RESOLVING THE NUCLEAR DISPUTE WITH IRAN BY NEGOTIATION
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KEY POINTS
As the UN Security Council prepares to meet to consider next steps in the light of Iran’s refusal to suspend its enrichment activities and its counter-proposal delivered on 22 August, this BASIC Note outlines the position of the parties involved and proposes a number of solutions for those considering action in New York, namely to:

• Delay any hasty moves towards sanctions and to consider Iran’s counter-proposal seriously. Sanctions are only likely to close off communication and, judging by previous examples, would be doomed to failure;
• Ditch preconditions and take up Iran’s offer of ‘serious talks’, starting with a genuine attempt to define the interests of all the key players involved;
• Identify common ground and isolate areas of conflict in order to formulate compromise proposals;
• Publish an agreed UN Security Council document on the security risks involved with the different technologies being developed by Iran, in order to prioritize proposals and demands accordingly, and search for common solutions; and
• Develop the proposals offered by the P5+1 on 6 June into concrete offers to Iran in return for tighter inspections and abandoning all ambitions towards reprocessing (as offered by the Iranians in 2005).

In addition, the international community should be applying pressure on the United States, Israel and Iran to enter into mutual security guarantees, as part of a regional security system. And UN Security Council members should consider their own deployment of nuclear weapons and engage more seriously in furthering the multilateral disarmament commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Introduction
This summer has seen an exceptional amount of world attention turned towards Iran. A brief review:

• The P5 (UN Security Council permanent members) and Germany laid out a proposal on 6 June calling for the suspension of Iranian uranium enrichment in return for a series of incentives.
• Iran’s leaders stalled, identifying 22 August as the date they would convey their formal response, while also making clear their consistent opposition to suspension of uranium enrichment.
When Israel invaded Lebanon to attack Hezbollah positions, Iran was simultaneously blamed for supplying and possibly directing Hezbollah attacks, and implicitly threatened with retaliatory attacks.

An EU/US push for action led to UN Resolution 1696 (passed on 31 July) calling for a halt to all enrichment activities in Iran by 31 August with the threat of sanctions in the case of non-compliance.

Ultimately, on 22 August, Iran came forward with a 21-page set of counter-proposals that offers the possibility of temporary enrichment suspension in negotiations (although the details of this counter-proposal have not been made public).

Ali Larijani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, when handing over Iran’s counter-proposals to Javier Solana, offered to start “serious” and “constructive” talks. These counter-proposals are apparently without preconditions and explicitly include “nuclear issues”. Iranian officials say that this amounts to a “new formula” capable of resolving the dispute. The reaction from the US government, and from Western media on both sides of the Atlantic, has generally been dismissive.

So what happens next? The EU and US, through UNSC Resolution 1696, have required nothing less than the full suspension of enrichment, but the Iranians will not accept that precondition. The UN Security Council will meet in early September to discuss the next steps. It is likely that the United States will push for limited and targeted sanctions, accusing the Iranians of defying the will of the international community. This BASIC note details the various proposals in play, outlines the positions of the key parties to the dispute and offers some alternative and more realistic solutions.

An evolution of proposals

A number of proposals have travelled back and forth in the negotiations between the Europeans and Iranians since talks opened after the Paris Agreement of November 2004. It is clear that Iranian proposals have emphasized a broad regional security approach, including action against terrorism (indicated by a stated willingness to reign in the actions of Hamas and Hezbollah, and to see to their disarmament and integration into the political structures of Palestine and Lebanon), further agreement to reinforce respect for sovereignty and national security, and technical and economic cooperation. In outlining their proposals to the joint meeting in March 2005, Iranian negotiators accepted the possibility of limiting Iran’s nuclear program along the following lines:

- Open fuel cycle (no reprocessing);
- Ceiling of enrichment at LEU level and limitation on the extent of the program;
- Immediate conversion of all enriched uranium into fuel rods;
- Continued implementation of the Additional Protocol and continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the Uranium Conversion Facility at Isfahan and the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz; and
- A permanent ban on nuclear weapons, and the enforcement of Iranian export controls on sensitive nuclear technologies and materials).

The Iranian proposals to the March and April 2005 meetings had clear precursor suggestions to those that were included in the European proposals later in August 2005. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President represented a turning point in relations, but it is still not clear if the deterioration in negotiations first occurred as a direct result of any change of policy by the Iranians, or more likely from an anticipation by the Americans and Europeans of hostility arising as a result of the new president’s election. What is clear is that the talks soured: the offer from the Europeans was delayed into August, and when the Iran restarted its uranium conversion activities on 1 August the opportunities for compromise had diminished considerably.

The August 2005 E3/EU offer was characterized by BASIC at the time as strong on demands and weak on concrete offers. It showed little willingness to make clear and concrete positive proposals until Iran had made commitments not to develop its nuclear fuel cycle activities and to place all nuclear work under tight safeguards. The E3/EU offer may not have demonstrated clear
respect for Iranian interests, and may have been motivated more by a fear of confrontation with Washington, which was not prepared to tolerate any Iranian enrichment than by a desire to resolve the dispute. The Iranian response was furious, and had an air of finality about it, pushing the diplomacy further towards a crisis situation.

The subsequent P5+1 offer made on 6 June 2006 was an improvement on the previous offer in two key respects: it involved all the major parties representing the Security Council (P5+1); and it was less demanding and included clearer incentives to Iran. BASIC highlighted seven key aspects to the draft offer that had been leaked at the time:

1. The willingness of the United States to sit down directly with Iran.
2. Recognition of the Isfahan uranium conversion plant.
3. An international fuel cycle centre in Russia involving the Iranians.
4. A five-year fuel-bank/buffer stock for Iran.
5. Affirmation of Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
6. An energy partnership that included investment in Iran’s oil and gas infrastructure, and assistance in energy conservation and renewable technologies.
7. A new regional political forum to involve Iran and other regional states to discuss security guarantees, and a WMD-free zone for the Middle East.

Subsequently ‘Elements’ of the P5+1 package were published by the French Foreign Ministry. It is difficult to know whether this is a summary document or the full proposal. This final offer, made after the Europeans consulted with the United States, appears to have diluted those offers outlined in the draft, particularly that which would have most interested the Iranians, namely the security guarantees. The regional political forum to discuss security guarantees and a WMD-free zone was relegated to a vague ‘new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues’.

The fatal flaw within the final offer was the precondition to Iran that it give up enrichment before coming to the negotiating table: giving up leverage with no clear quid pro quo commitment on the part of the US or the Europeans. The Iranian delay in replying was therefore inevitable; it would require complex internal discussions to hammer out an agreed line when offered tempting nuggets, alongside an unacceptable precondition that Iran give up its principle bargaining chip.

The Iranian counter-offer remains secret at the time of writing. However, the 21-pages had sufficient substance for Javier Solana, representing the EU in the negotiations and the formal recipient of the counter-offer, to decline any immediate formal public reaction. He limited his remarks to saying that “the document is extensive and therefore requires a detailed and careful analysis”. Official Iranian declarations and reports since then strongly suggest that the Iranian counter-proposal rejected pre-conditional suspension of enrichment, but that suspension within the negotiations would be considered. Officials outside the US approached for comment have remained tight-lipped, and appear willing to continue unofficial communications with the Iranians to clarify the offer. If the desire of the Iranians in offering this complex response was to prevent a rapid international move towards sanctions and possible military action, it appears, up to now, to be working.

**National perspectives**

**United States**

The outcome of policy choices in Washington will probably determine the future of this dispute. Policy towards Iran appears to be shifting back into the hands of the hawks within the Administration.

But this inflexible “unilaterally suspend enrichment” directive has backed the US Administration into a corner. UN sanctions will be called for, but Russia and China are very unlikely to answer favourably (without either further evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapon programme or some
sweeteners to the deal). Alongside some European states, they are particularly cautious about
the use of Chapter VII action (sanctions) when such a resolution may be interpreted in the future
by a US Administration as lending legitimacy to any unilateral military action (as was done with
Iraq). Similarly, the EU may also take a less strident approach, considering its energy and
commercial interests, and its clear desire to resolve the dispute by diplomatic means. However, if
the EU does join the United States in probably limited, targeted sanctions the stakes will be
raised considerably. In particular, a solution that allows both Iran and the United States to save
face becomes much harder to foresee. The US will not be able to back down without a
considerable concession from Iran, but Iran will be reluctant to easily give up its principal card:
enrichment. With limited (and likely ineffectual) sanctions in play, the rhetoric from US hardliners
will only increase, and the likelihood of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will grow
stronger.

US moderates are perhaps beguiled by the apparent newfound willingness of the Bush team to
follow the diplomatic route, but the Administration’s tactics have lacked any serious commitment
to the negotiation process, and any willingness for compromise on their demands. The public
mood in the United States appears sceptical, but nevertheless supportive of a diplomatic
approach, perhaps recognising that the options available to the US are few. The latest opinion
polls indicate that only 14% of Americans believe diplomatic measures will now stop Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. However, it also appears that 59% of Americans support
negotiations even if Iran refuses to suspend enrichment. It is unlikely the Bush administration will
accept this public desire. With the appropriate spin, many Americans could be convinced to
approve an attack if they are made to feel that a rejection of the “generous” P5+1 proposals is a
slap in the face for US diplomacy. 87% of Americans actively distrust Iran according to the same
poll, but few are likely to have bothered to assess the situation from the Iranian perspective. A
suspension of enrichment without concrete and well-defined incentives in place leaves the
Iranians with nothing.

The US Administration is not in a position to impose additional sanctions on Iran itself, as it
already has a full direct (and formally at least indirect) sanctions program. Sanctions achieved
through negotiation with allies or within the United Nations are likely to be limited either in
geographic scope or in sector, and could leave the Iranian government stronger (see ‘sanctions’
below).

Iran

“For twenty-five years, I have focused on security issues surrounding Iran and the region.
Never have I seen such potential for commonality of purpose and concern about mutual
sources of threat in significant areas.”

Official message from Hassan Rowhani, then-secretary of Iran's Supreme National
Security Council, to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 18 July 2005

Iran’s objectives in opening negotiations with the United States were set out clearly in its Spring
2003 proposal, made soon after President Bush declared victory against Iraq. It requested:

• An end to US hostile rhetoric towards and interference within Iran;
• An end to all sanctions;
• The achievement of a fully democratic government within Iraq, support for war
  reparations and respect for legitimate Iranian interests within Iraq;
• Access to nuclear, chemical and biotechnology for peaceful purposes;
• Recognition of Iran’s legitimate security interests within the region; and
• Pursuit of anti-Iranian terrorist organisations, especially the MKO.

Iran, somewhat justifiably, feels it has a strong negotiating position that has not been recognised
by the US Administration or European governments. As the previous section pointed out, the
P5+1 proposal demanded Iran give up enrichment prior to sitting down at the table, while it
offered little in advance in the way of specific offers. The Iranian leadership is holding out for
more. This crisis represents an enormous opportunity for Iran to normalise its relations with the
West and gain some significant economic and security guarantees. These are tangible benefits that Iranian moderates recognise only too well,

On the other hand, the pursuit of nuclear technology and, perhaps, a nuclear weapon capability, carries enormous appeal with hard-line factions represented by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khomeni. These factions within Iran see nuclear weapon possession as a clear deterrent to US and Israeli aggression as well as the defining capability for Iran to be the leading power in the region; a return to a historical leading Persian role in the Middle East.

Many Iranians, both hard-line and moderate, are also upset by what they see as a lack of recognition for their country’s contribution to the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, through long-term support of the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of warlords and militias from the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara minorities, by supply of military equipment, training and military advice. Despite such support, the US Administration rebuffed offers of negotiation and continued to label Iran as a “rogue state”. From the perspective of many Iranians, the US’ tacit support of Israel’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capability and the recent agreement to supply the nuclear-armed India with nuclear technology, seems like blatant hypocrisy. Thus, many Iranians see themselves as at the vanguard of the challenge to the established discriminatory international order, and that international law (notably Article IV of the NPT) is on their side in protecting their rights to technology.

It is widely acknowledged within Iran that if it were to produce its own nuclear weapon a Middle East nuclear arms race could ensue. Several other countries in the region are likely to invest money and research into their own nuclear programs, including Kuwait (always fearful of neighbourly aggression) and Saudi Arabia (the prevailing Sunni power). Indeed, the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the region is likely to be detrimental to Iran’s regional strategic interests, in that nuclear-armed competitor states would threaten Iran’s security more directly and achieve strategic parity. Thus, the consistent statements from leading Iranian political and religious leaders that Iran has no interest in nuclear weapons and are supportive of the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, also has some strategic rational. And if security guarantees could be obtained from the United States, and perhaps Israel, the strategic rational for an Iranian bomb largely disappears.

**European Union**

The E3 (France, Germany and Great Britain) have been in negotiations with Iran over this issue, on and off, for three years now. It is widely seen as a test case for European foreign policy after the divisions caused by the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The November 2004 temporary suspension of Iranian enrichment was seen as an initial success for European diplomacy. When the Iranians restarted enrichment in August 2005 the E3 saw it as an affront to their position, leading to a more determined stance. The EU could well enact its own targeted, but limited sanctions, in support of those already in place by the United States. But many EU member states are reluctant to add fuel to the fire or to hand over valuable commercial opportunities and essential energy sources to Russia and China. Opposition to military action is currently widespread within the EU, though key leaders (notably Tony Blair and Angela Merckel) have refused to rule it out, believing the threat to be an important negotiating tool.

**Russia and China**

As Permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China hold powerful positions in this diplomatic game. Both countries are keen to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons – they fear Islamic extremism as much as the US Administration. Both, however, also have strong interests in spoiling any strong rapprochement between Iran and the West that might harm their current and future commercial interests in Iran.

Russia is currently recommitted to building the Bushehr reactor and has invested heavily in the Iranian oil industry infrastructure. A more adversarial and distant relationship also seems to be developing between Russia and the West, particularly with regards to the US. This is partly due to renewed confidence in Russia’s own place in the world, bolstered by a much stronger
economic performance in recent years, its possession of globally-critical energy reserves, and partly by a perception that it continues to be frozen out by key Western institutions, such as NATO and the EU. In particular, the recent misguided US sanctions imposed on two Russian state-owned companies, Sukhoi and Rosoborexport, for violation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) will have harmed the chances of Russian support for sanctions.\textsuperscript{9} Thus, according to resurgent Russian strategic interests, Iran plays an important offsetting role to the US power in the Middle East. Russia and Iran together also hold more than 50% of the world’s known reserves of natural gas, which is widely expected to grow in strategic importance over the next decade or so.

China’s growing hunger for energy inevitably determines its foreign policy towards Iran and the Central Asian states to the north. Chinese Government officials have consistently called for both sides to rely upon negotiation to solve the dispute. Generally Chinese diplomacy within the UN Security Council has aimed at avoiding isolation, and there is a strong desire not to confront the United States directly in a manner that could severely harm relations. But if Russia ends up opposing sanctions, China will very likely back them up.

Sanctions

By declaring sanctions as the next step if enrichment is not immediately suspended, the US Administration has backed itself (and allies like Britain, France and Germany) into a corner. No matter how moderate the latest language may seem, the E3 and US Administration are still requiring enrichment suspension before considering Iran’s counter-proposal.\textsuperscript{10} Domestic politics in both Iran and the United States make a return to constructive negotiations very difficult at this point. The Bush administration is especially hesitant to admit error or concede on any issue, let alone one with such significance as this. The US Administration is undoubtedly pushing its allies to support limited sanctions, yet it is widely acknowledged that sanctions are not a credible threat.

In the short term sanctions would escalate the situation. Iran may respond with an oil embargo, though unless alternatives markets can be found rapidly, this option could cripple the Iranian economy, and has been dismissed by Petroleum Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh. Sanctions would more likely drive Iran into the hands of Russia and China, unite the moderates behind the hardliners, and increase public support for the regime, all making it more difficult for the West to gain traction. In the end, sanctions are a move away from negotiation and close down opportunities for breakthrough.

The record suggests that sanctions are not particularly effective and simply take too long to work. The impact of sanctions is weakened by easy access to markets and capital in a globalised world, by alternative secondary suppliers and buyers, which Iran is likely to find in Asia, and by illicit supply routes, for which Iran is well furnished.

The only clear and significant example of success was the sanctions regime imposed against apartheid South Africa, but it took nearly 30 years from the first UN resolution in 1962 to the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. In the 1990s sanctions contributed to the achievement of US foreign policy goals in less than 20% of the cases, according to Jeffrey Schott of the Institute for International Economics.\textsuperscript{11}

Sanctions can also have unintended short and long-term consequences. Those applied against Iraq in the 1990s, for example, undoubtedly slowed the Iraqi military build-up, but also crippled the economy, caused huge suffering for the Iraqi people, and paradoxically strengthened Saddam’s hold on power by enabling the regime to focus national unity around this act of ‘external aggression’, and exert a tighter grip on all economic activity. . It is likely that sanctions against Iran, even limited or targeted sanctions, would have a similar impact.

Enforcing sanctions will also prove highly problematic. Opportunities to interdict supplies to Iran are hampered by large porous borders with a number of states with populations likely to be uncooperative with US forces. Heavy-handed interdiction activities against shipping in the Gulf could also backfire.\textsuperscript{12} Getting sufficient numbers of the key trading partners with Iran to agree to
make the necessary sacrifices will be an enormous diplomatic task. Iran’s trade is diversified, and while it is growing, still represents a small percentage of its overall GDP.\textsuperscript{13}

**Military action**

In the coercion toolbox, the failure of sanctions tends to lead inevitably to the military option. What are the chances of its success? Recent US reports have suggested that in response to continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines are calling up numbers of their inactive reserves, a serious indication of overstretch and the first step before a renewed draft.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, a ground-based incursion into Iran seems very unlikely. An aerial attack, however, also comes with large question marks, particularly after the failure of the Israeli air strikes against Hezbollah last month led to ground-offensives. It is unclear whether the latest US conventional bunker buster would penetrate the hardened ceilings of the underground enrichment facility at Natanz, built eight meters below ground with additional thick concrete walls above.\textsuperscript{15}

Furthermore, a new report from the House Intelligence Committee suggests US intelligence on Iran is weak, specifically regarding its suspected extensive nuclear facilities and capability.\textsuperscript{16} The likelihood of a US-led air attack achieving a crippling blow to Iran's nuclear infrastructure is consequently doubtful and would certainly inspire a widespread and devastating Iranian response, both ‘asymmetric’ and ‘conventional’. It would also likely speed up Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, a withdrawal from all international mechanisms of inspection, unite the population behind such an endeavour, and attract sympathy abroad.

Iran's conventional armaments include high-speed torpedoes that could prove a deadly threat to shipping in the Straits of Hormuz and medium range Fajr-3 ballistic missiles that could strike forces and cities across the Middle East. Iran also has significant asymmetric capabilities. These include sponsorship of various militias and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Tehran has already displayed all of these resources to the world with various sabre-rattling military exercises, the seizure of a Romanian oilrig, and, of course, support for Hezbollah's ‘successful’ campaign against Israel.

Proponents of an attack argue that the US military can keep the Straits of Hormuz open and subdue any new insurgent campaigns that Iran might prompt. Recent naval exercises have supposedly demonstrated the feasibility of so doing, but those results may have been constructed under optimal circumstances.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, if certain US policymakers are hoping for a spontaneous, strongly, or even weakly, supported uprising within Iran, then they have not accurately assessed the situation. Most Iranians, even those opposed to the government on domestic issues, seem to support the nuclear program, and it can be expected that citizens will rally around the flag when their nation comes under attack.

The past few years have proved that the US Administration consistently demonstrates an over-reliance of faith in deterrence backed up by force. But when the threat of limited force lacks credibility, because to exercise that force actually causes greater damage to US interests, the Bush Administration appears to respond simply by upping the ante. This dangerous and inflexible strategy demands modification in light of the US-Iran military match up.

**Alternative solutions**

Solutions often require creative thinking. In attempting to develop a workable resolution those involved need to ask themselves what each party ultimately hopes to achieve. Once these goals are established and parties acknowledge that there are common interests, room for negotiation can be found, but only with a credible commitment from all sides. So far, while the US Administration has tempered its language in an effort not to alienate its European allies and Russia and China, it has shown little faith in achieving a negotiated solution, and little willingness to compromise on the policy positions adopted and demands made.

To begin with, the P5+1 must give proper consideration to Iran's counter-proposal. Though apparent breakthroughs in the Iranian nuclear program give the impression of urgency (for
example, Ahmadinejad’s opening of the heavy water production plant at Arak on 28 August), time is not the issue. Most experts, including those within the US Defense Intelligence Agency and the IAEA, do not believe Iran can create a nuclear weapon before 2009 or 2010 at the earliest - itself a highly pessimistic estimate.

The EU and especially the United States must enter into direct negotiations with Iran without preconditions. Flexibility aimed at closing off the easier routes to nuclear weapons while ensuring that any remaining sensitive activities (such as limited enrichment) are closely scrutinized through rigorous inspections could open up more palatable options for engagement in the future.

This could be assisted by the explicit identification of those technologies that present greater threats of proliferation, and an agreement on this analysis. Heavy-water reactors and reprocessing plants present more danger, and are more difficult to monitor, than enrichment activities, for example. If the EU were to lead on building a consensus around this, in collaboration with the IAEA, it could make more transparent the need to control such technologies.

Iran’s negotiators will most likely seek more detailed and specific measures to guarantee the security of the Iranian state (and the current regime) against external attack. Engaging with Iran on broader regional security issues could potentially be very favourable.

Concrete EU/US proposals for a new regional security architecture would go far in alleviating Iran’s sense of vulnerability. More than economic incentives, security cooperation has the potential to not only undermine ambitions for a nuclear weapons program, but also provides the opportunity to discuss Iranian support for radical groups in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and, perhaps, achieve concessions there as well. The recent events in Lebanon and Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised the country’s status in the region. The Iranian leadership is looking for some acknowledgement of this.

Media reports suggest that the Iranian offer of 22 August includes a willingness to consider temporarily suspending enrichment if negotiations progress. The P5+1 should offer an invitation to a major regional conference on specific security issues, including a discussion of security guarantees from the United States, while Iran suspends its fuel-cycle program as a quid pro quo.

In the longer term the international community must aim at solutions that assure Iran and other states that they have no need for nuclear weapons, by building clear assurances of security through regional defence arrangements. Control of technology transfers and enforcement of agreements could be further tightened. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) needs to be applied consistently and fairly; reaching out to Russia and China is therefore particularly important. The informal arrangements of the Nuclear Suppliers Group need reform; export control information is not systematically shared with the IAEA or even fully among the Group’s members.

More importantly, the nuclear weapon states must speed up their negotiations over the commitments they made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, such as the Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and processed plutonium, and make moves to reduce their reliance upon nuclear weapons. Pressure must also be exerted upon Israel to discard its weapons, sign the NPT, and join talks towards the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Endnotes

1 See Arms Control Association website for Iran’s proposals submitted to the Europeans prior to August 2005, and for the European (and then P5+1) official counter-proposals in August 2005 and June 2006: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.asp

3 ‘New Proposal to Iran; will it be enough to defuse the nuclear crisis?’ Ian Davis and Paul Ingram, BASIC Note, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060609.htm

4 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article-imprim.php3?id_article=5314 (in English)

5 Op Cit, Davis and Ingram, note 3 above.

6 Source: Bloomberg/LA Times poll. 6 August 2006 http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/12761


8 The text of Iran’s proposal is posted on the Arms Control Association website: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.asp


11 Jeffrey J. Schott, Statement Before the House Committee on International Relations, 3 June 1998.

12 This is treated in greater detail in a forthcoming BASIC Note on Iran and the Proliferation Security Initiative.


15 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/natanz.htm


17 Refer to Colonel Thomas X. Hammes speech at the Pritzker Military Library 14 April 2006.

18 See BASIC’s PSI webpage: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/counterproliferation/psi.htm