

**N**ATO's Future:  
Beyond Collective  
Defense

*Stanley R. Sloan*



***A popular Government,  
without popular information or the means of  
acquiring it,  
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or  
perhaps both.  
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;  
And a people who mean to be their own  
Governors,  
must arm themselves with the power which  
knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY  
August 4, 1822**

# **NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE**

STANLEY R. SLOAN

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***This study is dedicated to the  
memory of Joe Kruzel,  
Nelson Drew,  
and Robert Frasure,  
who lost their lives in the noble  
pursuit of peace***

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# NATO'S FUTURE: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

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## CONCLUSIONS: AN OUTLINE FOR A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN

Under the much different international circumstances of the mid-1980s, it was proposed that the NATO allies ensure NATO's future by striking "a new transatlantic bargain." The main goal of the new bargain was to increase European responsibilities for alliance missions. Today, a new bargain may be required to clarify NATO's future role as well as to enhance the European role in the alliance. Striking a new bargain would require the United States and the allies to commit themselves anew to a collective approach to advancing their common security interests.

The Governments of the United States, Canada, and the European members of NATO believe that continuation of the transatlantic alliance will serve their vital interests, but there is no consensus among or within NATO member states concerning the missions that the alliance should pursue in the period of history that follows the end of the Cold War. Consequently no consensus exists on how the North Atlantic Treaty *Organization*—the structure created to implement the Treaty's goals—should be reformed to serve their interests in the future.

This report assesses the current state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and suggests a package of political measures and institutional reforms that could be included in a "new transatlantic bargain" designed to revitalize the alliance and reform the organization. The report concludes that current members of the alliance would be well advised to strike a new



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transatlantic bargain among themselves *before* inviting additional countries to join the alliance. A reasonable goal might be to conclude the process of revitalizing NATO at a summit meeting of NATO leaders in the first half of 1997.

To be relevant, any new bargain would have to:

- Accommodate the eventual addition of new members
- Keep the door open to a constructive relationship with Russia
- Accommodate European aspirations to develop a European pillar in NATO
- Involve France on a regularized basis
- Keep the United States interested and involved.

The new bargain could include several elements:

- **A new statement of European and North American purpose for and commitment to the alliance.** Allied governments would declare that they are committed to cooperate politically and militarily to help ensure a more stable international environment for the post-Cold War world. Such a statement would emphasize that the *governments of the alliance share the responsibilities and burdens for maintaining international peace* even if not all allies will be involved in every peace support operation.
- **A restatement of NATO's mission.** In the early post-Cold War era, it was frequently said that NATO would have to become "more political." Even though NATO has always been a political as well as a military alliance, it is clear that NATO's unique functional role is to promote and implement political/military cooperation among member and partner states. Collective defense remains at the core of U.S. and allied commitments to the alliance. But NATO's day-to-day functions are already shifting from collective defense activities to collective responsibility sharing across a broad range of security-support activities. Such activities are not artificially limited by any geographic boundaries, as they do not fall under NATO's Article 5 collective defense mandate. For non-Article 5 purposes, NATO's future mission seems likely to focus increasingly on:

—**Preserving habits of military cooperation.** Even if NATO *per se* never formally ran a peace-support operation, the habits of cooperation developed through cooperation in NATO would remain absolutely essential to the ability of the United States and its European allies to conduct successful multilateral military operations in the future.

—**Promoting peace.** Developing cooperative military relations with non-NATO countries can help promote international peace. Political/military cooperation in NATO could help deter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and aggression by rogue states.

—**Restoring peace.** In the post-Cold War world, it undoubtedly will continue to be necessary from time to time to use force to restore peace where it has been broken by aggression or other sources of conflict. When the allies agree to use NATO for such purposes, the alliance will require the means to respond to a diverse set of possible operational requirements.

- **A Joint Declaration of Congress recommitting the United States to the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty and new missions for NATO.** Such a declaration could provide a bi-partisan foundation for self-interested U.S. policies that seek to share the burdens of maintaining a stable international system in cooperation with like-minded nations.

- **Organizational reforms and initiatives intended to adapt the alliance to new circumstances of the post-Cold War world.** The report presents a number of suggested reforms intended to help the alliance adjust to new circumstances. They include:

- Give the European allies greater responsibility in the alliance by enhancing the positions of Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT, granting those senior European officers the authority to run military operations using NATO's integrated command structure when the United States is not to be a major contributor to the operations.** The concept would help keep the European defense pillar within the framework

of the transatlantic alliance, avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and command structures, and potentially provide a path for France to follow toward a regularized military relationship with NATO.

—Experiment with joint NATO-Western European Union structures by merging NATO and WEU commands in the Mediterranean region

—Organize enforcement of a peace agreement in Bosnia as a NATO combined joint task force (CJTF)

—Consider reorganizing NATO commands along functional rather than geographic lines

—Seek explicit agreement on NATO decisionmaking procedures that would allow nations to stand aside from future non-Article 5 operations without exercising a veto over operations that are favored by most other allies

—Strengthen cooperation with partner countries by making the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) the consultative body under which the Partnership for Peace program operates and establishing a position of NATO Assistant Secretary General for Eastern Affairs.

- The establishment of a Transatlantic Cooperation Community among all members of NATO and the European Union to provide a framework for consultations on the wide range of political, economic and security issues that affect the interests of all states in the European and North Atlantic area. This consultative framework would be intended to initiate projects that could be implemented through existing organizational structures. Such a community would embrace, not replace NATO, but would help broaden the U.S.-European relationship in areas not traditionally handled by NATO's political-military framework.

Such a package of political initiatives and institutional reforms might provide the members of NATO with a revitalized cooperative structure and a more flexible set of tools with which to approach the new security issues and problems of the post-

Cold War world. At the end of the day, however, no set of reforms or proposed initiatives will make any difference unless the United States and the other allies are willing to make a strong commitment to multilateral cooperation and to pay the price that may be required to create and maintain a relatively peaceful international system. Such a commitment has not been fully evident in the early years of the post-Cold War period.

## **PREMISES:**

### **NATO IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

#### **Premises of Reform**

The suggestions developed in this report begin from several key premises, which are summarized below:

- The Governments of the United States and the European allies want to preserve NATO. This study is sensitive to the view of those who argue that NATO has outlived its purpose and should be disbanded, and if the allies are not able to adjust NATO's strategy and operations to reflect a new sense of common purpose in the post-Cold War world, such observers may be on target. The main focus of this report, however, is the policy issue of what the U.S. administration and Congress, in cooperation with allied governments, may need to consider if they wish NATO to remain a useful instrument on behalf of their interests.
- It appears unlikely that the allies can walk away from their commitment to open NATO's doors to new members, but enlargement of the alliance has become part of NATO's problem rather than a solution for the alliance's future.
- The strategic concept prepared in 1991 pointed the alliance in certain directions that it has pursued since, but the future mission of the alliance remains clouded by different perceptions of its rationale.
- NATO's mutual defense commitment in Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, while still valid for all members of the alliance, has been put in NATO's "back pocket." Collective defense remains at the foundation of membership in the alliance, but NATO's day-to-day activities during the

next period of history are likely to focus increasingly on the new "risks" and less and less on territorial defense.

- The European members of NATO are not likely to relinquish fully their sovereignty within a supranational approach to defense in the foreseeable future, and certainly not as a result of the European Union's (EU) Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 1996. But they are likely to develop cooperative approaches among themselves that prove fiscally, politically, or militarily necessary or attractive. Such cooperation is likely to remain largely intergovernmental in nature for the foreseeable future.

- It would be wishful thinking for Americans to believe that the European allies on their own will be able to take over significant responsibilities for defense without U.S. involvement. Future alliance military cooperation will not move forward successfully unless the allies shift back to a sharing approach from one that seeks division of burdens and responsibilities.

- Implementation of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative<sup>1</sup> is critical to make NATO more capable of responding to new security challenges. But this may not be possible until the upper levels of NATO's decisionmaking process are reformed to parallel the flexibility created by the CJTF at the operational level. NATO's role in helping ensure compliance with a peace settlement in Bosnia could provide a critical opportunity to test the CJTF concept.

### **Change and Continuity**

The Governments of the United States, Canada, and the European members of NATO believe that continuation of the transatlantic alliance will serve their vital interests. No consensus among or within NATO member states exists, however, concerning the missions that the alliance should pursue in the period of history that follows the Cold War. Consequently, there is no consensus on how the North Atlantic Treaty *Organization*—the structure created to implement the Treaty's goals under very different circumstances than those that

obtain today—should be reformed to serve their interests in the future.

Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO countries have been relatively successful in adjusting the policies and programs of the alliance to the new international realities in Europe:

- They have created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to promote consultations and cooperation between the NATO allies and the former Warsaw Pact states, Soviet republics, and former neutrals.
- The allies have in the last 2 years set out on the path toward inviting new European democracies to join the alliance.<sup>2</sup>
- They have agreed to establish a special relationship between NATO and Russia.
- They are currently studying the “why and how” of expanding the alliance to include new democracies.

They have been reluctant, however, to make fundamental structural changes to the alliance itself. This reluctance grows out of several sources. One influence is a basic “if it ain't broke, don't fix it” philosophy. According to this view, the unity of the NATO allies was a major force bringing the Cold War to a successful conclusion and precipitating the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. NATO's proven structure helped produce that unity. NATO institutions translated that unity into an effective political and military posture. From this perspective, proposed new structural arrangements would have to be demonstrably better than current ones to overcome the inertia created by NATO's past success.

Another source of resistance to change is the fact that almost any structural change in NATO presumably would reduce the U.S. role in the alliance relative to that of the European allies. During the Cold War, given the magnitude of the Soviet threat, the United States was by necessity the dominant force in the alliance. At the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world's only superpower, but the Europeans became much less reliant on the U.S. military guarantee for their day-to-day physical security.

Many European governments accept that "Europe" should assume greater collective responsibility in the alliance. The members of the Western European Union (WEU) have in recent years sought to build up WEU's planning, analytical, and coordinating capabilities to create the potential for the WEU to constitute a "European pillar" in the transatlantic alliance. They are reluctant, however, to give the impression that they want to reduce the U.S. role because they fear that the United States, in response, will pull out of Europe completely. Several high-ranking officials of several European governments have recently proposed a new Atlantic Community, to create a broader framework for cooperation between North America and Europe as a way of holding the transatlantic alliance together while various aspects of that relationship, including NATO structures, undergo change.<sup>3</sup>

Another fundamental problem is that the allies have not reached a consensus on what NATO's future mission should be. Positions taken by participants in the ongoing debate about NATO expansion and relations with Russia reflect a wide variety of assumptions about what NATO is and should become. Some still see NATO mainly as an insurance guarantee against a future revival of Russian power. Others view NATO as a vehicle for exporting stability and ensuring democratic development in the new democracies of Central Europe, and as a key part of a developing cooperative security system in Europe. Still others see the alliance as an instrument for developing multilateral responses to new security problems, particularly with regard to crisis management in Europe and beyond. Some U.S. officials, including members of Congress, see NATO as a way of developing effective burdensharing with our allies. Many Europeans regard NATO primarily as a way of keeping the United States "in" Europe. A factor for others is the reassuring framework that NATO provides for Germany. Some observers would include all these elements on the list of NATO's current and future functions.

Each of these positions holds implications for NATO's desirable structure. If NATO is only an insurance policy, there may not be much need for structural change. On the other hand, if NATO is to assume a key role in helping ensure European

stability, promoting crisis management cooperation among its members, and enlarging to take in new members, further evolution may be required in NATO's institutions and procedures. Some proponents of NATO enlargement have argued that expanding NATO membership would provide the main answer to NATO's future mission, but the enlargement issue has in fact become part of the problem rather than the answer to the question of what NATO's purpose should be in the future. Until the allies can produce a clearer statement of what NATO is and how the alliance serves their interests, all decisions concerning enlargement will remain contentious, and the allies will find it difficult to continue the process of reforming the alliance to ensure its future relevance.

In addition, the Bosnian crisis has challenged NATO member states to decide what role the alliance should play in such circumstances and how NATO should relate to the United Nations and other organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU). So far, the consequences of U.S. and European decisions regarding the crisis have damaged the image and credibility of both the United Nations and NATO. The allies therefore face NATO's future against the backdrop of perceived failure in their attempts to deal with the challenges posed by the Bosnian crisis.

Given the fact that the NATO countries, including the United States, appear to want the alliance to be more than an insurance policy, and the likelihood that NATO will decide to include some new members in coming years, some questions about NATO's structure will have to be faced in the near future. In particular, if NATO is to be used as an instrument to help develop responses to a wide variety of new security challenges in and beyond Europe, it might become increasingly important to develop greater flexibility in alliance decisionmaking and implementation than was possible during the Cold War.

The allies have already agreed to add "Combined Joint Task Forces" (CJTF) headquarters to NATO force structure to give the alliance flexibility in putting together force packages tailored to specific crises or contingencies. But the ability to use this new tool has been hampered by disagreements about how the allies



should exercise political control over the missions of CJTF headquarters.

At the heart of this issue is the question of whether the military structure of NATO should continue to reflect a dominant U.S. role (in the person of the U.S. general who serves as NATO's supreme allied commander) or whether new approaches should be developed to reflect more balanced U.S. and European roles in the alliance. This is a fundamental question that stirs political emotions on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, it is one that the United States and the European allies will have to address at some point if they hope to develop more flexible options for responding to new security challenges.

### **NATO'S 1991 Strategic Concept**

Just 2 years after the Berlin Wall fell, punctuating the end of the Cold War, President Bush and leaders of the other NATO governments in November 1991 agreed on a "strategic concept" intended to guide the alliance into the post-Cold War world. Even then, the allies recognized that NATO was moving beyond a mission focused on collective defense and toward more diverse tasks. The allied leaders agreed: "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe."<sup>4</sup>

The NATO leaders affirmed in Rome that "Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty,"<sup>5</sup> but they clearly shifted the focus of defense cooperation in NATO when they declared, "However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature." And they staked out the Allied prerogative to use NATO as an instrument of their cooperation in dealing with such "wider" issues when they noted that "Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultations among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and,

where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.”

Four years later, the allies have shifted NATO activities to reflect the concept's new directions. For all intents and purposes, Article 5's mutual defense commitment, although still valid for all members of the alliance and still an issue in the enlargement debate, has been put in NATO's “back pocket.” The commitment remains part and parcel of the alliance, but NATO's day-to-day activities, from force and contingency planning at all major NATO commands to training and exercises among NATO national forces, are increasingly focused on the new “risks” and less and less on territorial defense.<sup>6</sup>

The extent to which NATO has already changed remains somewhat obscured by the continuing transatlantic policy differences over Bosnia and the debate over NATO enlargement. In addition, it appears that, in spite of the foresight demonstrated in the drafting of the new strategic concept, the political commitment to move NATO in some new directions was not shared equally by all member states.

### **Shifting of Burdens and Responsibilities**

While trying to cope with enlargement and Bosnia, the alliance has also begun to deal with the issue of U.S. and European roles in the alliance. The Clinton administration came to office apparently determined to change one important aspect of Bush administration policy toward European security. The Bush administration had expressed profound skepticism about attempts to revitalize the Western European Union (WEU) and to give the European Community (now European Union, EU) a serious defense dimension.<sup>7</sup> While the Bush administration had seen this process as a possible threat to NATO's vitality, the Clinton administration chose to see it as a natural shifting of transatlantic relations toward greater European responsibilities and burdens.

At Maastricht in The Netherlands in December 1991, the European Union leaders gave new impetus to the community-building process. They agreed to complete a monetary union and to adopt a common currency by 1999. The treaty included provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy based on intergovernmental cooperation among the community members.

They agreed that the WEU would become the EU's defense arm, within the overall framework of the transatlantic alliance. The treaty came into effect on November 1, 1993.

During the NATO summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994, the Clinton administration pulled out all the stops in support of European efforts to develop a European defense identity. The summit communique included multiple references to the importance of such cooperation and the constructive role played by the WEU. The declaration included no fewer than eight references to WEU, seven references each to the European Security and Defense Identity and European Union, and two each to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy goal.

This warm embrace of European unity goals and institutions appeared to have broken a deadlock between France and the United States that had blocked progress on a number of important issues in NATO. Most importantly, the allies supported the U.S. initiative to establish Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) commands that could be used to assemble tailored responses to specific military challenges. The initiative was designed by U.S. military planners primarily to give NATO a more flexible set of options for organizing and conducting military operations, but it was promoted at and after the summit largely as a vehicle for the European allies to take on military operations relying on NATO infrastructure but without active or major U.S. participation.<sup>8</sup>

This approach seemed to reflect a degree of U.S. wishful thinking that the process of European cooperation could move rapidly enough to provide meaningful short-term burdensharing relief to the United States. It also reflected some wishful thinking among Europeans about the willingness of EU member states to submit decisions on important military and security issues to some kind of common authority in the context of the EU. The overall impact was to set the allies looking for ways to "divide" responsibilities and burdens rather than to share them, as had been the rule during the Cold War.

Over 18 months after the NATO summit, the allies have not been able to implement the CJTF initiative. This appears to be the case in large part because the CJTF sought to reform NATO

operations at the business end of the stick without first reforming the decisionmaking process and structure required to set up and initiate CJTF operations. In particular, the United States and France have continued to disagree about the level and degree of political control of CJTF operations.

Meanwhile, it has become clear that the high levels of optimism expressed at the summit about prospects for closer European defense cooperation greatly exceeded the ability of the European allies to make rapid progress toward establishing a clear European defense *identity*, to say nothing of a European defense *capacity*. Now, the EU members plan to review the Maastricht European security and defense arrangements in a 1996 "Inter-Governmental Conference" (IGC), and in parallel within the WEU.

### **NATO and Lessons from Bosnia**

Over the last few years, talk of NATO military cooperation seemed rather theoretical when the allies appear to be impossibly at odds over what to do about Bosnia. NATO got in trouble over Bosnia because neither the United States nor its European allies were willing to risk the sacrifices that could have been required to impose and enforce a peace there. This produced a tendency on both sides of the Atlantic to blame each other and NATO, as well as the United Nations, for the consequent policy failure. Without assessing the Bosnian experience further (which would go beyond the scope of this paper), it might be useful to suggest some "lessons" that the NATO countries might carry away from the experience.<sup>9</sup>

The Bosnian crisis has once again emphasized that no organization of sovereign states can function any more effectively than the consensus among its members permits. If neither the United States nor its European allies know what values or interests they are willing to defend, no bureaucratic arrangements will produce concerted action.

Until there is greater global consensus about how to deal with threats to the peace, the NATO members may emphasize the importance of preserving the option of acting outside the U.N. framework as well as in response to U.N. requests for assistance. This issue is bound to be controversial among the

allies, as many European nations will place a high premium on ensuring that there is a U.N. or OSCE mandate for most NATO military operations. Attitudes in the United States, however, currently favor more flexibility for the alliance and are particularly wary about NATO relinquishing operational control over military operations to U.N. authority.

Bosnia has also demonstrated that NATO's "golden rule" of consultation still needs to be observed religiously if the alliance is to survive. NATO members have conducted extensive consultations throughout the Bosnian crisis, but the process broke down on some occasions, most notably when the United States announced it would no longer help enforce the arms embargo against the Bosnian government in November 1994. Now, the possibility of a peace settlement gives the NATO allies an opportunity to demonstrate the value of continued political and military cooperation in the alliance.

Perhaps the most important lesson, drawn from both policy failures and potential successes in Bosnia, is that, even in the absence of a Soviet threat, U.S. leadership tailored to the new security realities may remain essential both to a stable European security system and to international stability more generally. Whether or not the United States will find the patience, creativity, and commitment required to provide such leadership remains at issue in the current American debate.

### **PERSPECTIVES: WHICH NATO?**

And the King went to where the blind men were, and drawing near said to them: "Do you now know what an elephant is like?"

And those blind men who had felt the head of the elephant, said: "An elephant, Sir, is like a large round jar.

Those who had felt its ears, said: "it is like a winnowing basket."

Those who had felt its tusks, said: "it is like a plough-share."

Those who had felt its trunk, said: "it is like a plough."

Those who had felt its body, said: "it is like a granary."

Those who had felt its feet, said: "it is like a pillar."

Those who had felt its back, said: "it is like a mortar."

Those who had felt its tail, said: "it is like a pestle."

Those who had felt the tuft of its tail, said: "it is like a broom."

And they fought amongst themselves with their fists, declaring, "such is an elephant, such is not elephant, an elephant is not like that, it is like this."

*The Udana or  
the Solemn Utterances of the Buddha*

Like the blind men in this Indian fable, participants in the debate on NATO enlargement, the governments of NATO nations, potential applicants, and neighboring countries "see" NATO from many different perspectives. All these perceptions have legitimate political and analytical foundations, but all also have limitations as the sole explanation of what NATO is and what it should become. To one degree or another, each of the following perspectives must be taken into account in any reformulation of NATO's mission and restructuring of the organization.

### **An Instrument for Dealing With Russia**

For many, NATO remains important as an instrument for dealing with the power and influence of Russia. Today, of course, Russia poses no imminent military threat to the United States or its European allies, but some observers see NATO as an important insurance policy against a future revival of Russian expansionism. For Moscow's former Warsaw Pact allies, NATO's most important function is to help protect them from a reassertion of Russian influence and control.

It is completely understandable that former Warsaw Pact countries and countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union would want NATO to help reassure against Moscow's re-imposition of control. The NATO governments share this interest, but they also see the need to make all possible efforts to develop a cooperative relationship with Russia, in the hopes of contributing to an external environment that will be conducive to democratic reform in Russia.

To the extent that NATO allies emphasize the collective defense function of the alliance, they make it more difficult to pursue a cooperative relationship with Russia. If collective defense is emphasized, the Russians naturally ask "defense

against what?" The shortcoming of this perspective, therefore, is that as long as there is a chance of Russia becoming a cooperative participant in European and international security relations, the allies cannot emphasize NATO's territorial defense function even if collective defense remains the bedrock of NATO membership.

### **An Extender of Security and Stability**

Advocates of NATO enlargement argue that NATO's new function is to spread stability and security to the East, to fulfill NATO's Cold War mission, and to prevent a security vacuum from emerging in the area. For example, this is the premise of much of the analysis completed by the RAND team of analysts that has advocated rapid enlargement of NATO membership.<sup>10</sup>

This perspective is a logical continuation of NATO's function of ensuring a European security environment that supports the interests of its member states. It also recognizes the need to integrate new democracies within the Western security community to avoid their slipping back toward totalitarian regimes or into regional conflicts that could spread beyond their borders.

The limitation of this approach is that most Americans and even some western Europeans are not willing to make commitments to the security of the new democracies at a time when they do not appear physically threatened and when electorates want their governments to take care of problems on the home front. A majority of experts probably would argue that preserving stability and promoting democracy in Central Europe serves important U.S. and western European long-term interests. The American public may not be convinced, however, that in the absence of imminent and overwhelming threats, money or political capital should be expended on defending against what they see as improbable contingencies. Some may believe that, even if these countries were threatened, the United States should not expose itself to nuclear or nonnuclear military risks on their behalf.

From this perspective, NATO's future may rest uneasily on the argument that its principal new mission is to extend security and stability to Eastern and Central Europe.

## **NATO as Part of a Cooperative European Security System**

In 1967, the NATO allies completed a study of the alliance's mission referred to as the "Harmel Report," named for Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who led the study group. The report affirmed NATO's critical role in defense and deterrence but suggested that the alliance also should be an instrument for promoting detente between East and West in Europe. This added role was critical to NATO's survival at a time of shifting East-West relationships. It demonstrated to allied electorates that NATO governments had no desire to perpetuate the costs and risks associated with the Cold War if tensions and threats could be reduced through political measures, including arms control negotiations, with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

When the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the Soviet Union disintegrated, and the Cold War ended, NATO had established clear credentials as a proponent of military cooperation as a path toward closer political relations. The NATO countries supported the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as the broad framework for peaceful relations among European states. But they also gave NATO new instruments to promote close ties with the former adversaries—a forum for political consultation, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and a program of military cooperation, the Partnership for Peace.

The program of outreach to former adversaries is undoubtedly essential to the future of NATO. This approach reflects continuity with the purposes of the alliance emphasized in the Harmel Report. Furthermore, the alliance would have very little credibility or appeal if it limited itself to defense cooperation among the present members. But it is also true that such cooperative ventures could be managed through other forums. The OSCE itself could arguably serve as the framework for much that is currently done in the NACC and the Partnership for Peace (although it would have to be given far more military security responsibilities fully to replace what NATO is doing through NACC and PFP). NATO's role as a key element in an emerging cooperative European security system therefore may



be a logical continuation of policy, but, probably is not, on its own, a sufficient foundation for the alliance's future.

### **An Instrument for Multilateral Military Cooperation**

NATO's principal function during the Cold War was to organize a defense against a potential Warsaw Pact attack that would deter such an attack and, if deterrence failed, be sufficient to preserve or restore the territorial integrity of NATO member states. Today, the NATO countries face no imminent threats to their security that compare with those encountered during the Cold War. The irony is that one consequence of the diminished threat environment is that continued military cooperation may be just as important as during the Cold War, but for different reasons.

The almost-universal reaction of the U.S. and other NATO governments, parliaments and electorates to the end of the Cold War has been to reduce military spending and shrink military forces and capabilities. This process has already made it more important for most countries to envisage operating in multilateral coalitions in all but the least demanding of military operations. The United States is perhaps the only country in the world that can envision operating militarily beyond its national borders unilaterally, without significant involvement with or assistance from coalition partners. But the American people and the Congress, as well as the administration, have decided that the United States should not be the world's "policeman." This means that even the United States will require international support—political, economic, and military—to promote and defend U.S. interests in a minimally stable international system.

NATO is uniquely qualified to serve as a framework for the continuation of military cooperation to deal with new challenges to peace and stability. The day-to-day planning, training, and exercising in multilateral settings is critical to the ability of coalition forces to work together under fire. In addition, cooperation in NATO in combination with defense cooperation in the Western European Union is viewed as necessary to avoid defense renationalization in Europe. Defense renationalization (greater self-reliance and less multilateral cooperation) would, at a minimum, waste defense resources. In the extreme,

renationalization could produce new regional arms competitions and growing tensions among European states.

Some analysts therefore believe that NATO's most important future function will be to sustain the habits of military cooperation that were developed during the Cold War. This approach is a key premise of NATO's New Strategic Concept, and currently no other organization has the mandate or the experience to perform the task of facilitating multilateral military cooperation.

The main question mark hanging over this perspective is that allied performance in Bosnia and the failure to implement the plan for Combined Joint Task Forces have called into question the political will of NATO countries to cooperate in dealing with the new security challenges in the absence of a Soviet-style threat.

### **A Burdensharing Tool**

NATO can also be seen as a way to ensure that other countries carry a fair share of the burdens of maintaining international peace. During the Cold War, some Americans saw NATO as a creator of burdens for the United States rather than as an instrument for sharing them. Some may still hold this view, but the U.S. military presence in Europe, down to approximately 100,000 troops on shore, is now increasingly oriented toward force projection and peace operations rather than toward defense of European territory. The day-to-day routines of U.S. forces there, once driven by the Warsaw Pact threat, now are focused predominantly on "peace operations," a term defined by the U.S. Army to include "traditional peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents."

Today, therefore, NATO can be seen as a way for the United States to share with its closest military allies and partner states the burdens of maintaining international security. The United States no longer views the defense of European territory as the principal mission of its forces in Europe. It is therefore increasingly possible to see NATO as a way to share the burdens

of international security maintenance with other countries. The main limitation on this perspective is that the allies are still in the early stages of deciding what burdens should be shared (just in Europe, in the European area, or more globally) and have not found working solutions for the question of how to share responsibilities as well as burdens.

### **A Way to Keep the United States in Europe**

One of the most pervasive European perceptions of NATO's role is that of keeping the United States involved in Europe. West and East Europeans believe that European peace and stability are still at least partly reliant on continued U.S. involvement in European affairs, particularly security affairs. Europe's 20th-century experience leads many Europeans to the conclusion that they are better off when the United States is directly involved in European security than when it is absent. This attitude has almost as much to do about internal relationships as it does with external threats. Russia is still a security concern for many Europeans, but they also are concerned about the dynamics of relations among themselves. In addition, some Europeans believe that a United States that is oriented toward another region or is isolated will be a much less predictable factor in international relations than one that is constructively involved in cooperation with European countries.

Therefore, even though European countries no longer rely on the United States for their physical security, they believe that their interests are served by a continuing transatlantic partnership. The shortcoming of this perception is that many Americans might see no U.S. self-interest in "remaining in Europe," and would see this factor as a disincentive for keeping NATO alive rather than as an incentive.

### **A Framework for Germany**

For Europeans, NATO and the transatlantic defense system remain an important part of the framework for Germany's place in and beyond Europe. Germany's constructive role and democratic accomplishments since World War II have built substantial trust and good will among its neighbors, east and west. Historical concerns linger long on the continent, however,

and excessive German power, even if it is limited to political and economic power, is still seen as potentially destabilizing, even by the Germans themselves.

Germany's security link to the United States through NATO helps reassure Germany's neighbors that Germany will not in the future feel it necessary, for example, to acquire nuclear weapons. The European Union is seen as a critical part of this framework for Germany, but the EU alone would not be sufficient reassurance for many in Europe, given the long and difficult nature of the process of European integration. Even if such concerns are not often voiced publicly, NATO is seen by many Europeans as a critical part of the reassurance system in Europe that has been responsible for peace and prosperity since World War II.

### **NATO Seen Fully**

In the fable of the blind men and the elephant, the Blessed One finally observes "Well is it known that some Samanas and Brahmanas, cling to such views, sink down into them, and attain not to Nirvana." An "ideal" NATO is probably beyond the reach of member governments today. And participants in the debate on NATO's future may well continue to "fight among themselves with their fists," as in the fable, declaring "such is an elephant, such is not an elephant." The future of the alliance most likely must be built on a foundation that accommodates all of these perceptions to one degree or another.

## **PARAMETERS: THE CONTEXT FOR CHANGE**

Proposals for NATO's further evolution will be lacking unless they take into account some basic and, in some cases, competing requirements. This analysis concludes that reform will have to:

- Accommodate the addition of new members to the alliance
- Keep the door open to a constructive relationship with Russia

- Accommodate European aspirations to develop a European pillar in NATO
- Involve France on a regularized basis
- Keep the United States interested and involved.

### **Accommodate Addition of New Members**

The next few years undoubtedly will see a continuing debate about NATO enlargement. Without prejudging the outcome of that debate in the United States and in other alliance countries, the best bet today is that at least a few countries will be invited to join NATO over the next 5 years. If this is so, an enlarged membership is one of the important parameters influencing the shaping of NATO's future mission, decisionmaking process, and organization.

If NATO were to continue the strategy and force deployment approach of the Cold War years, new members might be expected to increase defense spending, accept deployment of allied forces on their territory, and possibly host U.S. nuclear weapons. Allied countries might be expected to provide significant military assistance to help bring new members up to NATO standards.

NATO's strategic concept and other alliance programs, however, have placed a different emphasis on the approach to new members. Because the alliance perceives no threat to the peace in Europe on the scale posed formerly by the Soviet Union, the focus for alliance forces and for those of new members is on preparations for a variety of peace operations and contingencies much less demanding than territorial defense against a superpower opponent. It is therefore reasonable to presume that, unless the threat situation changes dramatically, new members will not require massive defense spending or assistance to play a useful role in NATO's new mission orientations or to be made more secure by becoming part of the alliance. No clear threat scenario exists against which applicant country military forces can be planned, so the issue is one for applicant and NATO governments to address: what levels of military interoperability are essential in what time frame, what levels of spending appear possible and in balance with the country's available resources, and what assistance are the United

States and other NATO countries willing to provide. In any case, the prospective new members will not be in a position to defend themselves against a superpower-type threat, but, in that respect, they will be in the same situation as every NATO country except, perhaps, the United States.

The prospect of enlargement does not appear to require the allies to change direction from that set out in the strategic concept. It does suggest that the new allied perception of the post-Cold War threat environment is the one that will condition acceptance of new members.

The simple addition of one, two, three, or more countries to the alliance raises questions about the efficacy of NATO's decisionmaking process. NATO traditionally has operated by consensus procedure. The process of building consensus among the current 16 members of the alliance is time consuming and, at times, difficult. How would the addition of new members affect the ability of the alliance to reach timely decisions and act on behalf of the interests of the members?

Enlargement clearly will not make the NATO consensus procedure easier or more expeditious, but would there be a large qualitative difference between today's NATO and an enlarged NATO? Perhaps not, but in any case, it might be prudent for the allies to consider amending NATO's procedures to permit certain decisions to be taken by something other than a pure consensus approach. An enlarged membership increases the importance of NATO decisionmaking and military command arrangements being sufficiently flexible to allow coalitions of the willing and able to act when the entire alliance membership does not join in or support a particular mission.

### **Keep Door Open to Russia**

The effect on relations with Russia of inviting former Soviet allies to join NATO is one of the most contentious issues in the debate on NATO's future. It can be argued that the actions of the United States and its allies will only minimally affect the political development of Russia. Whether or not Russia will continue its democratic evolution or retreat to authoritarianism of some sort is probably dependent primarily on internal Russian dynamics in which the United States and others have very little

influence. The future of Russian democratization and economic liberalization more likely depends on whether or not Russian citizens are able to enjoy a higher quality of life in a reforming system than on Russia's relationship with NATO.

On the other hand, U.S. and European policies will frame an important part of Russia's external environment. To the extent that these policies can make that environment conducive to a constructive Russian evolution, the U.S. and European Governments face important policy issues. Furthermore, Russia, even as distracted and non-threatening as it appears today, clearly has the political and military potential to call into question current hopes for the emergence of a stable and cooperative European security system. Whether European security relations move toward a cooperative model or toward some new form of confrontation would have profound implications for future U.S. foreign policy and defense spending.

At this point, Russians across the political spectrum oppose NATO enlargement. At least some of this opposition is based on Russian images of NATO as a instrument used by the West to work against Russian interests—old Cold War thinking. If NATO's future were defined primarily as an insurance policy against Russian revanchism, there would be no hope of changing such Russian perceptions. On the other hand, over time, Russian perceptions might become more benign as they observe the continuing evolution of NATO's day-to-day activities toward a wide variety of peace support activities, some of which will involve Russian officials, officers, and military forces through the Partnership for Peace program and other NATO outreach activities.

For most observers, it is apparent that the interests of the United States and its allies will be served best by a restructuring of NATO that protects against the possibility of a future threat from Russia while trying to make it less likely that such a threat will emerge. This will require that NATO's mission statement and activities reflect the desire to facilitate a Russian transition from Cold War opponent to post-Cold War partner. One American has observed that "Only when the Western alliance is reoriented [to meet the new challenges of peace operations and preparations for possible regional conflict] can its membership

be expanded without grave risk of pointlessly antagonizing Russia."<sup>12</sup>

### **Accommodate "European Pillar" in NATO**

The model of a united Europe effectively looking after its own defense needs is one that would please many Americans as well as Europeans. Even under the best of circumstances, however, most analysts doubt that Europe will in the near future be able to overcome differing foreign policy orientations and national sovereignty concerns to become an international actor in its own right. Further, European nations do not now appear willing to invest the resources required to prepare for a wide range of autonomous military interventions outside Europe without U.S. assistance.<sup>13</sup>

As noted above, the Clinton administration has taken a very favorable attitude toward European defense cooperation. U.S. experts and most officials understand that the process of European defense cooperation must be viewed as part of the long historical development of European unification more generally. Most of these experts are not misled by the rhetoric intended to promote the development of a common European foreign and defense policy. Marten van Heuven, for example, observes that, in spite of the tendency of the discussion to focus on institutional developments in Europe, U.S. policymakers will have to focus on the evolution of national European policies for the foreseeable future. According to van Heuven, "Emphasis on the architecture of European organizations—the tools to shape the purposes of Europe—obscures the fact that, for the present, the building blocs of Europe [will be] states, not international organizations. . . . Thus, even as American policy must creatively address the issue of relations with and within European organizations, . . . much of the American core business with Europe—trade relations perhaps excepted—will continue to have to be conducted on a bilateral basis."<sup>14</sup>

Some administration officials are frank enough in off-the-record discussions to say that the United States will continue to deal with European officials who have democratically based authority to speak and to act. For the time being, there is no supranational defense entity on the European level, and it is not



up to the United States to create such an entity. Therefore, even while hoping for the emergence of more coherence on the European level, the United States will continue to see representatives of national governments as the most reliable interlocutors on defense and security issues.

Nevertheless, NATO reform will need to take into account both the European aspirations to reflect greater European unity in their defense and foreign policies and the U.S. desire that the Europeans share more equitably the burdens of defense. It may be difficult to balance these desires with the reality that European cooperation will develop only slowly. NATO reform cannot be premised on the existence of a single European authority for defense when one is not likely to emerge during the next period of history, but NATO reform will have to be flexible enough to accommodate greater European responsibility and burdens in the relationship with the United States.

### **Regularly Involve France**

French President Charles de Gaulle removed French forces from NATO's integrated command structure in 1967, maintaining that subordination of French forces in peacetime to an American commander was an unacceptable qualification on French national sovereignty. Until the Cold War ended, the allies counted on French participation should NATO be attacked by the Warsaw Pact, but worried that French absence from peacetime cooperation would make it difficult, if not dangerous, for NATO and French forces to fight together should war come. The 1991 Gulf War ended up making this point clearly, which fortunately had not been tested during the Cold War.

A lesson that emerged from the coalition effort to remove Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait was that the forces of NATO allies were able to integrate their efforts against Iraqi forces because of the experience they had in preparing for a Warsaw Pact attack. U.S. and British forces, for example, worked together very closely and successfully. The French forces that were involved, however, had a difficult time fitting into allied operations. Because of incompatibilities in military equipment, communications, and procedures, French forces had to operate parallel to but largely separate from NATO forces.

Because France has both the capabilities and the political will to contribute to military efforts to maintain international peace, it has become increasingly important to bring those capabilities into a closer relationship with the forces of other NATO countries. French resistance to subordinating its forces to U.S. command remains strong, however, and the allies have been forced to find ways to adjust decisionmaking procedures to accommodate French participation. As one expert observed, "Since French reluctance to commit its forces to NATO's integrated command structure has remained firm, alternative mechanisms for overcoming that reluctance have had to be found, if only because France's military assets are too important to be left outside the NATO-WEU coalition framework."<sup>15</sup>

Over the last 2 years, the allies have attempted to accommodate French political concerns by adjusting the way the alliance does business. These adjustments have facilitated closer military cooperation with France, but they do not constitute a reliable permanent solution. The most difficult unresolved issue is that of political control of non-Article 5 operations conducted under NATO auspices or under WEU auspices with NATO and U.S. support. The problem is that the French Government still regards NATO's integrated command structure as a U.S.-dominated organization, because an American senior officer always serves as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

The French particularly object to U.S. command and control of operations in which the United States is not the principal military participant. Because of this French concern and the equally strong U.S. desire to keep the SACEUR in charge of military operations run out of one of his subordinate commands, the allies have not been able to agree on the final political guidance required to implement the CJTF initiative.

Resolution of this issue is absolutely critical to the future ability of the allies to respond effectively to non-Article 5 demands. The allies have already made some significant concessions to encourage closer French cooperation. For example, the role of NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in which France does not participate, has been de-emphasized by blending what would previously have been

discussions held in the DPC into the North Atlantic Council framework, where France does participate fully. (The French prefer that all important decisions be taken in the context of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's only decisionmaking body that derives its authority directly from the North Atlantic Treaty.)

Further evolution of the NATO system of political consultation, planning, and decisionmaking for military operations may be required, however, to cut a deal with the French that would regularize their participation in a systematic and effective approach to non-Article 5 military operations.

### **Keep the United States Interested and Involved**

Without an interested and involved United States, NATO loses all meaning. Some analysts have been led by recent events to conclude that this has already happened. In July 1995, columnist William Pfaff wrote that NATO's present "impotence" results because the alliance is "an agent of American policy, at a time when both executive and congressional branches of American government are convinced that the American public will electorally punish any decision placing U.S. forces at risk."<sup>16</sup> If Pfaff is right, then it is critically important to NATO's future that Americans see their interests as served by continuing military cooperation with the European allies. Why should the United States be willing to make any sacrifices to perpetuate such cooperation?

What are U.S. interests in maintaining the alliance? The United States finds itself at the end of the Cold War facing no imminent threats to its vital national security interests, and in the absence of a Soviet/Communist threat, the United States faces a spectrum of options between two extremes. One would be to become the global policeman, unilaterally enforcing sufficient world order to protect long-term U.S. political, economic, and security interests. Neither U.S. public nor elite opinion supports such a role. Another extreme would be to withdraw, taking an isolationist posture. Even though current American behavior suggests in many respects either an isolationist, unilateralist, or escapist approach to the world, most experts and officials

apparently reject this, at least in principle. Clearly, a range of multilateral options is found between these two extremes. The world apparently needs policing if regional conflicts are not to spread. In the longer term, the United States hopes to encourage the development of indigenous security arrangements in each region of the world to help maintain stability.

In the near term, if the United States does not want to be the world's policeman but believes that its values and interests require maintaining a degree of order in the international system, it presumably will have to rely on cooperation with other countries to police the international system. Multilateral military operations can be ineffective or even dangerous if not planned and practiced in advance. In theory, that leaves open a wide variety of organizational options, but when one looks for nations with compatible political objectives and military forces capable of, and experienced in, operating successfully with U.S. forces, most of them are members of NATO.

Perhaps the United Nations might one day provide a framework for military cooperation, but the consensus in the United States today is that we will not be able to count on the United Nations for effective operational control or even coordination of military operations for some time into the future. Many members of Congress, perhaps a majority, would oppose putting U.S. forces into combat under a U.N. command unless it is actually a U.S. or NATO command.

In sum, it appears that the United States and its NATO allies (and the new democracies who aspire to membership in NATO) have a continuing rationale for maintaining the Atlantic alliance and adapting it to the security environment of the post-Cold War world. In spite of the bad experiences in Bosnia, and the reality that there will be U.S.-European differences over security policy issues in the future, it appears that the United States and its allies have few promising options beyond NATO in the foreseeable future if they wish to preserve a degree of global stability and assume that the use of force may be required.

## **PROPOSALS: BEYOND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE**

### **Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain**

Under much different international circumstances in the mid-1980s, it was suggested that the NATO allies ensure NATO's future by striking "a new transatlantic bargain."<sup>17</sup> The main goal of the new bargain was to increase European responsibilities for alliance missions. Today, a new bargain may be required to clarify NATO's future role as well as to enhance the European role in the alliance. Most of all, however, a new bargain would require the United States and the European allies to commit themselves anew to a collective approach to advancing their common security interests.

Before the allies issue the first invitations to potential new alliance members, they might wish to strike a new bargain among themselves at a summit meeting, for example in the first half of 1997, that would make clear how they see their commitments to the alliance and to NATO's new roles and responsibilities.

### **Sharing Burdens and Responsibilities**

If the alliance is to preserve a degree of unity of purpose in the post-Cold War world, the allies will have to reform NATO's approach to military cooperation in ways that *share military burdens and responsibilities* rather than *dividing military burdens and responsibilities*. The tendency of recent years has been to divide. Until recently, the United States has largely told the Europeans that Bosnia is their problem; meanwhile, many Europeans have been looking for ways to accomplish military missions without U.S. assistance. This approach was enshrined in the January 1994 NATO summit that made much of separate European and American responsibilities and raised questions about the U.S. commitment to defense cooperation with its European allies.

The alliance probably cannot survive if these approaches persist. Rather, the allies would have to make a commitment to return to a sharing approach in which all allied governments

made a commitment to cooperate in NATO for the purpose of promoting international peace and stability. If future NATO programmatic and organizational decisions are not premised on a sharing rather than a dividing approach, allied cooperation will continue to deteriorate. Moreover, a sharing approach suggests that there should be no artificial geographic boundaries placed on non-Article 5 military cooperation. This means that non-Article 5 cooperation would be constrained only by the willingness and ability of the allies to contribute in any given instance. The mutual defense commitment contained in the NATO treaty's Article 5 will likely remain limited by the geographic description of its coverage in Article 6, but there is nothing in the treaty that geographically constrains non-Article 5 military cooperation.

### **Restating NATO's Mission**

NATO has been and always will be a political as well as a military alliance. In the early post-Cold War era, it was popular to say that NATO would have to adapt to new circumstances by becoming "more political." It is increasingly clear, however, that NATO's unique functional role remains its utility as a means to promote and implement political/military cooperation among member and partner states. As all member countries shrink the size and capabilities of their armed forces, the ability to form coalitions to deal with a wide variety of peace-threatening situations is becoming increasingly important. As British expert David Greenwood has put it, NATO is moving from an "alliance-in-being" to a "coalition-in-waiting," or perhaps, carrying the thought one step further, *variable* coalitions-in-waiting.

Collective defense remains at the core of the U.S. and allied commitments to the alliance. This analysis concludes, however, that collective defense will not be the principal focus of NATO's activities during the next period of history. Moreover, it would be politically divisive to try to enlarge the alliance and still maintain a constructive relationship with Russia if collective defense were to remain the main focus of alliance activity in this period. This change in NATO's mission is already reflected in NATO's routine work schedule.<sup>18</sup> NATO's day-to-day activities

are shifting from collective defense to collective responsibility sharing across a broad range of security-support activities. Such an evolution is the only one that can accommodate all the factors currently influencing U.S. and allied security interests. In this case, NATO's future mission will increasingly focus on the following mutually reinforcing goals:

- **Preserving habits of military cooperation**, by preparing allied commanders and forces to participate in multilateral military operations to ensure a high degree of readiness and interoperability among alliance and partner forces for whatever missions NATO nations may agree to take on, whether or not such missions are directed through the integrated command structure;
- **Promoting peace**, by developing cooperative military relations with partner countries, including Russia, through the Partnership for Peace program and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and through the cooperative use of allied military forces to provide humanitarian relief and disaster assistance, when necessary; using NATO cooperation to deter aggression by rogue states and discourage and deter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
- **Restoring peace**, by conducting multilateral military operations intended to restore or enforce a peace that has been broken by aggression or other sources of military conflict.

As long as no NATO country faces the kind of threat that used to be posed by the Soviet Union, NATO's strategy and force deployments will look substantially different than during the Cold War. They will be intended largely to support the functions specified above. This means that, unless circumstances change, the Article 5 mutual defense commitment will remain in NATO's "back pocket," readily available if necessary in the future, but not the day-to-day preoccupation of the alliance. Such a posture will help the allies make a more effective allocation of limited defense resources while reassuring Russia and other nonmember countries that their interests will not be threatened and, in fact,

will be reinforced by defense cooperation that develops around the nucleus of NATO member states.

This new mission focus, if it is to serve as NATO's main rationale for the next period of history, will have to be made clear to allied electorates, potential applicants, and countries that have partnership arrangements with NATO but that might not qualify for NATO membership in the near future, including, and especially Russia. A restatement of NATO's missions could take the form of a revised New Strategic Concept, accepted by allied governments at a summit meeting within the next 2 years. Furthermore, NATO will have to continue to evolve its internal organization, command structure, consultative and decisionmaking procedures, and its training and exercise routines to implement its new mission objectives.

### **Reaffirming U.S. Leadership and Commitment**

Perhaps the most important reform that the United States could initiate on behalf of NATO would be to start the process of rebuilding confidence among the allies in U.S. leadership and support among the American people for a U.S. international role based on collaboration with like-minded democracies. Such a commitment does not necessarily require deploying more troops in Europe or spending more money on defense. It would require greater clarity in U.S. executive and congressional policies about the U.S. role in the world.

One way to initiate the process of constructing a new form of U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War world could be for the Congress to pass, and the President sign, a Joint Declaration of Congress recommitting the nation to the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. Those goals, as laid down in the preamble and articles 1 and 2, include:

- Safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;
- Promoting stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area;
- Uniting their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security;



- Contributing toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being; and
- Eliminating conflict in their international economic policies and encouraging economic collaboration between any or all of them.

At the same time, the Joint Declaration could accept the principle that the new forms of cooperation in NATO outlined in the mission discussion above are essential to the U.S. interest of promoting international peace and stability while not becoming the world's policeman. Such a Joint Declaration could provide a bi-partisan foundation for self-interested U.S. policies that seek to share the burdens of maintaining a stable international system in cooperation with NATO allies and partner states.

### **Organizational Reform**

**Enhancing positions of Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT.** As noted earlier, the European members of NATO are not likely to relinquish fully their sovereignty within a supranational approach to defense in the foreseeable future, and certainly not as a result of the Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 1996. But they are likely to develop cooperative approaches among themselves that prove fiscally, politically, or militarily necessary or attractive. NATO will have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate this process.

By the same token, NATO's ability to perform its new missions will continue to be handicapped by a French position outside the framework of NATO military cooperation. The first reform suggested, intended to respond to this requirement, would restructure NATO to facilitate European command of operations taken on by largely European forces without damaging NATO's integrated command structure or breaking unity of command. Under this proposal, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) would remain U.S. officers, and their deputies Europeans. The Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT would be nominated by the members of the Western European

Union or of the European Union, if the Europeans wish, as a way of bringing NATO's European pillar into a close relationship to the NATO military command. The nominations would be approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to ensure the involvement of those NATO allies who are not WEU or EU members. The two European officers could also logically be the most senior military officers in the WEU or EU structure, as determined by the European allies.

In this new approach, the allies would have a variety of ways to conduct a non-Article 5 mission using the Combined Joint Task Force concept. When the allies decide in the North Atlantic Council to pursue a non-Article 5 mission in which the United States would participate fully, and to form a Combined Joint Task Force for the purpose, the SACEUR (or SACLANT) would be in charge, as would be the case under current NATO procedures. NAC guidance would flow through the NATO Military Committee to the SACEUR, down through a Major Subordinate Command to the CJTF commander.

In another scenario, if the NAC decided that the operation should be conducted largely by European allies with a supporting U.S. role, the Deputy SACEUR (or Deputy SACLANT) would assume control of the operation, with full access to the assets of the integrated command structure. In a third scenario, if the NAC decided that the European allies should take full responsibility for the operation without any U.S. role, the Deputy SACEUR (or SACLANT) would shift to his European (WEU or EU) command function and run the operation independent of U.S. or NATO support. In return for this strengthening of European responsibilities in the Alliance, the package deal would require that France negotiate reliable and predictable conditions with the other allies under which France would cooperate with NATO's reformed command structure. The goal of the allies would be to make practical arrangements for French involvement without sacrificing the integrity of the command structure.

It would be desirable if, in the first experience with such a system, the Deputy SACEUR were a French officer, and the Deputy SACLANT a British officer. (Currently, British officers hold both the Deputy SACEUR and the Deputy SACLANT

positions.) In the future, the Europeans might choose a German officer for the Deputy SACEUR position, but today Germany is still limited by domestic constraints on the use of its military forces. Thus Britain and France are likely to remain willing contributors in responses to non-Article 5 military contingencies.

Such a structure would create a way for the European allies to take responsibility for leadership and burdens within the NATO structure at a time when they have not elaborated a WEU or EU structure sufficient to support militarily demanding operations. If the system worked, it might help avoid unnecessary duplication of structure and resources that could result from elaborating separate WEU/EU capabilities. This approach would also have the advantage of not disrupting normal command relationships from the SACEUR/Deputy SACEUR (or SACLANT/Deputy SACLANT) level down through a major subordinate command to a Combined Joint Task Force operation.

One concern about European leadership of non-Article 5 operations has been that an Article 5 contingency could grow out of a non-Article 5 operation (for example, if the operation led to an attack on a NATO member's territory). The fact that the operation had been kept within NATO's command structure would allow the SACEUR easily to assume control to manage an Article 5 response, if the NAC agreed that such a response was necessary.

In order for such a system to work, when the NAC commits to a mission, the decision would have to specify what resources allies are willing to devote to that mission. *It would be particularly important for the United States to make clear what assets it would make available in the case of a largely European operation.* The United States would also be expected to follow through with its commitments once they are made. As Patricia Chilton argues, "Even greater damage [to allied cooperation] would result from a situation in which the US initially agreed to a WEU operation using NATO assets and CJTF headquarters, but later withdrew from this position."<sup>19</sup>

**Merging NATO and WEU structures in the Mediterranean region.** If the allies are not able in the near

term to agree to the reform of the command structure described above, or in combination with the reform, they might wish to try a more limited experiment with a merger of NATO and WEU command structures in the Mediterranean. An Italian defense analyst has suggested making the Mediterranean the region in which to concentrate efforts to develop the WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Maurizio Cremasco has proposed that subordinate headquarters under NATO's command in the Mediterranean, Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH), be restructured to be able to operate as NATO and WEU headquarters, with their commanders wearing NATO, WEU, and national hats. In a second phase, according to Cremasco, "The command and control of the Allied Forces in the Southern Flank is rotationally assumed by a European Admiral (who will wear a NATO and a WEU hat), flanked by an American Admiral (who will maintain his NATO and national hat)." <sup>20</sup>

Cremasco argues that this approach would encourage deeper security and defense integration of NATO and WEU, facilitate NATO and WEU crisis management activities in the Mediterranean, prevent unnecessary duplication of a European military structure parallel to that of NATO, ease implementation of the CJTF concept in the region, and help keep development of a European security and defense identity within the transatlantic context.

**A Combined Joint Task Force for Bosnia?** With the prospect of a peace settlement in Bosnia, NATO could seize on the opportunity to structure the planned Implementation Force (IFOR) as a NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Such an approach could help turn NATO's bad experience with Bosnia into a positive outcome. <sup>21</sup> A collective NATO force in Bosnia could be a credible presence for all former combatants and help ensure the success of the peace settlement. Allies and partner nations, including Russia, could contribute forces to the presence, and the burden could be shared by many nations rather than by a few. If some allies are reluctant to call the IFOR a CJTF, the alliance could nonetheless use the operation as a test case for command and decisionmaking procedures to be agreed for future CJTF operations.

**Reorganizing NATO commands along functional lines.** NATO commands are currently organized on a geographic basis, reflecting NATO's plan for defense against a Warsaw Pact attack as well as a political balance among NATO nations in the distribution of command organizations and responsibilities. With NATO increasingly focused on performing a wide variety of tasks largely beyond the borders of NATO members, the old geographically focused organization may no longer be the most effective way to do business.

A new organization might be constructed along functional lines, designed to facilitate training, exercising, and deployment of forces to meet the new diverse challenges to security. At the same time, a number of current commands could be combined and the entire structure streamlined. The exact nature of a functional reorganization is beyond the scope of this study, but it is clear that such a reform would inevitably meet substantial bureaucratic resistance from within national military establishments. It would have to be carefully planned in order to produce not only an effective military organization but also one that reflects a balance of political interests in the alliance.

Because there are so many self-interested perspectives on this issue, NATO might usefully appoint an independent commission composed of retired military officers from a wide range of NATO nations, respected military scholars and independent experts to develop recommendations for a new functionally organized command structure.

**Facilitating coalitions of the willing and able.** NATO is a consensus-based organization. According to the NATO Handbook, "When decisions have to be made, action is agreed upon the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority."<sup>22</sup>

As long as NATO remains a voluntary association among sovereign states the organization will operate on the basis of consensus. In the less orderly, less predictable post-Cold War world, and particularly with an expanded NATO membership, the requirement to achieve consensus for all actions that allied countries might propose or consider could, in theory, immobilize the alliance.

This issue was addressed in a nonattribution paper that circulated at NATO headquarters in 1994 and was provided to CRS anonymously in 1995. According to the view of its author, who at the time was involved at a high level in allied decisionmaking, NATO's current consensus system forces member nations either to approve an operation politically or to draw criticism from others for "blocking" action. In the observer's view, "A better solution would provide an 'emergency exit' for those unable or unwilling to participate which does not prohibit action by others. This can be done by *removing the requirement for consensus for Article 4 operations.*"

According to the author of this informal paper, the advocacy of a non-consensual approach to decisionmaking for non-Article 5 operations was rejected. The solution proposed would have created a separate NATO decisionmaking body for non-Article 5 operations, ranging from humanitarian relief and disaster assistance through peacekeeping to peace enforcement. According to the proposal, decisions in that body could be taken by at least two-thirds of Alliance members, with the majority including at least two of the four largest financial contributors to the alliance.

Any majority voting procedure for non-Article 5 operations probably will remain beyond political acceptance for the foreseeable future. And it should be noted that the consensus requirement can in fact facilitate decisionmaking by forcing countries to make difficult decisions in order to remain influential and respected members of the alliance. But the challenge of finding a way around the potential consensus barrier for non-Article 5 operations remains. In a time of reduced budgets and attempts to simplify governmental operations, it may not be prudent or necessary to create a separate decisionmaking body for non-Article 5 operations. And so perhaps the focus should be on decisionmaking procedures for non-Article 5 operations in the North Atlantic Council itself.

The allies could consider less formal alternatives to a weighted majority system like that proposed in the anonymous draft. Those could include allowing states that did not want to be politically linked to a given operation to "take a footnote" on a decision in the NAC as allies have done from time to time during

the alliance's history on decisions that posed domestic political or other difficulties for them. This would allow countries to opt out without blocking the operation. Countries could also take the option of remaining silent on a decision, neither agreeing to it nor footnoting their opposition. In the case of strong opposition, a country could perhaps even ask that none of its assets or contributions to infrastructure expenses be used in support of the operation. In all cases, the SACEUR would be required to render a judgment concerning whether or not the operation remained feasible in light of whatever support was offered by member states and whatever support was going to be withheld.

**Strengthening cooperation with partners.** As the alliance moves toward accepting new members over the next few years, it will be increasingly important to establish and nurture cooperation with partner countries that are not yet members. Such an effort is necessary to encourage partner countries to concentrate on the goals of developing effective civilian control of their military establishments and preparing to cooperate in NATO's new missions. Encouraging new democracies to move away from their understandable preoccupation with territorial defense and their residual fears about Russian domination would help create a more constructive, cooperative atmosphere in Central and Eastern Europe. Such an orientation would also help mitigate Russian concerns that NATO is working against legitimate Russian security interests.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), created during the Bush administration, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, an initiative of the Clinton administration, could work together more effectively. The NACC is a forum where all countries that wish to participate in a dialogue with NATO countries can do so;<sup>23</sup> the Partnership for Peace program allows any NACC nation to develop a program of cooperation tailored to their specific circumstances, abilities and needs. The Clinton administration has tended to give short shrift to the NACC while it concentrated on the Partnership for Peace and enlargement. In fact, however, the NACC and the PfP are natural partners in a program of NATO outreach.

U.S. defense analyst Jeffrey Simon has proposed a program designed to enhance the effectiveness to NATO's outreach to

potential new members as well as to countries that may not seek such membership or may qualify only many years in the future.<sup>24</sup>

Simon proposes

- Institutionalizing the NACC as the political/consultative umbrella under which the individual PfP programs would operate
- Establishing a position of NATO Assistant Secretary General for Eastern Affairs to provide political oversight and coordination for PfP's military activities and political objectives.

### **A Transatlantic Cooperation Community**

If the United States should recommit to an active and involved U.S. role in and beyond Europe, new cooperative approaches beyond those falling in NATO's mandate are likely required. Even though NATO's goals, listed above, include elimination of economic conflict in relations among the allies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has traditionally focused primarily on military aspects of security. In today's world, security is increasingly dependent on a variety of interdependent factors, including transnational political, economic, military, and other aspects.

There is apparently a growing sentiment in Western Europe that the challenges faced by the NATO allies cannot be completely resolved within the narrow confines of the alliance, or even in a treaty between the United States and the members of the European Union. The diverse nature of post-Cold War issues affecting allied interests suggests the need for a new initiative designed to broaden the context of the transatlantic relationship. The point of doing so would be to give form and substance to the apparent belief of all allied governments that, even in the absence of a Soviet threat, they continue to share many values, goals, and interests.

At the annual Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, Germany, in early February 1995, foreign and defense ministers from Britain, France, and Germany separately proposed a new European-American pact. German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe called for a "new, wider trans-Atlantic contract" designed



to emphasize the importance of military, political, and economic cooperation on behalf of Western economic interests and democratic values.<sup>25</sup> The approach was supported by Minister of Defence Malcolm Rifkind, who had advocated the idea some months earlier. Rifkind said, "Defense issues alone do not offer a broad enough foundation for the edifice we need." Along the same lines, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé called for "a new trans-Atlantic charter to consolidate the common desire of North America and Europe to contribute to international stability in all its dimensions."<sup>26</sup>

As suggested by these officials, creation of a Transatlantic Cooperation Community<sup>27</sup>—an intergovernmental consultative framework within which diverse cooperative projects could be initiated—could provide the new political foundation for cooperation required for the post-Cold War world. Such a community would encompass, not replace, NATO, which would remain the framework for transatlantic security cooperation. It would symbolize and provide a vehicle for consultation and cooperation between the United States and the members of the European Union. It would also help mitigate problems caused by the fact that some European NATO members are not currently members of the European Union, and would not be included in a U.S.-EU bilateral treaty. To add parliamentary involvement to the mix, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), NATO's interparliamentary consultative body, could become the Transatlantic Cooperation Community's representative forum for considering issues and making recommendations to the member governments. Perhaps most importantly, creation of a Transatlantic Cooperation Community might help generate the political energy in the United States and the European countries needed to address the challenges of moving beyond the Cold War, strengthening the international economic system, and dealing with new security challenges.

## NOTES

1. For background information on the CJTF initiative, see Stanley R. Sloan, *Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for NATO*, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 94-249 S, March 17, 1994.

2. For analyses of enlargement and Russia see Stanley R. Sloan and Steve Woehrel, *NATO Enlargement and Russia: From Cold War to Cold Peace?*, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 95-594 S, May 15, 1995 and Paul E. Gallis, *NATO: Enlargement in Central Europe*, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 94-879 F, November 10, 1994.

3. Stanley R. Sloan, *European Proposals for a New Atlantic Community*, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 95-374 S, March 10, 1995.

4. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991.

5. Article V states that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking, forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Article VI limits the geographic application of Article V (and only Article V) to the territory of the Parties in Europe or North America, the territory of Turkey and islands under jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

6. See appendix A for a survey of NATO's recent day-to-day activities.

7. For background on the Bush Administration approach see Catherine Guicherd, *A European Defense Identity: Challenge and Opportunity for NATO*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 91-478, June 12, 1991.

8. See Charles L. Barry, "NATO's Bold New Concept—JTF," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1994).

9. The "lessons" are drawn from Stanley R. Sloan, "U.S. perspectives on NATO's future," *International Affairs* 71-2, 229.

10. See, for example, Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps." *Survival* 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 7-33.

11. FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994), iv.

12. Michael O'Hanlon, "How to be a 'Cheap Hawk.'" *The Brookings Review* (Summer 1995): 35.

13. The Royal United Services Institute in London estimates that the development of independent logistic, intelligence, and communication systems as well as nuclear forces would require an increase in defense spending from a current European average of 2.5 percent of GDP by 1.5 percent. This amounts to an increase of \$107 billion per year into the next century, a sum which European constituencies are unlikely to be willing to support. See "The Defence of Europe: It Can't be Done Alone," *The Economist*, February 25, 1995, 19.

14. Marten van Heuven, "Europe in 1995: Identity, Architecture, and Commitment," RAND Paper, 1995, 13-14.

15. Patricia Chilton, "Common, Collective or Combined? Theories of Defense Integration in the European Union," in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds., *The State of the European Union (Vol. 3): Building a European Polity?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 81-109.

16. William Pfaff, "U.S.-Led NATO Is Neutered by American Domestic Concerns," *International Herald Tribune*, July 20, 1995, 8.

17. Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), 1985.

18. For a discussion of the operational shift in NATO's warfighting strategy away from entrenched forward-deployed forces to mobile reaction forces appropriate to post-Cold War threats see General George A. Joulwan, "The New NATO," in *The RUSI Journal*, April 1995, 2.

19. Chilton, 19.

20. Maurizio Cremasco, "Mediterranean Security: Issues and Prospects," Paper presented to a conference in Naples, Italy from 27 February to 1 March 1995, on "Mediterranean Security in the Post-Cold War Era" organized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University, Washington, DC. At the Lisbon meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in May 1995, France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal agreed to form a 12,000 strong rapid reaction force (EUROFOR) and a joint naval force (EUROMARFOR). These will come under the auspices of the WEU as forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU). The planned units, to be headquartered in Italy, could play an important role in implementation of Cremasco's suggested initiative and, more generally, in a developing cooperation between NATO and WEU.

21. The author appreciates contributions to the development of this thought by Stephen A. Cambone of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

22. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook*, Brussels, 1995, 94-96.

23. See S. Nelson Drew, *NATO From Berlin to Bosnia*, McNair Paper 35, NDU Press, 25. Drew's article draws particular attention to the accomplishments of the NACC in the first 6 months of 1993. The NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping succeeded, where NATO had failed, in outlining basic definitions and concepts, such as common terminology, and operational principles, for peace operations.

24. Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success," *Strategic Forum #44*, NDU Press, 1995.

25. Joseph Fitchett, "Western Europe Proposes New Trans-Atlantic Pact," *International Herald Tribune*, February 7, 1995, 1.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Originally discussed in Stanley R. Sloan, "US perspective on NATO's future," *International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (April 1995): 230-231.

## **APPENDIX A: NATO'S DAY-TO-DAY OPERATION: From Deterrence to Peace Support Operations<sup>1</sup>**

During 1994, many aspects of the day-to-day operations of the alliance have been specifically tailored to prepare NATO to operate in the new security environment. As a consequence, the alliance has already begun to assume some of the operational characteristics of a "peace-support" organization. In its planning, preparation, and training both with alliance members and with members of the Partnership for Peace program, NATO appears to be developing capabilities designed to carry NATO's mission beyond collective defense.

### **PROMOTING PEACE**

In a variety of ways, NATO is using military cooperation to promote peaceful and constructive relations among all states in Europe. The Partnership for Peace framework document signed by all partners and the Individual Partnership Programs developed between the Alliance and Partner countries on a bilateral basis emphasize goals of interoperability and cooperation in humanitarian and peace operations. This has been a consistent theme in joint exercises both planned and already undertaken. Three 1994 exercises took place in this context, and 11 major exercises, involving troops from the company to the battalion level, are scheduled for 1995. The first such exercise, *Cooperative Bridge 94*, conducted in Poland, helped to identify many requirements for effective peace operations with Partner countries. To date, smaller exercises on a multilateral basis among alliance and partner members, "in the spirit of PfP," have not been uncommon.

**Table 1. Partnership for Peace Exercises in 1995\***

<b>Major NATO-PIP Exercises Planned in 1995</b>			
<i>Name</i>	<i>Form/Type</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Area/Location</i>
Cooperative Rescue	Sea	7 June	Bulgaria
Cooperative Nugget	Land	6-28 Aug	Louisiana, USA
Cooperative Venture	Sea	4-18 Sept	Norwegian/Barents Sea
Cooperative Determination	Land	7-16 Sept	Romania
Cooperative Partner	Sea	10-15 Sept	Bulgaria
Cooperative Support	Logistic	25-29 Sept	Norfolk, USA
Cooperative Challenge	Land	26 Sept-6 Oct	Czech Republic
Cooperative Jaguar	Land, Sea, Air	2-13 Oct	Jutland/Denmark Baltic/Skagerrak
Cooperative Light	Land	12-24 Oct	Hungary
Cooperative Dragon-Esperia	Land	18-28 Oct	Italy
Cooperative Mermaid-Classica	Sea	Nov	Mediterranean Sea

\*Adapted from *NATO Review*, July 1995, 8.

For example, in January 1995, Albania hosted a search-and-rescue exercise in which the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, and Greece took part.<sup>2</sup>

Other exercises have promoted cooperative approaches to crisis management and peace operations. Exercise *Strong Resolve*, carried out in February and March of 1995, was designed to test NATO mobility and ability to deploy rapidly into areas of potential conflict, pursuant to NATO's new emphasis on highly mobile forces. Crisis Management Exercise 95 (CMX 95), a planning exercise conducted at NATO headquarters, was aimed at testing consultation and cooperation procedures, and encompassed peace operations and civilian-military cooperation themes. Traditional Cold War scenarios dealing with East-West conflict or nuclear use were excluded from this exercise.<sup>3</sup>

In August 1995, exercise *Cooperative Nugget*—the first Partnership for Peace exercise to occur within the United States—simulated a joint deployment of Allied and Partner forces to a war-torn island republic. This exercise sought to accomplish the dual goals of developing practical military skills required for multilateral humanitarian interventions and of cultivating military-to-military contacts and mutual understanding between former adversaries.

The stated goal of such exercises is to “develop cooperative military relations between the Partners and NATO for the purposes of joint planning, training and exercises in support of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and other operations as may be subsequently agreed” as well as to “develop among Partners forces that are better able to operate alongside those of NATO.”<sup>4</sup> The objective is to develop habits of cooperation for deploying multilateral forces for “collective responses to threats to peace and stability” alongside NATO forces.<sup>5</sup>

## **SEMINARS AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGES**

In addition to the major exercises both already undertaken and planned, NATO has organized a wide range of seminars. Such seminars have covered topics such as “Legal Aspects of

Peacekeeping” and “Peacekeeping and its Relationship to Crisis Management.” These meetings may be valuable in contributing to the development of common Allied and Partner perspectives on such issues and in transferring practical information to Partner countries. They may also serve to create personal links between military and civilian officials.

The establishment of permanent military liaisons between NATO and eleven Partner members at NATO headquarters in Brussels and through the Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium, aids in facilitating such initiatives. The liaison officers in Brussels participate in meetings of the Political-Military Steering Committee, and the Coordination Cell is tasked to coordinate joint Partner-NATO military activities and to carry out overall planning to implement Partnership programs. The permanent basing of these officers in close quarters with Allied planning and command institutions may serve to deepen channels of regular communication and coordination between the Alliance and Partner defense communities both at the organizational and personal levels. Brussels and Mons-based Partner officers and their families take part in SHAPE community life and their children attend SHAPE schools, increasing opportunities for such links to form. Such cooperation also serves as a confidence-building measure among partner countries as well as between them and NATO allies.

Meanwhile, each class at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, now routinely includes officers from non-NATO nations for 2-week periods of participation and study. Midlevel officers and defense and foreign ministry officials from former Soviet states, former neutral nations and East and Central European countries join actively in the lectures and seminar discussions on international and European security issues.

## **PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR PEACE OPERATIONS**

The implications of peace operations for defense planning were addressed as early as December 1992, at the meeting of NATO's Defense Planning Committee. Specifically, the ministers said



that the DPC would identify measures in the area of command and control, logistical support, infrastructure, and training that could contribute to NATO's peace operations capabilities and incorporate planning and preparation in this area into Alliance procedures.<sup>6</sup> The defense planning process has been made open to participation by Partner states to improve transparency in defense planning. Such planning is aimed at the practical goal of enhancing interoperability so that Partner forces can operate side by side with NATO forces in peace operation scenarios, but also seeks to develop a "common defense culture and habits of cooperation."<sup>7</sup> Such common defense culture and planning, in which collective rather than competitive aspects of security are emphasized, has played a central role in avoiding the renationalization of defense within alliance members.<sup>8</sup>

The autumn 1994 meeting of NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors emphasized the development and procurement of joint systems with applicability for peace operations. One such system is a proposed joint allied ground surveillance system, similar to the U.S. AWACS system, which has been used extensively in operations over the former Yugoslavia. The need for effective combat "friend or foe" identification systems, crucial both in war-making operations as well as in peace operations, has been identified, and options are under study for cooperative testing and eventual deployment. Self-protection systems for transport planes as well as mine-detection systems capable of detecting nonmetallic mines, a weapon widely used in the former Yugoslavia, were also discussed at this conference.

Long-term planning regarding interoperability, both within NATO as well as between alliance members and Partner states, has begun to emphasize peace operations as well. In early 1995, the North Atlantic Council decided to organize a new Standardization Organization, with the goal of improving allied policies concerning materiel, technical and operational standardization. To encourage participation in standardization planning, they stated that they would consider input from partner countries. The heads of the committee; Robin Beard, Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support; and General G.J. Folmer, Director of the International Military Staff, affirmed that

considerations of interoperability in the field of peace operations would play an important role in the work of the committee.<sup>9</sup>

## **NATO IN BOSNIA**

NATO's participation in the Bosnian conflict stands as the current example of an operational deployment of NATO forces in a peace-support capacity. Since its invitation in 1992 to provide air support for threatened U.N. peacekeepers and enforce the naval embargo of the former Yugoslavia, NATO has actively supported the efforts of the United Nations. Active support has not translated into flawless coordination, however, apparently because of unresolved operational and political issues both between these organizations and within the alliance itself.

Alliance preparation to assist in any potential withdrawal of UN forces from the former Yugoslavia has been continuous and extensive. In late February 1995, NATO conducted a computer simulation of an UNPROFOR evacuation. NATO contingency planning in the former Yugoslavia was a key issue discussed at a March 1995 meeting of U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, the French, German, and British defense ministers, and NATO Secretary General Willy Claes. They announced that contingency planning was complete and that the first phase of the operation, pre-positioning of equipment, had already taken place. The second phase, involving creation of communications and control centers in and around Bosnia, was not launched at that time because of concerns that such preparations could be interpreted as a sign that a withdrawal was imminent.<sup>10</sup>

## **NATO AS A PEACE OPERATIONS SUPPORT ORGANIZATION**

This brief survey of activities illustrates the extent to which NATO's day-to-day activities are focused on peace operations support. NATO appears now to be uniquely qualified to play such a role, even if the new mission focus has not been clearly articulated by NATO members.

**NOTES**

1. Prepared by Jason D. Meyers, an M.A. candidate in U.S. Foreign Policy at the American University, Washington, DC.
2. *Atlantic News*, January 27, 1995, 1.
3. *Atlantic News*, February 3, 1995, 2, and February 22, 1995, 3.
4. Partnership for Peace framework document, agreed on the 10th of January, 1994.
5. Drew, 31.
6. NATO Press Communique, December 11, 1992, paragraph 4.
7. Manfred Woerner, cited in Drew, 28.
8. Drew, 28.
9. *Atlantic News*, January 27, 1995.
10. *Atlantic News*, March 8, 1995, 3.

## **APPENDIX B: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY**

Washington DC, 4th April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

### *ARTICLE 1*

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

### *ARTICLE 2*

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

### *ARTICLE 3*

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

### *ARTICLE 4*

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of

them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

#### ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

#### ARTICLE 6<sup>3</sup>

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France<sup>(\*)</sup>, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

#### ARTICLE 7

The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

<sup>3</sup> As amended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey.

<sup>4</sup> On 16th January 1963 the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 3rd July 1962.

*ARTICLE 8*

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

*ARTICLE 9*

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

*ARTICLE 10*

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

*ARTICLE 11*

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.<sup>3</sup>

*ARTICLE 12*

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time

<sup>3</sup> The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

*ARTICLE 13*

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

*ARTICLE 14*

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other signatories.

## **APPENDIX C: THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

Agreed by the Heads of State and Government  
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic  
Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991

1. At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognized that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.

### *PART I - THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT*

#### *The New Strategic Environment*

2. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.

3. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity; and the enhancement of the role of the WEU, are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the rôle and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence rôle, reflected



in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

4. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE agreements and confidence and security-building measures of 1990). Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be pursued following President Bush's September 1991 initiative. Also of great importance is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon systems and provide for effective verification procedures. All these developments will also result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would be further enhanced by the achievement of an Open Skies regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports and the proliferation of certain weapons technologies.

5. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual framework for consultation and co-operation that can play a constructive rôle, complementary to that of NATO and the process of European integration, in preserving peace.

6. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.

7. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment in which the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

#### *Security Challenges and Risks*

8. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in

nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.

9. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.

10. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.

11. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.

12. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.

13. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.

14. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks

have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of different crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.

15. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.

## *PART II - ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS*

### *The Purpose of the Alliance*

16. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

### *The Nature of the Alliance*

17. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

18. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives.

19. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and

with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

*The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance*

20. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

21. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

- I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
- II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
- III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
- IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

22. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have rôles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

23. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

*PART III – A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY*

*Protecting Peace in a New Europe*

24. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and

establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.

25. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

26. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

27. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to cooperation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major rôle in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

28. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the rôles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

#### *Dialogue*

29. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unre-

cedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater cooperation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.

#### *Cooperation*

30. The Allies are also committed to pursue cooperation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of cooperation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

#### *Collective Defence*

31. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and cooperation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

#### *Management of Crisis and Conflict Prevention*

32. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.

33. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of

Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.

34. The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the rôle of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.

#### PART IV – GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE

##### *Principles of Alliance Strategy*

35. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

36. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

37. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of rôles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defence rôle progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the

European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.

38. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation.

39. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

#### *The Alliance's New Force Posture*

40. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies' military forces and in their posture.

#### *The Missions of Alliance Military Forces*

41. The primary rôle of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this rôle must take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.

42. In peace, the rôle of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the mainten-



ance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and cooperation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.

43. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.

44. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.

*Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture*

45. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organization of the Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies' forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

46. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:

- (a) that the overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced;
- (b) that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the adjacent areas.

47. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective rôle both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:

- (a) Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.
- (b) The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility – albeit unlikely, but one that prudence dictates should not be ruled out – of a major conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance.
- (c) Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.
- (d) In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance's political authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance forces.

#### *Characteristics of Conventional Forces*

48. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable elements.

49. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to cooperate closely

and combine and assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:

- (a) *Ground forces*, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be a greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.
- (b) *Maritime forces*, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.
- (c) *Air forces*, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both independent air and combined operations – counter-air, air interdiction and offensive air support – as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their rôle in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.

50. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile defences.

51. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.

52. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key rôle, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important rôle to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence. Allies' efforts to achieve maximum co-operation will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.

53. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible

contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed flexibly as part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.

54. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.

#### *Characteristics of Nuclear Forces*

55. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential rôle by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent rôle of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

56. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear rôles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces

need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

57. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated.

### *PART V - CONCLUSION*

58. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; cooperation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.

59. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and cooperation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.

60. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stanley R. Sloan is the Senior Specialist in International Security Policy for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He has held a variety of analytical and supervisory positions in CRS for over 20 years. Prior to his CRS service, Mr. Sloan served in a number of capacities at the Central Intelligence Agency, including Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe and NATO desk officer. He also served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Air Force.

Mr. Sloan is the author of numerous reports for Congress and journal articles on international and European security issues. His books include *NATO in the 1990s* (1989) and *NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain* (1985).

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
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