

Ukraine: Stability and Instability

John Jaworsky



*A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.*

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822**

UKRAINE: STABILITY AND INSTABILITY

JOHN JAWORSKY

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UKRAINE: STABILITY AND INSTABILITY

THE ISSUE OF STABILITY

It is a thankless task to attempt to assess the stability of any country during a period when even liberal democracies are facing a crisis of governability.¹ And the task is made more difficult when one is dealing with a country like Ukraine that is in the throes of a prolonged and difficult post-Communist transition. Nevertheless, an analysis that can shed some light on the complex factors affecting stability in Ukraine would be a useful, albeit modest, step forward.

The issue of stability in Soviet successor states has attracted a great deal of attention in the West because of a continuing preoccupation with the Soviet legacy and fears that the region will remain a zone of unrest that may eventually require some form of significant Western intervention. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the most immediate concern was the fate of its nuclear weapons and accompanying production facilities. Ukraine attracted special attention because of fears that its leaders might attempt to gain operational control of the large number of nuclear weapons on its territory in 1991.

That anxiety has now abated, but concerns remain that the deterioration of the physical and human infrastructure of the nuclear energy industry in Ukraine could lead to more Chernobyl-type accidents or the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials and technology. In the meantime, other concerns have arisen, including the prospect of continued economic decline and the spread of civil conflicts in Ukraine, either of which could lead to an influx of refugees into Western Europe or the need for greater Western involvement in the region. An American National Intelligence

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report (reflecting the views of the American intelligence community and the State Department), the details of which were leaked to the press at the end of January 1994, supports this concern, mentioning that Ukraine was the most likely former Soviet republic to precipitate a major continentwide crisis.²

Western commentaries frequently refer to a number of actual or potential threats to Ukraine stability. These include continuing economic decline, which has led to growing social distress and great dissatisfaction among the population; an increase in ethnic tensions and their potential transformation into communal conflict; centrifugal trends, sometimes linked to ethnic grievances, resulting in autonomist or separatist movements; weak and discredited political institutions and widespread political apathy, which could leave the country open to the rise of authoritarian rulers or outside interference in its internal affairs; and a growth in tensions between Ukraine and Russia.³ An examination of the factors influencing Ukraine's stability should also devote some attention to the behavior of institutions, such as the military and security forces, that can play an important role in deterring attempts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine or can themselves become destabilizing forces in certain circumstances.

Assessments of the significance of these threats to Ukraine stability have been hampered because Ukraine remains an unpredictable *terra incognita* for most statesmen and scholars, as well as the public at large, in North America and Western Europe. Whatever the negative images associated with Russia, this country and its people traditionally had a prominent profile in the West, largely because popular treatments of the Soviet Union frequently equated this state with Russia. This facile equation was broadly accepted, even if only at a subconscious level, in many political and academic circles in the West. After the USSR's disintegration, the great majority of the officials and scholars who had followed developments in the USSR switched their attention, without much difficulty, to Russia. Interest in other regions of the former Soviet Union has grown rapidly in recent years, but the inertia inherent in traditional Moscow-centered, Russocentric views of developments in the Soviet Union means that many scholars and analysts have had great difficulty adjusting to the new post-Soviet circumstances. As a result, the amount of analytical literature dealing with Ukraine and other Soviet successor states (with the exception of Russia) is still

limited, and the situation in Ukraine has often been viewed through the prism of developments in Moscow.⁴ In this context Ukraine has sometimes been viewed as a "problem," complicating the West's relations with Russia, which in many respects regards itself (and has, on the whole, been regarded in the West) as the "legitimate" successor to the Soviet Union.

This is not to deny that there have been good reasons to be concerned about Ukraine's stability. However, in spite of numerous predictions of civil war, the country's breakup, the rapid establishment of Russian hegemony over Ukraine, and other dire outcomes, to date these scenarios have not materialized. Further, any discussion of the sources of instability in Ukraine must also address the reasons for its relative stability to date and the prospects for the maintenance of this stability.

DEFINING STABILITY

There is no consensus on how best to assess the relative importance of the factors contributing to the stability or instability of a given state, and hard evidence about the general mechanisms producing stability or instability in political systems is limited. In addition, most of the literature on this topic is comparative and attempts to address the question of why some political systems are more stable or unstable than others.⁵

Even the term stability is ambiguous. At one extreme one can talk of a certain "minimal" stability—the absence of civil war and other forms of open armed conflict on a state's territory. If a given state exists in a very turbulent environment, maintaining this minimal level of stability is of crucial importance. In the rapidly changing setting of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), characterized by widespread violence in Tadzhikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and now Russia (Chechnya), the absence of large-scale civil strife certainly establishes an important "bottom line" of stability.

In such a turbulent environment stability is often achieved through means far from democratic, and the need to preserve domestic stability in a hostile setting is often used as a ready excuse to maintain dictatorial forms of rule. However, where this minimal stability has been achieved through inflexible authoritarianism, by maintaining the old status quo or by addressing serious internal problems only when they can no longer be safely ignored, it can quickly and easily break down.

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At the other extreme one could argue that a state is most stable when the structures that maintain the state and the personnel occupying these structures are very flexible and capable of quickly and creatively responding to ever-present internal and external pressures for change. It is sometimes argued that only powerful and highly skilled elites can properly manage a society facing such pressures. However, there is a general consensus that a political system will be healthier and more stable the more a population as a whole, and its politically active representatives in particular, are drawn into a democratic political process and influence this process through their activity in a wide range of public organizations independent of government control ("civil society").

Some of the states of the FSU (e.g., Estonia) have shown that they are capable of rising above the challenge of simply avoiding civil war. To the surprise of many observers even Ukraine has been marked by an absence of violent domestic strife. During most of the post-independence period, however, there were numerous indications that destabilizing trends were pushing Ukraine toward a crisis situation, and pessimism concerning Ukraine's future was widespread both inside and outside Ukraine.

Certainly, at present Ukraine can only aim at a middle ground between the two poles of stability noted above. It is still far from effectively satisfying even the basic needs of a large part of its population, and many structures in Ukraine are fully preoccupied with simply maintaining the status quo. In fact, in many respects Ukraine continues to exist in a profound state of disequilibrium.

Thus in 1995 the challenge facing Ukraine's leaders is not to forge ahead rapidly in creating a model, market-based, liberal democracy. Rather, the challenge is to combat effectively a number of destructive forces undermining the basis for a legitimate, law-governed, and economically viable state, and to promote a reform process that would begin to slow and then gradually reverse Ukraine's socioeconomic decline.

Given the numerous difficulties involved in assessing a country's stability, no attempt will be made in this paper to engage in facile predictions about the direction of long-term future developments in Ukraine. Rather, this is an attempt to assess the validity of current concerns regarding this country's stability and to analyze the factors that have influenced and will continue to influence the domestic political and socioeconomic situation in

Ukraine. Special emphasis will be placed on evaluating how the current reform process may contribute to the country's success or failure in achieving "mid-range" stability. Some of the strategic implications of recent developments in Ukraine for regional security will also be discussed briefly.

In the end, any observations are inevitably based on a subjective evaluations of a very complex and constantly changing set of circumstances. They are informed evaluation, however, made by numerous visits to Ukraine and extensive research on political and security-related issues in Ukraine.

1.

THE ECONOMY

Although some early analyses of the economic prospects of an independent Ukraine painted a fairly optimistic picture,⁶ more realistic prognoses indicated that the country would find the transition to a market economy difficult. In 1991 Ukraine's industrial infrastructure was outdated, energy-intensive, and heavily polluting; even Ukraine's well-known agricultural potential had been negatively affected by extensive soil pollution and erosion as well as an aging rural work force.⁷ In addition, Ukraine was burdened with a large proportion of the Soviet Union's inefficient military industrial complex and with the devastating (and costly) legacy of the Chernobyl nuclear station disaster.⁸

Thus Ukraine's economy was in poor shape when the country became an independent state in 1991, but the country's leaders made a bad situation much worse. In particular, Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, was reluctant to make a clean break with the old Soviet establishment, made poor use of the expertise of reform-minded advisers, tolerated massive corruption at all levels of government and among his closest advisers, and had little interest in economic policy. As a result, the deterioration of Ukraine's economy, which had commenced well before the country gained independence, greatly accelerated after 1991. All Western and Ukrainian evaluations agree that this precipitous decline had a devastating impact on all sectors of the economy and the population's living standards. For example, wages are so much higher in Russia that large numbers of Ukrainian citizens now work there illegally or semilegally, and the conditions in which they work are often very poor.⁹ There has also been a significant brain-drain of scholars and highly qualified technical personnel from Ukraine.¹⁰

Ukraine's economic problems were exacerbated by certain external factors, such as the impact of rising prices of energy imports from Russia under its terms of trade. In addition, given the tremendous challenge of restructuring the hidebound Ukrainian

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economy, a certain economic decline was inevitable no matter what policies were adopted. However, Ukraine's first post-independence leaders behaved in an irresponsible fashion and contributed to this decline by conducting a loose monetary policy until the end of 1993, incurring massive budget deficits, and failing to introduce a coherent reform program. These and other factors led to a very great fall in production in almost all sectors of the economy.¹¹

Ukraine's first 2 years of independence were marked by hyperinflation, limited economic liberalization, large credits to heavy industry and the agricultural sector, and irrationally confiscatory taxation. As a result of numerous and often confusing regulations, especially on foreign trade, many top government officials quickly took advantage of this situation to enrich themselves, and the limited privatization carried out primarily benefitted former state officials.¹²

The prospects for meaningful economic reform did not improve significantly until the summer of 1994, with the election of Ukraine's second president Leonid Kuchma, who made the improvement of the economy his top priority. After quickly initiating an anticrime and anticorruption campaign, he assembled a number of young reform economists, and three members of this group were added to the government: First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Mitiukov, and Minister of Privatization Yurii Yekhanurov. In conjunction with the incumbent Minister of Economy Roman Shpek and Viktor Yushchenko, the chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine, they comprised a powerful reform team.

President Kuchma presented his economic reform plan to the Ukrainian parliament in October 1994. It entailed a rapid transition to a market economy, and included the liberalization of all prices with the exception of natural monopolies, deregulation of domestic trade, a significant liberalization of foreign trade, significant tax reform with sharp tax reductions, mass privatization, and private ownership of land. Shortly afterward, Ukraine's parliament voted in favor of the reform program. Although most of the large number of left-leaning legislators disagreed with many elements of this program, they generally lent it their support because no viable alternative existed.

In September 1994, Ukraine's representatives and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reached an agreement at staff

level on a Systematic Transformation Facility (STF), and in late October of that year the agreement was approved by the IMF board. Ukraine committed itself to unifying the exchange rate, doing away with import subsidies, raising or liberalizing key prices (notably of food, energy, and communal services), and liberalizing exports. Ukraine's representatives also promised to reduce the country's budget deficit for 1994 to 10.3 percent of GDP.

Implementation of these reform measures has taken place roughly as promised. By March 1995 the exchange rate had essentially been unified and all import subsidies abolished. Prices, domestic trade, and foreign trade are at least formally liberalized, and energy prices for enterprises have been allowed to reach world levels. The only significant subsidies are for rent, household energy, and collective transport, and from January 1995 export quotas and licenses have been limited to four commodity groups, scrap metals, and grain.¹³

There has also been considerable success in obtaining international financing to support reform plans. In the fourth quarter of 1994, the IMF took the lead to raise a total of \$1 billion to finance Ukraine's balance-of-payments deficit from the beginning of the STF program, although only approximately two-thirds of the financing materialized. The IMF and Ukraine then negotiated a full-fledged standby program, which was to lead to the full stabilization of Ukraine's currency. The key feature of this program was a predicted 1995 budget deficit of approximately 5 percent of GDP; it foresaw the abolition of virtually all government subsidies, including those to agriculture and coal.

This austere program came under considerable criticism in the Ukrainian parliament but it gave its final approval to the 1995 budget in April 1995, thus meeting a vital precondition for a \$1.8 billion IMF credit. This will help a great deal to satisfy Ukraine's gross 1995 financing needs, which totalled approximately \$6 billion, according to Anders Aslund, the senior Western economic adviser to President Leonid Kravchuk. Most of the remaining financing needs are being met by contributions from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by a rescheduling of debts by Turkmenistan and Russia.

It is not clear whether Ukraine will receive all the financing aid promised, and the debt rescheduling agreement with Russia can always be held hostage to a deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian

relations. Nonetheless, representatives of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank have shown great confidence in the ability of Ukraine's economic reform team to hold to its current program, and Ukraine has now received most of the support it needs to press ahead with its reform program. In addition, in early April 1995 Ukraine's parliament accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Vitalii Masol, who had been appointed by former President Leonid Kravchuk, and passed a no-confidence vote in the government he had headed. President Kuchma now has greater freedom to appoint a strong team of reformist ministers to a new Cabinet of Ministers.

These recent positive developments by no means guarantee the success of President Kuchma's reform program. In particular, in April 1995 it was still not clear whether President Kuchma would receive the additional executive powers he needs to fully implement his plans. Even if these powers are granted, a great deal will depend on public reactions to the additional hardships (e.g., large-scale unemployment) that will accompany the new austerity regime being imposed on Ukraine, and on whether social peace can be maintained during the next phase of the country's transition to a market-type economy. In addition, although few corruption scandals have affected the reputation of President Kuchma's reform team, only a modest beginning has been made to deal with the massive network of corrupt activities that has been a major drain on Ukraine's economy and has greatly demoralized society at large.

Last, the rapid implementation of economic reforms will require at least the grudging cooperation of regional elites and midlevel bureaucrats throughout Ukraine. Reform-minded elites are quite strong in some regions of Ukraine, including, paradoxically, some of the industrial centers of eastern Ukraine.¹⁴ However, in other regions and in Ukraine's rural areas, where most of the population is still employed on old-style collective farms, strong resistance to reforms can be expected.

Some setbacks will be inevitable. From the beginning of his term in office, however, President Kuchma, in contrast to his predecessor, has made the revival of Ukrainian economy his top priority, and he has not wavered from the reform platform initially enunciated in October 1994.¹⁵ This priority has even been reflected in the activities of Ukraine's diplomatic service, which has reoriented its activities to focus much more attention on trade promotion and attracting foreign investment in the Ukrainian

economy.¹⁶ Thus the reform team now guiding Ukraine's economic development is doing a great deal to create the conditions that will allow for a gradual revival of Ukraine's economy.

2. SOCIAL STABILITY

Ukrainian society has gone through a very difficult and traumatic period since 1991, a period first characterized by euphoria and now marked by apathy and cynicism. As a result of the economic decline and associated problems noted above, social tensions continue to rise and the potential for societal conflict is high.

In the last 4 years Ukraine has begun a number of important and dramatic transitions:

- From a "colony" of the Soviet "empire" to an independent state
- From authoritarianism to liberal democracy
- From a semi-militarized command economy to a market-type economy.

In the process, the old Soviet "social contract"—where the ruling elites provided the population with a modest but stable standard of living and a guaranteed minimal level of social services—has been abandoned without being replaced by a new social contract.

At the same time, old ideals of egalitarianism, social justice, and consensus are being replaced by a new value system emphasizing the virtues of social differentiation and stressing the principle of survival of the fittest. One of the greatest challenges facing President Kuchma's administration, then, is the formulation of a new social contract which will accommodate the values of economic effectiveness, social justice, and political democracy in a fashion acceptable to an increasingly cynical and alienated electorate.

One important precondition for the introduction of a new social contract is already in place. Survey data show that when asked to define the most important challenges facing Ukrainian society, respondents most frequently choose the option "the preservation of social stability." The percentage of respondents choosing this option rose significantly between 1992 and 1993 (from 44 to 55

percent), and it was chosen more frequently than options such as "the creation of a strong state," "the implementation of profound socioeconomic reforms," "the development of market relations," and "the development of democracy." Maintaining social stability was thus clearly a priority value for a large part of Ukraine's population during this period in spite of the disruptive social changes they had endured. When protest actions were contemplated, a strong preference was given to protests that remained within the framework of the law.¹⁷

In the immediate post-independence period Ukraine's post-Communist elites often took advantage of this great desire for social stability by arguing that any significant changes to the status quo would threaten social peace. However, the resulting failure to introduce meaningful reforms led to the deepening socioeconomic crisis described above, and greatly increased the chance that a large sector of society would reconsider the priority value they placed on social stability in the past.

The extent of the challenge faced by President Kuchma's administration should not be underestimated. A survey conducted in May 1994 showed that by far the most important motive that would impel residents of Ukraine's capital Kiev to engage in protest actions would be a further decrease in the standard of living of their families. The great majority of residents of Kiev have considerable difficulty making ends meet; other surveys have confirmed that concerns over continuously declining living standards, which have affected a majority of the population, have clearly assumed priority over other concerns. It is interesting to note that half of Kiev's residents manage to get by largely because they grow many of the food products they use on small plots of land or get such products from relatives who live in villages.¹⁸

One positive aspect of this economic crisis is that many people have been forced to look for alternative sources of income, and in the process have become less dependent on the state. However, most working adults either lack the opportunity to gain additional income or lack the time and energy to take advantage of such opportunities. In addition, although most of Ukraine's population still prefers to use legitimate means of expressing their social grievances, a majority of Kiev residents are convinced that protest actions will have no positive results. In order to prevent a further deterioration of their standard of living, therefore, in May 1994 one

quarter of Kiev's residents were ready to engage in illegal or semilegal activities, a reflection of a substantial degree of moral alienation and contempt for the law.¹⁹

The likelihood of social conflict has also increased as a result of growing social differentiation and a resulting polarization between a small wealthy elite and an increasing majority of the population who live in poverty or are close to the poverty line. Only a small category of individuals can be said to belong to the middle class, which is usually seen as a guarantor of stability in society. By the end of 1994 the impoverishment of the greater part of the population of Ukraine had reached a critical level, and the main reason mass protests did not occur was probably the lack of serious and respected leaders and organizations who could channel and benefit from such protests.²⁰

This growing social differentiation in Ukraine will impede the mobilization of broad public support for economic reforms, for there is a widespread conviction that the reform process has allowed those who are wealthy to enrich themselves by dishonest means. According to one survey, 40 percent of respondents were convinced that one could become wealthy only by robbing state property. Only 24 percent indicated that commercial skills and only 4 percent indicated that talent and hard work could lead to wealth.²¹

The prospects for mobilizing the population to support socioeconomic reforms are also limited because of the extent to which fears among the public dominate over hopes. This has resulted in a despondent, frustrated, and largely inert population that feels it has little influence on the situation unfolding around it. Social frustration and disorientation have been exacerbated by widespread fears that prices will continue to rise, and by the growing conviction that the growth of criminal activities will allow organized crime to increase its control over the country. When combined with a loss of faith in the state and its ability to administer the country, this creates favorable circumstances for the emergence of populist demagogues.²²

In fact, it is surprising that Ukraine's population has shown such a high degree of patience in the face of recent adversity. There is no fully satisfactory explanation for the widespread aversion in Ukraine to violent protest as a means of expressing socioeconomic and political grievances. Some commentators rather impressionistically refer to a "traditional Ukrainian habit of settling

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issues peacefully.²³ More significantly, however, one should note that because of its exposed and strategically significant location, as well as its rich resources, during both World Wars Ukraine was the scene of very fierce combat, accompanied by great physical destruction and human losses. Its population suffered a disproportionately large percentage of the casualties incurred by tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union during these conflicts. In addition, Ukraine's large and relatively prosperous rural population was heavily victimized during Stalin's drive to collectivize agriculture in the 1930s. The cumulative impact of these events appears to have encouraged a certain conservatism among Ukraine's population, and emphasis on maintaining the status quo. This is based on the (largely correct) perception that in this century rapid socioeconomic and political change has been accompanied by massive devastation and loss of human life. Perhaps this is why there is a widespread unwillingness in Ukraine, especially among its older citizens, to support political strategies which could lead to physical conflict.

There is, of course, a limit to the patience shown by the Ukrainian population in the last few years; this has been reflected, for example, in various strikes and other protests called by trade unions protesting deteriorating living standards. (The labor movement in Ukraine, however, lacks strong, dynamic leaders and has splintered into numerous trade unions that often compete with each other. At present labor movement activities do not appear to pose a threat to state stability.²⁴)

In general, in recent years socioeconomic discontent has not been channeled into mass protests and violence; rather, it has been internalized and reflected in the growth of various social pathologies such as alcoholism, absenteeism and shoddy work performance, and breakdown of the family unit. Some of these phenomena are particularly widespread among youth, who are faced with very high levels of unemployment after completing their education.²⁵

Ukraine's socioeconomic difficulties have not provoked mass protests threatening the stability of the state, but they have led to increasing alienation, demoralization and political apathy among a large part of the population and among members of the younger generation in particular. Even if the economic situation in Ukraine soon begins to improve, it will be a considerable period of time

before the impact of these negative phenomena can be reversed. In the meantime, many of Ukraine's most talented scholars, scientists, and graduate students, unhappy with their prospects in the country, have emigrated or are considering emigration.

3.

ETHNIC TENSIONS

Since 1991 many Western commentaries have stressed the potential for interethnic conflict and violence throughout the former USSR, including Ukraine. A certain preoccupation with such a prospect is understandable in light of the spread of communal conflicts in the Caucasus region and growing tensions among ethnic communities in some other parts of the former USSR.

The ethnodemographic profiles of the USSR's successor states vary a great deal, however, and in each of these states relations among its ethnic groups have been shaped by a distinctive and complicated set of historical and socioeconomic factors. General commentaries stressing the potential for interethnic tensions and violent conflicts throughout the Soviet Union's successor states are therefore rarely enlightening and often obscure, and sometimes mislead rather than inform.

The painful legacy of Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine includes a lengthy and brutal effort to eliminate the Ukrainian nationalist movement in Western Ukraine during and after World War II, and the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar population to Central Asia in 1944.²⁶ More recently, in the 1970s and early 1980s a number of national rights activists in Ukraine were sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment for peacefully defending the rights of their language and culture.²⁷ Given this legacy it is not surprising that resentments concerning past mistreatment remain strong and some interethnic tensions are apparent in Ukraine. What *is* surprising is that these tensions have not, with some exceptions, been translated into widespread violent conflict.

Ukraine, like other Soviet successor states, has faced a difficult challenge in formulating and implementing new language policies and finding the right balance between its citizens' individual rights and the group rights of ethnic minorities as well as members of the

state's titular ethnic group. In particular, some Ukrainian activists have argued that ethnic Ukrainians were the victims of centralized discriminatory policies in the past and their cultural interests were seriously neglected. They feel that the present government of Ukraine is fully justified in introducing "Ukrainization" measures—a form of "affirmative action"—to help compensate for the negative impact of this discrimination. Some of the complaints voiced by these activists are justified; however, they are often insensitive to the fact that attempts to introduce rapid changes in cultural/linguistic policies and practices run the risk of alienating the sizable non-Ukrainian populations in Ukraine as well as many Russified Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian government's treatment of its ethnic minorities is important for two reasons. First, interethnic conflicts could play a major role in destabilizing the Ukrainian state and increasing interstate tensions in the region, especially if neighboring states were to intervene on behalf of fellow countrymen. Second, government policies toward minorities reflect the political elites' level of tolerance of pluralism and their commitment to liberal-democratic principles. Further, one of the criteria by which all of the USSR's successor states are being judged by the world community is treatment of minority ethnic groups.

Prior to Ukraine's independence, the future of the country's minorities drew considerable attention as Western scholars, politicians, and journalists warned of the possible negative consequences of a rise in Ukrainian nationalism and of the problems national minorities might face in a new Ukrainian state. As President George Bush said during an address to the Ukrainian parliament in August 1991:

As Lord Acton observed, "The most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities." Freedom requires tolerance. . . . Yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.²⁸

In contrast, many leading Ukrainian politicians have not only proudly noted the virtual absence of open ethnic conflict in Ukraine, but have sometimes even foolishly claimed that the

preconditions for such conflicts do not exist in their country.²⁹ Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, and many of his colleagues frequently emphasized that the results of the 1991 referendum on independence showed that the great majority of non-Ukrainians in Ukraine strongly supported the country's sovereignty.

Broad and facile generalizations motivated by political considerations can be easily dismissed, but Ukraine was, in fact, remarkably free of ethnic conflict both during and after the independence referendum in December 1991, and the positive state of interethnic relations in Ukraine has been noted in a variety of Western sources. For example, a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit summarizing developments in the CIS in the last quarter of 1992 concluded, "More than one year after independence Ukraine remains a model of inter-ethnic accord in spite of a very large Russian minority on its territory."³⁰ In addition, a report prepared by the United States Congress' Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe states:

Ukraine's treatment of its minorities has been encouraging, and Ukraine, unlike many other former Soviet republics, has been largely untouched by ethnic conflict. To date, inter-ethnic stability has been maintained.³¹

One could try to explain the absence of open ethnic conflict in Ukraine, especially between the majority Ukrainian population and the large Russian minority, by stressing, in the tradition of standard Soviet (and Russian) historiography, the supposedly "special" historical relationship between the two peoples, which led to their intermingling in Ukraine, and a cultural "rapprochement," which resulted in the Russification of significant numbers of Ukrainians. One could also search the historical record for "evidence" that members of the majority Ukrainian ethnic group are blessed with special virtues of tolerance and understanding. However, both approaches are based on a selective and idiosyncratic use of evidence which inevitably yields the results desired by the researcher.

More methodologically rigorous approaches to the study of ethnic group relations usually attempt to uncover the causal conditions or factors that have given rise to the political activity (or passivity) of various ethnic groups. Such approaches are frequently

very abstract and implicitly or explicitly rely on the concept of relative deprivation, which emphasizes the role of ethnic groups as instruments of economic interests. These approaches usually deny ethnic institutions and their leaders any meaningful autonomy in the political process and downgrade the role of politics and policy in general.

However, in a situation where ethnic tensions have not yet been transformed into open conflict, political action or inaction can play a very important role in shaping the environment of interethnic relations. By focussing on the way in which crucial elites in Ukraine have attempted to shape or influence interethnic relations, one can achieve more balanced explanations of ethnic political behavior than those provided by the causal approaches noted above.

The situation of Ukraine's ethnic minorities is greatly influenced by the fact that it is a "new" state on the European stage, with limited experience of independent statehood in the 20th century. In many respects, Ukraine's "youth" has hampered its emergence onto the international stage. However, it also means that Ukraine has greater freedom than many of its neighbors to mold a distinctive nationality policy, for it is not overly weighed down by traditions of statehood that, in the East European context, usually implied legitimization of the state through a heavy reliance on ethnic nationalism.

More than in the case of most other states in the region, the success of Ukraine's nationality policy has depended on the specific fashion in which it is designed, rationalized, and implemented. The emphasis here will be on some of the political factors that have led to ethnopolitical stability in Ukraine.

The most obvious factor helping to preserve interethnic calm in Ukraine is a consistent government policy, with strong support in the Ukrainian parliament, of reassuring ethnic minorities concerning their legal status and cultural freedom in Ukraine. In July 1990, in the Ukrainian parliament's Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, a firm commitment was made to respect the national rights of all the peoples of Ukraine, and the section on citizenship guaranteed equality before the law to all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their ancestry and racial or national identity. In its provisions on cultural development the declaration asserted, "The Ukrainian SSR . . . guarantees to all nationalities living on the

territory of the republic the right to free national and cultural development."³²

This was followed by the establishment in July 1991 of a Committee of Nationalities, attached to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, which was to monitor the implementation of laws on minority issues and help fulfill the social and cultural needs of Ukraine's national minorities. In November 1991 the Ukrainian parliament unanimously adopted a declaration guaranteeing all citizens equal political, economic, social, and cultural rights; in June 1992, a legislative base for Ukraine's minority policy was established when the Ukrainian Supreme Council adopted the law "On National Minorities in Ukraine." All major political parties in Ukraine supported this legislation, which states that the languages of ethnic groups residing compactly in particular territories will have coequal status with Ukrainian.³³ In addition, Ukraine's draft constitution contains numerous provisions guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Ukraine.³⁴

In April 1993, Ukraine's President Kravchuk issued a decree on the creation of a new Ministry on Nationality Affairs and Migration on the basis of the above-mentioned Committee of Nationalities. To head this ministry Kravchuk appointed a well-respected jurist, Oleksandr Iemets', who had earlier served as Kravchuk's senior advisor on legal-political affairs.³⁵ His successor, Mykola Shul'ha, appointed in September 1994, is a well-known specialist in the field of interethnic relations.³⁶

On a more symbolic but equally significant level, both Ukraine presidents and many other senior politicians have repeatedly denounced all forms of xenophobia and ethnic chauvinism in Ukraine and have consistently spoken out in favor of a state based on the principle of equal citizenship for all, regardless of ethnic background. To date there has been little evidence of the widespread use of an "ethnic key" in appointments to senior government positions. The appointment of Ivan Dziuba in November 1992 as Ukraine's first Minister of Culture was also a positive step, for Dziuba had been a prominent and consistent supporter of extensive rights for national minorities and a determined opponent of all forms of ethnic intolerance.³⁷

One can put forward several reasons for the liberal nationality policy adopted in Ukraine. Ukraine's senior politicians may be truly committed to the ideals of ethnic pluralism, although a more cynical

perspective would hold that they have found it quite easy to adapt the old and tattered Soviet slogans of "the friendship of peoples" and "socialist internationalism" to present-day circumstances.

On a more pragmatic level, the most important factor influencing the direction of Ukraine's nationality policy has been the presence on its territory of a large and potentially restive Russian minority that is heavily concentrated in several *oblasti* in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The only *oblast'* in which Russians formed a demographic majority (67 percent) of the population in 1989 was the Crimean *oblast'*. However, prior to Ukraine's independence the Russian minority was, in many respects, a "psychological" majority throughout most of Ukraine (the exception was Ukraine's western *oblasti*) because of tsarist and Soviet policies that provided the Russian population in Ukraine with a full range of Russian-language facilities to satisfy its cultural and educational needs.

At the same time, the spheres in which the Ukrainian language was used were gradually narrowed, and it was implicitly treated as a rural, "peasant" language. Over time this image of the "inferior" nature of the Ukrainian language and culture was internalized by many ethnic Ukrainians, especially in the eastern and southern regions, and the resulting inferiority complex has not been easy to overcome in those regions where Ukrainian was eliminated from most spheres of public use or, in fact, never penetrated.³⁸

As a result, in 1989, 59.5 percent of Ukrainians in Ukraine were fluent in Russian and approximately 12.3 percent considered Russian their native language, whereas only 1.6 percent of Russians in Ukraine considered Ukrainian their native language, and only 32.8 percent were fluent in Ukrainian. In addition, over time Russian had become the dominant language of government bureaucracy in Ukraine, with the partial exception of western Ukraine.³⁹ In many respects Ukraine's tolerant nationality policy would simply represent a pragmatic accommodation with demographic and linguistic reality, the reality being there are many ethnic Ukrainians who would have difficulty accepting, or adapting to, a harsh and rapid policy of "Ukrainization."

However, Ukraine's nationality policy was also greatly influenced by the principled stance adopted by Ukraine's major political parties and organizations, which quickly reached a consensus in 1990-91 on the need to guarantee the rights of all

ethnic groups in Ukraine. Of particular importance was the early position taken by Rukh, the Ukrainian popular front movement that initially served as an umbrella organization for the emerging national-democratic parties of Ukraine and played a crucial role in the campaign for Ukraine's independence. Rukh's policies on this issue reflected the liberal-humanistic traditions shared by many members of the literary-cultural intelligentsia, and one of the keynote speakers during Rukh's constituent congress was Ivan Dziuba, a former dissident and the well-known author of *Internationalism and Russification?* Over the years he had strongly opposed all expressions of intolerance and xenophobia in the Ukrainian national movement and his speech, as well as the speeches of several other speakers at the congress, strongly stressed the importance of good relations among Ukraine's ethnic groups.⁴⁰

In addition, over time many of the leadership positions in Rukh, and in some of the political parties that began to spring up in Ukraine in 1990-91, were assumed by individuals who had been harshly persecuted by the Soviet security apparatus during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.⁴¹ A politician's credentials as a former dissident or political prisoner did not necessarily testify to his/her moral qualities, tolerance, and political judgment. However, most of the former dissidents who have been active in political life in Ukraine at the national level have supported ethnic minority rights even though they had been harassed (and often imprisoned) by the Soviet authorities primarily because of their supposed "nationalist" activities.

Given their strong commitment to the development of the Ukrainian language and culture, and the principle of national self-determination, one might have expected these former dissidents to be somewhat ambivalent concerning ethnic minority rights. However, the most prominent members of the national rights movement in Ukraine had based their activities on liberal-democratic principles that were not abandoned when they were arrested and imprisoned. In addition, in the camps where they were detained the attempts by camp authorities to set dissidents of different ethnic backgrounds off against each other were so crude that they actually had the opposite effect and led to their cooperation against the common enemy—the camp administration.

This discussion has focussed on only one of the many factors that helped to shape Ukraine's nationality policy, and it was by no

means decisive. Still, one should not underestimate the impact of the stand taken by these former political prisoners on public opinion and public sentiments, especially during the period just prior to Ukraine's declaration of independence. Strongly influenced by the Soviet propaganda machine that had consistently portrayed the national rights activists as xenophobic chauvinists, most residents of Ukraine expected that they would live up to this reputation, being embittered by the repression they suffered.

In the early phase of Ukraine's independence, therefore, an important role was played by official statements and policies concerning minority groups and interethnic relations, and by former dissidents, who channeled their activities into Rukh and eventually into a variety of different political parties. In effect, at a crucial stage in the state-building process, a sociopolitical climate was created that made the expression of xenophobic views (such as the slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians") unpopular and hampered the growth of extremist organizations. When a sample of Ukrainian citizens was asked in 1993 to rank their fears for the future, only 18 percent of the respondents indicated they feared the outbreak of interethnic conflicts, a decrease in 6 percent from the previous year. Higher rankings were given to the growth of crime, rapid increases in prices, hunger, unemployment, and the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.⁴²

Some grounds for concern in the area of interethnic relations remain. The advocates of extremist forms of Ukrainian nationalism, based primarily in Western Ukraine, still remain a marginal force in Ukrainian politics. However, these extremists have had some modest success in strengthening and broadening their base of public support; if it continues to grow, their promotion of xenophobic views could eventually pose at least a modest threat to interethnic harmony.⁴³

Kiev's ability to implement a consistent and effective nationality policy has also been greatly hindered by the critical socioeconomic situation in Ukraine. Thus limited resources have made it difficult to provide even minimal funding to satisfy the needs of ethnic minorities. In addition, the poor state of Ukraine's legal infrastructure has made it difficult to counter the activity of extremist groups and prosecute cases of discrimination on the basis of ethnic background.

Most significantly, however, Ukraine's leaders are still faced with the challenge of finding the proper "formula" for the development of a distinctive, overarching national identity to unify the various ethnic groups and regions of Ukraine. Given the large Russian minority in eastern and southern Ukraine and the low prestige value of Ukrainian language and culture in these regions, as well as the significant number of Ukrainians who are linguistically and culturally Russified, any attempt to foster a national identity based on the Ukrainian ethnic identity would greatly exacerbate the ethnic cleavages in Ukrainian society.

Interethnic harmony would be seriously threatened if "Ukrainization" policies were implemented in a rapid and injudicious fashion, by crude administrative measures. However, the current minister responsible for nationality affairs, like his predecessor, has spoken out strongly against the use of such measures, and the Kuchma administration has been cautious in its statements concerning language issues. President Kuchma himself has generated some creative ambiguity on this issue by advocating that Russian, together with Ukrainian, be considered *official* languages, at the same time underlining that Ukrainian will be the country's sole *state* language. He has been careful, however, not to clearly delineate the difference in status between an official and state language.

President Kuchma has intentionally stressed the need for nonethnic sources of identity to help unify the population and regions of Ukraine, and at the end of his state of the nation address in April 1995 he suggested that the economic rebirth of Ukraine represent an appropriate unifying idea for the entire population.⁴⁴ However, even if the current reform process underway in Ukraine yields rapid results, economic success alone cannot provide the emotive basis for a full-fledged national identity.

There is a tendency in some political circles in Ukraine to encourage the development of a national identity that, if not based on Ukrainian ethnic identity, will be at least partly based on an anti-Russian animus. Persistent attempts by Russia's leaders to intervene in the affairs of neighboring countries have greatly contributed to the maintenance of anti-Russian sentiments in some sectors of Ukrainian society. However, it would be dangerous if these sentiments were to play a very significant role in shaping the Ukrainian identity, as this could easily alienate a large part of

Ukraine's population of Russian background and isolate Ukraine from a neighbor on which it is still dependent for most of its fossile fuel supplies and raw materials.

Given his background, President Kuchma is in an excellent position to promote the idea of a Ukrainian *political* identity not based on anti-Russian sentiments, and to encourage a shift from an ethnic-linguistic to a civic idea of the Ukrainian nation that would successfully integrate all those living in Ukraine, no matter what their ethnic background. All Ukraine's senior politicians continue to demonstrate a strong and consistent commitment to maintaining ethnic peace in Ukraine, and with the exception of Crimea there is no evidence that interethnic conflict could emerge as a major threat to Ukraine's stability in the near future.

4. CENTRIFUGAL TRENDS

CRIMEA

Centrifugal forces are present in several regions of Ukraine, although the situation in Crimea is by far the most dramatic and has attracted the most attention in the West. For most of the post-independence period, a major failing of the country's national security system was a consistent misreading of the political and socioeconomic situation in Crimea and other regions of Ukraine, which in turn promoted a growing inability to exert a significant influence on developments in the country's periphery. A cause of this misreading may have been deficiencies in Kiev's information-gathering capabilities. Kiev did little to ensure that it regularly received reliable and timely information about the state of affairs in Crimea.⁴⁵ When the appropriate information *did* become available, Kiev lacked a coherent regional policy framework within which the information could be analyzed.

In the first few months of President Kuchma's administration, Kiev continued to lose control over its remaining levers of influence in Crimea. In particular, the central authorities initially did little to take advantage of the favorable play of forces that emerged when both Crimean President Meshkov and the Crimean parliament succeeded in largely discrediting themselves during the fall of 1994. There seemed a general lack of will in Kiev to face up to harsh realities, make difficult decisions, and devise and implement consistent policies concerning the country's regions. As a result, inertia or ad hoc policymaking prevailed in the capital, and with some exceptions the old Soviet-era administrative elites in the regions were accommodated, probably in the hope they best understood and could therefore best control developments in the regions on Kiev's behalf. The best example of this accommodation was President Kravchuk's consistent support for Mykola Bahrov, the former first secretary of the Crimean branch of the CPSU and

one of Kravchuk's old colleagues.⁴⁶ Given the great shortage of experienced administrators who could act as alternatives to the local power bosses, rapid changes in the composition of the latter were not feasible, but President Kravchuk's administration did little to encourage the emergence of new, reform-minded elites in the regions.

Ukraine's central authorities were also slow to devise other means of influencing the situation in Crimea, to include ensuring that Crimea's population had access to various points of view concerning current and future developments in the peninsula and Ukraine as a whole. There were also few efforts to support the development of high-quality independent media outlets in Ukraine and improve the professional standards of state radio and television broadcasts.⁴⁷ The situation and quality of the media are far from satisfactory anywhere in Ukraine,⁴⁸ and the inhabitants of Crimea are particularly lacking in the diversity of information necessary for them to make decisions in their own best interests. The peninsula is almost totally dominated by local media and broadcasts and periodicals from Russia that almost always portray Kiev's policies in a highly negative and tendentious fashion.⁴⁹

Kiev's inability to effectively predict, analyze, and influence developments in Crimea is symptomatic of other significant weaknesses of the Ukrainian state. Thus there was a considerable danger in early 1995 that the emergence of a vacuum of power in Crimea could lead to a further destabilization of the situation in this region. For example, the predominantly pro-Russian senior officers of the Black Sea Fleet, who had increasingly linked the fate of that fleet to that of Sevastopol' and Crimea as a whole, could have taken advantage of this situation to increase their leverage on the local political scene.

Russia's representatives are well aware of these weaknesses (e.g., Ukraine's indebtedness to Russia, largely the result of a heavy reliance on Russian fossil fuels) and have readily taken advantage of them to push for major concessions from their Ukrainian negotiating partners. However, even moderate concessions will leave the Russian military and its political masters in a strong position in Crimea. They will possess an excellent opportunity to continue influencing local political developments and, if necessary, quickly project force throughout the Black Sea region, especially the south of Ukraine. Kiev's decision in March 1995 to abolish

the post of President of Crimea and to annul the Crimean constitution as well as a number of Crimean laws that do not correspond to Ukrainian laws, represents the most decisive action to date taken by Kiev to control the situation in Crimea.⁵⁰ Although the Presidium of the Crimean legislature and many of its deputies have protested Kiev's moves there have been no mass protests in Crimea, and a substantial minority of the peninsula's legislators have even supported Kiev's actions.⁵¹ However, although President Kuchma has indicated that Crimea will be allowed to maintain its autonomy, it still appears that Kiev has no coherent strategy to deal with Crimea's anomalous status in Ukraine and centrifugal trends in other regions of the country.

REGIONAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Ukraine's weaknesses have also affected its ability to respond to challenges in other restive regions of the country, giving rise to concerns that centrifugal trends could eventually result in domestic conflict, foreign intervention, and ultimately Ukraine's disintegration. The situation in Crimea is only symptomatic of the broader problems Ukraine faces in formulating a consistent and coherent regional policy.⁵²

Discussions of regional issues in Ukraine are frequently placed in the context of a debate on the virtues or drawbacks of introducing federalism in Ukraine. However, on the whole this debate has been marked more by emotions and sloganeering, as well as considerable ignorance of the comparative experience of federal states, than by a sober analysis of the pros and cons of federalism for Ukraine.

In particular, it has become popular among representatives of national-democratic and nationalist parties in Ukraine, to "demonize" the possible introduction of a federal system in Ukraine as inevitably leading to the strengthening of separatist movements in several of its regions. For example, a civic organization called "Mutual Understanding," recently launched by former President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, set as one of its goals

Consolidating the Ukrainian people and reaching a mutual understanding among the patriotic forces of society in the struggle against separatism, federalism, linguistic and cultural divisions, and in support of the unity and territorial integrity of our country.⁵³

However, many of the arguments against a federal system for Ukraine are based on rather flimsy logic. When pressed to explain the reasoning behind the apocalyptic scenario noted above, the opponents of a federal system for Ukraine frequently mention the worrisome precedent of the recent demise of federal states such as the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. However, these were hardly typical federal political systems. For example, the literature on comparative federalism usually treats the USSR as a prime example of an authoritarian state that was only nominally federal and was actually more centralized than many unitary states.⁵⁴

On a more emotional level, Ukrainian critics of federalism often try to discredit the idea by pointing out that a number of politicians in Russia have praised the virtues of introducing federal systems in Ukraine and other Soviet successor states. These politicians are perceived to have a hidden agenda, encouraging federalism in order to ensure weak neighbours that could readily be dominated by Russia or eventually be incorporated, in whole or in part, into a reborn Russian state or empire.⁵⁵ Ukrainian critics of federalism also frequently consider regional elites to be potentially disloyal, harbouring ambitions of re-uniting their regions with the Russian "elder brother" or other neighboring states.⁵⁶

There is some validity to these claims. For example, Russian officials negotiating the withdrawal of the 14th Army from the "Dniestr Republic" in Moldova strongly supported a federalization of Moldova that would provide Transnistria with considerable autonomy and the right to seek independence in the case of Moldovan integration with Romania.⁵⁷ However, devoting too much attention to such external pressures clearly detracts from a sensible discussion of the merits and drawbacks of federalism and actually precludes consideration of the ways in which the introduction of federal structures can actually undercut the development of separatist movements. Instead one usually encounters a reflexive "fear of federalism" based largely on the conviction that Ukraine, as a weak state with numerous internal problems, simply cannot afford the luxury of undertaking major administrative-territorial reforms that might contribute to the country's destabilization.

The drastic deterioration of Ukraine's economy since independence has created a highly unfavorable setting for serious consideration of federal or other proposals for major territorial-

administrative reforms. It is therefore understandable that after President Kuchma was elected in 1994, he and his associates focussed their attention on the crucial priority of promoting socioeconomic reforms. However, sooner or later the question of territorial-administrative reform will re-emerge, since Ukraine's present structure is a rather artificial legacy of the Soviet past.

In addition, the anomaly of an autonomous Crimea within an otherwise united Ukrainian state will continue to pose major problems for Ukraine unless an attempt is made to "regularize" Crimea's status. One option that would help resolve the Crimean anomaly, one frequently advocated by nationalist and some national-democratic politicians in Ukraine, is to revoke Crimea's present status as an autonomous republic within Ukraine and return it to the status of one of many provinces (*oblasti*) in a united Ukrainian state. However, such an initiative would meet with fierce resistance in Crimea. Given the extent to which the officers of the dominant Russian portion of the Black Sea Fleet have come to identify their interests with those of Crimea, there is a strong likelihood that the Black Sea Fleet, and in turn Russia, could be drawn into any resulting conflict between the Crimean and central Ukrainian authorities. A more feasible option is to allow Crimea to maintain autonomy and encourage a "creeping federalization" of Ukraine; this would satisfy some of the critics of radical federal experiments but gradually regularize Crimea's status. The example of Spain, which began a transition to liberal democracy in 1975 and engaged in a gradual form of federalization after a long period of authoritarian, centralized rule, could serve here as an interesting example for Ukraine.⁵⁸ However, discussions on territorial-administrative reform in Ukraine will likely become more fruitful only after Ukraine evolves more in the direction of the model of a "civil society."

Certainly, one can seriously question the depth and sincerity of the interest in federalism of regional political elites, and the extent to which they are prepared to engage in the extensive, continuous negotiations and numerous compromises which are an integral part of any healthy federal system. In some regions, such as the Donets'k and Dnipropetrovs'k oblasts, local politics largely consist of the old Soviet *nomenklatura* practice of strongly defending local "clan" interests and fighting off other "clans" for influence in Kiev.⁵⁹ In other regions, such as the Zakarpats'ka and Odessa oblasts, regional

elites have simply tried to insulate themselves from the influence of Kiev and gain the maximum amount of economic autonomy. As one journalist noted with respect to the latter regions, "The idea of an open and honest dialogue with Kiev, and influencing it to engage in legal federalization has no support, and is not even enunciated." In combination with Kiev's failure to understand the extent of Ukraine's regional diversity, the result is that "federalization is perversely transformed into feudalization, and the dialogue of regions and cultures is transformed into conflict."⁶⁰

Finally, any form of federalism introduced in Ukraine would have to be very flexible to accommodate the legitimate interests of the indigenous Tatar population of Crimea. In general discussions concerning Crimea, the Crimean Tatars unfortunately often are relegated to the status of a persistent "problem," which only complicates the already difficult situation in the peninsula. However, it should be emphasized that the Crimean Tatar leaders have been very consistent in advocating firm but peaceful means to achieve their primary aim, the re-establishment of a viable Crimean Tatar community in their homeland.

Thus the claims of the Crimean Tatars have more than just a moral basis, for their calm and measured behavior in the face of numerous provocations on the part of the local Crimean authorities has demonstrated that in some respects they are a stabilizing rather than destabilizing force. Certainly, the Crimean Tatars have shown themselves to be worthy partners in any dialogue between Kiev and Simferopol, and it would be a great mistake to fail to include them in such a dialogue.

The state-sponsored "homogenization" of all forms of sociopolitical activity during the Soviet period did a great deal to level regional differences in Ukraine. However, the historical legacies of the various regions of Ukraine are diverse, and the impact of these legacies has been supplemented by a renewed process of regional differentiation since Ukraine's independence. In fact, given the weak leadership displayed by the central authorities in recent years, it was inevitable that the regions largely go their own way in dealing with numerous local problems, and begin to depend more and more on their own resources. Decisive economic reforms will further encourage the process whereby the regions become more self-confident and self-reliant, diminishing their

dependence on directives from the center and thus creating a more favorable setting for the possible federalization of Ukraine.

However, the importance of seriously addressing the option of a federal system for Ukraine has been stressed not because it is ideally suited to Ukraine, would be easy to implement, would satisfy all of its regions, and provides a fool-proof solution to the problems of regional conflict management, as Duchacek points out:

There is really no reliable way of answering the question as to when the constitutional federal recognition and guarantee of diversity may ultimately contribute to a sense of satisfaction and unity or when, on the contrary, the federal formula may reinforce the sense of a separate territorial destiny, including the possibility of going it alone. Occasionally the road to territorial disintegration has been paved with the best of federal intentions.⁶¹

Nonetheless, Ukraine's politicians need to engage in a more balanced discussion of Ukraine's neglected regional problems and the ways in which they can best be managed.⁶²

In contrast to President Kravchuk's administration, which was marked by a dearth of dynamism and innovative thinking, President Kuchma's administration has shown great determination in formulating and beginning the implementation of long-overdue economic reforms. It has shown less initiative and creativity in dealing with regional issues; however, it is doubtful whether the regional status quo can be maintained much longer.

If President Kuchma and his advisors intend to introduce major territorial-administrative reforms it is understandable that they would want to lay the appropriate groundwork and ensure at least the preliminary cooperation of crucial regional elites before entering into substantive negotiations. However, there is little evidence of such groundwork, although there is a great need to finally break the self-destructive pattern whereby Kiev simply reacts (often with considerable delay and with limited effectiveness) to events in individual regions of the country.

The continued absence of a vigorous but reasoned debate on the virtues of a federal or quasi-federal variant of administrative-territorial reform in Ukraine is disturbing, because it allows the initiative to pass into the hands of those who advocate the strict subordination of all regions to Kiev's authority, with little recognition of their distinctive historical traditions and socio-

economic characteristics. In addition, it is illogical to reject the idea of a federal Ukrainian state simply because it is advocated by many senior politicians in Russia, as well as regional leaders in Ukraine who are building personal fiefdoms or might harbour separatist ambitions. However, the longer a clear decision on Ukraine's territorial-administrative structure is delayed, the more this hesitation will embolden those in Russia and Ukraine who are looking for signs of weakness on the part of Kiev and who are ready and willing to exploit it.

CONCLUSION

If Kiev's resolve to promote economic reforms begins to bear fruit soon and Ukraine's leaders devote more attention to Ukraine's regions, it is likely that centrifugal trends in Crimea and elsewhere will begin to fade away. For example, the Donbas, Ukraine's industrialized coal-mining region, is also frequently mentioned as a hotbed of separatism and pro-Russian sentiments. However, given the reality of the region's antiquated industrial infrastructure, the ever-increasing costs of mining Donbas coal, and the numerous environmental problems in this region, Moscow is unlikely to consider it an attractive prize. The Donbas can exert much more influence on Kiev than it could ever hope to exert on Moscow, and a growing awareness of this reality will do a great deal to dampen separatist sentiments in this region.⁶³

5. CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL STABILITY

The term *civil society* is often used too broadly, and in the early 1990s it was almost chanted like a mantra by well-meaning intellectuals, in both East and West, who saw the revival or establishment of civil society as a panacea for all of Eastern Europe's problems. The definition used here refers to civil society as the realm of autonomous organizations, of both a formal and informal nature, which mediate between the individual and the state and are outside the direct control of the state.

There is a general consensus that a healthy civil society is an important prerequisite for a flourishing liberal democracy and its long-term stability. At a minimum, the establishment or revival of civil society must accompany and support transitions from authoritarian to liberal-democratic rule. A bogus form of stability can be ensured by means of authoritarian rule and drastic limitations on human rights. However, such stability would be temporary, and destabilization could rapidly set in once authoritarian controls were lifted.

Even if one argues that Ukraine will always remain, to a certain extent, within Russia's sphere of influence, the gradual emergence of a healthy civil society would greatly increase Ukraine's stability and its ability to withstand external pressures. It is important at least to assess briefly a few of the indicators usually taken into account in an evaluation of the state of civil society.

- *The level of popular political participation is an important factor, especially when it is channeled through an effective multi-party system.* However, a full-fledged multi-party system is only beginning to emerge in Ukraine. Typically the membership of parties is small, they are dominated by a few individuals, and party members are overwhelmingly concentrated in large urban centers. The programs of many

parties are very similar, their proposals concerning social policy and economic reform are usually vague, and they generally have made poor use of the media.⁶⁴

- *The electoral system in place in 1994 appeared intentionally designed to downplay the role of political parties.* As a result a large number of deputies in the current parliament are independents with no party affiliation, and party discipline is weak among the others. Most parties have a strong regional base and have demonstrated limited efforts (and sometimes little desire) to broaden their support, or have found it difficult to gain votes outside of their local strongholds. Most parties are dominated by a few strong individuals and bitter intra-party factional disputes are common.

- *Popular political participation is limited, cynicism is widespread concerning the honesty and capabilities of Ukraine's political elites, and the population as a whole is characterized by a high level of political apathy, especially among youth.*⁶⁵ However, despite this general apathy, voter turnout in the 1994 elections was high in most regions of the country, and some other positive trends are beginning to emerge. Some of the original party leaders who belonged to the cultural intelligentsia and who were long on rhetoric but short on practical experience are slowly being replaced by a younger and more practically oriented generation of politicians. After a long period of proliferation of parties, most of them with negligible memberships, some amalgamation of these parties is now taking place, and the next national elections in Ukraine are to be held under the provisions of a new, simpler body of electoral legislation. As a result these elections will take place under conditions which should lead to a more professional, structured parliament.⁶⁶

- *The communications media also reflect the nascent state of civil society in Ukraine.* One can find a great deal of diversity in Ukraine's print media, but the circulation of newspapers is low and the state continues to dominate the broadcast media. President Kuchma and government officials have repeatedly assured representatives of the media that they support their independence and have imposed few restraints of any kind on newspapers, which are often very outspoken.⁶⁷ However, President Kuchma and his associates have occasionally taken

advantage of the state's levers of influence over the electronic media to advance their agenda and restrict the access of reform opponents to radio and television.⁶⁸

In addition, the publication runs of newspapers are small, and none of them is widely circulated. The quality of the broadcast media in Ukraine is poor, and a large part of the population relies on television and radio broadcasts from Russia, so the media have not played a significant role in supporting the development of a healthy civil society and helping to create a voluntary consensus on the need for reforms in Ukraine.⁶⁹ For example, Ukraine lacks a national newspaper with the authority and popularity of Russia's *Izvestiia*.

Political control of or influence over the mass media is of vital importance in the struggle for power in the turbulent context of Eastern Europe. Because the independent media in Crimea are weak and Kiev is unable to effectively penetrate the information space in this region, the central government lacks an important means of influencing public opinion in Crimea.

- *Trade unions independent of the state can also play an important role in building a civil society.* The old and highly bureaucratized Communist-era Federation of Trade Unions has survived the challenges posed to it by independent trade unions and has even expanded some of its activities. Meanwhile, the free-trade union movement has seen a decrease in the real growth of its membership. In early 1995, there were still no strong free-trade unions in the steel or chemical industries or among teachers,⁷⁰ and according to Ukraine's Ministry of Statistics, only 0.5 percent of the workforce took part in strikes in 1994 as opposed to 1.1 percent in 1993.⁷¹

- *Survey data show that the percentage of the population of Ukraine that did not belong to any voluntary organization greatly increased between January 1991 and June 1993, from 44 to 86 percent.*⁷² When President Kuchma was elected to office in 1994, Ukrainian society remained largely unstructured and was still establishing the initial infrastructure of a future civil society. This amorphous situation was reflected in the absence of a clear and effective legal and constitutional framework within which independent associations could operate with a clear knowledge of their rights and obligations.

Thus a rather paradoxical situation arises. Public frustration seemed to be on the point of spilling over into mass protests, especially if there were a further decrease in living standards. However, a high premium was placed on maintaining social peace because of fears of the potential explosion underlying social tensions, and because most of the population was still committed to lawful means of protest. By manipulating strong fears of the disruption that could be caused by social change, local and central elites maintained for a considerable period of time a gradually deteriorating status quo that led to the gradual impoverishment of the population.

In countries like Ukraine, where civil society and the legal system are still greatly underdeveloped, social conflicts can rarely be institutionalized; there are very few situations in which the appropriate rules and regulations exist that would allow for such conflicts to be readily resolved or managed. The other alternative, social revolution, is excluded in all but the most extreme of circumstance because of deeply ingrained fears of the consequences of social disruption and the absence of appropriately motivated revolutionary elites.

As in the case of other countries with a poorly developed civil society facing dramatic social change involving a massive redistribution of resources, it is difficult to envisage that such change can take place peacefully without a "strong hand" wielding legitimate authority and helping to create a certain social consensus on the need for reforms. In fact, a survey in November 1993 showed that there was a widespread desire in society at large for such a "strong hand" which would bring "order" to the country. Thus 50 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that "a few strong leaders are capable of doing more for our country than all laws and discussions" (16 percent of respondents did not agree with this statement, and 26 percent did not indicate their opinion).⁷³

In retrospect, it is clear that when he re-emerged on Ukraine's political scene as a candidate for the post of president, Leonid Kuchma was seen by many to fit the requirements noted above because, as the former director of the Pivdenmash (Iuzhmash) Rocket Factory, he had the reputation of a capable manager with a direct and uncompromising style of work. He also benefitted from his background as a partly Russified Ukrainian with roots in central Ukraine, because many residents of the heavily populated and

partially Russified industrial regions of Ukraine could readily identify with this background and accept him as a representative of local interests.⁷⁴ Also, Kuchma's terse bluntness and apparent pragmatism appealed to many who were disillusioned with President Kravchuk's rather florid and long-winded rhetoric.

President Kuchma made economic reform his top priority and moved quickly to address other issues frequently mentioned by survey respondents in Ukraine, such as the problem of pervasive corruption, although it is too early to discuss successes.⁷⁵ President Kuchma also repeatedly called for closer economic ties with CIS countries, although at the same time he has frequently stressed and convincingly demonstrated that he will stubbornly defend Ukraine's interests and sovereignty.

President Kuchma is above all a pragmatist, and he appears to have adopted a technocratic approach to governing which suits his personal style and background, and which has been favored by other politicians/technocrats who launched successful economic reform programs in various political settings.⁷⁶ Many of his advisers are quite young and, with the exception of Dmytro Tabachnyk, the head of the presidential administration, none has attracted a great deal of controversy.⁷⁷ Last but not least President Kuchma has maintained a consistently high popularity rating, considerably higher than that of any other senior political figure, in all opinion polls conducted since he took office. In a poll conducted in December 1994, 46 percent of all respondents positively assessed President Kuchma's influence on the economy, while 22 percent backed the cabinet and 17 percent supported the parliament in this sphere.⁷⁸

The Ukrainian public's general political passivity and preference for lawful, democratic forms of protest⁷⁹ have already given President Kuchma and his reform team breathing space to initiate significant reforms in the economy and several other priority sectors. In the process President Kuchma has gained the respect of many Western leaders and a considerable amount of financial aid and credits. In addition, he has managed, albeit with some difficulty, to get the Ukrainian parliament's support for many of his most important projects, but even if this support continues President Kuchma's "honeymoon" will soon be over, and within a few months the general public will expect to see some concrete results from this reform program.

President Kuchma must therefore now focus his attention on ensuring the success of the local implementation of economic reforms. In initiating the economic reform process, President Kuchma was able to draw not only on the expertise of Western economists and other specialists, but also on the growing number of their local equivalents in Kiev who had studied, worked, or traveled abroad, even if only for brief periods, within the last few years. Now, however, implementing the reform process will probably run into considerable resistance, and possibly sabotage, from local political conservatives and hidebound mid-level bureaucrats with little experience in implementing reforms and little interest in seeing them succeed.

Further success of economic reforms in Ukraine will depend on the extent to which the center's authority, and the momentum of the reform process, can be extended to the regions. It will also be necessary to duplicate, in the regions, the process of consensus-building that so far has met with considerable success, albeit within rather limited circles, in Kiev. It is likely that President Kuchma will buy extra time for the introduction of economic reforms in the regions by continuing to press a vigorous anticorruption campaign, and cleaning up some of the more blatant abuses of authority that have led to widespread public disillusionment.

One can posit an alternative, more authoritarian path of development in place of the legitimate "strong hand" approach favoured by President Kuchma. However, Ukraine is an unlikely candidate for the imposition of efficient and effective dictatorial rule. This is not because of the strength of democratic traditions and institutions in Ukraine, but because Ukrainian society is very diverse, and the Ukrainian public has become accustomed to the political freedoms now widespread in Ukraine, even if it rarely takes full advantage of them. Unless massive coercion is employed, any attempt to set up a Ukrainian nationalist dictatorship, a Soviet-Communist dictatorship, or a dictatorship serving Russian imperial interests would meet substantial resistance and have limited staying power. Currently there are no domestic forces in Ukraine sufficiently strong and in possession of the necessary will and determination to introduce effective dictatorial rule throughout the entire country.

It is easier to envisage a "soft" form of dictatorship based on what is commonly called the "party of power." This term is used to

describe the dominant post-communist oligarchy, largely composed of former Communist Party functionaries, which has used the emergence of an independent Ukraine to promote its personal careers and frequently lining its pockets in the process. However, this amorphous group lacks a program apart from self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment by means of the maintenance and manipulation of the status quo, and it is incapable of introducing reforms that would begin to reverse Ukraine's rapid economic decline. Given the lack of will and cohesion of this "power of power" and Ukraine's increasing impoverishment, it is unlikely that this category of individuals could install and maintain an effective dictatorship even if it truly desired to do so.⁸⁰

However, the weakness of domestic forces favoring a dictatorial regime does not in any way ensure that Ukraine can engage in an easy transition to some relatively stable form of liberal democracy and a market-type system. President Kuchma has done an excellent job of preparing the setting for further reforms, but even if they unfold according to plan (which is unlikely) they will be accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment, the continued demoralization of a large part of the population, and other problems.

One can envisage a number of scenarios whereby growing political apathy among the population at large, combined with a continuing economic decline, could lead to significant social unrest and a succession of weak governments in Ukraine. Ukraine's neighbors would naturally be tempted to take advantage of such weakness; in particular, in such a situation Russia would, over time, find it relatively easy to establish hegemony over Ukraine.

6. RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

It is important to avoid extremes when discussing the delicate issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and their impact on the stability of Ukraine. One extreme is to explain away many, if not most, of Ukraine's domestic difficulties by blaming the infamous hidden (or not so hidden) hand of Moscow. This tactic was regularly used by many of Ukraine's politicians during the first 2 years of Ukraine's independence, sometimes with the aim of diverting attention from reluctance to deal with or incompetence in addressing the many domestic problems.

The other extreme is to minimize Russia's influence on developments in Ukraine and to take at face value official Russian government statements concerning full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty. According to this complacent point of view, the occasional expression of dissatisfaction by certain Russian parliamentarians or private individuals concerning, say, Kiev's policies regarding Crimea is of little or no consequence as long as there is no change in Russia's official policy of respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, and no direct actions to undermine this sovereignty.

It is not easy to determine the reality between these two extremes. Russia's leadership and its policies concerning Ukraine are clearly not responsible for the majority of the problems now facing this country. Where direct Russian interference in domestic Ukrainian affairs can be identified, it has not involved dramatic forms of intervention with clearly identifiable consequences. Rather, it usually consists of attempts to take advantage of Ukraine's internal problems to promote Russia's domestic or international interests. The many displays of incompetence by Ukraine's leaders following the euphoria of independence certainly provided Russia's politicians and officials with many such opportunities.

On the other hand, most outside commentators now acknowledge that the majority of Russia's politicians are convinced that Ukraine's independence in its present form will not last for long. There is a widespread conviction in Russia that, at a minimum, hegemony will readily be established over Ukraine, and a recent analysis of the positions taken by various Russian politicians concerning Russian-Ukrainian relations concludes that for a majority of the political forces in Russia,

The current separation with Ukraine, rightly or wrongly, is more and more being treated as very much analogous to the German division after the Second World War. The implications behind this analogy are very clear. First, there is a belief and conviction that re-unification between the two states is ultimately *inevitable*; and secondly, there is a clear preparedness in much of the Russian political class to wait for as long as it takes to achieve re-unification. In other words, therefore, the issue will not go away from the Russian political agenda for the foreseeable future.⁸¹

Such attitudes are considered, at best, to be arrogant and patronizing by the large number of Ukrainians committed to their country's independence. The most provocative comments concerning Ukraine are usually voiced by individual politicians or by the legislative branch of the Russian government, rather than by President Yeltsin or other members of the executive branch of government. However, the regular disparaging or openly hostile comments concerning Ukraine emanating from the Russian parliament and representatives of political parties in Moscow have a significant impact on the political scene in Ukraine. They receive considerable coverage in the Ukrainian media, help mobilize the nationalist and national-democratic forces already suspicious of Moscow's intentions, and help prevent the emergence of a consensus in Ukraine on the nature of future relations with Russia. They also add another psychological burden to the many other burdens carried by Ukrainian citizens.

The two issues having the greatest symbolic and political impact on Ukrainian-Russian relations are very tightly linked. They are the fate of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and its infrastructure, as well as the fate of the Crimean peninsula as a whole. Given the limited capabilities of the BSF it seemed logical to assume that, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, representatives of Ukraine and Russia would quickly devise a pragmatic formula that

would allow for a division of the BSF and resolve the fate of its infrastructure—but these issues quickly became enveloped in highly emotional rhetoric.

In Russia, attitudes concerning the BSF have been greatly influenced by attempts to foster the myth of a great and noble Russian/Soviet naval tradition, although the Russian/Soviet navy, and the Black Sea Fleet in particular, did not play a particularly glorious role in Russian/Soviet military history.⁸² However, the heated rhetoric in Russia concerning the fate of the BSF is only partially linked to its past or current military-strategic importance. Its roots can more easily be traced to the continuing popularity of an imperial myth portraying the conquest of Crimea in the 18th century as striking a fatal blow to Ottoman influence in the south of Russia, subsequently allowing Russia to play a major role in the Black Sea and beyond. Many Russians, including representatives of Russia's democratic camp, strongly feel that Crimea is an integral part of their country's patrimony, that Crimea's current status as part of Ukraine is unnatural, and that sooner or later Crimea (possibly together with much if not all of the rest of Ukraine) will "return" to Russia. In particular, many Russian politicians have clearly linked the fate of the BSF to that of Crimea as a whole.⁸³

Coinciding with widespread nostalgia for Crimea among the general public is a growing trend in official circles, reflected in the evolution of Russia's military and foreign policies following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, to regard this country's neighbors within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as falling into an unquestioned sphere of direct Russian interests in which one will see an ever-increasing tendency towards economic, military, and political integration. As part of this trend, Russia's leaders have demonstrated a strong commitment, widely held among Russia's political parties, to maintain military bases in CIS member states and promote the military integration of the latter.⁸⁴

Establishing control over the Black Sea Fleet and its infrastructure provides Russia with the most logical avenue for maintaining such bases in Ukraine. The BSF may be incapable of playing any significant role outside of the Black Sea basin, but military bases in Crimea would provide Russia with an important and strategically convenient means of influencing developments throughout the entire Black Sea region. In particular, if there was an escalation of tensions with Ukraine, Russia could use these bases to

quickly establish control of Crimea quickly, project force along Ukraine's entire Black Sea frontier, and then control Ukraine's maritime trade.

Such control would be of particular importance if a major oil terminal is built in the Odessa region, which would greatly reduce Ukraine's dependency on fossil fuels from Russia and Central Asia. Russia's leaders have shown a keen awareness of the importance of such fuel supplies for the western states of the CIS.⁸⁵ They appear intent on maintaining this dependency, and this strengthens the elite consensus in Russia on the need for a strong naval presence in Crimea.

This presence is also important to Russia because of the impressive military infrastructure in Crimea. The monetary value and strategic importance of this infrastructure far outweigh that of the actual ships and aircraft of the BSF, since it includes a variety of facilities for testing new equipment, as well as naval tactics and operations, and training naval personnel. In addition, a large percentage of the Soviet Union's military shipbuilding capacity was located in Crimea.⁸⁶

In historical terms, Crimea does not have the same symbolic importance for Ukraine that it has for Russia, and as a new and economically weak state Ukraine clearly cannot afford to support the BSF in anything like its present form. However, the rhetoric on Crimea emanating from Kiev is not motivated solely by concerns about the potential security implications of a major Russian base strategically located on the Crimean peninsula. In Kiev, developments in Crimea and the Russian military's presence there are perceived as a crucial symbol of threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Western journalists and analysts sometimes imply that because Crimea was supposedly arbitrarily transferred from the Russian to the Ukrainian republics of the USSR in 1954, one could easily envisage a similar transfer of Crimea from Ukrainian to Russian jurisdiction in the future. This argument ignores the fact that, although political considerations probably played a role in this transfer, it was not an arbitrary move, and it took place in a very specific context. It was abundantly clear in 1954 that because of its proximity and direct territorial links with Crimea, Ukraine was by far the most convenient supplier of basic inputs into the Crimean economy, for Ukraine provided (and continues to provide) Crimea

with almost all of its water, electricity, industrial raw materials, etc.⁸⁷ It appears to have been a simple and logical administrative measure, in the context of the highly centralized USSR of the time, to arrange for Crimea's transfer to Ukraine's jurisdiction.

However, present circumstances are very different, because Ukraine, as a newly independent state, is still establishing its identity and international profile and is bound to react strongly to any challenges, real or perceived, to its territorial integrity. Thus Russia's strong commitment to maintaining a major naval base in a strategically significant region populated largely by Russians could not fail to provoke concern in Kiev. A disturbing example of the disruptive influence of Russia's military presence in a fellow Soviet successor state could, after all, be found directly on Ukraine's western border. In Moldova's Transdnistria region (the so-called "Dniestr Republic"), there is a prime example of what one observer has labelled a Russian "protection racket":

Encouraging separatist movements under the guise of defending embattled Russian minorities, and then intervening as peacemaker when the conflicts between the separatists and the successor regimes get out of hand.⁸⁸

An agreement that forces the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Transdnistria region in 1997 was signed by Moldovan and Russian negotiators in October 1994. However, Russia's 14th Army in Transdnistria has developed such a close relationship with the territory on which it is stationed that a full and unambiguous withdrawal is unlikely:

Most of the officers [of the 14th Army] reportedly identify the Dniestr Republic as their home, and local residents are being recruited into the enlisted ranks. The result is a unit that has its own set of strong interests tied to the existence of the Dniestr Republic. . . . Even if the 14th Army is eventually "withdrawn" from the region, it is likely to be replaced by a Russian "militia" that would deploy much the same weapons and many of the same officers and enlisted men.⁸⁹

In addition, the commander of the 14th Army, General Lebed, has evolved into a "rogue" officer who has entered into numerous open conflicts with his superiors in Moscow and is highly popular among

Russia's military personnel. Lebed has refused to accept military posts outside the Transdnister region, and it is widely believed that he will soon leave the military to play a significant role on Russia's political stage.⁹⁰

Similar uncertainty surrounds the eventual fate of the Black Sea Fleet and its infrastructure. Although the draft of a comprehensive agreement on Russian-Ukrainian friendship and cooperation was initialed in Kiev in February 1995, it did not resolve the BSF dispute, and this as well as other contentious issues continue to prevent the signing of a final version of the agreement. It is clear, however, that the negotiators for Russia are driving a hard bargain with their Ukrainian counterparts and are continuing to insist that Russia maintain a strong, long-term presence in Crimea.⁹¹

Of particular concern to the Ukrainian authorities is that in the past, a number of BSF personnel were allowed to stand as candidates for office to both the Crimean Supreme Soviet and the Sevastopol city council, where they formed a powerful military lobby. An increasingly symbiotic relationship developed between the BSF, which has for all intents and purposes been transformed into a Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the local administration in Crimea. For example, the Russia-Unity fraction in the Crimean parliament, which includes a number of former BSF officers, is led by a former deputy commander of the BSF, Vice-Admiral O. Frolov. The interests of a Russian BSF are also strongly defended by the great majority of the many former Soviet/Russian military officers who have retired in Crimea.⁹²

This growing symbiosis was reflected in a speech delivered by Admiral Eduard Baltin, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, when he appeared before the State Duma of the Russian Federation in November 1994 to describe the situation in the BSF and Crimea. In his presentation he stressed, "The infrastructure of Sevastopol' and the fleet have grown together so tightly that it is now impossible to separate them."⁹³ However Admiral Baltin, who is supposed to represent the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, was clearly interested in more than just the military equipment and shore facilities of the BSF. He was openly speaking on behalf of Russia and pro-Russian forces in Crimea when he stated, "From a political point of view Sevastopol', with its clearly defined Russian mentality, provides Russia with its last opportunity to strengthen its positions in Crimea."⁹⁴ Thus a network of mutually supportive

relationships has arisen among the pro-Russian majority of officers in the BSF, the municipal Sevastopol' and Crimean authorities, and certain political circles in Moscow.

In comparison, until recently the steps taken by Ukraine's leaders to influence developments in the BSF, deal with autonomist and separatist trends in Crimea, and counteract Moscow's initiatives generally appeared to be inconsistent, indecisive, and ineffective. Former President Leonid Kravchuk's Crimea policy was, in effect, a nonpolicy, because it relied on maintaining the status quo on the peninsula, and he preferred that difficult Ukrainian-Russian negotiations over issues such as the division of the Black Sea Fleet conclude with ambiguous statements that could be interpreted variously by both sides.

Kiev's passivity in this and other policy sectors fostered the emergence of a scenario in accordance with which Russia would gradually extend its control over Ukraine as a result of the latter's eventual inability to resolve its own domestic problems. Such control would not necessarily threaten Ukraine's formal sovereignty, as many of Russia's current or potential leaders would probably prefer to maintain Ukraine as a pliant vassal state rather than incorporate it into a reborn Russian empire.

Many of President Kuchma's nationalist critics were greatly perturbed when he seemed to initially confirm their suspicions that he was out to appease Russia and "sell out" Ukraine. In line with his pre-election commitments, his administration quickly took a number of steps that should have reduced tensions between the two countries. For example, the renewal of economic ties between Ukraine and Russia was strongly encouraged, and although Ukraine had developed a strong commitment to NATO's Partnership for Peace program from its very inception, President Kuchma stressed that Ukraine would remain a neutral state outside of all military blocs.

President Kuchma's administration has also clearly indicated that it plans to continue the inclusive policy of building a *political* rather than *ethnic* nation on the territory of Ukraine, and less emphasis has been placed on introducing the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life. As a result it has become more difficult for Russia's authorities to argue for some form of intervention on behalf of ethnic Russians in Ukraine on the grounds that they are suffering discrimination.

However, it soon became clear that these policies were not intended to mollify Moscow, but to adjust Ukraine's policy priorities and give them a more pragmatic orientation. This became apparent when the Kuchma administration shifted its attention from economic reform to the situation in Crimea, and took a number of decisive steps in March-April 1995 to subordinate Crimea to Kiev's authority and move ahead with negotiations concerning the division of the Black Sea Fleet.

In the process a number of the differences between Russia and Ukraine have taken on a more distinct profile. For example, until recently Russia's President Yeltsin could blame the Russian parliament's provocative but rhetorical statements concerning Crimea's future (and especially the status of Sevastopol) for much of the bad feeling between Kiev and Moscow. However, now that intergovernmental negotiations concerning the fate of the Black Sea Fleet have focussed on the concrete details of the basing rights of the Russian share of the Fleet, it has become clear that Russia's official negotiators are demanding a degree of control over the entire city of Sevastopol, as the main base of the Fleet—clearly unacceptable to the Ukrainian side.⁹⁵

The question of the basing of the Black Sea Fleet will continue to pose problems to Ukraine because of the Fleet's symbiotic link with the local Crimean administration, and the emotional fervor now surrounding this issue. However, with respect to the question of Ukraine's general control over Crimea, as well as other contentious issues in Russian-Ukrainian relations, the Ukrainian side is in a much more advantageous situation now than in 1992-93.

The local pro-Russian authorities in Crimea have largely been discredited, the Crimean public is in an apathetic frame of mind, and a major split has recently occurred in the Crimean parliament, with a sizable number of deputies (according to one report, 42 out of a total of 98) calling on Kiev to dissolve the assembly.⁹⁶ In addition, it appears that the decisiveness and dynamism demonstrated by President Kuchma in promoting economic reforms is now being applied to the fields of regional and foreign policy. This comes at a time when Moscow is preoccupied with issues such as winding up its campaign in Chechnya, which has drawn widespread condemnation in the world community.

As a result, Ukraine's peaceful moves to re-establish its control over Crimea have drawn a generally favorable response from the

international community (e.g., the Europarliament⁹⁷), and the situation on the peninsula is now being monitored by representatives of organizations such as the OSCE, which will help deter outside intervention in the affairs of the peninsula. In fact, Western interest in Ukraine and support of its current policies have grown considerably, and some Russian newspapers have claimed that the West is now more supportive of Ukraine than Russia.⁹⁸

However, Western support for Ukraine is no substitute for friendly, mutually beneficial relations between Russia and Ukraine, if only because of the long and "transparent" border between the two countries. Ukraine cannot isolate itself from Russia, and President Kuchma seems sincere in his intention to pursue better relations with Moscow. Nonetheless, he is insistent that Ukraine be treated as a fully independent state by Moscow. Even if liberal democratic trends prevail in Russia, however, it will take a considerable period of time before most Russians become fully accustomed to the idea of an independent Ukraine, and thus a fairly lengthy period of tensions between the two states is inevitable.

Over time, frictions between the two countries will become increasingly centered on their economic relations, and this will be the area of greatest challenge for Ukraine. If it does not continue moving rapidly to reform its economy, Ukraine could well end up as an agricultural periphery to a more dynamic Russia. In the short to medium term, Russia has a significant lever of influence on Ukraine (short of the use of force, which does not seem likely)—possible restrictions on the supply of fossil fuels to Ukraine—which will lose its significance only when Ukraine cuts down on its consumption of such fuels and ensures that it has access to alternative sources of energy.

7. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Dealing with the legacy of the Soviet Armed Forces and the KGB has posed enormous domestic challenges for some of the states of the Former Soviet Union, especially Russia and Ukraine. For example, after World War II Ukraine played a major role in the Soviet Union's military contingency plans and was divided into three strategically significant military districts. As a result, a very large proportion of the Soviet Union's military personnel, equipment, educational establishments, etc., was located in Ukraine, and there were close to 800,000 individuals in military uniform in Ukraine when it declared independence.

In addition, Ukraine was second only to Russia in terms of the concentration of military-related industries in the Soviet Union. According to several estimates, in the 1980s approximately 20 percent of Soviet defense production came from Ukraine, and a high proportion of Ukraine's industrial work force was employed within the military-industrial complex.⁹⁹

After independence, Ukraine, like Russia, was faced with the daunting task of drastically reducing the number of military servicemen on its territory and converting much of its military production to civilian use. Just keeping track of all the military equipment in Ukraine has been difficult, and inevitably some of this equipment has fallen into the hands of various criminals—the infamous post-Soviet "mafia."

General discussions of military developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States usually focus on the Russian Armed Forces. To a certain extent this is natural, as on several occasions the Russian military has played a dramatic and sometimes bloody role in the domestic affairs of the Russian Federation. This includes the shelling of the Russian parliament in October 1993 and, most recently, the massive use of military force in Chechnya.

Military developments in Ukraine have attracted much less attention. The exceptions are the now increasingly irrelevant controversy over the fate of the nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory, and the continuing dispute over the division of the Black Sea Fleet. However, the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was in itself a very significant and dramatic act. In addition, the military and other organs of coercion such as Ukraine's National Guard (internal security forces) can, depending on the circumstances, play an important role in stabilizing or destabilizing the situation in Ukraine.

Ukraine's declaration of state sovereignty in July 1990 clearly stated that the republic had the right to establish its own armed forces;¹⁰⁰ however, in the first 12 months following this declaration little was done to implement the declaration's clauses concerning the military. The first concrete steps to establish the foundations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) were taken following the abortive coup attempt of August 1991—on 24 August 1991 the parliamentary opposition stressed Ukraine's helplessness when it was faced, during the coup, with the possible use of military force. On the same day the parliament resolved to create a Ukrainian defense ministry and place all military formations deployed on Ukraine's territory under its jurisdiction.¹⁰¹

In fall 1991 the Ukrainian parliament approved a package of draft laws on national defense, and by the end of December 1991 the legal basis for the UAF had been fully established. By the time the Soviet Union formally ceased to exist, in December 1991, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came into being, Ukraine had already created the framework for its own military and was the very first state within the CIS to do so. An independent Russian army did not emerge until May 1992, after it became clear that Ukraine would refuse to engage in collective security arrangements.

This strong focus on quickly developing a Ukrainian military and a distinctive Ukrainian defense policy was part of the overall process of state-building in Ukraine. Given Ukraine's limited (and incomplete) experience of independent statehood in modern times, it was natural that a great deal of attention be devoted to the process of acquiring quickly the most visible and significant attributes of statehood. Because the defense of a state's territory through the establishment and maintenance of an independent military

capability remains an important component of sovereignty in the international state system, this became a top priority in Ukraine.

It is easy to criticize this early emphasis on institutions, such as the military, that were to guarantee Ukraine's security and respond to challenges by the use of force. It is clear, for example, that far too little consideration was given to the economic and social aspects of security. However, the problem was not so much an *overemphasis* on the development of Ukraine's military, but more an *underemphasis* on the need for socioeconomic reform. In fact, it was inevitable that military issues would assume a very high profile in an independent Ukraine in late 1991, and the reason is simple. After the abortive August 1991 coup attempt, close to 800,000 confused and disoriented servicemen, with access to a large volume of military equipment, were physically located on Ukraine's territory. Many if not most of these personnel had little or no meaningful attachment to the territory on which they accidentally happened to find themselves after Ukraine declared independence, and thus had they not been rapidly subordinated through clear lines of authority to the Ukrainian government, they could have posed a significant threat to Ukraine's sovereignty or, at a minimum, could have caused considerable disruption in Ukraine.

It is surprising that the initial stages in the formation of the UAF were so remarkably peaceful. This was partly because the strength of the drive for Ukraine's independence and its leadership's determination to establish the UAF kept Moscow politicians as well as the old Soviet military command off balance throughout the fall of 1991 and the first few months of 1992. Thus they were unable to respond quickly and effectively to developments in Ukraine.

Between August 1991 and prior to the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991, the central military and political elites of the Soviet Union strongly condemned all discussions on dividing the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF). It was proposed that the governments of the republics be given a greater role in the formulation and implementation of defense policy and that the SAF be restructured. However, the establishment of independent national armies was firmly opposed,¹⁰² and in fact, SAF representatives continued to emphasize the need for a highly unified defense structure for several months following the establishment of the CIS, arguing that only such a structure could ensure the security of member states.¹⁰³

However, the peaceful initial phase of the military transition in Ukraine cannot be attributed solely to confusion in Moscow. It was also the result of the quiet but persistent work of a small, energetic group of officers and civilians headed by Col. Gen. Kostiantyn Morozov, Ukraine's first Minister of Defense. Although this team was provided with limited resources and facilities, it tackled its goals in a serious and energetic fashion, and the results, at least initially, were generally positive.¹⁰⁴

The peaceful initial period of military transition was also because of the absence of concerted domestic opposition to the creation of the UAF. The various conservative forces in Ukraine opposed to the disintegration of the USSR and the demise of the SAF were greatly disoriented by developments following the August 1991 coup attempt and were unable to put up any coherent opposition to these processes. In addition, all nationalist and national-democratic forces in Ukraine were united in supporting the rapid creation of the UAF, and gave this goal their whole-hearted support in spite of numerous disagreements on other issues.

In its work, Morozov's team was also greatly aided by the Union of Officers of Ukraine (UOU). This organization was created in July 1991 on the basis of various groups and committees that had begun to advocate the creation of a Ukrainian Armed Forces as early as 1989 and gradually coalesced under the umbrella of the national-democratic "Rukh" organization. Following the failed coup attempt of August 1991 the UOU benefitted from the euphoria accompanying the drive for independence and gained considerable prestige and stature. A number of its activists quickly rose to senior positions in the UAF, playing a significant role in providing a cohesive "core" of officers committed to the formation and consolidation of the UAF, and promoting patriotism within its ranks.¹⁰⁵ UOU activities were generally supported by Defence Minister Morozov, who even advocated involving the UOU in identifying and removing corrupt officers.¹⁰⁶

This official support for what was in effect a military pressure group is far from what would normally be considered a desirable pattern of civil-military relations. However, the situation in the newly independent Ukraine was hardly normal, and the UOU provided crucial assistance to Defence Minister Morozov in implementing government policies during a critical phase in the development of UAF. In fact, during Morozov's term in office, the

UOU was partly coopted by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and probably served as a conduit for the expression of certain views, held by some senior personnel in this ministry, that could not otherwise be openly enunciated.

However, reality soon set in, and Ukraine's growing socioeconomic problems inevitably had a major impact on the military. For example, the Ukrainian authorities greatly underestimated the cost of maintaining a large and powerful military, and a significant proportion of the state budget was consumed by military-related expenditures.¹⁰⁷ Ukraine continued to carry a very heavy military burden at a time when its economy was declining dramatically.

In spite of these growing resource constraints, the process of establishing the budget for the UAF was chaotic, and there is no evidence that Ukraine's leaders attempted to conduct even a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of military-related expenditures. In fact, on several occasions Ukraine's second Minister of Defence, Col. Gen. Radetsky, complained that the UAF had existed for over 2 years without a budget.¹⁰⁸

The slow pace of economic reform in Ukraine also had a negative impact on the conversion process within Ukraine's large military-industrial complex, which has also been administered in a rather chaotic fashion. According to one source, conversion was not carried out "in accordance with a systematic program, but as a result of a spontaneous reduction in the production of military technology and weapons." Additional complications included a drastic reduction in orders for military goods from Russia, the low wages of workers in the machine building and military-industrial complexes, and very limited Western investment in Ukraine's fully state-controlled defense industries.¹⁰⁹

The possibility of Western investment in Ukraine's defense industries and its conversion programs has increased now that nuclear disarmament measures are proceeding, and Ukraine has pledged to abide by recognized treaties to limit ballistic and nuclear missile proliferation.¹¹⁰ However, until recently such investment was hampered by the slow pace of economic reform in Ukraine.

As Ukraine's economy declined, the standard of living of its military personnel deteriorated, leading to growing dissatisfaction in the ranks of the UAF. A rapid decline in the prestige of military service and a considerable increase in the number of cases of draft

evasion and desertion followed in 1992-93.¹¹¹ These problems were particularly severe in western Ukraine and the Kiev area, in spite of the high levels of national consciousness in these regions.¹¹²

Complaints increased concerning the lack of appropriate housing for officers and their families, low salaries for officers, and a deterioration in the level and quality of social services for military professionals.¹¹³ Deteriorating living conditions encouraged corruption within the UAF, which paralleled the growth of corruption in society at large and became so widespread that it contributed significantly to the diminishing prestige of service in the armed forces. As a result, many young and enterprising officers left the UAF in 1992-93.¹¹⁴

In addition, many of the flaws inherent in the rapid pace of the restructuring of the UAF became increasingly apparent in 1993. For example, a major controversy emerged when a decision was made in 1992 to reduce the large number of specialized military educational institutions in Ukraine and to rationalize their operations.¹¹⁵ Other controversies surrounded the decision to liquidate the Kiev military district (subordinating its military personnel to the Odessa military district) and create a unified Aerial Defense Troops structure by amalgamating the Air Force and Air Defense Troops in Ukraine.¹¹⁶

The self-interest of those negatively affected by these changes was behind much of the opposition to these and other reform measures. However, the reform process was also hampered by a lack of resources to carry out expensive reforms and by the small number of nongovernmental research institutions ("think tanks") in Ukraine that could provide informed and critical commentary on military and military-related issues.¹¹⁷

Certain political problems also emerged. In the fall of 1992 criticism of Defense Minister Morozov in the Ukrainian parliament became increasingly vociferous. The criticism that Gen. Morozov had done little to reduce corruption in the UAF was contrived, for he had, in fact, mounted a vigorous campaign to combat such corruption, albeit with relatively little success due to circumstances largely beyond his control. However, there were also accusations that the UAF were becoming highly politicized. In particular, Col. Gen. Morozov was strongly criticized for encouraging and supporting the activity of the UOU.¹¹⁸

Some of this criticism was justified, since Defense Minister Morozov had clearly cooperated with the UOU from the very beginning of his term of office. However, this cooperation can largely be explained by the enormity of the task of creating a cohesive Ukrainian military on the basis of officers who were largely of non-Ukrainian ethnic background, and in many cases had little or no genuine commitment to defending Ukraine's territory. Although some of the officers who were least interested in serving in the UAF soon left its ranks, legitimate doubts remained concerning the loyalty of many who continued to serve in the Ukrainian military.

The UOU was therefore seen as assisting Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MOD) in "Ukrainizing" the UAF—that is, promoting measures such as the greater use of the Ukrainian language and the introduction of Ukrainian military traditions in the UAF. In addition, members of the UOU were to help expose the theft and sale of military hardware and other forms of corruption and abuse in the UAF. Still, although the UOU made an important contribution to the construction of the UAF, its activity introduced a glaring anomaly into the development of civil-military relations in Ukraine. Officials within the Ukrainian MOD attempted to unofficially supervise and steer the activities of the UOU, but such supervision was not always possible or effective.¹¹⁹ Thus it was inevitable that as Ukraine's MOD became more firmly established, the ambiguous role of the UOU as an officially approved military pressure group was increasingly seen in some circles as a liability.

Additional controversy was provoked by the work of the Social-Psychological Service (SPS) of the UAF, the successor in certain respects of the Main Political Administration, which had coordinated all political socialization activities in the old SAF. The first head of the SPS, Volodymyr Muliava, was, for example, accused of dictatorial tendencies and artificially speeding up the "Ukrainization" of the Ukrainian military. However, Muliava and his supporters never denied that the work of the SPS was highly political. They simply argued that such politicization was fully justified, since its aim was to offset the impact of many years of pro-Soviet propaganda in the SAF. The political socialization effort in the SAF had been highly critical of even the most innocent expressions of so-called Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism" and of all military traditions which could be linked to the drive for

Ukraine's independence. Thus the work of the SPS was seen as helping to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by raising the patriotic consciousness of conscripts and officers.

These aims were not unreasonable, and much of the criticism directed at Muliava came from officers who were resistant to *any* changes in military practices. However, Muliava alienated a number of officers who felt that he was promoting a rather parochial form of patriotism in the UAF. In addition, he appeared to be intolerant of criticism and attacked many of his critics in an intemperate fashion. Further, the work of the SPS was often conducted, at the local level, by the same political instructors who had been responsible for the Marxist-Leninist indoctrination effort in the old SAF. Some of these instructors had difficulty "restructuring" their work, and its quality left a great deal to be desired.¹²⁰

Another development that has hampered the normal development of civil-military relations in Ukraine is the activity of paramilitary groups. Such groups have remained largely on the margins of Ukrainian politics, and their significance has often been exaggerated.¹²¹ However, there is one significant paramilitary group in Ukraine called UNSO—the Ukrainian People's Self Defense Forces. This organization is the military wing of the right-wing or Ukrainian National Assembly, and it has been very flexible in its tactics. Thus although the Ukrainian parliament has prohibited the formation of all unofficial paramilitary detachments, and some UNSO members have been arrested, the Ukrainian government has failed to establish firm control over the UNSO and it continues to conduct its activities in a relatively open fashion.¹²²

The UNSO sees itself as complementing the work of the armed forces and militia, and it has supported elements in the UAF who are dissatisfied with their wages and living conditions.¹²³ It has also tried to gain support among representatives of the military-industrial complex, and has tried to establish certain links with the UOU.¹²⁴ Until the second half of 1993, the state authorities appeared to tolerate the UNSO, possibly because it provided a certain counterweight to the activity of Russian chauvinist organizations in Ukraine. However, recent attempts to restrict UNSO's activities have been complicated by the unsettled political situation in Ukraine, and may be further complicated by the recent election of three members of the UNA to the new Ukrainian parliament.¹²⁵

The initial phase in the development of the UAF ended in October 1993, when Defense Minister Morozov offered his resignation after facing increasing opposition in the Ukrainian parliament and openly disagreeing with the position taken by Ukraine's President Kravchuk during the Russian-Ukrainian Massandra summit in Crimea in September 1993.¹²⁶ He was replaced by Colonel General Vitalii Radetsky, formerly the commander of the Odessa Military District.

It appears that President Kravchuk perceived Radetsky as more flexible than Morozov, more capable of getting the approval of conservative parliamentarians for certain military reforms, and better suited to help rationalize the production of Ukraine's military-industrial complex. In fact, parliament approved Ukraine's military doctrine less than 2 weeks after Radetsky took office, and he devoted a great deal of attention to military "hardware" issues.¹²⁷ For example, several discussions between representatives of the ministries of defense of Ukraine and Russia on the joint planning and preparation of defense production took place in late 1993 and early 1994.¹²⁸

At the same time, Radetsky made it clear that the process of "Ukrainizing" the UAF would be slowed down and that he disapproved of military involvement in politics, thus discouraging the activities of the UOU in the UAF.¹²⁹ He also quickly moved to restructure the controversial SPS. Muliava was reassigned to other duties, and the SPS was renamed the Main Administration for Educational and Social-Psychological Work.¹³⁰ However, this organization, whose personnel have had to undergo another "re-orientation" in their work, has continued to lose credibility and has proven incapable of stemming the renewed growth of so-called "informal" practices such as hazing in the UAF,¹³¹ an activity that has pitted servicemen from one area of Ukraine against those from another along ethnic or linguistic lines.¹³²

In addition, in 1993-94 the military came under increasing budgetary pressure because of Ukraine's continuing economic decline, for even the highest priority sectors are greatly suffering because of the severity of the country's economic crisis. Surveys have shown that the great majority of officers in the UAF are unhappy with the conditions of their service, which has led to the growth of independent trade union activities in the UAF.¹³³

In addition to expressing grievances concerning low pay, inferior living conditions, and poor social security provisions, officers have frequently complained about a deterioration in the military's combat capabilities, since financial constraints have restricted opportunities for training and for the development and purchase of new weapons systems.¹³⁴ Another commonly expressed grievance is the continuation of widespread corrupt activities in the senior ranks of the top-heavy military.¹³⁵

In spite of the many problems faced by the Ukrainian military, it is still trusted by a large part of the population, and its "rating" in various opinion polls is quite high, although it has declined in the last year. In fact, according to one poll taken in 1994, the only other major social institution with a similarly high rating was the church.¹³⁶ However, this is less an indication of the military's widespread popularity and more a reflection of very low levels of public trust in most other public institutions, with the major exception of the presidency, especially under Kuchma.

In spite of the activities of the UOU, the Ukrainian military generally appears to be less politicized than the Russian military. One reason is that the Ukrainian military has not been used to help deal with domestic opposition to the current central political authorities. None of the major actors on the Ukrainian political scene owes major debts to, or has tried to curry special favor with, the military. In addition, the vigorous role which the Russian military has played in certain neighboring countries (e.g., Tadjikistan, Georgia, Moldova) has contributed a great deal to its growing politicization. In contrast, the UAF have not seen service abroad, with the exception of contingents of peacekeeping troops in the former Yugoslavia.

There are few indications that military officers in Ukraine are prepared to directly intervene in the political process. The main exceptions consist of some officers serving in the Black Sea Fleet, and certain officers who have engaged in protests to publicize their deteriorating living standards. The major threat to the stability of civil-military relations in Ukraine appears to be discontent among military servicemen stemming from their deteriorating socioeconomic status and uncertainty about the future. For example, funding shortages have restricted the number of military officers who can be retrained to enter civilian occupations, in spite of continuing plans to drastically reduce the size of the UAF.¹³⁷

However, a number of Western institutions have provided some funding for such programs, although one can hear numerous anecdotes in Kiev concerning the effectiveness of attempts to retrain military officers to work as managers and businessmen.

The Ukrainian press has continued to carry numerous reports of poorly heated barracks, of military personnel ashamed to appear in public because of their thread-bare uniforms, and so on.¹³⁸ If the state of the Ukrainian economy does not improve, and the socioeconomic concerns of military officers are not addressed in a satisfactory fashion, the relative calm that characterizes civil-military relations in Ukraine to date (at least outside of Crimea) could be seriously threatened.¹³⁹

The trends in civil-military relations in Ukraine after Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine's new president, took office in the summer of 1994 have generally been positive, since the pattern of civil-military relations in Ukraine is becoming more similar to the pattern taken for granted in most liberal democracies. Most significantly, there is a possibility now that the economy can be stabilized and that over time one will see an end to rapidly declining living standards, the major cause of dissatisfaction in the UAF. It is also important to note that Ukraine's third defense minister, Valerii Shmarov, is the first civilian to occupy this post. Shmarov's appointment was treated with some dismay by Ukraine's defense establishment, which is totally dominated by military professionals, but it did not encounter any significant resistance.

Ukraine is moving decisively to cut back further on the size of its bloated defense forces, and impose more discipline on the chaotic process of budgetary planning for the armed forces and the country as a whole. In addition, a concerted drive to deal with the debilitating and demoralizing effects of corrupt activities within the armed forces has paralleled a similar drive in society at large. If the momentum generated by these developments is maintained, and is accompanied by further reform measures, one can expect a gradual stabilization of civil-military relations in Ukraine in the next few years. Given the situation in which Ukraine found itself in late 1991, it is hardly surprising that the process of building the Ukrainian Armed Forces was complex and often contradictory. What is surprising is that it was not even more complex and contradictory.

8. SOME CONCLUSIONS

Many observers have noted the importance of stability in Ukraine, and of its peaceful relations with Russia, for regional and even international security. However, during the first 2 years following Ukraine's independence, many of these commentaries had a pro forma ring to them, as if their authors knew that something significant was occurring in Ukraine and felt compelled to speak out on this topic, but had little of substance to say.

As interest in Ukraine has grown, the quality of commentary on this country has improved. A growing realization of the importance of domestic developments in Ukraine exists. Less news about Ukraine is "filtered" through Moscow, and the tendency to dismiss Ukraine as a passive periphery region inevitably dominated by a core Russian state is decreasing. In fact, in recent months the pessimism that pervaded commentaries on Ukraine in early 1994 has been replaced, in some reports, by almost euphoric praise of the Kuchma administration and its reform program.

It must be recognized, however, that a profound degradation of Ukraine's socioeconomic infrastructure has taken place in recent years, and it will take a lengthy period of time to reverse its effects. In the meantime, public dissatisfaction with low standards of living and very poor social services is growing. This dissatisfaction has not been expressed in the form of mass disobedience and violence largely because of the absence of vigorous and respected leadership figures and organizations that could mobilize and channel public discontent. The public's patience is wearing thin, however, and one can easily imagine the emergence of demagogues who would try to take advantage of increasing popular discontent.

Certainly, throughout much of 1994 there was good reason to doubt that Ukraine would break out of a vicious cycle of growing public apathy and cynicism fed by widespread perceptions (largely correct) of a passive leadership with no clear socioeconomic and political strategy. Even in these circumstances it was unwarranted

to paint an unremittingly bleak picture of Ukraine's imminent collapse, as more likely scenarios included the installation of an authoritarian regime in Ukraine or its subordination by Russia.¹⁴⁰ However, the maintenance of minimal stability was probably the best that could have been expected given the circumstances that prevailed throughout most of 1994.

Even if favorable conditions for effective socioeconomic reforms are soon created, it will be at least several years before Ukraine can achieve a level of stability that would justify a high level of confidence in its future. However, under the Kravchuk administration it appeared unlikely that one would see the emergence of such conditions. In contrast, the Kuchma administration has shown great determination in tackling this task, setting in motion a reform process that is beginning to acquire considerable momentum. Thus the rhetoric of economic reform voiced by President Kuchma in fall 1994 was soon followed by concrete reform measures, and Ukraine's leadership took a number of important steps in spring 1995 to establish its control over the restive Crimean peninsula.

Following the Ukrainian parliament's vote of no confidence in the government's cabinet in April 1995, the final distribution of political power in Kiev remained undetermined, but most observers have concluded that President Kuchma's position has improved as a result, because it will probably allow him to streamline the cabinet and appoint more reform-minded ministers. Aware of the lack of public confidence in Ukraine's central legislature, in recent months its members have generally backed away from sharp confrontations with the executive branch of government, and in contests between the legislature and the executive, the latter has usually emerged triumphant.

Initial reports concerning the new acting prime minister (and former head of the Ukrainian security apparatus), Evhen Marchuk, indicate that he is a tough and able manager and negotiator, and his access to the resources of Ukraine's security apparatus clearly strengthens his hand in dealing with the current administration's domestic opponents. In addition, there has been little open dissent to date among President Kuchma's closest advisers, who remain quite united in pressing for further reform measures. To date President Kuchma and his advisers have shown great skill in advancing their agenda and taking advantage of the weaknesses of

their opponents, and these successes have been gained without a resort to blatantly authoritarian methods.

Ukraine's transition to a relatively stable form of liberal democracy would be greatly facilitated by support from a full-fledged civil society, clearly lacking in Ukraine. However, the presence of a well-developed civil society is not essential for such a transition, as long as it becomes established in the course of the transition. As one scholar noted,

It may be that in these cases charismatic leaders, wise institutional designs, and exogeneous factors can play a role—not in making up or substituting for the civil society which is not there, but in helping the process by which such a society comes about. This role would require elites to pay close attention not only to the design of political institutions but also, and mainly, to the design of social institutions such as markets, social pluralism, and the public sphere.¹⁴¹

President Kuchma is not charismatic, but his blunt and direct style continue to appeal to a large number of voters, and he has retained a high popularity rating. In addition, he has devoted considerable attention to creating the preconditions for the development of a civil society, and there is little evidence that he is prepared to engage in any significant subversion of the democratic process. As an example, President Kuchma has generally supported the independence of the mass media and strongly stressed the need for a more capable and professional legal system. A good chance exists that the reform process in Ukraine will also be accompanied by the rapid development of a civil society, so essential for the long-term sociopolitical stability of any country.

Conversely, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine will become the scene of mass violence followed by civil war. An unpredictable chain of events could possibly lead to large-scale civil conflict, but extremist forces in Ukraine still have only a narrow social base and lack political influence. Of the mainstream political forces in Ukraine, none currently possesses the will, social support, and organizational resources needed to launch and sustain a major challenge to the current administration's authority. Equally important, none of these forces has a coherent plan for leading Ukraine out of its present crisis situation.

The absence of widespread violence in Ukraine is probably also due to another, less tangible factor: the great emphasis most citizens of Ukraine place on maintaining social peace. The importance of peaceful conflict resolution has been conditioned by the great losses of life experienced by Ukraine during the many wars and other conflicts on its territory in the 20th century, as well as the devastation wrought by the brutal forced collectivization of agriculture in Ukraine in the early 1930s.

However, as memories of these traumatic events fade, their role in restraining the population from new acts of protest and violence has gradually decreased and will continue to diminish. In turn, as economic reforms proceed, their differential impact on various social groups and regions of Ukraine will grow, as will the potential for social conflict, increasing the need for new formulas and "visions" to unify Ukraine's populations and its various regions.

Leonid Kuchma, who, during the 1994 presidential campaign was demonized by nationalist and national-democratic forces as a Russophile ready to sell Ukraine down the river, has paradoxically emerged as one such unifying force. With his family roots and work history connected with central and eastern Ukraine, and his wife of ethnic Russian background, Leonid Kuchma, who spoke poor Ukrainian only a few years ago, was initially perceived in many quarters as an "Easterner" with little emotional commitment to the cause of Ukrainian independence. Certainly, many commentators argued that if he achieved the presidency this would greatly accentuate the east-west cleavage in Ukraine.

However, by winning the presidential elections as a result of strong voting support in eastern and southern Ukraine, President Kuchma has given these regions a strong stake in developments in the Ukrainian capital. As he repeatedly demonstrates his strong commitment to Ukraine's independence, his popularity also quickly grows in western Ukraine. In fact, President Kuchma has managed to cobble together an increasingly influential coalition of moderate national democrats from western and central Ukraine, and centrists and social democrats from eastern and southern Ukraine. They are marked by a technocratic/pragmatic approach to politics and generally reject the option of emphasizing ethnic (cultural/linguistic) identity to promote the political integration of Ukraine's population. Rather, they have maintained the strategy, consistently adhered to since Ukraine's independence, of promoting

a civic (political) identity based on the principle of citizenship rather than ethnic origin.

The nature of the civil/political identity that will evolve in Ukraine has yet to be clearly defined. It will emerge slowly, and during this period circumstances could conceivably arise (e.g., continued economic decline in Ukraine and vigorous economic growth in Russia, accompanied by clumsy regional policies emanating from the central government in Kiev) that would seriously disrupt or even threaten the nation-building process. However, cautious optimism regarding developments in Ukraine is fully warranted given the current positive trends noted above.

9. DEVELOPMENTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

Although it was slow to develop, there is now a growing consensus in the West that the maintenance of Ukraine's independence and Russia's full acceptance of Ukraine's independent status are of great importance for regional security and Russia's development as a democratic state. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Michael Mandelbaum supports this point of view:

So long as it [Ukraine] remains independent it is a buffer between Russia and the rest of Europe. More important, an independent Ukraine is the best guarantee that Russia will remain a peaceful nation-state. Conflict between the two would have adverse repercussions to the west. And if Moscow absorbed Ukraine or attempted to do so, Russia would again become a multinational empire harboring a large, resentful subject nation, with poor prospects for the construction of a stable democratic system.¹⁴²

There is also a consensus that Russia's present leadership is committed to strongly promoting the economic and military integration of the post-Soviet space, especially that encompassed by the Commonwealth of Independent States. There is considerable disagreement in Moscow over the means by which this integration should be pursued and the desired end result of the process.¹⁴³ It is, however, being driven by an increasingly assertive and nationalist agenda in Moscow, an agenda which aims at Russian hegemony within the CIS.

The challenge facing the NATO countries and Ukraine's East European neighbours is to support Ukraine's independence without giving undue encouragement to nationalist forces in Moscow. This is a difficult challenge, because Moscow greatly resents all foreign efforts to influence developments in what it considers to be its

immediate "back yard." In fact, according to one influential theme in Russian nationalist thought, Ukraine's independence has always been linked to foreign "intrigues" aimed at undermining the unity of the East Slavic lands and is therefore a bogus phenomenon.

If one accepts the above-mentioned consensus concerning Ukraine's central role in ensuring regional security, this adds an important perspective to the current debates on the possible expansion of NATO. Ukraine is rarely mentioned in these debates, and it is usually assigned to the end of the line of potential NATO members. However, it is Ukraine rather than the most favored candidates for NATO membership (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia) that is most vulnerable to potentially aggressive Russian behavior, the most important rationale for quickly broadening NATO.

A rapid expansion of NATO to include the Visegrad countries would partly satisfy their long-term security concerns, but it would leave Ukraine in a partial security vacuum, between NATO and a potentially aggressive Russia. One potential reaction in Ukraine, which defines itself as a neutral state, would be to engage in a military buildup and possibly abandon the policy of ridding the country of all nuclear weapons on its territory. This could most easily be achieved under an authoritarian regime that would probably abandon the current program of political and socioeconomic reforms being introduced in Ukraine.

A more likely result of NATO expansion would be increasingly vigorous and insistent attempts on the part of Russia to integrate Ukraine fully into the heavily Russian-dominated CIS collective security system. Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma and other senior Ukrainian officials have openly voiced their concerns regarding the latter scenario as well as their unhappiness with the image of Ukraine as a "buffer" zone. They have argued that a quick decision to move NATO's eastern borders to Ukraine's western borders would not help to ensure regional or European stability.¹⁴⁴

Given these constraints, in the present circumstances the most desirable option, for both Ukraine and the West, appears to be a slow expansion of NATO accompanied by its gradual transformation into, or replacement by, a new European collective security organization. A new body of this kind would carry little of the political baggage now associated with NATO. It would also be

easier for Russia to join this body eventually if it wished to do so, and play a constructive role.

Russia is still a weak state. Although its behavior in the so-called "near abroad" has often been cynical and manipulative, especially with respect to the independent states of the Caucasus region, this behavior has not, to date, directly threatened Western security. Although one can easily understand and sympathize with the security concerns of the Visegrad countries, which are seeking firm protection against the revival of Russian imperial behavior, at present there is no pressing need for NATO expansion.

The situation in Russia remains confused and unpredictable. Certainly, in view of Russia's increasingly aggressive foreign policy stance with respect to the CIS countries, there are good reasons to doubt its commitment to maintaining the current post-Cold War status quo. For some time to come the United States and other NATO countries must be prepared to mount a vigorous response, in the form of an anti-Russian coalition, to a possible resumption of an imperial Russian foreign policy. The transformation of NATO into a new European collective security organization must be gradual and must not impair its ability to mount such a response.

Given Ukraine's importance as a linchpin of regional security and the special difficulty Russia's political elites have faced in accepting Ukraine's independence, it is also important that the West not encourage Russia's attempts to promote political-military integration within the CIS, especially where Ukraine is concerned, by accepting NATO/CIS equivalency. On the contrary, Ukraine should be encouraged to maintain its neutral, nonbloc status and to participate in the widest possible range of regional and international confidence-building measures. This would provide Ukraine with much-needed expertise in dealing with international security arrangements and eventually allow it to play a role in helping to shape these arrangements.

NOTES

1. See for example, A. Birch, "Overload, Ungovernability, and Delegitimation," *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (April 1984): 135-160.

2. *The Washington Post*, 25 January 1994.

3. See the comments in Elizabeth Pond, "An End, Maybe, to Sleepwalking in Ukraine," *The Washington Quarterly* 18 (Winter 1995): 73-74.

4. On this topic see the discussion in Oleh S. Ilnytskyj, "Russian and Ukrainian Studies and the New World Order," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 34 (December 1992): 445-458.

5. See, for example, David Sanders, *Patterns of Political Instability* (London: Macmillan, 1981).

6. Juergen Corbet and Andreas Gummich, *The Soviet Union at the Crossroads: Facts and Figures on the Soviet Republics* (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank AG, Economics Department, 1990), 11.

7. "Panel on Patterns of Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union," *Post-Soviet Geography* 33 (June 1992): 390; and Georgii S. Golitsyn, "Ecological Problems in the CIS during the Transition Period." *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 2, 8 January 1993, 33-42.

8. On Ukraine's MIC, its drain on the Ukrainian economy, and the problems of conversion, see John Tedstrom, "Industrial Conversion in Ukraine: Policies and Prospects." *Report on the USSR*, no. 34, 23 August 1991, 12-16; and the chapters by Antonov and Bodruk in Henry S. Rowen et al., eds., *Defense Conversion, Economic Reform, and the Outlook for the Russian and Ukrainian Economies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

9. For example, according to *Nasha respublika*, 7 April 1995, 2, over 2,000 trolleybus repairmen from all regions of Ukraine were working in Moscow in early 1995, which contributed significantly to the deterioration of the public transportation system in Ukraine.

10. On this brain-drain, the demoralization of Ukraine's intellectual elite, and the poor state of Ukraine's educational system, see the articles by Astakhova and Horodianenko in the Kharkiv journal *Sovremennoe obshchestvo* no. 3, 1994.

11. The discussion in this and the next few paragraphs is based on the following sources: Oleh Havrylyshyn, "The Ukrainian Economy," *Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine* 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1994): 2-4; David Marples, "The Ukrainian Economy in the Autumn of 1994: Status Report," *Post-Soviet Geography* 35 (October 1994): 484-491; the special section "Unruly Child: A Survey of Ukraine," in *The Economist*, 7 May 1994; Valerii Popovkin, "Suchasna katastrofa ukrainiskoi ekonomiky (Vytoky i shliakhy podolannia)," *Suchasnist* no. 9 (1993): 94-106; and conversations in April 1995 with Mr. Michael Zienchuk, Economic Analyst/Advisor to

the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine as well as his unpublished paper entitled "Ukrainian Economic Policy: Now Getting it Right," written in February 1995.

12. A very high percentage of the individuals at the highest levels of government have been accused of various forms of corruption. See, for example, the analysis in *Moscow News* no. 10, 17-23 March 1995.

13. The information in this and the next few paragraphs is based on reports in the newspapers *Finansovaia Ukraina* and *Post-Postup*, and well as articles from the *Economist* and news items from the *OMRI Daily Digest*.

14. See, for example, the article by Mar'iana Chorna in *Post Postup* no. 36, 6-12 1994, 3. For a more analytical discussion of the roots of liberalism in the Donbas region see Iurii Iurov, "Liberal'nyi trykutnyk Donbasu." *Studii politolohichnoho tsentru Henezha* no. 1, 1993, 43-52.

15. For a good report on President Kuchma's first 100 days in office by Volodymyr Zolotar'ov see *Post Postup* no. 37, 20-27 October 1994, 3.

16. See, for example, the interview with Ukraine's ambassador to Germany in *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 6 April 1995.

17. V.S. Nebozhenko, *Sotsial'na napruzhenist' i konflikty v ukrains'komu suspil'stvi* (Kiev: Abrys, 1994), 17-18; 32-33.

18. *Ibid.*, 21-24.

19. *Ibid.*, 24-28.

20. *Ibid.*, 30-32.

21. *Ibid.*, 43-45.

22. *Ibid.*, 38-42.

23. Mikhail Beletsky, "Ukraine: Alignment of Forces on the Political Scene," *New Times*, January 1995, 45.

24. Anatolii Rusnachenko, "The Workers' and National-Democratic Movements in Contemporary Ukraine," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 18 (Summer-Winter 1993): 123-149; and *Most* no. 6, 13-19 February 1995.

25. *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 25 March 1995. See also the bleak picture painted by a document, entitled *Ukraine Human Development Report*, published by the United Nations. For a summary of the contents of the report see *Ukrainian Weekly*, 19 March 1995.

26. See, for example, Ihor Vynnychenko, "The Deportation, Incarceration, and Forced Resettlement of Ukrainians in the Soviet Period," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 18 (Summer-Winter 1993): 55-68; and Andrew Wilson, *The Crimean Tatars* (London: International Alert, 1994).

27. John Jaworsky, "Dissent, Ethnonationalism, and the Politics of Coercion in the USSR," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Carleton University (Ottawa), 1990, Chapters 5-6.

28. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 4 August 1991. For negative reactions to President Bush's speech, which was criticized as being condescending and quickly labelled his "Chicken Kiev" speech, see the *Ukrainian Weekly*, August 11 and 18, 1991.

29. See, for example, the statement by Chornovil in *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 3 October 1992.

30. The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Commonwealth of Independent States* no. 4, 1992, 43.

31. Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union* (Washington, January 1993), 60.

32. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 19 July 1990.

33. For the text of this legislation, see *Holos Ukrainy*, 16 July 1992.

34. For analyses of the draft constitution of Ukraine see *Ukrainian Weekly*, 6 September 1992, 20 September 1992, and 15 November 1992. The full text of the draft was published in *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 July 1992.

35. *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 26 April 1993.

36. For interviews conducted with Shul'ha soon after his appointment, see *Kyivs'ka pravda*, 8 September 1994 and *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 19 October 1994.

37. See, for example, Dziuba's presentation delivered at the international conference, "Problems of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," held in Kiev 7-9 June 1991, in a special issue of *Svit*, Nos. 3-4, 1991, 1. For a good recent overview of Ukraine's nationality policy see the interview with the Vice-President of Ukraine's National Academy of Sciences in *Nasha respublika* no. 13, 7 April 1995.

38. The significance of this "Little Russian" inferiority complex is assessed in "Little Russianism and the Ukrainian-Russian Relationship: An Interview with Mykola Ryabchuk," in *Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty: A Collection of Interviews*, ed. Roman Solchanyk (Edmonton: Can. Inst. of Ukr. Studies Press, 1992), 19-30.

39. Roman Solchanyk, "Language Politics in the Ukraine," in *Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages*, ed. Isabelle T. Kreindler (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), 57-105; and "The Politics of Language in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 10, 5 March 1993, 1-4.

40. The speeches delivered at this congress, including Dziuba's speech, and other congress materials, were published in *Suchasnist'* no. 12 (December 1989).

41. Much of the material which follows is based on Jaworsky, "Dissent, Ethnonationalism and the Politics of Coercion."

42. Nebozhenko, *Sotsial'na napruzhenist'*, 42.

43. See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine," in the special issue, entitled "The Politics of Intolerance," of *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 16, 22 April 1994, 42-49.

44. Summary of address by President Kuchma to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, 4 April 1995, supplied to author by the Ukrainian Embassy in Ottawa.

45. On this point see, for example, Viacheslav Savchenko, "Kryms'ki uroky Leonida Kravchuka," *UNIAN-Polityka* no. 0074, 1 August 1994.

46. Savchenko, "Kryms'ki uroky," 11.

47. For a recent assessment of the quality of the programs on Ukraine's main state television channel (UT-1), see the article by Inha Balys'tka in *Visti z Ukrainy*, 8-14 December 1994.

48. See, for example, the section on Ukraine in "The Media in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2 (2 July 1993): 5-6. On the great popularity in Ukraine of Russia's Ostankino television broadcasts, see Oleksandr Vyshniak, "Bezperechnym liderom sered telekanaliv...," *UNIAN-Polityka* no. 0019, 16 June 1994, 5.

49. Mykola Riabchuk, "Krym: ni Honkonhu, ni Bosnii," *UNIAN-Polityka* no. 0012, 13 June 1994, 17; and Savchenko, "Kryms'ki uroky," 12.

50. See the coverage of the Crimean issue in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 26 March 1995 and 2 April 1995.

51. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 20 April 1995.

52. For a useful introduction to this issue, see Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 1 (1994): 47-68.

53. Ukrainian Republican Party Bulletin III, 21 January 1995; and *Ukrainian Weekly*, 15 January 1995. It should be noted, however, that Kravchuk's early policy concerning Crimea was inconsistent with his later emphasis on a unitary Ukrainian state, and that he supported the Crimean bid for autonomy in 1991.

54. Daniel Elazar, "Federal Democracy in a World Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism," in *Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation*, ed. Alastair McAuley, (Leicester: Leicester University Press), 2-3.

55. For an early version of this argument, pre-dating the disintegration of the USSR, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, "Maibutnia Ukraina: Federatsiia?" *Slovo* no. 12 (June 1991): 6.

56. I. Kuras, "Federatsiia chy unitarna derzhava?" *Polityka i chas* no. 6 (June 1993): 8.

57. Lepingwell, in "The Russian Military," 80-81, 86, notes several examples of support by Russian political leaders for the federalisation of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

58. Audrey Brassloff, "Spain: The State of the Autonomies," in *Federalism and Nationalism*, ed. Murray Forsyth (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989), 24-50.

59. Dzhanhіrov, "Donets'k i Dnipropetrovs'k," 6-8.

60. Zolotar'ov, "Odesa iak lokomotyv feodalizatsii," 20.

61. Ivo D. Duchacek, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among, and Across Nations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 117.

62. The issue of territorial-administrative reform in Ukraine has attracted very little attention in the West. However, one recent comment on the situation in Ukraine has briefly noted the possible benefits of the introduction of a federal system in Ukraine. See Gert Weisskirchen, "The Ukraine at the Crossroads," *Aussenpolitik* no. 4 (1994): 331.

63. For background information on the Donbas and the "politics of coal" in this region see Chapter 6 ("The Donbass Miners and the 1989 Coal Strike") in David Marples, *Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1991).

64. Taras Kuzio, "The Multi-Party System in Ukraine on the Eve of Elections: Identity Problems, Conflicts and Solutions," *Government and Opposition* 29 (Winter 1994): 109-127; and Peter Potichnyj, "Formation of Political Parties in Ukraine," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of Slavists, Learned Societies conference, Ottawa, 5 June 1993.

65. Nebozhenko, *Sotsial'na napruzhenist'*, 51-52.

66. For a recent description of some elements of Ukraine's party system, and a list of political parties registered by Ukraine's Ministry of Justice, see *Ukrains'ka hazeta*, 30 March 1995.

67. See, for example, the text of President Kuchma's address to the editors of Ukraine's main newspapers on 12 January 1995, in Ukrinform, *Ukraina: khronika podii*, 13 January 1995.

68. Information provided by Rostyslav Chomiak, from Kiev, on the Ukes-News list, 9 January 1995.

69. See, for example, the section on Ukraine in "The Media in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2 (2 July 1993): 5-6. On the great popularity in Ukraine of Russia's Ostankino television broadcasts see Oleksandr Vyshniak, "Bezperechnym liderom sered telekanaliv," *UNIАН-Polityka* no. 0019, 16 June 1994, 5.

70. *Most* no. 6, 13-19 February 1995.

71. Ukrinform, *Ukraina: Khronika podii*, 7 March 1995.

72. I.E. Bekeshkina, *Konfliktolohichniy pidkhdid do suchasnoi sytuatsii v Ukraini* (Kiev: Abrys, 1994), 35.

73. Bekeshkina, *Konfliktolohichniy pidkhdid*, 46.

74. In contrast, former president Kravchuk was born and raised in the region of Volhynia, one of the traditional "homelands" of Ukrainian nationalism.

75. For President Kuchma's rather pessimistic evaluation of the accomplishments of the campaign against corruption and organized crime, see the text of his speech in *Ukrinform Ukraina: khronika podii*, 31 January 1995.

76. See J. Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Economics, 1994), and the commentary by Ivan Koropets'kyi, "Vyhliady na uspih ekonomichnykh reform v Ukraini," *Suchasnist'* no. 11 (November 1994): 59-72.

77. For example the chief of the Presidential Informational-Analytic Service, Viktor Nebozhenko, is a sociologist who conducted many of the opinion polls cited in this study. See the interview with Nebozhenko in *Sil'ske zhyttia*, 23 February 1995.

78. *Holos Ukrainy*, 19 January 1995.

79. See Nebozhenko, *Sotsial'na napruzhenist'*, 32-33.

80. On the "party of power" see the excellent article by Mykola Riabchuk, "Deshcho pro 'partiiu vldy ta kryzu demokratychnoho rukhu," in *Suchasnist'* no. 12 (1994): 50-60.

81. Jeremy Lester, "Russian Political Attitudes to Ukrainian Independence," *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 10 (June 1994): 227-28. On this topic see also Roman Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9 (Oct.-Dec. 1993): 358-362.

82. Clarke, "The Saga," 46-49.

83. Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," 358-362. For a good general survey of political attitudes in Russia concerning Ukraine, see Lester, "Russian Political Attitudes to Ukrainian Independence," 193-233.

84. A number of articles have recently dealt with this issue. See, for example, Andrei Zagorsky, "Russia, the CIS and the West," *International Affairs* no. 12 (December 1994): 65-72; and John W.R. Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad'," *Survival* 36 (Autumn 1994): 70-92.

85. See the observations on "pipeline politics" in J.P. Dorian, I.S. Rossi, and S.T. Indriyanto, "Central Asia's Oil and Gas Pipeline Network: Current and Future Flows," *Post-Soviet Geography* 35 (September 1994): 423-429.

86. Clarke, "The Saga," pp. 45-46; and "Rusting Fleet," 29-31.

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87. Denis J.B. Shaw, "Crimea: Background and Aftermath of Its 1994 Presidential Election," *Post-Soviet Geography* 35 (April 1994): 222, 226.
88. Charles King, "Eurasia Letter: Moldova with a Russian Face," *Foreign Policy* no. 97 (Winter 1994-95): 107.
89. Lepingwell, "The Russian Military," 81.
90. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 26 and 27 April 1995.
91. On Russia's negotiating stance concerning the BSF see Petro Pavliuk, "Resursy kompromisiv vycherpano," *Visti z Ukrainy* 12-18 January 1995.
92. Pavliuk, "Resursy"; and Viacheslav Savchenko. "Hnit, shcho horyt' z dvokh kintsiv," *UNIAN-Polityka* no. 0107, 31 August 1994.
93. For the text of Baltin's speech, see *Flag Rodiny*, 17 November 1994. See also the response in *Flot Ukrainy*, 17 December 1994.
94. *Flag Rodiny*, 17 November 1994.
95. See, for example, the report in *OMRI Daily Digest* no. 82, 26 April 1995; and "Ukraine" Press Agency, 24 April 1995.
96. *OMRI Daily Digest* no. 77, 19 April 1995.
97. "Ukraine" Press Agency, 21 April 1995.
98. *OMRI Daily Digest*, 27 April 1995, quoting *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 26 April 1995.
99. John Jaworsky, *The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Developments in Ukraine*, Project Report no. 645, Operational Research and Analysis, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, August 1993, 93-96.
100. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 18 July 1990.
101. Military developments in Ukraine prior to mid-November 1991 are described in John Jaworsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Future of the Soviet Armed Forces," revised version of paper delivered at the 3rd Bedford Colloquium on Soviet Military-Political Affairs, 15 August 1991, Bedford, Nova Scotia.
102. Jaworsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism," 19-20.
103. Stephen Foye, "The CIS Armed Forces," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 1 (1 January 1993): 41-44.
104. Author's impressions based on conversations with military personnel in Ukraine in early December 1991.
105. Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine's Young Turks—The Union of Ukrainian Officers," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1993, 23-26.
106. *Molod' Ukrainy*, 23 July 1992.
107. According to an article published in one of the organs of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, in 1992 almost 20 percent of Ukraine's state budget was consumed by military-related expenditures. This figure did not include expenditures on conversion. Oleksandr Honcharenko *et al.*, "Kontsepsiia natsional'noi bezpeky Ukrainy: problemy i perspektyvy

rozbudovy," *Viis'ko Ukrainy* no. 5 (1993): 9.

108. See for example *Kievskie vedomosti*, 9 April 1994; and *Ukrains'ka hazeta*, 20 January-2 February 1994.

109. *Molod' Ukrainy*, 17 May 1994. Ukraine has had very little success breaking into the international arms market. On this topic, see the comment by former Defense Minister Morozov in *Visti z Ukrainy*, 10-16 March 1994. For general information on conversion in Ukraine, see Ilya Bass and Leslie Dienes, "Defense Industry Legacies and Conversion in the Post-Soviet Realm," *Post-Soviet Geography* 34 (May 1993): 302-317.

110. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 22 May 1994. On the state of Ukraine's rocket-space technology sector, see *Narodna armia*, 12 April 1994.

111. *Kievskie vedomosti*, 12 June 1993.

112. Foye, "The Ukrainian Armed Forces: Prospects and Problems," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 26, 26 June 1992, 56-57; and *Molod' Ukrainy*, 1 June 1993.

113. Jaworsky, *The Military-Strategic Significance*, 87-89.

114. *Ibid.*, 91-92.

115. A recent article has noted that Ukraine inherited a disproportionately large proportion of the Soviet Union's military educational institutions, while almost all military research institutions were located in Russia. *Narodna armia*, 21 April 1994. Vigorous debates concerning the fate of military educational institutions in Ukraine were still being waged in early 1994. See, for example, *Visti z Ukrainy*, 24 February-2 March 1994.

116. Jaworsky, *The Military-Strategic Significance*, 108-110.

117. *Ibid.*, 108. The two main "think-tanks" in Kiev which focus on security issues are the National Institute of Strategic Studies and the International Institute on Global and Regional Security.

118. Jaworsky, *The Military-Strategic Significance*, 111-112. A strongly-worded attack on Morozov's "politicization" of the UAF and his support of the UOU was recently published in *Nezavisimost'*, 8 April 1994.

119. Jaworsky, *The Military-Strategic Significance*, 100-101.

120. *Ibid.*, 112-113.

121. On right-wing extremism in Ukraine in general, and the UNA-UNSO in particular, see Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine" in the special issue, entitled "The Politics of Intolerance," of *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 16, 22 April 1994, 42-49.

122. *Ibid.*; Jaworsky, *The Military-Strategic Significance*, 102-104; Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Paramilitaries," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 1992, 540; and *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 9 August 1993. On the participation of UNSO members in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia see *Kievskie vedomosti*, 18 August 1993; and *Nezavisimost'*, 27 August 1993. In this conflict UNSO supported the Georgian side, since the

UNA leadership claimed that Russia was clearly behind the Abkhaz rebels.

123. On attempts by the UNA to gain support among poorly-housed military officers, see *Respublika*, 4-10 November 1993.

124. Links between representatives of the UOU and the UNSO are noted in *Kievskie vedomosti*, 15 May 1993; and *Vechirni Kyiv*, 11 November 1993 (citing *Moskovskie novosti*). The head of the L'viv branch of the UOU recently stated that he personally approves of the work of the UNA-UNSO. "Kontakt" Television program (Toronto), 16 April 1994.

125. An interesting interview with Iurii Tyma, one of the UNA-UNSO representatives who was elected to the Ukrainian parliament, was published in *Kievskie vedomosti*, 6 May 1994.

126. Lengthy excerpts from the autobiography of former Defense Minister Morozov, detailing his view of the events leading up to his resignation, were published in the January-March 1994 issues of *Ukrains'ka hazeta*.

127. Ustina Markus, "Recent Defense Developments in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 4, 28 January 1994, 26-32. On the adoption of Ukraine's new defense doctrine, see *Kievskie vedomosti*, 21 October 1993.

128. *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 11 January 1994. Regular working meetings between delegations of the Ukrainian and Russian defense ministries have taken place to discuss further technical cooperation. See, for example, the report in *UNIAN-Novyny*, 27 April 1994, at 21.40. During the conference on "The Military Tradition," former Defense Minister Morozov noted that most representatives of Ukraine's military-industrial complex are strongly in favour of a high level of integration of the economies of Ukraine and Russia.

129. The UOU's Fifth Congress, and changes in official attitudes towards the UOU, are described in *Vechirni Kyiv*, 6 January 1994. A plenum of the UOU has sharply criticized many of Radetsky's policies, noting that the Russian language is now used in many of the defense ministry's internal bureaucratic procedures, and that national Ukrainian military traditions are being de-emphasized in the UAF. The plenum also criticized the introduction of "officers' assemblies" in the UAF, arguing that they would serve as an official avenue of pressure by the "reactionary" military leadership on servicemen. See *Visti z Ukrainy*, 3-9 March 1994. The operation of the officers' assemblies is described in *Armiia Ukrainy*, 26 February 1994 and 30 March 1994, and they are criticized in Martyrosian's article in *Vechirni Kyiv*, 30 April 1994.

130. On the reassignment of General Muliava to other duties see *Ukrains'ke slovo*, 17 November 1993. See also *Kievskie vedomosti*, 12 April 1994. In an interview in *Molod' Ukrainy*, 6 May 1994, Radetsky criticized the hitherto prevailing tendency to criticize all SAF traditions as

having no relevance to Ukraine's Armed Forces. However, Ukraine's military press continues to publish articles dealing with themes which were strongly encouraged by Muliava. See, for example, the article on the military-educational preparation of OUN members in 1939-41 in *Armiia Ukrainy*, 29 March 1994. General descriptions of the work of the SPS's successor can be found in *Armiia Ukrainy*, 22 March 1994 and 2 April 1994.

131. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 1 February 1994; *Vechirni Kyiv*, 29 March 1994; and *Kievskie vedomosti*, 24 November 1993. According to a survey whose results were published in *Visti z Ukrainy*, 19-25 May 1994, the continued practice of "divivshchyna" is the main reason why conscript-age youths are reluctant to serve in the UAF.

132. Oleg Strekal, "No Way to Run an Army," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 1994, 34. Defense Minister Radetsky surveyed many of the problems facing the UAF, and called for determined action to weed out phenomena such as *divivshchyna*, in his "open letter" to military servicemen, members of their families, and members of the community at large in *Armiia Ukrainy*, 9 March 1994.

133. *Narodna armiiia*, 18 March 1994; and *Kievskie vedomosti*, 30 March 1994. On the difficulties of introducing and implementing effective reforms in the UAF during an economic crisis, see the interview with the chair of the Ukrainian parliament's Commission on Defense and State Security, Valentyn Lemish, in *Kyivs'kyi visnyk*, 25 January 1994. The activities of the Independent Trade Union of Military Servicemen of Ukraine are described in *Kievskie vedomosti*, 23 November 1993.

134. *Holos Ukrainy*, 10 March 1994; *Vechirni Kyiv*, 6 January 1994; and the article by Oleksandr Manachyns'kyi in *Narodna armiiia*, 29 April 1994.

135. For statistics on the growth of various forms of corruption and other "pathologies" in the UAF in early 1994 see the article on the work of Ukraine's military procuracy in *Holos Ukrainy*, 8 April 1994. In May 1994 a number of senior military officials were accused of financial irregularities in connection with the use of military aircraft for commercial transport purposes. *UNIAN-Novyny*, 13 May 1994, at 22:00.

136. *Kievskie vedomosti*, 30 March 1994; and *Vechirni Kyiv*, 6 January 1994.

137. *Kyivs'kyi visnyk*, 25 January 1994. On new initiatives to re-train military personnel entering the reserves see *Narodna armiiia*, 29 April 1994.

138. *Kievskie vedomosti*, 9 February 1994; *Ukraina moloda*, 6 January 1994; and *Uriadovi kurier*, 6 November 1993.

139. For example, according to a "Ukraina" Press Agency report dated 27 April 1995, Minister of Defense Shmarov stated that the most serious problem in the armed forces was social security.

140. See the discussion on this topic in Alexander J. Motyl's "Will Ukraine Survive 1994," *The Harriman Institute Forum* 7 (January 1994): 3-6.

141. Victor M. Perez-Diaz, *The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 40.

142. Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (May/June 1995): 10-11.

143. Sherman W. Garnett, "The Integrationist Temptation," *The Washington Quarterly* 18 (Spring 1995): 35-36.

144. President Kuchma stated his concerns *re* the expansion of NATO in an interview during a state visit to the Czech Republic, summarized in a Reuters dispatch, 25 April 1995. See also *Vseukrainskie vedomosti*, 1 April 1995.

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