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Research Paper
NATO Defense College
Collège de Défense de l'OTAN
Academic Research Branch
Via Giorgio Pelosi, 1
00143 Rome – Italie

Directeur de publication:
Jean Dufourcq

Assistante de publication:
Laurence Ammour

web site: www.ndc.nato.int
e-mail: research@ndc.nato.int

Imprimerie CSC Grafica
Via A. Meucci, 28
00012 Guidonia - Rome - Italie

Editorial

Exponential growth in aggregate global production occurred in the 20th century for the first time in the history of mankind. In 1972 the Club of Rome voiced its concerns about the sustainability of the newly acquired human capability in its report "The Limits to Growth: a global Challenge", issuing a stern warning against the depletion of non-renewable vital resources. Based on careful analysis and extrapolation of growth trends witnessed from the turn of the century to 1970, its conclusions could not simply be discarded as neo-Malthusian thinking. Subsequent shocking events on the world stage in 1973 seemed to confirm the validity of its message in the eyes of many.

On October 16, 1973, The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) cut production of oil, and placed an embargo on shipments of crude to the West, using oil for the first time as a coercive political instrument with a strategic aim. Because of their overt support for Israel during and after the Yom Kippur war, the US and the Netherlands were specifically targeted. Long lines and panic at the filling stations, and a lot of posturing by politicians just what to do about it, reinforced the impression of a real energy shortage. Of course it was not. Negotiations between the major oil companies and Arab governments on a higher price for crude had dragged on for months without result. Saudi Arabia had seen its purchasing power significantly eroded after two depreciations of the US dollar, and was just asking a fair price. But the decisive factor for using the "oil weapon" was that the US had become much earlier than expected dependent on imports. No longer self-sufficient, the US was unable to step up domestic production to offset imports. As the continuing oil embargo spread fear for further cutbacks and fueled uncertainty among consumers and oil companies, prices of crude skyrocketed, triggering the global economic downturn of 1974.

Pulitzer prize-winning author Daniel Yergin in his 800-page history "The prize: the epic quest for oil, money & power" heralded the new era for world oil as follows: "As war was too important to be left to the generals, so oil was now clearly too important to be left to the oil men. Petroleum had become the province of presidents and premiers, of foreign and finance and energy ministers, ... etc.". It still is, in spite of the fact that most of the dire predictions of the Club of Rome have not materialized (fortunately), and more importantly (and equally fortunate), we have not run out of oil. Of course we will one day, but as Professor Emeritus Peter Odell of Rotterdam's Erasmus University pointed out: since 1971 1500 billion barrels have been added to the reserves, whereas less than 800 billion barrels were consumed over the same period. The International Energy Agency (IEA) largely agrees: oil supplies will not become constrained until 2030 provided the necessary investments are made. And here is where the problems start. Many parameters have substantially changed over the past thirty years. Prices were kept fairly stable by Saudi Arabia, acting as a swing producer. Most experts believe that the Kingdom cannot fulfill this role anymore; like the US more than thirty years ago, it has no excess capacity. Cushioning the market has disappeared, and as demand for energy is inelastic, we can expect increased price volatility. Moreover, energy nationalism has strongly increased, the Seven Sisters losing their upstream activities to smaller competitors, and shaking out experienced personnel. But the small oil companies cannot afford the mega-investments necessary to keep supply in pace with demand, and the risks premiums for doing business with sometimes weak and unstable governments exert even more upward pressure on the price of energy.

In the following paper, Dr. Andrew Monaghan zooms in on the present day situation in the energy market, and analyzes the potential role for NATO in energy security. The outcome of his analysis may surprise many who after reading this editorial would think that the situation needs to be urgently addressed by the Alliance. Yes, there is a role for NATO, but it should be limited and well focused is his main conclusion. Therefore, reading on is my best advice.

Cees COOPS, Research Advisor, NDC Academic Research Branch

Energy Security – What Role for NATO?

Andrew MONAGHAN[1]

Introduction

The current state of global energy markets has driven energy issues to the top of the national and international agenda. A tight energy market, caused by rising demand and restricted production, has pushed up prices and highlighted concerns about future access to sustainable energy reserves at affordable prices. Debates between the peak and optimist camps about the sustainability of reserves focus increasingly on politics rather than geology.[2] Many questions concerning both political stability in the region and state where resources are to be found and also whether access to these resources will be possible remain. Fears of terrorist attacks on key elements of the global energy network or infrastructure have grown alongside anxieties that states might also use energy resources as a tool in geopolitical rivalries – some have suggested that the possession of major energy reserves equate to the influence of nuclear weapons.[3]

Thus, as the Western need for imported energy reserves grows, a feeling of vulnerability has begun to pervade discussion about energy security in the West, particularly about the reliability of foreign energy suppliers. Until recently, these issues were largely the concern of individual states. Nonetheless, international institutions are playing a growing role in energy security. Since 2000, the European Union (EU) has taken a greater interest, attempting to forge a coherent energy agenda and policy. A continuing focus on national interests has often blocked the creation of a common agenda, however, even to the extent that EU member states distrust the motives of other member states. Partly as a consequence, some have called for NATO involvement in energy security, especially as a result of the political friction in the energy relationship between the EU and Russia in Spring 2006.

This paper examines a potential role for NATO in energy security. The paper briefly looks at two of the key tenets of energy security before turning to look at the opportunities for NATO action in this field. First, it addresses political possibilities. Second, it looks at more practical dimensions where NATO expertise or capabilities might beneficially be brought to bear. The paper finally turns to assess some potential limitations and difficulties in a NATO involvement in energy security.

The key point that emerges is that by adopting a limited and well focused role, NATO could make a positive contribution to the energy security of its members and indeed more globally. But other institutions, such as the EU, have a key role to play and are more suited to resolving the major problems of investment and efficiency. Moreover, a lack of clarity about NATO's role and the reasons behind it, particularly in terms of its geographical role, could complicate NATO's relations with partner countries and other third parties.

Energy Security: Efficiency and Markets

Significant percentages of energy consumption are provided by imports and there is consequently an important foreign policy dimension to energy security. Indeed, in an interconnected world, states or institutions cannot simply isolate themselves and must also invest overseas to assist in the process of exploration, production and transit. However, two of the keys to enhanced energy security are through reducing domestic demand for energy through financial measures and market mechanisms rather than foreign and security policies.

Reducing consumption through improving efficiency is the main starting point for enhancing energy security. Particularly in the case of oil, the energy

[1] Research Advisor, Academic Research Branch, NATO Defence College, Rome.

[2] For a discussion of this debate, see Monaghan, A. *Russian Oil and EU Energy Security*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 05/65, Swindon: CSRC, November 2005. http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/russian/

[3] Such a point is most often made with reference to Russia. Among others, Grigory Yavlinski, a liberal Russian politician, asserted that oil is for Putin what nuclear warheads were to the USSR. Cited in 'Meet the Chief Executive of Kremlin Inc.', *The Guardian*, 06/07/05.

market is global. Oil is a fungible commodity: oil prices are governed by world market conditions, rather than by any given state. This means that although diversification of supplies or a more secure and protected energy transit network might help, it but does not guarantee the basic definition of energy security (sufficient resources at affordable prices): even states which do not import oil have to meet higher prices.

Therefore, consumer behaviour is of key importance, particularly in the transport and construction industries. And governments, most clearly in EU states, have improved consumption efficiency through carrot and stick fiscal measures, particularly higher taxation of gasoline. Information campaigns to raise consumer awareness and the encouragement of fuel substitutes and technological developments, particularly in transport and to reduce the use of energy in buildings, are also contributing to greater efficiency. Room for efficiency improvement remains, however, and official estimates suggest that the EU could save 20% of its current energy use in a cost effective manner, including the full application of existing measures.[4]

One of the key debates about energy security in Europe addresses the sustainability of Russian reserves. Russia is now the world's leading producer and exporter of gas and second largest oil producer and exporter. Russia's discovered and projected reserves are considered to be among the largest on earth, (Russian gas reserves are calculated to be approximately 47 trillion cubic metres; 26% of the world's total; estimates suggest oil reserves in excess of 100bn barrels). There are high expectations of potentially enormous reserves in regions which have yet to be exploited or even fully explored, such as East Siberia, the Komi Republic, Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the Barents region. High expectations about Russia's capabilities as an energy producer have been further driven by a major increase in production and export since the late 1990s, particularly in oil (the export of which reached a new post-Soviet high of 9.53 million barrels per day (mbpd)).

However, there are concerns in both Russia and Europe that underinvestment in exploration and production mean that Russian reserves, although apparently extensive, are more limited in the short to medium term.[5] Russian gas production declined for much of the 1990s, and now relies on three main fields, all of which are mature.[6] Oil production is in a similar situation, also relying on a small number of large but mature fields. Official Russian production predictions for the period until 2020 are notably more conservative than some western estimates, and although an immediate decline does not seem likely, two points are worth noting. First, reliance on a small number of large fields increases the vulnerability of production to accident. Second, some experts and Russian officials note the likelihood of a plateau, particularly in gas production, as soon as 2010, followed by a decline in production. Moreover, Russia's infrastructure is elderly and insufficiently developed – a high percentage of Russian oil and gas pipelines are operating beyond their planned lifespan, and there is too little infrastructure to facilitate the development of new fields in Eastern Siberia and other northern fields.[7] Therefore the official and policy debate between the EU and Russia is moving towards one of Europe seeking to invest in Russia's energy sector to enhance its prospects for development. The key elements of this dialogue are about establishing transparency, competition market rules and reciprocity, and developing the EU-Russia energy dialogue.

What Role for NATO?

It has been another concern, however, which has featured prominently in European energy security debates since late 2005 and which lies behind the rise in calls for a NATO role in the European context:

[4] *Doing More with Less*, European Green Paper on Efficiency (COM (2005) 265 Final, 22 June 2005.

[5] This concern is not limited to Russia, however. There are concerns about the sustainability of reserves and the need for investment in exploration, production and refining capacity in all regions, including the Middle East, the main oil producing region.

[6] It remains unclear when major new fields, including those with Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) facilities, will provide a major boost. Although officially some fields, such as the large Shtokhman field, are due to begin major production soon, many experts predict that this is unlikely until 2014.

[7] A major reason for this is a lack of confidence in the political atmosphere in Russia. There is currently a lack of clarity about property rights, tax legislation and licensing laws in Russia which has undermined confidence in the economic value of building such a network. The two main companies that could approach the problem with greater confidence – the state oil giant Rosneft and Gazprom – are in great debt which limits their capacity and desire to carry out such work.

the concern that Russia is a politically unreliable partner that uses its energy resources to exert political pressure on its "partners", particularly those in Eastern and Central Europe. The growing concerns about the reliability of supplies since January 2006 (when Russia turned off supplies of gas to Ukraine) created the grounds for a number of American and European officials, politicians and experts to call for a more prominent NATO role in Europe's energy security.[8]

For some, it is because of doubts that the EU can – or wants – to play a meaningful role in providing political support to Eastern and Central European states in resisting Russian pressure. With no EU support forthcoming, one former US ambassador has suggested that Bulgaria should respond to Gazprom's efforts to pressure Bulgaria into breaking an agreement on gas price by putting the issue of energy security on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council. Other states, he suggested, would have to "step forward and support a policy discussion of the issues surrounding Russia's aggressive energy policies. Poland, the Baltic States and Romania might be so inclined".[9]

In fact, the Polish government has already made suggestions to involve NATO. It has prepared a proposal to create a new agreement committing NATO and EU members to act together in the face of any energy threat incited by a reduction in energy supplies because of disasters (accidental or natural), disruption of distribution and supply systems or political decisions by suppliers. Poland seeks to establish an alliance which would oblige members to assist each other during an energy crisis as they would in the case of a military crisis.

Similarly, in the US senate it was resolved that the US President should place on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic Council the merits of establishing a policy and strategy for [NATO] to promote the security of members of the organisation through the development of secure, sustainable and reliable sources of energy, including contingency plans if current energy resources at put at risk.[10] For others in Europe, NATO is a good option, since "what we cannot do is leave it solely to the EU as an institution … (or) allow our own national energy security to be held to ransom by the dreams of Brussels for creating foreign and security policy integration".[11]

NATO may indeed have an important role to play in energy security, as acknowledged by senior NATO officials. In April, SACEUR made the link between the disagreements between the EU and Russia and the West's energy security.[12] In July, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, noted that NATO would be holding discussions on what contribution the alliance might make to the provision of security of energy lines.[13]

On one hand, a threat to energy security affects the stability of member states, thus making energy security a NATO responsibility. On the other, there is a clear military and civil defence dimension to energy security, ranging from responding to terrorist threats to responses to natural disasters and accidents, and NATO could bring both its expertise and capabilities to bear to address these issues.

In fact, NATO may find it difficult to avoid involvement in such discussions because of the key roles in global and regional energy security of some member states – the US as both a major producer and the world's biggest energy consumer, is a key global energy actor. This is important in four interlocking ways. First, some have argued that with NATO involvement, Europe could bring US diplomatic weight to bear on any producer that threatened to withhold supplies (most clearly, in the eyes of many, Russia). Second, the US is the only state with sufficient military capability to credibly defend or intervene in important

[8] There is considerable debate about the Russia-Ukraine energy problem, which is not clearly resolved yet, despite an agreement being reached. Many critics in the West considered Russia's move to have been primarily a politically driven attack on Ukraine to destabilise it prior to elections and punish it for its move westward. While there may be some basis to these views, the issue is more complex. Energy negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have been protracted and difficult, and there does also seem to be some weight to the Russian arguments that Ukraine was also at fault by taking Russian gas that was intended for its European market. For a study that investigates these, see Stern, J. *The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006*. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 2006.

[9] Smith, K. 'Security Implications of Russian Energy Policies', CEPS policy Brief, No.90, January 2006. p.3. www.ceps.be

[10] 109th Congress, 2nd Session, S.RES.456. See also http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=256873

[11] Speech entitled "Energy Security and Military Structures" at Chatham House on 22nd May by Dr. L. Fox, MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence. www.chathamhouse.org.uk

[12] Comments at the Brussels Forum, "Do we need a Transatlantic energy policy", 30 April 2006. See Wielaard, R 'NATO Plans Tighter Energy Security', *The St. Petersburg Times*, 2 May 2006.http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=17487

[13] "Energy Security is on NATO's Focus of Attention" (sic), 7 July 2006. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/features/fex62964.htm

energy producing areas. Third, the US imports oil from a range of important producing states or regions that are either unstable or are increasingly hostile to the US – or both. Consequently, finally, US energy policy is evolving, since its apparent vulnerabilities appear to be increasing as reflected in President Bush's State of the Union Address, during which he acknowledged US energy concerns and stated the need to reduce dependence on Middle Eastern oil by technological development. So the US is a key global player – whether through its global military deployment, or by examining the case for alternative energy sources or by reconsidering its approach to conservation, it plays a role that has a major impact on its NATO partners.

Turkey is also seeking to define itself as a key energy hub and a major artery for energy supply to Europe. Turkey's geographical position illustrates its importance: it sits astride important transit routes such as the Bosphorous and is almost immediately next to regions that possess nearly three quarters of the world's proven gas and oil reserves (the Middle East/Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean and Eurasia). Perhaps obviously, but nonetheless importantly, Turkey is a member of NATO but not yet of the EU – its membership of NATO represents a good opportunity to involve Turkey institutionally. Turkey's role as fourth energy artery is likely to be significant in the negotiations and process for its membership of the EU, and is likely to become increasingly so if the accession process is difficult.

Furthermore, if the EU is just beginning to develop its policies towards the Middle East and Gulf regions, South Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO's partnership programmes – including Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Instanbul Cooperation Initiative and individually in partnership programmes – provide established relationships that reach into these important energy producing and transit regions. This is already occuring, in fact: Jean Fournet recently expressed his approval of engaging Baku on energy security within the action plan of the individual partnership program of NATO and Azerbaijan.[14]

Closely linked, of course, to the political dialogue that it could facilitate, NATO could be involved in practical terms. NATO could provide support to those states who seek assistance in communications, intelligence sharing and by developing interoperability. NATO could also provide training and advice on infrastructure protection – especially given that a number of NATO states have experience in this, including Turkey. NATO could also become more actively engaged in the reactive side by developing its emergency management capabilities to facilitate an appropriate response following an accident, natural disaster or attack. Enhanced cooperation in the civil defence and emergency management dimension of NATO-Russia relations could provide a small but significant boost to that overall relationship.

Second, attacks on elements of energy infrastructure have taken place, and the leadership of terrorist organisations have frequently stated their intention to step up such attacks. The impact of such attacks is high, creating a sense of instability and heightening concerns about the tension in the supply chain. Thus, General Jones noted that NATO could provide security in unstable areas which are key parts of the energy chain, pointing to the Niger Delta where groups siphon off nearly $1 billion in crude from pipelines. He also noted the possibilities for maritime and air support over gas and oil routes and the protection of facilities against terrorism and piracy. A terrorist attack on an oil or gas tanker in a port could cause devastating damage and so security for storage and transport facilities in such areas is "not a problem we can walk away from much longer", he stated.[15] A focused maritime security role could be particularly beneficial, since energy transit by sea is becoming increasingly important – both oil and LNG tanker traffic is expected to grow significantly by 2020 – and NATO can offer a well integrated naval capability to assist protect this traffic. He noted that the major exercise Steadfast Jaguar off the Cape Verde Islands in June was 'very much oriented' to supply route safety 'from the point of origin to receiving countries'.[16]

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[14] Ibid

[15] "Do we need a Transatlantic energy policy?"

[16] Wielaard, R 'NATO Plans Tighter Energy Security', *The St. Petersburg Times*, 2 May 2006.http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=17487. Exercise Steadfast Jaguar was designed to test the readiness of NATO's Response Force (NRF) to carry out missions anywhere at short notice and was the first time that the land sea and air components of the NRF came together in an exercise. See http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0615a.htm

However, there are important limits and pitfalls to NATO involvement in energy security. If NATO's partnerships facilitate dialogue on energy, they are not as fully developed as possible and how they could practically benefit the security of energy supplies remains vague. Turkmenistan, for example, is a major gas producer and part of PfP, but its policy – often directed by the President himself – is inconsistent. Turkmenistan also suffers production problems similar to Russia. How NATO could positively contribute to the resolution of these two issues is unclear.

Furthermore, the complexities of Central Asian politics are likely to limit both how far NATO can develop its policies in the region and how far states in the region can develop their relations with NATO. Although states in the region have attempted to develop relations with NATO to reduce Russian influence on them, Russia remains a key actor through the interlinking of its increasingly active policies to re-enter the region in economic and political strength and the practical influence of its position as a key transit state for Central Asian producing states. Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as well as others, have important and well developed relationships with Russia, and their desire to put this at risk by developing relations with NATO is questionable.

Moreover, there are a number of potential pitfalls in NATO involvement in energy security, since members often espouse different priorities, different views of how to manage energy security and differences in approach to a number of international questions. In one respect at least, NATO suffers a similar problem to the EU – its member states have different energy mixes both in terms of energy type and in energy source and transit. While a high percentage of the mix of new members is met by Russian energy hydrocarbon supplies, Western Europe remains quite diverse both in its use of different energy types and sources. It is likely that NATO would encounter the same difficulties as the EU in attempting to unify energy priorities.

A second example is the difference in approach between the US and a number of European states. The US has taken a more critical stance towards Russia's attempts to establish itself as an "energy superpower". The EU remains strongly – indeed is becoming increasingly – critical of Russian monopolies Gazprom and Transneft and has criticised the lack of clarity in the Russian investment climate. There are also those within the EU who have warned of Russian attempts to use its energy as a lever, particularly in areas of the former Soviet Union. However, officially the EU has been much less critical and repeatedly notes that Russia has been a reliable supplier to the EU both during the Cold War and subsequently, even during times of serious domestic crisis. The EU seems less inclined to directly confront Russia on this issue: the EU, unlike the US, has to maintain a broad – if flawed – strategic relationship with it neighbour Russia across a wide range of issues of which energy supply is only one. Moreover, the EU is more inclined to assert Russia's dependence on the EU market as a safeguard against such a threat. Indeed, there is a strong tendency in the EU to view energy security as an economic issue to be addressed through the markets, rather than a military one.

In such an atmosphere, it is unclear how possible it would be to carve a unified NATO policy in response to a politically motivated reduction of supplies by a state. The concerns about Russia doing this were noted above. There are also concerns that other states such as Iran might limit its supplies in response to sanctions against it over its nuclear project. It could also use its geographical position to dominate a key "choke point" in the straits of Hormuz. How NATO might respond could be a divisive issue. Would NATO be able to ask for deploying nations' military capabilities to re-open the Straits of Hormuz? How would NATO use its weight against Russia in case of another cut off to Ukraine which impacted on European member states' energy supplies?

The need of "producer" states to export significant quantities of hydrocarbons to Europe and the US to sustain their economies means that the scenario of a politically motivated limitation or cut off to these markets is not immediately likely. But given the divisions within NATO and Europe over the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 and similar divisions in how to deal with Iran, it should be considered. Turkey does not support more robust measures against Iran; France, Germany and Italy are unlikely to support robust measures against Russia.

This also raises the connected questions about whether NATO would work as an alliance or as a forum to create *ad hoc* coalitions and what priorities NATO should address in terms of the best use of its limited – and, some might argue, already overstretched – resources. Where would an energy

security strategy "fit" in NATO's overall planning? As a key strategy in its own right, or as smaller, separate parts of other strategies, such as counter-terrorism?

Finally, and closely linked to the above points, if NATO's involvement in energy security is not carefully defined, it may generate real concerns in some states about its intentions. If NATO's discussions about a role in energy security become more regional – particularly in Europe – rather than issue oriented, it may serve to undermine European energy security, rather than enhance it. An undefined or inexplicit energy security debate may merge with other discussions that are ongoing, including the ones about NATO enlargement and democratisation processes. Both issues remain difficult with regard to Russia, and there are many who see NATO as a vehicle for US power projection. On the one hand, Russian concerns about NATO enlargement, particularly to include Ukraine, have not diminished. On the other, Russia and the west (both NATO and the EU) approach the political changes in the former Soviet Union from opposite positions: the West from the position that they were popular revolutions, Russia from the position that they were in effect externally supported *coups d'etat*. NATO would need to send clear signals that it was interested in protecting certain limited ends rather than engaging in an attempt to isolate Russia.

It is not only with regard to Russia, however, that NATO would need to be explicit – the introduction of NATO into the discussion might raise concerns among producing states, particularly in the Middle East that the west was preparing to use military force to protect its own energy supplies.

Conclusions

Transparency and confidence lie at the core of energy security. This is the domain of non-military centered organisations such as the EU and IEA and has increasingly been the focus of negotiations with Russia. The key problem is maintaining or increasing production and facilitating transit by developing infrastructure in states such as Russia. Economic mechanisms are the preferred method of addressing these issues, and the key issue of developing energy infrastructure lies outside NATO's remit. NATO's role, like that of the EU, is also limited by the fact that many of it member states believe that energy security is the remit of the member states themselves, rather than an international organisation – a point already acknowledged by NATO officials.

A role for NATO does exist, however, not least because there are valid military concerns. This role could be best defined as "issue" -based rather than "region" – based, however. A clearly defined elucidation of what NATO can bring to the debate – and why – without further confusing or complicating it is necessary. Given the complexities of Europe's political environment, NATO's role in specifically *European* energy security should probably remain limited to specific issues such as civil defence management. NATO would need to be careful to not complicate its own agenda by generating unnecessary concerns in third party states.

Nonetheless, by adopting an explicit role that was based on issue rather than region, NATO could play a global role in energy security. NATO could make explicit its intention to develop a limited role in energy security to protect domestic energy installations where necessary and in cooperation with third parties and to a certain extent international transit routes (although even this is difficult). It could also enhance its reactive capabilities to improve its consequence management.

Many of these points are already at the front of NATO thinking. The need to be active rather than reactive has been recognised – but by providing clear added value rather than taking a dominant role alone, essentially a valid military role but one that was not simply war fighting. The need to engage producer states so that the entire energy supply chain is protected, from exploration to consumption has also been realised. Indeed, this would perhaps be the most significant contribution: global energy security would be best served by breaking down the producer vs. consumer mentality that enhances feelings of instability and vulnerability.

August-September 2006
NDC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Visiting Fellows

Dr Rachid EL HOUDAIGUI, Morocco
Research Topic: "*Aspects juridiques, politiques et de sécurité de l'Opération* Active Endeavour. *Implications pour les partenariats de l'OTAN"*

Dr. Mirzohid RAHIMOV, Uzbekistan
Research Topic*: "Regionalism and Power: Toward Regional Integration in Central Asia"*

Capt. Sergey SMIRNOV, Navy, Russia
Research Topic: "*Enhancing Interaction and Interoperability between NATO and Russia in the Pacific Region*"

Col. Iliya MOLOKOV, Army, Russia
Research Topic: "*Methodology of Military Training Management Using Computer Systems: A Way Ahead for NATO-Russia Cooperation*"

Arrivals

Dr Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH, Switzerland, Research Advisor

Dr Andrew MONAGHAN, UK, Research Advisor

Departure

Ms Veronika NECASOVA, Slovakia

Internship

Ms Pamela PAGLIA, Italy
September-December 2006

INTERNAL ACTIVITIES

6 September 2006
Internal Debate with Professor Efraim Inbar (Director of the Begin-Sadat Center at the University of Bar Ilan, Tel Aviv, Israel), on "*Israel's Security Challenges*", NDC, Rome.

11-12 September 2006
Workshop on "*NATO and the Future of NPT*", co-sponsored by Los Alamos National Laboratory (New Mexico), NDC, Rome.

20 September 2006
Presentation given by Prof. Ilan Greilsammer (Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv, Israel): "*Une étude des divergences entre Israël et les pays européens de l'OTAN concernant la sécurité durable de l'Etat d'Israël*", NDC, Rome.

22 September 2006
NATO Anciens' Seminar on "*NATO and the Mediterranean Region*", NDC, Rome.

EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP
Participation to the 4th Annual Seminar of the ONG Group Urgence Réhabilitation Développement, 28-30 September 2006, Plaisians, France.

Jean DUFOURCQ
Lecture on "*The Mediterranean Sea and the Greater Middle East: Global Overview on Security Issues*", GCMC, 27 August 2006, Garmisch-Partenkirschen, Germany.

Lecture on "*Les trois tentations de l'OTAN*", Workshop on "Quel avenir pour l'OTAN?", 18 September 2006, Paris, France.

Lecture on "*Stabilization and Reconstruction: Political and Military Constraints Affecting Operations*", Roman Atlantic Forum organized by the Centro Alti Studi di Difesa (CASD), 25 September 2006, Rome, Italy.

Cees COOPS
Speaker in a Panel on *Stability and Self-Determination in the Balkans*, XVI Economic Forum, 6-9 September 2006, Krynica, Poland.

Carlo MASALA
Lecture on "*NATO's Riga Summit. A Potential Agenda*", Seminar on "Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Region", 14-18 September 2006, Antalya, Turkey.Lecture on "*NATO's Global Partnerships*", Roman Atlantic Forum organized by the Centro Alti Studi di Difesa (CASD), 25 September 2006, Rome, Italy.

Andrew MONAGHAN
Seminar on *Energy Security*, 14 September 2006, Brussels, Belgium.

Lecture on "*Europe-Russia Energy Relations: An Emerging Security Dilemma*", presented at the Conference "The Power of Oil and Gas", Carnegie Centre, 28-29th September, Moscow, Russia

David YOST
Presentation on "*NATO in the New International Security Architecture*," at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 18 July 2006, Monterey, California.

Chaired panel on "*Implications for NATO*" at the workshop on "NATO and the Future of the NPT" co-sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the NATO Defense College, 12 September 2006, Rome, Italy.

EXTERNAL PUBLICATIONS

Jean DUFOURCQ
"La France et sa sécurité", in *Commentaire*, No. 115, Automne 2006, Paris.

"Les militaires sur le chemin de la paix", in *Impact Stratégique*, No. 3 (20), 2006, Bucarest.

Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH
with Haltiner Karl W., Wenger Andreas and Würmli Silvia (2006), *Sicherheit 2006. Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend,* Au/Zürich:Militärakademie an der ETH und Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=22219

David YOST
"France's New Nuclear Doctrine," *International Affairs*, vol. 82 (July 2006), pp. 701-721.