



**INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

**U.S. AND NATO
FORCE STRUCTURE AND
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN**

TED GREENWOOD

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

McNair Paper Fourteen

***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822**

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**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Washington, DC**

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS □ Fort Lesley J. McNair □ Washington, D.C. 20319-6000 □ Phone: (202) 475-1913 □ Fax: (202) 475-1012
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U.S. AND NATO FORCE STRUCTURE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

TED GREENWOOD

As instruments of national policy, military forces fulfill a wide variety of military and political functions. During the cold war, however, military functions of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces not associated with the Soviet Union and political functions other than deterrence of the Soviet Union and, for the United States, reassuring our allies, were much overlooked. U.S. and NATO forces in and committed to the Mediterranean region, as elsewhere, were sized and structured for the purpose of defeating Soviet forces. Possessing such a capability was counted on to deter Soviet military aggression and coercion and to prevent NATO states from being intimidated by Soviet military power. U.S. forward deployed forces and reinforcement plans were intended to demonstrate to both the Soviets and our allies the firm U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, thereby contributing to the deterrence of the former and the reassurance of the latter.

Forward deployment also facilitated crisis management and a rapid transition to hostilities, if necessary, for contingencies involving the Soviet Union or others. Non-Soviet

contingencies, however, did not have to command much attention in force planning during the cold war. As "lesser included cases," the force requirements they generated were small and readily satisfied by the forces needed to meet the Soviet threat. Political functions other than deterrence and reassurance also could be safely ignored because they were fulfilled automatically by the forces maintained for Soviet-related purposes.

With the Soviet threat gone and Russia no more than a latent threat in the Mediterranean region, the United States and NATO can no longer take for granted the full range of their forces' political and military functions. The NATO Strategic Concept recognizes this explicitly by pointing out that, henceforth, risks to NATO's security will be "multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional." Nowhere do risks to NATO have more facets and come from more directions than in the Mediterranean region.

For thousands of years, the Mediterranean has been a strategic whole where events in one area inevitably affect the states and peoples elsewhere. Here, East meets West and North meets South, empires have risen and fallen, usually by force of arms, and the three great religions of the West confront each other.

Today, the Mediterranean region is rife with local disputes that are territorial, ethnic, or religious in origin. Territorial disputes exist between the following: Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front over Western Sahara; Morocco and Spain over Ceuta and Melilla; Spain and the United Kingdom over Gibraltar; Israel and its neighbors and the Palestinians over the occupied territories and Israel's very existence; Syria and Turkey over the Hatay Region; Greece and Turkey and Greek and Turkish Cypriots over Cyprus's future; Kurds and the governments of Turkey and

Iraq; various Lebanese groups; and various groups within the former Yugoslavia. Active ethnic disputes include those between Turks and Kurds, Turks and Bulgars, Turks and Greeks, Greeks and Albanians, Albanians and Serbs, Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Bosnians, Croats and Bosnians, and Basques and Spaniards. Religious rivalries exist between Suni and Shi'ite Moslems, moderate and fundamentalist Moslems, Moslems and Jews, orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews, Moslems and Christians, and eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians.

Although many of these disputes do not pose problems directly for the United States and NATO states, others do. Any assault on the territorial integrity of Turkey, for example, would trigger NATO commitments to common defense. Disputes between Greece and Turkey disrupt NATO planning and exercises. Instability or conflict in oil- and gas-producing regions of North Africa could threaten Europe's vital energy supplies. Social disorder and economic deprivation in North Africa and the former Yugoslavia have generated migration to Europe and could produce a flood of refugees. Continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia undermines confidence in the robustness of the emerging European security regime and is drawing in NATO nations' forces. The Arab-Israeli conflict and various intra-Arab disputes have bred terrorist attacks, sometimes instigated by Mediterranean littoral states such as Libya and Syria. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, currently chemical and possibly biological agents but potentially also nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, amplifies risks to NATO.

Some regard Muramar Khaddafi's Libya as a special risk to NATO security. It has displayed hostility toward the United States and some West European states and has

promoted terrorist attacks against European and American targets. It has interfered in the internal affairs of Chad, Sudan, and Egypt. It has also tried to erode the principle of freedom of navigation on the internationally recognized high seas by claiming the Gulf of Sidra to be its territorial waters. To support these activities, Libya has built a sizable military capability. Its Fencer aircraft and SCUD B missiles can reach Europe or European island possessions. Its Foxtrot submarines and frigates can threaten Mediterranean sea lanes. Libya also possesses chemical munitions and reportedly is engaged in biological warfare research, seeking a nuclear weapons capability, planning to procure MiG-29 Fulcrums and Su-27 Flankers, and developing air-to-air refueling capability.

These many risks and instabilities in the Mediterranean region are of no small moment for Europe and the United States. The peace, security, and prosperity of NATO Europe, especially in the South, and indirectly of the United States depend in part on containing and reducing these risks. Diplomacy and economic policy, of course, are primary instruments in this effort, but military forces also have their roles, especially when risks turn to threats and threats turn to violence.

Functions, sizing, and structure of U.S. and NATO military forces in and for the Mediterranean region are examined in this monograph. Some of these functions could be performed multinationally without NATO, perhaps following the model of the ad hoc allied coalitions or the Western European Union (WEU). Such alternatives to NATO and the conditions under which they might be feasible or desirable, however, are not addressed here. Here attention focuses exclusively on NATO and the United States. Also excluded are the important budgetary and manpower constraints that

must inevitably constrain force structure. The exclusive focus here is on force requirements.

Functions of NATO (and U.S.) Forces in the Mediterranean

Military forces and the NATO military structure serve political functions as well as military functions. Forces function politically when they do not engage in or explicitly threaten to engage in hostilities, although their potential for violent action is always relevant. Forces function militarily when they engage in hostilities or prepare to do so. Both political and military functions are important and must influence the size and structure of U.S. and allied forces in and available to be brought into the Mediterranean region. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

Peacetime Political Functions

Perhaps the most important peacetime political function of NATO military forces in the Mediterranean region is to prevent the risks discussed above from becoming actual threats to NATO security or to its air or sea lines of communication and to prevent any threats that do emerge from turning into hostilities. This function has both crisis prevention and crisis control dimensions. It is performed through *deterrence*, *intimidation* of overtly hostile states and, when necessary, *compellence*.¹ Deterrence and intimidation are achieved largely by maintaining a peacetime military presence and an adequate balance of forces in the region. The balance of forces here, as elsewhere, is important because it affects the psychological context for interstate relations, influencing both perceptions of security and the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy over issues to which military forces are not immediately central. In addition to

the maintenance of forces in being, the regular exercise of these forces to demonstrate capability and ensure readiness and interoperability and the ability of the United States and others to reinforce from outside the region contribute to deterrence, intimidation, and compellence.

The second political function of NATO military forces in the Mediterranean region and especially of NATO's military command structure there is to discourage the renationalization of NATO nations' defense policies. Though usually applied to Central Europe, this principle of NATO strategy is equally applicable to the Mediterranean. The continuing integration of Greek and Turkish forces into NATO force planning and (in the case of Greece only partially) into the unified command structure, help prevent these two countries from focusing excessively on each other as potential adversaries. Helping to connect the defense policies of France and Spain to NATO are the arrangements between their militaries and either NATO or other allied nations bilaterally, especially the Spanish Coordination Agreements and the French Cooperation Agreements. Even the integration of Germany and other Central European nations into NATO can be encouraged through their participation in NATO's multinational Mediterranean forces.

The third peacetime function of NATO's military forces is to keep Turkey connected to Western Europe. As a secular country with a predominantly Muslim population, and linking Europe to Russia, the Islamic Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey's European orientation is important to maintain, even as it is under pressure domestically. NATO is the only West European institution in which Turkey has full membership and participation and is therefore its only strong institutional tie to Europe.²

The fourth peacetime function of NATO forces in southern Europe is to encourage the continued engagement of the United States in Europe. Despite domestic pressures in the United States to reduce military deployments in Europe, the Sixth Fleet will not likely be withdrawn from the Mediterranean because its presence there is perceived as vital not only for U.S.-NATO interests but also for U.S. interests beyond NATO in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. However, U.S. air and ground deployments in the Mediterranean region are more vulnerable to budget pressures and the perception that, by maintaining forces in Europe, the United States subsidizes its economic competitors. Even the Sixth Fleet will remain a connection between the United States and Europe only so long as it is seen to have a central role in NATO as Strike Force South.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) also connects the United States to Europe, including to southern Europe, but only weakly. Only NATO causes tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel and their families to reside in southern Europe; integrates U.S. and southern European defense planning; and provides the political framework that allows, facilitates, and requires regular consultation between the United States and the countries of southern Europe. If any institutional arrangement has the potential to bind the United States to southern Europe, it is NATO, but this bond should no longer be taken for granted.

Ensuring the vitality of this bond is important for both. It is important for Europe because the United States acts as a balancer and mediator in the affairs of southern Europe, dampening and diverting potential antagonisms among the southern Europeans. Partly because Europeans have understood this value to them of U.S. engagement in Europe, they

have sought and still seek reassurance that the United States will remain. The U.S. connection to southern Europe is important to the United States for two reasons. First, U.S. economic as well as security interests in southern Europe and the Mediterranean region generally are likely to be better served with the presence of U.S. forces in Europe than without it, and much of that presence, especially in southern Europe, can be maintained only within the alliance framework. Second, its bond to Europe provides the United States with access to facilities and infrastructure that, with host-country agreement, could be usefully employed to support U.S. military activities outside of Europe.

The fifth peacetime function of NATO's military forces in the Mediterranean region is to provide a multinational basis for contacts and dialogue with the militaries of friendly non-NATO nations there. For the countries of southeastern Europe and the Black Sea, the purpose would primarily be to discuss civil-military matters. Assisting these countries in transforming their militaries into institutions appropriate for democratic states, with civilian control, fiscal responsibility, and public accountability, is a major contribution to peace and security in the region. In the short run, contacts will be possible with Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Russia. Eventually, contacts might also become possible with Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the successors to Yugoslavia. For other non-NATO Mediterranean states, the primary purpose would be to foster mutual respect and understanding and, in some cases, to facilitate combined operations for out-of-area contingencies, should this prove desirable. Although such contacts can be and are being made by NATO nations individually, a multinational approach carries more authority, reduces competition for favor among NATO nations, and for many non-NATO states is

politically more palatable than bilateral contacts, especially with the United States.

The sixth political function of NATO forces in the Mediterranean region is what might be called assistance projection. This includes providing humanitarian assistance (for example, in response to natural disasters or large refugee movements), performing noncombatant evacuations, and supporting other nations through training, transport, or construction. NATO states individually can perform such activities. Indeed, this will often be the preferred route because it maximizes the political benefits and goodwill redounding to the provider and avoids NATO's having to reach agreement prior to acting. However, intended recipients will sometimes more readily accept multinational than national assistance.

The final political function is peacekeeping. In June 1992 in Oslo, NATO foreign ministers offered to "support . . . peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE." Doing so might involve NATO forces not only in peacekeeping in the traditional United Nations (UN) sense, employing lightly armed troops authorized to use weapons only in self defense, to encourage parties to abide by a freely contracted agreement. The NATO force mission might also include what is now called peacemaking, employing troops to separate forcibly and perhaps disarm hostile factions. Purposes served might include guaranteeing human rights; protecting providers of humanitarian assistance; enforcing a UN ceasefire resolution; and enforcing or monitoring embargoes or other sanctions imposed by the United Nations against countries in the Mediterranean.

Military Functions

Overall, NATO and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean region must be prepared to counter any threat spawned by the "multi-faceted and multidimensional risks" and resolve any resultant conflict quickly and favorably. The probability of hostilities is low, but not zero. In addition, NATO and U.S. military forces in the Mediterranean region must be prepared, if called upon, to prevent instability within or conflict between non-NATO states in the region from spilling over into NATO countries. Examples of such instability or conflict with potential for spillover include the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Iraq, western Sahara, Israel and its neighbors, and Libya and its neighbors. Spill-over effects might range from refugee influxes, to disruption of airborne, seaborne, or land commerce, to attacks or threats against citizens of NATO states, or to armed conflict within the borders of NATO states.

Within this context, seven specific military functions of U.S. and NATO forces in the Mediterranean region can be identified. The first is preventing spillover into Thrace from the intercommunal hostilities in the former Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Balkan peninsula. The concern here is not that Turkey might intervene on its own to defend beleaguered Muslims in Bosnia or ethnic Turks in Bulgaria or that Greece might intervene to defend the exclusivity of its claim to the name Macedonia. These would be purely national, not NATO, matters although NATO might be drawn in as mediator, especially if Greece and Turkey ended up on opposite sides of a broadened conflict. Rather, the concern here is that if the fighting spreads to Kosovo or especially to Macedonia, the violence might spill over the border into Greece, triggering the NATO commitment to collective security.

The second military function of U.S. and NATO forces in the Mediterranean region is dealing with potential threats to Anatolia. Perhaps the most likely—albeit not very likely—scenarios for hostilities directed against a NATO nation in the Mediterranean region involve conflict between Turkey and one or more of its Anatolian neighbors, with several of which Turkey has longstanding disputes. Because aggression against Turkey by one of these states would trigger the collective defense provisions of the Washington Treaty, U.S. and NATO forces must be prepared to respond.

The third military function is to be capable of conducting small-scale military operations in the Mediterranean region. These might involve only limited air strikes (as were conducted by the United States against Libya in 1989) or limited ground operations, perhaps delivered amphibiously.

The fourth military function is countering weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems—whether missiles or bombers—that can reach southern Europe. The expected instruments of threat or hostility against NATO nations would be conventional weaponry and NATO would counter with conventional forces. However, several states in the Middle East and North Africa now possess chemical munitions and medium-range bombers or ballistic missiles capable of attacking NATO's southern states. Chemical, missile, and perhaps nuclear capabilities are likely to spread in the region unless the effectiveness of the missile technology-control regime and the nuclear nonproliferation regime improves markedly and unless a true global ban of chemical weapons is achieved. Such a ban still seems improbable despite reported progress toward a new chemical weapons treaty. In addition, Libya might soon succeed in developing airborne refueling techniques that extend the range of its bombers and escorts and might also increase the number,

range, and sophistication of its missiles.

The fifth military function is to be capable of defending the air and sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean region. Hostile action by a Mediterranean littoral state against a NATO nation or hostilities among non-NATO Mediterranean states could include threats to these critical lines of communication.

The sixth military objective is to deter and, if deterrence fails, respond appropriately to actions by terrorists, especially state-sponsored terrorists, against U.S. or allied civilian or military personnel or facilities in the Mediterranean region.

The final military objective for NATO and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean, at least from the U.S. perspective, is to provide capabilities, facilities, and experience with multinational operations that could be employed in out-of-area military operations.

The Special Role of the United States

The United States is not just one among equals within the Mediterranean region. It has unique military assets and its own interests that are not always coincident with those of its allies. Its unique military assets include:

- the Sixth Fleet, with its carrier battle group (CVBG), including aircraft, Aegis cruisers or destroyers, nuclear attack submarines, and land attack cruise missiles; and an amphibious ready group (MARG) with an embarked marine expeditionary unit (MEU)
- a global Navy that can reinforce the Sixth Fleet
- large air forces (including some aircraft with global reach) and ground forces (including rapidly deployable Army and Marine Corps units) able to reinforce the Mediterranean region

- nuclear weapons deployed in Europe for U.S. and allied aircraft and readily deployable at sea on short notice³
- land-based and seaborne prepositioned equipment
- mobility forces able to transport U.S. or allied personnel and equipment overseas rapidly
- logistics capabilities, including at-sea and airborne refueling, auxiliary ships, airfields and port facilities, and cargo handling equipment
- global command, control, communications, and intelligence
- high-technology weapons and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition systems
- limited antitactical ballistic missile capability, with the possibility of significant improvement over time.

Among the interests of the United States and its NATO allies in the Mediterranean that have not always coincided has been policy toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli dispute. The United States has been more supportive of Israel in its dispute with Palestinians and Arab neighbors than have the NATO allies. In the event of open warfare, the United States might wish to send supplies, equipment, and, conceivably, even combat units to Israel while the NATO allies might prefer to remain aloof from the conflict. In 1973, for example, the United States sought to resupply Israel quickly, but the Europeans refused to allow the transfer of supplies from Europe or, with the exception of Portugal, the use of their air bases for staging an airlift. Another example is response to terrorism. The United States did not obtain allied support for its punitive strike against Libya in 1989

(except from the United Kingdom) or for forcing an airliner known to be carrying a wanted terrorist to land in Italy.

Force Structure Requirements Organized Functionally

In light of this special role of the United States and the political and military functions of U.S. and NATO military forces in the Mediterranean, how can U.S. and NATO forces be sized and structured to fulfill them? The following derivation of force structure from functions is the special contribution of this analysis.

Political Functions

Because the United States has its own political interests in the Mediterranean region, it will want its own military presence there to discourage risks from becoming threats and threats from turning into hostilities. The minimum U.S. force for crisis prevention and crisis control should be a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group, with an embarked marine expeditionary unit deployed all or almost all the time. Anything less, including the current plan to have a CVBG and a MARG always within four days of the Mediterranean but actually in the Mediterranean only 300 days per year, would be widely perceived as an indication of diminished U.S. concern with the region.

A carrier battle group is not, however, the only useful unit for presence missions. An amphibious ready group, a separate task force led by an assault landing ship, a helicopter landing platform or a cruiser, or even a single ship is often adequate. A CVBG and a MARG could thus provide a simultaneous and meaningful presence in two, three, or more locations in the Mediterranean.

Some rapid ground and air reinforcement capability

would also be desirable. The equipment for a heavy Army brigade now prepositioned at Livorno, Italy, is very valuable. Basing two or three roll-on roll-off (RORO) ships nearby in Italy would make it even more valuable. Souda Bay in Crete would be another possible, though less desirable, location. At the least, several such ships based in the United States should be dedicated to transporting the equipment stored at Livorno. A Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) permanently based in the Mediterranean (perhaps at Souda Bay) rather than in the North Atlantic (as MPS I now is) or deployed to the Mediterranean most of the time would also be helpful. Additional Army equipment prepositioned in Italy, Greece, Turkey, or afloat would be useful. Retaining access to the air bases at Torrejon (Spain), Aviano (Italy), and Incirlik (Turkey), for staging or crisis deployment of combat aircraft is essential, especially in the absence of U.S. land-based fighter aircraft permanently deployed in the region. Deploying at least one U.S. tactical fighter squadron permanently in the region would be even better.

The benefits of presence come automatically for the forces of all NATO nations on the Mediterranean littoral, including British forces in Gibraltar and at the sovereign bases on Cyprus. Their naval forces and rapid reaction ground and air forces are of particular significance for crisis prevention and crisis control. The forward operating bases for NATO airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) in Italy, Greece, and Turkey are also helpful. The proposed NATO Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean is an excellent idea for enhancing NATO's crisis management capabilities in the region.

Needed, in addition, are appropriate command, control, communications, and intelligence assets and adequate

logistics and mobility capability. NATO should improve on its C³I in the Mediterranean region, except for overhead intelligence collection, for which no country but France has money to duplicate U.S. assets. In addition to the logistics capabilities of NATO nations along the Mediterranean, more underway support, maintenance, and logistics ships are needed if national or NATO presence operations are not to be dependent on the United States for such assets. Consideration should be given to creating a NATO Auxiliary Ship Force, perhaps modeled after the NATO AWACS program.

In the important area of mobility forces, NATO nations of the Mediterranean region possess only limited airlift and sealift capability. In most instances, therefore, the United States can most efficiently supply mobility transport. The U.S. C-130s deployed at Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany could be made available quickly to CINCSOUTH, NATO's commander in the Southern Region, and sealift and airlift assets deployed in the United States could begin arriving within a week. Both should be more fully integrated into planning and exercises for NATO's Southern Region (AFSOUTH). As mentioned, permanently deploying U.S. RORO ships in the Mediterranean, or in the United States but specifically designated for the Mediterranean would have great value.

To promote the integration of military planning and discourage the renationalization of NATO countries' defense policies, AFSOUTH should continue working to extend the integrated military command structure to Greece. Existing cooperative programs, including NATO AWACS and the NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) should be preserved and the broadest possible participation in STANAVFORMED should be encouraged. New cooperative programs should also be encouraged, including the proposed

Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean, the proposed NATO Mine Countermeasures Force Mediterranean, and a new NATO Auxiliary Ship Force. An extensive program of combined exercises should also be maintained, for example, "Display Determination" in the eastern Mediterranean and "Dragon Hammer" in the west, and should include all NATO nations in the Southern Region, if possible. The NATO and bilateral arrangements with France and Spain are also important and should be preserved.

To keep Turkey connected to Western Europe, NATO bases there should be retained and appropriately equipped and staffed, including by U.S. base access personnel. Turkey's contribution of a brigade to the Multinational Division (South) should be welcomed and the Turkish framework division of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) filled out with a brigade from another NATO state, perhaps the United States. Regular exercises should be held with Turkish naval, ground, and air forces. The practice of rotating U.S. Air Force squadrons into Turkey should be continued, drawing on CONUS-based forces if none are available under AFSOUTH command. Rotation of air force units of other states or occasional visits by the air and land components of the NATO Reaction Force should be considered. This would be greatly facilitated by the creation of a NATO air training area in Turkey near Konya, as previously considered. Because Turkey is the NATO state of the Mediterranean region for which risks come closest to threats, planning for contingencies there should continue.

To encourage the continued engagement of the United States in southern Europe and its obverse—reassuring Europeans of the U.S. intention to remain engaged there—the Sixth Fleet must stay in the Mediterranean and remain central to AFSOUTH planning and force structure as

Strike Force South. U.S. ships and aircraft, both combat and transport, should continue to have access to bases in Spain (Rota and Torrejon), Italy (Aviano, Naples, and Sigonella), Greece (Souda Bay), and Turkey (Incirlik). U.S. P-3 and EP-3 aircraft should remain based at Rota and Sigonella. A forward logistics facility at a Turkish naval base on the Mediterranean, perhaps to be manned by U.S. naval reservists, would be useful.

Significant U.S. participation in the NATO Reaction Forces should be encouraged. The airborne battalion at Vicenza could be upgraded to a full brigade,⁴ with both airborne and air assault capability, and perhaps attached to the Multinational Division South, MND(S), as a fourth brigade. One battalion of the brigade could remain committed to the immediate reaction force. Two more radical proposals, elaborated below, would involve either attaching U.S. brigades deployed in Germany to the Greek and Turkish framework divisions of the ARRC or redeploying a full U.S. division from Germany to the Southern Region. Either would enhance and guarantee the U.S. commitment to southern Europe. U.S. tactical fighter squadrons committed to the rapid reaction force's air component, RRF(Air), should rotate into southern Europe or, better, two or three squadrons should be deployed in the region. Although the earlier plan to deploy an F-16 Fighter Wing at Crotona, Italy, seems dead, new construction could be minimized by basing such aircraft at an existing U.S. base, such as Sigonella, or at existing Italian, Greek, or Turkish bases, assuming willingness of these countries.

AFSOUTH forces can help provide a multinational basis for contacts and dialogue with the militaries of non-NATO states in the Mediterranean region. Visits can be arranged to the Black Sea and Mediterranean ports of friendly

nations by STANAVFORMED or other naval units under AFSOUTH command or auspices. Similarly, AFSOUTH air units could visit airbases of friendly countries in the region. The militaries not only of NATO's cooperation partners (that is, former Warsaw Pact states and former Soviet republics) but also other friendly states in the region could be invited to send personnel to NATO schools and conferences and observe NATO exercises. Occasional exercises with the forces of these states might also be useful. If an antitactical ballistic missile network is deployed across the Southern Region, consideration should be given to offering to extend it to friendly non-NATO countries, such as Egypt, Israel, and Morocco.

Some assistance-projection missions, notably providing humanitarian assistance and performing non-combatant evacuations, might have to be performed with little advance notice. Therefore, mobile and specially trained ground forces should be on call in the region at all times. A U.S. marine expeditionary unit, at least some members of which have special operations capability training, would suffice for most imaginable contingencies. A full U.S. marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) should be available for reinforcement within days. This again suggests that an MPS squadron should be permanently based or usually deployed in the Mediterranean region. The Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean should receive tasking and training for humanitarian and noncombatant evacuation missions. This would ensure that assistance-projection operations could be multinational, rather than just U.S. Supporting other nations through training, transport, or construction would most likely continue to be conducted nationally, employing Special Forces in the case of the United States.

To make NATO resources available for peacekeeping,

peacemaking, monitoring or enforcement operations, attention must be given to the special training, including in restraint and civil-military relations, and special equipment needed. Although such missions are most likely in the short run near the Mediterranean littoral or NATO states of the Southern Region (for example, off the coast of the former Yugoslavia or within its territory, and in the Caucasus), participation need not be limited to states of the Southern Region. Consideration should be given to creating appropriate NATO training programs for NATO officers, command post exercises, seminar war games and perhaps even field exercises focused on peacekeeping, peacemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. Consideration should also be given to designating, training, and equipping particular units, perhaps within the IRF or the ARRC and including STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORLANT, for these missions.

Military Functions

Before addressing the force structure needed to perform military functions in the Mediterranean region today, two former missions no longer of concern should be mentioned: the defense of northern Italy and the defense of Thrace from attack by Warsaw Pact forces. U.S. forces programmed to both can be reassigned. Northern Italy is well buffered from any possible threat to its sovereignty, although concern remains about refugee flows or minor spillover of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. As a result, Italy's and allied forces, including a Portuguese brigade and squadron, that have traditionally been programmed to defend northern Italy can be safely reduced or redirected. Plans to incorporate a Portuguese brigade into the Italian framework division of the ARRC and commit a Portuguese squadron to the IRF (Air) recognize this new reality.

Although there is no longer a credible large-scale threat to Thrace (Athens' concerns about Turkey notwithstanding), the turmoil and violence in Albania and especially the former Yugoslavia could spill over into northern Greece. NATO, therefore, must be prepared. The immediate reaction forces, including naval, air, and land elements, should be large enough to augment Greek forces. Once stability is reestablished in the area, CINCSOUTH might help to dampen the continuing dispute between Greece and Turkey by suggesting that both parties reduce their forces in Thrace by eliminating or redeploying units. At that time, regional confidence- and security-building measures, beyond those required in the November 1990 Vienna Document, should also be encouraged among the states of the Balkan Peninsula. These might include announcing all military exercises in advance and inviting observers and permanently stationing military observers at other states' major military bases and brigade headquarters.

The most likely scenarios for a risk becoming a real threat to NATO or actual hostilities involve Anatolian Turkey. Spillover from the turmoil and violence in the Caucasus, Syria's claim to the Hatay region of Turkey, a Syrian-Turkish dispute over water rights, or hot pursuit of or support for Kurdish separatists in Turkey or Iraq could be the immediate cause of violence. Therefore, Turkey still requires significant forces and must continue to upgrade and modernize its equipment, including its F-16s, tanks, and air defenses. Other states must not only recognize this need but also provide financial assistance to Turkey. Otherwise, while the rest of NATO realizes savings through force reductions, Turkey will be unable to sustain its needed defense programs. In addition, NATO should continue the AWACS program and plans to reinforce Turkey with NATO

Reaction Forces and forces from other NATO states. Both the Immediate and rapid reaction forces, including air and ground elements, would be critical for Turkey's defense and should exercise there regularly. Occasional U.S.-Turkish bilateral exercises, as in the past, would also be helpful. Of course, a NATO reinforcement of Turkey would be possible only if appropriate reception facilities in Turkey and adequate mobility assets, probably U.S., were available. Therefore, military as well as political reasons argue for maintaining NATO air bases in Turkey and U.S. Air Force personnel at Incirlik; establishing a forward logistics facility at a Turkish naval base on the Mediterranean; integrating U.S. C-130s deployed in central Europe and both airlift and sealift deployed in CONUS more fully into AFSOUTH planning and exercises; and stationing U.S. sealift ships and an MPS squadron in the Mediterranean.

Potential scenarios elsewhere in the Mediterranean region would require at most small-scale military operations. They might involve NATO or U.S. or allied forces acting alone or through an ad hoc coalition. They might involve air strikes or ground forces, perhaps delivered amphibiously. Such an operation might be punitive, coercive, or preventative, for example, to destroy facilities associated with weapons of mass destruction or missiles. It might have to be executed on short notice. The ability to carry out small-scale operations effectively would act as a deterrent and could be employed for intimidation or coercive diplomacy. To assure this capability, CINCSOUTH or, for a uniquely U.S. operation, U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, must retain access to ground attack aircraft and ground forces.

Essential for the United States are the carrier battle group, the land-attack cruise missiles and the Marine

Expeditionary Unit of the Sixth Fleet and the air bases in Turkey and Italy to which U.S. reinforcement aircraft could be rapidly deployed. Long-range bombers, such as the B-1, flying directly from the United States, might also be useful under some circumstances. To maximize the value of the Sixth Fleet's carrier, consideration should be given to altering the mix of its aircraft. The traditional emphasis on defensive and antisubmarine aircraft, at the expense of ground attack, reconnaissance, and tanker assets, might have been appropriate when the Soviet Union was the primary potential adversary, but probably is no longer applicable. The equipment at Livorno allows rapid deployment of a heavy brigade from central Europe if Germany and Italy both agree to it. Basing roll-on roll-off ships nearby or committing U.S.-based ships to the mission would enhance this capability. Army and Marine Corps equipment afloat in the Mediterranean would allow the United States to deploy rapidly from CONUS without allied support or acquiescence. For small and even clandestine operations, the Special Forces Battalion squadron of fixed-wing aircraft and two squadrons of rotary-wing and the special operations aircraft in Germany, reinforceable quickly from the United States, are unique and valuable capabilities. The airborne battalion in Italy adds needed flexibility but would be even more useful if expanded to a brigade and given air assault as well as airborne capability. U.S. land-based aircraft permanently based within range of potential targets (for example, in Turkey, Greece, or Italy) would also be highly desirable.

Planners should consider two, more radical approaches to improving the U.S. ground forces in the Mediterranean region. The first is to give two of the brigades deployed in Germany, as part of NATO's Main Defense Forces, a second mission by attaching one to each of the Greek and Turkish

framework divisions of the ARRC. A set of equipment for these brigades would be prepositioned in each country and the troops would deploy to Greece or Turkey occasionally for exercises. A second approach would be to relocate a U.S. Army division from Germany to the Southern Region and restructure it. An airborne/air assault brigade, built from the airborne battalion now at Vicenza, would be incorporated within it. Heavier elements could be deployed in Turkey or elsewhere in Italy, if these countries would serve as hosts. Elements of this division would be committed to the IRF(Land) and the full division would be part of the ARRC.

For those instances in which other NATO allies are willing to participate in a limited strike or decide to act alone, their land- and sea-based aircraft and their marine and commando units would be particularly useful. The two French aircraft carriers with conventional aircraft and two British, one Italian, and one Spanish, with vertical/short takeoff and landing TAV-8B aircraft, could be used to augment Strike Force South. Italian and British Tornados, Turkish F-16s, and French Mirage 2000 aircraft could reach many potential target areas, especially if supported by U.S. or allied tanker aircraft. With respect to ground forces, Italy has a 12,000-man rapid reaction force, the Forza d'Intervento Rapido, with airborne, mechanized and marine elements with associated fixed- and rotary-wing transport, and two LPD amphibious ships to deliver them. Italy also has 600 personnel in its six naval special forces groups. Spain has six special operations battalions, an air-transportable brigade, a rapid action force of 6,400 men, one marine regiment of 3,500 men, and four troop- or troop- and-tank-carrying amphibious ships. France has a 47,300-man rapid reaction force, the Force d'Action Rapide, consisting of a paratroop division, an air transportable marine division, a

light army division, a mountain division, and an airmobile division, as well as 600 marine commandos. Although French forces are unlikely to deploy under NATO command, they could do so under WEU auspices or under national control, coordinated with NATO allies.

For limited strikes, the proposed NATO Amphibious Force, Mediterranean, mentioned above, would be especially valuable. Combining Italian, Spanish and U.S. amphibious ships and personnel, it would provide a multinational force for assistance projection and limited military operations anywhere along the Mediterranean littoral.

To enable the European NATO nations of the Mediterranean to sustain even limited naval operations without heavy dependence on the United States, their current deficiency in underway support, maintenance, and logistics ships must be remedied. As suggested above, this might be most efficiently accomplished by creating a NATO Auxiliary Ship Force, perhaps modeled after the NATO AWACS force.

Two approaches are possible to counter weapons of mass destruction and their aircraft and missile delivery systems within reach of southern Europe. First, defensive capabilities can be deployed to reduce their effectiveness. NATO should deploy adequate chemical warfare defenses for its forces, retain and improve its air defenses in the region, and develop a capable antitactical ballistic missile system (ATBM) deployable across the Southern Region. Until a truly capable ATBM is available, some protection can be provided by Patriot missile batteries and Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers.

Care should be taken, however, not to rely too heavily on such defensive measures. Defense against low-flying aircraft is difficult; no ATBMs available today or any time soon will protect civilian populations against nuclear or

even chemically armed missiles. Even if effective air defenses and ATBMs were deployed, chemical or nuclear weapons could be delivered in other ways and without warning. Civilian aircraft or commercial ships are quite adequate delivery platforms. Open societies, like the NATO states, are also highly vulnerable to munitions smuggled in and released locally rather than delivered from afar.

Second, a retaliatory capability can be maintained to deter the use of mass casualty weapons, although the ability to identify the users that is necessary for deterrence might be missing. A credible deterrent would require U.S. and allied aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean capable of attacking hundreds of miles inland and land-based, ground attack aircraft stationed in or programmed for reinforcement to southern Europe. The United States should furnish some of the stationed ground attack aircraft to demonstrate its commitment and enable a rapid reaction. Absent chemical weapons, which most NATO countries are reluctant to hold and which might soon be prohibited by international treaty, reliance must be placed on conventional and nuclear munitions. Some of the aircraft should, therefore, possess nuclear strike capability in order to deter nuclear attacks. With the removal of nuclear weapons from U.S. aircraft carriers and the removal of U.S. fighter aircraft from the region, CINCSOUTH's only nuclear assets are allied strike aircraft carrying U.S. nuclear weapons. Therefore, any U.S. aircraft deployed in the region should be dual-capable.

Any Mediterranean conflict that NATO wants to prevent from affecting allied security or interests would likely require defense of sea and air lines of communication. Air lines of communication (ALOCs) could be defended by U.S. and allied carrier- and land-based interceptor aircraft and land- and sea-based anti-aircraft missiles, all supported

by NATO AWACS. Improvements, however, are needed in warning, battle management, and operations against low-flying aircraft. Sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would be defended by U.S. and allied submarines, carrier-based attack aircraft, missile-capable and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) surface ships, mine countermeasure vessels, and land-based maritime patrol aircraft. NATO's coordination of nations' maritime patrol aircraft operations and water space management for allies' submarines are important contributors to antisubmarine warfare operations. The proposed NATO Mine Countermeasures Force Mediterranean to coordinate national mine countermeasure efforts would be an excellent contribution to SLOC protection. Shallow-water ASW and mine countermeasures especially need improvement.

Terrorist attacks against the citizens or facilities of one ally affront all, but response is best left to nations individually. The long-standing cooperation on counter-terrorism, including sharing of intelligence information about terrorist groups, should be continued and enhanced. Cooperation in training antiterrorism units might also increase efficiency and quality.

Many AFSOUTH military assets could be used in out-of-area operations if individual states or NATO collectively so decide. These assets include NATO and national ports, naval and air bases, communications centers, and combat forces, equipment, and supplies deployed in or committed to the Mediterranean region. Maintaining U.S. base access agreements with Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey would be essential. So, too, would ensuring the intimate knowledge of local facilities that comes only with regular use and exercises. Prepositioning supplies and equipment ashore or afloat in the Mediterranean for U.S. Marine Corps,

Army, or Air Force units would speed their deployment. Permission of the host country would be required, however, for the United States to employ regional bases or to remove military units or stored equipment for out-of-area operations, and obtaining such permission is by no means assured. Even the unilateral employment out of area of the Sixth Fleet's carrier battle group or marine expeditionary unit could cause friction with Italy, where the fleet is headquartered. The use of equipment or supplies prepositioned afloat in the Mediterranean by U.S. units based in CONUS would not be similarly constrained.

If AFSOUTH nations agreed, any of their national forces could be employed for out-of-area contingencies. These forces include the naval and rapid deployment ground and air forces of Spain, Italy, and conceivably France, and the air, ground, and naval components of the NATO Reaction Forces. Experience with multinational operations derived from the integrated military command structure of AFSOUTH, NATO exercises, and peacetime multinational units would be invaluable in any combined out-of-area operation, whether under NATO auspices or not. If not prohibited by political guidance, AFSOUTH should engage in generic and contingency planning for combined out-of-area operations. From time to time inviting Egypt, Israel, and other friendly non-NATO states in the region to participate in NATO exercises would facilitate combined out-of-area operations.

Force Structure Summary

Table 3 summarizes the U.S. force structure for the Mediterranean region as it currently exists and compares it to the force structure that this discussion indicates would be desirable to perform adequately political and military functions in the region. Table 4 indicates in general terms

elements of allied and NATO-wide force structure for the region that have emerged as equally important to fulfill these political and military functions.

In many instances, the findings summarized in these tables indicate that existing or planned assets, practices, and arrangements should continue or be brought to fruition. In a few, force commitments can be reduced or eliminated. In numerous cases, the analysis suggests that operating practices, training, or planning should be changed to better fulfill current needs. In a few cases, new capability is needed, notably expanding the U.S. airborne battalion in Italy to a full brigade with airborne and air mobile capability; contributing U.S. brigades to the Greek and Turkish framework divisions of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corp; deploying two or three U.S. fighter squadrons to the region; prepositioning additional U.S. ground force equipment on shore or at sea; deploying U.S. RORO ships in or dedicating some to the Mediterranean; creating a new U.S. forward logistics facility at a Turkish Mediterranean naval base; improving NATO shallow water antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasure capability; improving NATO chemical warfare defenses; and creating a NATO Combined Amphibious Force, Mine Countermeasure Force, and Auxiliary Ship Force in the Mediterranean.

During a time of defense budget reductions across NATO, these latter suggestions might seem discordant. However, the geostrategic reality is that disappearance of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat in the Mediterranean region has not eliminated the need for U.S. and NATO forces there. Moreover, for these forces to fulfill the many political and military functions that NATO nations expect of them, they must be sized and tailored appropriately.

NOTES

1. *Deterrence* is dissuading, through explicit or implicit threat to use force, another state from taking unwanted action. *Intimidation* means rendering a state compliant to another's will and responsive to the other's interests. *Compellence* is persuading, through explicit or implicit threat to use force, another state to take wanted action.
2. Turkey is not a member of the European Economic Community and is only an associate member of the WEU.
3. Tactical nuclear weapons are no longer deployed at sea under normal peacetime conditions.
4. Housing the larger force would require new construction, which Vicenza could probably not accommodate. Another site would have to be sought from the Italian government for the additional facilities. The air base at Aviano might be a possibility.

TEXT TABLES

**TABLE 1 □ POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF U.S. AND NATO
MILITARY FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION**

- Preventing risks from becoming threats and threats from turning into hostilities: crisis prevention and crisis management
 - Discouraging renationalization of NATO nations' defense policies
 - Keeping Turkey connected to Western Europe
 - Encouraging the continued engagement of the United States in Europe
 - Providing a multinational basis for contacts and dialogue with militaries of friendly non-NATO nations
 - Assistance projection: humanitarian assistance; noncombatant evacuations; and supporting other nations
 - Peacekeeping
-

**TABLE 2 □ MILITARY FUNCTIONS OF U.S. AND NATO
MILITARY FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION**

- Preventing or dealing with spillover into Thrace from the intercommunal hostilities in the former Yugoslavia
 - Dealing with potential threats to Anatolia
 - Being capable of conducting small-scale military operations along the Mediterranean littoral
 - Countering weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems that can reach Southern Europe
 - Being capable of defending the air and sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean region
 - Deterring, and if deterrence fails, responding appropriately to actions by terrorists
 - Providing capabilities, facilities, and experience with multinational operations that could be employed for or in support of out-of-area military operations
-

TABLE 3 □ US MEDITERRANEAN FORCE STRUCTURE SUMMARY

MARITIME

<i>Current</i>	<i>Proposed</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Sixth fleet connected to AFSOUTH as STRIKFORSOUTH	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Carrier battle group, present 300 days per year and otherwise within 7 days' sailing	<input type="checkbox"/> Carrier battle group, present all or almost all the time
	<input type="checkbox"/> Reconfigure aircraft mix to provide more ground attack, tanker and reconnaissance and less AAW and ASW capability
<input type="checkbox"/> Amphibious ready group with marine expeditionary unit (SOC) embarked, present 300 days per year and otherwise within 7 days sailing	<input type="checkbox"/> Amphibious ready group with marine expeditionary unit (SOC) embarked, present all or almost all the time
	<input type="checkbox"/> Employ naval task forces led LHA, LPH, or CG or individual ships for presence
<input type="checkbox"/> MEB available to reinforce	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Maritime prepositioning Squadron I in Atlantic available	<input type="checkbox"/> Maritime prepositioning Squadron I based or usually deployed in Mediterranean

MARITIME (cont.)

<i>Current</i>	<i>Proposed</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/> Two to three RORO ships based in the Mediterranean or some in CONUS dedicated to Mediterranean
<input type="checkbox"/> Access to naval bases in Spain Italy, and Greece	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Exercise with national navies of southern region	<input type="checkbox"/> Exercise with national navies of southern region, especially Turkish navy
<input type="checkbox"/> P-3 and EP-3 aircraft at Rota and Sigonella	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Special operations forces in CONUS available	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
	<input type="checkbox"/> Further integration of CONUS-based sealift and exercises into AFSOUTH planning
	<input type="checkbox"/> Establish a forward logistics facility at a Turkish Mediterranean naval base
	<input type="checkbox"/> Improved shallow-water ASW and mine countermeasures
	<input type="checkbox"/> Participation in combined amphibious forces Mediterranean

GROUND

<i>Current</i>	<i>Proposed</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Units designated to reinforce Thrace	<input type="checkbox"/> Eliminate
<input type="checkbox"/> Plans to reinforce Anatolia	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Exercise with Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Equipment for army heavy brigade at Livorno	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Airborne battalion at Vicenza	<input type="checkbox"/> Airborne/air assault brigade in Italy as part of MND(s), with battalion committed to IRF
<input type="checkbox"/> Special operations battalion in Europe and CONUS units, including antiterrorism unit	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Chemical defenses	<input type="checkbox"/> Improve
	<input type="checkbox"/> Additional army equipment prepositioned ashore or afloat in the Mediterranean
	<input type="checkbox"/> Contribute brigade deployed in Germany to Turkish and Greek ARRC framework divisions, with equipment prepositioned locally, or:

GROUND (cont.)

<i>Current</i>	<i>Proposed</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/> Alternatively, redeploy a full US division and from Germany to the southern region and restructure: airborne/air assault brigade in Italy; heavier brigades in Italy and/or Turkey
	<input type="checkbox"/> Antitactical ballistic missile capability

AIR

<i>Current</i>	<i>Proposed</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Tactical fighter squadrons designated for North Italy and Thrace	<input type="checkbox"/> Eliminate
<input type="checkbox"/> Access to Torrejon air base for staging and air bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey for staging and crisis deployment	<input type="checkbox"/> No change
<input type="checkbox"/> Occasional rotation of tactical fighter squadrons to Italy and Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/> More frequent rotation of tactical fighter squadrons to Italy, Turkey, and Greece
<input type="checkbox"/> Exercise with Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/> No change

AIR (cont.)

Current

- German-based C-130s

- One squadron of fixed-wing and two squadrons of rotary-wing special operations forces in Europe and CONUS reinforcements available

- Chemical defenses

Proposed

- Preserve German-based C-130s and further integrate them and CONUS-based airlift into AFSOUTH planning and exercises

- No change

- Improve

- Deploy two to three squadrons of dual capable ground attack aircraft in Mediterranean region at existing U.S. or other bases

**TABLE 4 □ REST OF NATO MEDITERRANEAN FORCE
STRUCTURE SUMMARY**

MARITIME

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">□ Maintain national naval forces (including British), including aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, anti-aircraft missiles, submarines, ASUW and ASW surface ships, mine countermeasure ships, land-based maritime patrol aircraft
□ Maintain or expand national sealift
□ Maintain or expand national underway support, maintenance, and logistics ships
□ Continue NATO water space management
□ Continue NATO coordination of MPA
□ Preserve and encourage broad participation in STANAVFORMED | <ul style="list-style-type: none">□ Increase visits by STANAVFORMED and national navies to friendly non-NATO states
□ Prepare STANAVFORMED to support Greece in event of spillover from Balkan conflict
□ Continue naval base access in Spain, Italy, and Greece for U.S. and allied navies
□ Obtain naval base access in Turkey for U.S. and allied navies
□ Exercise with friendly non-NATO states
□ Improve shallow water ASW and mine countermeasures |
|---|--|

TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)

<input type="checkbox"/> Create combined amphibious force, Mediterranean <input type="checkbox"/> Create NATO Mine Countermeasure Force Mediterranean <input type="checkbox"/> Create NATO Auxiliary Ship Force	<input type="checkbox"/> Create Greek and Turkish framework divisions in ARRC, possibly including U.S. brigades <input type="checkbox"/> Reduce Greek and Turkish forces in Thrace once stability is returned to Balkans <input type="checkbox"/> Exercise with Turkish army in Anatolia
<hr/> GROUND <hr/>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Maintain national rapid reaction ground forces of Italy, Spain, and France <input type="checkbox"/> Maintain special operations forces of Italy and Spain <input type="checkbox"/> Redirect Portuguese forces previously programmed for north Italy to Italian ARRC framework division <input type="checkbox"/> Create Greek and Turkish brigades in MND(s)	<input type="checkbox"/> Ready IRF(Land) to support Greece in event of spillover from Balkan conflict <input type="checkbox"/> Send IRF(Land) on occasional visits to Turkey <input type="checkbox"/> Italy to accept deployment of U.S. airborne/air assault brigade <input type="checkbox"/> Italy and/or Turkey to consider accepting full US division <input type="checkbox"/> Train multinational units for peacekeeping, peace-making, monitoring, or enforcement

TABLE 4 (CONT.)

- Improve chemical defenses
- Retain land-based anti-aircraft defenses and deploy ATBM

AIR

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Continue NATO AWACS with forward operating bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey <input type="checkbox"/> Redirect Portuguese squadron programmed for north Italy to IRF <input type="checkbox"/> Continue rapid reaction air forces <input type="checkbox"/> Maintain Italian and British Tomados, French Mirage 2000, and Turkish F-16 for ground attack, including nuclear strike <input type="checkbox"/> Maintain national land-based interceptors <input type="checkbox"/> Maintain national airlift | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Continue air base access in Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey for US and allied air forces <input type="checkbox"/> Accept basing of one or two U.S. squadrons of dual-capable aircraft <input type="checkbox"/> Exercise with Turkish air force in Anatolia <input type="checkbox"/> IRF(Air) to be prepared to support Greece in event of spill over from Balkan conflict <input type="checkbox"/> Rotate national squadrons to have IRF(Air) visit Turkey <input type="checkbox"/> Create air-training center in Turkey (at Konya) <input type="checkbox"/> Send AFSOUTH to visit friendly non-NATO states <input type="checkbox"/> Improve warning and battle management against low-flying aircraft |
|---|---|

TABLE 4 (CONT.)

OTHER	
<input type="checkbox"/> Improve command, control, communications, and intelligence, except overhead intelligence	<input type="checkbox"/> Assist Turkey in continuing to upgrade equipment
<input type="checkbox"/> Extend unified command structure to Greece	<input type="checkbox"/> Maintain reception facilities in Turkey for allied reinforcement
<input type="checkbox"/> Encourage AFSOUTH exercises that include Greece and Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/> Encourage additional CSBMS among Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and other Balkan states once stability is restored to the region
<input type="checkbox"/> Encourage Spanish and French participation in NATO exercises and planning	<input type="checkbox"/> Invite military personnel of friendly non-NATO states to NATO schools, conferences, and exercises
<input type="checkbox"/> Preserve bilateral arrangements with France and Spain	<input type="checkbox"/> Exercise with forces of friendly states
<input type="checkbox"/> Continue contingency planning for Turkish contingencies, including plans to reinforce Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/> Deploy ATBM and offer ATBM to friendly non-NATO states but continue to rely on retaliatory capability, including nuclear strike, for deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction
<input type="checkbox"/> Acknowledge Turkey's continuing need for forces in Anatolia	

TABLE 4 (CONT.)

<input type="checkbox"/> Maintain national antiterrorist units	seminar war games, and perhaps field exercises focused on peacekeeping, peacemaking, monitoring, and enforcement
<input type="checkbox"/> Continue and expand counterterrorism intelligence collection and sharing	<input type="checkbox"/> Consider training and equipping NATO units for peacekeeping, peacemaking, monitoring, and enforcement
<input type="checkbox"/> Consider combined training of antiterrorism units	<input type="checkbox"/> Engage in generic or contingency planning for combined out-of-area operations, if not prohibited by political guidance
<input type="checkbox"/> Procure special equipment for peacekeeping, peacemaking, monitoring, and enforcement	<input type="checkbox"/> Continue bilateral support for non-NATO nations
<input type="checkbox"/> Activate training programs for NATO officers, command post exercises,	

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ISBN 0-16-041856-9



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