European Infopolitik:
Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy

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with Hester Plumridge

Preface by Stephen Twigg

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Preface

With this year’s tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process – the EU initiative to foster greater co-operation in the Mediterranean region – Europe and its southern neighbours have much to celebrate. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been almost unprecedented in its ambition and, while it has not been without its problems, has contributed significantly to the development of international economic and cultural ties.

As European leaders contemplate how best to build on these foundations, we at the Foreign Policy Centre believe that ‘public diplomacy’ will be the new tool for international affairs in the global information age. Public diplomacy is a strategy to enable national governments to communicate and engage with foreign publics, as opposed to simply talking to foreign governments. A major pillar of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has been the ‘Social, Cultural and Human Dialogue’, which has involved a huge variety of activities designed to bring the peoples of the Mediterranean closer together. Although these activities have not generally been described as public diplomacy, their intention and outcomes closely parallel conventional state public diplomacy and cultural relations work. The FPC has led the way in developing the notion of public diplomacy – publishing one of the only books on the subject, and being one of the few think-tanks with a dedicated public diplomacy research programme.

Historically, the European Union institutions have been reluctant to employ the term ‘public diplomacy’ – and have been equally reluctant to be seen to be too pro-active in the way they communicate with people outside the Union. But as European governments themselves take the possibilities afforded by public diplomacy more seriously, we believe it is time for the European Union to do the same. For the Union to prosper it must project a positive image of itself to opinion formers and to the ‘man in the street’ both within and beyond its borders. If the European Union is serious about taking a greater role in the world affairs it will require a public diplomacy capability to match. Public diplomacy has an
important role to play, for example, in the management of EU-US or EU-China relations. To date the Union’s external action has been compromised both by its reluctance to engage pro-actively with foreign publics and its failure to communicate an accessible message to foreign elites. There is evidence, for example, that Chinese officials continue to seek bilateral contact with European states because they remain unsure about the nature of the European decision-making process. Better public diplomacy could help resolve this.

In fact a good deal of work currently conducted by the likes of DG RELEX and the EC delegations already involves communicating to and with people outside the Union. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of officials on the ground, this activity is generally disjointed and uncoordinated. It does not need to be that way.

Developing an EU-specific public diplomacy capability and strategy is not going to be easy. There remain significant political and structural obstacles. But policymakers within both the EU institutions and member state governments need seriously to consider such a strategy. Greater public diplomacy capability is a requirement for an increasingly global Europe. Increased public diplomacy co-operation between member states – particularly on issues of common concern – would avoid the wasteful, inefficiency of some current initiatives.

In recent years, our cutting-edge research has put the Foreign Policy Centre at the forefront of thinking on both Europe and public diplomacy. In publishing ‘European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy’, we aim to bring these two strands of research together. The Foreign Policy Centre looks forward to conducting further research in this important area in the future.

Stephen Twigg
Director of the Foreign Policy Centre

Executive Summary

In an increasingly globalised world, the strategic understanding and employment of international communications has become a priority for states. Understanding how governments and home publics communicate with foreign publics has become an important but challenging research issue – and one with real-world implications. The opinions, attitudes and behaviour of people abroad matters to states because they have genuine impact on the delivery of economic and foreign policy objectives.

Just as European member states increasingly acknowledge the strategic importance of communication with foreign audiences, so European Union policymakers should themselves consider how better to speak, and listen, to third-country publics. As an entity which comprises more than 450 million inhabitants, and which contributes 40 per cent of the United Nations budget and 25 per cent of global GDP, the European Union is punching well below its weight in communication terms. European policymakers must now address the issue of whether engagement with publics in the wider world – beyond that required as part of the enlargement process – should be a strategic priority.

In doing so policymakers must tackle difficult questions. How well are the EU institutions communicating to the world today? What is the Union capable of in the field of international communications? How should the Commission’s approach to third-country communication differ from that of states? To what extent will the EU’s developing global role require a new approach to communications outside the Union? Is it appropriate for the EU to be as calculating in its communication strategies as EU member states? How should strategy be designed, co-ordinated and implemented?

There is no question that the European Union has enormous public diplomacy potential – the combined ‘infopolitik’ might of the 25 member states and the Commission is formidable. It is true that political and administrative obstacles to a unified and integrated EU
public diplomacy remain but policymakers can and should work to remove such obstacles. An invigorated public diplomacy has much to offer the Union in its approach to a host of issues including accession negotiations with Turkey, relations with the USA, China and the former Soviet Union republics, the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the effective management of migration into the EU, and partnership with Africa. In this context, member states need to assess the value of the EU institutions developing and improving their own international public profile, mindful of the fact that improved EU public diplomacy will not necessarily weaken member state public diplomacy. A new brand of genuinely co-operative public diplomacy may suit the workings of the post-Cold War world; its practice by and through the EU will, for example, limit the ability of unsympathetic voices abroad to decry conventional member state public diplomacy initiatives as foreign propaganda, particularly at a time of reported ‘civilizational’ tension.

To date, the way that Europe and the EU communicate with third-country publics has been atomised and disjointed. In an effort to begin the process of refining how EU institutions think about and conduct public diplomacy and external communications in third-countries, this paper recommends that EU policymakers take the following key steps:

1) Create an EU Public Diplomacy Strategy Committee to centrally review and co-ordinate strategy;

2) Apply the lessons of the intra-EU communications strategy report of July 2005 to third-country communications;

3) Increase support for the public diplomacy and communications activity of EC delegations;

4) Conduct a comprehensive survey of EU public diplomacy and related activities; create an easily accessible database of all EU public diplomacy and external communications activity (including EuroMed and Intercultural Dialogue initiatives);

5) Increase research into how the EU is perceived in third countries through more polling, surveying, and media monitoring;

6) Be more aggressive in promoting EU aid visibility in third-countries;

7) Investigate means of improving EU public diplomacy with, and through, EU-resident diasporic networks;

8) Facilitate greater ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ between the European parliament and third-country political and civil society groups;

9) Expand the Public Diplomacy dimension of EUROMED;

10) Increase EU funding for third-country educational exchange schemes.
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Introduction

In an increasingly globalised world, the strategic understanding and employment of international communications has become a priority for states. Understanding how governments and home publics can, and do, communicate with foreign publics has become an important but challenging research issue – and one with real-world implications. The opinions, attitudes and behaviour of people abroad matters to states because they have genuine impact on the delivery of economic and foreign policy and, consequently, national interest. How a country is perceived abroad has implications for that country’s ability to attract tourism and investment. How a state is viewed by foreign publics can impact on its ability to engage with that country’s government, and its ability to operate diplomatically or militarily.

While policymakers generally acknowledge that international communications (in the broadest sense) have genuine political significance, there remains uncertainty about the exact nature of such communications and how best to manage them. Governments are aware that the trans-national media, for example, are important, but are still working their way both towards a comprehensive understanding of how they matter, and effective strategies on how to respond.

As national governments themselves progress to such an understanding, policymakers in the institutions of the European Union must do the same. Just as European member states increasingly acknowledge the strategic importance of communication with foreign audiences, so European Union policymakers should consider how better to speak and listen to third-country publics. As an entity comprising more than 450 million inhabitants, which contributes 40 per cent of the United Nations budget and 25 per cent of global GDP, the European Union is punching well below its weight in communication terms. European policymakers must now seriously consider whether engagement with publics in the wider world - beyond that required as part of the enlargement process – should be a strategic priority.

This paper includes a brief survey of the ways EU institutions currently communicate with third countries, and concludes with a series of strategic and operational recommendations on how EU-to-third-country communication and interaction strategy might be refined. The pamphlet also includes a survey of the 25 member states’ own ‘public diplomacy’ and cultural relations activities.

This is a difficult subject for analysts. Conceptualising and understanding how ‘Europe’ and Europeans project themselves to, and engage with, non-Europeans is not easy. Communication between Europe and ‘Non-Europe’ occurs daily in an almost infinite number of ways: the televised speech of a national leader, the performance of a Mozart opera, the screening of a European film, the blue flash of an EU sticker, the exhibition of a Picasso or a da Vinci painting, the fluttering of a European flag, the goalmouth celebrations of a UEFA Champions League footballer, the handshake of a European business executive, the rumble of a passing EU peacekeeper’s truck, the taste of French cheese, Italian pasta or Spanish olives, and the reassuring voice of the newsreader on the BBC World Service or Deutsche Welle. Improving understanding of this mutual flow of communications and encounters requires a considerable leap of imagination. As the EU seeks to develop its role in the world, policymakers should both make that leap and act upon it.

In doing so policymakers must also address some difficult questions. How well are the EU institutions communicating to the world today? What is the Union capable of in the field of international communication? How should the Commission’s approach to third-country communication differ from that of states? To what extent will the EU’s developing global role require a new approach to communications outside the Union? Is it appropriate for the EU to be as calculating in its communication strategies as the member states? How should strategy be designed, co-ordinated and implemented?
These are challenging questions for today’s Europe. This paper does not seek to provide neat answers – although future Foreign Policy Centre research will try – but instead initiate debate. It is the ambition of the authors to contribute to the process of reshaping Europe’s nascent public diplomacy and external communications strategy; to begin the rethinking, and therefore reshaping, of how the European Union institutions communicate with third-country publics, and so ensure that the ‘glorious confusion’ of European communications, as one senior EU official put it to the authors, succeeds in projecting Europe appropriately and positively in the world. Both the EU and member states have much to benefit from the refinement of such a strategy.

The EU in the Eyes of the World

Exactly how Europe is perceived in the world at large remains a source of debate. The European Union has been described by a variety of writers in a variety of ways: as a ‘civilian power’, as a ‘normative power’, as a ‘metro-sexual superpower’, and as a ‘post-modern power’. Europe is seen by some commentators as the ‘champion of multilateralism’, ‘a community of democracy’ and the purveyor of norms and values like human rights, sustainability and the rule of law. The views of Europeans themselves are perceived by some both to shape and reflect the global zeitgeist on issues such as climate change, sexual rights, and gender equality. At the same time, European culture and commerce are very appealing to global consumers. Six of the top ten countries on the Anholt-GMI nation-branding index are European.¹ Sixty-one of the top 140 companies in the ‘Global 500’ are European.² According to Joseph Nye:

The European Union as a symbol of uniting power carries a good deal of soft power. Polls conducted in July 2002 found that a majority of Americans had a favourable image of the European Union, and ranked it fourth for its influence in the world behind the United States, Britain and China.³

Despite such perceptions, there is much about Europe which hinders the way it is viewed or understood. The European Union is too complex an organisation for many people. Although global elites may be aware of the difference between, for example, the European Council and the European Commission, perceptions of Europe in third-countries do not just confuse the status and actions of the different EU institutions, many people around the world have difficulty distinguishing in their own minds, for example, between ‘the West’, Europe, the 25 member states, and the European Union itself. Such confusion is not aided by European citizens’ own common misunderstanding of the EU and EU institutions.⁴

Misunderstanding in Europe and beyond is almost certainly magnified by factors such as ongoing enlargement (‘Where does the EU begin and end?’) and rebranding of the political entity itself (‘Is the European Union the same as the old Common Market or European Economic Community?’). According to one source, Europe has historically been difficult to market or explain to the world because it is a ‘moving target’ – although it has been in existence almost as long as the United Nations, its nature and structure seem always to be changing to observers abroad. At a 2004 Brussels conference on ‘Images of Europe’ a number of high-level speakers outlined how Europe was viewed in their home countries:

It seems to me that in European eyes, there is no common European identity. But in Chinese eyes it seems that you are all the same. We cannot tell the French from the Belgians or the British from the Germans. In our eyes you are all Europeans.

- Yan Xuetong, Tsinghua University, China

¹ www.nationbrandindex.com
² ‘Why Europe will Run the 21st Century’, Mark Leonard, 2005, p.74
⁴ For a detailed analysis of how the EU is perceived in the Asia-Pacific region, for example, see research conducted by Martin Holland and his team at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/research/2005_database.shtml - see also ‘The EU through the Eyes of the Asia-Pacific’, Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban, E Sharp! magazine, www.peoplepowerprocess.com
What does Europe stand for? Europe from the outside seems to be defined more by what it wishes not to be, by a kind of residual definition. It is not America, it does not wish to become embroiled in national conflicts, it wishes to avoid economic decline and so on … America for all its bumptious aggression, and often worse, can at least be seen as standing for something.

- Sunil Khilnani, (John Hopkins University), India

Europe is not really seen as much more than the sum of its parts. European institutions are not really seen as contributing much added value to civilization as we know it … There is certainly a sense, in my part of the world of the economic power that has been collectively harnessed … and there is certainly … the continuing very real magnetic attraction of the extraordinary cultural legacy of the European countries. But a sense of Europe as a coherent political entity? Ask me again in another ten years.

- Garreth Evans (International Crisis Group), Australia

The reality is that the European Union is still profoundly misunderstood beyond its borders. Does this matter? Yes and no. It is in the nature of the evolving European entity that it is a kaleidoscopic and multifaceted thing. To seek obsessively to harmonise and manage the image of Europe and European Union would be both very difficult and counter-productive. But despite the political and organisational hurdles, it would be naive and irresponsible of policymakers in the European Union to ignore completely the possibilities afforded to them today. As national governments ratchet up their own communications activities, European institutions should seriously consider the value of doing the same – because they hobble themselves if they do not, because ‘Europe’ has phenomenal communication capability, and because, ultimately, just as with EU trade policy, member states have much to gain from co-ordinated action.

The term ‘public diplomacy’ is here understood to mean efforts by a state to communicate to, and engage with, foreign publics. It is true that a large degree of a country’s image and reputation abroad is created by informal exchange and contact beyond the control of government – a consequence of tourism and international commerce – but there is still much governments can do. Public diplomacy as conducted by the UK, for example, includes initiatives like the BBC World Service (which, as a consequence of its popularity, improves the reputation and image of the UK abroad), the UK’s Chevening scholarship scheme (which brings promising international students to study in the UK thus establishing long-term links with opinion-formers and elites), and the British Council (which conducts cultural diplomacy with international publics around the world); the UK also conducts public diplomacy locally through the activities of its embassies abroad. Other European member states run similar initiatives. As one commentator has suggested:

Public diplomacy is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause … Public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or disabling environment for individual transactions.

The term public diplomacy, coined in the 1960s, is commonly used by the UK and US governments among others, and is now showing signs of being adopted by the European Commission, although much of what might be described as public diplomacy is often categorised

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6 History of Europe and the European Union, AMO publication, 2005

7 Public Diplomacy, Mark Leonard, 2002, pp.8-9
by Commission departments simply as ‘information and communications’. When it comes to Europe’s conducting of public diplomacy, the EU institutions are key actors – and their role in communicating Europe and the Union to the world are almost as varied as the communication itself. Even if it is rarely described as such, the Commission particularly is already engaged in public diplomacy activities through third-country delegations, the activities of the external Directorate-generals, and the Euro-Med Partnership among others. Many of the activities conducted by, for example, DG Education and Culture as part of its Intercultural Dialogue programme, may also be described as public diplomacy.

It has been suggested by one writer that ‘the European project is probably the most successful example of soft power that has ever existed’. To date, Europe’s ability to transform post-Soviet Eastern Europe not by force but by incentive and persuasion has been impressive. In a world of globalised media and communications, the EU, the ‘co-operative empire’ of 25 member states and self-avowed champion of ‘unity in diversity’, has almost unprecedented public diplomacy potential. Now is the moment for EU policymakers to ensure that potential is both understood clearly, and applied appropriately.

**European Infopolitik**

A word about the title of the pamphlet. As policymakers and commentators have sought to understand the nature of international media and communications, and particularly their significance in the arena of foreign affairs, they have created a substantial lexicon. Depending on where and with whom one discusses international communications one encounters a bewildering array of terminology.

In English alone this includes: public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, soft power, political communications, perception management, propaganda, intercultural dialogue, dialogue of cultures, dialogue of civilizations, crisis management, media management, media relations, public affairs, public relations, strategic communications, global communications, strategic influence, psychological operations, information operations and media operations. None of these seem wholly appropriate in a European context.

As European analysts and policymakers seek to refine European third-country communications, it is important to be wary of terminology. One helpful approach to conceptualising states’ use of international communications is that formulated by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in their book ‘The Emergence of Noopolitik’. According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, just as, historically, states have pursued national interests in the political, economic and military spheres, so states must now recognise the importance of doing the same in the ‘infosphere’ or ‘noosphere’. Their term ‘noopolitik’ is a deliberate fusion of ‘noos’ (the ancient Greek word for ‘mind’) and the concept of ‘Realpolitik’.

By noopolitik we mean an approach to statecraft, to be undertaken as much by nonstate as by state actors, that emphasizes the role of informational soft power in expressing ideas, values, norms, and ethics through all manner of media.

In a footnote on the coining of the term ‘noopolitik’, Arquilla and Ronfeldt mention other related terms. One of these is ‘infopolitik’, which the authors discard because they prefer the ‘ideational’ association of ‘noopolitik’. In naming this pamphlet **European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy**, the authors hope to rescue the term. ‘Infopolitik’ is helpful in conveying a sense of how the European Union communicates, and ought to communicate, with the rest of the world. In English, the term ‘infopolitik’ implicitly acknowledges both that the EU institutions

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8 According to the EU’s Communication Strategy for Enlargement, information is the ‘flow of facts and figures’ and communication ‘the presentation of objective messages in the form of key messages adapted to particular audiences’ – http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/communication/pdf/sec_737_2000_en.pdf.


11 Ibid.
should take pro-active international communication seriously, and that the nature of that communication should be grounded in accurate and impartial information. This second point is particularly important – the European Union as much as any other state or supra-state actor must reflect its own nature through the projection of free and unbiased information. Even where EU Member states may see value in the management of information and communications for national gain, it would be inappropriate and unwise for the institutions of the European Union to do the same.

Today, particularly in the context of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, intra-EU communication has once again become a priority for the European Commission. The identification of communication to EU publics as a key priority for both the Commission and member states comes as no great surprise – nor is it something new. The publication in July of this year of a new EU Communication strategy (by the now renamed DG Communication) is part of a decades old trend. Debates over how to communicate with, and to, the citizens of Europe have been going on for generations. Often debate has, in fact, centred around means of conducting public diplomacy with the people of Europe, even when it was not described as such. The 1973 Declaration on European Identity, the 1984 Television Without Borders Directive, the 1984 EU Committee for a People’s Europe, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1993 De Clercq Report, and the 2001 Communications Strategy all contained recommendations for action designed to improve communication to European publics. These included now familiar initiatives like the creation of a European currency, a European Multilingual television channel, a Euro-lottery, harmonised passports and driving licences, a European literature prize, and themed European weeks, months and years.12

Even if contemporary commentators have been quick to criticise the Commission’s lack of success in communicating Europe to Europeans – hence the perceived failure in relation to the French and Dutch referenda – it is difficult to ignore the fact that Commission officials have at least been aware of the importance of the communication. Commission officials have known for decades that they must work hard to reach out to people across the Union – and more recently in Europe’s close neighbourhood. It is an argument of this paper that similar thinking and effort ought now to be applied to public diplomacy and communications initiatives in third-countries.

This is not just a question of the EU conducting adequate public affairs. The fact is that Europe, in all its diversity, and with the potential leadership of the institutions of the European Union, is uniquely equipped to engage effectively in public diplomacy and ‘infopolitik’. A host of factors favour European activity in this field. These include Europe’s unique global cultural, diasporic and colonial links,13 the existence of an expanding ‘ring of friends’ (Romano Prodi’s phrase), Europe’s unmatched contributions to overseas aid around the world, and the ongoing efforts, and therefore experience, of member state cultural relations agencies like the British Council and the Goethe Institut. Europe is not yet using these advantages. As one writer has put it, ‘public diplomacy is the current Cinderella of the EU’s global engagement’; policy makers must now decide whether to turn the impoverished maid into a princess.14

How the EU Communicates with the World

Europe has access to the world’s greatest fund of public diplomacy experience and capabilities. The 25 member states of the European Union are among the most experienced in the world at conducting public diplomacy and cultural relations. In the field of international broadcasting – a key strategic public diplomacy tool – the BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle and Radio France International are world

12 For an account of these initiatives see ‘Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration’, Cris Shore, 2000.

13 Javier Solana acknowledged these links in the European Security Strategy document, 12 December 2003: ‘Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on.

leaders. Cultural organisations such as the Goethe Institut and the British Council have worked for decades to facilitate and improve informal people-to-people relations between their own countries and others. The knowledge base of these organisations is immense. The sum of activities conducted by the 25 member states make the collective European Union easily the most active and well-funded public diplomacy actor in the world. France alone reportedly spends more than $1 billion annually, or $17 per capita, on a combination of public diplomacy activities, in comparison with the USA which spends on average a mere $0.65 per capita.  

To date such activity has tended to be competitive rather than co-operative. Public diplomacy is an acknowledged strategic tool for many European governments and one they are inevitably reluctant to surrender or share. Public diplomacy is usually conducted for the purpose of furthering national interest. As a consequence, among the European nations, co-operative public diplomacy is the exception rather than the rule. In the context of greater European integration, states’ lack of real commitment to working more closely in this field is puzzling to many observers. As Corina Suteu has written: ‘South-Eastern Europe can never quite understand why Western Cultural institutes don’t work together more, why their programmes sometimes overlap, why there is so much talk about co-operation with such meagre results’. In ignoring the opportunities offered by co-operative public diplomacy, states risk conducting parallel and therefore wasteful public diplomacy campaigns. They also ignore the possibilities of greater co-operative public diplomacy acting as a catalyst for greater co-operation in other areas. States will always wish to preserve their own independent public diplomacy capability – as they do armies. But there remains considerable unfulfilled potential both for greater co-operative efforts between member states, and for the EU institutions to work with, and through, member state organisations.

Some attempts have been made. One initiative which has tried to facilitate greater co-operation between member states’ public diplomacy organisations is CICEB (an abbreviation for ‘Consociato Institutorum Culturalium Europaeorum Inter Belgas’). Consisting of 12 members, with plans to expand to the full 25 member states, CICEB attempts to co-ordinate activities conducted by the various European cultural relations institutes. CICEB output typically includes language diversity training awareness, journalist networking initiatives, and European ‘active citizenship’ programmes. Thus far CICEB’s focus has tended to be intra-EU but the organisation is reportedly keen to expand its sphere of activity to third countries. Discussions at a June 2005 conference confirmed both that efforts are being developed to encourage better co-ordination of Europe-wide cultural relations activity and that the European Commission itself is keen to expand cultural projects beyond the borders of the EU.

Among the EU’s own institutions the Council and Parliament do have a symbolic public diplomacy role, but it is the Commission which is the chief actor. As many European officials acknowledge, the European Council is currently an organisation unsuited to effective public diplomacy. Its discussions are shielded from audiences, at any one time it is presided over by a single member state (whose instincts are typically either to promote itself or limit projection of the Council’s activities), and its presidency changes every six months. Even where it has more permanent representatives or spokespersons, publics tend to be confused by the job title, role and identity of such persons. The rejected European Constitution may have helped remedy this situation, for example by its establishment of an EU Foreign Ministry, but policymakers will now have to wait. It may be the case that the Chinese government, for example, tends towards bilateral contact in its dealings with Europe because officials misunderstand the EU’s decision-making structures – and that this would be partially resolved by improved Council public diplomacy.

To date, the European Parliament’s role in European public diplomacy has been limited. Acknowledging that the Parliament is still working to convince European citizens that it is the guarantor of democracy and legitimacy within the European institutions, it seems optimistic to believe that the Parliament should already be serving as such a beacon outside the EU. It is true that European

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16 ‘Growing a Bigger Europe’, British Council publication, 2004
parliamentarians are doing valuable work conducting so-called ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ abroad - establishing working networks with politicians and political parties around the world. Resulting publicity in third-countries can be understood as public diplomacy but the Parliament’s impact on mass opinion abroad seems, as yet, rather limited.

Acknowledging the limited current public diplomacy impact of both the Council and Parliament, it is the activity of the various elements of the European Commission that are our main concern here. It is the European Commission, its external directorate-generals (DGs), and its various delegations in third countries which conduct the bulk of European public diplomacy with the rest of the world.

Perhaps, surprisingly, the directorate-general charged with taking the lead on communications issues within the Union, DG Communication, has little remit to communicate outside the EU. In the July 2005 report on Intra-EU Communications Strategy, Commissioner Margot Wallstrom stated that ‘this Commission has made communication one of the strategic objectives for its term in office’ and, most encouragingly from a public diplomacy perspective, that ‘communication is more than information: it establishes a relationship and initiates a dialogue with European citizens, it listens carefully and it connects to people. It is not a neutral exercise devoid of value, it is an essential part of the political process.’

To date, such communication seems concerned with improving the status of the EU in the eyes of Europeans, particularly in the context of the referenda defeats in France and the Netherlands. The same report made a number of recommendations on improving EU communications strategy – including the evolution of a unified presentation of a single face of the Commission, making Commission staff more aware of the importance of communications, strategic communications planning and co-ordination, better research and feedback, better listening and targeting in target countries, increasing Commissioners’ profile, and better use of multimedia tools – but today such recommendations seem only to be planned for intra-EU communications.

In fact, the key actors in EU public diplomacy in third-countries are the various DGs with external remit – RELEX, Trade, Enlargement, Development, ECFIN and ECHO – and their dedicated ‘information and communications’ units. Although these DG information units are autonomous of each other, it is generally accepted by officials that they are ‘working for the same customer’, as one source put it, and some efforts are made to co-ordinate activities. The head of DG RELEX’s Information and Communication unit chairs a monthly meeting in Brussels of the heads of external DGs information and communications unit. This group is reportedly exploring the possibility of creating simpler, shared messages as well as a common website. One source suggested that while external communications budgets are very complicated at present, there are plans to tidy them up. Another source, a senior Information officer in one of the external DGs, suggested to the author that one outstanding problem is that it is not clear exactly whose job it is to take the lead on third-country communications strategy, and that, perhaps inevitably, different external DGs have different strategic and geographical priorities. The same source did acknowledge that there is a growing will within the Commission to improve EU third-country communications.

DG RELEX, the lead external action DG, has a significant communications capacity. Its annual communications budget of €7 million is mostly spent through the EC delegations (€5.5 million), although links between DG RELEX’s Brussels-based communications team and information officers in the delegations are sporadic. Contact is typically limited to annual discussion of that delegation’s communication strategy with occasional assistance on implementation. Delegation information activity typically comprises the management of local language websites, organisation of events (e.g. 9th May ‘Europe Day’), delegation visits around the host country, contact events with local schools and universities, the publication of brochures and newsletters, local media monitoring, management of journalist training programmes, the running of small EU information centres, and activities to promote ‘civil society dialogue’. Often this
activity is conducted autonomously of Brussels, and quality and quantity vary according to the skills and enthusiasm of delegation staff.

The Moscow delegation’s information unit, for example, is well funded and has 9 permanent staff members. According to one official there, it devotes half of its time to media relations – liaising with local media and locally-based foreign correspondents, running press conferences, and organising media trips to EU funded projects – and the other half of its time doing conventional communication work – managing the delegation website and monitoring the local media. The Moscow delegation has also organised an annual EU film festival for the last 8 years. The Ankara delegation communications team, by contrast, has only 4 permanent staff members. Beyond standard activities outlined above, the unit also co-ordinates a group of academic lecturers sympathetic to the EU called ‘Team Europe’, and has contracted a number of city and town chambers of commerce to host small EU Information centres.

The delegation in Washington, a natural key target for EU public diplomacy, takes local public diplomacy requirements very seriously. A new Press and Public Diplomacy section in the delegation will not only appraise and strengthen delegation public diplomacy strategy but make the EC delegation in Washington one of the first to embrace the term ‘public diplomacy’ in its work. According to one official there, the delegation has identified four distinct areas of public diplomacy activity: general perception-oriented public diplomacy (e.g. correcting American public misperceptions of contemporary Europe); specific issue public diplomacy (for instance, lobbying for the extension of the US visa waiver scheme to all 25 EU member states); co-operative EU-US public diplomacy (identifying ways of working with the US government on, for example, public diplomacy strategies in the Middle East); competitive and conflictual EU-US public diplomacy (relating to issues of dispute between the EU and US such as the Airbus-Boeing rivalry or lifting of the EU-China arms ban). The Washington delegation has also set up informal working groups involving representatives from the 25 member states.

It is worth noting at this point that a common challenge faced by delegations is the difficulty of recruiting local government and media to the task of informing local audiences about the EU; one official made the point to the author that although EC delegations are the best equipped to explain or promote the EU, they cannot do the job effectively without the support or acquiescence of the host government, particularly where that government dominates the media agenda. It is also worth acknowledging that often a particular head of delegation is able to develop a high-profile in a host country – and so become a considerable public diplomacy asset him or herself.

The activity of other external DGs, also has important public diplomacy value. Chief among these is DG Enlargement which has historically had the largest communications budget and its own dedicated communications strategy, although most resources have inevitably been targeted at member states and candidate countries rather than third-countries. The purpose of the strategy is to satisfy the public ‘demand for information’, ‘generate dialogue with a broad section of public opinion and dispel misapprehensions about the enlargement process’.18 Means of information delivery include the internet server EUROPA, the TV service ‘Europe by Satellite’, and the question and answer service EUROPE DIRECT. More nuanced communications to Enlargement countries have been conducted through the speeches and presentations of the Commission President and other Commissioners, the Commission’s representations in member states, and Commission delegations in candidate countries.

DG Development, responsible for Commission activity in the developing world, is largely dependent on EC delegations for third-country communications. €400,000 was recently made available for EC delegations in the developing world to fund activities like seminars, trade fairs, the production of television documentaries, and creating information centres. A key task has been promoting the Millennium Development Goals. It does run some journalist trips to

Brussels but, according to one official, its communication capacity is under-resourced. The same source suggested there should be an increase in support for local communications activity, better strategic design of messages, and greater professionalisation of all communications activity.

DG ECHO's communication mission involves ensuring that EU humanitarian aid and assistance is suitably visible in the recipient country and beyond. As such, it has an important public diplomacy function; it is important not only that aid be given but that it is seen to be given. In this context, ECHO aid contracts with recipient countries generally have 0.5-3 per cent of funding set aside for 'visibility' (typically used for the production of e.g. T-shirts and stickers). The EU's status as the world's largest aid donor ought to give ECHO communications a significant head-start but this does not seem always to be the case in practice. According to one official inside ECHO, despite being the first institutional donor to react to the 2005 Asian Tsunami, the EU did not get due public credit. The same source suggested that ECHO's communications in third-countries are seriously understaffed; ECHO is reportedly in the process of recruiting two information officers for the whole of Africa. At the same time, recipients of aid consistently thwart ECHO's attempts to achieve visibility. DG ECHO's Framework Partnership Agreement requires partners to acknowledge EU funding but such a clause is difficult to enforce. DG ECHO also finds itself competing for aid visibility with rival donors. USAID, for example, is a 'major competitor' and benefits from a number of communications advantages including better resources, a single chain of command, and significant experience of the use of branding and logos; USAID also benefits, for example, from the fact that, unlike the EU, the US government tends to source its international food aid from the USA itself making it much easier to brand. As with other DG communications capacity, ECHO seems to suffer from under-funding.

DG ECFIN tends to concentrate its limited communications resources on big financial centres like Washington, Tokyo, Singapore, New York, and Kuala Lumpur. Local ECFIN representatives' communications activity typically involves organising conferences on issues relating to the Euro. They also work closely with the European Central Bank. DG Trade has a rather simpler task than most in as much as it is one of the few areas of Commission activity where member states are willing to cede authority to the relevant commissioner so as to facilitate negotiation as a bloc. It also works with and through the delegations.

But Commission third-country public diplomacy is not limited to the activity of the external DGs. One major initiative which illustrates the way that the European Commission conducts public diplomacy (even when that is not the stated aim), is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. As Chris Patten, former European Commissioner for Foreign Relations, noted in 2002:

'The Euro med partnership has become the only regional framework for dialogue. Not only between countries but also between societies, cultures and civilizations ... The Social, Cultural and Human Chapter of the Barcelona Process aims to bring people on both sides of the Mediterranean closer together, to promote mutual knowledge and understanding and to improve their perception of each other.'

A core feature of the EuroMed Partnership has been the delivery of upwards of $10 billion in development aid to the region, itself of considerable public diplomacy value to the European Union. However, much of the partnership has employed other public diplomacy strategies, albeit unintentionally. The third pillar of the Barcelona process, the so-called 'Social, Cultural and Human Dialogue', to a great extent resembles the kind of two-way public diplomacy and cultural relations work conducted by national organisations like the British Council and Goethe Institut. Indeed, the EuroMed partnership – comprising the 25 EU member states, 10 Mediterranean partners and 2 countries with observer status – is arguably the greatest single public diplomacy initiative ever conceived. Its component parts include initiatives such as EuroMed Heritage (to highlight Mediterranean heritage, exchange know-how and promote knowledge), EuroMed Youth (to enable Mediterranean

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19 'Dialogue Between Cultures and Civilizations in the Barcelona Process', EU Publication, 2002
Commission Intercultural Dialogue activities include the Erasmus Mundus initiative (‘a cooperation and mobility programme in the field of higher education, promoting exchanges between the EU and third-countries’) and the Netd@ys initiative (which ‘seeks to promote the use of the new media in the fields of education and culture, especially among the young’).

This then is a brief summary of the EU’s current ‘public diplomacy’ activities (even where they are not described such). It is clear even from this short summary that the EU institutions are conducting much activity in this field and that there is scope for much more – both in terms of design and geographical reach. Should policymakers conclude that it is in the Union’s interests to step up its public diplomacy efforts, it is evident that there is a solid and long-established foundation on which to build.

Developing EU Public Diplomacy

As policymakers consider if and how to develop an EU-specific public diplomacy policy and strategy, there are a number of issues which they will need to address. As already noted, key among these are the questions of what the European Union is capable of achieving in the field of public diplomacy, and what it is appropriate for EU actors and representatives to do.

There is no question that the European Union has enormous public diplomacy potential – the combined ‘infopolitik’ might of the 25 member states and the Commission are formidable. The EU also has the important advantage of being perceived as a largely benign, if indistinct, force in the world. No degree of public diplomacy skill or effort can compensate for actions which antagonise third-country publics – as the US government is learning to its cost. When it comes to the perceptions of people around the world, actions speak louder than words. To date the EU’s actions – the pursuit of multilateralism, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the championing of the rule of law and human rights in its neighbourhood – have been of great benefit to its reputation globally.
It is true that political and administrative obstacles to a unified and integrated EU public diplomacy remain but policymakers can and should work to remove such obstacles. An invigorated public diplomacy has much to offer the Union in its approach to a host of issues including accession negotiations with Turkey, relations with the USA, China and the former Soviet Union republics, the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the effective management of migration into the EU, and increased economic partnership with Africa. It would also be naïve to ignore the fact that effective third-country public diplomacy will also improve the EU’s image inside its borders; in a globalised world the distinction between domestic and foreign public diplomacy has become increasingly blurred. Member states particularly need to consider these possibilities – to assess the value of the EU institutions developing and improving their own international public profile, mindful of the fact that improved EU public diplomacy will not necessarily weaken member state public diplomacy. Indeed, cooperative public diplomacy may be better suited to the post-Cold War world; its practice by, and through, the EU will limit the ability of unsympathetic voices abroad to decry conventional member state public diplomacy initiatives as foreign propaganda, particularly at a time of reported ‘civilizational’ tension.

Policymakers need to be aware that the future design of effective EU public diplomacy will be complicated by two major factors: the evolving nature of the EU itself, and the changing global context against which the EU is developing. As member states, the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission continue to debate the future direction of the EU, so the world around them is changing. The shifting sands of political, economic and cultural globalisation, the perceived rise of China and India, the ongoing ‘war on terrorism’, are all factors which European policymakers must take into account as they seek to develop EU public diplomacy strategy. As the EU develops its own brand of public diplomacy, it must also ensure it applies the principle of two-way communication outlined in Commissioner Wallstrom’s July 2005 report. In the field of international communications, listening is a much more difficult process than talking but it is one Europe can, and should, strive towards. To date, the way that Europe and the EU communicate with third-country publics has been atomised and disjointed. There is arguably not enough co-operation between EU member states’ own public diplomacy organisations – and the capacity of the EU institutions to engage in public diplomacy activities is limited by a lack of resources and political will. Both faults are possible to remedy.

In an effort to begin the process of refining how EU institutions think about, and conduct, public diplomacy and external communications in third-countries, this paper recommends that EU policymakers take the following steps:

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1) **Acknowledge that external public diplomacy and third-country communications are a priority for the EU**

The Council and Commission should state that public diplomacy is an important activity for an evolving European Union; this will increase institutional awareness of its importance, and facilitate greater co-operation between, for example, member state apparatuses and EU organs.

2) **Harmonise all Commission terminology relating to public diplomacy and third-country communications; and publish a short, internal document outlining and explaining this terminology**

At present, different elements of the Commission use different terms to describe a variety of public diplomacy-related activities. For example, the Moscow and Ankara EC delegations describe their activities as ‘information and communications’, in contrast to the Washington delegation which will soon be adopting the phrase ‘press and public diplomacy’. This confuses and hinders Commission activity in this field.
3) Create an EU Public Diplomacy Strategy Committee to centrally review and co-ordinate strategy

EU external public diplomacy and communications strategy is disjointed. More should be done to harmonise activities – particularly those conducted by the external DGs. In 2002, the UK government established a Public Diplomacy Strategy Board to bring together representatives of organisations working on UK public diplomacy (including the British Council, BBC World Service, UK Trade and Investment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and VisitBritain). This body reviews ongoing UK public diplomacy work and is responsible for the design of appropriate messages and narratives. The European Commission should consider establishing a similar body. It is vital such a committee have both Council and Commission backing. The composition of the committee should ideally include the High Representative for CFSP, representatives of both the Council and Commission, officials from member states public diplomacy and cultural relations organisations, and appropriate representatives from European commerce. The political realities of the EU mean it is naïve to imagine it capable of a highly co-ordinated strategy like that of the USA – and such a strategy may in any case be inappropriate for the EU – however, there is certainly room for better integration and co-ordination of communications and public diplomacy activity.

4) Apply the lessons of the intra-EU communications strategy report of July 2005 to third-country communications

The recent Wallstrom report outlined a new strategy for Intra-EU communications. Much of the report could usefully be applied to third-country communications including: the evolution of a unified presentation of a single face of the Commission, making Commission staff more aware of the importance of communications, strategic communications planning and co-ordination, better research and feedback, better listening and targeting in target countries, increasing Commissioners’ profile, and better use of multimedia tools.

5) Increase support for public diplomacy and communications activity of EC delegations; make more financial and human resources available; increase recruitment of local, communication-aware staff; increase language training for delegations staff; ensure delegations have capacity to work closely with local government and media

The public diplomacy activity of many EC delegations is under-funded. The Commission should increase funding where possible, while ensuring that each delegation retains the capability to act locally. Local communications-aware staff facilitate engagement with local government and media. All Commission activity in third-countries should have communications resources devoted to it. Every project should have a proportional budget for public diplomacy and media outreach. Delegations should be further supported and encouraged to reach out to local civil society organisations and networks.

6) Conduct a comprehensive survey of EU Public Diplomacy and related activities; create an easily accessible database of all EU public diplomacy and external communications activity (including EuroMed and Intercultural Dialogue initiatives); include in the database contact names and details of all delegation information officers and units to facilitate networking; encourage mutual exchange of best practice between EU delegations; research and publish an ‘EU Public Diplomacy Handbook’ to be made available to EU officials

There is significant room for improved contact and networking between EU officials and institutions working on public diplomacy and third-country communications. A database and ‘EU Public Diplomacy handbook’ based on best practice around the world would aid refinement of strategy and implementation.
7) Learn from experiences of member states; recruit communications and public diplomacy experts from both public and private sectors

Among the 25 member states, the Commission has access to considerable public diplomacy expertise. The Commission should seek to take greater advantage of this expertise. More member state communications staff should be encouraged to join the Commission on secondment.

8) Improve ability to work within the 24 hour global news cycle; ensure that delegations have adequate rapid-reaction media capability

The EU institutions must ensure they can respond to media interest as required.

9) Work to encourage more high-profile visits of foreign leaders to the European Commission and other EU institutions, for example, the visit by George W. Bush in February 2005

Foreign media coverage of high-profile visits to EU institutions does much to improve the Union’s profile in third-countries. The Commission should increase such visits, as possible and appropriate, and work to ensure positive coverage of those visits in third-countries.

10) Facilitate better co-operation with, and between, European cultural relations agencies (by expanding activities of CICEB and others), and between EC delegations, member state embassies and CR agencies

Historically, co-operation between European cultural relations agencies has been limited. The Commission should continue to work to increase and improve such co-operation. Closer contact should also be encouraged between EC delegations in third-countries and local offices of European cultural relations agencies.

11) Increase research into how the EU is perceived in third countries through the use of more polling, surveying, and media monitoring

In ‘EuroBarometer’ the EU has a very valuable tool for assessing public opinion in the Union and its immediate neighbourhood. Polling and survey data is invaluable for policymakers. Efforts should be made to ensure such data is gathered regularly in all third-countries – by expanding ‘EuroBarometer’, continuing to commission appropriate academic research (as conducted by the likes of the University of Canterbury, New Zealand), and empowering delegations to conduct their own surveys on third-country perceptions of the EU.

12) Be more aggressive in promoting EU aid visibility in third-countries

As the world’s largest aid donor, the EU has much to gain from more effective projection and promotion of its activities. This should include the enforcement of visibility clauses of contracts with aid recipients.

13) Investigate means of improving EU public diplomacy with, and through, EU-resident diasporic networks

As a consequence of recent trends in migration and strong post-colonial links, European countries have access to a rich and diverse web of diasporic networks. Just as member states are beginning to explore means of leveraging these networks to aid national public diplomacy strategies, so the European Union should invest in doing the same.

14) If and when the European External Action Service and EU Foreign Ministry are created, ensure they have significant Public Diplomacy capability and focus

Despite the recent shelving of the European Union Constitution, it seems possible that at some stage in the future plans to create a refined European External Action Service will be implemented. When
such a service is created provision should be made for a specific and stated public diplomacy function.

15) Facilitate greater ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ between European parliament and third-country political and civil society groups

Contact between European parliamentarians and politicians in third-countries is a valuable conduit for public diplomacy. Such networking should be facilitated and encouraged.

16) Expand the Public Diplomacy dimension of EUROMED

In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Union has created one of the most ambitious and comprehensive public diplomacy initiatives in history. The Commission should refine the public diplomacy and communications elements of the initiative so as to ensure maximum impact on public perceptions and intercultural dialogue across the region.

17) Continue to improve commissioners’ visibility outside the EU including foreign tours and interviews to foreign newspapers

Historically, the European Commission has lacked globally recognisable figureheads. DG Communication, in partnership with DG RELEX and the EC delegations, should continue working to maximise exposure of appropriate commissioners in third-countries. Extra efforts should be made to increase contact with Brussels-based third-country media correspondents. Commissioners should consider increasing visits to priority third-countries.

18) Continue to expand EU-foreign journalist training programmes

A key communications obstacle for the European Union remains third-country media and publics’ lack of understanding of the structure of the Union itself and the role of the various institutions. Journalist training seminars are one means of remedying this misunderstanding.

19) Investigate the possibility of renewed co-operative international broadcasting initiatives between organisations like the BBC, RFI, Deutsche Welle and Radio Netherlands; investigate the possibility of supporting television channels like Arte and EuroNews in efforts to reach third-country audiences

Previous co-operative initiatives between member state public diplomacy broadcasters have foundered. Technological advances may now facilitate such initiatives.

20) Increase EU funding for third-country educational exchange schemes

Although the EU, like the member states, already runs some scholarship and exchange programmes there are strong arguments in favour of increasing them. Such programmes are an established means of conducting long-term public diplomacy with foreign publics, and facilitating two-way intercultural dialogue.
A Survey of Current EU Member State Public Diplomacy

What follows is a brief survey of the various public diplomacy activities conducted by the 25 EU member states. It is hoped that the survey – to our knowledge the first of its kind – will assist European policymakers in planning both greater co-operative public diplomacy initiatives between member state agencies, and in planning Commission public diplomacy activity. The survey was collated with the help of embassy and institutional staff from most of the EU member states. For practical reasons the survey concentrates on public diplomacy conducted by home-based organisations; it should be remembered that most member state embassies around the world run local public diplomacy projects in addition to the centrally co-ordinated activities outlined below.

At first glance, what is plain from the survey is that member states are conducting an enormous variety of public diplomacy activities – and that those activities are driven by a range of agendas and philosophies. Countries like France, Germany and the UK continue to commit significant resources to their own established public diplomacy initiatives whilst new member states like the Czech Republic and Estonia have themselves recently begun developing such initiatives. There is plainly consensus among member states that public diplomacy and communications are an important responsibility of government. At the same time, it will be clear to EU policymakers that, among the member states, they have an enormous fund of experience on which to draw as they move to further develop public diplomacy strategies of their own.

AUSTRIA

The Austrian Foreign Ministry describes Austria as ‘an international place of encounter’. Partnership and development within the EU is very important for Austria, as it fulfills, both geographically and figuratively, a central role in the facilitation of European networks. Vienna is also one of the three permanent ‘homes’ of the UN, and houses the headquarters of OSCE.

Austria does not pursue an aggressive public diplomacy agenda, preferring instead to foster European cooperation. International cultural promotion is an area on which government policy has recently focussed, and which it aims to harness in the service of the European project. There are currently 29 Austrian ‘cultural fora’, just under half of which are in EU member states. These are part of the country’s diplomatic network and as such receive direct financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2004 the Austrian Foreign Ministry's operational budget for cultural activity worldwide (including activities and programmes implemented by Embassies, Cultural Fora, Austrian Libraries and Austrian Institutes) was increased by 23 per cent, from €4.8 million to €6 million with a view to expanding, in particular, activities in south east Europe, Asia and Latin America.

The Austrian educational exchange body, OAD, is the body tasked with administering government and EU scholarship programmes. It is a not-for-profit organisation with 92 members of staff and receives financial support of over €31 million annually from the Austrian government and the European Commission. The OAD focuses largely on the administration of EU scholarship exchange programmes, and government programmes focussing on Central European and ‘Aktionen’ countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Outside the EU, bilateral education agreements favour China, Israel and Russia.

Although still operational, Radio Austria International was forced to cut half of its regular 100 staff in 2002, when direct government funding was stopped and the international broadcasting station was handed over to Austria’s state broadcaster ORF, who were no longer under law to continue the service. Radio Austria International does
still broadcast worldwide in shortwave, in English, Spanish and also German, although the primary focus would appear to be the Austrian diaspora and the European market. Austria Radio 1 claims to be Europe’s most successful cultural radio network.

**BELGIUM**

Belgium lacks a unified national cultural institute, partly from dedication to multilateralism, and partly due to the strength and autonomy of its composite federal states and linguistic communities. International education promotion in Belgium is the individual responsibility of the three federal communities who autonomously administer EU programmes and also a number of grants available through the Belgian Administration for Development Cooperation which focus predominantly on African countries. Both French and Flemish-language international media broadcasters are supported by the federal communities: RTBF is the country’s largest international broadcaster, with a budget of 250 million euros, 75 per cent of which is a grant from the French federal community. It operates a shortwave radio channel which is particularly aimed at central Africa, but also broadcasts via satellite in southern Europe. The smaller Flemish international broadcaster, RVI, has two shortwave channels: one entirely in Flemish and another carrying additional English, German and French programmes.

Belgian organisation of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development under one Ministry illustrates the country’s ‘joined-up’ approach to international affairs. One federal portal offers an introduction to the political system, culture, and Belgium in Europe; it also links to the official tourism and foreign trade sites, as well as information on studying in-country. Belgium has identified the continual development of the Union as the highest foreign policy priority for the years to come. As such the capital hosts the headquarters of a number of European think tanks, multilateral diplomacy organisations and cultural institutes. Belgium’s involvement in Central Africa (particularly the former colonies), the Balkans and the Middle East also mean these regions are high on the diplomatic agenda. Overall, commitment to multilateral diplomacy is high, and Belgium is a key player in the EU, UN and NATO, hosting NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division headquarters in Brussels.

**CYPRUS**

The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC), a semi-governmental service, broadcasts internationally in Greek, but also Turkish and English, via radio and satellite television. Targeted regions are the rest of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. CyBC also regularly contribute to EuroNews (which it helped found) and also the CNN World report. In Turkish-ruled northern Cyprus, BRT broadcasts internationally on medium and shortwave frequencies. Aside from broadcast media, the Cyprus Tourism Organisation is the largest public diplomacy organism: another semi-governmental organisation, its operation is vital to the Cypriot economy, and its eighteen offices are located primarily within the EU, but with additional representation in Russia, Israel and the USA. This distribution is almost exactly mirrored by Cyprus Trade Centres, but with an additional office in Egypt. In common with all EU member states, Cyprus has a dedicated information centre to promote mobility of European students, and the government does administer a small number of scholarships, but education opportunities are not widely promoted. The country also lacks a dedicated cultural relations agency.

**CZECH REPUBLIC**

Public diplomacy is a hot topic in the Czech Republic. A new, integrated promotion strategy for the country was approved in January 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after wide consultation with the devolved regions. The aim is to create a new marketing image by the end of 2005, which will involve an overhaul of the website, www.czech.cz, and the possible creation of a new central body focussed exclusively on country branding.

Public diplomacy organisations in the Czech Republic include the integrated tourist, trade and investment organisations and a small network of cultural institutes called Czech Centres. There are eighteen such centres worldwide, with a focus on the country’s near-
neighbours – and more recent representation in Western Europe and the USA. The largest concentration of offices remain in Germany and Russia, with whom the Republic's history is closely tied. Total staff of the Centres is 280, 156 of which are in Moscow. The Centres are financed directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and received the equivalent of €3.75 million in 2003. They are often lightly resourced and act simply as 'networking institutes'. The UK Centre aims to promote the country as both responsible (the Czech Republic is the largest humanitarian donor amongst Central European countries) and ‘young, creative and hip’, moving away from the traditional image of medieval Prague and building on the country's architectural and film-industry credentials.

Radio Prague, which celebrated its 80th anniversary in 2003, aims to strengthen the country's international standing, and broadcasts in six languages worldwide on shortwave and the internet. It currently has 50 members of staff and is financed directly by the Foreign Ministry; following a downturn in funding, in 2000 it received a total budget equivalent to €1.2 million which allowed it to start a Russian service. In the realm of education promotion, an Academic Information Centre has recently been set up to advise on international grants and scholarships. There are however only a very small number of government grants currently available beyond EU-organised and funded programmes.

**DENMARK**

According to the Danish Embassy in London, it is the official policy of the Danish government that all state institutions must include public diplomacy in their daily work. Dedicated Danish public diplomacy institutions are however relatively small-scale. Danish Cultural Institutes, operate in ten countries outside Denmark, mainly in near-neighbours but also China and Russia. Offices are generally small with under ten staff each (e.g. four in Estonia, three in Germany, four in the UK); they receive a yearly grant from the Ministry of Culture, the equivalent of €1.5 million in 2004.

Cultural relations are also to some extent the domain of the Nordic Council, which has its headquarters in Denmark and which operates initiatives such as a cultural exchange program with Western Balkans countries. The Nordic Council mission statement includes a commitment to profiling cultural achievements both within and outside the Nordic region, and it is for this reason that Danish Cultural Institutes are absent from neighbouring Nordic countries. Radio Denmark, the country's international shortwave broadcaster stopped services at the end of 2003.

International education cooperation is the task of the government funded organisation Cirius, a division of the Ministry of Education. International education has recently been high on the Danish government's agenda and Cirius now employs 61 members of staff at its base in Copenhagen. The organisation mainly administers scholarships through three EU programmes and a special Nordic cooperation agreement, but Denmark also has bilateral education agreements with 27 other countries, and special provisions for students from the USA and Canada. In 2004 an agreement was signed with Australia.

**ESTONIA**

Following independence in 1991, Estonia faced a challenge to represent itself on the international stage. In 1989, the Estonia Institute, a cultural relations agency openly modelled on the Swedish and Goethe Institutes, was founded. Established by a council of independent artistic associations, the Institute is supported by the Foreign Affairs and Culture ministries. There are now offices in Finland, Sweden, Hungary and France as well as in the capital Tallinn. Estonia does participate in EU programmes of educational exchange but does not have a specific department or organisation which operates scholarship programmes with overseas countries. It also lacks an international broadcaster, despite a prolific media profile within the country.

Enterprise Estonia was set up in 2000 to promote the competitiveness of the Estonian business environment and in 2001, the government commissioned a 'Brand Estonia' project. The project aimed to improve foreign direct investment, expand international tourism beyond Sweden and Finland and broaden export markets.
The result of this re-branding, which labelled the country as a resourceful, self-starting ‘Nordic country with a twist’, is the ‘Estonia Style’ handbook, and the branding can be seen on official tourism, government, trade and investment websites. Estonian representative Halliste says the country has ‘tried to make people understand that we are credible as a state as well as a people’. On the international arena, it is the responsibility of the Foreign Investment and Trade team to run the network of Enterprise Estonia’s offices in five key European markets, which also promote the country as a tourist destination.

FINLAND

Finland operates a network of seventeen independent cultural and academic institutes which cooperate closely with one another but adapt their mission and approach according to the local operating environment. These represent civic society rather than official cultural policy, but the main funding stream is governmental. Outside Europe, the only offices are in Damascus, New York, St Petersburg and Tokyo. Student and researcher mobility is the responsibility of a body called CIMO which operates under the Ministry of Education. In 2002 the body had 84 members of staff, administered 836 incoming scholarships and received total government funding of nearly €9 million in addition to €7.6 million from the European Union. A large part of their work is on EU programmes, but some 40 nationalities are represented in the 7,300 students currently studying for a degree in Finland.

The most striking aspect of Finnish public diplomacy is the quality and targeting of their web presence. ‘Virtual Finland’, a site operated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is particularly comprehensive, and reads like an offbeat, humorous travel guide, sometimes thinly veiling what many would term a Finnish propaganda campaign, with references to the country’s ‘most competitive economy’ and a ‘school system, possibly the best in the world.’ Sites such as these provide a strong platform for Finland to promote itself more widely on the world stage, unrestricted by small population size or a general low profile in international affairs. YLE Radio Finland is another international broadcasting tool. Modelled largely on the BBC and 99.9 per cent state-owned, the station is progressively removing short and medium wave broadcasting in favour of a fee-paying internet service. A decision was also made in 2002 to cut nearly all of its foreign language programmes, in order to focus more exclusively on the Finnish expatriate market: the station now only relays selected output from domestic channels in Finnish and Swedish.

Finland maintains strong ties with the rest of the Nordic countries and has also been instrumental within Europe in pushing for engagement with Russia and the Baltic states. Relations with Russia, Sweden, and, above all, the EU are key for Finland, and these priorities are mirrored in public diplomacy work.

FRANCE

France has an extremely extensive diplomatic network and a strong record in cultural relations and international broadcasting. In a survey by Joseph Nye in 2004, the country had the highest per capita spending in the world on international cultural relations; the 2005 Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget was €4.4 billion. In addition to a strong worldwide presence, France has been particularly instrumental within Europe in fostering international cultural exchange and cooperation.

Support for international broadcasting is a government priority. Radio France Internationale broadcasts worldwide in 20 languages, has 45 million listeners, 811 members of staff and receives over half of its budget from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2003, this grant amounted to €69.7 million. After French, Arabic programmes receive the most airtime, and are considered the most strategically important. The government also gives public funding to the international satellite channel TV5, which has now become the 3rd largest TV satellite network worldwide.

In addition to more than 650 embassies, consulates and diplomatic representations worldwide, in 2003 France also operated 166 institutes and cultural centres with 1,215 full-time members of staff overseas. The ‘Instituts Francais’ are government-funded centres of language and culture abroad. French Institutes and cultural centres
have a particularly strong presence in Africa, and are the most high-profile international cultural presence in countries such as Senegal, Madagascar, Chad and Namibia. The French government also gives financial backing to the ‘Alliances Françaises’, a network of centres also dedicated to spreading French language and culture beyond the borders of France, but whose primary function is now French language teaching. There are some 800 ‘alliances’ in over 130 countries, with the greatest concentration regionally in South America. Overall the centres reach around 400,000 people. The ‘alliances’ are independent, not-for-profit agencies who receive most of their income from course fees. The centre in Paris, one of the biggest, is 95 per cent self-funded, has an annual operating budget of around €13 million, and teaches close to 13,000 pupils, with the largest numbers originating from USA, China, Japan, Spain, Brazil, Italy, Poland and Germany. This network of cultural relations agencies has however received criticism, notably from the 2004 inspection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for being too costly and over-staffed. Recommendations were made to rationalise both the number of institutes and ‘alliances’ and, in developed countries, to rely more heavily on cooperation with other international agencies. In Germany, the number of French Institutes has been reduced since 2003 from 24 to 13. In Southern Africa, Central Asia and Central America, the network is also moving towards a more joined-up method of working, with biannual strategy meetings uniting cultural agencies, broadcasters and relevant ministry representatives.

In the area of education promotion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps provide funding for around 22,000 incoming students each year, with 80 per cent of scholarships provided through bilateral agreements with other governments. There are also two separate scholarship programmes for particularly gifted students: the Eiffel and Major programmes. The Eiffel programme aims to encourage applicants from Latin America and Asia, which are currently under-represented in the French student community. In 2005, 431 scholarships were granted, of which 133 were to Chinese and 72 to Brazilians.

GERMANY

Public diplomacy in Germany is the domain of a number of institutions often funded by, but independent of, the state. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AA) also highlights the importance of contributions from the different spheres of politics, culture, the media, and particularly business, in public diplomacy efforts. Germany’s past has however instilled a cautious approach in this arena: Dr Spiegel, former head of the AA, notes that it is but a short step from marketing to a ‘propaganda campaign’, and the ‘disastrous hijacking of German culture for political purposes.’ Also as a result of the federal ‘Länder’ system, public diplomacy in Germany emphasises the concept of a ‘two way street’, and an ‘ongoing dialogue within German society, the spectrum of opinion, including critical and definitely also self-critical voices’. The AA views Germany’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2006, as a ‘one-off opportunity for modern public diplomacy’.

German public diplomacy is very advanced, and has a number of high profile and well-funded organisations. Among the more important is the Goethe Institute, which organises cultural programmes and promotes knowledge of the German language and everyday German life, with more than 120 offices worldwide, and the Institute for Foreign Relations which tours German artists internationally and operates a specialist library on foreign cultural policy and cultural relations. There are also a wealth of bodies with an emphasis on education, student and academic exchange services: the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Alexander Von Humboldt Foundation, the Educational Exchange Service (PAD), the Central Office for Foreign Education and the German Research Foundation (DF). The government-funded DAAD, one of the world’s largest education exchange bodies, spent €35 million in 2004 on promoting German language and culture abroad, €56 million on incoming scholarships, and €37 million on educational cooperation with developing countries, in addition to operating a number of EU exchange and mobility programmes.

Alongside more traditional public diplomacy messages: that the country has a vibrant culture, is a welcoming democracy and a good place to study, Germany is explicitly keen to highlight its role as an
important European actor and enthusiastic promoter of further EU integration. The Federal Culture Foundation has so far focussed its work almost exclusively on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and just under half of Goethe Institute Centres worldwide are within the borders of the EU. But German public diplomacy is in no way restricted to the European market. Other major contributors to public diplomacy are the ‘political foundations’, affiliated to German political parties but independent from them, who promote economic, political and social development in countries such as China, and receive financial aid from the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

On a wider scale, Deutsche Welle, one of the world’s leading international broadcasters, has an audience of more than 140 million worldwide, broadcasts in 29 languages, and a website available in 30 languages. It received funding of over €287 million from federal government in 2004 and employed 1,635 members of staff. As a response to the growing need for dialogue with the Arab world, the station also launched a TV news slot in Arabic in 2005.

GREECE

Despite ubiquitous recognition of ancient ‘Greek culture’, the country has pursued relatively limited public diplomacy work in relation to its size and world standing. In the field of international cultural relations, the Hellenic Foundation for Culture (HFC), established in 1992 under the Ministry for Culture, has only seven branches outside its headquarters in Athens. This is not to say that Greece does not enjoy high recognition overseas, yet this is largely the legacy of the ancient civilisation, and, within Europe, as an attractive holiday destination. Greek public diplomacy efforts have traditionally centred on the large expatriate community in Europe and the US, for both tourism and trade. As of 2004, with the re-establishment of the Ministry for Tourism, these were both singled out as priority areas. The scope for tourism has since been widened; offices are located worldwide and markets in India, China and Turkey have received specific attention. However, in terms of foreign policy priorities, the future of Europe is key. Thirty-nine selected Greek embassies, just over half of which are within the EU, are supplemented by dedicated Press and Communication Offices, whose mission is to serve as information links between Greece and European media sources.

Within wider Greek foreign policy, maintenance of good US-Hellenic relations and peace and stability in the Balkans are also cited as priorities. The proximity of the Arab world is another factor in public diplomacy outside EU borders. Two of the HFC’s offices are in Morocco and Egypt, and of the 43 different countries eligible for Greek government scholarships, there is noticeable weighting towards the Arab-speaking world. The Voice of Greece has a broad reach, with 23 hour coverage daily, worldwide, in 12 languages.

HUNGARY

The legacy of twentieth century history has left some three million Hungarians living outside the state’s new boundaries, largely in Romania, Slovakia and Serbia, and reaching out to this large expatriate community is of great importance to the Hungarian government. Preservation of the Hungarian language among the diaspora is encouraged through grants, scholarships and a special law passed in 2002. Radio Budapest, which transmits worldwide in six languages, operates an extensive international service in Hungarian, and the dedicated ‘Office for Hungarians beyond the Borders’ also aims to make expatriate Hungarians feel connected to their motherland whilst at home in their adopted nations.

Recent accession to the EU has also been very important for the country; the EU constitutes 75 per cent of all foreign trade and Hungary’s current tourism strapline is ‘The essence of Europe.’ Within Europe, official tourism and trade agencies target, specifically, Germany (a major trading partner) and other high-income Western European countries. A statement by the Director of Hungary’s government-funded Cultural Institutes in 2004 also highlights cultural diplomacy as an important way of backing up political and economic actions in the region, and of the network of eighteen centres, over half are located in Europe. The role of the institutes has shifted in recent years from scholarship assistance, to planning centres for literary, artistic and scientific events. They receive the equivalent of €13.7 million annually in government backing and employ 68
members of full-time staff outside Hungary. Scholarship administration is now the function of a dedicated department, the Hungarian Scholarship Board (HSB), which pays for over a hundred incoming post- and undergraduate scholarships from countries worldwide and also supports international students taking courses about Hungary’s culture and civilisation.

Outside the EU, public diplomacy efforts focus largely on Japan and the US. The US is Hungary’s single most important overseas trading partner and brings in high-income tourism. New York’s Hungarian Cultural Institute opened in 2001, and the US Fulbright Commission now has an office in Hungary, to which the Hungarian Ministry of Education contributes significant funds. Similarly, Japan receives priority targeting in educational cooperation: both countries provide a number of international scholarships and the Japan Foundation now uses Budapest as its base for Central and Eastern Europe.

IRELAND

Two major factors influence Irish public diplomacy activities: the European project and the Irish expatriate community. Ireland has been actively committed to Europe since 1973 and has embraced European integration to the benefit of its thriving economy. Some 70 million people worldwide claim Irish descent, and the largest expatriate Irish communities are found in the UK and the USA, where claims for Irish ancestry run as high as 40 million people. It is largely for these reasons that Irish public diplomacy is focused heavily on the EU member states, particularly the UK and wider Western Europe, and also the USA.

Cultural relations operate largely through Ireland’s network of embassies in over 100 countries. European cultural relations are the domain of the Louvain Institute, based in Brussels, which fulfils the double role of promoting the arts and culture of Ireland in mainland Europe and EU awareness back home. Independent Irish cultural centres are also found in Paris and New Jersey. The Irish Embassy in London singles out the easy accessibility of much of Irish culture, especially to the English-speaking world, and the country’s relative poverty in Europe prior to recent decades as a reason why public diplomacy has not in the past received much government attention. In 2005 however, ‘Culture Ireland’ was created by the Ministry for Arts, Sport and Tourism to enhance grant-giving and cultural event organisation activities overseas. Culture Ireland’s predecessor, the Cultural Relations Committee, had a much lower profile and received substantially less government funding; Culture Ireland will have 414 full-time members of staff but exact funding levels have not yet been agreed.

RTE, Ireland’s public service broadcaster has no international equivalent of the BBC World Service, although a government green paper in 1995 did discuss the desirability of setting one up. Tourism is a major driver for the modern Irish economy, and over half of tourist arrivals still come from Europe, and mainly from Britain, although the US is another major market. The industry initiated a major rebranding within the last five years but its core markets remain the same. In the realm of education promotion, the sole work of the Irish Council for International Students (ICOS) last year was the management of 96 scholarships under the Development Cooperation Ireland Fellowship programme, for which ICOS was given €405,000 for grants. 90 per cent of these were awarded to students from African countries, and predominantly Ethiopia. ICOS also administers European Commission and UN programmes.

ITALY

Italy has a high-level public diplomacy programme, targeted particularly strongly within Europe, and in the USA which is a major trading partner and home to a large Italian expatriate community. In a speech in Feb 2005, the Minister for Foreign Affairs singled out promotion of the Italian language as one of the Ministry’s top priorities, and spoke of a future project to ‘relaunch…our linguistic and cultural identity’. Linguistic protection is particularly high on the agenda within Europe, as a defence against the increasing hegemony of English and French.

In addition to its network of embassies, Italy has 85 cultural institutes, also managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which promote language and culture in 60 countries, with a strong
presence in France (6), Germany (7), and the United States (5). The country also has a cultural network called the Dante Alighieri Society. Founded in Rome in 1889, the society promotes Italian language and culture throughout the world through autonomous centres with their own structure and programmes. There are seven in Europe, eight in the Americas, one in Australia and one in Hong Kong. Italian tourist offices are found in eleven European countries and seven outside the EU: in Russia, North and South America, Australia, China, Japan, India and Korea. These countries account for 85 per cent of foreign tourism.

Italy was one of the first countries involved in setting up a European Area of Higher Education. In 1984 the Education Ministry set up CIMEA, an information centre to promote EU academic mobility; they have also recently created a ‘Study in Italy’ portal. The Rui foundation, originally an association of Italian academic institutions, also awards grants and scholarships and receives some funding from the state. Government scholarships are administered abroad through the embassies and cultural institutes, and in Italy directly by the Education Ministry.

International broadcasting was established in Italy in the 1930s. RAI started a service in English and Italian to North America, then enlarged its scope to South America with Portuguese and Spanish services. Expansion in the 1970’s led to the current worldwide service, with news programmes in 25 languages and a number of intercontinental TV channels.

LATVIA

Latvia recognises that it is in need of repositioning and rebranding. A poll in 2003 found many people in Western Europe and America are unaware of the country or view it unfavourably as poor, corrupt, or just irrelevant. Latvia achieved independence from Russia in 1991 and has since joined both the EU and NATO, but many Latvians themselves are still ambivalent about the country’s identity. Ties with Russia are strong: almost one fifth of Latvia’s citizens are Russian, and 95 per cent of nationals speak the language fluently. More recently the EU is expected to be the main spur to Latvian development and also the largest economic benefactor for decades to come. Latvia would like to re-position itself as European, but recognises that its links with Russia are the key to lots of western interest in the small state. Latvia has a strong national culture of folklore and song and often draws parallels with itself and Ireland, with which it shares a similar geographical size and economic growth phenomenon.

As a country which has recently undergone vast internal change, public diplomacy has until now been low on the national agenda. This is however changing. The Latvian Institute is a small, government-funded organisation of 12 full-time staff founded in Riga in 1998. The current president of Latvia was one of its original champions, and in December 2004 it became a state agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yearly funding since 1998 has been the equivalent of €130,000; this was increased in 2005 to €173,000. In June 2003 it commissioned a report on branding Latvia, and as a result of this the government has recently set up a ‘Council of Latvian branding’. The idea is to use Latvia’s existing diplomatic missions to broaden awareness of the country, particularly concentrating on Europe (and specifically countries such as Sweden, Germany, Finland, UK, Denmark) and also Russia, those countries which are potentially major tourist and trade partners. In education promotion, the Ministry of Education offers up to 40 scholarships based on bilateral and trilateral government agreements. In Europe, agreements exist with Spain, Italy, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. Outside the EU, agreements exist with Mongolia, Belarus and China. Government scholarships are not a major initiative: only three people at the Ministry of Education work on scholarship administration in addition to their other duties. EU programmes are administered separately by three independent agencies.

Diplomacy both traditional and public is still very much in its infancy in Latvia. In late 2004 the government announced its intention to broaden the network of diplomatic missions in the Middle East and Latin America, but other than embassies in South Africa and Morocco, Latvia has no diplomatic representation in Africa at all.
Radio Latvia, which used to broadcast internationally also made its last transmission on shortwave in August 1999.

**LITHUANIA**

Lithuania has made initial steps in public diplomacy, largely with EU support on Commission-led schemes such as Europass to encourage student and teacher mobility, and Culture 2000. Trade promotion offices are centred on neighbouring EU member states, particularly Germany. Radio Vilnius, which broadcasts worldwide on shortwave in Lithuanian and English, also has its studio in Germany. It is funded by the state budget. Tourism has also focused on neighbouring states: in 2004 new tourist centres were opened in Warsaw and Helsinki, as well as New York. In the field of cultural relations, the ‘Lithuania Institute’ was founded in 2001 and is run by a small core staff from Vilnius. It receives approximately one third of the €87,000 government budget for the promotion of Lithuanian culture and national achievements abroad, the rest being distributed through Lithuania’s network of 94 foreign diplomatic missions. Much of the Institute’s work is targeted within the EU: in 2005 its most high-level programmes were in the UK and Luxembourg (to coincide with EU Council presidencies), and Cork (as the European Capital of Culture) as well as photographic exhibitions in Brussels and participation at an international book fair in Sweden. Education promotion is the responsibility of the ‘International Division’ of the Ministry of Science and Education. Here too the emphasis is on Europe, where government scholarships to study in Lithuania are awarded to citizens of ten European countries, and also to Belarus, Russia, China, Japan and Mexico.

Lithuania, the largest of the Baltic states, achieved independence from the former Soviet Union in 1990. It attained membership of the WTO in 2001, and membership of the EU and NATO in 2004. Lithuania has enthusiastically embraced the European project: it ratified the constitution in late 2004 and is aiming to switch to the Euro in 2006. Within the EU, relations with the former occupying state Poland are strong. Sweden has also been an important partner: it was the first country to open an embassy in the country and has since helped financially with setting up a Lithuanian Institute.

**LUXEMBOURG**

Luxembourg’s public diplomacy activities outside the auspices of EU institutions primarily involve its close European neighbours: except for an office in New York, its only international tourist offices are in Belgium, Germany, France, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. Despite its small size, however, media broadcasting enjoys a high profile. ‘Radio Luxembourg’ was a major European station for over 50 years, and only stopped broadcasting in 1992. Although no official international broadcasting service now exists, the government has designated an area of the country as a ‘media port’, with special tax incentives intended to turn the country into a European centre for media development.

Luxembourg is a small country of under 500,000 inhabitants. Its geographical position between Europe’s founder members, France and Germany; its multilingualism; and its role in creating one of the EU’s predecessor’s, Benelux, have marked a distinctive ‘European’ path for it. Luxembourg now hosts a seat of the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and Secretariat of Parliament. Moreover, being a small country, of which almost one third of the inhabitants are foreigners, means Luxembourg is doubly interested in international diplomacy, and it became an enthusiastic advocate of international cooperation following occupation in the Second World War. Considering its size, the country’s network of embassies and consuls is extensive, and bilateral cultural agreements exist with 15 countries, mostly European partners and also China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for all international cultural relations, educational exchange and scholarship awards to incoming students from these countries; particularly strong links exist with France, Germany and Belgium.

**MALTA**

With a population of under 400,000, Maltese public diplomacy activities are understandably small-scale. Tourism is the country’s main source of income, and triples the island’s population in summer. The Malta Tourist Authority, which is sponsored by the government, targets primarily its core customers from the UK, Germany, France and Italy, and is currently working on rebranding the country to
achieve a better share of the market. Malta only gained a National Arts Council in 2002, and an official comprehensive cultural policy report in 2001, and there is as yet no independent body to promote international cultural exchange. Responsibility for culture and the arts currently resides under the Ministry of Tourism.

Malta participates in EU programmes in the field of international education exchange, and the biggest group of students from outside the EU come from China and Bulgaria. The government itself has no dedicated educational mobility body or scholarship schemes, largely because the island only boasts one higher education institute.

Malta has always held a key strategic position from a European perspective, and EU membership in 2004 has harnessed the country to the European cause. Foreign policy relations with Africa, and particularly Libya, also remain strong.

NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands international education body describes the country as ‘an emporium – a centre of trade not just in goods, but more significantly, in ideas’. The country is one of the world’s most densely populated nations and one of the top ten exporters of goods and capital. The Dutch nation is a keen exponent of international cooperation, and, notwithstanding the recent referendum, particularly the European project. This is due in part perhaps to its geographical location and the large proportion of international trade which makes up over half of its GDP.

Two-thirds of Dutch exports go to just five countries, including Germany, France, Belgium, and the UK, and a quarter of its tourists come from Germany. Public diplomacy is targeted accordingly. In the coming year, the Netherlands Tourist Board will focus specifically on attracting one million additional guests from Holland’s neighbouring countries. International cooperation in research and development is also being encouraged by the government’s Innovation Partnerships Grant Programme, launched in 2004 to encourage businesses and public-sector knowledge institutes to establish international partnerships. Furthermore, a special organization, the Taalunie, or Dutch Language Union, works to promote the Dutch language, particularly within the EU, and receives funding from both the Dutch and Flemish governments. Last year, approximately nine million euros were spent on projects which included support for Dutch-teaching university faculties and summer courses in the Netherlands and Flanders.

The Netherlands is also increasingly active in public diplomacy outside the EU: in 2004 for the first time all Dutch embassies were allocated funds for public diplomacy work and encouraged to come up with ideas and proposals. Outside its network of embassies, international cultural relations are assisted by SICA, the Dutch Service Centre for International cultural activities. Based in Amsterdam with a small core staff, SICA is government-funded and acts as an international arts desk which provides Dutch and non-Dutch organisations with information about opportunities and possible partner organizations. In the field of education, Nuffic, the Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education, promotes exchange, international recognition and also development cooperation in education, an area which has expanded greatly in recent years. It administers over ten scholarship programmes (mostly government-funded) and works extensively outside the EU on educational mobility: it is the third most active European country in the Erasmus Mundus worldwide educational exchange programme and works particularly hard to encourage incoming students from developing countries: 450 scholarships were awarded between 2000 and 2003 to Indonesian candidates alone. The Dutch government also prioritises the dissemination of Dutch literature as a means to gain a higher profile on the world stage. The Foundation for the Production and Translation of Dutch literature receives annual government funds of approximately €2.3 million to translate and promote Dutch literature at international book fairs and events. Wider recognition on the international stage is also achieved through Radio Netherlands, which broadcasts worldwide in eight languages and reaches some 50 million people a week. It is a market leader in Latin America, French-speaking Africa and Indonesia. The Netherlands also boasts an international Dutch-language TV station BVN-TV, and a semi-autonomous Radio Netherlands Training Centre, which teaches courses and gives
media and communications advice to media organisations in developing countries.

POLAND
Poland has a population of 38.5 million and occupies something of a crossroads in Europe, between the established power of Germany, and with borders on three newly-acceded EU states as well as Ukraine and Belarus. Strong financial support from the European Union encourages public diplomacy efforts within Europe. Polish ties with Germany are strong; as are relations with most of its neighbours.

Polish tourist offices exist in only thirteen countries: ten wealthy European states, in addition to Japan, Russia and the USA. International broadcasting also predominantly focuses on bordering states: Radio Polonia, although not a major player on the world stage, broadcasts for eleven hours a day internationally in Polish, English, German, Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian.

International cultural promotion in Poland is reasonably advanced, but again focuses mainly on neighbouring countries, as well as Russia and the USA. ‘Polish Years’ have so far been organised in Spain, Austria, Sweden, Ukraine and Germany, as well as festivals in Russia, France and Lithuania. Polish Cultural Institutes are located predominantly in the main European capitals, as well as in Moscow and New York; they work closely with the Adam Mickiewicz Institute (AMI) which is the national government cultural institution based in Warsaw. Outside of the dozen or so dedicated Cultural Institutes, many of Poland’s 41 embassies have cultural sections.

The Polish government directly grants and administers scholarships to incoming students through the Ministry of Education’s ‘Bureau for Academic Recognition and International Exchange’. In the 2004/2005 academic year the Bureau administered 820 scholarships for full-time master and postdoctoral studies, and over 2,000 for internships and summer courses in the Polish language and culture. The main beneficiaries were Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan, with an additional 100 places reserved for candidates from countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Participation in EU exchange programmes such as Socrates and Erasmus only started in 1998.

PORTUGAL
Portugal has two main public diplomacy institutes: the Instituto Camoes, an international cultural relations agency, and RTPi, an international broadcaster. The Instituto Camoes, which works to promote language and culture abroad, has an annual budget of €15 million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and offices predominantly in the former colonies, as well as China, Japan and a handful of European countries. The Institute also delivers Portuguese government scholarships to incoming students. Four full-time members of staff delivered 80 scholarships in 2004, with a budget of €549,000. RTPi, the Portuguese international media service, targets mainly expatriate communities in Africa, South America and Europe, and the service also broadcasts UN television programmes, specifically to Africa.

The Portuguese have a large diaspora community, and, by their history of seafaring and discoveries, strong ties to former colonies. Angola, East Timor and Mozambique are high on the list of foreign policy priorities and in 1996 Portugal formed the Commonwealth of Portuguese speaking countries to safeguard the Portuguese language. European integration is a strong priority for Portugal both economically and politically, and the Foreign Minister called in 2002 for a review of traditional European diplomacy to make it ‘more economic and political, more exposed and less reserved’, also calling for renewed Portuguese ‘assertion of national identity’ in an enlarged Europe of shifting sovereignty.

SLOVAKIA
2004 saw membership for Slovakia of both the EU and NATO, landmark achievements for a relatively small and recently-formed nation. However, Slovakia still suffers from a lack of public recognition and fights for its own identity as separate from its larger neighbour the Czech Republic. Efforts have been made to rectify this
situation, predominantly focusing on the country’s economic potential, and specifically its potential within the European market. The Trade Promotion Agency, Sario, has been active in this field, and the activities of the Slovak Tourist Board have mirrored foreign investment opportunities, with branch offices in the Czech Republic, Holland, Russia, Poland, Austria and Germany, which comprise three out of its four principal foreign investors.

Commitment to public diplomacy outside the realms of existing European structures, and outside EU borders appears uncoordinated. The Slovak Academic Information Agency was set up in 1990 by the Ministry of Education to foster new opportunities in educational mobility into and from Slovakia. Its work is however primarily in European scholarships, and its main partner is Austria. There is no official agency for the promotion of Slovak culture and language abroad and Radio Slovakia International, which broadcasts in six languages, threatened in July 2005 to close down its international broadcasting division due to shortfalls in government funding.

**SLOVENIA**

As a new EU member state, and young nation (achieving independence in 1991), Slovenia’s stated foreign policy focus, in diplomacy both traditional and public, is within the Union’s borders. Public diplomacy work outside the EU, if it happens at all, is largely channelled through existing EU institutions, or multilateral organisations such as NATO and the UN.

Post-accession, one primary aim of the Slovenian government has been to increase tourism from a lowly 0.3 per cent share of the market in tourist visits within Europe. The Slovenian tourist board now has nine European offices, and only one outside the EU. In the realm of culture, Slovenia is relatively better known. At present, Slovenian cultural promotion operates through existing embassies and cultural attache, although infrastructure is poor. Slovenia has to date relied upon cooperation with, and funding from, other international cultural institutes. In 2002, ‘international cooperation’ received only 0.2 per cent of public cultural expenditure, itself only 0.85 per cent of GDP. Focus is however changing. In 2008, Slovenia will be the first newly acceded state to hold the EU presidency and the establishment of an agency for international cultural promotion to coincide with this date has been recommended. Emphasis will be on the promotion of literature, and specifically the Slovenian language through scholarships. Slovene, a language which has survived even in the absence of a Slovenian state, is described by the Ministry of culture as a ‘treasury of culture and one of the main national and state symbols’. Over seventy incoming Slovenian scholarships are currently administered annually by an organisation called Ad Futura, set up in 2001, with four full-time staff members, as a public institution to encourage educational mobility. The majority of applicants for postgraduate studies scholarships come from the former Yugoslavia; but financial support for post-doctoral and secondary school education is also offered. The number of scholarships is increasing, and from 2004, contributions from private companies were also accepted.

**SPAIN**

Spain’s international broadcasting is the responsibility of Radio Exterior, part of the public service broadcaster RTVE group. The choice of broadcasting languages would appear to favour Spanish expatriates and particularly the former colonies of North Africa, with Spanish programmes 24 hours a day and four hours of Arabic, in addition to daily French and English coverage and less regular programmes in Sephardic, Russian and Portuguese. The service is available on shortwave worldwide, and has 101 full-time employees and an annual budget of €35 million. The RTVE group also runs a pay-to-view international television satellite service, TVE International, with 15 million subscribers in Latin America.

Scholarships, university exchanges and education promotion are managed by a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2004, just over €17 million were spent on providing over 1,500 incoming scholarships through 20 distinct programmes. The highest weighting of scholarships is awarded to the Latin America and Caribbean region (39 per cent), with 14 per cent to North Africa and the Middle East. In addition to scholarships, a special university cooperation
programme links Spanish, Latin American and North African countries and is awarded €3.5 million annually. 2004 also saw the start of a new exchange programme targeting Spanish and Brazilian students.

In the realm of cultural relations, three main bodies exist. The Cervantes Institute (CI), a government-funded public institution, was created in 1991 to promote Spanish language and culture internationally. There are now 43 institutes, mainly in Europe, although due to increasing demand, new centres will open in Tokyo, Beijing and Shanghai in 2006, as well as in Brazil and the USA. The annual budget for 2004 was €60 million and the institutes employ a total of 745 full-time members of staff (500 in the centres overseas) and an additional number of part-time and locally-appointed staff. Working alongside the CI is the State Cooperation for Overseas Cultural Action, set up in 2000 primarily for the organisation of international exhibitions. It collaborates widely with other international cultural institutions and has an annual government budget of €15 million. Also created in 2000, the Fundación Carolina, focuses on educational and cultural cooperation with Latin America and other countries with historical ties to Spain and runs a number of visitor exchange and scholarship programmes on an annual grant of €18.8 million. The Spanish development agency, the AECI, also operates a number of cultural programmes.

Since the birth of Spanish democracy in the 1970s, the country has increasingly sought to renounce tendencies towards ‘isolationism’ and punch at its full weight on the international stage. Commitment to the European project was cemented in 1986 when the country joined the EU, and historical and cultural ties with former colonies in Latin America and North Africa also remain strong. Engagement with the Middle East and the Muslim world in general is a particularly important issue for Spain.

**SWEDEN**

Many aspects of Swedish public diplomacy and promotion abroad are delegated to the Swedish Institute (SI), which has 90 members of full-time staff, and receives SEK 185 million a year in government funds. As well as its base in Stockholm, the Institute also has a branch in Paris, but for the most part works closely with Swedish embassies and consulates around the world. The SI administers around 500 incoming scholarships a year – including EU programmes and special scholarship programmes for Turkey, Belarus, Ukraine, parts of Russia and targeted developing countries. Bilateral exchange programmes are also operated with Bulgaria, China, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.

Radio Sweden’s programmes are broadcast internationally in six languages, including in the languages of a number of its near neighbours: German, Russian, Estonian, and Latvian. It also relays programmes from its Immigrant Language Service which include transmissions in Assyrian, Aramaic, Kurdish and Romani. It has 46 members of staff and a yearly budget of just over €3 million. The organisation is now entirely licence-fee funded, but up until 2000 received direct financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A commitment to non-alliance means Sweden stays out of military alliances including NATO, but the country is engaged in international mediation, conflict prevention and development issues. Sweden has made a priority of European integration and enlargement, and also engagement with Russia and EU neighbouring states.

**UNITED KINGDOM**

In 2002, the British government took steps to unite the UK’s extensive but often disparate public diplomacy activities by creating the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, comprising trade, development and education ministries representatives, tourism, cultural relations bodies, and other influential figures. The Board meets quarterly and a Strategy document was developed by the government in 2003, seeking to present the country along two major lines, as both ‘principled and professional’ and ‘building dynamically on its traditions’. A number of key priority countries were identified: the major developed countries Japan, France, Germany and the USA; the major transitional countries China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa; key Islamic countries and EU accession states.
diplomacy is also currently undergoing a government review, the results of which are expected in late 2005.

The UK has traditionally been very active in public diplomacy, with a yearly spending approximate to that of the USA. The British Council, the UK’s education and cultural relations agency, enjoys a high profile abroad, reaching ten million people worldwide in 2004 and working in 110 countries to promote the English language, UK arts, education, science and good governance. It receives a yearly grant from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, equivalent to over €274 million in 2004, and raises more than double the grant from administering exams and managing external contracts. A recent document by the British Council’s in-house think tank also highlights the importance of its ‘cultural relations’ work, which seeks purely to encourage international dialogue without pursuing UK diplomatic agendas. In the domain of education, the British Council administers all government-funded and EU scholarships. Outside the EU programmes, the largest government-funded scholarship programme, Chevening, saw the arrival of 2,000 scholars from all over the world in 2004, with a 31 per cent weighting from the Asia Pacific region. In the field of tourism, 86 per cent of revenue is generated from the domestic market; internationally the USA, France and Germany are the biggest contributors. In early 2005 however a high-profile ‘Britain Welcomes China’ tourism campaign was launched, following the signing of a memorandum of understanding relating to tourist visits between the Chinese and UK governments. The UK’s Culture Minister wants China to be among the top 20 tourist markets by 2020.

In international broadcasting, the BBC World Service is arguably the world’s best known and most listened to international radio broadcaster. Worldwide listener figures are in the region of 150 million, of which half are in Africa and the Middle East. BBC World Service broadcasts in 43 languages in shortwave, over the internet, and in FM in more than 129 capital cities. With over 2,200 staff in 2004, the World Service is primarily funded by a Grant-in-Aid from the Foreign Office, to which it is accountable.

Also available from the Foreign Policy Centre:

AN AFRICAN AL-JAZEERA?: MASS MEDIA AND THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE
Philip Fiske de Gouveia
May 2005
£4.95

A new momentum is building behind development efforts in Africa. The work of the UK Commission for Africa, for example, appears to be symptomatic of a renewed global interest in the world’s poorest continent. But while debate continues about how best to assist progress in Africa, one potential factor in the ‘African renaissance’ receives less attention than most: the media. Historically, the media has played a fundamental role in democratisation and economic growth across the world, yet its significance is routinely downplayed by development strategists. Taking his lead from the success of trans-national media like Al-Jazeera, the author examines how the media might contribute to much needed change across the African continent. What role could the media play as part of political and economic advances in Africa? Can and should Africa shrug off its perceived information dependence on the West? Should the creation of an indigenous pan-African broadcaster be a development priority?

EUROPE IN A GLOBAL AGE
Rt Hon Douglas Alexander MP
October 2005
£4.95

Europe is coming of age. The European Union has focussed its energies inwards for the past fifty years – developing the Common Market and harmonising laws and practices across the continent. Now, however, it faces new challenges: a global market that is ever more crowded; competition ever more intense and innovative; pressures on society ever more divisive; and new forms of threats and dangers which are no longer contained largely within our border. To survive and prosper in the twenty-first century, Europe must now address its own problems from this global perspective.
This pamphlet is a contribution to the debate on the future direction of Europe. It sets out why the traditional case for Europe is failing to convince. It explains why pro-Europeans in Britain need not just to rehearse the EU’s past achievements, but must also confidently and clearly explain the relevance of the EU to the challenges of the future, and in particular to the dramatic changes in the external political and economic environment provoked by globalisation. And it describes how the European Union can secure its objectives of peace, prosperity, and democracy and become a vehicle for economic progress and social justice for all the citizens of Europe – but only if it embraces rather than avoids change.

A NEW DEAL FOR SOCIAL EUROPE
David Clark, Neil Kinnock, Michael Leahy, Ken Livingstone, John Monks and Stephen Twigg
September 2005
£4.95

We are at a decisive moment in the development of both the European Union and the democratic left. European politics must not be allowed to become a competitive struggle between different national approaches. This pamphlet argues that a social model of the future must reflect a synthesis of what is best in each whilst still facilitating advances which accord with national preferences and conditions. In this process, Britain has much to offer, but it also still has much to learn. Future policies should include a minimum standard of universal childcare set by the European Union that would boost educational performance and promote social mobility. The response to Europe’s current problems cannot be to retreat into the politics of national isolationism or to narrow our agenda to the solitary task of creating an economic market. The peoples of Europe want much more than that. They want the opportunity to thrive in the global era without compromising their prosperity, security, freedom and social standards. Our ability to meet those aspirations has always been the fundamental test of our relevance as a political movement. It is a challenge we can only now realistically face as part of a strong and politically united Europe.

TURKS IN EUROPE: WHY ARE WE AFRAID?
Stephen Twigg, Sarah Schaefer, Greg Austin and Kate Parker
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The prospect of Turkey’s entry to the European Union has triggered a remarkable outburst of fear and anxiety in some European member states. Yet it is in our collective economic, geo-political and strategic interest to bring our key ally in the Muslim world into our midst. But hope will not win over fear unless we understand what makes Europeans frightened of Turkey’s membership. We have to grasp why so many are so afraid, and the role that labour market crowding and supposedly ‘insurmountable’ cultural differences play in nurturing these anxieties. Turkish membership might encourage the emergence of a truly modern, European version of Islam: that is a form of Muslim living that also incorporates a basic set of European values, women’s equality and human rights. This in turn adds urgency to the task of European self-definition and identity. To what, exactly, are we inviting new entrants to the EU to integrate? The past fifty years of migration are a story of mixed success. In a world of hectic mobility and change, we will need to be more confident of our own values and the boundaries we set. The prospect of Turkish accession is a welcome opportunity to revisit these questions.

FOREIGN MINISTER OF EUROPE
Brian Crowe
February 2005
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The creation of an EU Foreign Minister is one of the most innovative proposals of Europe’s proposed new constitution; yet there is still very little understanding of what the position would entail and what challenges the new minister would face. In this paper, Sir Brian Crowe, former Director General for External and for Politico-Military Affairs in the EU Council of Ministers, argues that empowering a new EU Foreign Minister is crucial for putting flesh on the bones of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Fundamental changes are needed if the EU is to develop the capability for coordinated, effective, and rapid action.
HOW TO REFORM THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
By Jack Thurston
September 2002
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The Common Agricultural Policy has come to represent all the failings for which the European Union is criticised. It's bureaucratic, expensive, wasteful, undemocratic, open to fraud and stubbornly resistant to change. CAP reform holds the key to enlargement of the EU and a successful round of WTO negotiations. With radical proposals now on the agenda in Brussels, the time for reform has never been better. For years European policy circles have been debating alternative ways of supporting farming and rural areas, and a model for reform is clear. The question is how to get there. This report examines the distinctive politics of CAP reform: who wins and who loses; what are the key drives for change; why some countries are in favour and others against; where does power and influence lie. The report presents an accessible road map for reform and sets out practical steps to help reformers achieve their goals.

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