STRATEGIC CULTURE IN POST-WAR EUROPE

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 3

1 THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE .................................................. 5

1.1 DEFINITION AND VARIABLES ................................................................ 5
1.2 BIRTH ....................................................................................................... 7
1.3 FLEXIBILITY, POSSIBILITIES OF MODIFICATION, AND EFFECTS .......... 8

2 COLD WAR: THE CASE STUDIES OF BRITAIN, GERMANY AND FRANCE .. 9

2.1 BRITAIN ............................................................................................ 10
2.2 GERMANY ....................................................................................... 15
2.3 FRANCE ............................................................................................ 18


3.1 BRITAIN ............................................................................................ 22
3.2 GERMANY ....................................................................................... 25
3.3 FRANCE ............................................................................................ 27

4 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................. 28

4.1 STRATEGIC CULTURE ........................................................................ 28
4.2 THE CASE STUDIES ........................................................................... 30
INTRODUCTION

There are many factors that influence state behavior and specifically the foreign policy of a state. Various theories try to explain state behavior in the field of international relations. Power maximization is considered to be the dominant motive of state behavior, while international distribution of power a key factor. Furthermore, domestic politics either in terms of public opinion or economic-interest and lobbying groups, as well as several cognitive and ideological variables have been championed as major state behavior causes. In this paper, I focus on the concept of strategic culture, its formulation and effects, and its influence to the decision-making process and, thus, state behavior.

Among a number of scholars that have referred to strategic culture having smaller or bigger differences regarding the way they perceive it, I focus on the views of Charles A. Kupchan and Thomas Berger (section 1 of this paper). Since the two scholars lie close to each other, I seek to examine their views and combine them with mine in order to conduct an analysis of the concept.

Although it is hard to define anything that involves culture, I consider strategic culture as an amalgam of beliefs, images, and symbols carried by the people – including the decision-making elites – of a country regarding, in a broader term, the relationship between their country and the rest of the world, and, more specifically, foreign policy and national security. Strategic culture is created or modified either by the ruling elites through propaganda, or by the effects of vivid events and shocks, or both. The major feature of strategic culture is the fact that it becomes dogmatic. It encourages and enhances the tendency of people to abstain from the time- and effort-consuming procedure of searching for incoming information, analyzing and reaching rational suppositions or conclusions. It does that by offering them a “pre-cooked” and broadly acceptable position on foreign policy and security. Furthermore, the high political costs of practicing foreign policies that oppose the existing culture, or even trying to do so, put constraints on the decision makers, and prevent – otherwise reasonable - shifts in foreign policy. It is also possible that strategic culture influences directly the decision-makers affecting their objectivity.

Through three case studies (Britain, Germany, France) I track the existence of those countries’ strategic culture and the way it affected policymaking both during the cold war era (section 2), and after the end of it (section 3). The major areas of interest are those aspects of strategic culture and foreign policy related to attitudes towards Europe itself and European integration. The question of how people in those countries considered of themselves with respect to the rest of Europe or the role and interests of their country in the European framework might be answered with the help of strategic culture. Further attitudes and policies towards the United States (US) and the rest of the world, as well as the notion of empire or theoretical issues, such as
militarism, diplomacy, and alliances are also of concern since they elaborate the diversity of strategic culture across Europe.

A third section follows the policies of the three case countries during the second Iraqi war (2003). In this way, I scan the effects of the end of the Cold War on these countries’ strategic cultures and the way the latter evolved and emerged from the 90’s into the 21st century. The attitudes of the three countries towards the three variables (US, empire, and Europe) can be depicted with the help of their Iraqi war policies, and simultaneously elaborate them.

The word ‘Europe’ or ‘European’ is conventionally used in this paper to describe not the whole of the continent but Western Europe or the European Union (EU) members at any time period examined. Britain, France, and Germany were chosen as case studies, not because they represent all the rest, but because they are considerable powers in the world setting and maintain a leading role in the European framework.
1 THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

1.1 Definition and variables

A number of scholars have used the concept of strategic culture, not always with the same meaning. Jack Snyder, for example, defines strategic culture as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation or share with each other with regard to ... strategy.”¹ Ken Booth argues, “Strategic culture refers to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.”² Thomas Berger, on the other hand, gives to the same concept a different name. He defines political-military culture – a subset of the broader political culture – as the cultural beliefs and values “that influences how members of a given society view national security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations.”³ Charles Kupchan defines the concept of strategic culture as “images [and symbols] that shape how the nation as a collective entity defines its well-being and conceives of its security.”⁴

Strategic culture as a concept seems to have three distinguishable variables. The first is what the term “culture” consists of, the second is who carries that culture, and, finally, the third has to do with the fields and issues that strategic culture applies to. All scholars quoted before seem to lie close to each other with regard to the first and second variable, while their views on the third variable differ only semantically. Regarding the first, they all agree that strategic culture consists of abstract concepts like values, images, symbols, traditions, notions, attitudes, and conceptions. Berger, however, adds the beliefs, differentiating the whole concept because cognitive beliefs are considered less abstract and dogmatic, more closely related to objective reality. Regarding the second, with the only exception of Jack Snyder, who limits strategic culture only to the members of a national strategic community - in other words the decision-making elites - the rest of the authors recognize the whole of a polity, society or a nation as the carrier of that culture. Finally, there are only semantic differences on the issues that strategic culture refers to. For Snyder is generally... strategy, for Booth the threat or use of force, for Kupchan security and well being, while Berger, eventually, gives a more detailed picture mentioning national security, use of force and the military as an institution.

I stay closer to Berger and Kupchan considering, first, that strategic culture consists of beliefs as well as of more abstract concepts like images, symbols, and attitudes, and second, that it is embedded in the whole of a nation, both masses and decision-making elites. Although Kupchan agrees on the second point, he distinguishes strategic culture from elite beliefs. He argues that elite beliefs are rational and coherent, and are influenced both by the evaluation of international dynamics and formative experiences including strategic culture.\(^5\) It is true that different social groups can be more or less affected by strategic culture. Economic or power groups, for example, need to have updated and unbiased information to protect their interests, which, however, are not always similar to those of the nation or the polity that carries the strategic culture.

Strategic culture, in my point of view, consists of beliefs with regard to foreign policy and national security that have often been linked to more abstract, inflexible and dogmatic elements such as images and symbols, so that the people can accept and adopt them usually by propaganda. Once these ideas are established, people tend to forget the causal suppositions and cognitive beliefs that led to their formulation and believe in them dogmatically and for reasons of convenience. In this way, even though strategic culture is influenced by reality during its formation, it loses its touch with it after a certain point. That happens because the symbolic and abstract element of strategic culture is unable to adjust to the flowing reality and evolve with it. In order to avoid that, people would have to spend considerable time and energy seeking incoming information and new arguments in a process of constant verification or falsification of their views. Elites, on the other hand, afford to follow that process, and consequently their beliefs, which are created by causal suppositions are flexible and closer attached to flowing reality.

Kupchan argues that strategic culture constitutes the key factor that explains the self-defeating behavior of great powers. He argues that decision makers in times of rapid international change and perceived vulnerability of the state end up propagating extreme policies according to their strategic beliefs. These policies needs to be linked to symbols and images so that masses can digest those otherwise costly policies relatively easily, and then a strategic culture or at least elements of it are formulated. It is likely that later on elites’ beliefs might change again adjusting to a flowing international setting. At that point, however, elites are constrained by the same strategic culture they had just successfully propagated, and abandoning their commitments or arguing for different policies would reduce their legitimacy and credibility. Kupchan presents as proofs of his argument the case studies of France (dates to be completed), Britain, Germany, Japan, and the US.

I consider that strategic culture does not only apply to great powers that adopt self-defeating behavior, as Kupchan argues, but it can also determine

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 491-492.
the behavior of powers of all sizes and without necessarily self-defeating outcomes. The pattern described by Kupchan is definitely a possible one, but cannot be considered as a rule. Propagation of strategic culture is not monopolized by great powers. Every human society has images of what is good and evil, friendly and hostile to its interests. The concept of nation-state, with the strong ‘us and them’ attitude that creates, encourages the creation of images and notions – of the kind described before – which are more stable than estimations and conclusions that derive from processing incoming information. Furthermore, considerably few ruling regimes would not be tempted to turn their beliefs into images of popular culture and thus gain support and legitimacy for their policies and actions. Regarding the outcome, one cannot argue with certainty that it will be negative. The antimilitaristic culture of the post-war Germany, for example, does not seem to have had negative consequences. It is doubtful whether Germany would have been more powerful in terms of peace and economic prosperity, if it had chosen to deploy significant military power even only for the benefit of negotiating leverage.

1.2 Birth

Birth of a new strategic culture or major alterations of an existing one usually take place in times of rapid change of international power balance. When the change or crisis is one of medium size, the new strategic culture can be dictated by the dominant decision-making group. School textbooks, newspapers and the media in general, intellectuals and politicians are some of the main instruments of that procedure. It is rare but possible that strategic culture can be formed with minimal or even none initiation by elites. Shocking and vivid events such as wars or economic and political crises can change the self-image of a nation. National security and its notions change accordingly covering mass attitudes, intellectual values and bureaucratic policies. In those cases, it is also very probable that the new culture is product of negotiations between the various political actors and groups (see the case of Germany, chapter 2.b). The agreed-upon compromises can be institutionalized. As Berger cynically observes, “what may have been an ad hoc response to historical necessities at one time becomes hallowed social truth in another.”6

Concerning the causes of strategic culture’s birth, Kupchan and Berger propose two correlated but different explanations. Kupchan argues that perceptions of high vulnerability, in terms of strategic deficiency, make decision-makers follow extreme policies.7 Those policies need to be propagated, likely using abstract images and symbols, in order to gain the necessary legitimacy and public support. In other words, Kupchan believes that emergence of a new strategic culture or modifications of the existing one derive from a conscious and rational attempt of the elites to respond to a

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7 Strategic deficiency is defined by Kupchan as the instance, when “decision makers calculate that their own resources, even in combination with the resources of their allies, are insufficient to cope with threat to their homeland.” See Charles A. Kupchan, “The Vulnerability of Empire,” p. 14.
rapidly changing and extraordinary environment by adopting extreme policies. Berger, on the other hand, considers a new strategic culture as a natural consequence of the reexamination of a nation’s previous beliefs and values. When the existing culture, for example, fails to satisfy basic security needs of a nation or holds responsibility for severe national defeat, humiliation or losses, the society discredits and reexamines the core values and beliefs of that culture. Seeking for new explanations and solutions, the polity creates its new strategic culture.

There are two basic differences between Kupchan and Berger concerning the process. Kupchan underlines that, first, elites adopt extremist policies and, second, they impose those policies to the rest of the society, while Berger speaks about negotiated realities, thus not extremist, products of final consensus among the major political actors. In my view, new strategic cultures are often based on extremist policies, but one cannot construct a rule out of that. Concerning the number of political actors and groups that participate in the formulation of the new culture, both cases are equally probable.

1.3 Flexibility, possibilities of modification, and effects

Strategic culture is very hard to change due to both its own nature and the convenience of people and elites. For it consists of abstract images and symbols and not of causal suppositions. Concrete notions of power and interests can often evolve to abstract symbols. The power derived, for example, from the British Empire evolved to an abstract symbol of power reflected in the Commonwealth. Strategic culture’s dogmatic nature makes it stable but also incapable of changing and adjusting. While elites have access to incoming information, masses do not have such privileges and cannot have a clear and well-informed picture of the flowing international setting at any time. Strategic culture can penetrate and influence bureaucracies and institutions. It can be even institutionalized, especially in cases where the role of the military and the civilian control over it is of major concern, as the case of Germany (see chapter 2.2).

In any way, preservation of the established notion of strategic culture, in the view of opposing events and incoming information, serves the interests of both elites and masses. Political leaders, ruling coalitions, and bureaucracies maintain legitimacy and domestic support by following the established norms. Challenging established notions of national security is very likely to cause extreme political costs. The public saves precious energy, otherwise spent on being informed, evaluating and analyzing incoming information, and finally reaching assumptions based on logic and causal inference. Failures and surprises that could lead to reevaluation and modification of the culture can

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8 Those extreme policies can be either risky (in cases of rising powers, e.g. Germany before WWI) or conservative (in cases of declining powers, e.g. Britain in the 30’s). See Charles A. Kupchan, “The Vulnerability of Empire,” p. 17.
be reinterpreted so that they do not contradict existing values and norms, as in the case of Britain and American suggestions for participation in European integration (see chapter 2.1) Furthermore, strategic culture functions like religion in the minds of people. It offers clear pictures of what is right and wrong, and it doesn’t have to be proved and reexamined. For most people that struggle in everyday life, stability and simplicity are more convenient than constant change and complexity.

Certain variables can differentiate the capability of a polity to modify its strategic culture. First, leaders can traditionally be less or more reluctant to engage in strategic culture modifying ventures. Traditional politics and political philosophy of a given country can influence this variable. The British case is a typical example of conservatism since it tends to avoid risky initiatives unless public support is secured (chapter 2.1). Second, the relation between governing elites and their public varies in terms of the quality and quantity of information flowing from the former to the latter. Elites find it more convenient to manipulate the public, controlling the information flow (e.g. secret diplomacy), than educate it offering all available information. Finally, the overall tendency of a given society to change can vary. A number of variables affect how much conservative or progressive a society can be. To mention just two, declining great powers are used of trying to maintain the status quo and thus become usually more conservative contrary to rising powers. The value, additionally, that a society traditionally puts on education and politics formulates a more flexible and rational electorate.

Strategic culture’s resistance to change puts severe political, institutional, and psychological constraints on the policy-making of a polity. Unless extraordinary circumstances are favorably present, policies that differ from the existing strategic culture are doomed to fail because of extreme political costs, and obstacles of bureaucratic and even institutional nature. Therefore, political leaders remove – otherwise desirable – options from their political agenda. The latter can be further constrained by the orientation of bureaucracies and institutions – as the military – towards certain national security options that follow the existing strategic culture. But even when leaders initiate or just propose policies that differ from the existing strategic culture, the public is very likely to react. Phenomena of varying intensity can occur, such as demonstrations, political confrontations and general political instability that can even cause changes or fall of the government.

2 CASE STUDIES (BRITAIN, GERMANY, FRANCE)

Through the following case studies I seek, first, to track the strategic cultures of the three countries and confirm – or falsify – the theoretical aspects presented in the second section of this paper. Second, my goal is to illustrate the divergence of the great European powers’ strategic culture during the Cold War. I cover that era because the grand strategies, as they were modified or formed right after the vivid events of WORLD WAR II and the
significant redistribution of power that it caused, have determined national strategic cultures, dominated over security policy-making, and up to a point continue to do so at the dawn of the 21st century. I also focus on aspects that influenced European integration examining how these powers viewed themselves through the prism of strategic culture in respect to the geo-strategic area that now constitutes the EU. It is also of major interest to see how these powers positioned themselves in respect to the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), since European integration has always been, in one way or another, closely linked to the American ally and the western security framework.

2.1 Britain

In order to explain and understand the British strategic culture of the Cold war with regard to Europe, one should go back at the late 40’s but not before having taken a glimpse of the British 19th and early 20th century. After World War II, Britain did not construct a new strategic culture but modified its previous one. Facing for the first time its finalized overthrow from the top of the international hierarchy, Britain chose to bind herself, first, to the US hegemony, second, to the illusion of maintaining an imperial status by leading the Commonwealth, and third, to differentiated herself from the rest of Europe. The first two choices, Atlanticism and Commonwealth, further enhanced the latter with Britain refusing to participate actively in the venture of European integration. These policies, conceived and spread by the British elites (initiated by Churchill), were partially imposed by reality, in terms of the decline of British power, while they were also influenced by the older imperial British strategic culture and were meant to influence, in their turn, the British strategic culture of the Cold War. When British participation became necessary, McMillan’s unwillingness to argue against the dominant anti-European strategic culture contributed to the fiasco of the British application being vetoed by De Gaulle.9

The major contribution of the glorious British past – during the 19th and early 20th centuries, when the sun never set in the British Empire – to the British Cold War strategic culture is, besides the notion of the empire, the attitude of maintaining the status quo and the conservatism that inevitably follows. Specifically, Britain’s main concern was to maintain the world order, where the British Empire was the major beneficiary thanks to its early industrialization and the plethora of resources available at the numerous British colonies. The continuous effort of avoiding any shift in the international balance of power for over a century can explain why the British polity has been tormented with conservatism. British political leaders, electorate, even the academia were oriented against risky policies, avoiding initiating innovative ventures, and joining only after benefits had been secured.

9 McMillan presented the case of British membership as a rather not welcoming necessity, giving De Gaulle the pretext of vetoing the British application quoting as his main reason that Britain had not yet accepted the European vocation.
Another contribution of that era was the British attitude towards European affairs. Focused on its global role, Britain used to pay attention to Europe only when the latter seemed to generate dangers for the stability of British dominance. Both the public and decision-makers considered themselves as non-part of the continent, while British leaders sought to keep a balance between the continental European powers so that none could dominate over Europe and, thus, threaten British international dominance. The sentiments of distance and differentiation between Britain and Europe, implanted in the British strategic culture, contributed to the great reluctance and difficulty of the British to embrace the venture of European integration.

During the inter-war years, the US seemed to have already overthrown Britain from the top of Western hierarchy in terms of wealth and industrial strength. Nevertheless, Britain continued to play the role of the global leader due to the isolationist policies adopted by the US, which seemed unwilling to take the lead of the international setting. That ‘patronage’ of the new hegemon played an important role on the way that British elites viewed their relation with the US as well as the British mission in the Post War era.

Concerning the years of World War II, their contribution to British attitudes was the preservation of British differentiation towards Europe. Britain was the only European power not to be invaded. That was important in terms of prestige as well as of pragmatic terms. British economy had partially survived, and national solidarity was not suffering from divisions between the right (considered as fascists) and the left (considered as communists), collaborators and resistance fighters etc. Furthermore, Britain was the only ‘European’ state to participate in the conferences that decided on the post-war settlement (e.g. The Yalta Agreement). That participation contributed to an internationally defined British sphere of influence.

British elites adopted a global perspective with regard to British post-war foreign policy. There is a debate on whether that decision was determined by an ‘illusion of grandeur’ or by rational estimations. The first argument underlines the influence of the prior strategic culture. Although no more strong enough to sustain its imperial status or imposing its will around the globe, Britain was used of having a global role during the past. George characteristically says that the perspective of British global role “represented a long-held habit of mind that proved difficult to break”. The argument of rational estimations, while presenting a sensible explanation, is really vulnerable to charges of grandeur. Specifically, it argues that the need for keeping the US committed to the leadership of the Western World and European security as the counterpart to the Soviet threat, and avoiding American isolation like the Inter-war era could be satisfied only through British mediation and supervision. That whole notion is known as ‘Atlanticism’

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and constitutes the first and most important of the three pillars of British foreign policy identified by W. Churchill right after the end of the war. Churchill accompanied by the vast majority of British elites - including the Labour Government 1945-1951 - considered that Atlanticism, the Commonwealth, and Europe should constitute the main pillars of the British foreign policy in the priority order mentioned.

The special relationship with the US (Atlanticism) aimed to ensure that America would not withdraw from the international setting and would keep leading the western group against the Soviet threat. The US was indeed the only power that could look the Soviet Union right in the eyes and guarantee that Soviet tanks would not run all over the devastated and weak Europe. The British, however, cannot explain the reason why they had to guide the US and show it how to rule the world. In other words, the British considered themselves as the ‘first lieutenant’ and advisor of the US hegemon just because they spoke the same language and because Britain was the former hegemon. In fact, the US had no reason itself not only to abandon Europe and offer its population and industrial potentials as a gift to its big Soviet rival, but also to deny the considerable contribution of a developed Europe to the Soviet containment.¹²

Nor it seemed to distinguish Britain from Europe as the intense American suggestions for British participation in the European Communities (EC) and other similar ventures like the European Defense Community indicated.¹³ Those signs not only were ignored but they were also considered as a proof of American thoughtlessness and, thus, elaborated the need for British guidance. The British missed a historic opportunity to lead Europe, allowing France to claim this role, and even dissatisfying their “special friend” in this regard.

Instead of joining the club of the European medium-size powers, Britain tried to chain herself to the American superpower. The absence of mutuality in the famous Anglo-American “special relationship” points out the British illusion. Unlike Britain, which has hardly ever challenged American choices for more than five decades now, the US has opposed British ones with two prominent examples being the Suez war (1956) and the Bosnian crisis (1992-1995).¹⁴ One could finally say that it was rather the prior ‘imperial’ strategic culture that influenced the British inclination to a special role right next to the hegemon than the medium-size power role that reality would suggest.

¹⁴ Contrary to the British, the US policy was focused more on securing the free use of the canal and not on the ownership status. The Americans, therefore, considered the option of military intervention as a “colossal” strategic mistake. US actions during the crisis humiliated Britain, but that led paradoxically to the consolidation of Atlanticism. See William I. Hitchcock, (2003), pp. 179-182.
The adoption of the Commonwealth as the second most important pillar of British foreign policy and strategic culture, although partially justifiable was not, however, that fortunate. There were political and economic reasons for that decision. Politically, the British leadership of the Commonwealth – although all nations were supposed to be equal – would give Britain a stronger voice in the international forum. Economically, a great amount of British trade was conducted within the Commonwealth. But the Commonwealth was also a very powerful image and symbol. It symbolized the glorious empire of the Victorian era and it had been propagated and exaggerated by schools and textbooks. Moreover, the British people were feeling culturally and even biologically closer to those of the Commonwealth than to the Europeans. Putting Europe before the Commonwealth would threaten the balance and cohesion of British identity and society.

By the 60’s, however had become obvious that Europe was rapidly improving and developing its economy than to European cooperation contrary to the British modest economic performance. Only then, Britain started to move closer to Europe with Prime Minister McMillan acknowledging in the House of Commons that the EEC application was a departure from the British tradition. Besides the fact that after the US and the Commonwealth there was very little space for British interest in Europe, British attitudes towards Europe had been rather distant and negative. ‘The continent [and not Britain] has been cut off’ say the British when fog over the Manch paralyzes the navigation. British popular culture had been traditionally negative towards the French, fearful and suspicious towards the Germans, and rather disdainful to the rest.

From a strategic aspect, British elites were convinced to participate in European institutions partially following American suggestions that they would serve better the joint Anglo-American interests that way. Nor were purely economic reasons that made Britain try to join a Community whose common tariffs and subsidies were challenging the British beliefs and practices of free trade and competition. The reason was related to a traditional pattern of British politics arguing that Britain would substantially engage in European affairs only when Europe threatened British interests. In 1960, British elites realized, first, that Britain could keep influencing European affairs only by participating to the ‘unfortunate’ framework of EEC, and second, that an economically prosperous EEC accompanied by political integration could many undesirable consequences for Britain. European integration could displace Britain from the position of America’s first Lieutenant, or destabilize the existing hierarchy of the West, or make the worst British nightmare come true.

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16 Up to the 70’ most of the British people when faced with the concept of the Commonwealth used to bring in mind Australia, New Zealand, and Canada due to the relatives they had there. See Stephen George (1999) p.16.
18 Ibid, p. 65.
true: a unified Europe, which according to the traditional British doctrine would be stronger than Britain. In reality, therefore, British application to the EEC in 1961 did not signal any shift from the Churchillian doctrine.

There was a shift, however, in the eyes of the public and numerous politicians, who protested that the EEC would overwhelm the Commonwealth. At this moment the McMillan government had to face the constraints of the existing strategic culture. The Prime Minister, however, made “no real attempt to convert the British public to enthusiasm for the Communities”, offering ironically, De Gaulle his main argument for vetoing the British application, which was that Britain had not accepted a European vocation.

After British membership, Europe became gradually the main trade partner, while popular culture and attitudes towards Europe started to shift especially among the younger generations. British strategic culture, however, changed only insignificantly. None post war government in Britain – most of them conservative – ever tried to propagate a more ‘Europhile’ strategic culture. On the contrary, politicians showed negative attitudes towards European integration in order to win elections or the public support of a rather Eurosceptic electorate. Only in the early 90’s when Europe had become a life experience for the youngest of the adults, elites recognized the need to adopt more pro-European rhetoric in order to avoid losing contact with the future of the electorate. Even then many Conservatives were unwilling to follow their party’s government shifting from their traditional position to a more ‘European’ one.

But still, British attitude towards European integration is reluctant. Britain likes to abstain, watch first the results of a new policy, and join if only they are successful. They have made this clear by staying out of the Schengen Treaty and the Monetary Economic Union. European federalism is not what the British would dream for their country. They seem to be very keen on maintaining their sovereignty, which is an integral part of the special position their country possesses in the world. Moreover, federalism could undermine two more British dogmas: the US hegemony and free international trade. While many consider the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the cornerstone of European integration, Britain seems to go back and forth between the two Atlantic shores. British unfaithfulness to Europe due to its special relationship with the US has often been pointed out.

**Conclusion / Remarks**

The British decision not to follow European integration from the beginning was influenced by the adoption of the other two pillars of the Post War

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21 Ibid, pp.33-35
23 Ibid.
foreign policy, the Atlanticism and the Commonwealth. Britain chose to follow the US not only because of their cultural and lingual bonds, but also due to reasons related to the British strategic culture. Two of them were the sentiment of non-belonging to Europe and the refusal of abandoning the hegemonic role, even if the latter had been limited to hegemon’s ‘first lieutenant’.

Instead, Britain could have gotten closer to the rest of the Europeans in order to accelerate European integration and reduce the gap of power that had just been created between the only actual winner of the war and new hegemon (US) and the devastated by the war and ex hegemonic imperial Europe. This latter choice would lie close to the Gaullist notion of “third forcism”. By participating, however, in the initiation and establishment of the European integration, the British would have better served their objectives. British participation could have turned Britain into the leader of Cold War Europe, ensured better control over French efforts to dominate the EC and facilitate the Franco-American differences.

2.2 Germany

Contrary to France and Britain, Germany shifted to a fundamentally new strategic culture after the end of World War II. Along with industrial strength, militarism had also been a dominant feature of Germany since 19th century.25 The Prussian army had significantly contributed to the unification of Germany, while the status of the country, as a great military power, was a major pillar of national identity.26 As a result, the German military had big influence and social prestige, and therefore militarism constituted an integral part of the German strategic culture. It was the devastating defeat at the war, the psychological burden of Nazis’ deeds, as well as an orchestrated effort of German elites and Western occupational forces that pushed towards the formation of a new German national identity and strategic culture based on antimilitarism, internationalism and an alignment with the West.

The birth of the new German strategic culture was a result of popular reexamination of the previous failed culture and a simultaneous propaganda coming from the elites. In the eyes of the people the prewar military culture was held responsible for the huge losses of the war. More than six million Germans had died, the country was occupied, economy and infrastructure were totally devastated, people were close to starvation, while the inhuman behavior of the Nazi’s had caused feelings of embarrassment and shame.

The existing, however, antimilitaristic and antinationalistic sentiment was established and even institutionalized by local political elites along with the Allied occupiers. Trials with war crime charges debunked the old military elites, while antimilitary propaganda, even through school textbooks, was

very intense. Militarism, besides the physical, had suffered a moral defeat as well. Moreover, democratic parties of the whole spectrum were unanimously committed to remove any possibility of future danger for democracy coming from the military. The institutionalization of German antimilitarism was also a demand of the international community, particularly the occupying forces. As a result, the new German constitution prohibited waging wars of aggression while in the 50's the German Bundeswehr was not allowed by law to operate outside areas of NATO jurisdiction. In the new strategic culture, the old obsession with power and the word itself was replaced by the concept of “political responsibility”. As Peter Katzenstein argues, that shift derived from German institutional sources that dictated a culture of restraint in foreign policy and “conscious avoidance of assuming a high profile or seeking a strong leadership role” in Europe or elsewhere. Germany would seek to restore its reduced sovereignty through international institutions.

German elites found themselves ironically constrained by the new strategic culture during its formation. The emergence of the Cold War and the intensified – or at least perceived as such – Soviet threat created the need of German rearmament and incorporation in the Western security framework. In the 50's, the right-center German leaders under US pressure had to face the popular antimilitary sentiment as well as the left parties, which argued for neutrality based on the pre-war strategic culture of neutrality. The right wing won that debate with the help of broad American financial help. That, however, became possible only when the new policies of rearmament and incorporation into the Western security framework were connected with the new national identity.

Specifically, German alignment with the West and participation in numerous Western organizations, such as the NATO, the EC, and the Western European Union were legitimised as antinationalistic policies based on multilateral cooperation that would consolidate German liberal democracy. Combined with some restrictions on German rearmament and the use of force, and invested with symbolic value the new pro-Western policies gained a place between the core values of the new strategic culture and were proved very hard to change. In reality, the allies used German participation in both institutions (EEC, NATO) in order to restore Germany's military and economic capabilities without, however, abolishing control over them. Ever since Germany has maintained close links with the US, which on her turn has provided the Germans a ‘free ride’ on security.

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27 Ibid, p. 331.
33 Ibid.
For Germany, the EC was a brilliant opportunity to exchange sovereignty with legitimate promotion of its interests through an international institution. In the EC framework, Germany deploy its non-military “soft power” and develop its robust economy without scaring its neighbours but helping them instead through multilateralism and devotion to institutional procedures being often quite willing to relinquish authority to European supranational institutions. Combined with the consolidation of the alignment with the West in the early 50’s, participation in the EC added to the German national identity and strategic culture a strong European dimension.

In the 60’s and the 70’s, German strategic culture grew stronger. Public opinion surveys indicated a growing pro-Western sentiment. At the same time Willy Brandt’s policy of approaching Eastern European countries (Ostpolitik), although controversial to the alignment with the West, illustrated the efficiency of non-military means in pursuing national interests. Throughout these two decades, Ostpolitik enjoyed an increasing popular support. In the late 70’s and early 80’s Ostpolitik and antimilitarism was supported by the masses even during that last escalation of the Cold War. When Chancellors Schmidt and Kohl tried to deploy a new generation of nuclear missiles, they met the same reaction as Adenauer in 1958. strong popular opposition in the form of massive demonstrations with various results, which included a change of government.

**Conclusion / Remarks**

The German strategic culture of the Cold War constitutes a sound case of the concept. A brand new strategic culture was created right after the War through an orchestrated effort coming from local elites and foreign actors. It emphasizes on antimilitarism and “soft power” utilized preferably in international fora and institutions. In the German case there was institutionalization of the new strategic culture. Antimilitarism, for example, is based on the German constitution and laws, which minimize the number of legitimate functions of a limited German army.

The tendency towards neutrality of the very first period of the Cold War shifted to an established pro-western stance some years later. This modification, however, of the strategic culture proved hard. Its aspirators – the same ones that established the initial strategic culture - spent much effort in politics and financial aid. They succeeded only after they linked the new elements with the fundamental pillars of antimilitarism and internationalism.

Since then, Germany has been very keen on European integration. European institutions gave Germany the ground, where it could serve its strategic culture by exchanging national sovereignty with international use of soft

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power. The pro-western - and pro-US - orientation has been preserved, although antimilitarism proved stronger in some circumstances, when it was threatened by some demands of the alliance (e.g. the deployment of nuclear missiles in Germany).

2.3 France

French strategic culture of the Cold War was founded right after WWII (during the Fourth Republic) and consolidated by De Gaulle's Fifth Republic. Its dominant features were the politics of empire, initially, and “grandeur”. Two more significant elements, the special relationship with Germany - in the framework of European institutions - and the challenge of American hegemony accompanied by feelings of anti-Americanism, partially derived from the first one. The first element was consistent with the pre-war strategic culture, as far as imperial attitudes were concerned, while the reconciliation with the Germans was a striking innovation. Gaullism consolidated the French strategic culture of the Cold War era and was not substantially challenged by De Gaulle's successors. French attitudes have reluctantly started to shift only by the late 1980’s and on.

The notion of empire, one of the foundations of French strategic culture, was based on the culture of the inter-war years and even before. The deterioration of the French position in the international setting during the late 19th and early 20th century made French elites turn to imperial gains. However, the French strategic culture and public opinion of that era were still influenced by the revolutionary ideals and, therefore, opposite to the notion of empire. The elites had to propagate the new imperialist ideology in order to convince the electorate, and they finally made the empire part of the French strategic culture. Kupchan notes that “peripheral empire had been sold to the French polity during the inter-war period”.38

Right after the end of WWII, the deterioration of France's international position was more obvious than ever. German occupation, combined with the totally inefficient French resistance to German troops, was humiliating for a country, which wanted to think of herself as a great world power. That status was further questioned by the French exclusion from the Yalta Conference (February 1945), where the victors of the war set the foundations of the future status quo. Furthermore, French economy and infrastructure had suffered by the war and the country’s reconstruction demanded significant time, effort, and committed resources.

Besides its permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, France was asserted as a world power only by the fact that it possessed the second largest colonial empire. Kupchan argues that the overestimation of the help and power that colonies, instead of metropolitan development, could offer to France before the war was a major cause of the French military

failure. French elites, however, chose once more the strengthening of imperialist ideology and culture as a means to re-establish their legitimacy and pursue France's recovery. The pattern that was followed was the common one, “Secondary school textbooks, newspapers, intellectuals, and politicians all spread the message of the empire”.39

The French commitment on maintaining the empire in its integrity was linked to the grandeur and prestige of France and the French national identity.40 The elites tried to excuse the poorest performance of France during the World War II, regain legitimacy, and present once more to the public an illusionary reason why they should feel proud and special for being French. It might also be true that public opinion might have reacted negatively to the abandonment of the imperial culture conceived as a further shrink of the already weakened French power.

In that very time of de-colonization, however, that strategic culture led to irrational policies. The price of French imperial ambitions was paid mostly in Indochina. In a 10 year war (1945-1954), about 70,000 soldiers (20,000 French) died fighting on behalf of France, not to mention the capital spent and the prestige lost.41 Indochina caused defeat, American intervention and, ironically enough, the loss of the great power status, which was exactly what France was trying to confirm. The Suez operation (1954) - despite the humiliation, not in military but in political terms - was largely supported by the French public. Finally, the French elites chose to conduct a colonial war in Algeria, whose brutality was ironically boosted after Indochina and Suez, and which dishonoured the French reputation.

The French persistence in Algeria lost broad public support in France only after disgraceful information was disclosed concerning mainly torturing methods used by the French side. The Forth Republic and imperial element of the French strategic culture collapsed under the vivid events of 1958, soon to be replaced by De Gaulle's Fifth Republic and the element of “grandeur”.42

The elevation to power of General De Gaulle (1958), who has been by far the most influential personality of France after World War II, boosted the French strategic culture even higher in terms of ambition. The elements of national grandeur and global role embodied in the vision of the “third forcism” became top national priorities, reaching the point of what is called “Gaullist nationalism”.43 According to his memoirs, “France cannot be France without grandeur”.44 When imperial practices could be applied, Gaullist diplomacy

43 Ibid, p. 221.
promoted the grandeur of France. To De Gaulle, France in order to preserve global peace should be independent and play the role of a “broker, arbiter, and critic of international relations” speaking “not just for herself but for Europe and for the emerging nations of the Third World”. 45

The fact that Gaullist policies, despite their obvious shortfalls and controversies, remained popular during the Fifth republic and after is closely related to the difficulty of the French public to abandon the “great world power” element of their strategic culture ignoring, nevertheless, its damaging consequences. Gaullist nationalism, in short, isolated France from her European partners, wasted valuable resources due to the military obligations of an independent strategy, and probably caused the failure of the effort for an early political European integration.46 Continued assertions of nationalism weakened the Gaullist critic against the bipolar superpower system, as well as the probability of representing the countries of the third world and unifying them into a common block.47

The other two elements of French strategic culture, the Franco-German partnership and Franco-American rivalry, are closely related to the politics of grandeur, and specifically with the vision of “third forcism”. De Gaulle’s basic goal was to create an autonomous Western European block as a third power between the blocks led by the US and the Soviet Union.48 That vision was also popular among other political groups in Europe, such as the British Labour Party, with the only difference that De Gaulle’s European third force would be clearly under French dominance.49 The special relationship with the traditional German rival through European institutions was seeking not only to prevent the reemergence of the German threat, but also to incorporate the economic power of Germany into a French-led partnership.50

The rivalry with the American ‘ally’ came also in support of the French desire for the status of an independent global power leading a Western European coalition that was not compatible with the American leading role in the post-war years. The US threatened to dominate the economy and culture, and was actively involved in European domestic politics using the leverage of financial aid.51 By exporting McCarthyism, America polarized the political scene of Europe recognizing only for those “who are with us” (friends), and the “ones against us” (enemies). De Gaulle succeeded in expressing, or even enhancing, existing feelings of growing dislike and suspicion towards the US in Europe and particularly in France. All the needed to do was to use his conservative

48 Ibid., pp. 236-247.
weight in order to consolidate anti-Americanism and incorporate it into the French strategic culture.

French anti-Americanism was fertile soil for De Gaulle’s politics of grandeur, his third forcism vision and his personal suspicion of the US. He chose foreign policy as the ground on which he challenged the US leadership criticizing, for example, America’s war on Vietnam. Extreme Gaullist policies, such as the French withdrawal from NATO’s military wing in 1966 found public support because of the close connection with the strategic culture. French defiance of US leadership was complimenting and verifying the notion of France as global power and satisfying the popular anti-Americanism.

The successors of De Gaulle moved closer to the US but still were constrained by the anti-American strategic culture, especially with respect to foreign policy. Even the center-left President Mitterrand, who can be characterized as the most pro-American of the Cold War, welcomed the deployment of the American Cruise and Pershing Missiles in Europe but not in France. Four years later in 1986, he refused to allow US aircrafts to use French airspace on their way to Libya.

**Conclusion / Remarks**

The French case is one of those cases when perseverance of the strategic culture serves both the interests of the masses and the elites without necessarily positive implications for the country’s interests. Throughout out the cold war, French foreign policy aimed at creating either a strong imperial France or an independent European French-led framework that could be included in the superpower level game.

The legitimacy of the French vision derived from its own intentions to moderate the ambitions and tactics of the two superpowers. In reality, besides the obvious political advantages that governing elites obtained from shifting the public attention from domestic issues to international politics of grandeur, most other explanations of French policies can be tracked in the strategic culture. The French self-image as a global power, the unwillingness of the French to realize that their power had declined, and a cultural superiority-based anti-Americanism can be considered as the most influential.

If the level of French ambitions had been lower, one can reasonably argue that the French economy would have been reconstructed faster and to a higher level due to additional resources that were wasted to overseas wars and high defense budget. Furthermore, European integration in its early stage could have been accelerated, if, besides Germany, France was also willing to give away part of its sovereignty.

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52 Ibid.

This third chapter seeks to identify shifts of strategic culture that were generated by a decade (90’s) of significant change in the international setting and balance of power. With the exception of Britain, Cold War strategic cultures seem to hold on quite well. They, furthermore, are capable of explaining the reactions of masses and decision-making elites towards the Second Iraqi War. This recent event was chosen because it can be considered as the most significant event in the field of international relations since the end of the Cold War. The international crisis that preceded it and the diverse reactions that emerged in the three case-countries are closely related to the concept of strategic culture.

3.1 Britain

There might not be a better example of how strategic culture puts constraints on decision-making than the British politics on Europe. Britain lost a historic opportunity to be integrated in Europe and play a leading role, when after the war it founded a strategic culture oriented towards the US and the Commonwealth. Even when British leaders (Macmillan, Heath, Major, Blair) proved in favour of approaching Europe, they faced the high political cost of opposing either the public opinion or party members and Members of the Parliament (MPs). They sometimes faced personal constraints in the form of instinctive drives towards what their strategic culture was dictating (Blair on Iraq).

In the 90’s British public attitudes kept shifting towards Europe according to a slow but steady process that had been activated after British membership. The young generations, bearing the lifelong experience of EU membership, could more easily diverge from the “anti-European” Cold War strategic culture. In this respect, John Major set as a prime goal of his premiership to put Britain in the heart of Europe. His efforts failed mainly due to opposition coming from a number of Conservative MPs that were stuck to the traditional anti-European attitudes.

Given that the Labour Party had presented a more Europhile position (e.g. The 1989 elections to the European Parliament campaign), Tony Blair’s favourite project since 1997 was to increase the influence of his country in Europe and establish it as a leading player in the region. Although he had been very successful in this aspect during the first five years, his stance on Iraq ruined most of his prior achievements.

Failure came exactly because, according to Blair, British engagement in Europe was to be combined with the preservation of the “special relationship”

establishing Britain as a bridge between Europe and Washington. In case of a large-scale crisis between the two shores of the Atlantic, Britain’s influence on both sides could bridge the gap. The case of the crisis on Iraq, however, showed that Britain neither had the necessary leverage, nor, according to many Europeans, was willing to facilitate the disagreement. As a consequence, Blair had to take sides and he chose to back the US against the will of the vast majority of the European public opinion and most of the European governments.

During the last three months before the break of the war (March 2003) Blair was considered to fully support the rhetoric of the Bush administration. He did that against the British public opinion as well as strong voices from within his party.

According to polls, a slight pro-war majority could be achieved only with UN backing, while even then more than 40% of the British would oppose the war. The big cities of the country became familiar with massive and frequent anti-war demonstrations and many Britons faulted Blair “for being too subservient to the United States”.

Opposition was also strong within the Labour party and the government. By March 19, several members of the government had resigned over Iraq including two Undersecretaries, the Foreign Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons Robin Cook, and the Secretary of International Development Clare Short. Furthermore, on March 19, Blair managed to secure a vote backing his overall policy on Iraq thanks to the votes of the Conservative, since 138 Labour MPs (about one third of all Labour MPs) voted against.

Both the persistence of Blair as well as the opposition of a big part of the British people need to be explained. For that was probably the first time that a shift of popular attitudes from the traditional British post-war strategic culture is acknowledged in such a clear manner.

The public attitude can be explained as a shift towards a pro-European orientation that gradually grew during the period of British membership of the EU. Thirty years after the British admission in 1973, a considerable portion of the British electorate has no memory of Britain being outside Europe. Pro-Europeanism could be accompanied by a decline of imperialistic attitudes. The British people proved much less willing to see British troops fighting abroad.

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55 Ibid.
59 Ms. Clare Short submitted her resignation numerous times before and during the war but she was persuaded to remain in the Cabinet. She finally resigned over Iraq on May 12th 2003.
without an immediate threat to the security of their mainland. Blair tried to convince the public about the existence of the threat, without great success.

On the other hand, it is more than hard to explain the position of Tony Blair on Iraq in pragmatic terms. According to Charles A. Kupchan, a policy that “is seriously imperilling his fortunes at home and perhaps irreparably damaging his relations with the European Union” is clearly a matter of sincere conviction of doing the right thing. The factors of politics, security, and economy cannot support Blair's conviction, since Britain found herself isolated by its European partners and the international public opinion, the lack of findings so far falsify the threat posed by Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, and furthermore all the big contracts of reconstruction in Iraq were assigned to American companies despite the ambitions of British economic circles. James P. Rubin argues that Blair was influenced by his own moralizing instincts, as he did in the case of Kosovo in 1999.

But if the Prime Minister took decisions on the abstract principle of right and wrong, then what factors determined what was right and what was wrong? Blair could not help being a carrier of the British Cold War strategic culture, which dictated the prime importance of Atlanticism and encouraged assertions of the British global role. The influence of the first factor has been more than obvious. As for the second, on March 20, Blair concluded his address to the British people with which he initiated the British military action in Iraq saying: “As so often before, on the courage and determination of British men and women serving our country, the fate of many nations rests”. There could not be a clearer link to the British imperial econology than that.

Conclusion / Remarks

Prime Minister Blair chose to fight against the sentiment of a big portion of both his electorate and the Labour Party MPs. Blair also chose to fight against his own plans of getting closer to Europe and making Britain the bridge between Europe and America. In the quest of Blair’s motives one should follow a process of elimination rejecting the cases of personal interests, deception, or big-scale miscalculation, since Blair has always been considered as an honest and competent prime minister. Although nobody can assume with certainty what is in someone else’s mind, the conclusion is that Blair probably acted according to his emotional and psychological reflexes that are closely related with him being a carrier of the traditional British strategic culture. By supporting a rather “imperialistic” unilateral intervention of the US in an geographical area that has been historically a British sphere of influence, Blair applied most of the British strategic culture. He supported the US hegemony and revived the British global role by invading a country, whose borders had been drawn on the map by British hands.

61 Ibid.
3.2 Germany

Germany reached the 90’s carrying a strategic culture of antimilitarism, dynamic participation in international institutions as the main assertion of national power, and alignment with the western security framework led by the US. The demolition of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany, even though the biggest events of post-war Germany, did not signal any major shift of the existing strategic culture. On the contrary, they came to do justice to it and, consequently, enhance it with the exception of the German commitment to the US-led security framework.

Reunification, the ultimate goal of German post-war policies, was a result of the western victory over the Soviet block during the Cold War. It fully justified Germany’s pro-western orbit set by Adenauer. The prospect of a bigger Germany in the early 90’s, however, was still scary to some who remembered with scepticism how dangerous a unified and aggressive Germany had been proved twice in the century.63

Those fears were scattered away with the help of German strategic culture. First, the strong sentiments of antimilitarism and anti-nationalism restrained the German people from demanding an appropriate global role for the new Germany. When, for example, Washington tried to drug Kohl’s Germany to the first Iraqi war, the German public reacted with white sheets hanging out of apartments’ windows and almost daily spontaneous anti-war protests.64

Furthermore, reunification was accompanied by a broader package of stronger European integration. As in the 50’s, German power was bound by international institutions (the EU and NATO). Political integration and the abolition of the Deutschemark (a strong symbol of national identity) in sake of the ‘Euro’ were welcome by the German people, whose strategic culture dictated that national power should be expressed in the context of international institutions.

Although both Chancellors Kohl and Schroeder envisaged a more robust role for the 90’s Germany in the international setting, public reaction was intense. In 1991, Kohl had to limit Germany’s contribution to only paying a big portion of the bill of the Iraqi war. Schroeder’s efforts to send troops to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan generated a deep crisis in his Social Democrat – Green party coalition government.65

Under these circumstances, it is not hard to explain why Schroeder’s campaign for the hard-won re-election in September 2002 was based on his

65 Ibid.
anti-American stance on Iraq.\textsuperscript{66} Trying to divert the negative attitude of the electorate towards him, Schroeder not only followed the public sentiment of antimilitarism but he also enhanced it by typical means of strategic culture propaganda. On the occasion of the 58th anniversary of the Allied bombing raids on Germany, a stream of TV documentaries reminded Germans of what their country had suffered from the war.\textsuperscript{67}

One month before the war about 80\% of the German people supported Schroeder’s opposition to the war on Iraq.\textsuperscript{68} Their attitude can be only partially explained by a growing anti-Americanism, which constitutes a shift from the pro-western pillar of the traditional German strategic culture. According to recent polls, more than 50\% of the Germans believe that the US is an arrogant warmongering superpower and that actually the US is the most significant danger to the world.\textsuperscript{69} Growing German anti-Americanism can be considered as a minor phenomenon, related, however, first to the growing sentiment of European identity, and second to the end of the Cold War and consequently the fact that Germany no longer needs American protection on security.

German opposition to the war, however, primarily derived from the strong antimilitaristic strategic culture of the Germans related to their identity and the image of themselves. James W. Davis argues that the generation of Joschka Fischer’s identifies itself in opposition to the tactics used by its predecessors.\textsuperscript{70} Besides the horror of the war itself, their historical memories categorically reject pre-emptive doctrines as those that led directly to the break of WWI.

\textbf{Conclusion / Remarks}

In the case of the Second Iraqi War, Chancellor Schroeder chose to cope with his people to prolong his, otherwise questionable, political future. Facing the prospect of an unlikely re-election and later on a fragile control over German politics, Schroeder had no choice but to become the spokesman of the strongest element of the German strategic culture, namely antimilitarism. However, growing sentiments of anti-Americanism, do indicate a shift from the Cold War placing Germany closer to the hard core of Europe (Franco-German axis) than the core of the Anglo-American alliance.

\textsuperscript{67} Australian Financial Review, 15 February 2003.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} John Curtice, “Victory still in the balance in the battle for hearts and minds”, (The Independent, 13 February 2003), and also “Forsa Institute - Opinion Polls”.
\textsuperscript{70} James W. Davis, “In Rejecting War, Germany Rights Its History”, (Newsday, 25 February 2003).
3.3 France

The French Cold War strategic culture has not changed throughout the 90’s. It consists of three basic elements: the politics of grandeur, according to which France should speak on behalf of others like Europe and the countries of the Third World, a special relationship with Germany, embodied in the EU framework, and feelings of anti-Americanism materialized in the form of sporadic challenge of American leadership in the western security framework.

Nothing changed significantly in the 90’s. The French broke the deal of deeper European integration and monetary union in exchange for the reunification of Germany and pushed for security and military cooperation between the EU members. On the other hand, the Balkan Wars promoted military cooperation between the NATO allies and illustrated to the French the usefulness of utilizing the sophisticated military infrastructure of the US.

The reaction, however, of the French leadership and particularly the French public opinion to the prospect of a US-led war on Iraq is comprehensible and closely related to the French strategic culture.

Throughout the period prior to the break of the war the vast majority of the French people (70-80%) opposed it, at least without UN authorization. Unlike the Germans, whose strategic culture rejects the use of military force, the French culture does not oppose it in principle. What made the French people opposing that war was their intense anti-Americanism. In addition, American unilateralism strikes a cord in France, where, as a consequence of the Gaullist politics of grandeur, people are convinced about their country still having a strong say in world affairs.

President Chirac chose to play along the public opinion of his electorate following both pragmatic interests and the French strategic culture. In pragmatic terms, a war resulting to regime change in Iraq would be costly to the French economy. France has been the biggest trade partner of Iraq in the West exporting up to $3.5 billion, while access to Iraqi oil fields would be also valuable. While some argue that France was dragged to the anti-war camp by Germany, it is understandable that Chirac choose to back up Germany in the framework of the Franco-German special relationship, especially in a crucial moment of the European integration.

In pure terms of strategic culture, Chirac’s stance is totally harmonized with the Gaullist tradition. Chirac was accused of opposing the war out of “a

71 “Public: A million different voices”, (Belfast Telegraph, 8 March 2003).
72 Gerrard Errera, “France is not posturing: We are listening to world opinion, and heeding the wisdom of Churchill”, (The Independent, 13 February 2003), and Robert Graham, “Careful language leaves Paris room to get off the fence”, (Financial Times, 7 February 2003).
Gaullist distaste of being seen to give way to US bullying” and a “tradition of challenging the US role as sole superpower”. Senior Pentagon officer Richard Perle accused France of “pursuing a strategy aimed at diminishing US influence in Europe and the world”. According to Dominic Moisi, Chirac an “inheritor of the Gaullist tradition” was expected to “appear as the courageous leader of a coalition against the new hyperpower”, while France was speaking on behalf of the vast majority of the European public opinion, and its popularity had never ranked higher in the Third world.

Chirac's policy can be considered as a smart update of the Gaullist “third forcism”. Instead of France leading a European coalition and other countries in a mission of moderating the two superpowers of the Cold War, Chirac might have just officially introduced the vision of the “second forcism”: A European coalition – preferably led by the French – integrated and strong enough to moderate the only hyperpower and ensure the integrity of international institutions, values, and principles.

**Conclusion / Remarks**

President Chirac applied his Gaullist legacy playing the role of a courageous leader that speaks the language of virtue on behalf of all Europeans as well as other less powerful peoples of the world. Chirac responded to the anti-american reflexes of the French (also part of their strategic culture) and built it up performing a new version of the Gaullist vision of France leading all the free people – in this case the vast majority of the Europeans and most of the rest of the world – against the superpowers – in this case the only hyperpower.

**4 CONCLUSIONS**

**4.1 Strategic culture**

The case studies of Britain, Germany, and France have helped confirm almost all of the major elements of the strategic culture theory. All three strategic cultures were formed after the vivid events of the World War II retaining, of course, some elements of the previous ones. They were propagated by elites and even institutionalized in the case of Germany. They stood in time throughout the Cold War and post Cold War era proving the difficulty of being modified and, even more, replaced at the absence of events of magnitude similar to World War II.

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76 “NATO tries again to heal rift as Iraq dismisses US claims as pretext for war”, (Agence France Presse, 12 February 2003)
77 Dominique Moisi, “France pays a price; Burned bridges”, (The International Herald Tribune, 18 April 2003).
The Second Iraqi War, on the other hand showed that sometimes shifts in the strategic culture can emerge as a bottom-up phenomenon, without initiation by the elites. A solid example is that although none post war British government was engaged in a pro-European propaganda, the British public has been turning slowly but steadily its eyes towards Europe.

A two-way effect between strategic culture and policy-making was illustrated. At the presence of the right momentum policy-makers can initiate a new strategic culture (i.e. right after World War II), which on its turn will influence the future policy-making. An older strategic culture can also influence the policy-making procedure that initiates a new culture. In specific, policy-makers are potential carriers of the older strategic culture, or at least some elements of it, and furthermore, the new strategic culture maintains some of the elements of the previous one, public support is more probable.

It was easy for the British decision-makers, for example, to place the Commonwealth higher than Europe in the eyes of the British people. Besides other reasons of economic nature that strengthened that policy, the British were already accustomed to consider themselves as a global imperial power, and the Commonwealth, as a successor of the empire, constituted a strong image of the imperial status. The French, similarly, supported the futile imperialistic policies of the Fourth and Fifth Republic ignoring their harmful consequences, influenced partially by the elements of empire and grandeur, which were present at both prior and new strategic culture.

Strategic culture often put constraints on the policy-making of the elites, when the latter tried to followed policies that contradicted the existing strategic culture. When British policy-makers, for example, realized that British participation in the European institutions might be beneficial for the British objectives, they had to face both an anti-European electorate and their own partisans. German Chancellors met hard resistance from their people when they tried to deploy nuclear missiles [in Germany] or to establish a new global role for the unified Germany.

Sometimes, even the unwillingness of the decision-makers to abandon policies which, no matter how much negative consequences they had, were however consistent to the existing culture, can also be considered as a constraining effect of strategic culture. The persistence of France in pursuing imperial policies can be partially explained by the inconvenience that public disappointment would cause to the French elites. The case study of the Second Iraqi War, in particular, confirmed the capability of the strategic culture to influence the decision-making process of a state by psychological and, even, cognitive constraints that can pose to decision-makers. Tony Blair chose a policy – probably out of conviction – that was opposite to the public sentiment of a significant part of his electorate, his party members and MPs, the vast majority of Europe and his own political goals but followed the basic pillar of the British strategic culture. In the time of crisis, Blair acted...
according to his intellectual reflexes and reflexes are dictated by strategic culture.

The Second Iraqi War, finally, illustrated how strategic culture can influence policy-making directly through public pressure. The public of Germany and France, for example, although for different reasons (the former due to its anti-militaristic culture, and the latter due to its anti-American reflexes), “imposed” their anti-war sentiments on their leaders.

4.2 The case studies

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the case studies is the differentiation and sometimes contradiction of the strategic cultures of the three countries (Britain, Germany, and France). It becomes obvious, especially if one examines their attitudes towards three elements: the Empire - in terms of militaristic, expansionistic, or nationalistic characteristics, the US - in terms of attitudes towards the US leadership of the western pole of the Cold War bipolar system, and Europe - in terms of European integration.

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As shown at the above matrix, although both Britain and France had imperial tendencies by the end of WWII, they eventually followed quite different strategic orientations. Britain turned to the US and France to Europe. They tried to use the US and Europe respectively as vehicles towards the global-power status they both badly needed to maintain against opposite post-war indications. Strategic culture theory would attribute this to the elements of prior strategic culture, which were maintained or even enhanced - in the case of France - by the new strategic culture. These elements were the pro-Americanism and anti-Europeanism of the British and the anti-Americanism of the French.

Germany, on the other hand, managed to reconcile many contradicting elements within its Cold War strategic culture. It remained steadily antimilitaristic, while a valuable NATO ally. It was considered as the engine of the EC, while always pro-American and with links to Eastern Europe.

One could argue that what substantially differentiated the German strategic culture is the absence of the imperial element, and specifically the unwillingness to reconfirm the dominant position of the German nation, at least by common means of power. Post-war nationalism is present in the French and British quest for spheres of influence, in the British attitudes of superiority and negligence towards Europe, and the French obsession with leading a coalition (not necessarily European), which could compete with the
two superpowers. Germany could not afford similar policies, since the German strategic culture was one of deliberate self-constraint especially in respect to traditional forms of power, such as military strength and alliances of imperial nature.\textsuperscript{78}

Did something change after the end of the Cold War? Its termination had two significant effects: first the unification and formal liberation of Germany, and second, the extinction of the need for American security commitment in Europe. These two changes could alter the European alchemy as shown in the matrix. Germany could potentially turn imperialistic, while pro-americanism in Britain and Germany could decline, since there is no longer vital need for American protection.

The case study of the Second Iraqi war showed that anti-militarism in Germany is still the hard core of its strategic culture and that the changes that have taken place in the international setting are not capable of altering it so far. Pro-americanism, however, looks more vulnerable. Before the break of the war only about 1/4 of the Germans hold favorable views for the US.\textsuperscript{79} In Britain, Blair was accused as being “too subservient to the US” while the resigned secretary Robin Cook stated that Britain’s place is with Europe.

The attitudes of the three countries at the “Europe” column are of crucial importance for the future identity of the EU. If all three are positive then European integration might come closer. For many, though, European identity and consequently a potential “European strategic culture” is linked to the US and the kind of relationship that integrated Europe will have with its patron. It is obvious that Europe cannot have a solidified identity if it is not able to raise its own voice, and this voice is already opposite to that of the US in a number of issues. Consequently, a strong Europe might also need to have negative attitudes under the title “US” of the matrix. By the term negative I do not mean “rival”, but able to disagree and follow independent policies.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& EMPIRE & US & EUROPE \\
\hline
BRITAIN & positive & Positive negative & Negative positive \\
\hline
GERMANY & negative & Positive negative & positive \\
\hline
FRANCE & positive & negative & positive \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{78} As alliances of imperial nature, I consider the interrelation of nations, when the strength of one is overwhelming enough to impose the dominance of that nation over the rest.