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**INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL
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**INTERAGENCY
COOPERATION
A Regional Model for
Overseas Operations**

**WILLIAM W. MENDEL
and
DAVID G. BRADFORD**

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

McNair Paper 37

***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822**

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INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations

INTRODUCTION

This case study describes methods used to encourage and support multiagency cooperation. Drawing upon the experience of the U.S. Southern Command in the early 1990s, it suggests ways that can assist civilian and military leadership to integrate the skills and capabilities of the many U.S. Government agencies that operate in an overseas region. These methods describe a process that can be important to civilian and military officials concerned with regional policy and strategy because it has proven helpful in resolving issues of interagency coordination in the Southern Region. Its methods can be applied in other areas as well.

A NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

For half a century our warfighting strategies focused on the Soviet threat and the possibility of nuclear war. The fall of the Soviet Empire has greatly diminished that specter. Now, as the unified commanders rethink their regional strategies, an appreciation of threats to U.S. interests includes considerations for major regional contingencies (Balkans, Korea, Iraq) along with instabilities prompted by arms proliferation, narcoterrorism, insurgency, warlordism, militant religious fundamentalism, ethnic conflict, and civil war.

By varying degrees, these issues require regional interagency effort. But not all government organizations sense the need for (or see a problem) integrating interagency capabilities. Many U.S. Government organizations work effectively within their own

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domains, having little need to operate beyond the reach of an ambassador's country team in a host nation. The unified commander, however, must look at his area of responsibility across country borders in a regional sense. Although it is not within the Department of Defense charter to pull together U.S. interagency actions regionally, the unified commander can assist State Department and other government officials in that effort.

From the perspective of the unified command, this new strategic environment has made it critical that the military learn to work effectively with multiple U.S. Government agencies to overcome regional instability and to counter the threat of regional war. Requisite for the military commander's strategic vision is a concept for integrating interagency resources in contingency planning as well as a concept for supporting other agencies of government for their planning and operations. Nevertheless, there is little national guidance for the unified commanders concerning interagency cooperation and integration.

The existing literature discusses the National Security Council (NSC) staff system and possibilities for improving government from that level. Yet, the NSC facilitates policy and strategy development; it does not to execute policy in the field. The Joint Staff publications and the service doctrine do not provide specific guidelines or techniques for building interagency teamwork and integrating capabilities. The regional integration framework described in this paper, however, may be of some help.

THE CASE STUDY EXPERIENCE

The method described in the case study is a set of interrelated plans, processes, exercises, and computer decision aids. The approach that evolved at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in the early 1990s included these steps:

- Provide Regional Vision: Theater Strategy and Plans
- Integrate Capabilities: Theater Deployment Process
- Educate and Facilitate: Modeling and Simulation Systems
- Support Planning and Operations: Computer Decision Aids
- Contribute Leadership: Command Interest and Involvement

No one of these elements has been sufficient to get the job done, but when combined, the mix has proven an effective way to

integrate military missions and capabilities with those of other U.S. agencies and foreign militaries, even when the unified command is not the lead agency. The approach may be helpful to civilian agencies too.

Vision. It begins with a set of cogent strategies and plans that identify objectives, concepts and resources; these provide the vision and intent for military operations in the theater, and are an important means of informing other government agencies of military intentions, capabilities, and needs for support.

Integration. Strategies and plans are backed by a complex system for deploying U.S. service personnel into the theater. Called the Theater Deployment Planning Group system, TDPG integrates SOUTHCOM mission essential training with the goals and objectives of the U.S. Ambassadors and the needs of the host nations.

Education. The Southern Command developed a political-military game called the Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System to aid in integrating counterdrug efforts in the Latin American region, but the CMASS educational process holds promise for other functional requirements in other regions. A similar game could help integrate efforts for peacekeeping, countering terrorism, professionalizing foreign armed forces, and providing humanitarian assistance.

Decision aids. Computer simulations such as the Regional Security Strategy Implementation Analysis (RSSIA) and the Regional Development Simulation System-Single Nation Model (RDSS-SNM) have proven useful for regional strategy development and to assist in decisionmaking and adjudicating decisions in the CMASS game. These computer programs can help civilian and military planners to analyze a nation's need for programmed resources (security assistance, JCS exercises, humanitarian and civic assistance, and counterdrug support) and immediate needs caused by changes in stability and socioeconomic factors.

Leadership. The regional leadership provided by unified commanders-in-chief has been a catalyst for coordinating multiagency capabilities to achieve unity of effort. Yet, by their enthusiastic coordinating visits to civilian leaders in Washington and to ambassadors throughout the Southern Region, the CINCs

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have been vulnerable to criticism for overreaching their domain. Turf issues will continue as a dominating factor in the quest for interagency cooperation and integration, but they can be overcome by civilian and military leadership.

ASSESSMENT

This regional cooperation methodology has proven useful to Southern Command and some civilian agencies for conducting interagency operations in the Southern Region, but it will not solve all the problems of interagency coordination, cooperation, and integration. The big issues lie outside the domain of the unified command structure and the Department of Defense. These include establishing lead agencies, providing directive authority over interagency task forces, resourcing (budget) interagency efforts, aligning country teams on a regional basis to solve functional problems, and appointing regional czars to integrate strategies and operations.

By his willingness to take the initiative to help in the process of education, coordination, and integration, a military commander-in-chief can be seen as driving the process in policy areas where he has no clear mandate. Yet, the CINCs are currently the only U.S. Government officials with the wherewithal to help foreign policy officials pull together U.S. interagency actions regionally. As such, the CINCs can continue to provide regional leadership—even while in a supporting role.

The approach to integrating interagency resources described in this case study deserves consideration as the Unified Commands deal with foreign militaries and foreign governments in the new world disorder. In this context, operating successfully within the interagency framework will be vital for successful unified operations.

1. AN INTERAGENCY PLANNING PROCESS

If we [civilian and military officials] are going to be successful in the region, we need to understand interagency roles, and come together in the effort.¹

Colonel Ronald Oates, U.S. Marine Corps

The problem of interagency cooperation can be a vexing one; to this end, a unified commander-in-chief (CINC) needs to:

- Encourage regional cooperation while supporting State Department officials who have the principal regional and country responsibilities.
- Coordinate with the U.S. Government agencies operating in the area of responsibility in assisting to achieve strategic objectives.
- Integrate military resources with the efforts of civilian agencies in support of their objectives.

Regional planning and operations involve all the elements of national power and, by extension, the many agencies of government that are outside the military chain of command. In the post-Soviet military era, unified commanders routinely operate in a peacetime environment where large-scale combat in the traditional theater of war does not apply. This is a multi-agency environment, where cooperation is essential, but it is also defined by competition for recognition and resources. National Command Authorities (President and Secretary of Defense, deputized alternates or successors) increasingly task unified forces to conduct a variety of operations in support of other U.S. Government or international agencies needing help. Situations in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Somalia are current and vivid examples.

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Witness the complexity of cross-agency and military command relationships as U.S. forces led the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) with 18 other nations in Somalia to secure the delivery of humanitarian convoys, then transferred (on 4 May 1993) command authority to the U.N. Operations for Somalia (UNOSOM II).² The initial UNOSOM II mission to help create a stable society became an urban manhunt.³ And were the elite U.S. commando forces that were looking for warlord Mohammed Farah Aided working for the U.N. military command, or were they conducting U.S. unilateral special operations? The admixture of international military, civilian, and nongovernment organizations in Somalia, each with differing viewpoints and operating methods, may have contributed to the military risk made manifest by the deaths in Somalia of 26 U.S. servicemen through October 1993.⁴ The uncertainty of objectives likely degraded intelligence and operational planning.⁵

"We didn't expect it to be that difficult," said a UNOSOM II military official after the 3 October 1993 Ranger raid to capture Aided in Mogadishu.⁶ But the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, Marine General Joseph Hoar (responsible for U.S. military in Somalia), had been unable to drive home his concerns about "the ramifications of the change of mission there to a manhunt for Aided."⁷ Even as U.N. envoy in Somalia Jonathan T. Howe, assisted by State Department political advisor April Glaspie, continued to seek a military solution, presidential envoy Robert Oakley was trying to arrange a negotiated settlement.⁸ Meanwhile, the President of the United States had determined to withdraw his troops from Somalia by 31 March 1994; and the United Nations was sticking to its agenda to help Somalis form a legislative assembly and hold national elections in a nation of clans and warlords.⁹

The Somalia initiative illustrates the difficulty of operating in a multiagency environment made even more complex by its international dimensions. Strategic objectives were not always clear, and they changed while events unfolded. It suggests that mastering interagency cooperation is fundamental to success in military operations.

Another example of the challenge of multiagency cooperation is found in the diverse military missions assigned to a regional

CINC. Alone, the military element of power is insufficient to accomplish missions such as nation assistance, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and insurgency, and assisting with disaster relief. While the U.S. Ambassador is in charge of synchronizing all U.S. capabilities within a single host country, some military mission areas extend beyond single countries and are inherently regional in nature. Support to the national counter drug strategy is typical, but there are other tasks with military aspects that suggest regional treatment—controlling weapons proliferation, counter-terrorism and insurgency, security assistance, peace enforcement, shows of force and attacks and raids. Success in these missions demands the synchronized application of the skills and resources of many agencies in addition to military forces. In dealing regionally with a wide range of U.S. Government and international agencies, our commanders often must provide support within foreign policy guidelines, but without the benefit of the specific command relationships that normally frame a theater of war.

The unified commander has no authority over the many government agencies that operate throughout his area of responsibility in peacetime. While the National Command Authorities apportion areas and forces for planning in case of war, the CINC is not granted any control over other agencies in peacetime. The experience of U.S. Southern Command at Quarry Heights, Panama, in establishing a process to institutionalize interagency cooperation regionally suggests an approach that might be useful in other theaters.

INTERAGENCY SETTING

Former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command Admiral Paul David Miller writes that future military forces must be capable of operating in the interagency policy process:

In a growing number of . . . tasks, the military must act in support of, and in concert with, other agencies. Interagency cooperation is therefore essential to smooth policy implementation.¹⁰

Miller's work, *The Interagency Process* (addressed in chapter 2),

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invites consideration of some innovative ways that hold promise for strengthening the interagency process. For now, established routines for interagency cooperation available to the commander-in-chief are few and limited in their reach. The National Security Council (NSC), established by the National Security Act of 1947, advises the President on how to integrate military, foreign, and domestic policy to support national interests. The small NSC Staff, expert in security issues, has no authority to implement policy. The NSC system of committees and coordinating subgroups seeks policy consensus, but the CINC is not likely to be invited to participate in these fora. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, must interpose their staffs between the CINC and the NSC in order to protect the integrity of the operational chain of command.

Still a more problematic issue for unified commanders is that beyond the Department of Defense, few government agencies enjoy a system of strategic planning with which unified commands could correlate their efforts. The Joint Strategic Planning System of DOD knows no counterpart in the civilian agencies, where 1-year planning horizons are typical.¹¹ Even the global operating areas of the Departments of Defense and State, the Agency for International Development (AID), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Information Service do not precisely coincide. In the theaters, the CINCs find that the U.S. Ambassadors' country teams are not aligned to operate on a regional basis, making regional coordination difficult. The need for working effectively with civilian agencies of the government became evident during the Noriega crisis of 1989.

THE NORIEGA CONTINGENCY

Operation *Just Cause* was the SOUTHCOM contingency operation for bringing Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega to justice. Although the *Just Cause* objectives (including ensuring the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty and restoring democracy to Panama) required interdisciplinary cooperation within the U.S. Government, the Federal Government did not establish a routine for coordinating interagency effort to assist Panama. The task of reactivating an effective Panamanian Government was daunting. Restoration suggested the need for

Panamanian constitutional changes to strengthen the judiciary and legislature, tax and banking laws to counter drug trafficking, a new civilian police force, and rebuilding needed infrastructure.¹²

The Departments of State, Justice, and AID were key players that could have been incorporated in the planning to ensure mutual support and a unity of effort, yet military officers did not discuss operational plans outside Joint Staff channels. This proved troublesome for coordinating the plan (named *Blind Logic*, later becoming Operation *Promote Liberty*) for restoring the Panamanian Government. As General Frederick Woerner, the SOUTHCOM CINC from 1987 to 1989 said: "The reason we could not develop that [Blind Logic plan] past a certain level was because I was not permitted to enter into plans with the Department of State, for security reasons."¹³ In the restoration phase of the Panama contingency, the civil-military operations headquarters did not have civilian agencies represented on its staff, and at the same time, some civilian agencies could not overcome narrow interests to cooperate with military elements.¹⁴

The difficulties experienced by USSOUTHCOM during the *Just Cause* restoration phase are well recorded, and the lessons are instructive.¹⁵ Success in this type of low-intensity operation requires the artful blending of military and civilian resources, skills, and directive authority. Because a desired condition at the end of operations was a return to civil control of our relations with Panama (under a U.S. ambassador), it seems sensible now that the agencies of civil government should have participated in the planning process along the way. But even so, with civilian agencies still lacking a strategic planning system, it continues to fall upon the military to take the lead in planning.

As Operation *Just Cause* and its follow-on *Promote Liberty* achieved their objectives, they faded from prominence into the routine of SOUTHCOM activities. USSOUTHCOM faced a new cycle of strategic planning with the experience of the demands of interagency planning learned in *Just Cause*. Needed was a planning process that could accommodate to the interagency environment. This was important challenge because the new SOUTHCOM Strategy would establish military support to the drug war as its top priority, and it would serve as a supporting agency.¹⁶ Success here would depend upon interagency

cooperation.

Where would the CINC find the appropriate guidelines needed to fit the needs of a command with a mission of conducting operations during peacetime or situations of conflict short of war? The following chapter looks at current doctrine and strategic guidance for operating in a multiagency environment.

Notes

1. Ronald Oates, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Vice Director, Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate, J5, interview by author, Hurlburt Field, FL, 27 April 1992. Colonel Oates has served as Game Director for the series of USSOUTHCOM Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System exercises. The goals for these games have been to build interagency understanding and cooperation, integrate actions and assets, and foster a regional view for solutions to counterdrug and nation assistance efforts.

2. Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters* XXIII, no. 4 (Carlisle, PA: Winter 1993-94), 45, 55. Professor Clarke was Deputy Director, U.S. Liaison Office in Mogadishu, Somalia from March to June 1993. He states: "The mandate of the U.S.-led UNITAF was to secure food storage sites and to open lines of communication through Mogadishu into the interior so that humanitarian relief organizations could distribute food to the needy and provide medical care to the sick." Professor Clarke concludes: "The strongest criticism leveled at the UNITAF intervention in Somalia is not that it do so much, but that it did so little. UNITAF did not disarm the warlords or establish law and order. . . . As soon as UNITAF left, the warlords sharply increased their bullying and extortion of fellow Somalis and international assistance agencies."

3. Clarke, 44-45. "In authorizing UNOSOM II, UN Security Council Resolution 814 greatly expanded the number, variety, and specificity of the tasks assigned to UNOSOM II and its attached forces, creating what was in effect a mandate for an extended period of 'nation building' in Somalia. Both Security Council Resolutions—794 [UNITAF mission to secure humanitarian relief] and 814—side-stepped the crucial issue of forcibly disarming the warring Somali factions. This default, combined with the lack of a clear political agenda for Somalia, greatly reduced the likelihood that UNOSOM II could ever have attained its political and nation-building objectives."

4. U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), *Situation Report No. 22*, 15 October 1993, 2. On 3 October 1993, 12 U.S. soldiers were reported killed and 78 wounded during fighting against troops of warlord Mohammed Farah Aided in Mogadushu, Somalia. Later reports indicate that 18 U.S. soldiers died as a result of that battle. Earlier in June, 1993, Aided forces launched an attack which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.

5. F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," *Parameters* XXIII, no. 4 (Carlisle, PA: Winter 1993-94), 37. Colonel Lorenz, U.S. Marine Corps, was the Staff Judge Advocate and senior legal advisor for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. He offers this insight: "Several limitations inherent in UN operations made the transition [from UNITAF to UNOSOM II] difficult. United Nations decisionmaking is divided between the military and civilian leadership, and it is sometimes not clear who is in charge. In late March [1993], [Lieutenant] General [Civic] Bir [UNOSOM II Commander] stated he would be ready to conduct the turnover on or about 1 May 1993, a date proposed publicly by the Secretary General sometime earlier. Nevertheless, [U.S. Admiral] Jonathan Howe, the new UN envoy, refused to agree to that date. This was despite the fact that all the humanitarian relief sectors, including Mogadishu, had been successfully turned over to coalition forces by the United States, and the UN military commander had stated that he was ready to assume command. . . . Another inherent limitation of UN forces was the lack of logistical and intelligence support. The United States agreed to leave about 3000 US troops in a logistics support role, as well as additional intelligence personnel at UNOSOM II Headquarters. Yet in July and August 1993, UNOSOM II operations were reportedly hampered by an inadequate intelligence capability."

6. "Rangers waited hours for rescue," *New York Times* article in *The Kansas City Star*, October 6, 1993, A-6.

7. Harry Summers, "Poetic justice for this president is lamentable for the nation," *The Kansas City Star*, 19 October 1993, B-5.

8. Clarence Page, "Troubles with Aided have eerie connection," *Kansas City Star*, October 12, 1993, p. B-5; also "Somalis are 'thirsting for peace'," *The Kansas City Star*, October 12, 1993, p. A-8; "U.S. pilot is released," *Washington Post* article in *Kansas City Star*, October 15, 1993, p. 1.

9. "Aided faction boycotts Somalian councils," Associated Press, *Kansas City Star*, October 30, 1993, A-10.

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10. Paul David Miller, Admiral, U.S. Navy, *The Interagency Process* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), 6.

11. The Drug Enforcement Administration is a recent exception. Since February, 1991, DEA has initiated a *Strategic Management System* for broad guidance to its subordinates. It was supplemented in November 1992 with the *DEA Strategy 2000*, and implemented in 1993 through a series of regional plans (Central American Regional Plan, South American Regional Plan, etc.). These strategies, and particular operational objectives in such projects as Cadence in Central America, and Snowcap in South America, have provided a general framework for SOUTHCOM planners to program military support.

12. David Ignatius, "Panama: This Mop-Up Could Take Us Years," *Washington Post*, December 24, 1989, C1.

13. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 25, 51. General Woerner, well regarded as a strategist and Latin America expert, fell out of favor with the Bush Administration, and in July 1989, Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono advised Woerner "that his honorable option was to resign rather than be removed." Woerner agreed to resign.

14. As one former military liaison officer assigned to the State Department explained in note to author, the situation was as much the military's fault as the civilians; the military did not actively seek State Department expertise and help, and State did not actively seek to help.

15. John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, April 15, 1992). Dr. Fishel provides an excellent history of the problems of interagency coordination experienced during the restoration phase which followed Operation *Just Cause*.

16. By 1994, strategic priorities for U.S. Southern Command had changed; top interest was in strengthening military-to-military relationships and contributing toward host nation professionalization of military forces.

2. GUIDELINES FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

When the United States undertakes military operations, the U.S. Armed Forces are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of Federal departments and agencies.¹

Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 1,
Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*

Today's national security environment finds even our small unit leaders thrust into the multiagency arena. U.S. military forces are routinely committed to operations which are interagency by nature. Yet, top-down guidance as well as information about the techniques and processes for interagency coordination and integration seem slim. Where does the unified commander and his staff find the guidance for planning such operations and working with other agencies of government?

This chapter recalls the policy development and coordination process of the NSC, briefly reviews a new proposal that could facilitate strategic direction to operational elements, then discusses the available military doctrine. It begins with the NSC process.

NATIONAL DIRECTION

Guidance and procedures for coordinating and integrating the efforts of government agencies seemingly could branch from the NSC system that has evolved since the National Security Act of 1947. Conceived to coordinate policy issues, the NSC ebbs and

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flows in importance according to Presidential usage. For example, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the NSC had fallen into disuse. During the crisis, an ad-hoc Executive Committee was formed to advise President John F. Kennedy. A few years later, President Lyndon Johnson's Tuesday Luncheon Group largely supplanted the NSC staff and system for coordinating Vietnam War policy.

Aside from the variation in its role in national policy-making, the NSC process and staff organization are not designed to execute policy decisions in the sense of coordinating interagency operations afield. Figure 1 shows the NSC organized to match the leadership style and needs of President Clinton. (Note that under the NSC are committees and other interagency groups.²)

By the process that has evolved in recent years, NSC interagency groups constitute the principal mechanism for developing policy advice and recommendations for Presidential consideration. These groups formulate, recommend, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national security policy and strategy. Often a government department such as Department of State or Defense will take the lead or chair of an interagency group. If not, the group will be chaired by a member of the NSC staff. Typically, these are organized in a hierarchy that affords flexibility and invites several tiers of the national leadership and their staffs to participate in the consensus process.

After the NSC is a Principals Committee (the NSC without the President or Vice President) chaired by the National Security Advisor to the President and convened for only the most important matters. Next is a Deputies Committee, with participation at the undersecretary level, chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor or an undersecretary. It conducts the routine business of the NSC system and it serves as the crisis management cell. Additional subordinate level groups, called Interagency Working Groups, are manned at the staff action officer level to investigate specific fields of interest.

It has been observed that traditional functions of the NSC and its staff are concerned with administration, crisis management, and policy in all its aspects: coordination, integration, supervision, adjudication, formulation and advocacy.³

National Security Council Organization

CHAIR	FORUM	PARTICIPANTS
PRESIDENT	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> <p style="text-align: center;">NSC</p> </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * VICE PRESIDENT * SECSTATE * SECDEF * STATUTORY ADVISORS: DCI & CJS * OTHER ADVISORS: DIR, ACDA & DIR, USA
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> <p style="text-align: center;">PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE (CABINET LEVEL)</p> </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * SECSTATE * SECDEF * DCI * CJS * WHITE HOUSE CDB * OTHERS
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> <p style="text-align: center;">DEPUTIES COMMITTEE (SUB-CABINET LEVEL)</p> </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * UNDER SECSTATE, POLITICAL AFFAIRS * UNDER SECDEF, POLICY * DEPUTY DCI * VICE CHAIRMAN, JCS * OTHER FROM DEPT/AGENCIES
DEPT/AGENCY ASSISTANT SECRETARY	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> <p style="text-align: center;">POLICY COORDINATING COMMITTEE (ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL)</p> </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * MEMBERSHIP AT ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL OF DEPT/AGENCIES * REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEES: EUROPE, USSR, LATAM, EAST ASIA, AFRICA, NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA; DEFENSE; INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTELLIGENCE, ARMS CONTROL
DIRECTOR LEVEL	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> <p style="text-align: center;">COORDINATING SUB-GROUP NARCOTICS (WORKING GROUPS)</p> </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * NSC STAFF AND DEPT/AGENCY ACTION OFFICERS * WORKING GROUPS: ANDEAN STRATEGY CARTAGENA AGREEMENT, HEROIN STRATEGY, MILITARY INITIATIVES, TRANSIT/SECONDARY SOURCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

Figure 1

Source: Robert D. Walz, "U.S. National Security Process," Course C510, Lesson II, Appendix 1 (Draft) to Advance Sheet (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May, 1994), 44.

The supervision function is of great importance, but it must not be confused with an operational role for the staff. It has neither the expertise nor the size to execute the policy decisions made at the presidential level, yet sometimes problems with policy implementation within the departments create pressures for the staff to assume an operational role.⁴

One aspect of the Oliver North/Iran-Contra incident surely represents the problem of confusing the supervising of policy with implementing it, and frustration with the difficulty of integrating policy decisions among multiple agencies and with Congressional intent. If it is not appropriate for the NSC system to place policy into operation, then where should that function reside when numerous agencies are involved? A new approach to supplement the NSC with an implementing organization has been suggested.

In his book *The Interagency Process*, former U.S. Atlantic Command Commander-in-Chief Admiral Paul David Miller suggests that Interagency Action Groups should be established to manage the execution of policy.⁵ The IAGs (figure 2) would integrate effort under the aegis of policy councils, such as the NSC, Economic Council, and Domestic Council. Established by presidential decision, an IAG would be sponsored by a lead agency (supported agency in joint terms), have an Interagency Director (department deputy or third tier appointee as "Joint Force Commander"), and have a steering committee and working level agency representatives. IAGs would implement presidential policy decisions in such areas as nation assistance, humanitarian assistance, disaster assistance, and countering illicit drugs.

Until this or a similar proposal to supplement the NSC system is adopted, military commanders must recognize that the integration of multiagency capabilities for field operations is unlikely to be done by interagency groups in Washington or elsewhere. For now, CINCs will operate within foreign policy and defense guidelines using the available doctrine.

THE JOINT DOCTRINE

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* is the most important manual in the Joint Publications series because it is the

<u>FORUM</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> INTERAGENCY DIRECTOR <hr/> LEAD AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE </div>	LEADERSHIP	USAID REPRESENTATIVE
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> STEERING COMMITTEE <hr/> KEY AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES </div>	COORDINATION ADJUDICATION	USAID, USDP/GLOBAL, DSAA APPROPRIATE REGIONAL BUREAUS (STATE). POLITICO-MILITARY BUREAUS (STATE)
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> CORE COMPETENCIES <hr/> WORKING LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES </div>	ACTION IMPLEMENTATION	AMBASSADOR, USCINCLANT, COUNTRY TEAM, MILITARY SERVICES, JOINT TASK FORCE, OTHER AGENCIES

Figure 2

Source: Based on diagram by Paul David Miller, *The Interagency Process* (Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), 32.

strategic warfighting philosophy of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As initially written, it was Chairman Colin L. Powell's message that joint warfare is team warfare. The Chairman's views on interagency teamwork are found in National-Level Considerations, which describe unity of effort at the national level. Pub 1 says,

The combatant commands play key roles in cooperation with other Federal and Defense agencies within their theaters. This is one reason why the term "unified operations" is a useful description for the broad, continuing activities of the combatant commands.⁶

Beyond Pub 1, the subordinate Joint Publications do not capitalize on the strong tone of the Chairman's views about the role of the combatant commands in the interagency arena.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, the keystone document for joint operations, provides "the doctrinal basis for

US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations."⁷ If the doctrinal basis is treated thinly in Pub 3, tucked away in parts of two short chapters at the end of the manual, then additional guidance is provided in other manuals of this keystone (3.0, Operations) series. Because the central image of Joint Pub 3.0 is decisive warfare in large-scale combat operations, the manual seems to neglect the notion of warfare along a range of theoretical options between annihilation warfare (battle of decision; dramatic turning point in war) and attrition warfare (political decision with no dramatic turning point in combat). Many of the operations other than war reside along this continuum within a domain often influenced by social, political and economic concerns, and therefore their multiagency dimensions are not well addressed in military publications. Examples are foreign internal defense, combatting terrorism, nation assistance, peace operations, and counterdrug operations.

Joint Pub 3 assigns the issue of interagency coordination to the section concerning military operations other than war, where we are told, "For operations other than war, the military instrument is typically tasked to support the diplomatic instrument, working with the economic and informational instruments."⁸ It misses the point that all military operations, large and small, seek to achieve the objectives of national (political) policy as these objectives are translated into departmental terms. Further, interagency-international planning with agencies such as USAID, the Red Cross, the United Nations, and the Department of Justice is an essential part of large-scale combat as well as a part of the little operations other than war.

A look at subordinate manuals in the Joint Pub 3.0 series, where the details of all this are anticipated, fails to turn up any useful guidance for planning and operating in the interagency arena. Joint Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* reminds that "Interagency actions to accomplish campaign planning in a LIC environment are critical."⁹ It goes on to say that government agencies such as the Department of State have important roles, but it provides no insight as to how a joint force commander can prompt the cooperation of these critical government players.

Only Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics*,

Techniques, and Procedures for Counterdrug Operations, has the necessary detailed information to be of use to the joint planner for interagency planning and operations. By design it is limited to information about key interagency players in the counterdrug effort and does not address concepts and techniques for interagency cooperation. Even the fundamental primers for all joint staff officers, AFSC PUB 1, *Joint Staff Officers' Guide*, and AFSC PUB 2, *Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces*, fail to give the joint staff officer any insight about synchronizing joint forces with interagency capabilities.

To develop guidance for interagency activities, the Joint Staff has assigned the Navy (Doctrine Command) as lead agent for the development of a new Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. The Strategy Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) is the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, and the technical review authority is the Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The publication is to outline doctrinal guidance and processes involved to achieve interagency coordination during unified and joint operations. The date of publication is expected to be February 1996.¹⁰

SERVICE DOCTRINE

The *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, Air force Manual 1-1, Volumes 1 and 2, our best conceived and written service manual, summarizes aerospace doctrine in Volume 1, then follows in the second volume with an excellent series of essays on aspects of war and military activities short of war. Surprisingly, no where is the issue of interagency synchronization or coordination drawn out for the reader.

Naval Warfare Publication 11, *Naval Operational Planning*, describes in detail a generic military planning process. It advises that "crises often involve concurrent planning by the NCA, combatant commanders, and by other[s]," but it does not address interagency planning.¹¹ The Navy White Paper, *From the Sea*, describes a reorientation in Navy doctrine: "Away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations from the sea."¹² It suggest a greater Navy involvement in building

foundations for viable coalitions, enhancing diplomatic contacts, projecting a positive American image, and being a peacekeeper. Yet, there is no indication of how the Navy will interrelate with other agencies along their new course.

Keystone Marine Corps manuals are FMFM 1, *Warfighting*; FMFM 1-1, *Campaigning*; and FMFM 1-2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*. None specifically addresses interagency issues, but in FMFM 1-2, chapter 6, "Service with Other Military Forces," guidelines are suggested for working with other services and nations and offer one framework that could be used for conducting interagency endeavors:

- Authority should be assigned only to commanders [and civilian leaders] possessing the wherewithal to influence the action.
- Authority should be assigned to those having responsibility for the outcome.
- Responsibility for planning an operation should be vested in the commander [civilian] responsible for its execution.
- In general, command organization should employ centralized direction, decentralized execution, and common doctrine.¹³

Though we are lacking a common doctrine for interagency coordination, these guidelines could make a good starting point for structuring interagency activities.

The Army's keystone field manual is FM 100-5, *Operations*. It describes "The Strategic Army" as "competent in many areas, such as nation assistance, counterdrug operations, security assistance, . . . and stability operations, that can combine with other elements of national power to achieve strategic effects favorable to U.S. interests." It says little of how it will conduct "full dimensional operations" in coordination with other agencies.¹⁴ In a chapter on "Operations Other Than War," FM 100-5 simply advises that commanders may have to seek "an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives by unity of effort."¹⁵ The manual, with its emphasis on decisive, offensive warfighting, is wedded to "the dogma of the battle of annihilation" and the theories of

Clausewitz, only partially acknowledging the broader continuum of conflict in which the 21st Century army will operate.¹⁶

Army Draft Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, is being developed to provide guidance for operations that are decidedly joint, combined and interagency in nature. These include peacekeeping, protecting humanitarian assistance, establishing order and stability, enforcing sanctions, guaranteeing or denying movement, establishing protected zones, and forcibly separating belligerents. Because "Much of the interagency coordination and planning will be conducted by a joint headquarters," the guidance provided to Army commanders is that "Interagency operations are important" and they "facilitate unity of effort" by providing "a vital link uniting Department of Defense (DOD) and other governmental department and agency efforts." Although FM 100-23 notes that Army personnel will be coordinating with U.S. Government agencies, the manual provides no insight into the scope of involvement or guidance or how to proceed.¹⁷

FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, *Domestic Support Operations* does a good job of defining military relationships with federal, state, and local civil organizations. Though its focus is on military support to civil authority in domestic situations, it is the type of manual that would be useful if applied to military planning across the operational continuum in a CINC's area of responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

Instilling unity of effort at the national level is a necessary but elusive goal. Beyond the policy formulation role of the NSC, an interagency organizing structure is not available for overseeing integrated operations in the field. Until a national interagency system (e.g., Miller's IAG) and process is considered desirable and put in place, the function of multiagency integration to support regional objectives will reside in the good offices of the separate government organizations: the State Department as the lead for foreign policy overall; Drug Enforcement Administration for a specific counterdrug operation; the unified commands for a military contingency; and so on.

As yet, there is little doctrinal guidance for joint and service commanders to explain their roles and responsibilities in the process of interagency integration. This lack of specific direction

should be corrected in 1996 with the printing of the new Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. To date, the military's own doctrine provides little help.

The American military experience in Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf War and restoration of Kuwait (1991), and Somalia (1993) is certain evidence of the importance of interagency planning and integration alongside the necessary doctrine to facilitate military operations.

Notes

1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* (Washington: November 11, 1991), 39.

2. The NSC forum consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Statutory Advisors (Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff), and other invited advisors, such as the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament or the Director of U.S. Information Agency. President Clinton has added non-statutory members to his NSC: the U.S. United Nations Representative to emphasize the role of the U.N. in national security policy; the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy to underscore the role of economics.

3. Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officers' Guide to the National Security Council* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1989), 28.

4. *Ibid.*, 41.

5. Paul David Miller, Admiral, U.S. Navy, *The Interagency Process* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993).

6. Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, 39-40.

7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, September 9, 1993), V-1.

8. *Ibid.*, V-2.

9. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Test)* (Washington: October 18, 1990), VI-2.

10. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff message, 021800Z May 94, from Joint Staff J7 JDD, Washington, Subject: Program Directive for Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. The message states that "The objective of this project is to fill a doctrinal void by developing a single source joint publication which outlines the

critical information, doctrinal guidance, and the processes involved to best achieve interagency coordination during unified actions and joint operations."

11. U.S. Department of the Navy, *Naval Warfare Publication 11 (Rev F), Naval Operational Planning*, Washington: September 1991, 1-4.

12. "From the Sea," Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Washington: September 1992, 3. This is a "White Paper" which describes Navy doctrine to support emerging National Military Strategy and a move toward jointness and interoperability.

13. U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1-2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense* (Washington: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 21, 1991), 6-4.

14. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), 1-4.

15. FM 100-5, *Operations*, 13-4.

16. Jehuda L. Wallach, *The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation, The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 103. Wallach describes the disaster caused by the doctrinal fixation upon the battle of annihilation as the only proper, German solution to Germany's strategic problems. Herein he describes an aborted 1912 attempt to conduct "a grand-scale [interagency] war game, embracing army, navy, Reichskanzler, Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Reichsbank, etc., to be directed by the Kaiser in order to investigate the over-all problems of a future war."

17. U.S. Army, Draft Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Version 5, Training and Doctrine Command [ATDO-A] November 12, 1993), 4-4 & 5.

3.

STRATEGY AND PLANNING

*Can we look regionally? How can we focus assets by targeting the whole [interagency and international] structure . . . and try to develop the underpinnings for a relationship for a region?*¹

General George A. Joulwan, USA

A fundamental issue in conducting coordination among government agencies is that each agency must first understand its own objectives, concepts for operating, and the resources it has available. To this end, the military sector of government has done a good job developing a framework of strategic planning, programming of resources, and campaign planning. This chapter describes the evolution of U.S. Southern Command's strategy framework from the late 1980s through 1993, a strategy that has been the foundation for coordinating with other agencies of government.

The unified commands have a continuing need to coordinate regional strategies to ensure that concepts and resources are integrated within the overlapping domains of numerous agencies. The union of multidisciplinary skills and capabilities are as critical to success for peacetime strategies as for any wartime effort. Yet in peacetime, when the military component of national strategy is not the locus of government policy initiatives, achieving interagency teamwork among the military and civilian bureaucracies can be difficult. If the CINC carries the authority of combatant command in a theater of war, then during peacetime he represents only one of many government agencies operating throughout his area.² Getting cooperation from other departments to support regional military strategies remains a difficult task. This is especially critical for Southern Command because this area of responsibility remains near the bottom of U.S. strategic

priorities.³

The first part of attacking these challenges is the CINC's vision of the command's objectives and strategic concepts to explain how military action directly supports current national-level policy and strategies and relates to other agencies. The planning framework established by Southern Command over the past five years is the spring board for participating in the interagency arena.

THE STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

The basis of unified planning effort is the Joint Strategic Planning System, explained in detail in a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy (MOP 7) and in joint publications. Inherent in MOP 7 is the underlying assumption that coordination throughout the interagency community (especially via the NSC interagency groups) will be made by the Department of Defense and Joint Staffs so that planning under the current national military strategy (and especially the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan--JSCP) will proceed smoothly.⁴ It does not recognize that a CINC may have a need to directly participate in interagency coordination at the national level, or that some planning initiatives can extend beyond the JSCP tasks.⁵

This is especially true in Southern Command, where much military effort is expended supporting foreign policy decisions concerning nation assistance. Indeed, the past several Southern Command CINCs spent considerable time in Washington coordinating regional plans with government leaders and their bureaucracies. As one USCINCSOUTH observed, "National planning is a hoax—so its up to the regional CINC to do the planning."⁶ Another CINCSOUTH said, "We're not reactive, we're in a proactive mode. We have a strategy which supports the ambassadors in the region. [The issue is]...who are the players and can they cooperate."⁷

The broad scope of theater planning is illustrated by the established arrangement of Southern Command strategy and plans.⁸ The Southern Theater Strategy first began to take form in June 1987 through the development of a strategic analysis by General Fred Woerner, then the newly appointed CINC. The analysis, called "Missions, Tasks, and Responsibilities," covered

some 500 CINC responsibilities, and it became the starting point for U.S. Southern Command's theater strategy. This set the basis for the Regional Security Strategy published in 1987 and 1988.⁹

The strategy development continued under General Max Thurman, who saw to it that the strategy included a resources component that logically matched objectives and concepts, and that the strategy was implemented with campaign plans for the subregions Central America, Andean Ridge, and Southern Cone. Thurman made an effort to talk with and understand key civilian leaders in Washington and the U.S. ambassadors in his region. He conducted subregion planning meetings with his Military Assistance Group commanders to ensure that military plans reflected support for the ambassadors' country plans. Thurman even included a marketing plan as a way of informing the interagency leadership about the strategy and gaining their support. Figure 3 reflects the planning process in 1990; note that the country plans were an integral part of the strategy formulation process.

The maturing of the strategy was briefly interrupted in 1989 by Operation *Just Cause*, but was brought to current form by General George Joulwan. Five years in development, the Southern Theater Strategy is the compass for SOUTHCOM's operational planning. Figure 4 illustrates the conceptual framework of strategy and plans that resulted from the process and is discussed below.

The Southern Theater Strategy has been designed to "encourage and sustain cooperation among our allies, friends, and new partners" throughout Latin America—directly supporting the President's National Security Strategy.¹⁰ Its principal operational concept draws from the National Military Strategy requirement for forward-presence operations: exercises, deployments, port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, counterterrorism, protecting U.S. citizens, humanitarian assistance, and helping to counter illicit drugs.¹¹ None of these can be done in isolation, and that most missions require intensive interagency coordination is recognized in the strategy:

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In this theater, successful implementation of the strategy will be achieved with the cooperation and support of a myriad of government agencies and with each U.S. ambassador who is himself the centralized planning authority within his country of appointment.¹²




Figure 3

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate, J5, Quarry Heights, Panama, March 1990.

It is easy to understand why interagency cooperation is central to SOUTHCOM's strategy and planning when given its priority missions: enhancing the roles of professional military forces in democratic societies; promoting peace and stability to facilitate economic development and the growth of democracy in the region; supporting counterdrug efforts; and implementing the Panama Canal treaties.¹³




Figure 4

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate, J5, Quarry Heights, Panama, April 1993.

To engender cooperation within the Southern Theater, Theater Strategy goes to every ambassador, to ensure that military strategic objectives are in line with the Ambassadors' annual Goals and Objectives statement as well as host country national plans. The objectives of U.S. agencies operating in the Theater are considered in order to set the stage for synchronized interagency operations.¹⁴ Sound operational planning that can achieve the policy objectives of the Federal departments and our ambassadors overseas is another way to encourage multiagency participation and support.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Putting the Southern Theater Strategy into operation is accomplished by USCINCSOUTH Peacetime Engagement OPLAN 6001-95, which guides, in turn, four subordinate SOUTHCOM programs: the nation assistance and *Promote*

Democracy programs, and the military roles and counterdrug campaigns. The mission is "to promote and strengthen democracy by providing support to the U.S. ambassadors' and the host nations' counterdrug and counterinsurgency efforts, enhancing the roles of professional military forces in the host nations, and providing nation assistance."¹⁵

The scope of the OPLAN includes military support for countering illicit drugs, disaster relief, assisting host nations with their national plans, noncombatant evacuation in times of crisis, counter-terrorism, providing support to counter insurgencies, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. These are tasks that must be accomplished in a peacetime environment as well as during war, and they involve many agencies of the U.S. and foreign governments. The four subordinate programs focussing effort in support of the Peacetime Engagement OPLAN demand a variety of multidisciplinary and interagency resources.

NATION ASSISTANCE

The Nation Assistance Program has established Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru as its priority nations. The intent is end up with self-sustaining capabilities and institutions for continued development in host nations. Program objectives are to develop the capabilities of host nation institutions and infrastructures, contribute toward increasing the legitimacy of governments, assist in fulfilling citizens' expectations about their emerging democratic governments, and provide support to strengthen these democratic governments.

Concepts for achieving these objectives include:

- Conducting combined exercises with host nation forces
- Deploying U.S. forces for training in the Southern Theater and sending mobile training teams to assist host nation people and units
- Facilitating Foreign Military Financing for military resources and the International Military Education and Training Program; facilitating Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (Title 10 USC, Sec. 401)
- Conducting psychological operations
- Conducting medical and dental readiness training exercises as well as engineering exercises

- Providing excess Department of Defense property
- Providing civil affairs support.¹⁶

Civil affairs teams assist the host nation to integrate support from international organizations, nongovernment organizations, private voluntary organizations with support from U.S. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. These ways of conducting host nation assistance also apply to the SOUTHCOM *Promote Democracy* Program.

PROMOTE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

The *Promote Democracy* Programs give priority to Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Venezuela, and El Salvador; 14 other nations also receive assistance. The intent is to help in building an environment in host nations where change and development can occur without violence. Its objectives are to assist in protecting the developing democracies, increase their legitimacy and credibility, and enhance the capabilities and roles of their militaries to support democratic societies. In addition to Nation Assistance, concepts for promoting democracy include helping host nation civil and military organizations establish systems and procedures for command, control, communications, and intelligence. Staff assistance visits are provided for training and to work out procedures. Funding is provided for formal and informal professional exchanges on an individual to unit level basis.

MILITARY ROLES CAMPAIGN

The campaign for enhancing military roles in democracies establishes a priority effort for Peru, Guatemala, Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador and Chile. The intent is to help develop or enhance host nation military ethics that support democracy and protect and promote human rights and still allow nations to defend themselves against internal and external threats. Objectives are to improve military capabilities, assist professional development, and advocate a professional ethic that is supportive of democratic society. U.S. SOUTHCOM does this through the concepts of operation described above, plus a strong emphasis on education. In turn, U.S. ambassadors send selected foreign

officers to the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, GA, the Interamerican Defense College at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, combined conferences, and similar professional exchanges.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN

The Counterdrug Campaign has set priorities for drug source areas (Andean Ridge), drug transit areas, then potential source and transit areas. The intent of the Counterdrug Campaign is to reduce the flow of illicit drugs to the United States through support to U.S. Ambassadors and U.S. drug law enforcement agencies. Its objectives are to support the development of host nation political will to fight narcotrafficking, assist in developing host nation counterdrug capabilities, and to encourage a continuous counterdrug effort on a cooperative, regional basis. A series of programs named *Support Justice* have strengthened host nation efforts by giving support to regional, interagency and international counterdrug operations.

The first *Support Justice* program started in 1991 with a bilateral (U.S.-Colombia) counterdrug operation; subsequently, the program matured to include U.S. support to multilateral operations. The *Support Justice* program (renamed Operation *Steady State* in 1994) has helped to integrate multiple agencies from the United States, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador to fight the illicit drug trade. As a result of the *Support Justice-Steady State* operations, "Host nations realized the benefit of mutual cooperation and began to address the problem from a regional perspective," according to the SOUTHCOM CINC.¹⁷ Also, cooperation between host nation militaries and their civilian law enforcement agencies has been facilitated by SOUTHCOM's operational support.

This support includes small Operations Planning Groups (operations), Planning Assistance Teams (plans), and Tactical Analysis Teams (intelligence) to help in coordinating interagency and international counterdrug actions within host nations. U.S. personnel committed to support these operations are technical men and women of all services who repair and operate radars at fixed installations, install communications equipment, facilitate information sharing, and help host nation law enforcement and military units coordinate counterdrug support.

MILITARY RESOURCES

The family of SOUTHCOM plans draws from a range of military and interagency resources. Military units and the skills of their service personnel may be the most important resource available to SOUTHCOM, but there are practical limits to the numbers of service personnel that can be deployed within Latin American nations.¹⁸ Any noticeable presence of U.S. service personnel invites political criticism by those wishing to exploit sovereignty issues. Witness complaints by politicians about *Support Justice* counterdrug efforts in Bolivia, or humanitarian and civil assistance in Guyana as a threat to Brazil's sovereignty, or engineering assistance in Colombia as a threat to that nation's sovereignty. Fortunately, there are a number of additional resources that can support the SOUTHCOM strategy.

Funding for defense assistance is handled by the Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) through U.S. Southern Command and in-country Security Assistance Organizations with the Foreign Military Sales and Grants, and International Military Education and Training programs. Latin American Cooperation Funds are appropriated to the military departments and administered by the services; this provides funds for cooperative exchanges and professional visits. The U.S. Information Agency and U.S. Information Service (USIA/USIS) provide funding for contact programs with essentially nonmilitary audiences.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) funding is the primary means to support nation assistance plans. It is funded according to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 401 through the Department of Defense. It serves the interests of both the United States and host nation by addressing economic and social needs: medical, dental and veterinary care; transportation systems; sanitation facilities and wells; and construction of public facilities. HCA provided over \$6 million for medical and engineering support in 14 Southern Theater nations during fiscal year 1993.¹⁹

The complete resourcing picture includes many other considerations besides HCA. Figure 5 provides an overview of considerations for building the SOUTHCOM budget; note that research concerning host nations' humanitarian and civic action

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needs is conducted 2 years in advance. Also, coordination with the ambassadors' country teams needs to take place a year before operations in order for resources to be in place when needed. Individual pay, unit operating and maintenance costs, and travel costs for people and equipment are obvious considerations; then there are exercise-related construction costs, other in-theater costs, and even funding to be provided by USG agencies as well as the host nations. Engineering activities in SOUTHCOM (such as project design, contract construction, disaster assistance, environmental support, joint exercises and deployments for training) are funded by a variety of sources and are typical of the complex manner in which the command funds its operations.




Figure 5

Source: "Building the Budget," USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate, J5, Quarry Heights, Panama: 1993.

Engineer support funds devolve from an amazing array of sources. These funding sources include exercise related construction, foreign military financing program, infrastructure

study, HCA, operations and maintenance, USAID, port handling and inland transportation, counterdrug, CINC's initiative, developing countries combined exercise program, host nation funds, and more. By combining these many sources for funding, USSOUTHCOM realized \$65 million to support engineer activities in Latin America in Fiscal Year 1993.²⁰

All these considerations must be brought together in some reasonable way to maximize limited funding support for SOUTHCOM operations. The SOUTHCOM programming process does this.

CONCLUSIONS

The Southern Theater Strategy and the Peacetime Engagement Operations Plan are focused on military operations other than war. These kinds of operations place a premium on the cooperative efforts of other USG agencies alongside our joint forces to ensure success. This can be seen in the types of operation plans and programs developed by SOUTHCOM. Nation assistance, promoting democracy, professionalizing military roles in democratic societies, and countering illicit drug trafficking are tasks that require multiagency participation for success. Further, U.S. Southern Command operates in an economy of force theater where resources will continue to be limited. This makes the blending of the objectives, concepts for operating, and scarce resources of multiple U.S. Government agencies a necessary prerequisite for successfully pursuing strategic goals in the region.

Of course, having a cogent plan is not an end, but it is a way to inform subordinates and to coordinate with counterpart organizations. The potential for SOUTHCOM strategic planning to contribute toward integrating multiagency capabilities is diminished by the dearth of planning systems extant in counterpart organizations. Typically, U.S. Government organizations operate on an annual basis, without the benefit of a process akin to the military's Joint Strategic Planning System. One exception is the Drug Enforcement Administration which has started a Strategic Management System in recent years, greatly facilitating interagency coordination. To the extent that agencies are beginning to develop strategies and plans to explain strategic

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vision and intent, objectives and operating concepts, it will aid interagency cooperation.

Notes

1. George A. Joulwan, General, U.S. Army, interview by author, Quarry Heights, Panama, 8 April 1993.

2. A sample of the U.S. agencies currently operating in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility include Department of State, Department of the Treasury, USAID, Department of Justice, Commerce Department, Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Trade Representative, DOD stove pipes (example DIA), CIA, FBI, Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. OAS Representative, Department of Labor, and DEA.

3. After CONUS defense, the United States strategy since World War II has been "Europe First," with other regions falling in line, generally Pacific Rim, Middle East, Latin America, then Africa. The lack of interest in its own hemisphere has been evidenced by the low priority for resources (especially foreign aid) given Latin America by the United States. Prioritization of strategic interests is necessary, and such strategic decisions are one reality to which USSOUTHCOM planning must accommodate.

4. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan contains guidance to the commanders of unified and specified commands and the chiefs of the Services for the accomplishment of military tasks in the short-range period (two years). These assignments are based on the capabilities of available forces. The JSCP directs the development of plans to support national security objectives by assigning tasks and apportioning major combat forces to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The JSCP apportions "above the line" or combat forces for the CINCs' planning; the necessary support forces are then provided to the CINCs by the Services as they deem appropriate. See AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1991), 5-15.

5. The Chairman, Joint Staff needs to insure that he maintains consistency in policy coordination with other Federal departments and cannot have the various CINCs running afield throughout Washington. Because the Joint Community must speak with one voice, we are not likely to observe the CINC or his staff represented at NSC staff meetings. Conversely, the unified commands have a need to effect coordination at the highest levels of government to support regional planning efforts.

6. Maxwell R. Thurman, General, U.S. Army, Retired, former USCINCSOUTH, interview by author, Quarry Heights, Panama, 31 March 1990.

7. General Joulwan interview.

8. The intent of the current Southern Theater Strategy is to manage threats related to illicit drugs, economics, insurgencies, and the environment, and to enhance opportunities concerning stability and security, democracy, and commerce. The SOUTHCOM Strategy supports these **national security objectives**: global and regional stability for peaceful change and progress; open democratic political systems; open international economic system; U.S. leadership in collective responses to crises. The strategy supports these **national military objectives**: deter/defeat aggression in concert with allies; ensure global access and influence; promote regional stability and cooperation; stem the flow of illegal drugs; and combat terrorism. In turn, the SOUTHCOM **theater strategy objectives** are: strengthen democratic institutions; assist host nations in eliminating threats to national and regional security; support continued economic and social progress; assist host nations in defeating drug production and trafficking; ensure an open and neutral Panama Canal; enhance the roles of professional military forces in the region. The major supporting operation plan, Peacetime Engagement Operations, directs specific programs to achieve these objectives.

9. John T. Fishel, "The US Military and Security in Latin America in the Clinton Era," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 7.

10. U.S. Government, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (The White House, Washington: January 1993), 13-4.

11. Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: January 1992), 7, 14-5.

12. U.S. Southern Command, *Southern Theater Strategy*, Quarry Heights, Panama, July 1, 1992, 2.

13. General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 March 1994, 15. Another priority was quality of life for U.S. forces and their families.

14. Lieutenant Colonel Leon H. Rios, USA, Chief, Policy and Strategy Division, J5, U.S. Southern Command, interview by authors, Quarry Heights, Panama, 19 October 1993.

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15. U.S. Southern Command briefing to author in Panama on October 20, 1993, "USSOUTHCOM'S Peacetime Engagement Operations Plan, Information Briefing" SCJ5, Policy and Planning Division, Quarry Heights, Panama, 9 September 1993, slide 10.

16. The military component of nation assistance includes medical, engineer, and civil affairs (CA) assistance. CA assistance is rendered by surveying and identifying nation assistance prospects within host nations. CA serves as the integrator of nation assistance efforts, identifying goals and missions, and working a balance between types of support rendered. Civil Affairs is a link to the local population through local health, public works, and leadership officials and to national level officials in civil and military agencies of government. See U.S. SOUTHCOM *Southern Theater Strategy*, Appendix 2-4, "Nation Assistance," Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993, 21-2.

17. McCaffrey, 20. U.S. Southern Command started the Support Justice program in April 1991 with the initial objective of sparking bilateral cooperation with the Andean Countries. The program was developed so that host nations would have the political will and necessary capability to carry out effective counterdrug operations. After Support Justice (SJ) I, SJ II (June-October, 1991), III (November 1991-April 1992), and IV (September 1992-October 1993) expanded operations to include synchronized land, air and riverine interdiction, intelligence sharing, and regional cooperation among Andean nations. Now, Southern Command has written Operation "Steady State" (October 1993 to present) which continues the SJ programs on a recurring basis. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mark Richardson, USAF, Chief, Counterdrug Plans Division, Counterdrug Directorate, U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 20 October 1993.

18. One systemic problem for unified commands in executing peacetime engagement strategies is that the Joint Strategic Planning System was largely developed to support mid or high intensity warfare by mission taskings and the apportionment of major combat units (above the line forces) to the CINCs for war planning. It has been assumed (perhaps incorrectly) that the services would properly structure and provide adequate service support units (non-combat, "below the line" units) to the CINCs based on the combat units in their warplans. However, strategies for peacetime engagement require medical, engineer, communications, civil affairs, and like units. That The Joint Staff would not apportion below the line (non-combat) Combat Support and Service Support units to USCINCSOUTH Operation Plan 6001-95 suggests continued problems for the U.S. military in effecting operations other than war. The Joint Strategic Planning System will need to

accommodate to the low intensity conflict environment of the 21st century.

19. U.S. Southern Command briefing, "HCA, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (10 USC 401) Program and Funding," Director, Operations, SCJ3-CA, Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993, slide, "FY 93 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program."

20. U.S. Southern Command, SCEN, "Engineer Program Overview," briefing at Theater Deployment Management and Coordination Conference, Quarry Heights, Panama, 10 June 1993, slide "Engineer Support Funds."

4.

UNIFIED OBJECTIVES FOR MULTIPLE AGENCIES

The problem is how to align the country teams regionally. ¹
Brigadier General Richard Potter, U.S. Army

Since its initiation in fiscal year 1993, U.S. Southern Command's system for planning and monitoring the movement of units and personnel into the theater has become a means to coordinate interagency efforts regionally. The Theater Deployment Planning Group (TDPG) merges SOUTHCOM's strategic objectives and priorities with the ambassadors' country plans.² It is a big job: in fiscal year 1994, the 1,082 deployments into 18 Latin American nations involved over 60,000 U.S. active duty and reserve component personnel.³ In this process, SOUTHCOM can consider the objectives of the many USG agencies represented on a country team as the command develops concepts and resources for training and assistance. The process is designed to avoid duplicating host nation support provided by other USG agencies and to ensure that U.S.-sponsored activities are not working at cross-purposes.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN THE THEATER

The deployment planning program provides a widely coordinated way to support the CINC's strategy objectives for the theater. General Barry R. McCaffrey, current CINCSOUTH, has explained that as SOUTHCOM executes its strategy, it operates with and in support of other U.S. Government agencies:

U.S. objectives are not accomplished unilaterally by any Government entity. They are accomplished by the cooperative

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efforts of all departments and agencies. These agencies work together to support the Ambassadors' and their Country Teams' efforts to assist host nation governments. Identifying shared U.S. objectives and developing mutually supportive strategies and programs are necessary for us to attain national objectives.⁴

The TDPG program is one way of doing that. It supports host nations' and ambassadors' country plans as it identifies and develops midrange training opportunities for U.S. Forces. It recognizes country team and host nation needs for subject matter Expert Exchanges, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, military aspects of nation assistance (i.e., engineering, medical, civil affairs), training assistance, and the like. By coordinating for future fiscal years (a 5-year program), SOUTHCOM programmers have time to arrange funding in the budget for these activities, and they reinforce the training management process for U.S.-based units.

TDPG STEERING COMMITTEE

A Theater Deployment Planning Group steering committee meets to establish program priorities by subregion and country with regard to the CINC's strategy and his Annual Training Guidance. Decisions are based on information provided by the country teams, SOUTHCOM staff, and service components. The SOUTHCOM J3 Operations Directorate, Deputy Director for Exercises provides staff members to oversee the program. The program has two major elements: a Deployment Planning Guide to guide the MILGROUPS in preparing their input to the TDPG process, and on-site TDPG assistance visits.

Planning Guide

The Deployment Planning Guide is a handbook that can be used by the country team (MILGROUP) to help in planning, forecasting and managing troop deployments into the host country. It consolidates Deployment Program information and contains the out-year deployment plans. It also includes the CINC's training guidance and SOUTHCOM regulations which apply to the program.

The Guide includes specific direction for such concerns as human rights, force protection, and certification procedures for airfields. The Guide is especially important to facilitate MILGROUP planning because limited funding prevents the TDPG from visiting all 19 host nations annually for on-site coordination and planning. (SOUTHCOM plans to schedule about nine visits annually.)

Team Visits

The steering committee schedules TDPG team visits to host countries to provide country team members direct access to the SOUTHCOM staff. The visits afford the staff on-site information and impressions that are helpful in building the program. The point of contact on the ambassadors' country teams is typically the Military Group (MILGROUP). Procedures for the visit include these steps: a country clearance request 30 days ahead of the proposed staff visit; an advance party arrives in the host country several days ahead of the staff meetings to complete administrative requirements and itinerary; then coordination meetings are held with the country team and host nation representatives to jointly identify requirements that support the country plan and the CINC's strategy.⁵

The Operations Directorate of SOUTHCOM tailors the TDPG visiting team to the needs of the host country; it could consist of officers from many staff functions, such as intelligence, operations, plans, programming, engineers, medical, and special operations. The specific goal is to match military training and operations to the needs identified in the ambassadors' country plans.

TDPG PRODUCTS

Products of the TDPG process include the Theater Training Deployment Plan (TTDP) and the Theater Training Opportunities Plan (TTOP).

The Theater Training Deployment Plan: Provides for the forthcoming Fiscal Year a forecast of the expected deployments listed by type (Overseas Deployment Training or Deployment For Training), quarter of year, number of days, military service,

number of troops, and type of mission (e.g., site survey, engineer support, training in riverine operations, instruction in diesel engine repair, training in inventory control).

The Theater Training Opportunities Plan: Represents forecasts for the next fiscal year beyond the Deployment Plan. It is based on information from TDPG visits, country team information using the Theater Training Deployment Planning Guide, and historical data. It looks much the same as the Deployment Plan, and provides a proposed set of deployments to simplify planning and programming. After the springtime Theater Deployment Management and Coordination Conference attended by joint and service staff officers and country team members (MILGROUP) to coordinate the Deployment Program, the Deputy Director for Exercises of SOUTHCOM's Operations Directorate produces a prioritized TTOP. It becomes a basis for the following year's Deployment Plan.⁶

THE COUNTRY ROADMAP COMPUTER SYSTEM

The Country Roadmap Computer System (CRCS) helps to establish priorities for theater deployments (figure 6). This SOUTHCOM programming tool takes elements of the ambassadors country plans and organizes them in a format that eases decisionmaking about the application of limited SOUTHCOM resources. For budget preparation, the principal vehicle through which the country team projects security assistance requirements is the Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA). The AIASA is one part of the SOUTHCOM country roadmap that includes other resources.

The Country Roadmap Computer System takes potential resource inputs (such as security assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, training exercises) and relates them to functional areas of support and services (agriculture, civil works, commerce, communications, education, health, housing, justice, military, and transportation) (figure 7). The roadmap organizes these potential needs in categories such as the ambassadors' goals and objectives, and SOUTHCOM objectives, programs and requirements. The output is a "capability package" that aids the




Figure 6

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Programs and Resources Directorate, J8, Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993.

prioritization process overseen by the Programs and Resources Directorate, SCJ8 (figure 8). The CRCS is one means to aid in the development of a master requirements list for the command. It establishes increments within programs and needs within appropriation elements. This affords a systematic review of requirements for the Theater Deployment Program and facilitates internal change.⁷

CONCLUSIONS

In the overview of the process for theater deployment planning and programming (figure 9), the TDPG visit serves to blend elements of the ambassadors' country plan with those of the SOUTHCOM Strategy. Computer models are used in the process. The Regional Development Simulation System--Single Nation Model helps determine courses of action; it is explained in detail in chapter 6. The Country Roadmap Computer System

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POSSIBLE ROADMAP INPUTS	ITEMS AND SERVICE									
	AGRICULTURE	CIVIL WORKS	COMMERCE	COMMUNICATIONS	EDUCATION & RECREATION	HEALTH	HOUSING	JUSTICE	MILITARY	TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ASSISTANCE (TITLE 22)	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
OTHER DoD (TITLE 10)										
TRAINING EXERCISES	X	X		X		X		X	X	X
HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
INTERNATIONAL COOP PROGRAM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
OTHER COOP PROGRAMS		X		X				X	X	
COUNTER-NARCOTICS	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
DISASTER RELIEF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Figure 7

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Programs and Resources Directorate, J8, Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993.

ROADMAP REPORT EXAMPLE (FIVE YEAR RESOURCE PLAN)

FROM THE PLAN										
STRATEGY: ESTABLISH HN COUNTERNARCOTICS CAPABILITY										
AMBASSADOR'S GOAL: MAINTAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES										
OBJECTIVE 5: IMPROVE FIXED WING AIRLIFT										
PROGRAM #1: SUSTAIN C-130 CAPABILITY										
RESOURCE STRUCTURE										
REQUIREMENT	QTY	FY93				FY94				FY...
		ITEM	SRCE	COST (\$K)		QTY	ITEM	SRCE	COST (\$K)	
1) FLT HRS	3000	FH	FMFP	3600	4200	FH	FMFP	5040		
2) AC MAINT	1	PARTS	FMFP	3658	1	PARTS	FMFP	4896		
3) MECH TNG	3	SCHL	IMET	20	6	SCHL	IMET	40		
4) CN TNG	12	OJT	INM	30	15	OJT	INM	35		
5) LOG SPT TNG	1	MTT	DEA	8	1	MTT	DEA	10		
6) SMEE	2	EXCH	COOP	14	2	EXCH	COOP	16		

Figure 8

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Programs and Resources Directorate, J8, Quarry Heights, Panama, 1993.

helps to organize the programming effort. U.S. joint training requirements, as guided by the CINC's Mission Essential Task List, are included before the deployment plans are published.

The Theater Deployment Program is an innovative approach to deployment planning, yet time will be needed to prove its effectiveness as a tool for aligning theater training and operations with the CINC's strategy and available resources. Initial reports from the SOUTHCOM staff indicate that it is performing well. A more important determinant of TDPG success will be its long-term usefulness to the country teams as a way that the unified command's strategy and plans are aligned with country team goals and missions.




Figure 9

Source: USSOUTHCOM, Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate, Quarry Heights, Panama: October 1993.

The TDPG represents a systematic and organizational approach to facilitating interagency cooperation, but it does not tackle the human aspects of the issue. The next chapter describes a political-military exercise called CMASS that established

conditions in which leaders and staff personnel of government met to learn about other agencies' objectives and bureaucratic cultures and to informally exchange views on current issues of policy implementation.

Notes

1. Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 February 1994. As former Commander Special Operations Command Europe, General Potter deployed his forces to Turkey providing combat search and rescue during the 1990-91 *Desert Storm* fight against Iraq. After the war, he gained considerable interagency experience as leader of the first elements on the ground coordinating relief efforts for Kurd refugees during Operation *Provide Comfort*.

2. Major Miguel I. Becerril, USA, Manager, Theater Deployment Program, "FACT SHEET, USSOUTHCOM'S Theater Deployment Planning Group (TDPG)," Exercise Division (SCJ3-DDX), U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 19 October 1993.

3. U.S. Southern Command briefing, "FY 94 TTDP Overview," Exercise Division (SCJ3-DDX), US Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 11 June 1993, slide "FY 94 TTDP Overview (Non-CJCS Exercise)." FY 94 Theater Deployments (Total Projections) included: CJCS exercises, 19; unit training (DFT, ODT), 1,150; Security and Technical Assistance (Mobile Training Teams), 275; rotations to Jungle Operations Training course, 18; operations and support, 2,650; for a total of 4,112 deployments involving 63,600 personnel. Most of these deployments are small numbers of personnel in training and assistance teams, which accounts for the large number of deployments.

4. General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, 2 March 1994, 14.

5. Becerril.

6. Colonel Norman R. Flemens, USA, Force, Deputy Director for Joint Exercises and Training, "Memorandum, Proposed FY95 Theater Training Opportunities Plan," U.S. Southern Command, SCJ3-DDX, Quarry Heights, Panama, 15 May 1993.

7. U.S. Southern Command briefing, "LATAM Country Plans Resource Planning," Programs and Resources Directorate, SCJ8-P, Quarry Heights, Panama, 10 June 1993, slide "Master Requirements List."

5. BUILDING CONSENSUS, LEARNING COOPERATION

It became clear that we often have the same goals but different processes for arriving at those goals.

Game process was very good in highlighting the issues, and set a good stage for further discussion in real world agency settings.

Rarely can we meet under a single roof with all the actors who contribute to the effort.

The agencies had a difficult time communicating even though they were all in the same building.

Player Comments, CMASS Exercise

"How do you develop mutual trust and confidence? In Europe we ran exercises to demonstrate trust and confidence," advised a former CINCSOUTH.¹ In trying to develop the underpinning for effective working relationships in his area of responsibility, the CINC encouraged a process for education and cooperation. In April 1991, he directed the development of the Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System (CMASS) to establish "a gaming system that could address counterdrug issues and promote unity of effort among the agencies involved in the war on drugs."² This was an important decision because the counterdrug effort was one facet of an operations plan for peacetime engagement that also included concepts for nation assistance and promoting regional stability. Establishing a means for interagency coordination in the counterdrug effort would have immediate overlap into other aspects of the SOUTHCOM strategy. Inherent in the project design was the development of analytical computer models to support SOUTHCOM's ongoing operations and periodic exercises.

SOUTHCOM designed the game with the help of Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Incorporated to aid the command with this complex and difficult mission of support the U.S. national counterdrug effort. With 15 or more government agencies conducting operations throughout Latin America at once, the potential for misunderstanding and waste of resources was ever present. Supporting the ambassadors, U.S. drug law enforcement agencies and other government agencies, plus responding to the policy goals of Washington-based agencies, was a daunting task. The CMASS would prove to be a big contribution toward interagency cooperation at the policy level in Washington and among operators in the field.

OBJECTIVES

USSOUTHCOM designed CMASS to provide a structured environment for analyzing the complex problems of the counterdrug effort, looking at courses of action, and coming to agreement about cooperative interagency efforts.³ Common objectives of the series of CMASS games have been to:

- Enhance the effectiveness of U.S. interagency operations.
- Help the USSOUTHCOM and component commanders and staffs understand the support required by U.S. country teams and agencies.
 - Improve regional coordination to increase host nation and law enforcement capabilities.
 - Contribute to an understanding of the narcotrafficking threat to U.S. interests.
 - Aid in the synchronization of resources; and enhance the planning and operations of interagency players, the country teams, and the host nations.⁴

CMASS ORGANIZATION

Within the setting of a nearly real-world scenario, functional seminar groups explore concepts for programs and operations that would put into action national drug policy and strategy. In the game, assumptions are kept to a minimum. The controllers modify the actual situation on the ground only to the extent necessary to drive the objectives of the game. Thus game players

use the actual guidance of the Presidential Decision Directive for counterdrug operations, the National Drug Control Strategy, USSOUTHCOM's strategy and plans, and other government policies and strategies as bases for exploring courses of action.

CMASS encourages an exchange of ideas among a wide range of government officials who usually role-play themselves in positions from the strategic to the tactical levels. Host nation officials have participated in some seminar games, contributing to the realism and importance of game interaction. Figure 10 shows the typical organization.




Figure 10

Source: *Game Book* (Quarry Heights, Panama: USSOUTHCOM Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System, Simulation IV, May 1993), 4.

Blue Team seminars are manned by government representatives from the Washington interagency arena. They represent high-level policy positions in such organizations as the National Security Council, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and so on. This team is the Washington Interagency Group and for game purposes, represents a National Security Council group.

One Blue Team is the USSOUTHCOM staff, providing the military information for the regional strategic and high operational level of game activity.

Green Team seminar groups are staffed with players who are directly involved with carrying out U.S. policy in the field. A U.S. ambassador's country team would typically compose one Green Team group, and a host nation team would be another. Host nation officials have been called upon to serve on this team. When sensitive or classified information is at the center of contention, then knowledgeable U.S. personnel play the role of host nation officials. The CMASS game director will form a composite country team when it is impractical to bring many country teams together simultaneously. Such was the case at CMASS IV, held by the National Defense University in Washington, DC, where the composite country team was made up of MILGROUP and embassy officials from Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

The white team is the control team, headed by a senior SOUTHCOM officer as the Game Director. The control team depicts organizations not represented by players at the game and it keeps the play in line with game objectives. It provides the function of adjudication of the decisions (or moves) of the teams.

A Red Team simulates the way narcotraffickers, insurgents, and terrorists operate and provides that response to Blue and Green Team players. The USSOUTHCOM Vice Director of Intelligence is head of the Red Team. Members of the Red Team can include contractor personnel and analysts from U.S. embassies, DEA, the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Defense Intelligence Agency, Los Alamos National Laboratories, and SOUTHCOM staff officers. Often, the Red Team has functional cells to represent separate types of threats (e.g., narcotraffickers and insurgents) to encourage realistic and independent response to the Green and Blue groups' initiatives.

HOW THE GAME WORKS

A typical game would have the Washington Interagency Group review emerging counterdrug strategy or policy and decide upon appropriate guidance to U.S. military and civilian agencies

operating in the Latin American region. During this initial period, the SOUTHCOM staff team and country teams would review the game scenario and current plans and operations.

The Washington Interagency Group (WIG) could then issue guidance to the Unified Command, the U.S. embassies, and drug enforcement agencies, thus getting the first game move underway. After much discussion and debate, and coordination with other teams, these groups then develop courses of action to carry out the new counterdrug guidance. The Red Team, which is really a player (not a controller cell), reacts to the moves of the White, Blue, and Green Teams.

At the end of the day, all teams assemble and discuss the rationale for their decisions and raise issues to discuss with the group at large. An interesting aspect of this is the Red Team's discussion of the impact of White, Blue and Green Team actions and the reasons for its Red Team reactions.

The game continues for three or four moves, taking about four days to conduct a CMASS exercise. The controller team uses several computer models for adjudication of team moves, and to provide accurate responses to other teams.

COMPUTER MODELS AND SIMULATIONS

Macro Models—Regional Development Simulation System

The CMASS computer models, which provide feedback to game players based on game moves, can serve as predictors of anticipated courses of action.⁵ In many cases, the computer models are not apparent to the game players; at other times a team may choose to make use of the models to help them decide upon a course of action. The general term used for the set of models used is the Regional Development Simulation System (RDSS).

RDSS is a group of three macro computer models that support regional planning and strategy development. These models are called the Regional Development Simulation System—Single Nation Model (RDSS-SNM), which simulates the socio-political, economic, and military processes in a developing nation; the Regional Counter Drug Model (RCDM), which

simulates the functioning of the cocaine industry; and the Regional Security Strategy Implementation Analysis (RSSIA).

RDSS-SNM: Examines the economic, military, political, and social dynamics of a developing nation. SOUTHCOM designed the model for supporting nation assistance and other military operations other than war. RDSS-SNM supports regional deployment planning by helping SOUTHCOM staff officers and country team members set priorities deployment, training and support requirements for host nations (figure 9). It is also useful for educating planners about the complex relationships among political, social, and economic factors in a developing nation.

Inputs to the model run include initial conditions of a nation, internal policy decisions (courses of action), and external actions affecting the development of a nation. RDSS-SNM processes the variables so that internal and external actions can be examined, helping teams optimize courses of action. Because the RDSS-SNM compresses time and space, analysts can investigate the long range affects of their policy decisions. During the CMASS game, RDSS-SNM supports seminar interaction, contributes to the dynamics of scenario development, and helps the White Team adjudicate game moves.

RCDM: "Designed to aid analysts in understanding and examining the regional narcoindustry and in assessing the effects of alternative courses of action directed against the narcoindustry."⁶ The model simulates external factors that can affect the drug industry along with internal components that represent the decisionmaking of the drug industry. It is based on the assumption that the cocaine industry behaves as any large industry, making decisions about raw materials, methods of manufacturing, form of the finished product, moving the product to market, collecting revenues, and returning revenues to the corporate structure. The model presents a regional and industrywide view of four specific functions: coca growing, transporting, refining, and distributing. RCDM gives inputs to and receives inputs from RDSS-SNM.

RSSIA: Looks regionally at levels of political stability and socio-economic potential of nations throughout the region. Because RSSIA supports several aspects of theater planning, and it is not central to CMASS games, it is discussed separately in

chapter 6.

Micro Models

CMASS uses several micro models as decision aids. These are helpful in giving specific feedback concerning proposed courses of action to player teams. The micro models discussed below also can be helpful in the adjudication of player moves.

The Transport of Illicit Product Scheduler (TIPS): Models the flow of coca paste and base from growing areas to laboratory locations where paste is converted into cocaine hydrochloride. It helps the analyst understand transportation routes, schedules, and costs and gives an estimate of capacity, location of coca growing, and laboratories. The model helps to support decisions about courses of action for the Red, Green and Blue Teams. Inputs to the model can include growing areas, laboratory locations, raw material source preferences, cocaine hydrochloride production factors, transportation network descriptions, transportation assets and characteristics, and sensors and interceptors. As a goal driven program, TIPS reacts to drug traffickers' preferences in order to satisfy decisions for raw materials and processing needs, and minimize loss and travel time.

The Counterdrug Surveillance Intercept Coverage (CDSIC): A tactical decision aid developed by the U.S. Navy for use during *Desert Storm*. It shows the surveillance coverage of air and ground based radar sensors, thus giving an idea of coverage and possible intercepts. It is useful in developing courses of action for intercepting drug trafficking aircraft and positioning radar systems.

The Counterdrug Modeling and Analysis Capability (CMAC): A means for simulating the interaction between detection and monitoring assets and the narcotraffickers. It can display radar detection zones, cities, national boundaries, and topographic information along with the flights of narcotrafficker transport aircraft and host nation interceptors. Outcomes of detection and interception are provided to team players at the end of each move, to include rates of detection and interception along with flight aborts.

Computer models such as TIPS, CDSIC, and CMAC are focused at the tactical level and are of greatest use to the Red

(narcotrafficker) Team and the Blue/Green Teams (country teams and host nation teams). In the larger picture, however, the models contribute to unbiased adjudication of team moves. Both macro and micro models have contributed a degree of realism and unbiased adjudication throughout the evolution of the CMASS series of games.

GAMING EVOLUTION

USSOUTHCOM has sponsored seven CMASS exercises. It conducted an initial developmental simulation for the staff in December 1991 in Panama. Its purpose was to validate the CMASS concept. The six games which followed were designed to facilitate interagency cooperation for U.S. Government policy in Latin America.

In April 1992 SOUTHCOM held the second CMASS game at the Joint Warfighting Center, Hurlburt Field, Florida. It contributed to country team counterdrug and nation assistance initiatives in Bolivia. Objectives were to "support the development of courses of action to increase the effectiveness of [Operation] *Ghost Zone* and to gain insights into narcotrafficker responses to the operation."⁷ The Bolivia Country Team reported that the simulation significantly contributed to their efforts in Operation *Ghost Zone*.⁸

In August 1992, SOUTHCOM conducted a CMASS game on the last day of a 3-day *Support Justice* planning conference.⁹ It was the only game specifically designed to support bilateral planning with the host nation. The exercise was conducted in Panama, which allowed participation of host nation general officer police and military representatives from Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Objectives were to foster the integration of U.S. and host nation operations and help integration of host nation operations regionally. This game allowed U.S. interagency players to work directly with host nation personnel. Results of this effort were realized throughout 1993 as Andean Ridge nations integrated some aspects of their counterdrug initiatives on a regional basis.¹⁰

In a fourth simulation in November 1992 at the Joint Warfighting Center, Hurlburt Field, FL, the CMASS simulation used the current situation in the *Support Justice* program as a

basis for the exercise. It was the first large integration game involving country team representatives from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil alongside the SOUTHCOM staff and representatives from the Washington organizations. Objectives were to examine the effectiveness of the current *Support Justice* concepts of operation and to improve planning and coordination. The game identified a "breakdown . . . of the planning and coordination process . . . particularly in the Washington Interagency arena."¹¹ It made sense that the next iteration of CMASS should involve policymakers in key agencies in Washington.

THE WASHINGTON GAME

The May 1993 simulation at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, addressed national counterdrug policy. It was a strategic level game "conducted to provide a forum for the senior leadership of the counterdrug community to discuss the impact of policy on our ongoing and future CD operations in the region."¹² For 2 months prior to the game, SOUTHCOM worked to encourage key Washington leadership to attend; even so, key civilian leaders had difficulty dedicating 2 or 3 days of their schedule to participate.

During this time DEA made the decision to become fully engaged in the game. In the event, they became heavily involved, providing good support and using the game effectively to educate the interagency community about DEA planning objectives.¹³ The simulation used actual guidance from a draft Presidential Review Directive concerning counterdrug policy in overseas areas and the DEA's South American Regional Plan. Objectives were to build interagency teamwork, find ways to improve interagency and combined (with host nations) planning processes, and provide an understanding of evolving U.S. counterdrug strategies. Figure 11 illustrates the Washington game's organization.

This iteration was especially useful in providing an opportunity for senior-level policymakers to discuss issues among themselves and to work with the officials who implement policy in the field. There developed a general agreement that law enforcement and military actions against illicit drug activity in

the Andean Ridge nations would not succeed by themselves; countering the illicit drug trade required a long-range strategy to include all the elements of national power to deal with broad-




Figure 11

Source: *After Action Report* (Quarry Heights, Panama: USSOUTHCOM, Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System, Simulation IV, Interagency Integration, July 1993), 16.

based economic, political, and social development. Figure 12 is a chart developed by CMASS players during the course of the Washington game describing their consensus on how the

counterdrug process works in Latin America. It is evidence of how effective the game is in getting interagency players to jointly work at a complex problem and come to a common view. In sum, the May simulation focused on counterdrug policy, developed a general agreement on an approach for the Latin American region, and set the agenda for a follow-on game held in November 1993.




Figure 12

Source: *After Action Report* (Quarry Heights, Panama: USSOUTHCOM, Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System, Simulation IV, Interagency Integration, July 1993), 7.

THE ECUADOR GAME

In September 1993, SOUTHCOM held a regional CMASS simulation at the Ecuadorian War College in Quito, Ecuador. The exercise was conducted at the request of the Ambassador (prompted by the MILGROUP) to build cooperation between police and military organizations of Ecuador and Colombia. This

sixth exercise was co-directed by senior representatives from Ecuador and Colombia, who wanted to further some initiatives for joint cooperation in law enforcement and border control. Objectives were to:

- Improve regional cooperation, improve information flow for senior officials of Ecuador and Colombia.
- Improve the interaction between police and military in critical areas.
- Optimize the uses of available resources, and enhance the skills of host nation authorities in planning, decisionmaking, and conducting joint and combined counterdrug actions.

This game was especially noteworthy because of the international participation:

Participants in the [Quito, Ecuador] simulation included the commander of the Ecuadorian Joint Staff, the Chief of Ecuadorian Intelligence, the head of the Ecuadorian Police, the Inspector General of the Colombian Military, senior Colombian police officials, senior U.S. Embassy officials from Colombia and Ecuador, and the Director for Operations, USSOUTHCOM. Bolivia and Venezuela had senior counterdrug personnel present as observers. The simulation's objectives were developed by a joint panel of Ecuadorian and Colombian military and police officers; the simulation was conducted in Spanish (no English translations), and senior Ecuadorian and Colombian officers acted as simulation directors.¹⁴

The result of the Quito simulation was a recognition of the need for regional cooperation, especially in the border areas. The participants agreed to work on coordinating operations, sharing intelligence, and improving communications links (to include agreements on common equipment, frequencies, and procedures). Countries exchanged liaison officers and it was agreed to pursue a possible joint intelligence center in common border areas.

In a seventh exercise in November 1993, the Joint Warfighting Center at Hurlburt Field again hosted the CMASS as a followup to the May simulation in Washington. Conforming to the policy guidelines developed in the previous May exercise (take a regional approach, and integrate international counterdrug

programs), CMASS players in November were challenged with these objectives:

- Identify ways to support the Linear-Kingpin strategies of the DEA.
- Identify ways to improve the combined and interagency counterdrug planning process.
- Examine how to integrate the detection and monitoring and Linear-Kingpin objectives
- Develop future counterdrug courses of action for the Andean region
- Provide a basis for out-year programming of resources to support counterdrug operations
- Find ways to better integrate computer models into exercise play.¹⁵

This game was successful as an educating and coordinating vehicle, but the perceived lack of national-level interest and direction in counterdrug strategy at the time of the game inhibited the development of specific and forward-looking counterdrug strategies and operations.

Now, after seven iterations, SOUTHCOM has proven its ability to engender understanding, cooperation, and often team consensus through its Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System. More than exercises in doctrine and theory, the game has directly supported current operations in the theater. As a politico-military exercise CMASS has done a good job simulating current situations in Washington and in Latin America so that the participants can work together on nation assistance and counterdrug issues in a nonthreatening, nonattribution environment.

FUTURE GAMES

Future games will emphasize coordination with country teams and host nations in the region. More in-country games will be conducted, as in the Ecuadorian example above, and the CMASS name will likely be dropped because of its narrow focus on counterdrug efforts. In the near term, SOUTHCOM will concentrate its modeling and simulation effort with the host nations in small, workshop-type games to support peacetime engagement activities. The gaming concept is being expanded to

involve scenarios for such activities disaster assistance and relief operations, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance, and even supporting environmental initiatives. Getting government agencies within host nations to work effectively together on these types of issues will be one goal of these political-military games.

A small seminar game was held June 1994 in Ecuador involving Ecuadorian and Colombian officials. It looked at cross-border problems of lawlessness in the Putumayo River area (border between Colombia and Ecuador) and explored concepts for combined operations. The game was linked to a *Fuerzas Unidas* command-post exercise.

La Paz, Bolivia, was the site of another seminar game in September 1994. Bolivians used the game to advance a regional method for controlling smuggling (precursor and essential chemicals used to make cocaine hydrochloride, automobiles, cigarettes). A goal for this game was to enhance the interoperability of police and military operations. Large, integrating games, as that held at Fort McNair in Washington, will not be held (at least through fiscal year 1995) because of a lack of funding.

RESULTS

By USCINCSOUTH's measure, the CMASS game has been successful because of its power for "integration and coordination" in a diverse interagency environment. Because the game was structured as a counterdrug exercise, it contributed to "understanding . . . the operational capabilities and business environment of the narco industry."¹⁶ The CMASS series provided players an opportunity to investigate actual policy documents such as the SOUTHCOM Strategy, the DEA South American Regional Plan, and the Presidential Review Directive concerning overseas counterdrug strategy. Players from SOUTHCOM, DEA, State Department, Customs, etc., saw that their objectives and plans had commonalities that could serve mutual interests. This gave players "a chance to 'brainstorm' how the new guidance might be carried out under conditions that would not have been possible in day to day circumstances."¹⁷ CMASS games brought to the forefront the problems and

opportunities that interagency players must address in their jobs, thus giving them a head start for real world planning and operations.

Two significant results affecting U.S. Andean Ridge initiatives are seen in interagency consensus and international cooperation. First, by the time of the May 1993 game, U.S. interagency players reached the conclusion that overseas initiatives would have to be regional and interdisciplinary in nature if they were going to have a positive impact on helping the host countries and disrupting the drug industry. Second, through the Quito, Ecuador, exercise, the CMASS achieved international cooperation in police and military operations. Dr. Peter A. Lupsha observed, "Through CMASS, host nation players could and did, air problems, concerns, recognized commonalities of constraint, and forged methods for overcoming them in play, that could never have happened elsewhere."¹⁸ CINCSOUTH explained:

They sought solutions to common problems including: illegal immigration; insurgent intimidation of their citizens; smuggling of illegal arms, munitions, and explosives across common borders; and narcotrafficking in border regions. Participants agreed that the conference strengthened relationships between two countries and improved cooperation between the militaries and police forces in both countries.¹⁹

This saw real results on the ground as the Ecuadorians and Colombians exchanged liaison officers and coordinated plans for operations.

Finally, the establishment of a professional Red Team for the game series to simulate the actions of the drug trafficker leadership provided realistic game play and insight into the behavior of the drug threat. It allowed the interagency players to "breakthrough the traditional and too common, enemy-Red on Blue paradigm to recognize that narco-Red was a complex multidimensional BUSINESS and POLITICAL phenomena, not some simple direct extension of military war gaming, and which, importantly, could not be responded to by traditional superior FORCE and MASS warfighting."²⁰

CONCLUSIONS

An interagency exercise such as the CMASS is a valuable tool that the military commands and civilian agencies can use to tackle the challenges of interagency cooperation—and as seen, it is effective with host nations also. There are, however, problems inherent in the exercise. Although it meets its full potential when the civilian leadership plays the game in their real-world roles using real or near-real scenarios, it is difficult for the exercise director to get a solid commitment to attend the game from ambassadors, country team members, and key bureaucrats in Washington. Parochial concerns can dissuade some, but others may be too busy to attend.

Also, it is incumbent on the exercise director to convince other agencies of government that they have a stake in the common effort and its outcome. Scenarios must illustrate timely and important issues but must not make key leaders politically or bureaucratically vulnerable during game play. Third, exercises are costly in terms of time away from the job, travel costs, and money to run the game. Finally, there is this danger: in his enthusiasm to promote a political-military game involving important policy issues, a military officer could be seen as stepping beyond a line between contributing leadership and seizing the lead. Even with these problems, the CMASS series of games has already demonstrated a payoff in terms of interagency networking, coordination, and teamwork.

Teamwork will be critical if we are to successfully meet the objectives of peacetime engagement strategies: countering aggression; strengthening free market democracies; and fostering new democracies and market economies. Although SOUTHCOM developed CMASS for the counterdrug part of its regional strategy, the game can be applied to other security concerns such as nation assistance and civil-military cooperation. It has strong potential for fostering cooperation in other areas such as weapons counterproliferation, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Notes

1. George A. Joulwan, General, U.S. Army, interview by author, Quarry Heights, Panama, April 8, 1993.

2. U.S. Southern Command, "Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System (CMASS), Simulation V, Regional Operations," *Simulation Book* (Quarry Heights, Panama: Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc., November 1993), 2.

3. Ibid, 2-3.

4. The country team, in essence is the Ambassador's staff, called together for functional purposes. When it assembles to coordinate counternarcotics actions, it is usually chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission. Principal players with counterdrug interests can include officers from the Narcotics Assistance Section, Security Assistance Office (SAO), Chief of Station, the DEA Narcotics Attaché, the INS Attaché, the Customs Attaché, the FBI Legal Attaché, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Information Service, and the the Defense Attaché. Some country team members maintain stovepipe communications with parent organizations located stateside as well as directive authority for teams they may have operating within the host country. For example, the Narcotics Attaché maintains a link with DEA in Arlington, VA, while he also directs actions of DEA teams in the field. The same stovepipe effect is true of the Legal Attaché (FBI), Security Assistance Officer (Defense Security Assistance Agency and Unified Command), Defense Attaché (Defense Intelligence Agency), Public Affairs/USIS Officer (U.S. Information Agency), and the Narcotics Assistance Section Chief (State Department, International Narcotics Matters). This heterogeneous assemblage demands the close attention of the Ambassador and his Deputy Chief of Mission to ensure their coordinated action within the host country. The existence of such a system makes evident the need for close cooperation in country and regionally.

5. A description of the CMASS computer models is found in "Tab A, Computer Models and Simulations," *Simulation Book*, 29-39, and in Larry B. Hamby, "The Regional Security Analysis Approach: New Tools for a Changing Environment" (Weston, MO: Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., December 15, 1993).

6. Hamby, 6.

7. U.S. Southern Command, "Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System (CMASS) Simulation IV, Interagency Integration," *After Action Report* (Quarry Heights, Panama: Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc., July 1993), 12.

8. The objective of Operation *Ghost Zone* in Bolivia was to suppress the cocaine traffickers' export of the coca paste via air, land and river routes from the growing fields to distant processing labs in Pando, El Beni, and Santa Cruz Departments; this would cut into the flow of cocaine to the United States. It had three phases. Phase I started 4 February 1992. It was an intelligence preparation which included imagery, signal and human intelligence collection methods to identify narcotrafficking leadership, processing laboratories, and airfields. Phase II began 28 March with intensive operations to close land, sea and air lines of communications from the growing and processing areas to the Colombian traffickers; to dismantle trafficking organizations via raids, arrests, and seizures; and to enhance eradication efforts of the Government of Bolivia. Phase III started 12 May to sustain Phase II operations in order to keep the pressure on the narcotraffickers for a significant period of time to make the difference in lowering coca profits. The same concept continues today at a slower pace (because of a lack of funding), helped by the *Support Justice* program. The sophisticated counterdrug operation involved about 750 Bolivian counterdrug personnel under a Special Antinarcotics Force (FELCN), Rural Area Police Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), other police, and service participants. They were supported by about 35 Americans from the Army, Coast Guard, and Customs, with the Drug Enforcement Administration as the lead agency. A full description of *Ghost Zone* is found in "Illusive Victory," *Military Review*, December 1992.

9. *Support Justice* is a USSOUTHCOM program that supports joint-combined counterdrug operations. The concept is that regional governments work together and with supporting U.S. counterdrug agencies to disrupt narcotrafficking organizations throughout the Andean region. After *Support Justice* (SJ) I in 1991, SJ II, III, and IV expanded operations to include synchronized land, air and riverine interdiction, intelligence sharing, and regional cooperation among Andean nations. Now, Southern Command has written a "Steady State OPORD," which continues the SJ programs for logistics, maintenance, intelligence, and planning support and standardizes its procedures. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mark Richardson, USAF, Chief, Counterdrug Plans Division, Counterdrug Directorate, U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, 20 October 1993.

10. Larry B. Hamby, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 1994. Mr. Hamby was one of the creators of the CMASS.

11. *After Action Report*, 13.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Hamby interview.

14. *Simulation Book*, 7.

15. Linear-Kingpin strategies were developed by intelligence organizations and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The idea is to capture, prosecute and incarcerate the drug leadership (Kingpins), and to attack the critical nodes in narco-trafficking organizations (transportation, essential chemicals, money laundering, growing coca plants).

16. USCINCSO Quarry Heights PM//SCJ//, 132130Z Oct 92, unclassified message to Military Groups and American Embassies, 3.

17. *After Action Report*, 3.

18. Peter A. Lupsha, Professor, University of New Mexico and consultant to USCINCSOUTH, "Some Thoughts on the Role of CMASS Activities on Drug Policy and Policymakers," private papers, Department of Political Science, Univ. of N.M., Las Cruces, 24 October 1993, 3.

19. General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington: 2 March 1994, 16-17.

20. Peter A. Lupsha, 1.

6. DECISION AIDS FOR THEATER STRATEGY

*With many calculations one can win; with few, one may not.
How much less the chances for victory for one who makes
none at all.*

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The Regional Security Strategy Implementation Analysis (RSSIA) is one of the analytical tools that strategists use to evaluate key socioeconomic and stability indicators, examine conditions that make significant impact on a region, and see the effect that resources can have on its future growth. It is one tool that helps to maintain some degree of objectivity during the design of strategy, plans, and exercises and has strong potential to assist with interagency planning efforts.¹

RSSIA began as an effort to assess the effectiveness of Southern Command Regional Strategy. It allowed strategic planners to compare the relative levels of political stability and socioeconomic potential throughout the region over time. It helps to identify the region's needs for long-term programmed resources and short-term immediate support requirements. RSSIA gathers subjective and objective information into data fields. This results in spread sheets that reflect where nations are in comparison to other nations within the region.

RSSIA METHOD

Once RSSIA provides a survey of the region and develops the appropriate indicators, the model then displays the relative positions of countries in the region. By adding and changing input factors the analyst can compare nations' responses to economic and political stimuli. The intent of the model was to

create a tool that would allow the two factors (political stability and economic potential) to be placed with each other graphically on two axes, with the variable factors plotted on the existing graphic plane. Figure 13 shows an example of the spread sheet's final plot.

A Regional Analysis Support Package (RASP) is available to help organize the concepts and data that planners use in RSSIA. It provides four sets of interrelated data bases:

- An events database that tracks significant political, military and economic events
 - A subject matter expert database that stores survey data
 - A theory database that stores existing theory from many disciplines
 - A statistical database that holds data over time.

RASP allows the strategist to reassess RSSIA analysis based on new data and tailor information (text, lists, graphs) to the needs of the decisionmaker.² The various data bases contribute to the factors that the RSSIA model analyses.

THE FACTORS

To arrive at a plot like the example in figure 13, 28 factors are currently used; as the model continues to mature, additional factors are added. Following are some major factors currently used in the RSSIA model:

Communications infrastructure. Number of telephones per capita is used because it directly reflects internal communications. Also, programmers are building into the system the ability to capture cellular systems, satellite usage, and international courier data. The ability of industry in developing nations to communicate internationally is used for analysis.

Transportation infrastructure. Kilometers of rail, highways, and waterways are totaled and entered into the model. This factor reflects the ease of internal movement, but does not directly reflect the capacity of the infrastructure to support a nation's economic strategy. Potential refinements that can be introduced into this factor include freight costs from secondary cities and interior cities, tonnage of traffic per border point and anchorage. Important aspects are how well the host nation is maintaining its transportation network, the age and materials of roadbeds, and the




Figure 13

Source: Authors

appropriateness of the infrastructure to support nascent industries.

Access to energy. This factor includes kilowatt hours per capita's consumption, direct measurement of price per kilowatt hour for industry, number of hours of interrupted power in major industrial areas, and the number of major producers who rely primarily on private sources of power. For a developing region, this factor, when examined from the total viewpoint, is critical for socioeconomic development. Additional information that is collected about these factors is reliability of the national power supply of the nation, its vulnerability to sabotage or disaster, and dependence of the power sector on imported oil.

Diversity of economy. The indicator used for this factor is the ratio of agriculture to industry to labor to the service sector. After collecting the information to load into the data field as a ratio, further analysis of this factor should indicate if there is a technology present to support industrialization and if there is an agroindustry capable of feeding the population.

Access to credit and capital. The indicator is debt per capita. While this is seemingly an objectively collectable factor, a

petroleum exporting nation can sustain a high debt per capita. Since economic data is a standard used by outside investors, future models will include credit ratings for government bonds and major private and public companies. Recent efforts to privatize industry have opened new avenues for making this factor more robust by putting stock prices for publicly traded companies or mutual funds values into the data field.

Availability of trained labor. The literacy rate is an indicator. In most nations, analysts measure the literacy rate in terms of the predominant colonial language (Spanish, Portuguese, English). This does not directly measure aptitude for specific industries that may require more tradecraft or high technology skills. Future improvements to this factor will include the number of technical and trade school graduates, percentage of students studying abroad that return home, and per capita graduates of math, science and engineering schools.

Petroleum and mineral reserves. The barrels of crude and cubic feet of proven reserves per capita are used.

Economic policy and strategy. These data are based on subject matter expert advice rather than objective data. It is a judgment as to a government's ability to carry out sound economic policy. Model programmers factor into the data field a concept for economic austerity because of the long range impact on the nation's economic development.

Responsiveness of economy to governmental intervention. Factors used examine how well the economic structure of a nation responds to governmental intervention to sustain growth, monetary and fiscal policies (taxes, interest rates, money supply). The rationale for using this subject matter expert factor is that many developing economic structures depend on governmental intervention to sustain growth. Monetary and fiscal policies assume that the government can influence the economy through taxes, interest rates, money supply, and bond prices. The key question is how well does a nation's economic structure respond to these tools?

Competitiveness of the nation in the international economy. Nations need access to world markets and a sound position from which to compete. Politics, geography, and the nature of the market for goods and services affect this factor. It can change

radically if there is a technology breakthrough that either improves or cancels a nation's market factor. How well a nation fares in the GATT rounds is also part of the subject matter expert's ranking score.

Cultural and ethnic friction. The indicator used is the percentage of the population that is indigenous. The history of oppression and uprising, the conflicts between indigenous cultures and the dominant Europeans (or other historical foreign ethnic culture) are also used to decide the relevance of this factor. Research into this factor was borne out during the recent uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, where the Zapatistas considered Mexicans as the foreign ethnic culture.

Vulnerability of economy. This factor uses the percentage of exports based on a single product plus percentage of trade that is dependent on one market. A second part of this factor is the percentage of the economy that is dependent on foreign trade.

Potential for labor-based unrest. A key factor is the percentage of the labor force that is unionized plus the percentage of unemployment. The factor does not include underemployment and this must be considered. Also, many nations' statistics on unemployment are very questionable. Programmers are rewriting this factor so it can differentiate between government and private sector labor. Government unions may well respond violently to price and wage controls and to unemployment.

Military intervention in government. The percentage of the Gross National Product spent on armed forces, which includes paramilitary forces, border guards, and police forces that are under the control or supervision of the military. This factor will be expanded to include the percentage of active duty military officers serving in an elected, civilian government cabinet (other than the Ministry of Defense).

Dependency on external support. The ratio of government revenue to foreign aid is a key indicator. The factor is not intended to reflect governments that are sustained in power by foreign troops, or the threat of foreign intervention. In future versions of the model, this factor will reflect hard currency reserves compared to foreign aid dollars.

Confidence in the political system. The current factor used is the net migration from a nation per year. Some nations are

more difficult to leave than others because of location, border controls, or quotas, so the analyst can use information about immigration applications versus migration. To improve this factor, analysts will need to identify migrants by social or economic class.

Elite satisfaction. This factor is based on the reaction of the most informed elements of the society to political, economic, and social conditions. This is a subject matter expert factor, but objective information is available from organizations such as Gallup International that gather data from their extensive polling.

Adaptability and responsiveness of institutions. The church, military, and government are key institutions considered in the model. A judgment is made concerning their legitimacy, responsiveness to the demands of the population, and the changing political environment.

Political culture and tradition. This factor is subject matter expert based and is a historical examination that establishes a sense of how a nation confronts adversity. Some nations have a history of violent change; others weather their problems more stoically. While this factor is very subjective, most experienced regional analysts have a feel for how nations confront problems. This factor quantifies those feelings.

THE THIRD AXIS: THE COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

Programmers designed RSSIA to allow a third axis for the integration of other decisionmaking considerations such as strategic priorities. Strategic priorities can be provided by a military commander or other interagency leaders, an interagency working group, or by strategists and analysts on lead agency staffs. The following recounts the 1991 experience with the SOUTHCOM strategy assessment process.

In the SOUTHCOM case, after about a year on the job, the CINC provided his regional assessment. He determined his "strategic interest" factors and gave a subjective weighting and ranking (on a scale of one to five) how he judged each nation was doing in a particular area compared with the Theater Strategy; the results are seen in figure 14. USCINCSOUTH used

these factors within his regional assessment to aid in deciding priorities:

Regional security. Principal concerns are terrorism or other activities that can destabilize a nation and adjoining nations. This factor is critical as it drives where resources are dedicated and where stability becomes a crucial defining factor in terms of a total strategy for the theater.




Figure 14

Source: Authors

Established or emerging democracy. What kind of democracies are the nations in the Southern Theater? A nation with three or more elections that put a civilian in charge is considered an "established" democracy. A nation that does not fit this characteristic is "emerging."³

Drug activity. Drug production, trafficking, and money laundering touches every nation in the region. The CINC's

subjective score gives the highest ranking and heaviest weighting to drug source area nations, then transit area nations, followed by potential source and transit area nations.

Promotion of U.S. interests. The United States has many interests in Latin America, but because of the region's low priority in U.S. national strategy, influence there is hard to come by. The United States gives several key allied and friendly nations close attention because of their ability to influence regional issues of concern.

U.S. prestige. This factor allows the CINC to give a rank to nations on which he must concentrate to ensure U.S. prestige in the region. The implementation of the Panama Canal treaties is one example. Every nation in the Southern Theater is watching intently to see if the United States will carry out the mandates of the treaties.

Resources. The United States has increased its exports and imports from the region greatly in the past 4 years. This factor recognizes which nations are our most important trading partners.

Lines of communications. Sea lines of communication and air lines of communication are critical to movement of resources into and out of a region. The model subjectively scores information about a nation's ability to close or keep open regional lines of communications.

Basing and access. Basing and access for US Forces can be important to the mission of a command. In the SOUTHCOM area, Honduras and Panama permit basing and overflights for a variety of administrative and operational purposes. They are given preferential ranking for their cooperation.

Host nation power. This is a very subjective score given by the CINC as a general score about nations based on personal visits, contacts and negotiations with the nations. The score is also based on the elements of national power the country possesses to include political-diplomatic, military, economic, demo-geographic, psychosocial, techno-industrial, ideological, and informational factors.

Arms control. The production and sophistication of conventional arms are weighted. Many nations produce weaponry to reduce their reliance on outside purchases because it can amount to control. Also, these same nations must sell their

products to keep their manufacturing plants hot.

Weapons of mass destruction technology. This factor is a ranking of capabilities given by the CINC to nations that can produce weapons of mass destruction.

These strategic interests are ranked on a scale of one-to-five, then multiplied by an assigned weight. The total points for a nation are displayed down the third axis (Z) as shown in figure 14. The assessment procedure is significant because it describes, in part, the process for developing a regional strategy. It shows how these considerations are entwined with the goals and interests of other U.S. Government agencies and the host nations in the region.

THE COMPLETE REGIONAL ASSESSMENT

To arrive at the complete regional assessment, the CINC's subjective analysis on the Z axis is juxtaposed with the X and Y axes. The information in figure 14 describes the CINC's preferences from low to high degree of interest for distributing resources throughout the theater.

One of the most important aspects of the RSSIA program is that it is a tool for making decisions, but it does not do the deciding. The RSSIA model's objective analysis helps temper subjective analysis by reminding decisionmakers of where each nation is in relation to its political stability and socioeconomic abilities. An example concerning Peru is illustrative.

According to the objective theater analysis of 1991 (plotted in figure 13), Peru was in chaos. Its political stability was very vulnerable and its socioeconomic potential was shaken because of massive destruction of its infrastructure system. What the RSSIA model run told the command was that it should expend the U.S. Government's resources on triage type programs like AID, medical deployments, food shipments, water drilling, and shelter construction. However, the CINC's subjective assessment gave Peru enough "points" to move it into the second field of the Z axis. This told the resource planners to put both triage type resources plus self-sustaining programs into Peru. Peru's relative importance to U.S. national security interests, the drug war, and Peru's fight against anarchy were important enough to the CINC that it overrode the objective analysis that RSSIA displayed. By

1994, a new RSSIA plot graphically showed that the long range strategy SOUTHCAM had developed for Peru was paying a dividend as Peru plotted higher in stability and further to the right on the socioeconomic scale.

The CINC's interests are dynamic, and he can change priorities based on national level direction, host nation situations, and the effect that assistance programs are having on a nation. The unified staff completes a regional assessment twice a year to reflect the CINC's views and to review how much change has occurred within the nations of the region.

The RSSIA methodology assists the strategist in applying better reasoning about the theater as a whole in a consistent, logical and balanced manner to achieve regional objectives. RSSIA's analyses can determine priorities, but it does not suggest giving equal resources to all nations. It does not imply neglect for nations at the lower left of the spread sheet (Figure 13). RSSIA demonstrates where nations need immediate assistance programs, as well as where long range, long payoff type programs (such as the International Military Education Training) should be applied.

RSSIA gives the planner a valuable tool to husband the scant resources that have been allocated. RSSIA provides the logic, strategic thinking, and long-range analysis for:

- Decisions made during the program objective memorandum (POM) (the military process for programming resources according to national military strategy) and the annual integrated assessment of security assistance (AIASA) requirement
- The distribution of excess defense articles.

Significantly, the RSSIA model has application for civilian agencies that must apportion scarce resources.

OTHER REGIONS

RSSIA capabilities are assisting planners in other regions. Model programmers are tailoring RSSIA to the needs of the European theater, placing new demands on the model. Concerning the emergence in Eastern Europe of newly independent nations and capitalism, information available in the 1980s can be difficult to compare with data from the post-Soviet world. Strategic focus and resource availability change from theater to theater. The key

emphasis placed on political stability and economic development by USSOUTHCOM must be reexamined considering the European security environment. Yet, with proper adjustments to data bases, the basic research and analysis tools of RSSIA are helpful to strategists dealing with the European theater.⁴

The RSSIA model is now being revamped to make it user friendly and put into MS-DOS format so that easier applications and data bases can be loaded into it. With the advances made in computer memory and *Windows* applications, even more calculations can be added into the model. The Joint Staff, Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J8 (PMAD), manages RSSIA and related computer models to facilitate its use by the unified commands.

CONCLUSIONS

RSSIA has demonstrated its usefulness to planners for determining how and where they can apply limited resources to support U.S. interests in a region. It helps to show where military resources can be integrated with those of other agencies, and it introduces a degree of objectivity into the strategy process.

Critics of RSSIA believe there are too many calculations in the model, and some strategists believe that they should not use computer models to make theater-level strategic decisions. RSSIA is only a decision aid, and one open to subjective information. If the calculations are imperfect, then "How much less the chances for victory for one who makes none at all." Perhaps Sun Tzu has a point.

Notes

1. Except where noted, this chapter is based on a description of RSSIA provided by Lieutenant Colonel David G. Bradford, USAF. As regional strategist for the Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate, J5, U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, during the period 1991-93, he was author of the RSSIA model, and contributed to other models under the Regional Development Simulation System umbrella.

2. Larry B. Hamby, "The Regional Security Analysis Approach: New Tools for a Changing Environment," Weston, MO: Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., December 15, 1993, p. 8.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. This book was used in the strategic analysis to help define the concepts of established and emerging democracy. The RSSIA model typically relies upon subject matter experts (regional and functional expertise) to aid in the assessment process.

4. Hamby, p. 7.

7. A MODEL FOR PEACETIME INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

It is essential to appreciate the strength of what I call bureaucratic faultlines—policy areas where agencies have overlapping responsibilities and very distinctive institutional interests and perspectives. The most important faultline of this sort occurs at the intersection of political and military affairs. . . . What is required is not coordination in an administrative or technical sense but the integration of divergent (and sometimes mutually antagonistic) perspectives through the active exercise of strategic thought.¹

Carnes Lord

All Unified Commands have been dealing with the issues of working with multiple agencies of government, but throughout the cold war the primary concern of most commands was with warfighting strategies to counter the Soviets. SOUTHCOM has been the exception. The Unified Command Plan assigned an Area of Responsibility to SOUTHCOM that has been dominated by threats and conditions suggesting military operations other than war for their resolution. These operations place a premium on integrating different perspectives and capabilities, and establishing interagency teamwork. Military operations such as combatting terrorism, nation assistance (foreign internal defense, security assistance), support to insurgencies, peace operations, and civil support thrust SOUTHCOM into a multiagency arena from its beginning in 1947.²

Today, the Unified Commands find themselves operating in regions containing vast "grey areas" where some governments cannot control their cities, regions, or the fundamental functions

and institutions of their societies. Dr. William J. Olson has described a new world disorder that will place demands upon the CINCs as they structure engagement strategies:

What is the U.S. and the international community being called upon to do? Unilaterally or through the U.N., the demand now extends to peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, internal security, refugee management on a colossal scale, development assistance in deteriorating situations, environment damage assistance, disease control and disaster relief, famine relief, and drug-control assistance. In essence, the demand is for the international community to substitute for local government, to deliver the basic goods of government to societies where all or most of the attributes of governance have failed or fallen into disrepute.³

As the CINCs renew their regional strategies, an appreciation of the threat will have to consider the "consequences of instability that range from terrorism, insurgency, and illegal drug trafficking to warlordism, militant fundamentalism, ethnic cleansing, civil war, and regional wars."⁴ The environment at the turn of this century will make necessary the artful combination of all the elements of our national power if we are to overcome the tyranny of transnational threats and internal disorder. Put directly, interagency cooperation will be the foundation for any strategic vision of peacetime engagement.

A MODEL FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

Cooperative efforts can foster integration of multiagency capabilities, but making this happen often becomes problematic. Ideal solutions such as one inspired by Marine Corps Manual FMFM 1-2 (discussed in chapter 2) proffer straight-forward guidelines for attacking functional problems on a regional basis:

- Designate an interagency leader and give him the wherewithal to get the job done.
- Assign to one leader the operating authority, planning responsibility, and responsibility for the outcome.

- Provide top-down strategic guidance, but encourage decentralized execution in the region.

Yet, such a scheme may seem too idealistic or improvident to practitioners in the field. As Ambassador Edwin Corr suggested, "We want to maximize unity of effort, but you are never going to fully achieve it . . . the perfect solution may be the enemy of the good."⁵

Another approach is one that has been effective for USSOUTHCOM to encourage and support interagency cooperation within currently established structures. It is a set of interrelated plans, processes, exercises, and computer decision aids:

- Provide Regional Vision: Theater Strategy and Plans
- Integrate Capabilities: Theater Deployment Process
- Educate and Facilitate: Modeling and Simulation Systems
- Support Planning and Operations: Computer Decision Aids
- Contribute Leadership: Command Interest and Involvement

No one of these elements has been sufficient to get the job done, but when combined, the mix has proven to be an effective way for the CINC to integrate his regionwide mission and capabilities with those of different agencies and governments.

SOUTHCOM's strategy and plans provide the framework for coordinating military capabilities with other government agencies. The mature series of plans and programs identify objectives, concepts, and resources. They serve as a start point for dealing with other U.S. Government agencies, and they position SOUTHCOM as a key supporter of U.S. foreign policy in the region:

- The Theater Deployment Planning Group (TDPG) program is an effective integrator of missions and capabilities. On the one hand, it ensures that U.S. Southern Command's 1100 annual deployments of service personnel into the Southern Theater serve the CINC's strategy and training priorities; but just as important, it is a means to integrate host nation, country team and unified command objectives and capabilities. The process affords the command a rationale for programming midterm

resources to benefit the command and the agencies it supports.

- The Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System (CMASS) exercise as previously described has proven its ability to bridge the faultline that "occurs at the intersection of political and military affairs." It does this by integrating divergent agency objectives and interests in the course of problem solving in a realistic scenario. In addition to achieving interagency cooperation and understanding at the Washington level, it is an established vehicle for regional cooperation among host nations. The CMASS has an integrative potential for a wide range of multiagency functional areas such as peacekeeping, countering terrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nation assistance.

- Computer models such as the Regional Security Strategy Implementation Analysis (RSSIA) and the Regional Development Simulation System-Single Nation Model (RDSS-SNM) assist in decisionmaking. They are helpful for allocating resources for nation assistance, deciding where to place infrastructure facilities, choosing a foreign source for raw materials or goods, and determining which nations to approach as preferred allies. The models can assist the planner in analyzing a nation's need for programmed resources such as security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and counterdrug support. However, the computer models are subject to error because of the high degree of subjective input. For example, figure 13 was plotted before Mexico's Zapatista uprising and the assassination of Presidential candidate Colosio; now, the new perception of Mexican stability might not allow top ratings for stability. This obvious example tends to place doubt on the relative positions of other countries as well, and diminishes the predictive confidence of the computer program.

The SOUTHCOM model is not a solution to the interagency friction that plagues U.S. endeavors. It is not an attempt to take the lead in the region; that responsibility rests with our foreign policy officials in the State Department and elsewhere. The approach is one of facilitating integration through the good offices of a staff already extant in the region, and by means of the skills and resources which normally attend a Unified Command.

DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CULTURES

In spite of the advances made by U.S. Southern Command, and other government agencies, there remain shortcomings in interagency cooperation that deserve the attention of our national leaders. The primary issues that attend Admiral Miller's suggestion for an Interagency Action Group, the appointment of a regional coordinator for strategic functions, or the designation of a Lead Agency with directive authority over other agencies will remain Presidential prerogatives.

The problem of "who's in charge?" still vexes interagency efforts. In the past, the concept of a designated lead agency did not carry with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation. The executive and legislative branches have not seen fit to routinely provide interagency leadership with direct control over the resources necessary for interagency operations.

For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 gave the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, some influence over the level of funding and the content of agency budget requests, but until now, he has seemed to lack meaningful authority and wherewithal to integrate counterdrug actions.⁶ Is there any hope that interagency leaders will be given the authority needed for integrating tasks and capabilities? Referring to the 1993 Presidential Decision Directive for Counternarcotics, the recently appointed Director, ONDCP said:

The President's Directive identifies the interagency processes to consist of developing, coordinating and implementing international counternarcotics policies, strategies, and programs. My role in overseeing counternarcotics policy development and coordination will be greater than that given my predecessors. State will chair an interagency working group on counternarcotics. I will oversee the activities of this working group and will have the authority I need to mediate interagency disputes, manage the implementation of the strategy, appoint an interdiction coordinator [a regional coordinator] who will report to me, and make appropriate budget recommendations to the President for the implementation of the international strategy.⁷

Perhaps this effort at the Washington level to strengthen interagency coordination will succeed to become a model for other fields such as peacekeeping and nation assistance. At the regional level the situation has been troublesome. An overseas counterdrug effort provides the illustration. According to the U.S. Senate:

U.S. anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean Ridge have been substantially undermined by a failure on the part of concerned agencies—e.g., the Defense (DoD) and State Departments, DEA, and those responsible for intelligence collection and analysis—to adequately cooperate with one another and coordinate their respective drug-related activities. For the most part, the reasons for this can be traced to legitimate differences in their respective institutional missions, attitudes, and operational approaches, which seem to prompt almost inherent conflicts between and among them.⁸

Consider:

- The Department of State is the lead agency for U.S. assistance funds for counterdrug programs
- U.S. AID is the lead for sustainable assistance in host nations
- The Department of Defense is the lead for detection and monitoring and communications infrastructure
- The Department of Justice (DEA) is the lead for investigations
- The Treasury Department (Customs) is the lead for aerial smuggling and detection and monitoring aircraft
- The Transportation Department is lead agency for maritime interception
- The intelligence community (National Drug Intelligence Center, El Paso Intelligence Center, CIA, NSA, DIA) provides intelligence

So then how will their efforts be drawn together to achieve synergism?

Exacerbating the problems surrounding issues of authority and resourcing is the lack of an agreed interagency planning process that might synchronize interagency effort. Decentralized

operations in the field require cogent strategies and plans to inform the operator of his agency's objectives, concepts for operating, and available resources. Agencies will continue to be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to different priorities, schedules, and operating areas.

One solution to the problems of interagency cooperation would be placing some of the tools found in the integration model into State Department hands. The most practical of these is the regional game. With scenarios focused on functional issues needing interagency integration, government leaders and staffs in Washington and the region could address problems in a relatively nonthreatening environment under the aegis of the State Department. The promulgation of Presidential Decision Directives such as PDD 25, Multilateral Peace Operations, could be followed by regional games to educate players to new policy, establish personal relationships among multiagency players (including host nations), and shed light on ground-level procedures that will implement lofty policy statements. Yet as long as the CINCs are the only U.S. Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together U.S. interagency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to provide the leadership--even while in a supporting role.

APPLICATION

In Europe the model has potential to help as military structures are reformed, new security relationships emerge, and the NATO partnership for peace determines which nations join the Alliance. East European states and some former Soviet Republics may demand the same types of nation assistance outlined in SOUTHCOM's Peacetime Engagement OPLAN. As former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin advised:

Ultimately what we're looking at is developing capabilities jointly between NATO the organization and these individual countries through joint exercises, joint planning, joint training, and . . . interoperability of equipment and methods of operation between NATO and the partner state. What we're doing . . . is expanding NATO's capability by bringing in more assets to do the kinds of things that NATO is going to be doing in this

new post-Cold War, post-Soviet world. Those kind of things . . . include peacekeeping, . . . search and rescue operations, disaster relief operations, and crisis management.⁹

Similar issues apply along the Pacific Rim as we adjust regional plans to the ascendancy of Japan and China, and in the Middle East where the security structure remains unsettled.

Recent U.S. actions in Haiti and Somalia suggest that there are opportunities to improve our sense of strategic vision and ways of integrating the capabilities of our government agencies. As we look toward the troubled environment of the 21st century, a model for regional cooperation is available to help bridge our bureaucratic faultlines.

Notes

1. Carnes Lord, "Strategy and Organization at The National Level," *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process*, ed. James C. Gaston (Washington: NDU Press, 1992), 143-4.

2. Southern Command traces its origins to 1903, when troops arrived in Panama to protect the canal. In 1916, HQ U.S. Troops, Panama Canal Zone occupied Quarry Heights, the current home of SOUTHCOM. When reestablished as Caribbean Defense Command in 1941, it became a "joint" command with other service elements. Officially designated a joint command in 1947, it was renamed U.S. Southern Command in 1963. "USSOUTHCOM History, Fact Sheet," *Information Booklet*, Public Affairs Office, Quarry Heights, Panama, January 1989.

3. William J. Olson, "The New World Disorder: Governability and Development," *Gray Area Phenomena, Confronting the New World Disorder*, ed. Max G. Manwaring, (Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 22.

4. Max G. Manwaring, "Beyond the Cold War: Toward A Theory of Engagement to Confront the Gray Area Phenomenon," *Gray Area Phenomena, Confronting the New World Disorder*, 64.

5. Edwin Corr, discussions at Strategic Outreach Initiative Roundtable on Operations Other Than War, "The Relationships Among Theory, Strategy, Doctrine, and Practice" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 2, 1994).

6. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690) instructs the Director of ONDCP to "develop for each fiscal year, with the advice of the program managers of the Departments and agencies with responsibilities under the National Drug Control Program, a consolidated National Drug Control Program budget proposal to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, and...[to] transmit such budget proposal to the President and to Congress." Moreover, the law requires the Director to certify as to the adequacy of each drug control agency's drug budget request. Once the budgets are certified, agencies cannot reprogram monies from the drug program without ONDCP approval. In fact, this has given ONDCP little control over the implementation of counterdrug strategies in the field.

7. U.S. Congress, House, Lee P. Brown, "Statement [concerning the Interim National Drug Control Strategy] to the House Foreign Affairs Committee," 3 November 1993.

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Report 101-143, *United States Government Anti-Narcotics Activities in the Andean Region of South America*, Washington, 6 February (legislative day January 23), 1990, 10.

9. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Press Conference, Travamuende, Germany, 21 October 1993.

APPENDIX: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFSC	Armed Forces Staff College
AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance
ASST/EP	Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
CAMPLAN	Campaign Plan
CDSIC	Counterdrug Surveillance Intercept Coverage
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMAC	Counterdrug Modeling and Analysis Capability
CMASS	Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CRCS	Country Roadmap Computer System
CT	Country Team
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DCI	Director, Central Intelligence
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DDCI	Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFT	Deployment for Training
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DNSA	Deputy, National Security Advisor
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation

FELCN	Special Antinarcotics Force (Bolivia)
FinCEN	Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
MFM	Fleet Marine Force Manual
FMFP	Foreign Military Funding Program
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HN	Host Nation
IAG	Interagency Action Group
IMET	International Military Education and Training Program
INM	International Narcotics Matters, Bureau of Department of State
J5	Joint Staff Directorate for Policy, Planning and Strategy
J7	Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability
J8	Joint Staff Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDD	Joint Doctrine Division of Joint Staff J7 Directorate
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—current U.S. military strategy based upon currently available resources
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MILGROUP	Military Group
NCA	National Command Authorities—President and the Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates or successors
NDU	National Defense University
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Council

OAS	Organization of American States
ODT	Overseas Deployment Training
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
RCDM	Regional Counterdrug Model
RDSS-SNM	Regional Development Simulation System- Single Nation Model
RSSIA	Regional Security Strategy Implementation Analysis
SJ	Support Justice—U.S. Southern Command program to support counterdrug efforts in Latin America
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
TDPG	Theater Deployment Planning Group
TTDP	Theater Training Deployment Plan
TTOP	Theater Training Opportunities Plan
UMOPAR	Rural Area Police Patrol Unit (Bolivia)
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government
USIA/USIS	United States Information Agency/Service
VPNSA	Vice President's National Security Advisor

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