS assistance for Croatia for the period 2002–2004 are 255 million euros, which includes 113 projects in the following areas: democratic stabilization, economic and social development, justice and home affairs, administrative capacity building, and environment and natural resources. Croatia is a full participant in the SAA process, and was the only one among the SAA participants to formally apply for full-fledged membership on the basis of Article 49 of the Treaty on the EU, on 21 February 2003. After accepting this application, the EC issued a questionnaire with more than 4,500 questions on Croatia’s capability to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Croatia responded to the questionnaire in October 2003, and expects positive advice from the EC very shortly.

**Some Strategic Issues**

The main problem that should be discussed within the process of implementation of the new economic development strategy is how to conform the assistance with development rather than to put too much stress on stabilization. This relates primarily to the CARDS assistance framework, which should prepare the countries in question for the full scope of pre-accession activities. Based on the present experience, one can recommend that, for the benefit of the post-conflict rehabilitation process, CARDS has to
reflect the individual needs and priorities of the countries in the region, some of which are still struggling with the consequences of the conflicts in the region and have, therefore, different starting points and different absorption capacities. In this context, it is particularly important that the Commission underlines the necessity for the adjustment of Community assistance to meet individual development needs of different countries in the region, and to changes in those needs.

According to some experience, the visibility of any concerned assistance program (including CARDS) that is involved in the new assistance strategy should be enhanced, especially at the local and regional levels. In Croatia, but also in the other countries in question, NGOs in particular are concerned with the fact that only a limited number of people (apart from those directly involved) are aware of the new assistance strategy, which makes the promotion of the multitude of benefits received through the programs difficult. This is very important because the lack of visibility of any given program, and of the strategy in general, results not only in a lack of public support, but also in a lack of peer support in the institutions within which they work.

Within the scope of the new assistance strategy, additional incentives are needed in the process of the harmonization of legislation. It is very important to activate mechanisms that would secure a rapid and efficient response to the demand for expert support in the process of adjusting the national legislation to the *acquis communautaire*. These mechanisms should rely on the TAIEX instrument (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office), which is now open only to the candidate countries. Such assistance should be adapted to the dynamics of legal harmonization in each recipient country on a case-by-case basis. Within the scope of implementation of the SAA after its entry into force, it is of critical importance to introduce a systematic verification of the harmonized legal provisions with the *acquis communautaire* by the respective services of the European Commission. This can be achieved through a screening principle.

Following the process of harmonization of national laws with the *acquis communautaire*, the demand for investments, which would provide for an efficient application of the harmonized legislation, will become increasingly pronounced. In that respect, and in accordance with the experience of the candidate countries, it is proposed to adjust and amend the CARDS Program in particular, in such a manner as to secure resources for investment-type projects with a view of implementing the *acquis communautaire* in the fields of environment protection, transport infrastructure, technical legislation, market surveillance, and the creation of infrastructure related to the functioning of the internal market in concerned countries.

Over the course of 2003, primary and secondary legislation were drafted; the year 2004 is reserved for building the capacity of the state bodies responsible for the application of the harmonized laws. 2005 is crucial in terms of the enforcement of legal provisions and building the appropriate technical infrastructure. The final deadline for the full operability of the established technical infrastructure is the beginning of 2007. The application of technical provisions will result in a stronger demand for investments in technical infrastructure, and it will require amendments to the existing financial and technical instruments by which the Community supports the integration process of
Croatia and other countries in the region. It will also require harmonization with the EU in such a manner that more substantial investment support is provided.

Since the CARDS Program is primarily an institution-building program, the introduction of the twinning mechanism as a model of project implementation is felt to be especially relevant. Twinning enables the direct transfer of know-how and experience from state officials in donor countries to those in recipient countries, but it also contributes to the process of development of institutional relations, in that related administrative bodies maintain contact after the completion of a given project. It is necessary to stress that the inclusion of state officials from the candidate countries as junior partners is extremely important, since they offer a direct perspective emerging from the process of transition and adjustment to the standards of the European Union. Since the twinning model can currently only be applied in certain sectors (public administration reform, justice and home affairs, public finance, and adjustment of laws related to the functioning of the internal market), it is estimated that it would be useful to extend the twinning model to the entire acquis communautaire.

Furthermore, it would be extremely helpful to undertake the necessary legal and institutional measures with a view toward harmonizing the CARDS implementation mechanism with the INTERREG initiative and other programs of cross-border cooperation open to the candidate countries (PHARE CBC). Within its priority goals, the CARDS Program includes the promotion of cross-border, trans-national, and regional cooperation among the recipient countries, and cooperation with the candidate countries and the EU member states. In Croatia, for example, there is great interest at the national and regional levels for implementing the activities that would result in closer linkages between national (regional) areas that share common borders or belong to a larger trans-national area. The majority of those activities are planned within the scope of the INTERREG initiative or bilateral cross-border cooperation with Slovenia and Hungary. The member states are entitled to utilize the resources of the European Fund for Regional Development for participation in such activities, and the candidate countries are granted this opportunity through programs supporting cross-border cooperation (PHARE Cross Border Cooperation). Croatia and other SAA countries, however, are currently not in the position to finance their participation with means provided by the CARDS Program in such a manner that the projects are mutually linked. The extension of this provision to the SAA countries would contribute a great deal to the implementation of the new assistance strategy and subsequently to the process of post-conflict rehabilitation in the region. Bearing this in mind, there is an urgent need for the CARDS Program to act in a manner that is complementary to other Community initiatives and programs. In this sense, the measures necessary to adjust the implementation mechanisms of the mentioned instruments and secure appropriate financial means for the implementation of cross-border and trans-national projects should be undertaken.
Conclusion

The EU has made increasing efforts lately to enforce its foreign policy, as well as its security policy, in order to become a more relevant partner of the U.S., at the same time contributing to the transformation of the international relations paradigm from the present state of unilateralism to multilateralism. One of the preconditions for this transformation is the creation of the sub-regional security structure in South Eastern Europe, or the Western Balkans, and the involvement of the states in the region in the process of “Eastern enlargement.” Bearing in mind the armed conflicts, destruction, and bloodshed that have plagued the region in the past decade, this is a very complex task. However, a stable security situation in “Europe’s backyard” (the informal nickname for the region) is one of the conditions for securing the entire territory of the EU, as well as territories beyond its formal borders. The best guarantee for this would be adjusting these countries to EU standards and criteria, which is the optimal way toward successful post-conflict rehabilitation. One of the preconditions is a suitable level of economic development, and in this context a suitable level of economic cooperation.

Here one encounters a delicate question concerning the level of such cooperation. Economic cooperation between countries with such differences in economic development, and even differences in their respective development of democratic society, could turn out to be counterproductive. The theory of integration and cooperation should be thoroughly examined. It starts with functional cooperation, goes on to functional integration, which then leads to institutional cooperation, and ends in institutional integration. It should be carefully analyzed to find out which type of cooperation could be applied to the territory of the Western Balkans in order to exercise optimal PCR practices.

According to economic indicators, there are substantial differences between the level of development of Croatia and other countries in the region. In theory (as well as in practice), these differences could be overcome only by a normal market approach, which forms the basis of all the reforms of the countries in transition. The market approach derives from the business interests of business units or companies, and not from political structures, which aim to form an association under all costs, thus forming an association with no real business interest. If Croatian companies are interested in buying certain factories in Serbia, and vice-versa, they should carry out their business transactions on their own. As far the state authorities are concerned, they could give their support to a particular type of functional cooperation. State authorities could, for instance, give their support to cooperation regarding free trade zones. Any further cooperation—whether it be in the form of multilateral free trade zones, highly recommended by Brussels, or custom unions—should be left in the hands of business experts. Therefore, this is a very delicate situation, one that requires a subtle approach from all parties involved, including Brussels and the stakeholders in the region, as well as careful decision-making.

As far as other assumptions about how best to attract foreign investments are concerned, it is very important to establish a credible judiciary and effective structures of public administration. The situation in Croatia concerning both these elements is
catastrophic. This is the case at the level of civil and criminal lawsuits, but also regarding the procedures governing accepting foreign investments. The legal procedure regarding foreign investments is very complicated and long; cases dealing with corruption and privatization in this area are simply being postponed until the statute of limitations runs out. Even the international community has singled this out as a problem. A large part of the funds of the CARDS Program were allocated for the reform of the judiciary and public administration in Croatia. This is a cesspool that needs to be filled in order to attract more foreign investment. There are no orderly land registry books in Croatia, so when an investor asks for the exact borders of the land he has bought, no one knows. This is a vicious circle.

Generally, it can be concluded that the stabilization process in the region has made progress, but the complex and long-term challenges of state-building and economic development are far from being met. The region is not yet firmly locked into the EU integration process, and the situation in Serbia in particular could get worse before it gets better. In addition, a coming array of presidential and local elections will provide new opportunities for the radicals to further enhance their strength. The Western Balkans need the EU very much, and the EU is now offering a new assistance strategy for the region, but the level of assistance offered is insufficient (except for Croatia) to meet the main preconditions for successful post-conflict rehabilitation.
European Security and Private Military Companies: The Prospects for Privatized “Battlegroups”

James K Wither *

Introduction

“Mercenary” remains a pejorative term. It is associated with the hired killers implicated in coup attempts in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, and more recently associated with human rights abuses in post-Cold War conflicts in Eurasia and the Balkans. However, until the nineteenth century a large part of the armed forces of most European nations was supplied by the private sector. It was normal for professional soldiers—especially those with technical expertise, such as artillerymen or siege engineers—to offer their services on the open market. Often contractors organized soldiers into formed units on behalf of paying clients, notably the condottieri that held a monopoly on providing military services to the city-states of fifteenth-century Italy. Later, formed bodies of mercenaries were hired by the emerging nation-states of Western Europe and integrated into their armies. Units of Swiss, Scots, and Irish soldiers served in the armies of France. Great Britain hired nearly 30,000 German mercenaries to help fight the rebellious American colonists. Commercial contractors were also required to equip, feed, and sustain troops in the field, carrying out many tasks that would later be performed by uniformed logisticians in the large standing armies of the twentieth century. But, just as mercenaries supplanted unreliable feudal levies towards the end of the Middle Ages, they began to fall from favor as the scale of warfare increased and mass citizen armies emerged during the French revolutionary wars. For the last two centuries, a state monopoly on armed violence has been an accepted feature of national sovereignty.

In the early twenty-first century, political, technological, and societal developments have again combined to change the predominant character of armed conflict. A complex and unpredictable security environment has replaced the threat of large-scale interstate war. Compulsory military service and large standing armies have become anachronisms, while the bonds of national sentiment and identification that helped to sustain these forces are in decline. To the extent that emerging security threats require a military response, the need is for rapidly deployable, expeditionary forces capable of conducting operations in a wide variety of environments. However, most member states of the European Union (EU) appear reluctant to reform and resource their armed forces to provide these capabilities. Given these conditions, this exploratory paper examines whether the states of Europe could once again turn to the modern-day equivalent of the condottieri, private military companies (PMCs), to supplement or even substitute for their national military forces in an expeditionary role. A PMC is defined as an enterprise organized on corporate lines, which is formally contracted to provide

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military services to its clients. These services can be restricted to training and support functions, but may also include combat activities. The focus of this essay is on what P. W. Singer has classified as “military provider firms,” those that supply direct combat services.

The Military Challenge for Post-Modern Europe

The Europe of nineteenth-century imperialism and twentieth-century total war is no more. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the European integration project have transformed international relations within the continent. European states of the early twenty-first century show no inclination to make war on each other or conquer territory. The commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, cooperation through common institutions, and growing interdependence and transparency have largely replaced inter-state relationships based on narrow definitions of sovereignty, national interests, and the balance of power. Consequently, the British diplomat Robert Cooper has described the EU as a “post-modern system.” He distinguishes European states from countries elsewhere in the world, where traditional concepts of national interest and military power still dominate security thinking, and from so-called “failed states,” where national institutions and authority have largely collapsed.

EU states favor using diplomatic and economic tools to address the underlying causes of conflict outside Europe, and place their faith in multilateral approaches based on international institutions and the rule of law to tackle emerging security challenges. Nevertheless, the EU’s strategy paper of December 2003 identifies specific threats to European security, namely the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and state failure. While the drafters recognize that “none of the new threats to security is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means,” military capabilities are acknowledged as necessary in efforts to counter terrorism, restore order in failed states, and assist with post-conflict reconstruction. The strategy paper also stresses the need to “develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.” “Robust intervention” must include the option to apply military force outside of Europe if necessary to combat terrorism, prevent humanitarian tragedies, or evacuate EU citizens caught up in civil wars.

Unfortunately, the rhetoric of European security ambitions is not matched by the military reality. The European Institute for Security Studies has concluded that, “The

1 A comprehensive discussion of the distinction between mercenaries, private armies, private security companies, and PMCs is provided by Dr. Kevin A. O’Brien in “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies,” RUSI Journal 145:1 (February 2000).
5 Ibid., 11.
Union cannot deploy land forces quickly and cannot sustain them, due to the shortage of committed, deployable, combat ready forces.\textsuperscript{6} The “Headline Goal 2010,” endorsed by the European Council in June 2004, is an attempt to address these shortfalls.\textsuperscript{7} Under the Headline Goal, the EU will respond to crises throughout the world—including humanitarian missions, rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and disarmament operations—with forces ready to implement their mission within ten days of a decision to deploy. A key feature of the Headline Goal is the proposal to create up to thirteen self-sustaining, rapidly deployable battalion-sized combined arms “battle groups,” with a forced entry capability and the capacity to operate in a wide variety of combat environments in response to requests from the United Nations (UN). France, the United Kingdom (U.K.), Italy, and Spain have indicated that they will each supply a battle group. However, concerns have also been expressed about “straining the budgets and capabilities of the smaller member states,”\textsuperscript{8} and in a recent article on the potential of providing EU peacekeeping support to the UN, the U.K.’s Director General of International Security Policy acknowledged that the creation of these battle groups would be “extremely challenging” for most EU member states.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Europe’s Military Weakness}

During the Cold War, European security depended on the guarantee of United States (U.S.) support through the medium of the NATO alliance. But since 1990, U.S. and European threat perception and strategic thinking have often diverged. Despite NATO’s program of military transformation, the differences within the transatlantic partnership suggest that it might be hard to arrive at the necessary political consensus to deploy the alliance’s new flagship NATO Response Force (NRF) in a timely and effective manner. NATO has even struggled to provide adequate helicopter support to its International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan.

The EU’S attempt to develop its own distinct intervention capability recognizes the eventuality that the Union may have to address security interests beyond its borders without direct support from the U.S., even if NATO resources are made available. In fact, EU-sponsored peacekeeping and enforcement operations have already begun, albeit on a modest scale. The EU may have failed to meet its much-trumpeted original Headline Goal force targets by 2003 as intended, but in the same year the Union assumed responsibility for peacekeeping in Macedonia and policing in Bosnia, as well as

mounting Operation Artemis, a French-led humanitarian relief intervention in the Congo.\(^\text{10}\) All told, between 50,000 and 60,000 troops from EU countries were deployed outside of the NATO and EU area, in more than twenty countries.\(^\text{11}\)

The extent of these deployments appears impressive, but the ability of many EU armed forces to undertake military operations except in benign peacekeeping environments is doubtful. Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 revealed significant gaps in European military capabilities, and progress to address these shortfalls has been slow and inconsistent despite a common commitment to the European Capabilities Action Plan in 2001. A 2003 report by the Bonn International Center for Conversion highlighted a long list of deficiencies, one that was little changed from those identified in 1999, including critical force multipliers such as strategic airlift, electronic warfare, secure communications networks, intelligence assets, and special forces.\(^\text{12}\) According to Professor de Wijk of the Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies, only 10 percent of the EU’s military forces are suitable for deployment on overseas combat missions, although member states have approximately 1.7 million men and women under arms.\(^\text{13}\) Currently, only the British and French have an independent capability to mount expeditionary operations outside of the European area, although their capacity to act without U.S. support is limited. Nevertheless, the EU has taken over from NATO in Bosnia, and the possibility of future deployments to Moldova and the Sudan has been discussed.\(^\text{14}\) If the operational tempo increases, those few states that possess effective armed forces are likely to balk at continuing to shoulder a disproportionate share of the military burden, with its attendant political risks and inevitable casualties.

Western militaries have been described as “increasingly unpatriotic in motivation, civilian in ethos and constabulary in purpose.”\(^\text{15}\) Such a viewpoint would be anathema to many professional officers and soldiers in Western armed forces, but the militaries of EU states are arguably a reflection of a general public which, if not manifestly pacifist, appears increasingly reluctant to support the use of force as an instrument of policy in international relations.\(^\text{16}\) Few governments are willing to pay the financial and

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\(^{10}\) The Headline Goals agreed at the Helsinki Conference in 1999 aimed to establish a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 by 2003 that could be deployed within sixty days with the necessary support to fulfill the full range of Petersberg military tasks.


\(^{14}\) Smith, “Development of Response Forces,” paragraph 42.


political price of diverting resources from domestic health, education, and social priorities in order to enhance their military capabilities during an era of unprecedented peace in Europe. Thus the bulk of the EU’s soldiers may be ill prepared for the kind of high-intensity combat that might be necessary during expeditionary operations. Nor will they necessarily be effective in a gendarmerie role as peacekeepers. The British experience in Iraq has indicated that soldiers must be ready to handle humanitarian tasks, stabilization functions, and combat operations concurrently. It is doubtful if many states can be relied upon to field troops with the appropriate training, equipment, flexibility, or even resolve to soldier effectively under such exacting conditions.

The response of some soldiers from EU states to the more demanding peacekeeping tasks on recent operations has already raised concerns about their combat readiness, although it is only fair to note that many peacekeeping contingents have had to operate within very restrictive rules of engagement imposed by governments anxious to avoid casualties that could undermine domestic support for their policies. Dutch troops were accused of cowardice following their failure to protect the Muslim population of Srebrenica from Serbian aggression and massacre in 1995, a disaster that caused much disquiet and debate in the Netherlands. The International Crisis Group report on the unrest in Kosovo in March 2004 highlighted the failure of Italian, French, and German Kosovo Force (KFOR) units to confront Albanian mobs intent on attacking the Serbian minority. Police officers who vainly attempted to stop the rioting talked of a “Srebrenica syndrome,” accusing KFOR soldiers of running away instead of standing their ground in the face of violence. Spanish troops came in for similar criticism during the upsurge in violence in Iraq in spring 2004. A combat team from the elite “Plus Ultra”

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brigade refused to deploy to assist Latin American contingents under attack from insurgents in Najaf until after the fighting was over.22

The armed forces of the new EU member states can currently contribute little to expeditionary operations. Essentially, they are still organized and equipped for general war, not limited intervention. Poland is making a serious effort to modernize, but as the preparations for deployment to Iraq revealed, its armed forces will need substantial investment to develop an effective expeditionary capability.23 In other countries, such as Hungary and Slovakia, there is a lingering reluctance to shift from a military emphasis on territorial defense, mainly because of the political and economic costs of restructuring and downsizing armed forces. Many states still retain conscription policies, but conscript soldiers can normally only be used for collective defense or in the most undemanding peacekeeping environments. Forces with a Cold War-era organization and mindset will be of little assistance to the EU as it seeks to develop an effective intervention capability.

Back to the Future: The Re-emergence of Private Military Companies

While Europe’s state militaries struggle with reform and restructuring, the heirs of the condottieri are thriving. Globally, the private sector offers the full range of military services from combat infantrymen to strategic consultancy. Between 1994 and 2002, the Pentagon entered into more than three thousand contracts with PMCs.24 The extent of privatization is illustrated by statistics from the two wars against Iraq. In the campaign of 2003, the ratio of civilian contractors to military personnel was 1:10, compared to an estimated 1:50 at the time of the Gulf War in 1991.25 A two-year research project by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists completed in 2002 identified around 90 PMCs, which had collectively operated in 110 countries throughout the world.26 The war in Iraq and its aftermath have resulted in a huge expansion in private sector military activity. The revenues of British PMCs alone are estimated to have risen from $320 million before the war to over $1.6 billion by March 2004.27

The growth of PMCs has been driven by a number of factors, most of them unique to the post-Cold War era. Since the early 1990s there has been a significant reduction

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22 Interview by the author with a senior U.S. Marine Corps officer from the Marine Expeditionary Force on 1 December 2004. He claims Spanish commanders were unprepared for combat and more concerned with their soldiers’ “creature comforts” than with the tactical situation.
in the size of armed forces around the world. The U.S. military, for example, is 35 percent smaller than at the time of the Gulf War. During the same period, North American and European soldiers have deployed on more military operations than they had during all forty years of the Cold War. These operations have covered the full spectrum of conflict, from peace support to high-intensity combat, demanding a range of military skills and experience beyond the capabilities of many states. Private contractors have expanded to meet the skills gap and to fill the shortages caused by the reduction in the number of military personnel. This expansion has been assisted by the availability of individuals with appropriate expertise who have found themselves without work through the downsizing of state militaries. The complexity of modern military hardware has also fuelled the growth of a small army of civilian maintenance specialists. The U.K. employed around 1500 civilian contractors during the Iraq campaign in 2003, mainly to provide equipment and technical support, not least because British soldiers lacked the specialized skills to service the more sophisticated equipment in the field.28 As equipment maintenance is increasingly carried out by the original manufacturer, contractor support on operations has become vital for advanced Western militaries.29

The broader political vogue for privatization has also played an important role in the growth of military enterprises. It has become an article of faith that the public sector should be exposed to the rigors of the market to benefit from what are perceived to be cost effective commercial financial and management practices. Although the benefits of outsourcing public sector activities are sometimes disputed, defense ministries have not been exempt from this trend, and the private sector now provides many service-support functions such as cleaning, catering, transport, and training services, even on operations.30 In Kosovo, the U.S. firm Brown & Root Services (BRS) supplied U.S. forces with 100 percent of their food, vehicle maintenance, and hazardous materials handling; 90 percent of their water; and 80 percent of their fuel provision.31 In Europe, the U.K. has led the trend towards outsourcing since the Thatcher government’s reforms in the 1980s. Various initiatives, such as “Competing for Quality” and “Private Finance Initiatives,” have resulted in the complete or partial privatization of a wide range of military support functions, including potentially mission-critical tasks such as air-to-air refueling. The U.K.’s concept of “Sponsored Reserves” already arguably

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29 For examples of the U.S. military’s dependence on contract technicians during the war in Iraq in 2003, see: Isenberg, “Fistful of Contractors,” 21.

30 A Pentagon report from 1995 estimated savings of up to $6 billion annually by 2002 if all military support functions were contracted out to the private sector. See Peterson, “Privatizing Combat,” 3.

31 Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 145; see also Table 9.1, 144.
blurs the distinction between the armed forces and the civilian employees of PMCs in the field.footnote{32}

Most controversially, the employment of PMCs has allowed military assistance to be supplied in situations where it might have been politically unpalatable to use the regular armed forces.footnote{33} U.S.-based private firms have carried out clandestine operations proscribed by Congress or unpopular with the American public, most notably in Colombia. Federal law prevents U.S. troops from participating in the war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) guerrillas, but PMCs hired by the government have been used to train the Colombian army and combat the drug trade on which FARC depends for funding.

PMCs already undertake a range of peacekeeping tasks for the UN and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the provision of security for humanitarian assistance, the construction and operation of medical facilities, and de-mining services. As noted above, civilian contractors provide critical combat support and combat service support to Western militaries on operations. Yet the growth of the private military industry is far from universally applauded, and no European state has yet employed a PMC in a direct combat role. The very idea of military provider firms operating at the cutting edge of EU expeditionary forces would currently be an unthinkable and even distasteful prospect for many policy makers. Nonetheless, at present armed forces face rapid and continuing changes in the structure, roles, and delivery of military force in response to the emergence of novel security challenges and technical transformation. The privatization of military services is part of a continuing change process that began at the end of the Cold War and seems set to continue, as the breakup of the state monopoly on military services deviates from the norm of the last two centuries, when armed forces were exclusively financed and controlled by state governments.

PMCs have already taken over many functions that were until recently the exclusive preserve of uniformed personnel. Formed units from military provider companies have also demonstrated the private sector’s ability to intervene effectively in the kind of intrastate conflicts in Africa that the EU’s battle groups are intended to tackle. Since the mid 1990s, many officials and commentators have contemplated moving toward “privatized peacekeeping” because of the persistent failings of the national military contingents deployed on UN missions. P. W. Singer of the Brookings Institute has de-

footnote{32} Under the Reserve Forces Act 1996, PMCs can provide support services in conflict situations by allowing their employees to become “special members of a reserve force.” As reservists, these employees are liable for “call out,” subject to service discipline and regulations, and receive appropriate military training. See: www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/96014--e.htm#39. See also discussion in Elke Krahmann, “Controlling Private Military Companies: The United Kingdom and Germany,” Paper for International Studies Association Annual Convention 2003, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 8–9.

scribed the emergence of private firms as heralding “tectonic” changes in the way military capabilities are provided to both states and non-state actors. American military analyst Steve Metz has also predicted that, “Corporate armies, navies, air forces, and intelligence services may be major actors in twenty-first century armed conflict.” Other commentators have even questioned whether the motivation and morality of soldiers in modern professional armed forces can really be distinguished from the so-called “mercenaries” employed by PMCs.

Privatized Peacekeeping and Enforcement: PMCs in Direct Combat Roles

As the services of PMCs became increasingly critical to the success of peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, it was inevitable that employees from these companies found themselves placed in “harm’s way.” Contractors from Defence Systems Limited (DSL), a PMC based in the U.K., provided transport, maintenance, communications, and engineering services for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. But these activities involved DSL employees driving armored personnel carriers on peacekeeping operations and sometimes delivering supplies to bases under small arms and artillery fire. In an unprecedented venture for a PMC contracted by a Western government, the United States hired the Virginia based DynCorp to supply ceasefire monitors for Kosovo in 1998. Although the DynCorp employees were unarmed, they were deployed into a potential combat environment instead of regular soldiers.

As non-linear battlefields and asymmetrical methods of warfare come to characterize more contemporary armed conflicts, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant has become increasingly blurred. Although none of the PMCs in Iraq was hired to take part in combat operations, contractors providing military security services, such as installation protection and convoy escort, were forced into direct combat with insurgents during the eruption of violence in spring 2004. Four employees of Blackwater USA were ambushed, killed, and mutilated while on convoy escort duty in Fallujah. A few days later, eight “commandos” from the same PMC successfully de-

34 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 18.
fended the U.S. headquarters in Najaf against an attack by hundreds of Iraqi militia. During the operation, helicopters manned by Blackwater employees even ferried in fresh ammunition and evacuated the wounded.39 As major security firms recruit former members of the special forces and other elite combat units, it is hardly surprising that these employees and personnel from other security firms such as Control Risk Group, Triple Canopy, and Hart Group Ltd. acquitted themselves well under fire.40 In some cases, private contractors proved to be more professional and effective than coalition troops. Triple Canopy’s operatives fought for three days to protect civilian members of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) at a facility in Kut after Ukrainian soldiers apparently retreated from their positions.41

While PMCs in Iraq have demonstrated their competence to fight limited defensive battles in low-intensity conflicts, elsewhere private sector forces have already taken a leading role in offensive military operations in theatres of war as far apart as Macedonia, Colombia, and sub-Saharan Africa. It was the successful interventions by the South African PMC Executive Outcomes (EO) in the mid 1990s against rebels in Angola and Sierra Leone that brought the issue of the employment of PMCs in direct combat to the forefront of discussion. EO’s operation in Sierra Leone in 1995, in particular, was a classic example of what a small force of highly skilled, professional soldiers from a military provider firm can achieve against the more numerous but poorly trained irregular fighters that make up the bulk of combatants in conflicts in the developing world. The company employed a battalion-sized force of infantry, supported by combat helicopters, light artillery, and some armored vehicles, which completely defeated rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in a few weeks.42 EO’s success contrasted sharply with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’s (UNAMSIL) costly and ineffective operation, and launched much debate about the possibilities of privatized peacekeeping and enforcement.43 An Adelphi Paper from 1998 argued for governments and international institutions to begin a “constructive en-

43 See, for example, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “Should We Privatize the Peacekeeping,” Washington Post, 12 May 2000, A47.
“engagement” with military companies that might allow them to supplement international and regional peacekeeping activities. PMCs themselves also appeared anxious to “legitimize” their business activities. Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), a lobbying group for companies providing military security, argued strongly that PMCs could supply the “sharp, intensive use of force when necessary to end conflicts quickly” and add much needed “teeth” to peace operations by acting as “force multipliers” for otherwise mediocre local military forces.

Military Provider Companies in Support of EU Expeditionary Forces

Recent conflicts have illustrated that a small unit of well trained and equipped, highly motivated soldiers can wield tremendous firepower and have a military impact out of all proportion to their numbers. Although even the largest PMC is unlikely to be able to field more than around 500 troops, this should prove sufficient for a limited intervention role with support from EU or NATO combat and logistic assets. In a hypothetical EU operation, a PMC could be hired to intervene rapidly in a deteriorating security situation, defeat local opposition, and stabilize a conflict long enough to allow peacekeepers from member states or the UN to deploy at a more leisurely pace without significant military risks. An intervention operation might involve the creation of a humanitarian safe haven or “corridor.” A member of the U.S. National Security Council is reported to have suggested that EO be hired for such an undertaking during the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1996. In addition to providing units for forced entry operations, a combatant PMC might also provide a rapid reaction force in support of an EU peacekeeping operation. This force could be used to hunt down war criminals, mount combat and hostage rescue missions, and engage in counter-terrorist activities as a supplement or alternative to the employment of overstretched special forces assets from EU member states.

In Sierra Leone, the EO force deployed in the field with integral long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and signals jamming and intercept capabilities that easily outclassed anything fielded by the RUF. However, in the future intervention forces could find themselves confronted by opponents with sophisticated technology and expertise as advanced surveillance, communications, and targeting equipment find their way into the arsenals of non-state combatants. Unlike the armed forces of many EU member states, major PMCs have remained abreast of technological developments in the U.S. military in order to continue to service their most lucrative market. Private sector companies are also directly involved in the operation or maintenance of much of the tech-

44 David Shearer, “Private Armies and Military Intervention,” Adelphi Paper No. 316, IISS, (February 1998), 76. The author had headed Save the Children Fund programs and served as a senior adviser to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Liberia and Rwanda
nology on which evolving network-centric warfare capabilities depend. Therefore, the employment of technologically advanced PMCs conceivably offers EU military planners both a means to bridge some of the gaps identified in the Union’s combat and force protection capabilities and remain interoperable with U.S. forces on operations.

On occasion, employees from PMCs have already operated successfully alongside Western armed forces in combat roles. For example, a firm called Express Air was hired to supply pilots to fly Hind attack helicopters in support of British forces during operations in Sierra Leone in 1999. In a partially privatized peacekeeping scenario, EU expeditionary operations of the future could involve coalitions made up of formed units from both the state and the private sector, a return to the military norm of the early modern period. It is already envisaged that some battle groups will be composed of contingents from a number of different EU states. The incorporation of a PMC, organized and staffed on the lines of advanced Western militaries, into such a formation would arguably be less difficult than the integration of units from some of the smaller, newer, or non-NATO member states.

The Practical Challenges of Employing Military Provider Companies

There are, of course, significant practical obstacles to the employment of PMCs in a combat role. Currently, only a very limited number of firms are willing or able to provide such services. Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), one of the largest and most prestigious PMCs, claims to have 12,500 veterans on call, but the company eschews a combat role. A spokesman for ArmorGroup, a major PMC in the training and security fields, has expressed opposition to the very idea of the private sector supplying combat services. To date, Executive Outcomes and the British firm Sandline are the only companies to have engaged in combat openly, but EO disbanded in 1999 and Sandline ceased trading in April 2004. Both firms were able to draw on South African veterans with a common training, language, and philosophy. In order for a PMC to have the same operational effectiveness with recruits from more diverse origins, substantial, expensive training might be required. Firms providing direct combat services face the additional challenge of maintaining their operatives at a high state of readiness between assignments.

Other companies have the potential to fill the gap left by the demise of EO and Sandline. Gary Jackson, the president of Blackwater, claims to want to have “the largest, most professional private army in the world” ready for peacekeeping duties in any

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48 The House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence, Appendix 8, “Memorandum from MA students of Defence Technology, The Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University,” Chapter 5, The United Kingdom Perspective, 23 July 2002, paragraph 5.4. The pilots were drafted into the Sierra Leone armed forces to provide legitimacy and accountability, and obeyed orders from the commander of British forces in Sierra Leone.


country.\footnote{See Barry Yeoman, “Need An Army? Just Pick Up the Phone,” \textit{New York Times}, 2 April 2004.} Many other established PMCs such as DynCorp and International Charter Incorporated (ICI) could offer combat services, but are not currently in this market. However, the Anglo-American firm Northbridge Services Group has claimed to be able to deploy a fully equipped brigade, including full logistical support, anywhere in the world within three weeks.\footnote{Jeremy Lovell, “Privatized Military Wave of the Future, Firms Say,” \textit{Birmingham Post}, 12 May 2003, 11.} The same PMC offered to provide a battalion of peacekeepers for Liberia in 2003 to halt the fighting around Monrovia and arrest the indicted war criminal President Charles Taylor.\footnote{Stephen Fidler and Thomas Catan, “Private Military Companies Pursue the Peace Dividend,” \textit{The Financial Times}, 24 July 2003.} The company’s web site offers “Operational Support” services including special forces units, air assault capabilities, and rapid reaction forces.\footnote{See http://www.northbridgeservices.com/services_opsupport.htm.} Unfortunately, as with Sandline, some of the company’s business activities have courted controversy and undermined its claims to respectability. In April 2003, the British foreign secretary publicly accused the firm of jeopardizing the peace process in Ivory Coast by reportedly recruiting personnel to intervene in the fighting.\footnote{British Government, \textit{Official Report}, 1 April 2003; Vol. 402, c. 52WS.} Currently, the absence of competition in the military provider field means that any government seeking these services has few reliable options. It also remains to be seen whether many well-established PMCs would want to enter the high-risk business of direct combat, even if such a role were viewed as legitimate.

There are no reliable data on the likely costs of employing a PMC in a combat role, although claims have been made about the cost effectiveness of these enterprises based on the interventions of military provider firms in Africa. EO’s fee for its operation in Sierra Leone is reported to have been $35 million, which compared favorably with the $47 million for the scheduled UN observer force at the time and the cost of the later UNAMSIL mission.\footnote{Brendan O’Shea, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” \textit{Peacekeeping and International Relations} (April–September 2001): 17–18; and David Shearer, “Privatising Protection,” \textit{World Today} (August/September 2001).} However, the demand for private security personnel in Iraq has pushed up the revenues of PMCs and inflated employees’ salaries to record levels, not least to cover insurance costs.\footnote{See discussion in Isenberg, “Fistful of Contractors,” 25–26.} Given the limited number of companies offering direct combat services, the dangerous nature of the work, and the level of military skills required, the employment of a competent PMC in a combat role would not be a cheap option, even if it were an expedient one.

Military provider firms and top-flight security companies hire from the same pool of elite soldiers. Such enterprises provide a source of employment for retired officers and soldiers, who often leave the armed services in the prime of life, with not only years of military experience, but also a profound understanding of the norms of mili-
tary behavior. PMCs can provide a means by which the expertise of these military personnel can continue to be leveraged on behalf of a state, albeit at a price. But recruitment by PMCs could have a negative impact on retention and morale in national armed forces, especially if private-sector soldiers were to be deployed on a battlefield alongside regular troops performing the same tasks, but with lower pay and greater liabilities. The high salaries on offer in Iraq have already caused elite soldiers from armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic to retire prematurely in record numbers. The U.K. has even resorted to offering soldiers “sabbaticals” from the army to enable them to work for private security firms. While the situation in Iraq has resulted in a unique demand for private security operatives, which is unlikely to reoccur on a similar scale, a growth in the number of military provider companies could cause a hemorrhage of critical skills from leading Western militaries, as well as create the unacceptable situation where a government funds the training of special forces and other elite soldiers, only to end up having to buy back their services from the private sector.

Despite the good combat record of those few modern military provider companies to take the field, formed bodies of mercenaries have not always proved the most reliable of troops—hence Machiavelli’s famous warning that, “Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince bases the defense of his state on mercenaries he will never achieve stability or security.” Even when integrated into a state’s armed forces and subject to military law, it might be impossible to eliminate all the tensions between a commercial organization seeking to maximize profit and the security objectives of a contracting state. As reports of waste and over-billing from Iraq suggest, military establishments currently lack the institutionalized knowledge required to draw up, supervise, and administer complex contracts with private sector military firms, although it is often overlooked that most private firms have performed creditably in Iraq, and many PMC employees have died fulfilling their contracts.

Military Provider Companies and International Law

International regulatory measures are largely concerned with prohibiting traditional mercenary activity, and are widely recognized as both impractical and ineffective when

62 “Hundreds” may have died, according to David Simons, “Occupation for Hire: Private Military Companies and their Role in Iraq,” RUSI Journal 149:3 (June 2004): 71.
applied to PMCs. Both Article 47 of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and the 1989 UN International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries focus on individuals recruited to fight in a specific conflict rather than the regular employees of an established company hired by a recognized government. Most legislation at the national level, where it exists, is also aimed at countering the recruitment or use of individual mercenaries. Only a few states have laws that apply to the private military industry, and these are of questionable effectiveness.

International law does not permit civilians to participate directly in hostilities. Civilians who do so may be classed as illegal combatants and treated as mercenaries, or possibly war criminals. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 included members of the armed forces and even guerrillas in their provisions but were, of course, drafted before the advent of modern private military enterprises. The legal position of PMCs on the battlefield remains ambiguous, although employees of military provider firms can be incorporated into the forces of a contracting state to acquire legitimacy as combatants. The French Foreign Legion, the U.K.’s Gurkhas, and the Swiss Guard at the Vatican are formed units of troops that serve foreign governments, but are not classed as mercenaries because they are sworn into the service of the relevant state, subject to military law, and are integrated into a recognized chain of command. A PMC could be similarly “nationalized” by a country seeking to create a specialized capability, such as an expeditionary force.


64 Both documents define a “mercenary” narrowly and cumulatively using six criteria:

• Is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
• Takes a direct part in hostilities;
• Is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and is promised by, or on behalf of, a party to the conflict material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party;
• Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
• Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict;
• Has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

65 The Guantanamo Military Commission has suggested that illegal participation in combat may be a war crime.

66 See the discussion in Michael J. Schmitt, “Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees,” Chicago Journal of International Law (forthcoming).

67 The term “nationalization” is used in a UN context by Christopher Spearin, International Peacekeeping, 36. The term “public PMC” has also been used to describe this development.
A less comprehensive arrangement might allow employees of PMCs to be hired as voluntary, sponsored reserves of the armed forces, similar to the arrangements under the U.K.’s Reserve Forces Act in 1996. A related measure is also under consideration in the U.S. that would allow contracted security personnel to be given temporary commissions as reserve component officers in order to subordinate them to the military chain of command. When serving with the armed forces, contractors would be subject to service regulations and discipline to ensure that they conformed to the norms of military behavior and the laws of war. As the Geneva Conventions and the Statute of the International Criminal Court apply to individuals, PMC employees engaged in combat roles would be liable for prosecution for war crimes if they committed breaches of international humanitarian law. Incorporating contractors into a state’s armed forces would also permit oversight and accountability, as well as ensuring that troops from a provider firm obeyed military commands.

In practice, military provider firms have already sought to acquire legal combatant status for their employees and avoid possible prosecution for mercenary activities by arranging for them to become provisional members of an employing government’s security forces. Sandline’s ill-fated contract with the government of Papua New Guinea in 1997 is a notable example. The company’s personnel were sworn in as “special constables” in order to give them the authority to bear arms and conduct military operations. However, if EU governments were to seek to make regular use of military provider firms, a more permanent legal arrangement than the somewhat ad hoc Sandline solution would be required, especially to avoid bureaucratic problems that could delay the rapid deployment of a partially privatized intervention force.

The Failure to Legitimize Military Provider Firms

None of the practical or legal barriers to the employment of military provider firms is insurmountable. The real obstacle to the use of PMCs in direct combat is that such a role is not generally viewed as legitimate or appropriate for the private sector. While the use of PMCs in training, logistical, security, and other supporting roles is becoming more or less an accepted feature of the modern military environment, this is not true of military provider companies, which are still widely viewed as indistinguishable from mercenaries. As long as this is the case, major PMCs—anxious not to jeopardize

70 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 193–94; see also the example cited at note 53.
lucrative government contracts to supply support services—are unlikely to offer direct combat as a part of their portfolios. Doug Brooks has acknowledged that the future of military provider firms largely depends on regulation of the industry. Without legitimacy, he claims that firms will be disinclined to invest in this area of the market because they remain vulnerable to changes in governments’ policies with regard to extant international or domestic laws against mercenary activity.

It is not surprising that the message on Sandline’s website cites “general lack of governmental support for Private Military Companies willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa…” as the reason for the firm’s decision to cease trading. Those governments that have sought to regulate the growing private military sector have shown little sympathy for the aspirations of firms seeking a direct combat role. Currently the U.S. has the most progressive regulatory system for the private military sector. But U.S. doctrine specifically rules out the deliberate employment of private contractors in combat. The involvement of security firms in firefights in Iraq has already resulted in the reinforcement of existing regulations on the tasking and arming of private sector employees. Despite support in some quarters for the use of military provider firms in both a peacekeeping and enforcement role in Africa, there is no indication that the government would be willing to employ a PMC in a combat role alongside U.S. forces in the foreseeable future. In the 1990s, members of the apartheid-era South African security forces found a ready market for their skills in PMCs operating in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the personnel employed by EO and Sandline proved both more effective and better behaved than most local state militaries, their links with the former apartheid regime alone were enough to generate controversy.

73 See http://www.sandline.com/.
74 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Joint Publication 4-0, 6 April 2000, at V-1.
76 Subordinate Commanders in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations have been reminded that General Order 1 A prohibits contractors from carrying weapons, except when an exception to policy is requested for personal protection or contracted security duties. To preserve contractors’ non-combatant status, exceptions are not granted when the intention is to guard military personnel, military convoys, military supply routes and military facilities. Headquarters, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Information Paper, “Procedures to Obtain CENTCOM Authority to Arm Government Contractor Employees,” 29 July 2004 (on file with author). A discussion by the author with a senior Pentagon official on 15 November 2004 confirmed that the Department of Defense would continue to proscribe a direct combat role for PMCs employed by the U.S. government.
licensing regime that implicitly sought to curb the activities of firms that offered combat services.77

In Europe, the French have adopted a tough stance on PMCs, passing the Répression De L’Activité De Mercenaire act of April 2003, which effectively bans military provider firms as well as individuals from direct participation in combat.78 EU member states Italy, Belgium, and Cyprus are among the countries to have signed and ratified the UN convention on mercenaries, although, as noted above, this measure is more applicable to individuals than companies.79 Uniquely, the U.K. has attempted to take the lead in addressing the recognition and possible wider employment of PMCs. A “Green Paper” discussion document on the options for regulation of the private military sector was released in February 2002. In the foreword to the document, Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, acknowledged that, “A strong and reputable private military sector might have a role in enabling the UN to respond more rapidly and effectively in crises.”80

The British government’s “Green Paper” recognized that a regulatory regime could eliminate many of the concerns about accountability, lack of transparency, and illegality in the private military sector and offered licensing and registration options for both companies and their services.81 Nevertheless, attempts by the government to draw a distinction between the activities of responsible military provider companies and traditional mercenaries failed to convince the many government officials, parliamentarians, and journalists that continued to view such enterprises in a negative light.82 Most commentaries on the document rejected a direct combat role for PMCs. The House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended, “private companies be expressly prohibited from direct participation in armed combat operations.”83 The NGO International Alert drew similar conclusions based on an arguably contentious interpretation of Article 47 to Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1977.84 The official response from the Ministry of Defense was less uncompromising, but still ruled

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79 Germany and Poland have signed but not ratified the Convention.
81 Ibid, 22–27.
82 See, for example, “Mad Mike Comes in From the Cold: Mercenaries,” The Economist, 16 February 2002; and the editorial “It’s Foolish to Rely on Mercenaries for Security,” The Independent, 14 February 2002.
out a frontline role for the private sector in a U.K.-supported international operation. To date, the British government has taken no further formal action on the issue of PMCs.

Given the British influence in the EU on military matters, potential military provider firms may have hoped that a permissive regulatory regime in the U.K. might have prompted the consideration of similar measures in other member states. The drafters of the “Green Paper” and various commentators raised the possibility of cooperation within the EU to create an international regulatory regime based on a re-drafting of the current, flawed UN convention on mercenaries. EU legislation would certainly address common anxieties about weapons proliferation and human rights abuses, but given longstanding differences within Europe on security policy, a common EU approach appears a distant prospect. It would in any case be unlikely to offer any comfort to prospective military provider companies, given current attitudes towards them.

Spokesmen for combatant PMCs have stated a preference to work for legitimate governments, and have expressed a willingness to submit to the kind of regulatory regime necessary to bring respectability to their industry and distance themselves from the temporary “companies” set up to recruit traditional mercenaries. The IPOA code of conduct states that members “support effective legal and financial accountability to relevant authorities for their actions and the actions of company employees” and “pledge to work only for legitimate, recognized governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.” Nonetheless, the private military sector has been unable to shed the mercenary tag. Nor have events in Iraq helped to legitimize PMCs in the eyes of the general public. References to mercenaries, reports of overcharging by military support firms, and concerns about a lack of accountability following the involvement of private sector employees in the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib have dominated media reports.

Outside of Iraq, the exploits of some colorful individual “mercenaries,” widely reported in the press, continue to undermine the private military sector’s aspirations to be classed as a respectable industry. Military provider firms in particular are in a “Catch-22” situation. Until they are viewed as wholly reputable, governments are re-

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86 For example, the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended that services provided by PMCs be included in the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports legislation of 1998.
87 See, for example, “Private Military Companies—Independent or Regulated?” Sandline International, 28 March 1998.
luctant to introduce a licensing and regulatory regime. However, it is exceedingly difficult for them to be accepted as legitimate without such regulation.

Conclusion

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once reportedly declared that the world was not yet ready for privatized peacekeeping. This is certainly true of the countries of so-called “post-modern Europe,” which remain effectively “modern” in their approach to the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. As Philip Bobbitt has argued, the evolution of warfare is intimately bound up with the growth and development of the modern nation state. Therefore, the rise of PMCs is a sensitive issue for governments, as it threatens to undermine their control of armed force, regarded as one of the foundations of state sovereignty. Advocates for the private military industry may claim that a private force can still be under state control and be accountable to it as a legitimate corporate enterprise. But such arguments will remain academic as long as fundamental reservations about the privatization of combat remain in the minds of policy makers and the public at large (although the cause of military provider firms would certainly be assisted if reputable PMCs were able to distance themselves successfully from comparisons with the seamier side of their industry).

As discussed earlier, the EU faces a gap between its security ambitions and the reality of its military capabilities. It remains to be seen whether initiatives to promote greater defense integration and role specialization will successfully enable EU member states to rise to the challenge of a global security role. PMCs are likely to play an increasingly important function in supplying support services for the expeditionary forces that will be critical to effective European power projection. While contracts for these firms will continue to rule out a direct combat role, the character of modern warfare suggests that their exclusion in practice will become progressively more difficult. Perhaps over time, particularly if EU regular armed forces prove unequal to the task, military provider companies may have the opportunity to demonstrate that they can play both a vital and legitimate role on the front line of EU intervention forces. Until then, the new condottieri will be unable to challenge the relevance of Machiavelli’s warnings to the twenty-first century.