On January 27-28, 2005, representatives from Arab and interested European Partner States met in Copenhagen under the framework of the dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) to discuss medium- and long-term issues relating to transit migration, combating of irregular flows through development cooperation, and better joint management of migration, including readmission, return and reintegration issues.

This report contains the background papers produced for the Copenhagen conference by the implementing partners ICMPD and DIIS. The papers are concerned with the policy implications of international migration for source, neighbour, transit and destination countries, and they discuss how international migration can be utilized to further development. Then, drawing on case studies from the Mediterranean region, the background to current Mediterranean transit migration is presented. Beyond the focus on the Mediterranean, the papers provide a critical framework for discussing if and how current policy approaches to remittances, return and diaspora have relevance for transit migration. Finally, the report includes the policy options agreed upon by the participating Arab and European Partner States.

Ninna Nyberg Sørensen is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, and Senior Advisor for Danida’s Human Rights Programme for Central America. She has worked on Dominican, Moroccan and Colombian transnational migration, the developmental impact of remittances, and on internal displacement and repopulation in Peru and Somaliland. Her current work focuses on democratization, human rights and anti-corruption in Central America.
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

EDITED BY NINNA NYBERG SØRENSEN
CONTENTS

MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
EXPERIENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS ............................................. 5

IRREGULAR TRANSIT MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:
FACTS, FIGURES AND INSIGHTS .................................................. 25

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES TOWARDS
THE MIGRATION/DEVELOPMENT ISSUE ....................................... 67

POLICY RESPONSES IN MENA COUNTRIES OF TRANSIT FOR
MIGRANTS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-MAKING .... 101

THE CURRENT STATE AND RECENT TRENDS IN MIGRATION
BETWEEN MAGHREB STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ............ 109

UNDOCUMENTED SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN MIGRANTS
IN MOROCCO ............................................................................. 129

FORCED MIGRATION, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT:
SOME POLICY ISSUES ................................................................ 147
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION
Mediterranean Transit Migration and Development: Experience and Policy Options

NINNA NYBERG SØRENSEN
Danish Institute for International Studies

INTRODUCTION

International migration, whether in the form of labour migration or refugee movements, is not only a concern for source and destination countries, but increasingly also for the transit countries involved. With enhanced border controls and visa requirements, situations of transit migration, which are often assumed to be short term and temporary, may end up being long term and semi-permanent.

As the recent occurrences of fence-climbing in Ceuta and Melilla have shown, transit migration presents us with the paradox that while, the circulation of people is continually becoming easier and cheaper, human mobility is becoming increasingly restricted by laws and regulations, further contributing to a situation in which more and more persons are left in the limbo of transit. And who are the transit migrants? In the case of sub-Saharan transit migrants in North Africa, the media headlines have focused on illegal migrants and the desperate means they resort to in order to beat European border controls. But transit migration is a phenomenon that cuts across various categories of migrants, including both regular and irregular migrants, as well as readmitted (failed) migrants, asylum seekers and refugees – categories that are usually dealt with in mutually exclusive policy regimes (see Cassarino and Fargues, this volume). Moreover, transit migration introduces a continuum in the migration experience, namely one between emigration and settlement. As such, transit migration is not a specific type of migration, nor is it a status: it is rather a process and a contingency (Papadopoulou 2005: 4).
Recent policy debates have centered on the link between migration and development. Very little has been said and written about how, if at all, this link relates to transit migration and the issues of remittances, return and diaspora support. For example, although migrants and refugees’ remittances are generally more significant than official development assistance (and may be also targeted at the poor), transit migration may confront individuals with particular constraints that makes remitting difficult. Secondly, transit migration is, as the term indicates, ‘en route’, making voluntary return less likely. Thirdly, although promoting development through active engagement with migrant and refugee diasporas has proven an effective development tool, the irregularity of transit migration flows confronts source, transit and destination states and development institutions with particular problems. Some of these are discussed in the present collection.

The papers on transit migration in this volume stem from a meeting held in Copenhagen on 27–28 January 2005, at which interested European partners met with seven Arab partner states\(^1\) to discuss medium- and long-term issues relating to the combating of irregular flows through development cooperation and better joint management of migration (including readmission, return and reintegration issues).

The overall report is concerned with the policy implications of international migration for source, neighbouring, transit and destination countries with regard to how international migration can be utilized to further development. Apart from this introduction, the report consists of six contributions focusing on various aspects of transit migration in the Mediterranean. These are briefly summarized at the end of the introduction. The remainder of the introduction gives some general background to Mediterranean transit migration and takes issue with current policy approaches to remittances, return and diaspora support, as well as suggesting ways to disaggregate policy responses within these broader fields. The third and final section presents the set of policy options agreed upon by the European Partner States (EPS) and Arab Partner States (APS) at the Copenhagen meeting.

\(^1\) The seven Arab partner states were Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.
BACKGROUND

Migration has been a long-term feature of the African continent and is in many areas closely linked to local development. Intra-national rural-to-urban migration and cross-border migration into neighbouring countries still constitute the bulk of sub-Saharan African movements of migration, even though inter-regional and international migration is on the rise. In 2004, an estimated 20-50 millions migrants were thought to be residing in Africa, whereas the estimate for international migrants of African origin was 16.3 million. Of these, the majority are refugees. By 2005 it is projected that one in ten Africans will be living outside their countries of origin. As these figures show, out-migration from the African continent is still relatively small. Of the 3.3 million Africans estimated to be living in the countries of the European Union, the vast majority (2.3 million) are North Africans: only about one million originated in sub-Saharan African (2002 figures, GCA 2005).

How many of those aiming to reach Europe end up in transit? The ICMPD estimates that about 100-120,000 migrants cross the Mediterranean irregularly every year, of which 35,000 are of sub-Saharan origin, 30,000 are in transit from other regions and 55,000 are nationals of the region (ICMPD 2004). The Maghreb is the region most affected by sub-Saharan transit flows, while the Mashreq region (in particular Egypt, Lebanon and Syria) is also affected by flows from Asia and even the CIS countries (Papadopoulou 2004).

Apart from the recent press coverage of destitute sub-Saharan climbing the electronic fences of Fortress Europe on the arbitrary borders of the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, transit migration has become prominent for a number of reasons. First, factors such as poverty, low wages and unemployment, demographic growth, a lack of (access to) natural resources, poor governance and corruption on the one hand, and conflict, persecution or political instability on the other, have mobilized numerous Africans on the northern shore of the continent with the ultimate hope of reaching Europe. For professionals, a lack of opportunities, poor working conditions and professional isolation may add to the incentive to migrate.

---

2 The most important source countries include Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Gambia and South Africa.
3 The most important destination countries include France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal.
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

As such, transit migration is triggered by the inability of source or neighbouring countries to provide decent livelihood possibilities or effective protection. Secondly, and as a consequence of restrictive European migration policies, the Maghreb and Mashreg regions have become, if not favoured destinations, then certainly transit destinations for sub-Saharan migrants because of their key geographical location next to the prosperous EU. Thirdly, transit migration takes place because of gaps in legislation and administrative procedures, porous borders and insufficient border-control capability, incomplete policy developments, and – to a certain extent – established informality and certain demands in the transit countries’ labour markets (Papadopoulou 2004).

MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT LINKS

As noted by the Global Coalition for Africa, conflict prevention, political inclusion and improved governance would do much to reduce the political insecurities that encourage migration, as would improving the conditions for economic growth (GCA 2005: 7). However, not least given the widening wage differentials between most African and European countries, it is unlikely that economic incentives to migrate will be reduced in the short to medium terms. Only sustained social, economic and political development in sub-Saharan Africa will reduce the pressure to migrate. During the Copenhagen meeting, the ways in which migration might contribute to this process was discussed.

Particular emphasis was placed on remittances, return and diaspora involvement – three links between migration and development that have been accorded growing attention by the European Union in its relationships with third countries.

Remittances

Compared to other regions of the world, African remittance data are generally scarce or suffer from a lack of reliability. This may in part be explained by the relatively low share of official migrant remittances flowing into Africa (15% of global flows to continental Africa, 5% to sub-Saharan Africa). Another factor is the high prevalence of informal flows. Evidence from, for example, Sudan and Egypt suggests that informal remittances double, and in some cases even triple, the total amount remitted. In recent years, the highest share of remittances has gone to North Africa, with Egypt and Morocco receiving the largest amount. Nigeria is the largest sub-Saharan recipient, but countries such as Senegal, Mali, Benin, Cape Verde and Burkina Faso also
receive substantial sums. Remittances therefore constitute an economic reality that is not to be neglected.

As elsewhere, remittances are used for private consumption as well as for investment in human capital (education, health). In Zimbabwe, households with migrants are found to have higher educational levels than households with none; in Burkina Faso it is estimated that remittances reduce the poverty headcount of rural and urban households by 7% and 3%, respectively. Remittances have also been positively associated with improvements in rural areas of Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, the Sahel and Zambia, with investments being made in cattle, housing, education, agriculture, grinding mills, tools and equipment, wells, transport vehicles and the establishment of enterprises (Sørensen 2004b).

Recent debates within the development community have been divided into two camps. One emphasises reductions in transfer costs and incentives for productive investments as a way to enhance the developmental impact of remittances. The other stresses the need to acknowledge the private and family nature of the bulk of international remittances (‘hands off’).

Instead of disagreeing on the nature, impact and possibility of the political leveraging of remittances, recent theoretical debates point to the importance of disaggregating remittances into different forms of transfers and the concomitant need to recognize the specificity of remittance types in policy and programme interventions (Goldring 2004).

Assuming a broad definition of development – including economic, social, community and political development – Luin Goldring (op. cit.) asserts that a first premise for mobilizing remittances for pro-development efforts is that different types of remittance contribute to different aspects of development. Concrete policy proposals must therefore distinguish clearly between such different forms, for example, between family remittances, collective remittances or donations, and entrepreneurial remittances.

Family remittances build on intimate social ties, are private transfers, and tend to be used for recurrent livelihood costs and to substitute for or improve access to public services such as health, education and social security. Collective remittances are generally donations for community projects associated with diaspora organisations. Entrepreneurial remittances have the clearest productive potential but do not have organisations behind them. Thus, one of the key differences between the different
forms of remittance has to do with the institutions that mediate the transfer and use of the funds. It may therefore be argued that, although collective remittances may not be nearly as important as family remittances in economic terms, the extra-economic dimensions of organisation and experience that accompany collective remittances represent an under-utilized development potential.

A second insight stemming from the disaggregating of remittances is that economic remittances have important political and social dimensions. In assessing the developmental impact of remittances, it may therefore be useful to work with remittance definitions that include social, technical and political aspects. Social remittances are generally defined in terms of the diffusion of different social practices, ideas and values, mainly to migrant-sending areas; technical or technological remittances include the knowledge, skills and technology flowing from destination to source countries; and political remittances may be understood as changes in political identities, demands and practices associated with migration.

Goldring’s (2004) analysis underlines the fact that different types of remittance have specific qualities and therefore require specific interventions. For example, existing initiatives to reduce transfer costs and bank the un-banked have high potential for family remittances. Efforts to improve project-planning and implementation may be of equal importance to collective remittances. In order to enhance the developmental impact of collective remittances, the following policy interventions might be considered:

- Diaspora organizations are not always easy to sustain over time, nor are they necessarily democratic and transparent. Offering training and technical assistance to develop leadership and other skills may enhance diaspora organisations’ opportunities to accumulate not only economic, but also social and political capital. The same assistance should be offered to local community, municipal and/or state authorities that deal with the channelling of collective remittances at the other end.

- In turning collective remittances into productive projects, policy-makers and NGOs may consider the creation of different types of cost-sharing or matching funds, with different conditions and with attention to specific regional contexts (e.g. for collective goods, co-operatively owned enterprises, or entrepreneurial investments).
• The planning of such cost-sharing programmes needs to become increasingly transparent, democratic and participatory, and must include migrants, local community representatives and political authorities at all relevant levels.

• Most development NGOs have traditionally had little contact with migrants, as they are not considered to belong to the local population. NGO awareness of existing transnational or diasporic networks linking local communities to family members abroad could, if acknowledged, play an important role in which NGOs could provide technical assistance, organizational development and the creation of financial instruments useful for migrants and their home communities.

The growing diversity inherent in contemporary international migration flows (Sørensen 2004a) suggests that analytical and policy frameworks regarding remittances need to be broadened. These should not only refer to labour migration, but also to irregular, transit and asylum migration (Papadopoulou 2004). In spite of the limited data available, evidence shows that asylum-seekers and refugees are actively engaged in money transfers and can demonstrate a propensity to remit funds to kin and community members in both the home country and camps in neighbouring areas (Levitt and Sørensen 2004). However, since relative few sub-Saharan refugees settle outside the continent, they often find that they are looked to for economic assistance by a disproportionately large number of family members. To mitigate the resulting unforeseen burdens experienced by refugees, Riak Akuei (2005) suggests that states or international development institutions consider:

• stepping up resettlement durable solutions efforts, such as filling resettlement quotas and reducing status-determination and resettlement waiting times

• assist refugees – and even asylum-seekers – in locating (better paid) jobs in a shorter period of time than is currently the case

• the resettlement of needy family members to reduce the economic obligations reported by refugees

• expanding ‘cultural orientation programmes’ offered by resettlement agencies to include discussions of onerous family and community obligations such as remittances.
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

Only the application of a multidimensional typology of remittances – including the full constellation of remitters, receivers and mediating institutions; the norms and logics that regulate remittances (including the enormous remittance pressure on resettled refugees); the different uses of remittances; the social and political meanings of remittances; and the implications of such meanings for various interventions – is likely to establish long-term positive linkages between migration and development.

Return
Across sub-Saharan Africa, regular migration to Europe is dominated by skilled migrants, giving rise to considerable concern over the issue of the brain drain. IOM estimates that 40% of African countries have 35% or more of their university graduates residing outside their country of origin and that some 80,0000 professionals leave these countries each year. IOM programmes, like the ‘Return of Qualified African Nationals’ (RQAN 1983-1999) and the current ‘Migration for Development in Africa’ (MIDA), seem to have only limited success in facilitating the return of larger numbers of skilled migrants.4

Return is generally seen as the end-product of the migration cycle, repatriation as the end of the refugee cycle. Moreover, return and repatriation are often believed to be a prerequisite for migrants’ and refugees’ engagement with local development. Yet inadequate attention has been given to selectivity in terms of returnees’ personal characteristics, duration and location of stay abroad, and the motivations and preparedness underlying different types of migration and return. The return of migrants and refugees can be a substantial force for development and reconstruction, not least in terms of the human, social and financial capital that migrants and refugees may bring home with them. There is the dilemma, however, that a mass return of migrants will reduce the flow of remittances. Similarly, if the resolution of conflicts or crises is accompanied by large-scale repatriation, the source of remittances will obviously diminish at the same time as growing pressure will be put on scarce local resources, thus placing additional stress on fragile infrastructure and ultimately creating the potential for instability and new or renewed conflict (Van Hear and Sørensen 2003).

4 Over its lifetime, RQAN facilitated the return of approximately 2,000 migrants to Kenya, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Ethiopia, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone.
In general, only a little is known about the developmental impact of return on sub-Saharan countries. Conventional analyses suggest that return and repatriation after relatively short periods abroad, especially among low-skilled migrants and refugees – and if caused by an inability to adapt to the destination country or unforeseen and adverse family circumstances – are less likely to contribute to development. Return after a longer stay abroad, especially if the returnee has saved money to meet specific investment goals back home, is generally expected to have a higher developmental impact.

As is the case with remittances, the question of whether return and repatriation will benefit local development varies and is generally determined by three factors:

- Resource mobilization and the returnee’s preparedness
- Whether or not the source country provides a propitious social, economic and institutional environment for the returnees to use their economic and human capital
- In the case of refugee repatriation, an additional factor is a political climate facilitating former adversaries to begin to work together

Owing to the growing complexity of migration flows and the concomitant diversity of returnees, the issue of return needs to be disaggregated in much the same way as remittances. Such a disaggregation may produce better knowledge of who returns, when and why, and why some returnees become development actors in specific social and institutional circumstances, whereas others are less likely to play a developmental role.

As Jean-Pierre Cassarino has recently argued (2004), the length of stay and types of migration experience acquired abroad have a certain bearing on the various levels of preparedness (including willingness and readiness) of returnees, as well as on their potential capacity to contribute to development. It is therefore not enough to focus exclusively on the voluntary dimension of return. By including preparedness, Cassarino puts emphasis on the returnees’ ability to gather tangible and intangible resources before, during and after return takes place. The level of preparedness corresponds directly to the returnees’ ability to mobilize resources and is therefore a precondition for contributing to development. At the same time, resource mobilisation may be determined by being involved in the dynamics and maintenance of cross-border economic and social networks.
Table 1: Resource mobilisation and levels of preparedness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of returnees</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Resource mobilisation</th>
<th>Length of stay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour migrants</td>
<td>Residence/(dual) citizenship status in destination country</td>
<td>Migration objectives are reached</td>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>Long to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>May own property in destination country</td>
<td>Perceived positive changes in labour market or government in source country</td>
<td>Contacts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly skilled migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived economic and/or political improvements in source country generate new opportunities</td>
<td>Networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong incentives in source or destination country induce return</td>
<td>Knowledge, skills, experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum-seekers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour migrants</td>
<td>Temporary, tourist or none</td>
<td>Migration objectives could not be reached as planned, disappointment</td>
<td>Few savings</td>
<td>Medium to short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term refugees</td>
<td>Few assets in destination country</td>
<td>Lack of integration</td>
<td>Few networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly skilled migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unexpected family events in source country interrupted stay abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected asylum-seekers</td>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>Deportation, expulsion</td>
<td>None or negative resources (debt)</td>
<td>Medium to short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migrants (including those in transit)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rejected visa extension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cassarino (2004), with a few amendments made by the present author. Please consult original.
These insights allow Cassarino to distinguish, in crude form, three different levels of preparedness of importance to reintegration processes and developmental impacts of return and repatriation. As the model below indicates, well-established cross-border social and economic networks may be a prerequisite for successful return, since in most cases resources need to be mobilised not only before but also after return. This provides a strong case for involving diaspora and migrant organisations in future development cooperation.

**Diaspora Involvement**

Diaspora associations generally consist of groups of migrants from the same local community or country who, through their activities, maintain formal links with their village, urban area or nation. Such links may be economic, social, cultural, political or religious in nature, may have an altruistic or an investment character, and can be more or less formally organised (sporadic or regular). A common trait of most diaspora organisations is that their economic base is often quite modest. Their importance as development agents may therefore lay elsewhere.

Increasingly, source country governments recognize the important role that their diasporas may play in shaping local and national development. Organised diaspora groups represent a potential lobby that, if well organized, can promote source country interests abroad, serve as links for skills and technology transfers, and stimulate trade and investment.

In response, some source countries have put in place policies to encourage migrants’ and refugees’ long-term, long-distance nationalism, for example, by granting them some form of dual nationality or citizenship or other rights. These may include allowing the expatriate to vote or granting the diaspora representation in the national legislature (Levitt and Sørensen 2004). Granting rights and representations is simply a one-way strategy for maintaining migrants’ loyalties. A number of governments have also instituted a range of initiatives and have reformed ministerial and consular services to be more responsive to diaspora needs. In Senegal and Mali, for example, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs have created departments devoted to relations with nationals living abroad, as has Morocco.

In addition many states have put in place investment policies designed to attract and channel entrepreneurial remittances. Several governments have worked actively to promote the establishment of home-town associations and cooperation. Finally a few states have put in place matching funds schemes, in which migrant-generated funds
are matched by contributions from either local, state, federal (or all) levels (Levitt and Sørensen 2004).

In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, there are a number of African diaspora organisations – some small and localised, while others are international, with multiple national chapters – with diverse aims and objectives. The sheer number of organisations and wide scope of their activities may make it difficult to assess their development potential, let alone engage them in any coherent way (GCA 2005).

Reaching out to diaspora members and organisations is the key to any development agency’s strategy to mobilise resources and agents for development. Fostering a positive collaboration with migrant diasporas must involve:

- increasing interactions and interest at the political level (e.g. by promoting linkages with diaspora networks)
- inviting diaspora groups to participate in forums for dialogue on migration-development issues
- facilitating the cooperation of source-country governments with diaspora groups and international organizations by providing joint training and confidence-building environments

The fostering of investments by diaspora organisations could be enhanced by:

- offering economic co-development or matching funds schemes that are attractive to migrant (and perhaps even European) entrepreneurs
- facilitating the creation of joint investment and skills-transfer frameworks to stimulate local development activities in which migrants can play a role by remaining in the destination countries
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE

In the expert papers and plenary discussions, a number of concrete policy options were proposed. These are presented below:

New perceptions on migration. It was agreed that there is a need to humanize migration. If the aim is to make migration work for development, it is important that the negative images of refugees and migrants are countered. Facilitating migrants’ opportunities to become motors of development in source and destination countries may contribute to weakening or even removing negative images.

Creating dialogue and partnerships. Migration and the migration–development link will become extremely important in the next five to ten years. We are now at a turning point, as future policies in the area will be decided in the next year or two. In order for the European Union (EU) to develop policies, it needs inputs from the sending and transit countries. Otherwise there is no partnership.

The issue of creating equal partnerships was stressed. It was generally agreed that EU member states could not necessarily teach APS’s how to manage migration. However, it was mentioned that many EPS’s have long experience of these issues, and as the UK representative put it, ‘You can learn from our mistakes.’ Similarly, the APS’s could learn from each other, as some had gone much further than others in collaborating with EU.

Finally it was mentioned that representatives of sub-Saharan diasporas and/or source countries should be invited to participate in future dialogues.

Mixed flows. Not enough is known about the mixed flows of migrants and refugees who transit through Maghreb and the Mashreq. Further mapping studies were recommended.

Although it is difficult to distinguish refugees from other kinds of migrants, it was agreed that the protection issue in the transit situation remains important. The transit countries in Maghreb and Mashreq need to build their capacities to handle migration.

The unique situation of the transit countries. Most Mediterranean countries are in a complex position as both sending, transit and receiving states.
The policy options for transit countries are determined by five factors:

- domestic social concerns; fears in the population
- the capacity to absorb foreign labour and particular job opportunities for immigrants
- neighbourly relations with sending countries and other countries of transit
- neighbourly relations with receiving countries
- participation in regional and sub-regional trading blocs

In order for transit countries to address migration issues and manage migration better, ways to improve one or several of these factors must be explored. Many of the factors are beyond the capacities of individual countries to affect.

Concrete recommendations emerging from the conference included:

- the different transit countries may to some degree learn from each other’s experiences
- each transit country must adopt an approach to migration that correspond to the specific determining factors of that country
- the EU should differentiate the application of the New Neighbourhood Policy to its Mediterranean partner countries
- transit cannot be dealt with exclusively in terms of border controls and security-oriented provisions ... ... but must also involve social, economic and developmental concerns in countries of origin and transit.

*Concrete measures to enhance the development opportunities of migration.* There is no contradiction between ‘more development for less migration’ and ‘better managed migration for more development’: both can be achieved at once. The concrete policy proposals emerging from the conference are summed up in Table 2. Many of these proposals cannot be carried out by individual states but rely on agreements between sending, neighbouring, transit and receiving states.
Table 2: Policy options at different levels to ensure development opportunities in migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source country</th>
<th>Neighbouring countries</th>
<th>Transit countries</th>
<th>Destination Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deregulate currency</td>
<td>ensure trade relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>lower costs/fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower import tariffs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ensure easier access (transparency/information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strengthen financial infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>matching funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matching funds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dual nationality</th>
<th>readmission agreements</th>
<th>temporary work permits</th>
<th>temporary work permits (sector specific)</th>
<th>dual nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>readmission agreements</td>
<td>temporary work permits</td>
<td>temporary access to land</td>
<td>'regions of origin' approach</td>
<td>portable claims (e.g. pensions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>targeted training (sponsored by receiving countries)</td>
<td>ensure freedom of movement</td>
<td>information campaigns</td>
<td>dual nationality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus from tertiary to primary and secondary education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>use immigrants in development projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora Support</th>
<th>Dual nationality</th>
<th>easing investments (e.g. right to buy property)</th>
<th>ensure freedom of movement</th>
<th>information campaigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>departments/ministries for expatriates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dual nationality</td>
<td>promote investment in (and trade with) source country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dual nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ease investments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE CONTRIBUTIONS

Having introduced the policy fields of remittances, return and diaspora involvement in development, as well as the broader policy recommendations agreed upon during the Copenhagen meeting, the remainder of this volume presents edited versions of the background papers prepared for the meeting. These include a desk study of the transit migration situation in the Mediterranean region and the policy responses by the seven APS (carried out by ICMPD); a desk study of European attitudes and policies towards the linking of migration and development (carried out by DIIS); and four commissioned expert papers focusing on: i) policy responses in MENA countries of transit migration; ii) the actual state of migration between the Maghreb and the EU; iii) transit migration in Morocco; and iv) forced migration, conflict and development. These background papers present a variety of perspectives on transit migration.

The desk study on European attitudes and policies towards the linking of migration-development issue identifies three challenges for attempts to harmonize EU policy. The first of these is the conceptual question of how migration and development are understood to be connected. The second challenge revolves around the institutional constraints within the European Union. Finally, the third challenge stems from the different national interests at stake, which partly reflect diverging national experiences of migration. By subsequently focusing on four European member states with different migration experiences and very different migration policies – Denmark, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy – some of these differences are highlighted. The study concludes by suggesting adopting a transnational approach to both migration and development policy.

The desk study on irregular transit migration in the Mediterranean presents the currently best known statistics on transit migration, according to which about 100,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean each year. Of these, an estimated 30,000 are of sub-Saharan origin, 25,000 are transit migrants from other regions, and the remaining 45,000 nationals of countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean. In recent years, an estimated 2,000 human beings have drowned in the sea annually on their way to Europe. The most worrying trend described in this study is that transit migration through the Maghreb keeps rising. North African countries, where an increasing number of migrants have become stranded, thus have to deal with a new situation for which they are poorly prepared.
The first of the commissioned expert papers, ‘Policy Responses in MENA Countries of Transit for Migrants: An Analytical Framework for Policy-Making’, by Jean-Pierre Cassarino and Philippe Fargues, explores the highly contested meanings of ‘transit’. Transit constitutes a phenomenon which often cuts across various categories of migrant, ranging from legal, illegal and irregular migrants to readmitted migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. Transit migration is therefore not an isolated phenomenon: rather, its configuration is closely connected with other processes of mobility that need to be taken into account. As a consequence, a consideration of transit raises a wide range of potentially conflicting policy-related issues, such as protecting nationals on labour markets while protecting the basic rights of transit migrants, or taking care of domestic public opinions while managing external relations. The authors conclude that the political and legal treatment of transit migration can be properly assessed and understood only if we take into account the intertwining of a set of factors affecting international relations, the domestic economy and finally social concerns in transit countries.

The urgency of the problems generated by current irregular migration is further explored in Medhi Lahlou’s expert paper on ‘Patterns of Transit Migration between the Maghreb and the European Union’. Lahlou’s paper focus attention on immediate security matters, as well as the long-term economic, social and political factors creating the current flows. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership policy, ‘Action Plan Morocco’, and other local and regional economic development programmes have not eliminated poverty, famine, armed conflicts or the lack of employment opportunities on the African continent. There is thus a dire need for renewed development efforts, including the issue of human rights.

Any long-term solution to the problem of transit migration must take account of the experiences of the people involved. Michael Collyer’s expert paper on ‘Undocumented Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco’ does this by giving voice to a number of transit migrants interviewed in Morocco. The migration histories related to Collyer includes life before migration, the journey, residence in Morocco, and life between the risk of deportations and the increasingly utopian prospect of moving on. The process of migration must be seen as a series of choices made by the people involved within the constraints placed upon them. The spiralling costs of migration mean that a growing number of migrants are becoming stranded at different stages along the way, with little prospect of continuing and no hope of even returning. It is this group that raises most concern.
The fourth and last expert paper on ‘Forced Migration, Conflict and Development’, co-authored by Nicholas van Hear and Stephen Castles, focuses on recent shifts in patterns of and policies towards forced migration. Conflict and forced migration mainly arise in situations of underdevelopment and poor governance. In their turn, conflict and forced migration are major obstacles to development. As patterns and types of forced migration are constantly shifting, the resources and efforts of development agencies have to be distributed among several different kinds of forced migration populations. Recent UNHCR initiatives, including the Agenda for Protection, Convention Plus and the Framework for Durable Solutions, as well as recent developments at the EU level, such as the HLWG and AENEAS, are reviewed. It is concluded that, since all of these policies maintain a compartmentalized approach to the three durable solutions, potentials in the transnational livelihood strategies of forced migrants continue to go unnoticed.
REFERENCES


Riak Akuei, Stephanie (2005), Remittances as Unforeseen Burdens: The Livelihoods and Social Obligations of Sudanese Refugees. *Global Migration Perspectives*, no. 18, pp. 2–16.


MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION
Irregular Transit Migration in the Mediterranean: Facts, Figures and Insights

JULIEN SIMON
International Centre for Migration Policy Development

FOREWORD

In 2004, within the framework of the Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) between European Partner States (EPS) and Arab Partner States (APS), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) produced a working paper on irregular transit migration in the Mediterranean, focusing largely on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb states. The present document is a fully revised version, which also includes eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East countries. It was prepared as a background paper for the 2005 activities of Working Group II (medium- and long-term issues relating to the combating of root causes of irregular flows through development co-operation) of the MTM Dialogue. The paper is part of the study ‘Migration Development in the Mediterranean’, carried out in close co-operation with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
INTRODUCTION

Migration in sub-Saharan Africa and four countries of the Maghreb (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) has a long history. Important movements of migration both within and between the Sahelian zone and the Maghreb area have always existed, particularly in connection with the historical and economic relationships that the two regions have had over the centuries. The Maghreb region is more affected by sub-Saharan transit flows than is the Mashreq region (Egypt, Lebanon and Syria). This region is now increasingly affected by transit flows from the Horn of Africa, Asia and even the CIS countries. However, for various reasons, differences between the two regions which used to be significant are, although still important, dramatically decreasing, as on the one hand sub-Saharan migrants now also use routes through the eastern Mediterranean to transit to Europe, while on the other hand Asian migrants have recently also been using African routes to reach Europe.

An increasing number of people put their lives at risk by attempting to enter Europe on board unseaworthy and overcrowded boats or by hiding on ships concealed in containers, trailer carriers or other facilities, travelling in conditions of extreme hardship, which all too often result in their deaths. Many unfortunate migrants have lost their lives by drowning in the Straits of Gibraltar, the Atlantic between the Canary Islands and Africa, the Aegean and off the shores of Sicily while fleeing from hardship, extreme poverty or discrimination, or merely seeking a better future. Last but not least, migrants must often deal with unscrupulous smugglers or fall into the clutches of merciless traffickers. All this presents enormous management challenges to the governments concerned on both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, both in terms of controlling and halting the irregular migrants, and combating traffic and smuggling on a wider scale, bearing in mind its links with organised crime in general. This report will first provide some statistical information on transit migration, before presenting an overview of the routes taken by transit migrants.

STATISTICS ON TRANSIT MIGRATION

The information available regarding the number of immigrants originating in or transiting the Maghreb and Mashreq regions come from various sources, often non-
corroborating, very disparate and/or partial, depending on the source. Establishing estimates and figures as regards transit migration is consequently a very delicate exercise. This section will give some information on the foreign population in transit countries, the African communities in European countries, and finally the apprehension figures from border control authorities.

**Foreign Communities in North Africa**

Libya is the main destination country and is currently considered the main transit country in North Africa. Its authorities estimate that currently the foreign population residing legally in Libya is 600,000, and that a further 750,000 to 1.2 million are residing illegally. Moreover, the same authorities estimate that each year 75,000 to 100,000 foreigners enter Libya. Regarding the foreign populations in the other APS (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia), the relevant authorities confirm that their numbers are higher than a few years ago and that the flows are moving more rapidly. In 2003, for instance, the Lebanese authorities estimated the number of irregular migrants residing in the country as 140,000 and growing. APS have also indicated that more and more migrants are becoming stranded in their countries due to the heavy reinforcement of border control activities, particularly in Spain, Italy and Turkey.

Most of the APS used to be countries of origin and transit, but nowadays they are also increasingly becoming countries of destination ‘by default’ or because migrants choose them as such. This situation will continue to increase, since disparity between GDP per inhabitant in the sub-Saharan countries, Maghreb and Mashreq on the one hand, and European countries on the other continues to grow.²

**African Population in Europe³**

African migrants account for some 17% of the total foreign population in Europe, of which 43.3% reside in France. Spain has one of the fastest growing African populations, due mainly to the 2005 regularisation programme.

---


³ Different sources have been used for all the charts concerning stocks and populations of migrants in Europe, notably World Migration Report 2003, Table 12.1; (1) Statistik Austria 2002; (2) Eurostat 2000; (3) Council of Europe 2000, (4) EUMC 2003; Total/Foreign Population according to most recent census, except France: 1990, Greece: 1997, Finland: 1998
As for the countries of origin of African migrants in Europe, 65% come from the three Maghreb states of Morocco (36%), Algeria (20%) and Tunisia (9%). Relatively few migrants in Europe originate from Egypt (2.3%) or Libya (0.5%). The most prominent sub-Saharan countries of origin of migrants in Europe are Ghana (2.8%), Somalia (2.8%), Senegal (2.7%), Nigeria (2.6%), South Africa (2.0%), Cape Verde (1.5%) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1.4%).

Sub-Saharan migrants represent on average 34.2% of all African migrants residing in Europe. Some countries have small percentages of sub-Saharan populations, but the figures are still significant in absolute terms. This is especially the case for the estimated 252,900 sub-Saharan Africans living in France, who constitute 21.2% of all sub-Saharan Africans residing in Europe, but only 15.3% of all Africans living in France. In May 2005, the French Ministry of Interior officially estimated the number of migrants residing illegally in France to be 200,000 to 400,000, an important propor-
tion being of African origin. In Spain, the percentage of immigrants among the Spanish population increased from 2.3% in 2000 to 8.4% (3.7 million) in 2004. For the first time Morocco represented the main country of origin for immigrants in Spain, with 500,000 (14%). This figure is likely to increase further, since about 600,000 immigrant workers (11.56% of them Moroccans) will have taken advantage of the 2005 Spanish regularisation programme. Moreover, the authorities stress that the number of unregistered foreigners living in Spain – both from EU countries and those outside Europe – is thought to represent another 1 million persons. Furthermore, according to the Spanish Minister of Interior, immigration originating from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa and entering Spain across its southern borders represent 15% of total immigration into the EU. In Belgium, the authorities estimate the number of illegal immigrants to be 100,000. In the UK the number of illegal residents is estimated at around 500,000.

Graph 3: Percentage of selected foreign population

6 http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=81&story_id=16785;
7 AFP, 14 February 2005; Expatica News, 27 April 2005,
8 http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=81&story_id=19502;
9 National Statistics Institute (INE), http://www.ine.es/welcoing.htm
http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=81&story_id=16859
More than half (51.4%) of the sub-Saharan population lives in France and the United Kingdom, and more than a third (34.4%) in Germany, Italy and Portugal.

**Graph 4: Location of Sub-Saharan migrants in 14 European countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>10.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>24.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>6.632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>252,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>161,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>138,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>24,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>88,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>45,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>22,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>21,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>328,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Apprehensions**

**Apprehensions in the APS**

Figures taken from different studies indicate that during the past few years about 100,000 to 120,000 sub-Saharan migrants reach the Maghreb region annually. Out of these figures, about 70-80% of migrants head towards Libya, 20-30% towards Algeria.

**Graph 5: Migrants intercepted by the Moroccan authorities while attempting to depart for Spain (Peninsula and Canary Islands)**

10 The figures mentioned in this section are mainly published by public authorities in Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey (Ministries of Interior, Border Control Services, Intelligence Services). Information also originates from Moroccan authorities, however these figures are not published as regularly. Some statistics in this section come from studies carried out (generally under isolated circumstances) by researchers in Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. Information also comes from the MTM questionnaire on irregular transit migration in the Arab Partner States, meetings and interviews by ICMPD during missions in partner states.
In 2002, the Moroccan authorities detained a total of 31,739 persons before they could make a clandestine journey to Spain. Of the total, 16,141 were Moroccans, 13,424 sub-Saharan, 1,445 Algerians and 729 from various Asian countries. Moreover, 780 smugglers or traffickers and their accomplices were also arrested. According to more recent figures, during the last five months of 2003 the police in Rabat-Salé have arrested 1,224 irregular migrants before they could attempt to reach Spain. Of these the majority were from Mali (297), Nigeria (283), Senegal (250) and Ghana (164). The others (229) were from various sub-Saharan countries, except for one Pakistani. These figures should be seen in relation to estimates by the Moroccan Ministry of Interior that a total of 26,541 migrants wanting to head for Spain illegally were arrested in the first nine months of 2003, a significant increase over 2002. Most of them were Moroccan nationals (17,401) but there were also sub-Saharan (8,215), Algerians (945) and Asians (277). During the same period, 2,960 other sub-Saharan are said to have been denied entry at the airport in Casablanca and 119 groups of smugglers broken up. In 2004, the Moroccan authorities announced the dismantling of 423 networks and arrest of about 26,000 would-be immigrants in total, including 4,989 in Western Sahara. Of the total, 17,000 were sub-Saharan. In 2002, sub-Saharan migrants apprehended represented 42% of all apprehensions. This percentage decreased to 30% in 2003 but dramatically grew to reach a record high of 65% in 2004.

The gendarmerie in Algeria has recorded the number of irregular migrants apprehended in the last few years as 28,828, including 4,273 in 2001, 4,118 in 2002 and 4,870 in 2003. Moreover, the Algerian Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale informed ICMPD that they apprehended 4,684 irregular migrants on the border in 2002 and 6,594 in 2003. While in the last few years their services have repatriated 2,000 to 3,000 sub-Saharan migrants per year, in 2002 the number of repatriations increased to 4,602 and in 2003 to a record high of 8,843.

---

14 The Algerian contribution to the questionnaire on illegal transit migration in the Mediterranean for the Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM).
Graph 6: Irregular migrants apprehended at the border by the Algerian authorities 2002-2003

Graph 7: Illegal migrants intercepted by the Algerian Gendarmerie

According to the Ministry of Interior in Tunisia, during the period 1998 to 2004 the Tunisian authorities apprehended about 45,000 people attempting to cross from Tunisia to Italy, among them at least 10,000 foreign nationals, mainly sub-Saharan. The authorities also claim to have broken up 1,475 smuggling and trafficking networks during the period from 1 August 1998 to 10 October 2002. Moreover, in 2003 official figures indicated that 3,318 irregular migrants had been apprehended, including 1,670 intercepted at sea.

In Libya, the authorities have provided the following figures to the EU Technical Mission to Libya on Irregular Migration: between 2000 and 2003 20,295 irregular migrants were apprehended and resettled at the expense of the Libyan authorities.

15 http://pagetunisie.com/content/view/24/41/
The Libyan authorities also estimate that each year between 75,000 and 100,000 foreign nationals enter the country, and they have carried out important repatriation operations, with 43,000 irregular migrants being repatriated in 2003. These include 38% Egyptians, 15% Nigeriens, 12% Sudanese, 11% Ghanians and 10% Nigerians. In 2004, 54,000 irregular migrants, mainly from Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Mali and Egypt, were repatriated. Migration in the Mediterranean region also includes important movements departing from its eastern shores. Though most illegal immigrants from the Middle East transit northward via Turkey and then on to Greece, some depart from Lebanon or Syria. On 18 March 2002, the cargo ship Monica arrived in Sicily from Lebanon, carrying more than 900 undocumented migrants. About a year before, in February 2001, the vessel East Sea, carrying 908 Kurds, 480 of whom were children, was wrecked on the coast of Var (France). These major arrivals, which were widely covered in the media, hide the frequent, more minor and more discreet arrivals of irregular migrants on the coasts of Sicily and especially Cyprus and Greece. The boats usually depart from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria or Turkey.

Graph 8: Illegal migrants intercepted by the Libyan authorities

Graph 9: Origin of illegal migrants apprehended by the Libyan authorities 2000-2003
As regards irregular migration, Egypt used to be a major transit country for Asian immigrants travelling through the Suez Canal, but according to police sources this flow has now been stemmed through international co-operation. Egypt is now a country of both origin and transit for migrants to Europe. No significant figures on irregular migration could be obtained in this case.

The Documentation Department of the Immigration Directorate of the Ministry of Interior of Syria estimates that irregular migration since the war in Iraq has become difficult to manage. However, the official figures concerning apprehensions of irregular migrants by the Syrian authorities remains quite low, with 313 in 2001, 293 in 2002 and 261 in 2003. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the number of legal entries – given that citizens of Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen) are not required to obtain a visa to enter Syria – increased from 4,585,506 in 2002 to 8,132,635 in 2003.

Graph 10: Illegal migrants intercepted by the Lebanese authorities


16 Syrian contribution to the questionnaire on illegal transit migration in the Mediterranean for the Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM)
17 Lebanese contribution to the questionnaire on illegal transit migration in the Mediterranean for the Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM)
Graph 11: Origin of illegal migrants apprehended by the Lebanese authorities 2002-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apprehensions in the EPS

Turkey is a country of destination, transit and origin of migrants. The number of irregular migrants apprehended on Turkish territory first increased considerably between 1995 and 2000. 11,362 migrants were apprehended in 1995, but 47,529 in 1999, a figure that nearly doubled the following year to 94,514 (a dramatic increase of 831.8 percent compared to 1995), and then decreased slightly in 2001 and 2002 to 92,362 and 82,825 respectively. In 2003, the efforts made by the authorities to

Graph 12: Total number of illegal migrants apprehended by the Turkish authorities 1995-2004 (entry and exist)
tackle irregular migration in Turkey have had significant effects on apprehension figures, with a substantial decrease to 56,219. Last year, the numbers of apprehensions increased again to reach 61,228. The Turkish authorities estimate that the 59.5 percent decrease in official apprehension figures between 2000 and 2003 were a direct result of their substantial efforts to combat irregular migration and reinforce border controls. The last two years confirmed that more distant regions, such as Asia, Central Asia and Africa, were becoming more and more important as region(s) of origin of irregular migrants in Turkey. In 2000, about 11.9 percent of apprehended migrants originated from these three regions. In 2001 and 2002 this figure stayed more or less constant at around 11 percent, but in 2003 it increased to about 18 percent of all irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey. The share of African migrants reached 8 percent in 2003. The total number of apprehensions of irregular migrants since 1995 is more than half million (522,711). Regarding smugglers, 1,155 were arrested in 2001, 1,157 in 2002, 937 in 2003 and 956 in 2004.18

In this connection, the geographically exposed position of Cyprus should be mentioned. According to the Cypriot police, there were around 182 migration-related border apprehensions in Cyprus in 2001, 725 in 2002, 3,796 in 2003 and 2,559 in 2004.19 Most of the migrants come from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Romania and Jordan. Moreover, in 2004 the Cypriot authorities returned 2,800 irregular migrants. According to the Cypriot authorities, the pressure of illegal immigration has increased since Cyprus became Member State of the EU in May 2004. The division

Graph 13: **Total number of illegal migrants apprehended by the Cypriot authorities 1995-2004 (entry and exist)**

18 Office of Irregular Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings of the Ministry of the Interior.
19 ICMPD 2004 Yearbook on Irregular migration and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe (forthcoming).
of the island also makes the situation delicate, since most of these migrants apparently travel via the northern part of the island, which is under the control of the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

According to the Ministry of Merchant Marine in Greece, in 2002 a total of 3,945 irregular migrants were intercepted at sea while attempting to enter Greece illegally. According to the Turkish authorities, by invoking the readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey, the Greek authorities requested the readmission of 8,045 illegal immigrants in 2002. 4,990 of 8,045 were claimed to have left Turkish shores and were seized at sea while attempting to enter Greece illegally. It is also worth observing that the Maritime Borders-Illegal Immigration Department, Hellenic Coast Guard Security Directorate, of the Ministry of Merchant Marine, apprehended 21,733 irregular migrants attempting to land on Greek territory during the period 1998-2003, whilst during the same period the Turkish authorities apprehended 402,878. In March 2005 the Greek authorities rescued about 200 irregular immigrants whose boat capsized while they were trying to reach the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.20

The Ministry of Interior in Italy has provided figures for 2002 on the origin of irregular migrants apprehended in Sicily and its dependent islands, mainly Pantelleria and Lampedusa. For the previous two years, 2003 and 2004, only the total figures are available.

Of the migrants intercepted in Sicily and its dependent islands, mainly Lampedusa and Pantelleria, in 2002, the main group was composed of migrants of sub-Saharan origin. There were 5,547 from sub-Saharan Africa, or 30.4%. Other intercepted migrants were from North Africa (22.3%), Asia (20.8%), the Middle East (20.1%) and the eastern Mediterranean (6.4%). In 2003 the

Graph 14: Migrants intercepted by the Italian authorities in Sicily and belonging islands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,225</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>2,564</td>
<td></td>
<td>14517</td>
<td>12,723</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Until 2.12.2004
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior, Department of Public Security, Immigration and Border control Services.

Italian authorities recorded a significant drop in migrants apprehended, with 18,225 in 2002 and 14,331 in 2003. However, almost all of these migrants (14,017 or 97.8%) arrived in Sicily or Pantelleria and Lampedusa, a fact that emphasizes the continuing significance of migration from Africa. Moreover, the Italian Ministry of Interior announced that it believed that about 15,000 irregular migrants currently living in Libya were preparing to cross to Italy in the near future, and that considerable arrivals were expected in the summer of 2005. Parallel with arrivals in Sicily and Lampedusa, a new phenomenon, which has started to worry the Maltese authorities, was the high increase in what were described as ‘accidental’ arrivals in Malta. In 2002, this confusion between the shores of Sicily and those of Malta has attained huge proportions. Indeed, 1,686 migrants, most of whom were from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad and Liberia, were intercepted in Malta in 2002 compared to 57 the year before. Since that year the number of irregular migrants apprehended has remained very high, with 1,700 in 2003 and 1,369 in 2004. Moreover, Malta is believed to be becoming a transit point for Chinese irregular migrants, as well as for Sri Lankans attempting to reach Italy.

Graph 15: Origin of irregular migrants apprehended by the Italian authorities in Sicily and belonging islands in 2002

![Graph showing origin of irregular migrants](source: Italian Ministry of Interior, Department of Public Security, Immigration and Border control Services.)

Italian authorities recorded a significant drop in migrants apprehended, with 18,225 in 2002 and 14,331 in 2003. However, almost all of these migrants (14,017 or 97.8%) arrived in Sicily or Pantelleria and Lampedusa, a fact that emphasizes the continuing significance of migration from Africa. Moreover, the Italian Ministry of Interior announced that it believed that about 15,000 irregular migrants currently living in Libya were preparing to cross to Italy in the near future, and that considerable arrivals were expected in the summer of 2005. Parallel with arrivals in Sicily and Lampedusa, a new phenomenon, which has started to worry the Maltese authorities, was the high increase in what were described as ‘accidental’ arrivals in Malta. In 2002, this confusion between the shores of Sicily and those of Malta has attained huge proportions. Indeed, 1,686 migrants, most of whom were from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad and Liberia, were intercepted in Malta in 2002 compared to 57 the year before. Since that year the number of irregular migrants apprehended has remained very high, with 1,700 in 2003 and 1,369 in 2004. Moreover, Malta is believed to be becoming a transit point for Chinese irregular migrants, as well as for Sri Lankans attempting to reach Italy.

23. Maltese police sources.
25. Maltese police sources.
In Spain, the number of sub-Saharan migrants intercepted by the Spanish authorities increased from 142 in 1996 to a record high of 8,761 in 2002. For 2003 and 2004 the figures are respectively 7,295 and 7,936. During the same period, the total amount of irregular migrants apprehended on the coasts of Spain increased from 7,741 in 1996 to 21,013 in 2002 and 19,176 in 2003, before decreased in 2004 to 15,675. The percentage of sub-Saharan migrants in the total number of migrants apprehended by Spanish forces while attempting to cross the Mediterranean or the Atlantic has considerably increased from 1.8% in 1996 to 25.3% in 2000, 41.7% in 2002 and 38% and 50.6% respectively in 2003 and 2004. Moreover, during 2003 a total of 942 embarkations were detected and 225 smugglers arrested.27 In 2004, 740 mainly makeshift vessels were intercepted and 283 smugglers apprehended28 50 networks dismantled and 9,013 false documents seized.29 Furthermore, according to the same police source, in 2004 Spain organised 338 flights to return 11,407 irregular migrants to their countries of origin. Of these 338 flights, 265 went to Morocco, 22 to Nigeria, 10 to Senegal, 3 to Guinea and 3 to Mauritania.

---

27 Comisaría General de Extranjería y Documentación, CAT: Oficina Policial Central de Asilo, Fronteras e Inmigración, Ministerio del Interior.
28 AFP, 7 January 2005.
29 Dirección General de la Policía, Comisaría General de Extranjería y Documentación, Unidad Contra las Redes de Inmigración Ilegal y Falsedades Documentales (UCRIF).
Other figures must also be mentioned in order to estimate the flow of migrants transiting in the Mediterranean region each year, and more precisely in the last few years. There have been recurrent reports of tragic accidents to migrants whose boats have capsized, engines broken down, have been murdered by smugglers or simply lost their way across the Mediterranean. The Ministry of Interior in Italy has estimated the number of irregular migrants who die while attempting to reach Italy by sea each year at about 500.

All the recorded tragedies that occur in the Mediterranean might be listed in order to illustrate more dramatically the situation of these irregular migrants, who appear in official and unofficial apprehension figures and estimates of irregular flows. Although such figures are necessary to appreciate clearly the scale of the problem, it should not be forgotten that most of the irregular migrants who risk their lives while attempting to reach European shores are often suffering from severe political, demographic and/or economic situations in their countries of origin and are only searching for a better life.
The Moroccan Association des Familles des Victimes de l’Immigration Clandestine (AFVIC), supported by the Council of Europe, the aim of which is to combat smuggling syndicates and irregular migration, states that between 1997 and 2002, 3,286 corpses were found on the shores of Spain (an average of 657 per year). It is commonly accepted by experts that, once lost at sea, the probability of discovering a corpse is one out of three. Consequently it can be estimated that 10,000 individuals (an average of 2,000 per year) died while attempting to reach the southern shores of Europe. The Spanish Ministry of Interior published the official figures for 2002-2004 (see above). However, according to the human rights group, Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucia, the real death toll could be about 500 for 2004.30

Estimating flows of irregular migration is not an exact science, and all conclusions about them, taking due account of official and unofficial figures, interviews with concerned authorities and information exchange, are still no more than best guesses.

30 Deutsche Presse Agentur, 5 January 2005.
However, according to the above-mentioned figures, some estimates can be made as regards transit migration for the western and central Mediterranean region. In 2002, Spanish and Italian authorities intercepted a total of 39,213 migrants on their southern borders. Of those who were apprehended, 36.5% or 14,294 were of sub-Saharan origin. 71.3% of those intercepted in Italy and 41.7% of those apprehended by the Spanish authorities were transit migrants. Together these authorities apprehended 33,193 irregular migrants in 2003 and about 30,000 in 2004. Figures concerning transit migrants could only be gathered from the Spanish authorities, who recorded 38% in 2003 and 50.6% in 2004, respectively. Moreover, the Moroccan authorities apprehended about 84,280 irregular migrants between 2002 and 2004, about 50% from sub-Saharan countries or various Asian countries. During the period 1998-2004, the Tunisian authorities apprehended about 45,000 irregular migrants; 10,000 originating from sub-Saharan countries. In 2002-2003, the Algerian authorities apprehended 10,429 sub-Saharan irregular migrants, representing about 80% of all apprehensions. Between 2000 and 2003 the Libyan authorities apprehended 20,295 irregular migrants; the great majority originating from sub-Saharan Africa. A significant number of these irregular migrants were transiting the region. For the eastern Mediterranean, numbers are still too imprecise.

All this information brings ICMPD to the conclusion that about 100,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean each year. An estimated 30,000 are of sub-Saharan origin, 25,000 transit migrants from other countries of origin, and the remaining 45,000 nationals of the countries on the south and east of the Mediterranean.
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

ROUTES AND NETWORKS OF IRREGULAR TRANSIT MIGRATION THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

The purpose of this part is not to present an exhaustive description of all air, land and maritime migratory routes in the region, nor to portray precisely all smuggling or trafficking networks. The objective is rather to give a more general view of the current situation. This description will mainly focus on land and maritime migration, preceded by some brief information on air migration routes.

ICMPD’s study of migration routes results from in-depth surveys undertaken in the field by researchers in Maghreb, Mashreq and European countries, using official and unofficial statistics as well as information obtained at the instance of ICMPD missions to the partner States as well as through answers to the MTM questionnaire on irregular transit migration in the Mediterranean. It must again be emphasised that migration-related information regarding transit through Maghreb and Mashreq countries is subject to much variation and is not always consistent.

Smuggling networks and revenues
Before describing routes, smuggling networks and the revenues generated by their activities should be mentioned. According to police sources, there is clear evidence that smugglers operate in highly organised networks, exploiting the lack of adequate national criminal law and the lack of co-ordination between the police and immigration authorities in different countries. Some networks work from countries of origin to countries of destination via countries of transit. These cells are often independent but also maintain regular contact with each other, or at least with the cells operating at prior or later stages of the journey. They also tell the migrants who they should contact to continue their journeys, or more often the smugglers deliver the migrants to the cell responsible for the next stage of the journey. It is worth noting that, according to the Spanish authorities, the long Saharan crossing may take on average one month. They also confirm that according to their information nobody travels unassisted. These networks have proved to be extremely flexible and react to improved immigration control measures in one seaport or departure area by shifting their activities to others. This is not surprising, since smuggling can be a very profitable business. However, given the unstable and changing situation in the region, it is not only difficult but also not useful to try and estimate the average price for smuggling, since this varies tremendously depending on the route used, the smuggling network and the migrant him- or herself. Nevertheless, according to ICMPD estimates, 830,000 immigrants (from all countries of origin) are migrating irregularly to the enlarged European Union each year. Out of these, 450,000 will be smuggled, generating revenues of €4.2 billion.
Air migration routes
Air migration routes still represent a relatively rare means of entering the EU, owing partly to the high cost on the migrant and partly to the regulations on air carriers and visa requirements. Usually the migrant uses the so-called ‘via/via’ system. Smugglers organise the journey on a regular flight from an African country to Australia or China via Paris or Rome. Once at the transit airport, local accomplices help the migrant exit the premises. This is certainly the safest way to enter Europe, but it has a price, approximately €7,000. The Spanish authorities also indicated that Asian migrants, mainly from China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, use the airport in the Jordanian capital, Amman, as a transit point. Some continue on their way by land, but others use other airports, such as Casablanca, to continue their journey. According to the same source, Pakistani smuggling networks are also increasingly using Bamako in Mali as a transit airport. The rest of the trip is organised overland towards northern Africa (Mauritania, Algeria and Morocco). Moreover, in 2005, the Ghanaian authorities broke up a Chinese human-trafficking ring that was using Ghana as a transit country towards the EU or the USA. Recruited in China, the victims of human trafficking paid about $5,000 each to obtain false documents and visas from the Ghanaian embassy in Beijing.31

Maritime migration routes
The main arrival points for maritime migration routes are the Canary Islands, the Straits of Gibraltar, Sicily and its dependent islands, Malta, Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. Due to the relatively short distances separating Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Italy and Spain from departure or transit countries, most migrants trying to reach Europe clandestinely by sea do not travel as stowaways. However, information confirms that some sub-Saharan do not attempt the long and perilous crossing of the Sahara, but make for the principal harbours of the African Atlantic coast, such as Lagos (Nigeria), Accra (Ghana), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Conakry (Guinea) and especially Dakar (Senegal), trying their luck as stowaways. The Spanish authorities also stress the importance of the so-called barcos negreros, boats that are hardly seaworthy, but which pick up migrants in harbours in the Gulf of Guinea and especially Liberia, Sierra Leone and Senegal before continuing their route to the Cape Verde Islands and finally the Canary Islands. In 2005, Spanish coastguards intercepted five boats with about 1,000 migrants on board.

31 AFP, 23 February 2005.
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

Mediterranean migration routes

- Minor land routes
- Major land routes
- Maritime routes
- Major air routes

Main area of entry in the EU

Countries
- Cape Verde (country code)
- EU Member States
- Arab Partner States
- Countries less concerned by illegal migration

Routes

Middle Eastern countries of origin (country code)
Irregular movements of migration across borders also take place via seaports. In this case, most clandestine migrants travel by rail or road to reach a seaport with close ferry or cargo connections to the destination country of choice, and then hide on board a ship or, more often, in containers or trailers waiting to be loaded on to the ship. A number of migrants gain access to the port area via unauthorised points of entry. Most people, however, are already in the container when it arrives at the port. People hiding in containers generally travel in groups, mainly of young men, but occasionally including women and children too.

The main seaports for migration routes in the Mediterranean region or on the way to it are Dakar (Senegal), Conakry (Guinea), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Accra (Ghana) and Lagos (Nigeria) in sub-Saharan Africa; Port Sudan (Sudan) and Suez (Egypt) on the Red Sea; Port Saïd and Alexandria (Egypt), Beirut and Tripoli (Lebanon), Antalya and Istanbul (Turkey) in the eastern Mediterranean; Zilten, Tripoli and Zuwarah (Libya), Sfax, Port El Kantaoui and La Goulette (Tunisia) in the central Mediterranean region; and finally Tangier (Morocco) in the western Mediterranean Region.

Although most of the attempts to cross take place during the spring and summer, more and more networks are also organising crossings during the winter season. During the first two weeks of 2005, for example the Spanish security forces announced the apprehension of more than 200 irregular migrants.

In recent years, countries receiving a high number of arrivals by sea have increased their reception facilities by building reception centres in the main arrival areas, along the coast or in its proximity. However, regularly, centres such as those on Lampedusa must accommodate two to three times more migrants than their supposed maximum capacity.

**Enforcing immigration control in coastal areas**

The task of enforcing immigration control in coastal areas is overwhelming for a single coastal state, given the high number of small-scale arrivals. States such as Italy have called for international co-operation to ensure control of the Mediterranean and the main maritime migration routes.

It is in this context that in June 2002 some EU Member States launched a multinational maritime border control pilot project, Operation Ulysses, which was set up as part of the EU Council’s Border Control Programme, following the Seville Summit of June 2002. Under this project, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK have
begun carrying out navy patrols in the Mediterranean to intercept vessels transporting irregular migrants. Any vessel intercepted is to be escorted to the nearest Member State to obtain information on the vessel, its crew and passengers. According to the Spanish Interior Minister, the aim of Operation Ulysses is to create a ‘rectangular filter’ six nautical miles in width, with a length measured in multiples of twelve miles according to the number of ships. He added that any boat attempting to pass through that filter would be detected, since the radars of the ships taking part in the patrols have a twelve-mile range. The cost of the project was €950 million, financed 80% by the European Commission and 20% by the five participating states. In the first phase, the Command Centre that is based in the Campo de Gibraltar port of Algeciras focused on the Straits of Gibraltar. The second phase was launched on 8 February 2004, when Operation Ulysses was extended to include the Atlantic zone of the Sahara, which includes the maritime frontier of the Canary Islands. Ulysses has been controversial, and critics have claimed that the focus is on ‘detect and deter’ missions rather than on saving lives.

Another highly technical system, SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior, or Integral Service of External Vigilance), introduced by Spain, is monitoring the Straits of Gibraltar. It consists of radars, thermal and infrared cameras, as well as police units ready to act at very short notice. This extremely costly system had its first headquarter in Algeciras, and was extended to Cadiz and Malaga in 2003. Due to the increased controls on the Spanish side of the Gibraltar Strait, a shift from the traditional route to another route based on the Canary Islands was observed in 2003. This change will be discussed in more detail in the section below, dealing with the Moroccan routes. However, in 2004, the Spanish authorities also installed a control station in the Canary Island on Fuerteventura. Soon Ceuta and Melilla are also expected to be covered by the system. Its effectiveness has been questioned, since the number of irregular migrants attempting the crossing, although decreasing, is still high. Moreover, part of the burden may simply be shifted to the route between Libya and Italy or to the eastern Mediterranean, the networks being, as already explained, very flexible. Furthermore, in 2004 the Balearic Islands witnessed the first landing of irregular migrants by boat. Another consequence of the SIVE is the increased risk that migrants are taking to make the crossing. Before the strengthening of controls in the Canary Islands, the smugglers accompanied the migrants until they landed on the island. The strengthening of controls and of Moroccan and Spanish legislation to combat smuggling activities initially forced the smugglers to take fewer risks.

32 In addition to these five countries, Germany, Greece, Austria, Norway and Poland have sent observers.
According to the Spanish authorities, the smugglers used to get to fifty metres of the coast and then throw their passengers, most of whom could not swim, overboard after they had been two days at sea. Now, it is clear that smugglers do not even attempt the crossing themselves anymore. The immigrants are given a compass, a few brief instructions on how to manage the old engines, and directions. The motors break down, the fuel runs out and they drift into oblivion.33

Several measures are on the agenda at the EU level for controlling external borders, including maritime borders. In 2005, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) was created and is located in Warsaw. The budget is about €6 million for 2005 and €10 million for 2006. For the period 2007-2013 a budget of €285 million has been set aside for the agency’s operations.34 The Agency will also take responsibility, as soon as possible, for the tasks of the EU Risk Analysis Centre, which ended its operations on 30 April 2005. In addition, the land border centre in Germany, the airport centre in Italy, the maritime border centres in Spain and Greece, and the Austrian Ad-hoc Centre for Border Guard Training will probably be integrated into the framework of the new Agency.

AFRICAN LAND MIGRATION ROUTES

Three main migration routes can be identified in the African continent, namely the western, northern and eastern routes. Since migration flows react sensitively to the opening or closing of borders in both the Maghreb countries and the EU, this description should not be understood as being exhaustive.

The Western, Northern and Eastern African Routes

The migratory channels between the Sahelian countries, the Horn of Africa and North African countries are organised along the southern Algerian and Libyan borders, mainly on the borders separating Libya from Sudan and Chad, Algeria from Mali, and especially on those separating Niger from Algeria and Libya. In the southern Sahara, two cities constitute the crossroads and main hubs of migration, namely Agadés and Tamanrasset. These cities, as well as Al Jawf and Shebha in Libya, belong to a network of cities that are on the itinerary of trans-Saharan migration.

Agadès
As already mentioned, the Spanish authorities regard Bamako as a city of growing importance for irregular transit migration in Africa. However, Agadès remains the main and central hub of migration flows towards North Africa. Before migrants take the western or northern routes, they mainly gather in the city of Agadès, in the north of Niger, between the Sahel and the Maghreb. Agadès is now a city of about 100,000 inhabitants, but it had only 30,000 in 1985. Traditionally a transit point, this city has developed into a ‘passenger transport centre’, from where trucks cross the Tenere Desert, the only possible route to transport people connecting Agadès and the large cities in the southern Maghreb.

The migrants usually arrive from the west, such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo or Benin via the city of Niamey in Niger. Most Nigerian migrants heading for Agadès usually arrive after first gathering in the cities of Sokoto, Kano, Tessaoua and Tahoua, cities where the presence even of South African migrants has been reported. The geographical situation of Agadès is of strategic importance for the smuggling syndicates. Once the migrants heading towards Europe pass into northern Sahel, several convoy routes come into play, along south-north-east and south-north-west axes.

The West African route
Once migrants in Agadès have decided to head for Algeria and eventually continue on to Europe, they usually board Toyota pick-ups that have been adapted for the journey. The convoys travel in the direction of the border and attempt to avoid the Algerian border patrols around the border city of Arlit.

Tamanrasset: Whereas Agadès serves merely as a point of transit, Tamanrasset is often seen as a final destination for the migrants, even though this has changed lately owing to the reinforced controls of the police in and around Tamanrasset. The city of Tamanrasset has seen its population rise from 3000 people in 1966, 332 of whom were sub-Saharan, to 70,000 in 1998, 31,300 of whom were sub-Saharan. The presence of sub-Saharan communities prompted the governments of Mali and Niger to establish consulates in the city. The sub-Saharan stay in the city for shorter or longer periods before either heading back to their country of origin or proceeding to Libya via the city of Ghât on the Algerian-Libyan border or to northern Algeria and the Moroccan Rif.
When, after a few days, weeks, months or even years in Tamanrasset, the migrants decide to continue their journey on towards Morocco, they usually head for the border city of Oujda on the northernmost tip of the Algerian-Moroccan border. On the way they will transit through In Sahal, Ghardaïa, Ouargla and Maghnia. Lately, it has also been reported that sub-Saharan migrants are transiting Mauritania to reach El Aioun.

*The Moroccan channels:* The main route to enter Morocco is from the Algerian city of Maghnia and then on to Oujda in Morocco. For the rest of the journey, the smuggling syndicates maintain three main channels, which can be called the northeast channel, the northwest channel heading towards the Straits of Gibraltar, and the south channel heading towards the Canary Islands. These names will be retained, as the distinctions they make help us to understand the routes being used.

In addition to the approximately 100,000 migrants attempting to cross the Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean to the Iberian Peninsula using the first two channels, the constant increase on the most recently established route must be added, namely that leading to the Canary Islands. This increase is primarily due to the strengthening of controls, such as the SIVE on the Spanish side of the Strait as described above. Moreover, the SIVE system now also covers the Canary Islands. Although figures have fallen since 2002, the number of irregular migrants landing in the Canary Islands is still high. Moreover, based on the number of arrivals of duck boats or *pateras* carrying irregular migrants, several sources indicate that more and more smugglers are apparently moving their operations to Algeria in order to avoid routes that are now covered by this comprehensive system of surveillance. Noteworthy in this context, as already mentioned, is the first landing on the Balearic Islands, recorded in 2004.

The number of boat migrants apprehended for trying to disembark clandestinely on the Canary Islands rose from 2,410 in 2000 to 4,094 in 2001 and 11,144 in 2002. At the same time, those caught trying to disembark along Spain’s southern coast fell from 16,885 in 2000 and 15,149 in 2001 to 9,869 in 2002. In 2003, the number of arrivals on Spain’s southern coast and in the Canary Islands were 9,749 and 9,382 respectively. In 2004, figures continued to decline, reaching 8,426 in the Canary Islands and 7,249 on the southern coast.
Other incidents emphasize the increasing importance of the route to the Canary Islands. An even higher number of Asian migrants are being caught here, and even though the Red Cross and State Police have been sceptical about the prospect of Asians travelling enormous distances to enter Europe through the Canary Islands, 2004 and the beginning of 2005 confirmed this trend, not only for the Canary Islands but for the whole region. The Spanish authorities stated that in March 2005, about 70 Indians and 20 to 30 Chinese were detained in the reception centre on Fuerteventura.
The south channel
The migrants taking the south channel gather in Rabat or Casablanca and small groups are transferred by night to Agadir. Once migrants have gathered in sufficient number to fill the *pateras* – usually 25 to 30 people – a 600- to 800-kilometre night voyage is set up in the direction of the city of El Aioun in Western Sahara. In 2004, the French reporter Grégoire Deniau and French photographer Olivier Jobard accompanied a group of sub-Saharan migrants during their journey to the Canary Islands and witnessed the immense difficulties and dramatic risks that such migrants are willing to take in order to reach Europe.35

El Aioun and its surroundings became a migration hub and ‘waiting area’ very recently, when controls on the northern coast of Morocco were reinforced. When conditions allowed for crossing, smugglers used to bring the migrants to the shore and hand them over to a fisherman, who, as an intermediary, would sail the *pateras* to south-west Fuerteventura, the closest of the Canary Islands. As described above, due to the strengthening of controls, neither the smugglers nor the fishermen accompany the migrants during the crossing any more. Since the conditions of the *pateras* range from utterly unseaworthy to hardly seaworthy, the migrants must repair them and maintain themselves with the very poor means that the smugglers provide them with. The main areas of departure are Tan-Tan, Tarfaya Lemsia and Bojador. The irregular migrants attempt to reach Grand Canary or Fuerteventura using the rudimentary instructions and vague directions they are given. In 2001, half of the sub-

Saharan migrants came to Spain through the southern route. In 2002 and 2003, about 75% of them were caught on the shores of the Canary Islands, a figure rising to 90% in 2004.

**The northeast channel**
As already mentioned, the Moroccan city of **Oujda** is the main entry point for irregular migration flows from Algeria to Morocco. From Oujda, smugglers organise either entry into the Spanish enclave of **Melilla** or crossings to the Spanish mainland. The departure area for the northeast channel is located on a large coastal zone around the Moroccan city of **Nador** in the north-east of Morocco. The usual arrival area is the shore between Malaga and Almeria. This channel is obviously geographically longer but may easily facilitate a faster journey, since the area is not yet covered by SIVE, although an extension in the coverage of the system is planned.

**The northwest channel**
The northwest channel represents the shortest distance to Spain, but also the most perilous. The **pateras** leave Moroccan territory between the area to the south of Tangier and Tetouan. In this way, the twelve kilometres separating the northern shores of Morocco and the shores of Andalusia may often become several hundreds of kilometres of an extremely hazardous crossing. Controls are particularly strong in this area, and as already mentioned above, the Spanish border authorities have sophisticated detection equipment available to them. All the detours taken to avoid the controls of the coastguards increase the risks. A much shorter option is to attempt to enter the Spanish enclave of **Ceuta** illegally. However, this option is also becoming increasingly difficult, since the controls there have been significantly reinforced.
The North African route
Towards Libya and Tunisia

The northern route, originating from Agadès in Niger, is by far the most important migration channel from sub-Saharan countries to Maghreb countries. ICMPD estimates that about 60,000 to 80,000 migrants take this route every year. The Libyan Sahara is open to two distinct areas, Sudan and Chad in the east, and Niger and Algeria in the west.

The smugglers usually negotiate a truck with cigarette-traffickers for about €2,000 per truck. Eighty to a hundred migrants are placed in each truck in the convoy. Another option for those who can afford it is to travel on board a pick-up, which can transport 25 to 30 people. Once in the city of Dirkou (Niger), the migrants are directed to other trucks, where they find that the fare has doubled and that the number of passengers is not less than 160 per truck. The route to Libya, including hundreds of kilometres of desert, is considered the most dangerous and deadly land route that migrants can take.

Libya has long been an important destination for influxes of Arabs, Asians and Africans. Lasting recent decades, we have witnessed the installation of an urban framework in the cities of Shebha and Koufra (in the south of Libya), serving the trans-Saharan networks.

Tunisia, as a Maghrebian and Mediterranean country, was of crucial importance for the networks of clandestine migration towards the countries of the European Union. Irregular migration via the Tunisian coasts is divided into two distinct zones of traffic: one in the capital, Tunis, in the north, managed mainly by criminal smugglers from disadvantaged neighbourhoods in greater Tunis; the other on the coast, especially near Sfax, which is managed by sea smugglers. However, in the last two years the activities of smuggling networks have dramatically decreased. The Italian and Maltese authorities consider that nowadays most irregular migrants depart from Libya.

Crossing from Libya and Tunisia to Sicily and its dependent islands

Italy is a main country of arrival, and often transit, for irregular migrants travelling by sea. With its 7,600 kilometres of coastline, it is often considered to be the easiest way to enter Europe for irregular migrants and criminal smuggler organisations alike. The most motivated sub-Saharan migrants who have decided to try to reach the southern shores of Sicily and pass all obstacles gather around Tripoli or Tunis, these being the main departure areas or harbours from which another journey will start.
The north Tunisian coast extending down to the city of Misurata in Libya are favourable points of departure for travel to Sicily and its islands. Most departures are from points located within the area between Cap Bon and Sfax, as well as from the Libyan-Tunisian border to the city of Misurata or even Styre. The main harbours in which syndicates are active are the Tunisian ports of La Goulette, Sousse El Katanoui and Sfax. In Libya, the main harbours are Zuwarah, Tripoli and Zilten.

In Tunisia, the routes proceed in two directions. The northern route departs from the port of La Goulette and Cap Bon and heads for the south-western Sicilian shores in the region of Mazara del Vallo or the island of Pantelleria. Boats taking the southern route leave from a coastal zone situated between Sousse and Sfax and head for the Italian islands of Linosa and Lampedusa or directly to Sicily.

The Libyan shores are much further south of Sicily than the Tunisian coast, which implies a longer trip but also fewer controls. The two main seaports of Zuwarah and Zilten see the departure of an increasing number of boats heading for Sicily. According to police sources, the port of Zuwarah is becoming the centre of smuggling networks in Libya.
The main arrival area is by far is the island of Lampedusa, followed by the islands of Pantelleria, Linosa and Sicily itself. Of the 18,225 illegal immigrants who landed in Sicily in 2002, 5,760 came from ports in Libya. Of the 1,700 who landed in Malta in 2002, the great majority had transited through Libya.

In the last two years, according to the Italian and Maltese authorities, most of the boats originated from Libya, but also Egypt. There were also several arrivals from countries in the eastern Mediterranean, such as Turkey, and even from Sri Lanka through the Suez Canal. As already mentioned in the section on apprehensions, the Italian authorities were expecting significant arrivals from Libya in summer 2005.

The East African route
The third main route used by irregular migrants on their way to north Africa (mainly Libya and Egypt) or Europe might be named the eastern route, since this is the one that is mainly used by migrants originating from the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and Sudan. Less information is available regarding this route as compared to either the western or northern routes.

Migrants coming from Somalia usually gather in Addis Abada and continue their journey towards Al Qadarif in Sudan, then to Khartoum and Selima. At this stage reports also mention the presence of Eritreans. Sudanese, Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somalian migrants enter Libya and then head towards the city of Al Jawf, the significance of which for irregular migration in northern Africa has grown considerably in the last few years. In Al Jawf, these migrants are often joined by Chadians. Some of them do not attempt to continue their journeys towards the Libyan coast, but others still have a long way to travel before they can reach departure areas in northern Libya, where they will attempt a crossing to Malta or Italy.

It is also worth noting that, even though the main routes nowadays head towards Libya and Algeria, some minor routes also lead to Egypt and further north by boat or by land towards Turkey.

---

36 As mentioned, earlier the quiet island of Lampedusa (Italy), with about 6,000 inhabitants, saw the arrival of five hundred irregular migrants during the single night of the 2 June 2005; Le Monde, 6 June 2005.
37 Italian Intelligence sources.
38 The Sri Lankan authorities alerted the Italian authorities about a fishing boat transporting 154 irregular migrants heading towards the Italian coast; AFP, 14 February 2005.
The Eastern Mediterranean

The eastern Mediterranean is also a major region of transit for migrants heading towards Europe. Significant flows of particularly Asian, Middle Eastern and Central Asian migrants are transiting through Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey.

Reports still cite Egypt and the Suez Canal as the main transit route for Sri Lankans heading towards Italy. The Italian authorities have conducted investigations which have revealed the presence existence of sophisticated criminal networks smuggling people from Sri Lanka to Italy via Egypt and Malta. Migrants originating from the Horn of Africa and heading towards Europe also use Egypt as a transit country, although Libya remains their main country of transit.

It is important to emphasise that the eastern land borders of Turkey are probably easier to control than the 7,200 kilometres of coastline. This becomes evident regarding the 3,000 neighbouring Greek islands and rocky islets, of which several are just a few kilometres from the Turkish shores. Moreover, Greece has about 14,000 kilometres of coastline. On the whole, the Aegean Sea can hardly be controlled. Furthermore, Cyprus is located approximately equidistant from Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, which naturally makes the southern part of the island a target for entering the EU. The Cypriot authorities have noticed a serious increase in the number of irregular migrants, mostly entering from the Turkish side of the island through the now open demarcation line.

It is also worth noting that more and more migrants originating from Africa are using the eastern Mediterranean as a transit route towards Europe. This tendency is probably also due to the strengthening of controls, especially in the western Mediterranean and Canary Islands, and the increased cooperation between the Moroccan and Spanish border police. At the beginning of May 2005, a motorboat carrying twenty irregular migrants sank off Turkey’s Aegean coast. The migrants had come from Mauritania, almost 5,000 kilometres away, although the shortest distance between Mauritania’s coasts and the Canary Islands is only about 300-400 kilometres.39

Next, the air migration routes will briefly be described. Land and maritime routes will then be dealt with more specifically.

39 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 May 2005.
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AIR MIGRATION ROUTES

Air migration routes still represent a relatively rare way of entering the EU, owing partly to the substantial costs involved for the migrant and partly to the regulations concerning sanctions on air carriers and visa requirements. However, better-off migrants also use air routes either directly from Turkish airports to their countries of destination, or through other known transit airports in countries with looser visa requirements, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Morocco. This seems to be particularly the case with Mohammed V airport in Casablanca.

Syria has visa-free entry for nationals of every Arab country, a fact which facilitates the transit of migrants in this region through Damascus (Syria). Moreover, reports by the Spanish and Italian authorities have established that Amman airport (Jordan) is a main transit point in the eastern Mediterranean in use by smuggling networks, especially for migrants originating from China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Eastern Mediterranean land migration routes

Recurrent tensions in the region do nothing to reduce the flourishing business of the smuggling networks. In the last few years several major arrivals of irregular migrants on the Italian and French coasts originated from the harbours of Lebanon. Nowadays, most migrants entering from Syria find themselves stranded in Lebanon, thus creating serious problems for the local authorities. A significant proportion of the irregular migrants who try to enter the EU through the eastern Mediterranean will still attempt to continue their journey via Turkey.

**Turkey** is a centuries-old commercial bridge between Asia and Europe. It naturally became a staging point largely due to its geographical position and vast sea lanes. The overwhelming majority of irregular flows are oriented north-westward, while entry mainly takes place at the eastern borders. Two major land routes can be described. The southern routes and its variants also use maritime routes, while the northern route exclusively uses land routes. In both cases, the routes almost always originate from the neighbouring states of Iran, Iraq and Syria. Turkey is thus the main transit country that these routes cross. The northern route uses Bulgaria and Romania as further transit countries after Turkey and then continues towards western Europe by crossing or ending in Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Germany. Migrants using the southern route exit Turkey via Greece or Bulgaria and continue their voyage towards the western Balkans, Italy and the rest of western Europe.
The Eastern border
Turkey is the first stop on the way from the Middle East to Europe. Migrants usually congregate in the border cities of Van, Agri and Hakkari, from where they move on to Istanbul, a nexus point in the migration route. They usually stay in warehouses, safe houses or friends’ houses and try to obtain irregular day jobs in the area to finance the next stage of their journey. The duration of stay varies from a couple of weeks to one year in Turkey before migrants continue their trip via the northern or southern route. Kurds from Turkey migrating to Europe use the same routes.

Istanbul
Istanbul is a major hub for irregular migrants from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Istanbul is the starting point for the northern and southern routes. Migrants gathered in Istanbul stay in small hotels or other accommodation for an indefinite period. Following similar patterns as in Turkey’s eastern region, some try their luck with day labour jobs on the black market, while others who have already paid for their trip wait to be transferred and to commence the next stage of their journey.
The northern route
The Evros River marks the Turkish border with Greece. According to the Office of Irregular Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings of the Turkish Ministry of Interior, almost 30 percent of all apprehensions of irregular migrants by the Greek authorities occur on this border. Crossing the river at the border is quite perilous and many are reported to have drowned in it. Another risk is posed by the border minefield, which is badly signposted and has cost the lives of 74 migrants in the last decade. The Greek authorities have announced that the minefield will be cleared by 2011. The smugglers usually lead migrants up to the border and give instructions for which paths to follow or accompany them to the other side. Some have a specific contact for a safe house in Greece, while others hide in trucks heading towards Athens. It is also important to note that a number of migrants cannot afford to pay the expensive services of smugglers and consequently cross the border on their own. It is also significant that the Greek and Turkish authorities regularly break up smuggling gangs, who imprison migrants until their families pay a ransom.

Aegean and east Mediterranean routes
The second option is the sea passage. The smuggling networks use different routes in the eastern Mediterranean to organize the crossing, mainly to EU member states. The main arrivals, who depart from the eastern Mediterranean and land in France or Italy, have already been mentioned. The short crossings mainly take place between Turkey and Greece or between Lebanon, Turkey and Cyprus.

Crossing to Cyprus
According to information from the security forces, crossings to Cyprus mainly occur through the demarcation line between the north and south of the island. No report indicated significant major movements by sea recently from Lebanon or Syria to Cyprus. According to the Cypriot authorities, the irregular migrants apprehended

---

40 Kathimerini newspaper, 29 August 2002; http://www.ekathimerini.com/, and a count compiled by Agence France Presse (AFP), 15 April 2005.
41 In January, the Greek police arrested 21 irregular migrants near the border between Greece and Turkey after finding them hidden inside two trucks heading for Athens. The migrants, from Bangladesh and Pakistan, paid US$2,500 each to the smugglers; AFP, 14 January 2005.
43 Greek police freed 59 suspected illegal immigrants from various Asian countries, who had been imprisoned in a house in Athens by a trafficking gang demanding a ransom for their release. Eleven Iraqis, members of an international trafficking ring, were arrested in the operation. The trafficking gang had allegedly demanded a ransom of €3,000 from the migrants’ families. AFP, 25 March 2005
entered from the northern part of island. They mostly originate from Central Asian countries as well as Romania and Jordan and enter the country with Turkish entry visas.

The Aegean routes
Most migrants use this route, since it is seen as the easiest way to enter Greece. Smuggling arrangements are made in Istanbul and the Turkish coastal cities. For migrants who cannot afford the extra US$1,000 for the trip, there is the option of using a small inflatable or motor boat, or even of stowing away in cargo ships. The sea route is equally dangerous; hundreds of unfortunate migrants have lost their lives attempting to reach the Greek coast during the last decade.

As already mentioned, about 3,000 Greek islands are located west and southwest of Turkey. As a result, the Greek border is diffuse and much less definable compared to countries that are composed primarily of a single land mass. Moreover, ships can legally sail through it freely under the right of innocent passage. Thus surveillance and patrolling are difficult, beset by both legal and geographical challenges. According to the Greek authorities, irregular immigrants arrive daily in small boats.

The main departure points in the northern Aegean are Izmir, Aivali, Istanbul, Bodrum and Alikarnassos. Boats from Istanbul are usually motorized and larger than the rowing boats and inflatables that are common from Aivali, which are among the most numerous according to the available information, but on average smaller and carry between five and fifteen illegal immigrants. These mainly head towards the island of Lesbos, which is approximately twenty kilometres from Aivali.

Boats originating in Izmir, Sigacic and Canakalle carry on average more irregular immigrants than elsewhere in Turkey. Immigrants are transported from Cesme, Turkey, to the island of Chios in Greece mostly in small inflatable boats without a crew; a voyage as little as six kilometres from shore to shore.

The largest number of reported trips between Turkey and Greece take place in the southern Aegean. Boats depart from Tugutreis in Turkey and other departure points to the Greek islands, especially Kos and the Simi Islands. The shortest distance between Kos and Turkey is eight kilometres, while from Turkey to Simi Island it is seven kilometres. Most of the boats are inflatable rowing boats, though fishing boats and speedboats operated by smugglers are also in use. Other boats, such as pleasure and tourist boats, may also be involved in smuggling, but they are less likely to be intercepted.
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

Regularly, small groups of irregular migrants depart from numerous parts of Turkey on smaller inflatable boats and disembark on those Greek islands that are close to the Turkish coast. According to the Greek authorities, facilitators may provide the immigrants with the inflatable boat. They then arrange for further facilitation by regular ferries to the Greek mainland.

The Turkish authorities face problems in intercepting departing boats for a range of legal and operational reasons. Despite common acceptance of the fact that departures from Turkey occur in large numbers, only sixteen reported interceptions were made by the Turkish authorities during 2003. Most of them were of medium to large boats, carrying more than fifty immigrants. A boat carrying people cannot easily be intercepted, as there is limited evidence that the ships and crews are violating laws until they enter the territorial waters of the desired destination country loaded with irregular immigrants. Most boats are inspected upon arrival, not departure. This information, together with an analysis of numbers of irregular migrants apprehended, confirms that until now the Turkish authorities have focused their efforts on tackling irregular flows in the eastern region.

Irregular migrants entering Greece from Turkey do not necessarily intend to remain in Greece. Indeed, once within the Schengen area, they usually continue onwards to other EU countries, where they can apply for asylum and/or work in the informal economy. As both Italy and Greece are part of the Schengen zone, irregular migrants moving within the Schengen borders are less likely to be controlled. Nevertheless, there are several known cases of smuggling between Greece and Italy.
CONCLUSION

According to ICMPD estimates, about 100,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean each year. An estimated 30,000 are of sub-Saharan origin, 25,000 are transit migrants from other regions, and the remaining 45,000 are nationals of countries in the south and east Mediterranean. In recent years, an estimated 2,000 human beings have drowned in the sea each year on their way to Europe. The most worrying trend described in this report is that transit migration through the Maghreb region keeps rising. This is of concern, especially taking into account the fact that migration in general from the southern shores of the Mediterranean is currently declining. Indeed, North African countries, where an increasing number of migrants are becoming stranded, are having to deal with a new situation for which they were not prepared and for which may not have the means to cope. As far as European countries are concerned, return procedures and operations involving rejected asylum-seekers from sub-Saharan countries are, according to authorities, far more expensive and difficult to implement. As for the migrants, sub-Saharan are usually more susceptible to suffering bad treatment from smugglers as migrants who are transiting North Africa irregularly. Also, the journey through first the Sahara and then the Mediterranean doubles the risks.

Moreover, the strengthening of controls, using highly developed systems such as the Spanish SIVE, may increase the efficiency of interceptions of irregular migrants, but it also raises a number of questions regarding their negative consequences. The price is mainly paid by the migrants, since their desire to cross into Europe still exists, and smugglers are continuing to exploit their situation by offering an opportunity to cross to Europe. This results in more dangerous and unattended crossings, with no smuggler manning unsavoury vessels – smugglers do not risk their best boats any longer – and thus much higher risks are being taken by the migrants for ever-increasing prices. Moreover, smugglers alter their activities in response to the enhancing of border controls. Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and Sri Lankan migrants are apprehended transiting not only through Turkey, but also through Ghana or Morocco, or else when they reach Greece, Spain or Italy, while Mauritanian migrants are apprehended attempting to cross not from Morocco to Spain but from Turkey to Greece. Finally, North African and east Mediterranean countries, which were not countries of destination to any significant extent, with the exception of Libya, are now becoming major countries of destination ‘by default’ for sub-Saharan and Asian migrants. As far as sub-Saharan are concerned, the trend may only continue to increase.
The economic crises in sub-Saharan Africa will induce still more people to leave. In terms of migration movements, it is still too early to judge whether the significant rise in transit movements in the North African countries, and the corresponding rise in irregular arrivals in southern Italy, Malta and elsewhere result from a lack of development in Africa and the continuously growing gap between that continent and Europe or other rich parts of the (see Annex below regarding expected population growth). At any rate, this is the general view of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior in Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and Cairo.

Never before has the need for collective co-operation with Europe on migration issues been so urgently required, both in the short term, to cope with current movements and to control and manage them, and in the long term, to deal with the crises in Africa, which will only trigger more movements.

On the EU side, there is a heavy emphasis on the need to stem irregular migration over the Mediterranean, as regularly called for in EU summits in Seville, Thessaloniki and Brussels, as well as, recently, under The Hague and AENEAS Programmes. The priorities of the European Neighbourhood Policy comprise the speedy implementation of the plan for the management of external borders, the establishment of priorities for a common readmission policy, and strengthened partnerships with the third countries concerned. This will without doubt be of great significance to Euro-Mediterranean co-operation.
## Graph 21: Estimated population in Africa, 2000–2030 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>000</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>141,893</td>
<td>653,493</td>
<td>984,225</td>
<td>1,187,584</td>
<td>1,398,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>169,118</td>
<td>795,671</td>
<td>1,026,129</td>
<td>1,228,815</td>
<td>1,437,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>195,056</td>
<td>814,743</td>
<td>1,049,866</td>
<td>1,259,246</td>
<td>1,478,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>216,210</td>
<td>841,464</td>
<td>1,084,214</td>
<td>1,311,668</td>
<td>1,533,632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://esa.un.org/unpp](http://esa.un.org/unpp)
* Sum of populations of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
** Sum of populations of sub-Saharan African countries (see ‘UN medium variant of population for selected countries’).
European Attitudes and Policies towards the Migration/Development Issue

SIMON TURNER, JAIRO MUNIVE RINCON, NINNA NYBERG SØRENSEN
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)

INTRODUCTION

On 5 November 2004, EU leaders agreed a five-year programme to work towards a common asylum and immigration policy by 2010. This was the result of months of negotiations and was the culmination of a decade of attempting to harmonise EU policies in this area. The urge to do this is a consequence of the gradual opening of internal borders between EU member states. This has created a perceived need to strengthen the EU’s external borders and find common standards in order to resist the perceived migration pressure on EU member states. It is believed that different policies and standards can lead to weak points on the EU’s common borders and to possible abuse of the asylum system, to the detriment of member states and genuine refugees in need of protection alike.

Along with an intensified focus on guarding external borders, new policy issues have emerged as possible long-term solutions that might not have the same human costs as pure control activities tend to do. Rather than simply attempting – in vain – to fortify Europe, several attempts have been made to address the ‘root causes’ of migration and link migration and development. There is much discussion in EU circles on ‘externalising border controls’ versus ‘addressing the root causes’ of migration (Boswell 2003b ). This means striking a balance between on the one hand cooperating with third countries over readmission and border and visa controls, and on the other hand adopting more long-term preventive measures in the form of development assistance in order to address the root causes of migration. The former is often portrayed as ‘hard’ and short-sighted, the latter being ‘soft’ and long-sighted. (Black and Russell 2004; Boswell 2003b ).
However, it is not just a question of these two choices. Within the long-sighted, preventive option there are also a number of diverging attitudes on the relationship between development and migration. (Neo-)Classical migration theory sees migration as a result of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Poverty and a lack of opportunity push people to emigrate, while opportunities to accumulate wealth or education in other countries function as pull factors. Similar models have been applied to forced migration, where violent conflict functions as a push factor and security as a pull factor. What determines migration, then, is the discrepancy in wealth and security between states (Gent 2002).¹

The main issues at stake in pursuing these approaches are thus first to pinpoint the root causes and then to prescribe the right remedy. Such root causes may be defined as a lack of economic, political or social development or a lack of human rights and security, and the prescribed solutions are usually development assistance and/or conflict prevention.

In the 1990s several experts began questioning this model, pointing to empirical evidence that development tends to create a ‘migration hump’ in the short term, only reducing migration in the long term (Martin 2004; Boswell and Crisp 2004: 29; Sørensen et al. 2002: 7). The migration hump theory claims that the poorest countries do not contribute the most to migration and that development can actually create more emigration.

More recent approaches (see especially the work by Holzman and Münz 2004; Sørensen et al. 2002; Spencer 2003) have attempted to take an even more dynamic stance based on transnational approaches to migration. This approach sees mobility as an essential condition for economic and social development. In policy terms it signals a shift from ‘more development for less migration’ to ‘better managed migration for more development’. The EU and its member states are not quite clear on whether to adopt one or the other approach. The following discussion will demonstrate, however, that there is a tendency to move from the traditional to the transnational approach to linking migration and development in the recent policies of some member states.

¹ The same applies to migration within states, and the model has been very much adopted from studies of rural-urban migration in the industrialised world
Apart from these conceptual differences, EU policies on migration and development face other challenges, which will be the focus of this paper. First, there are institutional constraints inherent in the EU that have to be overcome. Secondly, there are national interests involved, which partly reflect diverging national experiences of migration patterns.

EU policies and attitudes often reflect ad hoc solutions that are the result of compromise between the interests of various actors both within and outside the system. The study therefore explores the trajectory of migration and asylum policies within the EU, as well as the extent to which these policies have linked up with development issues, if at all.

The presentation is organized as follows. The first part of the analysis focuses on developments in EU policies and attitudes towards migration and development. We show how this has resulted from lengthy negotiations and compromises between institutions and between national interests. The second part moves on to explore the policies and attitudes of individual member states. Here the focus is on Denmark, the UK, Spain and Italy, four countries with very different migration experiences and very different migration policies. Their different experiences and domestic political climates determine the kind of policies they pursue in relation to migration and development. As with the analysis of the EU, we also analyse the institutional set-up in the individual countries and point to the possible frictions that might result in relation to the development of a common policy, but also within each country. Finally, the various dilemmas that the EU faces are discussed and possible policy options outlined in order to link migration and development in ways that can benefit all sides.

EUROPEAN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT: DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

This section explores the key policy developments in the areas of migration and development in the European Union. It is argued that the good intentions of co-development, partnership and 'better managed migration for more development' are not always carried through in practice. This is due to conflicting institutional interests between various Director Generals in the Commission on the one hand and to the anti-immigration political rhetoric in many European member states on the other.
From Tampere to Seville: Linking Migration and Development

The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999 marked the transfer of competencies in the field of asylum and migration to the Community pillar. The Amsterdam Treaty paved the way for the development of a European ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, in which ‘the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’.2

At the Tampere Summit later that year, the EU introduced what came to be known as the ‘comprehensive approach to migration’, emphasising ‘partnerships with countries of origin’ as a crucial element of a common EU asylum and immigration policy. The Tampere Summit called for greater coherence of the Union’s internal and external policies, and as such cooperation with countries of origin and transit was seen as an indispensable element in the Union’s efforts to address migration (Council of European Union 1999). Although phrased in vague terms, the resolution links migration management with long-term strategies to address root causes, thus acknowledging the limitations of border controls. The Summit expressed the political will and ambition of European leaders to achieve such a comprehensive approach. Therefore the Tampere guidelines are considered to be one of the milestones in European migration policy.

However, EU member states’ concerns with the external aspects of migration and with the elimination of the ‘root causes’ of migration had been an issue even before the Tampere Summit (for a detailed overview, see Boswell 2003; Gent 2002; Stepputat 2004), notably the intergovernmental High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, established in 1998 by the EU Council at the initiative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The HLWG drew up action plans for six countries from which a high proportion of refugees and migrants originate, namely Morocco, Sri Lanka, Albania, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The action plan contained a mixture of diplomatic, humanitarian and development assistance measures aimed at eliminating the root causes of migration. The HLWG on asylum and immigration is in principle comprised of civil servants from the interior, development, trade and foreign ministries and is in charge of developing an external immigration policy. However, it has in practice been driven by the interests of national justice and

---

home affairs ministries. High-level officials attending the group’s meetings are generally justice or home affairs ministry civil servants, with only a few development representatives taking part in its activities. This has resulted in a paradoxical situation where justice and home affairs officials have been discussing development issues (van Selm 2002).

This has also meant that there have been very few funds available, which in turn means that the concrete results of the process have been modest. In 2003 the HLWG was finally allocated project funding, although only a modest €15 million. The HLWG has funded a programme encouraging Moroccan migrants to set up businesses in Morocco and another project to establish a savings bank for the remittances of Moroccan migrants.

The 2002 European Council Summit at Seville further developed migration management as a major strategic policy priority for the EU. The Council stressed the importance of preventing and combating illegal immigration and of integrating migration issues into overall relations with non-member states. The Council favoured the inclusion of clauses on the joint management of migration flows and the compulsory readmission of illegal migrants in existing and future Association and Co-operation Agreements. Additionally, the Council concluded that closer economic co-operation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention were expected to promote economic prosperity in the countries of origin and in this way reduce migration into member states. Yet, in its detailed recommendations, the Seville Summit almost exclusively emphasised ensuring the cooperation of countries of origin and transit in combating illegal migration, improving border controls and undertaking readmission (Council of European Union 2002).

**Beyond Seville**

In December 2002, the Commission issued a Communication on integrating migration issues into the European Union’s relations with third countries, together with a report on the effectiveness of the financial resources available for repatriation, the management of external borders, and asylum and migration projects in third countries (CEC 2003). The text puts forward proposals on how the EU external policies and instruments, including development policy, could address the underlying causes

---

3 According to van Selm 2002, only the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Sweden send foreign ministry officials as part of their teams. According to Stepputat 2004, Denmark also has sent representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
of migration. In concrete terms, action is to be taken according to three basic principles:

- First, the integration of migration aspects into the external activities of the Community, which respect the overall coherence of its external policies. Dialogue and partnerships with third countries in the field of migration are central to this.
- Secondly, the long term priority is to address the root causes of migration flows. Development resources should contribute to poverty eradication, institution and capacity building and conflict prevention.
- Finally, migration aspects should be included in the framework of regional and country strategy papers. The relevant budget line of cooperation with third countries in the migration field is complementary to EU development assistance.

It is particularly interesting to note that the Communication includes issues of economic and social governance, thus prioritizing preventive measures over control oriented approaches to migration management. Yet addressing the ‘root causes’ is so broadly defined that migration policy seems to incorporate the entire European development policy and external relations (Pastore 2003).

In its conclusions of May 2003, the Council emphasised the potential for greater synergies between migration and development policies. Areas mentioned by the Council included capacity-building to combat the trafficking and smuggling of human beings, the improvement of legislation and management of legal migration and asylum, and the facilitation of a sustainable return of migrants through programmes accommodating both the returnee and the developing country of origin. In addition, the Council invited the Commission to exploit synergies between migration and development policies where they already exist by facilitating ‘brain circulation’; facilitating efforts by the ‘transnational community’ to contribute to the development of the country of origin, thus making migrants’ remittances to their countries of origin cheaper and more reliable; and employing more local staff in development co-operation programmes (Council of the European Union 2003).

In 2003, the Commission gave concrete expression to these commitments: the dialogue with third countries in the area of migration has been intensified and, in particular, a clause on the joint management of migration flows has been included in every Association and Co-operation Agreement negotiated with third countries during this period, allowing a full dialogue about migration issues with them. In addi-
tion, migration has been identified as a priority in the context of the Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Papers. This should, in certain cases, result in adjustments of strategy in order to take migration concerns more adequately into account.

The EU is, in other words, striving to develop a burden-sharing system with third countries in managing migration flows, based upon full partnerships with and between countries of origin, transit, first asylum and destination. A very important commitment in this regard is the AENEAS program.

**Migration Management Support: from the B7-667 budget line to the AENEAS Programme**

In 2001, The European Union’s budget included support for migration and asylum management in countries of origin, particularly those countries for which the Council of Ministers had adopted migration action plans (Council of the European Union 2004b). The budget line initially supported projects aimed at building up asylum systems in transit countries and the voluntary return of migrants and refugees. Later, the EU began to support the capacities of these same countries to tackle trafficking and smuggling in human beings. The projects were part of police cooperation and law-enforcement capacity-building in various frameworks, such as PHARE and TACIS for eastern Europe and MEDA for Mediterranean countries.

The budget line has now been replaced by the AENEAS programme, which is aimed at providing technical and financial assistance to third countries in the fields of migration and asylum. It is particularly, but not exclusively, intended for those third countries that are engaged in preparing or implementing a readmission agreement with the EU. The financial framework (2004–2008) is EUR 250 million.

The AENEAS programme recognizes that a more efficient management of migration flows in cooperation with the third countries concerned cannot be achieved by individual member states and can be better achieved at the European level. The programme includes: campaigns and the provision of legal advice on the consequences of illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings; the dissemination of information about working legally in the EU; the development of activities aimed at maintaining the links between local communities in the countries of origin and their legal

---

4 The Country Strategy Papers (CSP) are instruments for guiding, managing and reviewing the European Union’s assistance programs with third countries. In the case of Morocco, for instance, slow economic growth, social challenges, the fragile agricultural sector, unemployment and migration were identified as key medium-term priorities.
emigrants and facilitating the contribution of migrants to the social and economic development of communities in their countries of origin, including facilitating the use of remittances for productive investments and development initiatives and providing support for micro credit initiatives; support for capacity-building in ensuring the effectiveness of national legislation regarding migration, asylum and the fight against organized crime (the trafficking and smuggling of human beings); and identification of the root causes of migratory movements and the definition of measures aimed at tackling them. Again, the aims are ambitious and rather broadly defined.

**European Migration Management: Between control and preventive measures**

In spite of the progress made at policy level, observers note that actual cooperation with third countries in the migration field has been limited, with the dialogue focusing almost exclusively on control measures of illegal migration and readmission issues rather than those of long-term development and political dialogue (Boswell 2003; Pastore 2004; Niessen 2003). There is a gap between the intentions of the framework of a comprehensive approach on linking migration and foreign relations, and its implementation, which appears to be preoccupied with control issues (Niessen 2003: 4).

The link between migration, foreign affairs and development has been made in such a way that foreign policy has been ‘instrumentalized’ for domestic political goals to restrict the admission of refugees and migrants. Academics refer to this policy development as the ‘globalization of migration controls’ and ‘outsourcing security’ (Pastore 2004; Stepputat 2004). By this is meant that the EU essentially retains its focus on controlling borders and restricting movement, but has now outsourced the task to sending and transit countries. Recent suggestions by some EU member states (most notably the UK proposal in 2003, supported by Denmark and the Netherlands, and more recently the German-Italian proposal in 2004) to create ‘reception’ and transit processing centres in transit countries can be seen in this light. This effectively ‘pushes’ back the immigration line and externalises European border control, creating a ‘buffer zone’ around what critics have termed ‘Fortress Europe’.

According to Boswell (2003), there are two reasons for the emphasis on the ‘containment’ of migration movements at the cost of the ‘root causes’ approach. First, it is due to the political climate in Europe, where media and public attention has been focused on the negative impacts of migration, and where economic migrants and asylum-seekers alike are seen as imposing a burden on welfare systems and public resources. In the post-9/11 world, immigration is also seen as a threat to security and to what
has been conceptualized as the national values of European states (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002). Secondly, the problem is institutional, in the sense that there has been a lack of cooperation between different directorates within the European Commission, notably between the Justice and Home Affairs, External Relations and Development Directorates. Within development circles, concerns have been raised about the distortion and subversion of development goals, such as the fight against poverty, by narrower migration objectives (Boswell 2003: 633). This has resulted, as mentioned above, in justice and home affairs officials attempting to develop policies in a field where they have no expertise, while those with the right expertise to a large degree recoil from entering the debate. This picture does appear to be changing at the moment, however. As we shall see in the analysis of the individual country cases, there seems to be a rapprochement between the two areas at the national level, albeit in quite different manners in each case.

Along with the lack of expertise, due to these institutional dilemmas, there is also the question of funding. As development DGs have been reluctant to fund what they see as border control measures, there has been very little funding for projects that incorporate long-term development aspects addressing the root causes of migration. Thus, there is a risk of entering a vicious circle: the more the JHA focuses on control mechanisms, the less are Development DGs willing to become involved, the less expertise and funding there is for long-term development policies, and so forth. Similar mechanisms can be observed in the HLWG, where justice and home affairs officials tend to set the agenda.

To sum up, the tendency to externalize EU policies – that is, the tendency of the EU to influence the migration and asylum policies of third countries through the use of incentives or pressure – is set to expand (Boswell and Crisp 2004). Readmission agreements are now a standard clause in the EU’s association and partnership agreements and in action plans with third countries within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

**THE POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES**

In spite of the declared wish to coordinate migration policies in the EU, individual member states often have very different approaches to migration management and to linking migration and development. This is due to their different migration experiences and histories, which are based in their turn on different colonial histories and
MIGRATION POLICIES AND ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The UK experienced substantial immigration from its former colonies from the Second World War until the 1960s, when it introduced the first restrictive measures, and in 1971 the Immigration Act sought to stop all primary immigration. In line with general British Common Law, however, there was still room for discretion, which resulted in more liberal immigration practices for citizens from the ‘old’ commonwealth countries (Canada, New Zealand and Australia) (Baldaccini 2003: 1).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the country experienced increasing pressures on the immigration system. This pressure came on the one hand in the form of increasing numbers of asylum-seekers and on the other hand as pressure from employers to liberalise the immigration laws (Baldaccini 2003).

Since New Labour came to power in 1997, Britain has in many ways taken the lead in reforming migration policies and finding new ways to combine migration with development. The UK has taken a two-tracked approach to the issue. While on the one hand it has liberalised labour migration, going further and faster than other European countries in this field (McLaughlan and Salt 2002: 4), it has simultaneously toughened up on asylum-seekers on the other. The government is keen to keep the two aspects sharply separated (Baldaccini 2003).

LABOUR MIGRATION

Even during the years of migration stop, Britain has had various work-permit schemes, allowing employers to apply for temporary work permits for individuals to

5 Laws to restrict Commonwealth immigration were introduced in 1962 and 1968.
6 According to Heath, Jeffries and Purcell (2004) in 1995 there were ca 44000 applications.
7 See, for instance, the new Asylum and Immigration Act (July 2004); Spencer 2003.
fill a gap in the labour market that could not be filled by the domestic work force. In 1998 the government introduced the White Paper, *Fairer, Faster, Firmer*, which stepped up immigration controls while making economic immigration easier. By 1999, the economic immigration system had been streamlined, reducing the processing time, lowering the thresholds for skills, and making it easier to extend the temporary permits.

In the following years, the government increasingly expressed positive attitudes towards migration. In September 2000, the Home Office Minister for Immigration, Barbara Roche claimed that there was a need for ‘a real shake-up’ of the immigration system and that migration brings with it considerable economic benefits (Spencer 2003: 1). Similarly, a number of conferences and studies initiated by the Home Office emphasised the positive affects that immigrants can have on the economy. Even the need for low-skilled labour has become increasingly acknowledged.

The context of these changes has been the buoyant British economy in the 1990s, which has meant an increasing demand for high-skilled labour. Although the ‘demographic problem’ that many European countries face in the near future, with an ageing population and a shrinking workforce, is not expected to be quite so acute for Britain – which, like France, has a long history of immigration (Weil 2002: 45) – it is, however, a problem that needs to be reckoned with. There is already a lack of labour in a number of low-skilled jobs in agriculture and hotels and restaurants, and the government has taken steps to allow in more seasonal low-skilled immigrant workers, as well as expanding the Working Holiday Scheme to more countries.

**Asylum seekers**

Simultaneously with the liberalisation of economic immigration laws, laws on asylum-seekers have been tightened considerably.

---

8 On top of this there were the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and the Working Holiday Scheme (WHS).
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

In the foreword to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, it is noted with satisfaction that the two first phases of the reforms (1999 and 2002) reduced the number of asylum claims by 60% in 18 months. The 2004 act continues this policy: 11

The 2004 Act is intended to provide a quicker and more robust system that protects those in genuine need but deters and prevents behaviour designed to frustrate our processes. We are getting tougher on traffickers and others seeking to play the asylum system in order to ensure that the public has confidence in our immigration controls.

The context for these measures has been an increase in asylum-seekers to the UK 12 and popular demand to get a grip on what was seen as uncontrolled asylum shopping (Stepputat 2004: 128). The objective of the policy reforms is to be faster in processing work permits and asylum applications. The aim to be fairer assumes that the present system is unfair, permitting only those who have enough money to pay air tickets and traffickers to arrive in the UK, while the real refugees end up in camps in neighbouring countries. It is also implied that many of those who reach the UK, are not real refugees but rather fortune-hunters. Hence the need to be firmer.

Linking migration and development
In March 2003 the government proposed a strategy to solve the refugee problem, regain public confidence in the asylum system and address the ‘root causes’ of migration. This was set out in a paper called ‘New International Approaches to Asylum Processing and Protection.’ The proposal was presented to the EU informal Justice and Home Affairs Committee on 28 March and at the Council meeting in Thessaloniki in June, where it was rejected, although some countries, notably Denmark and the Netherlands, supported some of the ideas.

The proposal claims that ‘the current global system is failing’ and that this is due in part to the fact that ‘between half and three quarters of those claiming asylum in Europe do not meet the criteria of full refugees’ (Home Office 2003: 1, original emphasis). Due to this failure, ‘public support for asylum is falling across the developed

12 In 2002 the UK experienced a record high of 84,030 applications for asylum (Heath, Jeffries and Purcell 2004).
world.’ This in turn, it is argued, causes problems for genuine refugees. Furthermore, the paper outlines that support for refugees is unevenly distributed at a global level. Finally, the paper underlines the fact that people have to enter Europe illegally, thus supporting criminal networks.

The proposed solutions to these problems are twofold. A long-term solution is to improve protection in regions of origin. A short- to medium-term solution is to establish ‘transit processing centres’ en route to Europe.

Most importantly in relation to debates on migration and development, the government proposes:

Working to prevent the conditions which cause population movements. This includes: an increased focus on poverty reduction through effective use of development assistance targeted on the poorest countries; better conflict prevention in areas of instability ... (Ibid.: 3, original emphasis).

In other words, the proposal seeks to address the ‘root causes’ of (forced) migration. It is based on a rather conventional approach to the relationship between development and migration, believing that poverty-reduction is the solution to conflict and that this will automatically reduce migration flows.

The British proposal sends a number of negative signals to regions of origin and transit countries. First, it gives the impression that wealthy European countries are attempting to export their problems to poor countries in the Third World, and that they can use the threat of withholding development aid to those who do not comply.13 Secondly, there is a tendency to perceive refugees as a burden and a problem rather than a resource. Thus the aim of development assistance becomes to reduce migration, just as there is much mention of burden-sharing. Finally, it puts the blame for hostility towards asylum-seekers in Europe on the very victims of this hostility. Many partner states are not willing to comply with these demands, and there is a growing hostility towards asylum-seekers among the public in many of these countries as well.

---

13 Even if this is not the intention of the British government, the proposal sends signals that are easily interpreted in such a manner by proposed ‘partner’ states.
**Institutional set-up**

The issue of migration and development bridges several traditional institutional divides. The main actors are the Home Office and DFID. These institutions respond to different pressures, resulting in a somewhat incoherent policy on migration, refugees and development. However, the various government bodies are gradually approaching one another, fostering a hope that a comprehensive and in many ways sophisticated approach may materialise in the near future.

Home affairs has been in the lead when it comes to recognising the positive effects of migration – even low skilled migration – on the British economy. However, the debate has rarely touched on the development potentials of migration on the sending countries in the Third World.

Historically DFID has been hesitant to tie immigration objectives to its development strategies on the ground that it may ‘instrumentalise’ development aid and move the focus away from the Millenium Development Goals (House of Commons 2004: 74). However, the situation is changing. Since 2000, when the government published its White Paper on *Eliminating World Poverty: making globalisation work for the poor*, DFID has been taking a more pro-active stance in relation to migration. DFID has, for instance, been active in the HLWG (Ibid.: 79). To retain a focus on poverty, DFID has added a migration aspect to its ‘Livelihoods Connect’ programme in collaboration with IDS at Sussex.14 Apart from collaborating with the Home Office, DFID has worked with the Department of Health regarding the recruitment of health personnel. In July 2004 the House of Commons’ International Development Committee published a report on *Migration and development: how to make migration work for poverty reduction*. This comprehensive study gives a nuanced and cutting-edge view of how best to combine migration and development. Rather than encouraging poverty-reduction in exchange for less migration, it pleads for migration to be managed so that it might reduce poverty. It calls strongly for more cohesion in policies between departments and for DFID to be more actively involved in the formulation of policies on migration.

**Concluding remarks**

Since 1997 the immigration and asylum system has been reformed in the UK, resulting in a two-tracked approach, at once more flexible and stricter. Labour immigration, intended to fill gaps in the booming British economy, has been eased by reduc-

---

ing the bureaucratic procedures for obtaining work permits. While the reforms were initially aimed at highly skilled professionals, they have recently targeted low-skilled seasonal labour as well.

The asylum system, on the other hand, has been tightened up and made more ‘robust’. The main objective is to limit human trafficking and fraud in order to regain public confidence in the asylum system. This should in turn help genuine refugees. The government has made itself known in the EU for proposing provocative solutions to refugee ‘problems’, most notably the proposal to establish transit processing zones.

While the UK seems to be taking the lead in exploring the positive effects of migration on the British economy, its position regarding mutual relationships between development and migration is less obvious. There have, however, been some promising developments recently, with DFID having taken an active role in exploring the potentials of migration for development. Similarly, the policy analysis of the House of Commons’ International Development Committee is cutting edge.

Migration Policies and Attitudes in Denmark

With the economic boom in the 1960s and early 1970s, Denmark, like several other West European countries, invited in a number of ‘guest workers’, from Yugoslavia, Turkey and Pakistan in particular, to take up employment as unskilled workers in the industrial sector. After the oil crisis and the recession in 1973, Denmark, along with most West European countries, stopped all economic immigration into the country. Since then immigration from non-EU countries has mostly been represented by asylum-seekers and family reunification policy.

The issue of immigrants, asylum-seekers and ‘foreigners’ in general has become central in the public debate, with the major political parties competing to show a ‘firm’ attitude towards foreigners in order not to lose votes to the populist Danish People’s Party. In the words of the government’s own ‘Think Tank on Integration in Denmark’, Denmark generally has a more restrictive immigration policy than other European countries (Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2004).

Central to the reasons given for this restrictive policy is the Danish welfare system, which is perceived to be unique but also to be under pressure from an increasing burden of ‘foreigners’ dependent on social welfare. Therefore, unlike other European states that see immigration as a possible solution to an ageing population, the Danish
authorities see immigrants as part of the problem. With this assumption in mind, the Think Tank suggests limiting immigration pressure in order to strengthen the integration of ‘foreigners’ already in the country. The logic of stopping further immigration in order to strengthen integration efforts is central in government discourse.

Labour migration
Since 1973, Denmark has had a restrictive policy on issuing residence permits to labour migrants from outside the EU and the Nordic countries. Despite an expanding economy over the past decade, with unemployment rates below the EU average (OECD 2003) and the prospect of a lack of labour in the near future due to an ageing population, Denmark has done little to encourage legal immigration. This might be due in part to a public debate since about 1997, which has seen immigration as a burden on the welfare state (Stenum 2003).

Given the present labour shortages in certain areas, Denmark has set as its first priority the training of existing immigrants so that they can join the labour market (McLaughlan and Salt 2002: 8). However, only a limited number of immigrants from third countries are given residence permits for work-related reasons. A job-card scheme was introduced in July 2002 to grant work and residence permits to skilled labour within certain areas where there is a shortage in supply in the Danish labour market. These include IT specialists and medical specialists (Stenum 2003: 10). This is not a quota system, since there is no limit to the number of permits given. However, in 2003 the total number of permits issued was merely 661 and the figure for the first three quarters of 2004 was 386.

The Danish Employers Association has occasionally voiced the need for a more liberal immigration policy, but it has generally followed the official policy of ‘integration before immigration’.

15 This is the main assumption in a report on ‘Immigration, Integration and the National Economy’, carried out by the Think Tank under the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs: http://www.inm.dk/publikationer/engelske_publikationer/thinktank/kap01.htm; accessed 15 December 2004.
16 Denmark has had a special agreement with other Nordic countries since the 1950s, permitting citizens of these countries to take up residence and work in other Nordic countries without applying for permits (Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2004: 45; Baldaccini 2003: 1).
18 See www.da.dk
Asylum policies
Denmark has opted out of certain aspects of the EU treaties. Thus it does not take part in the Council’s decisions in the areas of justice and home affairs, including immigration and asylum (section IV). In practice this means that Denmark has been able to introduce policies that are stricter than those of the other EU member states. This is especially the case with family reunion. Since the laws were tightened up, the number of asylum-seekers has fallen significantly. In 2001 the Danish authorities received 12,512 applications for asylum. In 2002 this figure had fallen to 6,068 and has continued to fall since. 19 At the same time, the proportion of claims being granted fell from 53% in 2001 to 22% in 2003. In 2003 only 770 applicants were granted asylum (Danish Immigration Service 2003: 4).

Linking migration and development
While the British proposal 20 was turned down at the Thessalonica summit in June 2003, Denmark – along with the Netherlands and Austria, whose governments also are under pressure from anti-immigration parties – supported the proposal (Stepputat 2004: 129). Denmark had already taken steps to implement programmes in the ‘regions of origin’, either through bilateral ‘partnership agreements’ or in collaboration with the UNHCR. Denmark has been active in the UNHCR’s ‘convention plus’ efforts to rethink protection issues, especially strengthening protection in regions of origin.

The logic behind the strategies has been to obtain ‘more value for money’. 21 Apart from the fact that the vast majority of refugees live in their regions of origin, the foreign ministry also argues that they are a burden on national and local development in the poor countries where they live. The objectives of this support are rather broad and vaguely defined as strengthening protection for refugees, improving the living conditions of refugees and locals in the regions of origin, and strengthening development work in the country of origin so that they may eventually return. 22

20 See the section on the UK.
21 Danish Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration: EU åbner for nye flygtninge-ideer (EU open for new refugee ideas), 23.06.03, www.inm.dk
22 Indsatser i Flygtningenes Nærområder, www.um.dk.
All in all, Denmark is taking very concrete steps towards following the path set out by Austria and later the UK to ‘contain’ the refugee ‘problem’ in the regions of origin. Still having the highest level of development aid per capita, Denmark is able to play a significant role in comparison with its modest size.

**Institutional set-up**

With the change of government in Denmark in late 2001, there has been a political process to link development and migration. This can be seen in the reforms in the numbers of ministers and their respective areas. First the new government abolished the position of Minister for Development Cooperation. Secondly, a new ministry was established, for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. It took over jurisdiction from a number of ministries and dealt with anything to do with foreigners in Denmark, whether asylum-seekers, immigrants or the descendents of immigrants.

Both ministries were concerned with the concept of regions of origin, and both took part in the HLWG. There were, however, certain frictions, as the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs was not given the funding to develop the strategy, while officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were worried that such a strategy might divert funds (which were already being squeezed) away from the core target group: the poorest.

In August 2004 the Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs was also nominated the Minister of Development Cooperation. This sent clear political signals that the government intended to integrate migration and development issues more strongly than before. However, in February 2005 the position of Minister for Development was re-established and separated from the Ministry of Immigration.

**Concluding remarks**

The Danish government is working hard on integrating migration and development issues, taking the lead in developing strategies of strengthening regions of origin. The issue of linking migration and development remains at the level of offering ‘more development for less migration’ by aiding regions of origin so that people may not be inclined to move to Europe. Denmark has very few labour migrants (whether legal or

---

23 Interestingly ‘immigration’ in the Danish version becomes ‘immigrants’, suggesting that Denmark does not have immigration, only immigrants (even second-generation).

24 This is quite uncommon. Very few member states send foreign affairs or development officials to HLWG meetings.
illegal), but it has had a large number of asylum-seekers, most of whom end up on welfare benefits. Therefore, immigrants are only seen as a burden, whether by anti-immigrant groups, who fear they are destroying the Danish welfare model, or pro-immigrant groups, who believe that a wealthy country like Denmark has a moral obligation to ‘take care of’ asylum-seekers. Neither group perceives of immigrants as a resource to either Danish society or their home countries. Therefore, there has been very little attempt to develop policies that might exploit the development potential of transnational migration, whether for sending or receiving states.

Migration policies and attitudes in Spain
Spain is a recent destination country of immigration, having been a land of emigration for decades. Recent immigration is caused by an expanding economy, creating a need for low-skilled labour in the agricultural sector in particular.

Between 2001 and 2004, the number of immigrants with legal residency increased by 667,890. As of June 2004, Morocco was the principal source country of immigration to Spain (350,059 persons) (Spanish Ministry of Labour 2004).

From 2000, the country set about reaching agreements on the circulation of people, readmission and regulation of migratory flows. Unlike other European countries, who prioritize the migration of high-skilled labour, the Spanish labour market requires unskilled labour. Whole sectors of the labour market operate without any regulation and increasingly rely on immigrant workers (Zapata 2003).

While Spain has experienced massive labour immigration (documented and undocumented), it has had relatively few asylum-seekers. In 2000, 7,926 applications were filed, and favourable rulings were handed down in 453 cases, covering 752 individuals.

Labour migration and work permits
The new Socialist Government in Spain acknowledges that the phenomenon of illegal migration reached historical numbers during the previous administration, despite a tightening of control measures, and it has accordingly proposed a ‘change in orientation’ in how the issue has been tackled until now. The government is preparing a reform of the immigration law with the aim of facilitating legal and orderly migration to the country.

The new regulation aims to streamline the administration of the basic instruments for hiring personnel in their country of origin. The reform also provides for academ-
ic and technical training in countries of origin, in order to prepare migrants to fill vacancies in bottleneck sectors of the Spanish economy (Spanish Ministry of Labour 2004b). For the first time ever, the Spanish government recognizes that the phenomenon of illegal migration has to be understood as the direct result of an un-regularized labour market that is suffering shortages of manpower. In 2005 Spain regularized some 800,000 irregular migrants that fulfilled certain requirements.

**Labour migration and readmission agreements**

Spain has signed bilateral agreements on the regulation of migratory flows with six countries: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Romania, Colombia, Poland and Bulgaria. These agreements are aimed to regulate labour flows by establishing mechanisms for communicating job offers in Spain to job-seekers in the countries of origin.

The government also intends to manage and control immigration by signing bilateral readmission agreements with third countries. The agreements have permitted the Spanish government to repatriate more than 200,000 people between 2001 and 2003, mostly nationals of Morocco and Bulgaria.

**Migration and development**

Law 23/1998 on international development cooperation and the norms for its implementation do not mention any link between migration and development. However, in 2003 the subject of co-development was raised in some of the strategies, and the concept of co-development was analysed by the Planning and Evaluation Office of the Spanish Development Cooperation Agency.

The Ministry of the Interior has the overall competence for migration policy. The Ministry’s GRECO plan (Global Programme on the Regulation and Coordination of Immigration and Alien Affairs in Spain) presents some lines of action regarding cooperation:

> ... the investment in the development of countries of origin must be the key element in the government’s overall design ... in which we must favour over other actions the return of immigrants to their countries of origin. Their professional training, after their work here, will be an added value to their own experiences which will allow them to contribute to efforts towards development and growth in their own countries.\(^{25}\)

---

The Greco plan has received criticism because of the exclusive focus on return policy and neglect of a transnational approach. Furthermore, the idea of co-development has not been translated into a specific budgetary commitment (Terron 2004).

**Institutional set-up**

Decentralized cooperation is a notable feature of Spanish development cooperation, equivalent to about 16% of total ODA for 2000 (OECD 2002).

The government of the Generalitat de Catalunya, in its interdepartmental plan,\(^{26}\) has a number of proposals related to co-development.\(^{27}\) The plan aims to influence the development of immigrants’ countries of origin by means of development cooperation, awareness-raising and training. More concretely, the immigration plan must encourage partnerships and co-operative plans based on co-development carried out in association with agents from the beneficiary country, especially those migrants living and working in Catalonia.

Recently, the Catalan government adopted the General Plan for Developmental Cooperation. Co-development policies are of importance in the new regional plan of cooperation:

> The objectives of co-development are to contribute to the social integration of these persons in the host country, the development of the country of origin and the establishment of relations between actors in sending and receiving countries. Co-development is a mid- and long-term development tool. Catalonian development aid should be grounded in the creation of partnerships, in which both the donor and the beneficiaries share the objectives and design of the strategies and resource management.\(^{28}\)

**Concluding remarks**

As a comparatively new destination country, Spain receives very few asylum-seekers compared to the large numbers of undocumented labour migrants that enter the country every year. These immigrants make up a vital part of the unskilled labour force and are indispensable to certain sectors of the Spanish economy.

---

\(^{26}\) The plan is an inter-agency exercise within the regional government that touches upon cross-cutting issues such as integration, welfare, employment and social conditions.


The key strategy in migration policy in Spain has until recently been to control border areas, sign effective readmission agreements with non-EU countries of transit, and assist in strengthening the immigration control capabilities of non-EU countries’ authorities. However, Spain seems to be moving towards a comprehensive approach to the issue of migration, such as correcting inefficiencies in its labour market through legal quotas of migrants in order to ease bottlenecks in certain sectors of the economy. By managing legal migration procedures and entering bilateral agreements with sending countries, Spain hopes to combat undocumented immigration.

With regard to the migration-development nexus, the space for manoeuvre and experimentation is greater at the regional and local levels of government. The rationale of many of the policies and programmes being put forward is to create chains of interdependence for the mutual benefit of both sending and receiving societies.

Migration policies and attitudes in Italy

Between 1865 and 1973, more than 25 million Italians left the country to work abroad (Chaloff and Piperno 2004). This picture changed in the 1980’s, when the country began to receive foreign labour, becoming a net receiver of immigrants. Its geographical position, between the Mediterranean basin and northern Europe, together with the upsurge of regional conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and economic distress in North Africa, has increased the numbers of those seeking asylum and work in Italy. The restructuring of the Italian labour market under increasingly competitive global pressures and the demand for unskilled labour in certain sectors of the economy have also contributed to the phenomenon. The Italian debate on migration is not concerned with asylum (only 18,000 applications in 2000) but more specifically with undocumented immigration. Italy is also a country of transit: although many immigrants look for employment in Italy, a large number of both immigrants and asylum-seekers move on to northern Europe.

By 2001, the foreign population had reached nearly 1,350,000, almost a million more than in 1991.29 Morocco and Albania combined accounted for more than 20 percent of the foreign population in 2001.

When the country established its first amnesty program for illegal aliens in the late 1980s, immigration policy became a matter of public concern. In 1990 the govern-

ment passed the Martelli Law, Italy’s first comprehensive immigration legislation. The new law aimed to attract multilateral attention to Italy’s growing immigration concerns and to increase ‘burden-sharing’ with other EU nations to help Italy manage its borders.

Italy’s 1998 Immigration Act for the first time separated humanitarian and refugee issues from immigration policy. This new legislation provided for tougher action on undocumented immigration, introduced migrant labour admissions based on quotas, and gave greater attention to integration issues among migrant communities. This has ultimately had the effect of bringing Italian policy in line with the Schengen Agreement.

Italy’s immigration profile changed again, with the victory in 2001 of Silvio Berlusconi. In August 2002 the government passed legislation to regulate immigration, and in September of that same year it adopted a decree to provide for the regularization of undocumented immigrants already in the country. The new Law no. 189 amends the 1998 Immigration Act and introduces changes that include immigrant quotas, mandatory employer-immigrant contracts, stricter deportation practices, the regularization of immigrants who have worked and lived in the country for a period of time, and new provincial and decentralized immigration offices to help manage the need for labour in specific sectors and family reunification cases.

Perhaps the greatest effect of the 2002 law is the introduction of an explicit foreign policy priority that rewards countries that ‘actively collaborate in the fight against undocumented migration to Italy’ (Bertozzi 2002).

**Labour migration and work permits**

Since 1998 Italy has designed a quota system. The rationale behind it is been economic, with the government trying to respond to labour shortages in certain sectors. The government is required to publish an annual list of quotas broken down by region, sector and employment. Like other south European countries, Italy has been active in signing bilateral agreements which admit temporary or seasonal workers. It has signed two agreements with Albania and Tunisia that involve labour migration, primarily of seasonal workers.

Another example of Italy’s attempt to manage labour migration is the AILE register. The AILE (foreign workers’ computerised registrar) has been set up in Tunisia and Albania to help match the demand for and supply of foreign labour in Italy.
As in Spain, the fight against undocumented migration has been one of the driving forces behind the government’s policies of opening up new legal channels of migration. Preferential labour quotas are granted only if a readmission agreement has been signed with the incumbent third country.30 ‘Preferential’ quotas have been drawn up for workers from selected priority countries (Albania, Tunisia, Egypt, Nigeria, Moldavia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Argentina). They are established through consultations among different public institutions, namely the Ministry of Labour, local and regional employment offices, the federation of employers and trade unions. The preferential quotas for specific countries, however, represent only a minor percentage of the overall quota policy and have not exceeded 22%.

Discussions about migration management are essentially discussions about the quota system. Due to the insignificant numbers of asylum-seekers, refugees are not much of an issue in public and policy debates.

**Linking migration and development**

Generally, Italy’s thinking on development policy and migration has focused on the effectiveness of reducing migration and refugee flows by generating local development, preventing and resolving local conflicts, and retaining refugees in neighbouring or first countries of asylum. Development aid has focused exclusively on reducing migration pressures and has been streamlined towards reducing ‘push factors’ in Morocco, Albania, Tunisia and Egypt.

In its 2002 annual report, the Department for Development Cooperation sees a pivotal role for Italian small and medium enterprises with regard to ‘wealth distribution, job creation, poverty reduction and its positive effect on migratory pressure containment’ (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002: 17).

In recent years, there has been a refocusing of policy thinking and action on the migration–development nexus, with concern shifting from alleviation of the root causes of migration to trying to understand how migration flows can be turned to the advantage of development. These changes are taking place at the multilateral, regional and local levels.

**Institutional set-up**

The Organization for International Migration (OIM) has developed a capacity-building programme, Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA), which aims to

---

30 See CEC 2004f for an overview of the experiences to date of different European member states.
transfer skills and resources of the African diaspora living in European countries to support development in their countries of origin. The programme does not necessarily imply the permanent return of migrants, but rather seeks their support in contributing to the development of their countries of origin while still respecting their dual identities (IOM 2002).

The MIDA concept is based essentially on the notion of mobility – of people, skills and resources – and the possibility today of that mobility being either real or virtual. The driving force for IOM’s work in this programme is the conviction that well-managed migration can produce benefits for both countries of origin and destination, as well as for the migrants themselves. The project MIDA/Italy, promoted by IOM and funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, links migration to development, thus enhancing the role of immigrants in the socio-economic growth of their countries of origin. Sub-Saharan African immigrants in Italy have been actively engaged in the activities of MIDA, along with local governments, NGOs and Italian firms. This strategy is aimed at stemming the brain drain, triggering a virtuous cycle of entrepreneurial know-how transfer between Italy and Africa, developing trade, and creating a hinterland of small and medium-sized enterprises capable of sustaining themselves by generating employment and fostering the development and growth of their countries of origin.

The pilot project, financed by the Italian Cooperation for Development, has launched this strategy in Ghana and Ethiopia. The initial results achieved and responses received within the terms of reference of the MIDA-Italy programme involve business plans, joint ventures, territorial mobilisation etc.31

Along with projects in collaboration with international bodies such as IOM, local authorities and regional governments are playing a central role in linking migration and development. A number of projects have been launched in various regions (Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Lombardia), where immigrant organizations are in direct contact with Italian institutions and funding from the EU, the national and local government, NGOs and training organizations. Actions have mainly concentrated on the following areas: vocational training courses for future transnational entrepreneurs, recruitment schemes, the creation of employment leading to the reduction of migratory movements, and improvements in the use of remittances.32

---

31 For more information, see: http://www.iom.int/mida/; accessed 15 December 2004.
32 For an overview of the different initiatives, see Chaloff and Piperno 2004.
Concluding remarks
Being a recent country of immigration, Italy has only had to develop migration laws in recent years. As in Spain, the vast majority of immigrants are undocumented labour migrants seeking employment in the informal economy and as low-skilled labour in certain sectors of the economy. As in Spain too, initiatives that attempt to connect the issue of migration with development are basically taking place at the regional level. The vitality of local governments, compared with the ambivalence sometimes of central governments, has brought some analysts to talk about a southern European model combining control measures for more secure borders with quotas for foreign workers. Additionally, regional and local governments are engaged in projects that link migration and development, often in the sense of creating more development through migration.

Recent developments, such as the signing of an agreement between the Italian government and Libya in August 2004, seem to confirm that Italy is keen to ‘push’ back the immigration line through the planned ‘reception’ and transit processing centres in the desert. The centres, if established, would provide medical assistance and offer immigrants information about work opportunities in Europe. The reception centre proposal, which has drawn criticism from some quarters, is part of a series of cooperation initiatives that Italy is spearheading in an effort to control the flow of desperate illegal immigrants across the Mediterranean from northern Africa.

CONCLUSION
In the EU, as in the individual member states, we have seen what might appear to be a conflict between migration-friendly approaches and ‘tougher’ approaches to migration control. NGOs, opposition parties and human rights organizations have often criticised governments and the EU for adopting harsh measures to control the movements of people from third countries. It is, however, perhaps mistaken to perceive such approaches as contradicting ‘softer’ ones. Often policies that seek to tighten the asylum system are adopted with the explicit aim of helping those who are believed to

33 Libya is the only North African country which does not have a formal agreement with the EU on tackling illegal immigration. It has become the focal point of refugees, most of whom have travelled from across Africa and the Middle East.

34 See, for instance, Human Rights Watch press release, 16.9.2004: ‘European immigration policy has to do more than simply try to bar the door to migrants and asylum-seekers. A truly visionary approach to immigration and asylum would position Europe as a leader in development assistance to countries from which migrants flee’.
be ‘genuinely in need’ of protection. This appears to be the primary objective of recent UK policies. In Denmark the rationale is to integrate the immigrants and refugees that already are in the country before letting in any more. Neither of these policies expresses hostility towards immigrants or asylum-seekers, although arguably they might have the (unintended) consequences of creating hostility. However, it is has not been the aim of this paper to explore whether this might be the case. What we prefer to point out is that all these approaches to migration – whether ‘soft’ or ‘hard’, hostile or friendly, short term or long term – have the objective of managing movements of people in and out of the EU. They are concerned with the well-being of the European population as a whole and see uncontrolled movement as a threat to this well-being. To be ‘firm’ with regard to asylum-seekers is not to be against all asylum-seekers but to ensure first, that the national population remains secure, and second, that the majority of genuine asylum-seekers are treated fairly.

The approach to labour immigration is slightly different, as it is dictated less by notions of fairness and philanthropy and more by the instrumental needs of the labour market. One might even argue that certain sectors of the economy, such as the agricultural sector in southern Europe, prefer a semi-legal immigrant work force to a fully legal one, as this allows them to keep wages down and avoid social security costs. In the policies of the Italian and Spanish governments, however, one sees an increased need to ‘regularise’ this workforce. As with policies regarding asylum-seekers in northern Europe, the Spanish and Italian authorities use a method of simultaneous tightening and opening up. Thus, the precondition for regularizing sections of the illegal immigrant population is to deport the rest and tighten up on controls in the future.

**Present dilemmas**

A number of initiatives are being taken to integrate migration and development policies in the EU and its member states. However, there is still a long way to go before such approaches are fully developed and a comprehensive approach for the whole of Europe can be adopted. The various obstacles can be categorized as being national/historical, institutional and political.

Our analysis of four very different member states shows that, because of their unique experiences of immigration, they all have very different approaches to the issue. Immigrants also come to the four countries for different reasons. While Italy and Spain can offer employment for illegal low-skilled labourers, the UK is attractive due to its language and a certain reputation for being multicultural and a ‘land of opportunities’ like the US and Canada. Denmark, on the other hand, does not offer many
opportunities for the entrepreneurial spirit, which it does have a reputation for having a high standard of living and a highly developed welfare system.

While the majority of immigrants arriving in southern Europe arrive as irregular immigrants, the majority in countries like the UK and Denmark are now asylum-seekers and those who have entered under programmes of family reunification. This obviously calls for very different approaches to managing migration, and the experiences of one country cannot easily be transferred to the others.

Although policies and attitudes can therefore be explained to a high degree by the kinds of immigration patterns that the four states have experienced, we must be cautious in drawing decisive conclusions. For instance, Sweden, which in many ways resembles Denmark, because of its highly developed welfare state, has taken a radically different approach to immigration control and is usually very vocal in its criticisms of Danish immigration policies. Similarly, recent developments in Spain and Italy have shown strongly divergent policies, with Spain arguing for more legal immigration, while Italy is taking a tough stance on controlling immigration. Spain has been among the member states to openly criticize the Italian-German proposals on transit centres.

Apart from national differences, there are also institutional differences. While some institutions in the EU are embracing the new idea of linking migration with development, others are sceptical. Similar differences exist at national levels, usually between the ministries of development and foreign affairs on the one hand and the ministries of justice and home affairs on the other. The main reason for this difference is the fact that the whole idea of linking migration management to foreign policy is open to different interpretations. While some see it as a means of combating immigration pressures, others are more interested in development issues or foreign relations. This also shows that such policies always are open to political interpretation and send political signals, however much officials and experts try to see them as purely managerial or technical questions.

This takes us to the final dilemma in trying to create a comprehensive approach to linking migration and development in order to create a win-win situation. Being a politically sensitive issue, especially in recent years, any attempt to develop new approaches to migration will be interpreted politically. On the one hand, third countries will be sceptical of the motives and intentions of the EU in wanting to create ‘partnerships’ and establish co-development projects. Are the EU states offering development funds for selfish motives, simply to reduce migration pressures? Such
speculations are exacerbated by the other political side of the coin, namely the strong anti-immigration sentiment in the European public debate. Therefore any political decision on managing migration flows has to appear to be ‘tough’ in order to appeal to these sentiments. And if it does not appear tough, it certainly has to convince the population that it is efficient at stemming migration pressures and tackling ‘the refugee problem’. Such rhetoric certainly gives third countries reason to fear the ulterior motives behind the attempts to link migration and development.

For similar reasons, it has become virtually impossible to argue for a managed migration approach that allows for more migration as part of development assistance. In spite of a number of experts pointing to the potential of this approach for creating a win-win situation in which migrants, host societies and sending societies all benefit, it is difficult to get such proposals through due to the public fear of more migration. This fear might be concretely related to fears of losing national cultural values, of the burden on the welfare system, of losing jobs to immigrants, or a more general fear of globalization and change.

While some are unwilling to acknowledge that migration can bring benefits, others are unwilling to acknowledge that it may produce costs. A debate about the best way to make migration work has to be based on a balanced evaluation of these costs and benefits. Opposed to those who fear immigration are those who defend migrants, in particular the rights of asylum-seekers. They are often unwilling to accept a policy of selecting migrants according to labour needs. This is particularly the case in Scandinavia, where an egalitarian ethics is predominant. The problem with this supposedly positive attitude towards immigration is that it reproduces the picture of migrants as victims and a burden rather than as active agents in change and as resources in both the host and home countries. It may even be argued that inviting highly qualified migrants from third countries might help reduce the hostile perception of immigrants in many EU countries, thus breaking a vicious circle.

At the moment, this polarised debate effectively hinders any serious debate on the pros and cons of opening managed migration to more development.

**Future options**

There is a need for a serious rethinking of policies on migration and development. Migration can play a positive economic role in the migrant’s country of origin, neighbouring and transit countries, and European destinations. This is not to say that liberalising migration regimes is a miracle cure or the solution to all migration and development problems (Boswell and Crisp 2004; Gibney and Hansen 2003). Rather,
a carefully managed approach to migration is needed in order to exploit the development potential of migration for the benefit of all sides (Holzman and Münz 2004; Spencer 2003; Weil 2002) rather than simply seeing migration as a problem and a burden for both the sending and receiving societies, as well as for the migrants themselves.

We need to abandon the common perception of migrants as either victims or criminals. This also means breaking with the notion that people only belong to one state or territory. The transnational character of migration means taking policy steps that allow for, indeed promote, transnational livelihoods. In this way, the migration of highly skilled labour from one state to another does not necessarily mean a loss for one and a gain for the other. Given the right opportunities, this transnational migrant can be of benefit to both places, just as he or she can be a loss to both places (and to the person involved) if the circumstances are wrong. By promoting a more mobile and portable approach, the right environment can be created, provided it is carefully managed.

We therefore need to move away from the mutual institutional suspicion between departments and work towards a model that can benefit all parties. That said, however, it is not a straightforward task. The links between migration and development are complex. There is no evidence that more development necessarily produces less migration. In certain cases it might even have the opposite effect, leading to what has been called the ‘migration hump’. But even in this case, there is no clear indication that certain levels of income or certain differences between income levels in the sending and receiving countries create migration flows. Actual political and historical contexts make it very hard to predict such correlations. This means that much more knowledge is needed in order to design policies that should be built on more than assumptions and guesstimates.

There are, in other words, a number of challenges in this model. It is no miracle cure that solves all problems at all times. Just as migration flows and networks are complex and multifaceted, so must the responses to migration be. Before we enter these concrete and contextualized approaches, however, we need to overcome the institutional barriers to dialogue, just as we need to counter the prevailing political winds of suspicion and fear regarding immigration into Europe.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Ceyhan, Ayse, and Anastasia Tsoukala (2002), The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies, Alternatives, no. 27, Special Issue.


Niessen, Jan (2003), International Migration and Mobility on the EU Foreign Policy Agenda: Is there a Case to be made? Paper presented at the PES Group Conference ON Migration and Development: The Missing Link, European Parliament, Brussels.


INTRODUCTION

Transit can be defined as ‘a stopover of passage, of varying length, while travelling between two or more countries, either incidental to continuous transportation, or for the purposes of changing planes or joining an ongoing flight or other mode of transport.’ According to this definition, most persons in transit are not migrants, but simply international travellers bound for their country of departure after their journey has ended.

For logical reasons that will be discussed later, no definition of ‘transit migrant’ seems to exist. However, a growing number of people on the move find themselves in a situation called ‘transit’, namely migrants staying on a temporary basis in a country with a view to reaching another country, whether they eventually reach it or not. In the context of this study, these will be referred to as ‘transit migrants’. This situation has become so common that, in addition to migrants’ countries of origin and destination, an intermediate category has emerged in the migration lexicon: the category of transit countries.

---

Provided that migrants in a situation of transit can be identified and counted, there is still no clear picture of where they come from (i.e. a bordering or a more distant country), of how they entered (i.e. legally or illegally), nor of how long they will stay in the transit country (before they either become settlers or leave for another country).

Transit constitutes a phenomenon which may cut across various categories of migrants, ranging from legal, illegal or irregular migrants to readmitted migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. In other words, transit migration does not constitute an isolated phenomenon; rather, its configuration is closely connected with other processes of mobility that need to be taken into account.

To a certain extent, transit is also a new phenomenon which in part reflects a paradox, namely that the circulation of people is becoming increasingly easy and cheap, whereas immigration is increasingly being restricted by laws and regulations. This is why countries that border the major destination areas are transforming themselves into places of transit for would-be migrants originally destined for these areas. This applies in particular to countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the gateway to Europe. Remaining at the same time major countries of emigration, they often consider transit migrants as unwanted newcomers. Moreover, because countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean mainly see themselves as countries of emigration, they have a deficit of regulations on immigration and thus offer a niche for transit migrants. Transit migration becomes a matter for policy-making.

As a consequence, the phenomenon of transit raises a wide range of potentially conflicting policy-related issues, such as protecting nationals on labour markets while protecting the basic rights of transit migrants, or taking care of domestic public opinion while managing external relations. It is the contention of this study that the political and legal treatment of transit migration can only be properly assessed and understood if we take into account the intertwining of a set of factors affecting international relations, the domestic economy and finally social concerns in the transit countries themselves.

Such factors will be developed in the second part of this paper. The analysis will demonstrate that the participation of Mediterranean third countries in the joint management of international migration, including transit migration, lies at the crossroads of various factors at the domestic, regional and international levels, which determine their responsiveness and policy options.
The study is also intended to demonstrate that transit migration requires an ad hoc approach, and that besides the management of permanent and temporary migration, further attention should be given to the effective management of transit, for the benefit of all.

**TRANSIT: A GROWING CONCERN FOR A BLURRY NOTION**

Transit is certainly one of the most elusive notions of mobility in the migration spectrum. Interestingly, no definition of transit migration or transit migrant can be found in any glossary specialising on migration (UN Population Division, DG Freedom, Security and Justice of the European Commission, IOM, Migration Policy Institute).

As a multifaceted phenomenon, the large variety of actors it involves makes it difficult to quantify from a statistical point of view, because those who count will vary from one transit migrant to another, depending upon their reasons for transiting and whether the administration will grant them any status. Moreover, beyond this obvious heterogeneity of actors, transit migration also constitutes a blurry notion in terms of duration. Being a transit migrant has to be taken for what it is by definition: a transitory state in the migrant’s life-cycle. Beyond a certain duration of stay (varying according to the visa regime) in a country initially viewed as a stopping-off place, he/she ceases being a transit migrant and becomes an ordinary migrant (whether legal or illegal).

Duration of stay in the transit country turns out to be determined by a set of factors ranging from the migrant’s ability to find the proper channels to leave for the destination area or for another transit country, to his ability to face the living conditions associated with his journey through the transit country. Empirical evidence suggests that these living conditions may in turn vary according to the historical and cultural affinities that exist between transit migrants’ countries of origin and the transit country’s society.

Similarly, the level of historical and cultural affinity may shape the social and legal conditions that the government (and society) of the transit country will grant to specific groups of transit migrants. In others words, the impact of transit migration (whether legal or illegal), as well as its subjective perception as a problem by the local authorities and society, vary substantially. It also gives rise to highly fluctuating living
conditions in the transit country for specific groups of transit migrants, who are, to various degrees, subjected to vulnerability and insecurity, unequal treatment and human rights abuse, and exploitation.

Ahmet Içduygu’s study of Turkey’s policy regarding transit migrants is of great interest in showing how transit migrants’ living conditions fluctuate according to the subjective treatment they receive from the local authorities. In fact, despite Turkey’s limited application of the 1951 Geneva Convention to persons seeking asylum from Europe (Kiriçi, 2004), it enabled large number of Iranians seeking asylum on its territory to enjoy some form of protection by allowing them to ‘enter and stay in Turkey without an appropriate travel document and residence permit’ (Içduygu 2000: 360). Iranian migrants using Turkey as a transit country ‘have been allowed to stay on as tourists for time periods that are regularly extended’ (Içduygu 2000: 360). Conversely, still because of Turkey’s limited application of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the mass arrivals of Kurds moving from northern Iraq to Turkey in the late 1980s and early 1990s were viewed negatively by the Turkish authorities, who ‘encouraged [them] to go home or to seek refuge in the West rather than to [enable them to] stay in Turkey’ (Içduygu 2000: 362).

In the same vein, the dynamics and pre-existence of social networks may also have provided for a significant adjunct to the living conditions of transit migrants (Koser 2004: 30). Such networks not only disseminate information on potential destinations and on how to obtain the official documents needed to leave for the destination country. They also provide information on the safest routes through which the transit migrant can travel to reach the targeted destination areas. In this respect, a survey conducted by IOM (1996) in Istanbul and Ankara supported the argument that Iraqi transit migrants in Turkey relied, among others, on ‘relatives and friends’ in Turkey to gather information about their intended destination countries and about routes to them.

Other empirical surveys have also showed that, in specific circumstances, the poor living conditions and ordeal with which transit migrants are faced may be compensated for by the dynamics of networks based on mutual organisation and assistance, regardless of their ethnic origins or kinship. For example, field surveys carried out in northern Morocco with sub-Saharan transit migrants placed in the border camps of Gourougou and Bel Younes (Wender 2004) give clear evidence of how the latter can organise their daily lives collectively and find solutions to secure their living in these camps before crossing the border with a view to seeking asylum in Spain or elsewhere in the European Union (EU).
VARIOUS LEVELS OF RESPONSIVENESS: THE BALANCE OF FORCES

There is no question that the conditions with which migrants are faced in transit countries, regardless of the duration of their transit, are reflective of the preparedness of transit country governments to deal effectively with these patterns of cross-border mobility. The effective management of transit migration on the part of transit (and origin) countries is not a mere question of willingness; rather, it results from a tricky balance of forces which shapes the strategic political options adopted by the transit country’s government. This balance of forces lies at the intersection of five interrelated factors:

*Domestic social concerns.* Repeated media coverage of migrants arrested while crossing a country’s border illegally shows how societies in transit countries are becoming increasingly aware of the growing dimension of transit migration. The press often reports the difficult living conditions of transit migrants. It also chronicles incidents of confrontation with local populations, which, in the words of Ali Bensaad (2003), may have connotations of social intolerance and racism towards the ‘other migrants’. Just like destination countries, transit countries are also faced with social concerns linked with the presence of migrants coming from poorer countries or origin. Just like destination countries, transit countries need to respond to social concerns (whether real or constructed) by adopting drastic measures of control.

*The capacity to absorb foreign labour in the domestic labour market.* Labour markets in transit countries are characterised by a low capacity of absorption of additional labour, leading to high unemployment rates in rural and urban areas and to poverty. The low absorption capacity of the local labour market is certainly a deterrent for transit countries’ governments to foster the social and economic integration of migrants (Barros et al., 2004: 135). However, even in developing countries confronted with unemployment, segmented labour markets may offer specific job opportunities to immigrants and allow transit migrants to settle.

*Neighbourly relations between transit countries and migrants’ countries of origin.* The ways in which transit countries respond to the management of
migration inflows may have a strong impact on the state-to-state relations with the countries from which migrants originate. This point is particularly salient between countries that are historically and culturally interrelated.

Neighbourly relations between transit countries and migrants’ intended countries of destination. Transit countries are also emigration countries, since they too have a large number of expatriates living in destination countries. To guarantee fair treatment for their nationals abroad, as well as their temporary circulation, transit countries need to play the efficiency card in managing migration flows in order to appear as credible players vis-à-vis the major destination countries of their expatriates.

Participation in regional and sub-regional trading blocs. Transit countries participate in regional and sub-regional trading blocs, which may be organized at the vertical or horizontal levels. The existence of such trading blocs is necessarily founded on mutual obligations and commitments, which often favour the cross-border circulation of goods, services and persons. As far as the mobility of individuals is concerned, the implementation of trade agreements at the regional or sub-regional levels may be conducive to reciprocal visa facilitation or exemption among the parties involved in the trading bloc. As Lorenzo Coslovi (2004: 10) rightly stressed by referring to the political hegemony of Morocco over sub-Saharan Africa, the adoption of measures aimed at restricting flows of immigrants might be counterproductive for political and economic relations between transit and origin countries if such restrictive measures are not properly managed.

These five factors can be seen as providing an analytical framework shedding light on the multifarious forces that shape transit countries’ preparedness to manage international migration. The analysis of these factors is also crucial to understanding that the levels of responsiveness of transit countries may vary substantially from one regional context to another, as well as across time. For instance, policy options regarding transit migration may appear to be more restrictive at a given time because such restrictive policy options are strategically conducive to trade concessions and preferential treatment on the part of destination countries. Conversely, other policy options may
prefer to adopt a flexible or pragmatic approach towards transit migration at a given time, for example, because such flexible policy options may be strategically conducive to much-needed relations of good neighbourliness with source countries.

Another insight provided by these five factors lies in stressing that any initiatives aimed at encouraging transit countries to manage flows of migrants better – for example, through enhanced border controls and stricter visa regimes – should take more fully into account the forces that are shaping the policy options of transit countries’ governments.

Finally, the various levels of responsiveness that may take place regarding the management of international migration flows, including transit migration, supports the EU argument that patterns of cooperation in the field of migration management should be differentiated (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 20). Nonetheless, transit is not an isolated phenomenon which can be exclusively dealt with in terms of border controls and security-oriented provisions: it also involves social, developmental and economic concerns in the transit and origin countries that their governments cannot disregard.
REFERENCES:


Coslovi, Lorenzo (2003), Migration de transit au Maghreb: le cas du Maroc, Rome: CESPI.


The Current State and Recent Trends in Migration between Maghreb States and the European Union

MEHDI LAHLOU
INSEA

INTRODUCTION

Migration between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand and Europe on the other, the origins of which go back to the colonial past, has marked the history of both continents. Since the end of the 1980s, the motives behind the migration movements, their development and the groups of countries concerned have particularly changed.

Having for many years become a kind of ‘safety valve’ for most African countries, these movements result from a conjunction of a series of factors that are economic and social in nature (increases in poverty, in unemployment; the increasing precariousness of resources), political (violent problems and conflicts intra and inter African countries), and regulatory (extension of the visa system and implementation of the Schengen agreements by the countries of the EU). From there, the problems that they give rise to are global and multidimensional.

Obviously this challenge requires immediate responses of security nature, but this also calls for both medium and long terms answers of an economic, social and political nature.

In what follows, after briefly giving the main reasons for the migration movements that are currently emanating from the African continent, we shall lay out the essential developments that have shaped them in recent years, as well as the most obvious impacts of migration on the Euro-Mediterranean region.
REASONS FOR MIGRATION FROM AFRICA

The extremely rapid growth in the migration of individuals in an ‘irregular situation’ observed anywhere in Africa, including North Africa, as well as within the continent, since the beginning of the 1990s is to be linked to multiple pull and push factors that act on certain segments of the African population, especially the youth. On the one hand, the increasingly strong attraction exerted by the way of life and living standards of the populations of Western Europe and North America, thanks to the development of the new information technologies, and, simultaneously, the penetration of images into places that were still inaccessible only two decades ago are playing a powerful role today, particularly among young people from the cities, mostly men, though increasingly also women. For such people especially, Europe and North America represent ‘the best you can get’ in terms of living conditions, freedom, guarantees of one’s rights, leisure activities, etc.

In addition, by limiting legal migration in particular and adding a ‘forbidden’ aspect to the attraction, the extension of visas in most of the rich, potentially receiving countries has greatly contributed to an increase in clandestine movements and the illegal overstay after a legal entry, out of a fear of not being allowed back into the country if one leaves it.

However, these two factors are not the only ones that need examining in explaining recent migratory trends. On the other hand, indeed, for a couple of years Africa has increasingly developed push factors by exerting repulsion on an increasing proportion of its population, for which the hope of a better life in their place of birth is declining, as poverty and the associated low quality of life increase.

In this respect, the evolution of the situation in Africa, especially south of the Sahara, since the mid-1960s, and more particularly during the last two decades, is globally marked by four major aspects, which summarise the scope and depth of the African dilemma at the beginning of this century.

Africa, indeed, is still experiencing an era of demographic growth, poverty is spreading there like nowhere else in the world, and the natural resources at the disposal of its inhabitants – especially water – are becoming less and less abundant. For a multitude of reasons, therefore, including the three causes mentioned above and the high

---

1 On this, see the article by Saskia Sassen, Mais pourquoi émigrent-ils?, Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2000.
degree of external interference, whether political and thus dating back to the Cold War, or economic, especially in the current era of globalisation, conflicts and wars of all types are becoming increasingly numerous, thus reducing the possibilities of reversing these trends especially regarding the economy. In this latter respect, insecurity represents a factor of strong repulsion as much for local investors (whose numbers are a priori limited) as for potential foreign investors. At this point, two direct determining factors, which are closely linked in the current African situation, must be particularly mentioned: demographic growth, which is continuing at a high rate; and poverty, which is linked to it and magnifies it, becoming increasingly pronounced and general.

A growing population
One factor that is both a cause and a consequence of the combination of an endemic situation of poverty and the failure of school systems almost everywhere on the African continent is that African countries in general are still showing the highest birth rates in the world, combined with a mortality rate that, globally, is continuing to fall, despite the impact of AIDS. As a consequence, these countries are experiencing the fastest natural population growth that is a 3% annual increase, compared to an average economic growth rate of 1.7%. The overall natural growth rate of the African population\(^2\) represents 184% of the world average and is almost five times the North American rate. Moreover, the birth rate in Central and East Africa represents twice the world rate.

Thus Africa, which had a population of 221 million in 1950 and 8.7% of the world’s population, today has close to 800 million, nearly 13.5% of the world’s population, with projections of 1.3 billion in 2025 and 1.76 billion in 2050.

A multiform poverty that is increasing
Although the demographic factor is playing a role in the movements of population from one region or country to another, this only takes shape if other aspects are joined to it, which then become the actual motors of migration. Except for general political factors related to the existence of the rule of law, or more fundamentally to the conditions of security prevailing in a country or a region, as far as the African situation is concerned (which is not, in this regard, a historical or factual exception), there appears to be an important relationship between economic situation, living conditions in a broad sense (see table) and migration movements.

\(^2\) Even when we take into account, as examples, the cases of Tunisia or Morocco, for which this rate was, in 2004, 1.2% and 1.4%, respectively.
However, this connection does not act uniformly. The assessment concerning migration towards Europe is that there is a kind of gradation in movements of people, in which citizens from the poorer countries go to their richest neighbours. This is the case between Niger, Mali and Chad on the one hand, and Libya, Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Morocco or Tunisia on the other.

In Sub-Saharan countries, the determining motivation for leaving is first extreme poverty (this being, incidentally, both a catalyst and a consequence of local and regional conflicts, causing in turn a greater mobility of populations). This explains migrants establishing themselves in a richer and possibly more stable neighbouring country, like inhabitants of Burkina Faso in Côte d’Ivoire (before the current crisis in the latter country), inhabitants of Niger and Mali in southern Algeria, Nigeriens, Malians and Chadians in Libya, and cross-border migration of brief duration, especially between the countries mentioned above. As a result, available estimates of this type of migration indicate that out of 100,000 Africans from the south of the Sahara who migrate to North Africa each year, only about 15% try to go as far as Europe.3

Work-related migration towards a richer neighbour is explained by the significant gap in Gross Domestic Product existing between countries bordering one another or not very distant from one another. It is this gap, as shown in the following table, that explains the presence of Malians, Nigeriens and Chadians in Algeria, or, more importantly, in Libya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Libya*</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated on the basis of an estimated income of US$6,000 an hour in Libya.

Among people from the Maghreb (except for the Libyans, who do not emigrate, given their petroleum wealth), whose significant gaps in GDP/inhabitant compared to those of their neighbours from the south can be seen in Table 1, the reasons for going to Europe, apart from the political and security issues, are unemployment, especially urban and graduate unemployment (the illiterate generally find jobs more easily), as well as their own increasing gaps in GDP and therefore living standards with Europe, including, for Morocco, its immediate neighbour, Spain.

As we can see in the following table, therefore, everywhere in central Maghreb, the unemployment rate at the beginning of this century was more than 15% in average. In urban areas, it was 25.1% in 2001 in Algeria and 19.5% in Morocco.

Table 2: Evolution of unemployment rates in Maghreb in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>25.1 (urban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>16.0 (urban)</td>
<td>16.9 (urban)</td>
<td>19.5 (urban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, it appears that this situation of unemployment, apart from the fact that it is first and foremost urban, essentially affects people with higher education. Thus, the latest data available for Morocco, by indicating an urban unemployment rate of 19.3% for 2003 (more or less the same as in 2001), shows that the unemployment rate in the countryside is only 3.4%, while that affecting people without diplomas is 5.7% on average, as opposed to 24% among the working population who have a diploma.4 That proportion of the population in the Maghreb countries as a whole with a diploma but no job, as well as those who have a job but not one that conforms to their expectations, will try to emigrate to Europe. This situation is not, of course, unrelated to the significant gaps in GDP per inhabitant that exist today between the main European Union countries that are receiving migrants and the countries of the central Maghreb.

---

Table 3: GDP gap per inhabitant between the central Maghreb and leading EU countries receiving migrants from there

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The case of Morocco, from where most migrants from the region leave for Europe, vis-à-vis Spain, is most characteristic of this situation, which has only become asymmetrical since the beginning of the 1980s, mostly since the entry of Spain into what was then the European Community in 1986. Moroccans of all classes and ages, who came and went to and from Spain without any restriction other than the presentation of a valid passport until the end of the 1980s, had, in 1970-1975, an average income equal, at face value, to a quarter of the average income of a Spaniard in the same period. In terms of the equivalence of purchasing power, the difference was even smaller. However, in 2002, the difference in GDP had grown to a ratio of 12 to 1 between a typical Spaniard and a Moroccan, with all the consequences this would imply for these two countries, geographically and historically so mutually entangled, with the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla being in Moroccan territory.

Figure 1: Economic gap between Spain and Morocco
GDP per capita per year in Spain divided by that of Morocco

Source: ‘Décalage économique Espagne Maroc’ (Economic discrepancies between Spain and Morocco).
In this regard, what seemed perfectly normal, or at least did not seem to pose any problem thirty years ago, has definitely become a problem since a little more than a decade ago, through a combination of discrepancies in economic and social growth on the one hand, and the implementation of the visa system on the other.

**MAIN CHANGES AFFECTING IRREGULAR TRANS-MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION IN RECENT YEARS**

Irregular migration in the last few years, have gone through certain changes in quality and quantity that are determining their essential outline, today as well as in the close future.

Quantitatively, the impression\(^5\) that predominated throughout 2004 was one of a relative ebbing of the tide after the thrust of the previous years. This ebbing, however, has brought with it a multiplication of transit routes and a greater diversification in the origins of migrants. Moreover, the national, regional and international settings in which – especially irregular – migration is taking place have also taken a new turn in recent years, which is fundamentally different from the trends observed before 2001.

Thus, even though the numbers of irregular migrants between the southern and northern shores of the western Mediterranean – that is, between Morocco and Spain – seem to have gone down, especially in the last two years, migration itself has gone through a four-fold transformation, consisting in:

- A significant radicalisation
- A significant interweaving of migration and terrorism
- An increase in the risks involved
- A progressive move from bilateralism to multilateralism.

**Trends in numbers of irregular migrants in recent years**
Without being able to know the exact number of irregular migrants who have been able to cross the Mediterranean from the coasts of Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, or across the Atlantic between the south Moroccan coast and the Canary Islands, the information provided by the Spanish and Moroccan authorities indicates that the

---

\(^5\) Impression confirmed by the numbers of arrests of migrants carried out during the first months of the year and by a declaration of the Spanish Minister of Labour made on January 2nd 2005 (Spanish press agency EFE).
number of irregular migrants apprehended by the authorities in both countries decreased in 2004 compared to 2003 because of greater obstacles on the routes, following stricter controls on the Moroccan side, and the full implementation of the Spain’s ‘integrated system of external vigilance’ (SIVE), set up in southern Andalusia in 2002. But this may well be due also to the increased awareness among potential migrants of the many risks that they run during irregular migration.

Thus, while the statistics available up to 2002 show, as indicated in the following table, a continuous increase in the numbers of migrants apprehended (and therefore the number of migrants who succeeded in crossing the straits), in 2004 there has been an important change, manifested in a decrease of nearly a fifth in arrests of migrants compared with the previous year on the Spanish side.

Table 4: Trends in the number of migrants arrested between 1996 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
<th>Algerians</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6701</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5911</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5724</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5819</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12858</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5: Total number of arrests on the Spanish side (all nationalities, arrivals by sea)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Straits of Gibraltar</th>
<th>Canary Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4952</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5287</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7741</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>7348</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7178</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16885</td>
<td>2387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Idem.
Therefore, the number of irregular immigrants arrested upon their arrival on the coasts of the Iberian peninsula coming via the Straits of Gibraltar and on the Canary Islands from 1 January until 31 December 2004 amounted to 15,675 individuals, compared to 19,176 the previous year.6

The number of *pateras* or small boats seized amounted to 740 in 2004 as opposed to 942 in 2003, representing a decrease of 21%. In another sign of increased vigour, 283 individuals responsible for the boats used in the crossings were put in jail, 26% more than in 2003. The foundering of boats recorded in 2004 totalled 14, one more than in 2003, but the number of people who drowned and were recovered from the sea (81) dropped by 20%. The number of survivors, 17% (339), decreased too, while the number of people missing (60) was half that recorded in 2003.

The same data show, incidentally, that crossing the Atlantic to the Canary Islands is now preferred to crossing through the Straits of Gibraltar, due, among other things, to the full implementation of SIVE in the waters of the Straits. Some 8,426 potential irregular immigrants were arrested upon their arrival in the Canary Islands in 2004, which represents a decrease of less than 10%, but the decrease is more significant in the area of the Straits, where the number of foreigners intercepted (7,425) dropped by more than 26%.

Another meaningful sign of the rigor of the SIVE is that in 2004 the Balearic Islands appeared for the first time in the statistics of irregular immigration into Spain, after the boarding of a boat with four people on board.

The Moroccan authorities noted down that 400 people-smuggling networks were broken up and 26,000 attempts at irregular immigration prevented, including 17,000 Sub-Saharans, by operations carried out inside Morocco.

Per migrant country of origin, 5,864 irregular migrants arrested in Spanish waters between January and September 2004 were of Moroccan origin, 1,860 Malian, 1,094 Gambian and 332 Guinean. The rest came from Côte d’Ivoire, 226; Ghana, 220; Sudan, 202; Liberia, 173; Mauritania, 171; Nigeria, 163; Guinea-Bissau, 158; India, 146, and 34 migrants of other nationalities.7

---

6 Data published on 7 January 2005 in Madrid by the Spanish Secretary of State for Immigration, MAP, 7/1/2005. The Secretary of State thus emphasised, at the end of December, the importance of the efforts that were made by Morocco in 2004 to restrain illegal immigration, as well as the ‘spectacular’ reinforcement of cooperation with Spain in this area.

7 EFE (Spanish press agency), 10 October 2004.
In 2003, following the development of control operations and the fight against irregular immigration arriving via maritime routes, the number of foreigners arrested during attempts at irregular entry into Spain increased by 15.03% compared with 2002, reaching the figure of 19,176, as opposed to 21,682 in 2002. Arrests in the waters of the Straits were almost the same (9,794) as those recorded offshore of the Canary Islands (9,382).

For their part, the Moroccan authorities announced on 24 December 2004 that the number of would-be irregular migrants arrested in Morocco during 2004 had seen a considerable decline, as much in the north of the country as in the Saharan region, when compared to the Canary Islands. According to the same authorities, in 2004 the multiple actions taken have prevented more than 26,000 attempts at irregular immigration, 4,989 of them in the south of the Kingdom, facing the Canary Islands, as well as the breaking up of 423 trafficking networks. Of the 26,000 attempts, 17,000 involved citizens of Sub-Saharan countries.

Compared to 2003, this reinforcement of control measures produced a fall of 26% in attempted irregular immigration into the Iberian peninsula in general and of 44% to the Canary Islands.

For the Saharan region alone, the authorities in charge of security announced the arrest, on 15 August 2004, of 3,400 irregular migrants, of whom 2,744 originated from Sub-Saharan countries, 331 being Asians and 229 Moroccans. They also announced the breaking up of 34 trafficking networks, one being 100% Mauritanian, and the destruction of 113 pateras. For these authorities, 90% of foreign immigrants apprehended in the Sahara come from the north of Morocco, having started from the Algeria-Morocco border (1600 km away), with a minority coming from Mauritania. And, indeed, the Moroccan police force announced the arrest, on 31 October 2004, north of the Mauritanian Sahara (300 km north-east of Zouerate), of 52 migrants, of which 19 were from Ghana, 17 from Mali and 16 from Gambia, who

---

9 The notion of ‘attempt of illegal migration’ is applied to any Subsaharian migrant arrested in Morocco in an irregular situation (whether he is arrested on a boat or waiting for departure). For the Moroccans, this means any arrest of a person already on board of a patera or about to go on board, and includes as well any attempt aiming at migration, like for example trying to infiltrate a port, or on a road leading to a port in a vehicle (usually a truck) supposed to lead there. Moreover, the same persons can be arrested many times. Each arrest will be considered as one attempt.
11 (Barcelona), 19 August 2004.
said they had paid €800 each to be taken to the region of Layoune in order to try and reach the Canary Islands.12

The multiplication of routes and the diversification of the origins of migrants

Not all the migrants who try and pass over the Straits of Gibraltar or via the Canary Islands come from Africa. To illustrate this, and after numerous apprehensions in 2003 and 200413 in the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania of Asian migrants (Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani about to leave for the Canary Islands, it appeared increasingly that a new factor was coming into play in feeding migration flows towards Europe. This new element was the Polisario Front, which has been disputing ownership of the former Spanish Sahara with Morocco since 1975.

This assumption, with everything it implies regarding, among other things, the dangers incurred by would-be migrants in conflict zones, was confirmed during the autumn of 2004 by the United Nations. Indeed, the report of the Secretary General of the Security Council of the United Nations on the situation regarding Western Sahara, presented in New York on 20 October 2004, to extend the mandate of the international peace force (MINURSO) in the region, states that:

On May 3rd 2004, the Polisario Front informed the MINURSO that a group of 23 persons coming from Bangladesh and India had been given shelter by its military force, close to the site of the Mission in Mijek. On September 2nd, they also informed them that 20 persons coming from Pakistan had been discovered close to the site that they occupy in Tifariti. Both groups declared that they had been abandoned in the desert by their guides, which had promised them the passage to Europe. Both groups are currently being given shelter by the Polisario Front. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is currently taking measures regarding their repatriation through a neighbouring country. We are also trying to develop a coordinated approach between the parties, neighbouring countries and other interested parties regarding what seems to be an increasing

12 Al Ittihad Al Ichtiraki and Libération (Casablanca), 2 November 2004.
13 During the last weekend of September 2004, 125 illegal migrants were arrested at the border of Morocco and Mauritania. Among them there were 70 persons from India and Bangladesh. As well, on November 29th 2004, the Spanish frontier guards announced having intercepted 39 Indian nationals and three Moroccans who were on board of a precarious/makeshift boat, 5 kilometers off shore of Fuerteventura, one of the island of the Canary archipelago.
phenomenon of irregular migration towards Europe through Western Sahara.

Moreover, not all migrants landing in the Canary Islands come from Morocco, an example being the announcement by Spanish coastguards, on 15 October 2004, of the arrest of 176 irregular Sub-Saharan migrants offshore of Fuerteventura on a boat coming from Guinea Bissau.14

Similarly, sea passages by irregular migrants to Europe do not take place only between Morocco and Spain, but also between Libya and Tunisia on the one hand and Italy on the other. Thus, during the summer of 2004, the Italian island of Lampedusa received a continuous flow of migrants from North Africa, including Tunaisians, Algerians, Moroccans, Egyptians and other Africans from the south of the Sahara, among others. Their numbers had reached more than 9,000 by the end of September 2004, compared with only 6,500 in 2002 and 6,000 in 2003.

The appearance of Libya, a country not densely populated and rich in oil, where more than two million immigrants from the south of the Sahara and many thousands of Moroccans, Tunaisians and Egyptians have been living for many years, as a ‘new country of transit’ should be considered in connection with Libya’s willingness to reintegrate itself into the international community and all the initiatives it took to this end throughout 2004.15 Migrants in Libya went there mainly for work, in accordance with the desire expressed on many occasions by the Libyan authorities (and among other things as a reaction to the ‘Arab passivity’ in the face of the sanctions imposed on it by the USA between 1986 and the beginning of 2004).

15 On 16 December 2004, the President of Libya – where, at the beginning of December 2004, a delegation from the European Union was inspecting camps in which ‘irregular’ migrants are gathered together in most large Libyan cities – declared that ‘it would not be the policeman of Europe in Africa’, while asking at the same time for the summoning of an ‘international conference on migration in Africa’.
OTHER QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A situation becoming markedly more and more radical

A radicalisation of the situation is appearing among other things through:

More restrictive laws regarding foreigners

The two laws, one Moroccan (published in November 2003), the other Tunisian (adopted and published in February 2004), illustrate this perfectly: they indicate a total reversal of trends, in every instance at the levels of legislation and regulation, of two important transit countries for migration in the Maghreb.

The realignment of the legislative framework is being carried out in parallel with the increasing criminalization of migration (the greater involvement of organised crime), an area in which Europol and the security authorities have become important decision-makers.

A reinforced security approach, the apparent outlines of which are:

- The implementation, between Tarifa and Cadiz in the south of Spain, of SIVE, the Integrated System of External Vigilance. Set up in 2002, this system should be completely installed by 2008. At an overall cost of €260 million, and equipped with almost military capabilities, according to its creators it should make the coasts of the south of Spain and of Europe impassable to irregular migrants.
- The formation of joint Moroccan and Spanish patrols from the beginning of 2004 in the Straits of Gibraltar, and starting on 15 November 2004 offshore in the Atlantic, between the coasts of Morocco and the Canary Islands.
- The announcement in Rabat, on 10 November 2003, of the formation of the Direction de la migration et de surveillance des frontières (Migration and border surveillance office), which seems to have been assigned to the Direction de surveillance du territoire (DST, Territory surveillance office), which seems to have taken charge in respect of migrant-smuggling networks.
- The reinforcement of controls in European ports and airports. In this connection, at the beginning of November 2004 the Spanish police announced that they would dispatch some 300 additional officers to help with border control and the deportation of irregular migrants. A new central unit for deportation and repatriation comprising 103 officials will be created, while 130 additional police officers will be deployed to internment centres for those ‘without papers’
in the country and 90 more to Madrid airport.\textsuperscript{16} The central unit of deportations and repatriations will be in charge of coordinating internment centres for foreigners, controlling irregular migrants serving jail sentences, repatriating foreign minors and carrying out judicial sentences relating to deportation.

In addition, 130 police officers will be dispatched to internment centres for irregular migrants, 50 at the port of Algeciras, where those originating from Sub-Saharan countries who have entered Spain from Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands are collected together.

**A strong connection between migration and terrorism**

This connection was first linked to the terrorist attacks against the USA (New York, Washington, 11 September 2001), Morocco (Casablanca, 16 May 2003) and Spain (Madrid, 11 March 2004). As a matter of fact, migration in general, and between Africa and the European Union in particular, has taken a turn that is far more harmful, having been made subject to a much more political and security-related approach since 2001. Controls against migrants have implicitly become controls against terrorists as well, especially given that almost all those involved in the attacks against the United States and Spain were of foreign origin. It is therefore also necessary to understand the interventions of the Algerian security forces, supported by American logistics, on Algeria’s southern borders and between it and Morocco.\textsuperscript{17}

**An increase in risks**

- Migration is now carried out essentially through human traffickers, who are more and more determined. They appear to have raised the price they demand from migrants and to want to take fewer risks themselves. This is how we must understand them leaving migrants alone in the boats they supply them with and that they take a lot of time to prepare the ‘crossings’. For example, preparation for an attempted shipment, which ended tragically at the beginning of October 2004 on the Tunisian coast (see below), started as early as May 2004 in Morocco.
- The cost in human lives is also becoming higher in the Canary Islands (32 drowned on 12 August 2004, from a boat carrying 41 people; 7 drowned on 12 [\textsuperscript{16} Specified to the French press agency, Agence France Presse, by a spokesperson of the Spanish police force. AFP, November 5th 2004.]
[\textsuperscript{17} At the beginning of November 2004, Morocco was informed by the Algerian authorities of troop movements on its border in order to deal with the different movements that were taking place there, and especially to reduce the flows of migration between the two countries. Assahifa (Casablanca), 17 November 2004.]

**An increasing shift from bilateralism to multilateralism**

The trend nowadays, as well as since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, is that no aspect regarding migration should any longer be dealt with bilaterally between a country of the EU and another country. This was confirmed by the adoption of the Hague Programme in November 2004. At the same time, some new European initiatives have been launched, including one to set up transit centres, selection camps or reception gates in the transit countries, outside European territory.

In reality, there has been a passage from the concept of a ‘single border’ to be established by transit or departure countries (and based on a flexible approach to the Maghrebian borders), to one involving transit centres (concentration centres, information gates etc.).

For the Maghrebian countries, depending on different demands of the EU, the ‘single border approach’ consisted in:

- Better control and reduction of the exits from their territories towards the north
- Attempts to keep as many irregular Sub-Saharan migrants as possible on their territories
- Better control and reduction of people entering through their southern borders

From there, for part of public opinion in the Maghreb, the impression is being formed of the creation of the Maghreb as a kind of enclave on the human level, together with the idea of the creation of reception centres on its southern borders. This idea dates back to June 2003, at the Thessalonica summit, where the EU Council postponed, without rejecting it explicitly, a British proposal to establish centres for the treatment of asylum applications outside Europe’s borders. Today, the project of ‘externalising’ European asylum procedures seems to be making a strong comeback, with the joint German-Italian initiative published in August 2004. Using the term ‘immigration gates’, the idea is for the German and Italian Ministers of the Interior to create a ‘European institution’ in charge of selecting asylum-seekers and migrants in camps situated outside the borders of the Union.
Supported once again by Germany and Italy, for example during the meeting of EU Interior Ministers in Florence on 25 October 2004, this policy was rejected by the Spanish and French, as also by the Libyans, Tunisians, Algerians and then Moroccans (in a declaration by the Moroccan Minister of the Interior before Parliament on 14 December 2004).\textsuperscript{18} For the French Minister of Foreign Affairs especially, France is opposed to the idea of establishing such centres outside the European Union because it would ‘create a kind of first filtering out of candidates for immigration and asylum’.\textsuperscript{19} The fact is that, as well as encouraging irregular migration, to concentrate flows of irregular immigration in places without any capacity to receive all of them and to encourage criminal networks, who would make even more profits from trafficking people in precarious situations, the proposal to establish these centres seems to raise more questions than it is able to answer, among others:

- Who would manage them?
- Who would finance them, and how?
- How would migrants be transported there?
- What legal system would apply?
- How would ‘selection’ be carried out?
- What would be done with migrants who have not been selected?
- How long should they stay there?
- What would be done with migrants who do not go through these camps?

\textsuperscript{18} On 14 December 2004, the Moroccan Minister of the Interior stated his government’s opposition to the idea of creating, in the Maghreb, centres hold illegal migrants originating from Sub-Saharan countries who are attempting to reach Europe. ‘Morocco is not convinced of the creation of these centres in the countries of the Maghreb’ as suggested by certain European countries, said the Minister, answering a question in the Moroccan parliament. ‘The approach has to be economic, in the framework of a partnership with the Sub-Saharan countries’, he added incidentally. Dispatch from Agence France Presse (French press agency), 14 December 2004.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE, AND HOW?

All the quantitative and qualitative developments that have been presented above show very clearly that, in order to reduce the scope of the migration phenomenon in the medium and long terms and to limit, in the short term, all sorts of negative consequences that both the sending and the receiving countries and the migrants themselves have to be subjected to through the migratory process, any credible intervention must be built around a combination of elements – involving security, of course, but also economic and social elements – and must first be carried out in the countries of departure.

Moreover, in order to obtain concrete results in the field in terms of poverty reduction, increasing employment, increasing the level of education among the population, improving living conditions, and ensuring security and stability, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership needs to be strengthened and a common approach needs to be developed that is more dynamic and voluntary between African regional groups, the European Union, Japan, the United States of America, the organisations of the United Nations specialising in development and international financial organisations, among others the IMF and the World Bank. More specifically, this approach should be led by those groups that are most directly affected by the migration and by problems of development in Africa at the present time, namely the European Union and the Maghreb countries as politico-economic groups, as well as the Sub-Saharan sending countries as a whole.

The problems we are faced with and the populations affected at present and in the years to come are such that a Euro-African Conference20 is required to discuss the basis for a framework of multilateral dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and the Maghreb countries and the main sending countries for irregular migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. This conference should aim at the creation of a ‘political and security partnership’, on the example of what was agreed in 1995 between the European Union and the countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean, to tackle, in the short and medium terms, the flow of irregular migration, but most of all to address the long-term issues involved in establishing an ‘economic and development partnership’, this being the only way to reduce migratory pressures in a continent that will soon have more than a billion inhabitants. Given the urgency of the problems posed by irregular migration at the moment and the size

---

20 Like the Euro-Mediterranean Barcelona Conference, held on November 27th et 28th 1995.
MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

they may reach in years to come, this Euro-African partnership must be based on a combination of a strong political will and a real economic commitment in order to fight poverty and ensure development in the least affluent regions of Sub-Saharan Africa.

More specifically, the creation of jobs in the Maghreb would significantly reduce migratory pressures from this region. This would lead, in particular, to a reduction in the flows of irregular migration, which would similarly reduce the presence of irregular networks organising this migration and allow for the disappearance of this element of unemployment, which represents an important push factor in irregular migration from Sub-Saharan Africa. The reduction in the numbers of irregular and legal migrants from the different countries of the Maghreb, as realised progressively since the beginning of the 1980s for countries like Portugal and Spain and since the mid-1970s for Italy – which only started really to develop thanks to their integration into Europe and the resources they received from it to develop the most backward regions of their countries – will subsequently enable more space to be ‘liberated’ for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in the different European countries that they are trying to reach.

However, in order to be initiated and to last, these policies need the support and backing of the rich countries, especially in the European Union, as much as they need to be initiated in the main Sub-Saharan departure zones of the irregular migrants.

For this purpose, it is useful to list possible ways of creating productive activities that are generative of jobs and wealth, to emerge particularly through:

- A very precise targeting of the zones in which intervention is possible with a maximum of effectiveness.
- Preferred recourse to a decentralised form of cooperation, which means a preference, in the different interventions, for local collectivities dependent as much on modern organisations as on traditional communities, which are less likely to be questioned regarding the absence of democracy or corruption, for example.
- Appropriate recourse to development NGOs, which have proved to be reliable in both donating and beneficiary countries.
- A concerted but very precise choice of projects, according to the different local situations and the means available.
- An appropriate follow-up of the different parties intervening in any project of training and awareness-raising activities, regarding the donors and providers of services, as well as the beneficiaries.
• The targeting of each project on a well-defined region, while trying to concentrate its impacts on a particular community, in order for its initial results to reach a critical point to serve as a reference point in repeating the project in an adjacent geographical area by creating step-by-step propagation and emulation effects.

• Considering training as one of the bases for the success of any project, by accompanying any development activity with the effort to achieve a basic elimination of illiteracy and to provide learning for the different trades and professions that it requires.

• The targeting of women and young people, those who have the greater tendency to emigrate, in any implemented action.

• Harmonising, in their regions of intervention, the activities of the different development agencies depending on the UN, in order to evaluate effectiveness and impacts on the populations concerned. Interventions that are geographically isolated and unidimensional have no practical impacts.
Undocumented Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco

MICHAEL COLLYER
University of Sussex

INTRODUCTION

At the entrance to Tangier medina, there is always a small gathering of dishevelled adolescent boys, anywhere from 16 to 25 years old. One of them, obviously unaccustomed to begging, will occasionally mumble a request for a few coins, and sympathetic passers-by will hand them a dirham or two or buy them some bread from a nearby cafe. They are not Tangerois but migrants from elsewhere in Morocco, mainly rural areas, attracted to the port in the hope of bettering their lives. The ultimate goal for these boys is to reach Europe: beyond that few of them have any idea what they will find, except rumours of well-paid work, and they have no contacts apart from a few mobile telephone numbers of friends or acquaintances who have already gone. Yet the chances of raising the cash required to pay for a passage to Spain through begging and the odd bits of work are extremely slim. Shipwrecked within sight of the Spanish mainland, but before they have even set foot in a boat, they are happy if they are able to satisfy their hunger for the day.

These boys are now usually the only regularly visible indication of this desire to reach Europe, but on occasions, further into the medina, small numbers of sub-Saharan African women also ask one for change. Their presence is far more noticeable and has raised considerably more interest from policy-makers, journalists and academics. These women always work in pairs, but by 2004 it was rare to see more than two or three such pairs at any one time. This marks a significant change from the situation in Tangier a few years previously, where the presence of sub-Saharan African migrants was highly visible throughout the medina, where the cheaper accommodation is located. In 2002, St Andrews, the Anglophone Anglican church just outside the medina, was receiving 300 or more Anglophone worshippers from sub-Saharan Africa every Sunday, far outnumbering the five to ten regular European churchgoers. By early 2004 the small number of Europeans in the church were again outnumbering the sub-Saharan Africans on a weekly basis.
The fall in the visible presence of sub-Saharan Africans in Tangier from 2002 onwards coincided with unprecedented efforts by the Moroccan police and security officials to prevent undocumented migration into and out of Morocco. Four broad strategies of enforcement can be identified: the prevention of undocumented immigration, particularly on the Algeria-Morocco border; the prevention of undocumented emigration, particularly on the Mediterranean and north Atlantic coasts; verification of the residence status of immigrants in immigrant neighbourhoods; and regular deportations, including deportations direct to the country of origin in the case of recent mass expulsions of undocumented Nigerian migrants. While these strategies have forced a change in the behaviour of undocumented sub-Saharan migrants entering Morocco, they have obviously not affected the underlying reasons why people wish to migrate from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. They are therefore thought to have had a relatively limited effect on the numbers of such migrants in Morocco, who have now simply moved away from certain town centres. This is particularly true of towns near the Mediterranean, such as Tangier or Nador, where there are now significant settlements of such migrants in forests on the outskirts of towns.

The growing significance of transit migration by non-Moroccans through Morocco has received considerable media coverage both in that country and throughout Europe and is occupying increasing amounts of the time of politicians, policy-makers and law-enforcement personnel. Research work in the area is much more limited, and although several small projects have been undertaken, only one has been published, by the ILO (Barros et al. 2002). Research in this area presents a number of specific difficulties, particularly gaining access to and the trust of the migrants in a climate where they have good reasons to be suspicious of everyone.

The study presented here was carried out between January and October 2004 and is based on 42 long, qualitative interviews with undocumented sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco and a further eighteen interviews with key informants in various positions. Many of the migrant interviews were based on multiple meetings and were often undertaken in the migrants’ own homes and neighbourhoods. Migrants were contacted initially through associations or churches or approached in the street, with some further introductions through migrants’ networks. This has become a common method for reaching undocumented migrants (Bloch 1999), but it has the disadvantage that, since it cannot produce a random sample, it cannot be taken as representative of undocumented migrants resident in Morocco more generally. Of the sixty interviews that were carried out, forty were conducted in Rabat, fourteen in Tangier and six in Casablanca. Where possible the interviews were recorded, but the majority of migrants were not happy with this, so hand-written notes were taken. All inter-
views were carried out on the condition of absolute anonymity. This study represents one of the first attempts to establish the impact of the significant new Moroccan law of November 20031 on the movement of undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter falls into five sections, presenting the ethnographic material in chronological order of the migrants’ experiences.

LIFE BEFORE MIGRATION

The migrants interviewed came from eleven different sub-Saharan African countries (Table 1). This variety of national origins was also found in Lahlou and Escoffier’s study carried out in 2000 (Barros et al. 2002), although a much larger proportion of their sample (50%) was Nigerian. These nationalities are reported by the migrants themselves and no proof of nationality was requested, so they are not absolutely reliable. Having said this, the incentives for misreporting had changed considerably in the four years that had elapsed since the previous study. Given that the situation in Sierra Leone had stabilised considerably, there was no longer any perceived advantage for Nigerians to claim to be Sierra Leonean in the belief that they may have a greater chance of receiving asylum. It was also widely believed that UNHCR in Morocco was recognising far fewer individuals than in previous years, so claiming to be persecuted offered few advantages. One Nigerian I spoke to initially claimed to be from Côte d’Ivoire as he spoke French very well, but he soon changed his story when he realised that I spoke English and explained that he had lived there for a number of years. Other than that there is no reason to believe that these figures are not a reasonably accurate reflection of reality.

Although the national origins of the migrants who were interviewed was extremely diverse, there is none the less a range of common characteristics shared by many. This research supports the widely held view that it is not the very poor who migrate. The financial resources required for undocumented migration are many times those needed for regular migration. Twelve of the 42 migrants had previously visited Morocco, and two had visited Europe, but they had been unable to secure a visa for legal travel on this particular occasion due to evolving requirements for entry into Europe and, significantly, Morocco. This previous history of international movement clearly places these individuals in a very small, privileged minority in the West African con-

---

1 Loi no. 02.03 relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du Maroc, à l’émigration et l’immigration irrégulières.
Similarly, a majority (29) reported having family members already resident in Europe, indicating access to greater resources than those with no such relatives.

Table 1: National origin of migrants interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Kinshasa)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to these general indicators of privilege, only five of the 42 migrants reported that they had employment at the time they left. However, in most cases individuals had been employed previously and lost their jobs due to some financial or political disruption that provides an indication of the causes of movement. While in some cases this change of circumstances directly precipitated their departure, in others several years elapsed between a loss of significant revenue and the decision to leave. However, the need to make do with considerably less than they had become used to was a factor reported by a majority. In most cases the loss of revenue had primarily economic causes but was also provoked by the volatility of the political climate. Amadou, from Sierra Leone, described the small business which he owned, employing eight people, and the circumstances of the conflict in Sierra Leone, which forced him to close his business. As a result, he found himself unable to feed his family or send his children to school. He described his decision to leave as follows:

It’s not just bullets and bombs that make you flee. There are other reasons that can make you go even further. If you’re just fleeing bullets, you just have to leave for a while, until things have calm down, then you can come back. If it’s poverty that’s chasing you, it’s like you’ve got fire behind you, and you just keep going.
The comparison suggests that Amadou is familiar with situations of violence, although he freely admitted that he was not leaving out of fear for his physical safety and justified his need to get further than simply out of harm’s way. In a relatively small number of cases, individuals had been personally threatened by the political institutions of their home country. Ali had been a local politician in Chad; after his home was raided, he left for Morocco.

Once I arrived here I received a message that I should not return. They said that I would be killed before I even left the airport.

Ali had made the mistake of expressing his interest in higher political office, a fact he uses to explain the persecution that he faced. Reports of directed, individual persecution of this type were relatively rare among the migrants interviewed. In general the origins of migration can be traced to some traumatic event compounded by pre-existing circumstances, but these typically reflected a more complex mix of political, economic and social disturbances and could only very rarely (as in the case of Ali) be clearly attributed to a single cause. Individuals had to possess both the means and the desire to leave. Most commonly this combination of factors was found either in individuals who had possessed political power or financial wealth, which they had lost in events relating to the political instability of their countries of origin or, in some cases, in children of relatively wealthy individuals, who saw no prospects of making progress with their lives in their home societies.

THE JOURNEY

A significant minority of migrants had entered Morocco legally, most often as students, then simply overstayed their visas and so become undocumented. Some research in Europe suggests that this is the most common way for individuals to become illegally resident (Black et al. 2005). Of the 42 migrants considered here, eleven had overstayed visas. They had all come to Morocco by air and passed through immigration control without problems. The other 31 had travelled overland from their country of origin and entered Morocco clandestinely. This group had all entered Morocco from Algeria rather than across the southern border from Mauritania. Two migrants reported that they knew of individuals who had come directly from Mauritania, but this clearly remains a less popular route. This is unsurprising, given the significant military presence in Morocco’s southern provinces and the sparse habitation. Gao in Mali, Agadès in Niger and Tamanrasset in Algeria are all significant staging posts along this route, where migrants gather together to pre-
pare for the following stage. Two migrants reported much longer journeys; one Nigerian had travelled to Cairo before doubling back to return to Morocco, while one young man from Congo (Kinshasa) had reached Tunisia, where he found the conditions to cross to Europe particularly difficult and heard that it was easier to enter Ceuta, so he travelled on to Morocco from Tunis.

Migrants reported taking as long as three years to reach Morocco from their point of origin, though this included periods of up to several months working in particular locations en route. The most difficult leg of the journey, the crossing of the desert, took anywhere from four to twelve days. All migrants emphasised the extreme difficulty of this crossing. One woman from Congo (Kinshasa) recalled:

In the desert, sometimes you pass groups of dead bodies. There must be people in Africa who think that they have a relative in Europe when, in fact, they are dead in the desert. They think ‘my cousin or uncle left five years ago for Europe and they haven’t been in touch but one day they’ll come back’, when in fact they died on the way.

A migrant from Côte d’Ivoire captured the potential horror of this crossing:

When you find yourself in the desert, and the truck is lost on the crossing, if it’s been ten days that you’ve been there and water is totally finished, those who still have a bit of food will exchange their food with those who can still urinate. So, if you can manage to urinate that’s already good [...] because there’s the other guy there who’s still got some food, but he hasn’t had anything to drink for three days and if you give him some of your urine, he’ll give you some food.

Very little is known about these crossings. No systematic research has been undertaken, and we have no more to go on than these admittedly anecdotal accounts. Occasionally reports surface in newspapers of migrant deaths in the desert, but these events are only reported if a large number of people have lost their lives, so they offer only a poor indication of the reality of the dangers. The dangers of crossing the Mediterranean are now widely appreciated, in part due to the frequency of reports of migrants who have drowned attempting it, but the dangers of becoming lost on the desert leg of the journey are at least as extreme and much less widely understood.

Given the difficulty that the desert crossing presents, it is hardly surprising that all the migrants who were interviewed reported paying for assistance on certain legs of
the journey. Without exception, this assistance was small in scale and local in nature and did not reflect the image of large-scale trafficking operations that are often cited by policy-makers in this area. Migrants paid for help in crossing a particular border. Often, the individuals whom they paid were also migrants seeking to make their way to Europe but with some experience of the particular leg of the journey, as they had made it before (some individuals repeated earlier routes following their deportations) or were making the most of an opportunity to make some money to pay for their onward journey. In some cases this payment was virtually institutionalised. A migrant from Nigeria explained the system that operates in the forest outside Maghnia, on the Algeria-Morocco border, which has become an obligatory stop-over for migrants on this route:

Each nationality has its own area to put up their shelters. They say ‘That’s the Nigerians’ camp, that’s the Ghanaians’ camp, that’s the camp for the Senegalese...’, and each camp has its own governor. They have a full government, there’s a prime minister, a finances minister ... that’s what they call them. Every three months the government will leave, and before they go they will designate the next government. They collect money from people coming in and, when they have enough, they leave for Europe.

Other payments may be much more haphazard, even those that are organised internationally. A Ghanaian migrant explained the procedure he had used to get from Maghnia into Morocco:

It was organised by a migrant who was in Spain. I had to ask my parents [in Ghana] to pay €200 into his bank account. When he saw that the money had arrived, he phoned his friends in Algeria and they showed me how to get across the border.

On the rare occasions when migrants reported paying for several stages in advance, this was not successful. Peter, from Côte d’Ivoire, said:

People say that you can get from Bamako to Algiers for 80,000 CFA [about €1,200] and you pay that and there’s a guide to accompany you until you leave Gao and pass you on to the person who will take you across the desert, but we were leaving Gao, and there’s just the desert in front of you, and we were stopped by the Malian police. They say ‘OK, all of you who are Malian over here, and the rest over there’. And then ‘Those who are Malian and have a passport pay 5,000 [CFA, €80]; Malians without a
passport pay 10,000 [€160]. Those who aren’t Malian but who have a passport pay 25,000 [€400-480]. I’d managed to buy a Malian identity card earlier, so I discussed it a bit with them and I paid 20,000, but I’d paid 20,000 for the card.

Peter’s plans for travel all the way to Algiers fell through at this stage, and he had to make further arrangements from this point onwards.

Given the unpredictability of each stage of the route and the difficulty of arranging more than one stage in advance, the costs of the journey can quickly spiral out of control. The total cost of the route varied widely and depended as much on individuals’ ability to speak the local language, or at least both French and English, so that they could negotiate with the various officials that they encountered, as on any other factor, such as national origin. Only fifteen people of the 31 who had taken this route were able or prepared to estimate the total amount that they had paid. These sums varied from €2,000 to more than €7,000, but it was frequently very difficult for migrants to estimate. Adrissa from Senegal described the financial arrangements for his whole trip to Rabat:

“It’s a fortune! A real fortune. I left with 350,000 CFA [€5,200]. Then my parents sent me another 100,000 CFA [€1,500] in Tamanrasset, then €200 to get out of Maghnia … not counting all the money that I earned … not counting the money at … Nador, up there, at the fence … not counting what it cost me to get here [Rabat] … a real fortune.”

Sam, a young Nigerian, had fared considerably better:

Sam: 2,500 in total. And that’s good, there are people I know who’ve paid €4,500 or €5,000 and are still in Algeria.

MC: And if you’d known that it would cost €2,500? If someone had given you €2,500 in Nigeria, what would you have done?

Sam: Honestly? … Honestly … if someone had put €2,500 in my hands in Nigeria I wouldn’t have left … but of course you never know that it will be that much. I could never have got hold of €2,500 all in one go in Nigeria, but it’s €300 here and €250 there. And it’s cost you €1,500 to get to Algiers and you think, ‘If I go back now, that will be wasted’. But no, if I’d have known I’d have stayed.
Regrets at the spiralling costs were frequently expressed, especially since none of the migrants interviewed had yet reached their final goal, and some of them had been in Morocco for longer than a year.

**RESIDENCE IN MOROCCO**

Conditions in different parts of the country vary very considerably for undocumented migrants. In the last few years, Moroccan police activity has been concentrated in the most obvious locations for emigration to Europe, particularly Tangier, Tetouan and Nador. Continued and regular ‘round-ups’ of undocumented migrants have forced them to retreat to makeshift encampments in rural areas outside of the towns. Conditions in these encampments are extremely primitive. Alain, from Congo (Brazzaville), explained the living conditions in the camp outside Nador:

Alain: There’s nothing like cabins or houses, it’s just tarpaulins. You string up your tarpaulin, then you put rocks up the hill a little way and build a platform of rocks to put your mattress on – that way, when it rains it reduces the amount of water coming through.

MC: And what do you eat when you’re there, in the forest

Alain: [...] There’s a large skip that people there refer to as the ‘world market’. It’s where a lot of the food is dumped from the boats or the planes that come through there. Everyone knows when there’s been a new dump there and they run to get there first, to look through and find stuff to eat.

The population of these encampments fluctuates but may be as high as several hundred at various times of the year. There are obviously no sources of income in these areas, and the conditions here are often the most desperate that they have faced. Many people have no money left, nor any prospect of getting any, and therefore no possibility of either moving on or returning. Trapped for months at a time in appalling living conditions with inadequate food supplies their health is bound to deteriorate, and public-health concerns were widely expressed by NGO workers in Tangier who were in contact with these individuals.

Migrants generally had a pragmatic attitude to the treatment they received from the Moroccan authorities. Mistreatment at the hands of the police was fairly widely reported, but it was seen as an understandable response on the part of the police and
was generally interpreted as simply another hazard of the journey; like the weather or the physical environment, it was something to be avoided or endured. Real hostility was saved for co-nationals who mistreated them, since this was seen as far less excusable. Several migrants had visited their embassies to ask for assistance and were extremely disappointed by the response they received. Peter described a visit to the Côte d’Ivoire embassy:

I went to ask them for a consular card, since I had lost my passport in the desert. I explained everything, I didn’t hide a thing, but they refused, they wouldn’t help me. If our own countries can’t cover us when we are outside the country, that’s the first problem.

Apart from the consular officials, who (for perhaps understandable reasons) typically do not offer assistance, other migrants reported actual mistreatment at the hands of other migrants. This was particularly widely reported by the Nigerians. Thomas, from the south of Nigeria, described the treatment he received from a group of fellow Nigerians on arrival in Rabat:

They came to where I was living and took me, by force, to their apartment. There they shut me in a small cupboard, small like this [he mimes crouching down] and they told me to give them all the money I had. Luckily my uncle lived in Rabat and he was able to free me, but sometimes I have heard of people kept like that for three days, until they agree to hand over all of their money.

This abuse of Nigerians by other Nigerians is apparently carried out by well-organised gangs. Thomas also reported that, when migrants are caught by the police and driven back to the Algerian border to be deported, this gang will contact friends in Oujda, who will stop the migrants after they have been left by the police and again threaten them to extort any money they have left. This practice of preying on co-national migrants when they are most vulnerable was widely reported and universally condemned by everyone I spoke to.

There is, of course, a significant population of sub-Saharan Africans legally resident in Morocco. Most Moroccan universities have a significant population of sub-Saharan African students, some of whom are funded by the Moroccan government. Morocco is also a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the OAU’s 1969 supplementary definition of refugees. UNHCR operates in Morocco as a first port of call for individuals who wish to claim protection in the
country. The UNHCR office in Casablanca interviews asylum-seekers and advises an office in the Moroccan Ministry for Foreign Affairs about those individuals it considers to be refugees. The Moroccan government then interviews them, and if the government also deems them to be in need of protection, they will be issued with Moroccan residence papers. Neither UNHCR in Casablanca nor the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs are willing to issue up-to-date statistics on the numbers of individuals currently recognised as refugees. From 1991 to 2001, UNHCR in Casablanca considered just over 2,000 individuals to be in need of protection, but it is thought that only a tiny percentage of these people have been issued with residence papers by the Moroccan government. Two of the people I spoke to were in this situation of limbo, having been recognised as refugees by UNHCR, but still lacking any official Moroccan residence papers. It was widely reported that UNHCR was no longer recognising individuals as refugees. Local NGOs and church-workers supported the view that, since 2001, far fewer individuals have been recognised, though UNHCR were not prepared to confirm this. UNHCR’s operation in Morocco differs from its operations in sub-Saharan Africa and other countries in North Africa, such as the Cairo office, which works closely with the Australian, Canadian and US embassies to resettle refugees recognised under the 1951 Convention.

In contrast to individuals living in the makeshift camps in the north, undocumented migrants resident in the towns further south, particularly Rabat and Casablanca, are a less obvious target for police enforcement measures. However, round-ups in neighbourhoods in these towns with a very high concentration of sub-Saharan Africans are becoming increasingly common, and migrants reported increasing concerns about venturing out into the streets, preferring to remain in the relative safety of their apartments. Despite this, these towns still offer much greater security than the makeshift encampments further north. The cities also provide opportunities to make money through either work or begging. Work is nonetheless difficult to come by for them, and they were generally pragmatic about their chances. A young man from Sierra Leone, who had lived in Morocco as a student for several years before his visa ran out and he decided to stay on, explained that:

Here, even some Moroccans find it hard to find work, so what chance is there for us? There are even Moroccans who do not have enough to eat, who are hungry and cannot live as they would wish, so how much less chance do we have, as outsiders, of finding this?

A widely cited article in Jeune Afrique in 2004 explored the experiences of racism of sub-Saharan Africans in Moroccan society, and all migrants interviewed could report
experiences of racial abuse that they had received in Morocco. However, these were viewed in much the same way as the treatment received from the police, and very little bitterness was expressed over this. In contrast, many migrants, particularly those who relied on begging, were keen to emphasise the generosity of the Moroccans they encountered. None of them was happy to be begging. Peter from Côte d’Ivoire explained:

I thought, ‘Here I am, I used to own a small business, and now I’m forced to beg on the streets’. It was a real fall, and I understood how low I had come, but if you don’t beg you don’t eat, it’s as simple as that.

Many people recounted experiences of begging. Sam from Nigeria described begging in the wealthy suburb of Agdal, in Rabat:

When I can, I go to Agdal. There’s one man there, whenever he sees you he will give you fifty Dirhams [€5]. Once he stopped his car when he saw me and he got out and gave me the money.

On average, migrants reported that they were able to make twenty Dirhams (€2) a day through begging or other activities in the larger towns. Although I heard reports of ten or fifteen migrants living in one room, none of the people I visited were sharing the rooms they were renting with more than two others, and they typically paid 400-600 Dirhams (€40-60) a month in rent. Given extra expenditure for food and occasional communication with one’s family back home or in Europe, it is clear that it is virtually impossible to save any money in this situation, at most only a few euros a month. In October 2004 the lowest figure I was quoted for a passage to Europe was €600, and this was for the most dangerous crossing, by boat to the Canary Islands. The economics of the situation are clear. Those who have exhausted all their funds and all possibility of external assistance can just about manage to survive in Morocco, but they are extremely unlikely to be able to save up the money required to reach Europe. Given the difficulty of keeping money safe and the ever-present danger of extortion by gangs, reaching even the lowest target is virtually impossible, making the difficulty of their situation very clear. This situation has become apparent to many individuals. Although only five of the 42 individuals I spoke to said that they would be happy to return if they were offered a flight back to their country of origin, many more said that they knew of many people who now only wished to return home.
DEPORTATIONS

It is very rare for individuals to be deported directly from Morocco to their country of origin. This presents considerable practical difficulties, since many undocumented migrants in Morocco have either genuinely lost or deliberately destroyed their papers, which are the only evidence of their nationality that will be accepted by their home governments. Paying for return flights for the thousands of undocumented migrants in Morocco would be extremely costly, and in any case it is seen as removing an important deterrent to undocumented migration in the first place, the risk of migration being reduced considerably if return home is always possible. It seems likely that the majority of migrants would not wish to return home, and this is certainly the case among those I spoke to. Given that it has often cost them many thousands of euros to get to Morocco, to return home with nothing is clearly not an attractive option. Typically, only migrants who arrived by air and are not admitted at Casablanca are deported by air. This was the experience of two migrants I interviewed. Both set about preparing to try again overland as soon as they were returned home.

Those migrants who are caught in Morocco without papers are deported no farther than the Algerian border. Migrants who are suspected of arranging or assisting with transport for others (often called ‘connection men’) are usually imprisoned for a period of up to six months, but all other migrants are deported without serving a custodial sentence. These deportations are occurring with increasing regularity. In the first week of October 2004, after a series of large-scale ‘round-ups’ around the country, over six hundred undocumented migrants were driven to the border. Some migrants have been put through such deportations more than once. Sam, the Nigerian, reported that an acquaintance of his had been deported no less than seven times, on each occasion being able to evade the Algerian authorities and return to Morocco. Others are less fortunate. Those who are caught by the Algerian authorities are deported again, this time to the southern border. Unfortunately, given the tremendous distances and inhospitable terrain in southern Algeria, migrants are rarely taken right up to the border, but dumped in the last town on the Algerian side. This happened to Peter from Cote d’Ivoire:

The Algerian police do not take you to the border. They leave you in Sibrit, hundreds of kilometres before you get to the border. Even the inhabitants there have to get water from a nearby town. If someone gives you water one day, they certainly won’t do the next. I don’t know how many people have died there, but there are huge cemeteries that stretch
into the desert. [...] If they are going to deport people, they should at least do it correctly. They should take people to a place where they can get by ... perhaps in Mali, or Niger ... that’s all ... that’s all they need to change.

Sibrit is just over three hundred kilometres from the Algeria-Mali border. Beyond Sibrit the road is not paved, and the track is not passable all year round. Peter was fortunate in that he was able to return to Tamanrasset and receive some money there in order to be able to move on. He managed to return to Morocco, and I spoke to him in Rabat.

In January 2004 this policy of deportation changed, as a number of direct flights to Nigeria were laid on. A total of ten flights were initially programmed, and by October six had already been carried out, leaving from different airports around Morocco. Officially these flights were all paid for by the Nigerian government and were intended to allow the voluntary repatriation of Nigerians. Unofficially, many NGO workers were highly sceptical that the Nigerian government had financed the flights of its own free will and assumed that the European Union had brokered and perhaps helped fund the arrangement. There is, of course, no evidence to suggest this, and all official sources repeated the official explanation. Migrants who had witnessed these operations were highly critical of the procedures, and some reported that they knew people who were certainly not Nigerians but who were taken anyway, suggesting that many people did not board the planes voluntarily. Given how common it is for undocumented migrants to lack any proof of their nationality, it would not be surprising if some non-Nigerians were included on the flights, though if the operation was genuinely voluntary this would not have been an issue. This is purely a police operation, like any other deportation, so there is no independent verification of the voluntary nature of the boarding process. Given the severity of these accusations, however, they should be taken seriously. It seems likely that such operations will continue, as they represent one of the few solutions to the blockage in the migration process that is increasing the undocumented population of Morocco, given the extreme difficulties of migrants moving on elsewhere, or even of returning home.
MOVING ONWARDS

Without exception, the objective of all the migrants interviewed was to reach Europe. Some of them had no preference for a particular European country, simply anywhere in Europe. Others had family in certain European countries and clearly hoped to reach them. To a certain extent, where the family was, was influenced by language and therefore former colonial relationships. This was certainly the case where family members had been resident in Europe for some time. Two migrants from Côte d'Ivoire said they had family members resident in France and that they wished to reach France in order to stay with them, and one of the Ghanaian migrants had family in the UK. However, language was only a limited indication of migrants' ideal destinations. Interestingly, none of the nine Nigerians reported any intention to reach the UK; Italy was perceived as a far more attractive destination. Similarly, all three Senegalese migrants cited Spain as their destination of first choice, and none of them had any family in France. Gradually migration networks are breaking away from former colonial ties, which are ceasing to be major predictors of intended destination.

The difficulties of this final stage of their journey into Europe was what kept them in Morocco. When asked what he needed to reach Europe, one Nigerian migrant replied:

Money, it’s only money. Money or papers, but who’s going to give you papers without money? Some people have friends in Europe who will take the risk and send them their papers, then they just get on the boat, no problem, but that’s very rare. No, it’s only money.

Most migrants were well aware of the cost of the various means of reaching Europe and could rattle off a price list. One Nigerian woman explained the full costs:

By air, €3,500, that’s the diplomat’s route; you get the passport and safe passage at the airport. By ferry, €2,200, that’s the normal passenger service. A zodiac across from Tangier is €1,200, entry into Ceuta is the same, then Las Palmas is €800.

These prices were quoted in October 2004, the last price list I received. They should be compared with the cost of a standard single fare on the ferry from Tangier to Algeciras, of €27. The woman who quoted them earned between €2 and €5 a day, begging in Tangier. She needed virtually all of this money to feed herself and her six-
month-old baby. She had lost all her money in crossing the desert and had exhausted the possibility of receiving further funds from her family in Nigeria.

Prices for the crossing to Europe change considerably according to season, demand and the extent of the controls. In the mid-1990s most crossings were made into Ceuta, and the demand for the now famous *pateras* (rickety boats) only grew when the new high-tension fences were built around Ceuta and Melilla in 1999. A fisherman in Tangier who was occasionally employed to assist on boat crossings described these operations:

I would prepare the boats. Some weeks we would leave every night of the week. [...] maybe with 25 people in each boat. They would always leave from a beach, down near Asilah. There would be both Moroccans and [sub-Saharan] Africans in the same boat, but the Moroccans would pay 1,000 Dirhams [€100] and the Africans 1,500 [€150] [...] I don’t work with them any more. Now the police have discovered that launch site, so they can’t use it. Some of them still leave from further south, but that’s too far for me to go.

Now that the monitoring of departures from the Moroccan coast has intensified, the difficulty and therefore the costs of the crossing have increased. According to the Nigerian woman quoted earlier, the prices to cross by zodiac and to get across the fence into Ceuta are once again similar, though both are very much higher than the figures cited a few years earlier, reflecting the increased risks that the smugglers are being forced to take. This increase in cost is obviously passed on to the migrants making the final leg of the journey, which is very much the most expensive one. Nigerian migrants in Tangier commonly refer to the Straits of Gibraltar as ‘the river’, understandably as, on a clear day, the fourteen kilometres across to Tarifa appear no further than the opposite bank of a river – a small step, compared to the thousands of kilometres they have already travelled. The difficulty of this last leg of the journey is frequently misunderstood by family members at home. Sam, the young Nigerian, explained:

Now, every time I speak to my family they say, ‘You’re still there! When are you going to get to Europe?’ They want to know when I’ll be able to pay back the money I owe them. I don’t dare say that I need another €1,000 [...] I work, I try to save money and I’m still here [...] – the struggle continues.
CONCLUSION

This brief chapter has presented a migrant-focused account of trans-Mediterranean migration. Examining the situation from the migrants’ perspective reveals that, so long as the conditions that encourage migration continue to exist, there will continue to be considerable demand. The process of migration can be seen as a series of choices made by migrants themselves within the constraints placed upon them. The information about the nature of these constraints that migrants have access to is rarely accurate and in some cases highly misleading. This is especially true of the more distant stages of the journey, and most of the migrants I interviewed reported that the costs of the entire trip were far more than they had imagined before they left. Those migrants who have access to a continued supply of money, whether from relatives back home or in Europe, can still manage to get through. Other migrants who still have some finances may opt to return to their countries of origin. It is the third group which raises most concern. The spiralling costs of migration mean that a growing number of migrants whose financial resources are exhausted have become stranded at different stages along the way, with little prospect of continuing, but also no hope of returning. These individuals are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by other migrants or by unscrupulous officials and have no option but to live in unsanitary conditions with inadequate food supplies and no health facilities. Any long-term solution to the problems caused by this transit migration, which must be faced by the countries through which they move as well as by the migrants themselves, must take account of the latter’s experiences.

REFERENCES

MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT MIGRATION
Forced Migration, Conflict and Development: Some Policy Issues

NICHOLAS VAN HEAR AND STEPHEN CASTLES
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society; Refugee Studies Centre,
University of Oxford

INTRODUCTION

This briefing discusses current patterns of forced migration in developing countries and examines responses by humanitarian actors, including governments, intergovernmental agencies and NGOs. The main categories covered are refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees. The briefing reviews recent initiatives for improving international responses to forced migration, especially by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Union and governments. The aim is to provide a navigation guide to the policy issues in this complex field. The briefing first outlines the current place of forced migration as a global issue before summarizing recent changes in the policy environment; it then turns to policy issues that have come to the fore in recent years.¹

FORCED MIGRATION AS A GLOBAL ISSUE

Conflict, forced migration and development

Conflict and forced migration mainly arise in situations of underdevelopment and poor governance, although the links between these factors are not straightforward. In their turn, conflict and forced migration are major obstacles to development. Violence and displacement destroy material resources, stifle human potential and force large groups of people into inactivity and dependence. Refugees and internally

¹ This article draws on research for an ongoing study commissioned by the UK Department for International Development: Stephen Castles, Nicholas Van Hear, Christian Wolff and Paul Ryder, Developing DFID’s policy approach to refugees and internally displaced persons, forthcoming 2005.
displaced persons may become a burden to receiving areas, especially if they are not allowed to seek livelihoods or are hindered from working by security checks, pass systems and other constraints. They may even become, or be perceived as, threats to social cohesion and security. Durable solutions, which allow the displaced to return home or become self-reliant in areas of refuge, are therefore crucial to development in many poorer regions of the world. However, sustainable return or local integration may require substantial development inputs. The relationship between conflict, forced migration and development is thus marked by complex chains of cause and effect, which relief and development policies must address.

**Shifts in patterns of forced migration**

The patterns and types of forced migration are constantly shifting. After rising seemingly inexorably for several decades, refugee and asylum-seeker numbers have recently declined. This is partly due to the resolution of some long-running conflicts and subsequent large-scale repatriations, but it is also a result of the success of richer states’ efforts to contain forced migration within countries or regions of origin. The latter trend is arguably reflected in the rise in numbers of IDPs, as refugee numbers have fallen.

This means that the resources and efforts of development agencies have to be balanced among several different kinds of forced migrant populations: for example, among returning refugees to help consolidate peace and stability in countries emerging from violent conflict; among refugees in poor countries of asylum, particularly where their presence has been protracted and when they place strains on host countries and communities; and among IDPs and other war-affected populations in countries embroiled in or emerging from conflict. The latter particularly need attention because there is no international body with a mandate to protect and assist them, and they tend to be poorer than refugees. UNHCR is normally only involved with IDPs if there is a refugee or returnee connection, as when returning refugees are located side by side with IDPs. Development agencies could help in areas where there are no returning refugees and therefore little or no presence by UNHCR or other agencies. The increased complexity of situations of forced migration also makes it important to improve coordination mechanisms between humanitarian agencies at the international and operational levels.

The other major shift in forced migration patterns is the increasing significance of protracted refugee situations, in which large groups of refugees experience long-term exile with no real hope of either repatriation or local integration. Often such cases are eclipsed by more immediate, headline-grabbing emergencies. But confinement in
camps without any chance of self-reliance over many years is a violation of human rights, leads to risks of involvement in criminal bands or extremist activities, and generally undermines development objectives.

THE CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT

The international forced migration regime
The international refugee regime developed in the context of post-1945 displacement and the Cold War. Critics argue that some of the basic assumptions and structures no longer meet current requirements and are in need of reform. Some categories of forced migrant, most notably IDPs, lack adequate legal frameworks and institutional arrangements to provide protection and assistance. Another major problem is coordination of the many organisations involved in complex humanitarian emergencies, where a wide range of actors with differing mandates may be present. The UN has made repeated attempts over the last fifteen years to improve arrangements for IDPs and to achieve better coordination at both HQ and field levels. The key issue in reform of the international forced migration regime is achieving durable solutions to situations of conflict and displacement. These need to be linked to long-term development efforts to improve economic, political and social conditions in conflict areas. At the same time, the protection and assistance of existing forced migrant populations must not be neglected while durable solutions are being sought.

Recent UNHCR initiatives
In a period of rapid change in the characteristics of forced migration and of responses to it, the role of UNHCR is being transformed. The organisation has launched a number of new initiatives in recent years. The Agenda for Protection focuses on measures to improve international protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. Convention Plus aims to develop comprehensive plans of action to respond to mass influxes. The Framework for Durable Solutions is perhaps of greatest interest to development agencies, since it focuses on the targeting of development assistance and is concerned with bridging the relief–development gap. It has three components: Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR), Development through Local Integration (DLI), and Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (‘the 4 Rs’). The Framework for Durable Solutions involves close cooperation with a range of relief and development actors, both intergovernmental and non-governmental. It is based on the principle of leadership and ownership by governments in the regions of origin. The UNHCR initiatives represent constructive ideas for addressing key problems. However, it is important to learn from the experience
of past efforts in this area, which have not been very successful. It is also important to engage forced migrants themselves in seeking solutions.

**The EU and forced migration**

Developments at the EU level concerning forced migration present a mixed picture. Some policy initiatives seem to be driven by political pressures to prevent secondary migration to Europe, while other initiatives seek to build partnerships with poor countries in order to alleviate pressures on conflict regions. This ambivalence is seen in the work of the High Level Working Group (HLWG), the EU policy of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), the AENEAS programme and the proposed EU Resettlement and Regional Protection programmes. Recent signs of greater understanding between the Justice and Home Affairs, External Relations and Development Directorates-General, seen in the AENEAS programme and in calls for better cooperation with states of origin, appear positive. But the volatility of this area is underlined by the recent resurgence of ideas about asylum processing outside the EU. The potential should be explored for the EU’s High Level Working Group (HLWG) to become a more transparent mechanism focused less on migration control and more on addressing root causes. EU ideas for Resettlement Programmes and Regional Protection Programmes have some potential from a development perspective. As the work programme for these linked proposals is currently being drawn up, development agencies could usefully help to influence this process in development-friendly directions. Development agencies could also draw on their relations with non-governmental organizations to encourage and support European NGOs to form partnerships with counterparts in regions of refugee origin.

**States and forced migration**

Addressing issues raised by forced migration has become an important area of government policy among developed countries, and increasingly among developing countries. A key motivation in several recent initiatives has been the desire to reduce secondary flows of refugees to developed countries. However, there is increasing awareness that border control is insufficient and that the root causes of conflict and displacement need to be addressed. This underlines the need for whole-of-government approaches, embracing all departments that are directly or indirectly concerned with forced migration issues. Government policy also needs to be based on multilateral approaches with other states – including those in regions of origin – the UNHCR and other international agencies, and the EU. Perhaps the most immediate issue for development agencies concerns the effective targeting of development assistance in situations of return, as well as in refugee-hosting countries. Development agencies should identify areas for interventions which are both consis-
tent with poverty reduction and supportive of agencies and countries that deal with forced migration.

POLICY ISSUES

The continuing need for protection
The most immediate need for refugees and IDPs is for protection against violence and persecution. The dangers of violence and human rights violations exist not only in the early stages of forced migration emergencies, but also often in long-term camp situations and situations of repatriation and local integration. The primary purpose of the UN Refugee Convention is the protection of refugees, and the principle of non-refoulement remains crucial to this. Similarly, the Guiding Principles on IDPs stress the need for legal and physical protection. Initiatives linking relief and development must always remain conscious of the key role of protection. It is also important to recognize that much protection work is done by NGOs and civil society organizations. While it is invidious to single out particular groups – and bearing in mind that gender policies and practices should be mainstreamed – development agencies should give special attention to supporting people whose rights and needs may be particularly adversely affected in situations of conflict and displacement, especially women, children and the elderly.

Societies in transition
Much energy has been expended on efforts to address the gap between relief and development over the last decade or more. In particular, there has been much debate about when UNHCR involvement should end, or when refugee issues become development issues. UNHCR’s recent initiatives, notably Convention Plus and the Framework for Durable Solutions, have significant potential in addressing such transitions. There also appears to be a new willingness among agencies – notably UNHCR and UNDP – to improve their cooperation in this area. Bringing together all the UN development agencies, as well as those concerned with forced migration, such as UNHCR and OCHA, within the UN Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance Working Group on Transition Issues represents a concrete step forward in international planning and assistance.

Debates on the relationship between relief and development feature strongly at the EU level, where the approach is cast as Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in the EU’s humanitarian work. Such considerations also figure in other arenas, such as the High Level Working Group (HLWG), though
emphasis here has been on the containment of migration. The early Action Plans of the HLWG were not successful, but more recent tendencies in this area, such as the AENEAS programme, are more encouraging (though there are still reservations). The June 2004 Communication of the European Commission Improving Access to Durable Solutions is also a step in the right direction in so far as it promotes assistance along lines similar to Convention Plus.

**Striking a balance among durable solutions**

Since at least the end of the Cold War, repatriation has been seen as the preferred durable solution for forced migration, somewhat to the neglect of the other two, namely local integration and resettlement. Recently, however, the potential of the latter two solutions has come to be acknowledged again by the international community. Local integration has come to be seen as an incremental strategy involving the principle of ‘self-sufficiency pending a solution’, that is, one of assisting refugee-hosting communities until refugees are fully integrated locally, have the opportunity to return or can be resettled elsewhere. Modest programmes for resettling residual refugee caseloads in Europe have been developed, which, though limited, may encourage poorer host countries and communities to be less wary of continuing to extend their hospitality to refugees. Such trends towards balancing solutions for forced migrants should be supported, since they are likely to be more productive in terms of conflict- and poverty-reduction than more unilateral approaches, such as the pursuit of extra-territorial processing of asylum-seekers. Comprehensive plans of action embodying multilateral approaches to balancing the various durable solutions may prove to be useful approaches.

**Integrating durable solutions into development planning**

Some observers believe that UNHCR missed an opportunity to integrate forced migration issues into the development arena by not participating sufficiently in the process that led to the setting of the Millennium Development Goals. UNHCR has since taken steps to remedy this: the Framework for Durable Solutions has considerable potential here. Such tendencies should be supported in both policy debates and development programmes. While the inclusion of forced migrants in development planning should be relatively unproblematic for countries involved in post-conflict return and reconstruction, it will be more controversial for countries hosting refugees. Possibly just as difficult, for host governments at least, is the need to engage refugee and host communities in that planning.
Targeting development assistance: promoting ‘additionality’
Targeting development assistance can be a useful approach for both refugee-hosting areas and situations of return and reconstruction. It can also be useful in circumstances, such as protracted displacement situations, where a durable solution is not currently in sight. ‘Self-sufficiency pending a durable solution’ may be the best, indeed the only option. Making refugees useful economic actors not only reduces their burden on local economies and societies, but also equips them for the time when a durable solution can be found. As in other fields of aid, all forms of targeting development assistance in refugee or returnee contexts require the engagement of the refugees, returnees and host communities themselves.

However, countries in regions beset by conflict and displacement have voiced concerns at the linking of development assistance with cooperation over the containment of refugees and other migrants in regions of origin. Whether justified or not, host country concerns about the diversion of general aid budgets to cater for refugees and refugee-hosting areas remain in connection with, for example, UNHCR’s DAR and DLI, and other initiatives for targeting development assistance. Development agencies should press for the ‘additionality’ of assistance both on principle and to allay the fears of host countries that aid for refugees will be siphoned off from general aid budgets.

Migration partnerships
Against the background of criticism that initiatives linking migration and development assistance were not taking sufficient account of the concerns of countries of origin and transit (for example, the ‘Action Plans’ formulated by the EU’s HLWG), the idea of ‘migration partnerships’ between richer and poorer countries is now being promoted. These should be real partnerships and not driven by the containment agenda. Like Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), migration partnerships should be country-led and -owned. Moreover, the partnerships should not be limited to national governments. Experience in partnerships with civil society organisations could be brought to bear here. Partnerships with local governments should also be supported. Existing political, cultural, economic and development relationships could be used as entry points to ensure that refugee and IDP issues receive adequate attention in development planning. Again, mechanisms need to be developed to engage civil society organisations (both formal and informal), including those of refugees, IDPs and host communities.
**Comprehensive Plans of Action (CPAs)**

Protracted refugee situations are often eclipsed by high profile emergencies, but they have obvious and profound implications for conflict resolution and prevention, development and poverty reduction. Though not without their critics, CPAs have proved in the past to be useful mechanisms to resolve such protracted situations. They have taken on a new lease of life recently, not least in the context of Convention Plus. Development agencies should ensure their presence in the formulation of CPA’s. In particular, Afghanistan and Somalia present cases in which there are clear and strong poverty-reduction imperatives as well as migration concerns. After long periods of stagnation, these now provide opportunities that might lead to resolution, given a push from the international community. Development agencies should take part in both the formulation and implementation of the comprehensive plans that are emerging in these and other cases.

**Targeting development assistance in conditions of return and reconstruction**

Under the rubric of the ‘4 Rs’ within Convention Plus, this area is the least controversial for intervention, since the governments involved are usually receptive to assistance with repatriation and reconstruction. There are several areas that need to be watched, however. The nature and timing of repatriation need to be monitored: is it voluntary, do refugees wish to return? Is return in conditions of safety and dignity possible? Are the society and economy, particularly in conflict-affected areas, capable of integrating the expected numbers? Recent experience has shown that mass return can put a severe strain on local communities: returns can raise tensions over land and property, as arriving refugees find their assets occupied by internally displaced people, whose property has in turn been occupied by other IDPs in long chains of displacement. These and other tensions have to be carefully managed if renewed violence is to be avoided. Continuing assistance after repatriation to countries and communities that have hosted refugees, often for long periods, also needs to be part of the overall package.

**Targeting development assistance in countries of first asylum**

Assistance for refugees in countries of first asylum tends to be rather more sensitive for the governments and publics of such countries than assistance with repatriation and reconstruction. This is because such assistance means using resources for people who are not nationals, but who are often located among nationals who are themselves poor. Consequently the most promising approaches are those directed at refuge-
hosting areas, which include refugees and the local communities around them. Development agencies could build on some recent interventions, such as the Zambia initiative and special programmes for refugee-affected areas in Tanzania. As already noted, ‘additionality’ of assistance is an important principle to be maintained here. Assistance to refugee-hosting areas is compatible with overall objectives of poverty-reduction, particularly in protracted situations. Such assistance also continues to be relevant once repatriation has taken place and agencies like UNHCR have withdrawn. An important principle is that refugee populations should be encouraged to become as self-reliant as possible, whether in situations of temporary asylum or long-term integration. Refugee self-reliance can also help to reduce negative attitudes on the part of host populations.

Resettlement
It is increasingly acknowledged that resettlement should be part of the package of durable solutions. This is because the options of repatriation or local integration are not available to certain refugee groups, which are often residual groups that have experienced long-term exile and encampment. While resettlement cannot be the main solution to mass movements of forced migrants, the option of the strategic use of resettlement should be kept open in the name of burden-sharing and decreasing instability in refugee-hosting areas.

Taking account of transnational connections
Areas of resettlement, local reintegration and repatriation do not exhaust areas for useful development interventions. The dispersal of households among several different sites – whether by internal displacement within the homeland, flight to neighbouring countries of first asylum, and flight or resettlement to countries outside the region of conflict – needs to be considered in development interventions. This is because the livelihood strategies of such dispersed or transnational households often span several locations: they may involve the transfer of remittances, movement across borders to farm, work or run businesses, the establishment of cross-border trading networks, and so on. From this perspective, the objective of discouraging ‘secondary movements’ from first asylum countries to western states or ‘backflows’ after repatriation may be counter-productive, since they may curtail what may be important elements within families’ livelihood portfolios. Such considerations do not figure in Convention Plus and other such instruments, and a compartmentalised approach to the three durable solutions may miss or even undermine transnational and translocal livelihood strategies.
Supporting groups inadequately covered by existing mandates and policies
While the principle of tailoring assistance to benefit whole communities affected by conflict and displacement should be maintained, there are particular groups of forced migrants, not covered by existing organisational mandates and/or policies, whose needs should be addressed, such as internally displaced people, people displaced over protracted periods and urban refugees.

Reconciling security concerns with forced migration and development
Forced migration has a range of security dimensions, including the dangers of mixed civilians and combatants among displaced populations, the political and military exploitation of camps, the location of camps in insecure border regions, the weak rule of law in such regions, and the sometimes negative impact on the local security of refugee camps and settlements. Development assistance can have a double benefit in such circumstances: it can foster greater security and protection for refugees and the local population, and it can also contribute to poverty-alleviation in refugee-hosting areas and to broader national development objectives. Promoting good governance, the rule of law and democratisation can help to short-circuit anti-refugee sentiments and grievance-driven insecurity. Security concerns can also accompany return and reconstruction. Efforts to reintegrate former combatants need to complement efforts to reintegrate returning refugees and IDPs; there can be conflicts of interest here.

Engaging with civil society
Many NGOs have useful knowledge and expertise in the field of forced migration that is often under-used. Development agencies have good relations with such organisations and should build dialogue with them in countries and regions of origin. Establishing partnerships and effective working relationships with such organisations will help deliver policy aimed at lessening the pressure for forced migration and mitigating its effects.
CONCLUSION: ADDRESSING FORCED MIGRATION, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT

Recent shifts in patterns of forced migration and in policies towards forced migration make this an opportune time for development agencies to review their approaches to this field. Effective strategies to address both the root causes and the effects of forced migration are needed for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Such strategies should therefore be seen as an integral aspect of poverty reduction. Forced migration issues need to be addressed in regional and country programming, and to be explicitly considered in the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and other development instruments.
On January 27-28, 2005, representatives from Arab and interested European Partner States met in Copenhagen under the framework of the dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) to discuss medium- and long-term issues relating to transit migration, combating of irregular flows through development cooperation, and better joint management of migration, including readmission, return and reintegration issues.

This report contains the background papers produced for the Copenhagen conference by the implementing partners ICMPD and DIIS. The papers are concerned with the policy implications of international migration for source, neighbour, transit and destination countries, and they discuss how international migration can be utilized to further development. Then, drawing on case studies from the Mediterranean region, the background to current Mediterranean transit migration is presented. Beyond the focus on the Mediterranean, the papers provide a critical framework for discussing if and how current policy approaches to remittances, return and diaspora have relevance for transit migration. Finally, the report includes the policy options agreed upon by the participating Arab and European Partner States.

Ninna Nyberg Sørensen is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, and Senior Advisor for Danida’s Human Rights Programme for Central America. She has worked on Dominican, Moroccan and Colombian transnational migration, the developmental impact of remittances, and on internal displacement and repopulation in Peru and Somaliland. Her current work focuses on democratization, human rights and anti-corruption in Central America.